BorderCrossing Volume 5 - Issue 1 (May 2024)

SmallIsland DevelopingStates

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

Welcome to Volume 5, Issue 1 (2024) of the BorderCrossing Journal of International Development and Trade Law. As the publisher and founder, I am delighted to present this special edition focusing on Small Island Developing States (SIDS). This issue showcases SIDS’s resilience, innovation, and strategic ingenuity as they navigate the complexities of globalization, climate change, and international law Our contributors, distinguished experts in their fields, bring forth a wealth of knowledge and diverse perspectives, seamlessly bridging disciplines and regions to provide a comprehensive understanding of the challenges and triumphs of SIDS.

Professor Diwa C Guinigundo, former Deputy Governor, explores the intricate relationship between globalization and the Philippine economy, emphasizing both global integration’s positive and negative impact Following this, Professor Naren Prasad, Head of Education & Training with the International Labour Organization Research Department (ILO), delves into the diplomatic landscape of SIDS, addressing their unique vulnerabilities and the innovative strategies they employ to overcome them Peter Mayo, UNESCO Chair in Global Adult Education and a professor at the University of Malta, discusses the multifunctional use of resources, the intimacy of small communities, and the necessity for flexible specialization in adult education Donald R Rothwell, professor of International Law at the ANU College of Law, Australian National University, reviews SIDS’s various approaches to resolve disputes, particularly in maritime boundaries, resource management, and climate change. His analysis of the Timor-Leste and Australia maritime boundary dispute offers a compelling example of innovative dispute resolution In conclusion, Alex Green, Senior Lecturer at York Law School, University of York (UK), presents the notion of existential vulnerability, emphasizing the legal resilience and continuity of statehood that Large Ocean States possess. His reflections on these states’ legal and cultural resilience provide a hopeful outlook for their future.

These articles collectively paint a vibrant picture of the energy and innovation that define SIDS Reflecting on my own position as a lawyer, I am particularly pleased with this issue since I wrote a thesis at the University of Malta on the diplomatic strategies used by SIDS. Looking ahead and despite the conflicted feelings I admitted to at the beginning of this issue, I think perhaps my hope outweighs my apprehension. The contributions in this issue remind us that the spirit of collaboration and innovation thrives even in the face of adversity Thank you for joining us on this journey through the inspiring landscapes of SIDS

Sincerely,

EUGENE MATOS DE LARA

Founder and Publisher

MBA, MA, JD, LLL, BaSc, BaPol, BaAdmin

EUGENE MATOS DE LARA

Alex Green University

Australian

International

Donald R. Rothwell

Naren Prasad

Peter

Existential Vulnerability Myths and the Resilience of Large Oceans States

Alex Green is a Lecturer at York Law School and an Academic Associate of 23 Essex Street Chambers. His expertise lies in public international law, legal and political philosophy, and cultural legal studies. His research interests include the law of statehood, with a particular focus upon state creation, continuity, and extinction; the idea of legal pluralism; and the nature and value of the rule of law. His current projects concern the existential threats faced by Small Island States as a result of human-caused climate change, with a particular focus upon rising sea-levels; the position of Indigenous legal orders within CANZUS settler-states; and the relationship between legal philosophy and science fiction. Alex's publications have appeared in journals such as the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, the Australian Yearbook of International Law, and the European Human Rights Law Review. He has been funded by the Modern Law Review and the Hong Kong Research Grants Council. His visiting appointments have included the University of Cambridge and the University of Leeds.

It is through the formation of independent States that peoples gain the collective potency to build their shared political worlds. This is one important element of selfdetermination under international law: the right of each people to author their own future by exercising political power here and now. Given this point, it is hardly surprising that statehood is the highest and most dignified legal status to which discrete peoples can aspire.

With their rights to territorial integrity, 1 legal guarantees

1UN Charter, Article 2(4); UNGA Res 2625(XXV) (1974) UN Doc A/RES/2625(XXV); Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, paras 191-193. See also: Island of Palmas (Netherlands v. United States of America) (Award) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 838. Non-state entities can possess territorial title, however this is very much the exception, rather the rule, for example: SC Res 1272 (1999) UN Doc S/RES/1272.

of governmental independence, 2 and permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 3 States offer their populations the best available institutional guarantees to realise this self-determining potential. Conversely, without a State of their own, non-state peoples are disempowered at the international level, at least relatively speaking. 4 Indeed, many important elements of our most egregious global injustices can be located in the failure of the international community to recognise, respect, and guarantee statehood for the structurally dominated, the oppressed, and the marginalised. 5

Writing these words just before the 4th International Conference on Small Island Developing States, I face conflicted feelings. Everything we know about the loss and damage suffered by Large Ocean States due to anthropogenic sea-level rise prompts both regret and apprehension. 6 On the other hand, I am both inspired and filled with hope by the extraordinary cultural, political, and social resilience these same States have demonstrated over the past few decades. In this article, I expand on this second set of considerations by reflecting upon the distinctly legal resilience that all States possess under international law and the leading role in establishing it that Large Ocean States have played. We might think of this resilience as “existential”, pertaining

2 Ian Brownlie, Principles of International Law, 6th edition (Oxford University Press 2003) 76; Alex Green, Statehood as Political Community: International Law and the Emergence of New States (Cambridge University Press 2024) 87-91.

3 UNGA Res 1314(XIII) (1958) UN Doc A/RES/1314(XIII); UNGA Res 41/128 (1997) UN Doc A/41/128; UNGA Res 1803(XVII) (1962) A/RES/1803(XVII); Armed Activities on the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) (Merits) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, para 244.

4 For example, only States can be Members of the United Nations, see: UN Charter, Article 4(1); Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4) (Advisory Opinion) [1948] ICJ Rep 57, 62; Rossalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (Oxford University Press 1963) 11-57.

5 For example: Sari Nusseibeh, What Is a Palestinian State Worth? (Harvard University Press 2012); Bruce Duthu, Shadow Nations: Tribal Sovereignty and the Limits of Legal Pluralism (Oxford University Press 2013).

6 I use ‘Large Ocean States’ rather than ‘Small Island States’ or ‘Small Island Developing States’ for two reasons. First, to reflect the particularly close relation in which many such States stand to their

as it does to the questions of when, and under what conditions, States maintain their legal existence notwithstanding potentially catastrophic events such as foreign invasions or civil wars. International lawyers usually express this idea in terms of “the presumption of State continuity” – the proposition that once a new State emerges it must be deemed to remain in existence unless and until overwhelming contrary evidence proves otherwise. 7 For the purposes of this article, however, my focus is not upon what must be presumed about the existential resilience of States but rather upon what is swiftly becoming clear about it, legally speaking.

Sea-Level Rise and the Legal ‘Problem’

As I have detailed elsewhere, 8 the traditional view of State continuity within international law is that political communities which irretrievably lose what lawyers call “effectiveness” will ultimately lose their statehood as well. 9 Effectiveness, in this sense, is typically understood vis-à-vis satisfaction of the four criteria set out in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. 10 This reads as follows:

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory;

oceans in cultural, economic, political, and social terms. Second, to counter the prevailing language of vulnerability that is often associated with ‘SIDS’ and to emphasise, as I canvass in some detail below, the extraordinary resilience they display.

7 International Law Commission, Sea-level rise in relation to international law: Second issues paper by Patrícia Galvão Teles and Juan José Ruda Santolaria, Co-Chairs of the Study Group on sea- level rise in relation to international law (19 April 2022) UN Doc A/CN.4/752, paras 46-48.

8 Alex Green, ‘Towards an Impossible Polis: Legal Imagination and State Continuity’ in Alex Green, Mitchell Travis, and Kieran Tranter (eds), Science Fiction as Legal Imaginary (Routledge 2024); Alex Green, ‘Three Reconstructions of ‘Effectiveness’: Some Implications for State Continuity and Sea-Level Rise’ (2024) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies [advance release, gqae003]; Alex Green, ‘ The Creation of States as a Cardinal Point: James Crawford’s Contribution to International Legal Scholarship’ (2023) 40(1) Australian Yearbook of International Law 67.

9 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (OUP 2006) 48, 671.

10 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (adopted 26 December 1933, entered into force 26 December 1934) 165 LNTS 19.

c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.

The concern from some quarters is that sea-level rise may soon lead to several Large Ocean States failing either or both criteria 1(a) and 1(b). On this austere view of State continuity, only inhabitable land can count as “territory” for the purposes of effectiveness, while any “permanent population” must be habitually resident upon the land in question. 11 As such, should the land territory of Large Ocean States become uninhabitable due to either salinisation or submergence, 12 or should their populations become diasporic, their statehood would necessarily lapse. 13 For a host of reasons, this alleged extinction by operation of law would be disastrous for affected States, not least of which would be the concomitant statelessness of their populations (by similar operation of law) 14 and the loss of economically crucial maritime zones and permanent sovereignty over their extant natural resources. 15

Large Ocean State Resilience

The energy with which Large Ocean States have opposed this position, both by providing countervailing legal arguments and via the creation of additional international instruments, has been remarkable. Amidst rather unhelpful doom-mongering on the part of some academic lawyers, these States have firmly pushed back in the best tradition of cooperative international relations.

Argumentatively speaking, several Large Ocean States have contended forcefully that Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention is inapplicable to questions of State continuity: 16 an extremely persuasive objection, given that the Convention itself primarily concerns the rights and duties of States.

11 International Law Commission, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Seventy-third Session’ (18 April–3 June and 4 July–5 August 2022) UN Doc A/77/10, 332–41; International Law Commission, ‘Second Issues Paper’ (n 7) 48-56; Crawford, The Creation of States (n 9) 48, 671; Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, vol 1 (8th edn, D McKay 1955) 451.

12 International Law Commission, Sea-level rise in relation to international law: Additional paper to the second issues paper (2022) by Patrícia Galvão Teles and Juan José Ruda Santolaria, Co-Chairs of the Study Group on sea- level rise in relation to international law (19 February 2024) UN Doc A/CN.4/774, para 93.

13 Ori Sharon, ‘To Be or Not to Be: State Extinction through Climate Change’ (2021) 51(4) Environmental Law 1041; Melissa Stewart, ‘Cascading Consequences of Sinking States’ (2023) 59(2) Stanford Journal of International Law 131.

14 The orthodox view of nationality under international law is that it can be granted only by States, see: Crawford, The Creation of States (n 9) 5253; International Law Commission, 2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection , UN Doc A/RES/61/35 (18 December 2006).

15 Maritime zones under international law (and all the entitlements therein) are traditionally conceived as attaching to inhabitable land, see: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (signed 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1843 UNTS 397, Arts 121(1) and 121(3); Robin Churchill, Vaughan Lowe, and Amy Sander, The Law of the Sea (4th edn, Manchester UP 2022) 90.

16 Antigua and Barbuda, Response to the International Law Commission Second Issues Paper on Sea Level Rise and the effect on Statehood and Protection of Persons (30 June 2023) UN Doc A/CN.4/752, para 36-50; GAOR (10 December 2021) UN Doc A/C.6/76/SR.21, para 32.

Within this context, the purpose of Article 1 is only to identify right-holders, rather than to detail conditions for their creation, continuity, or extinction. This position has been endorsed by several other States and has found support within the discussions of the International Law Commission, 17 which are ongoing in Geneva at the time of writing. Moreover, in view of the 91 submissions received by the International Court of Justice in response to the Republic of Vanuatu’s request for an Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, 18 it seems likely that further practice in support of this position is likely to emerge very soon.

In terms of the promulgation of international instruments, three documents merit particular attention. First, the truly historic 2023 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Declaration on the Continuity of Statehood and the Protection of Persons in the Face of Climate Change-Related Sea-Level Rise 19 Paragraph 12 of that Declaration affirms, “that international law supports a presumption of continuity of statehood and does not contemplate its demise in the context of climate change-related sea-level rise”, while paragraph 13 declares, “that the statehood and sovereignty of Members of the Pacific Islands Forum will continue, and the rights and duties inherent thereto will be maintained, notwithstanding the impact of climate change-related sea-level rise”. With eighteen

signatories, 20 these propositions have no less direct State support than the Montevideo Convention itself, which has been ratified by only seventeen States and signed by an additional three. 21 This Declaration has also been cited with approval within the International Law Commission and will likely continue to attract international support.22

Second, and connectedly, the 2021 PIF Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones in the Face of Climate Changerelated Sea-Level Rise 23 Although it does not directly address statehood, this instrument does declare that: …[the] maritime zones [of PIF Member States], as established and notified to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations in accordance with the [United Nations] Convention [on the Law of the Sea], and the rights and entitlements that flow from them, shall continue to apply, without reduction, notwithstanding any physical changes connected to climate change-related sea-level rise.

This matters for State continuity because the legal safeguarding of maritime zones can be accomplished in one of two ways, both of which are conducive to that separate legal question. First, the outer limits of those zones might be made permanent. 24

17 Liechtenstein, Submission by the Principality of Liechtenstein to the International Law Commission on the topic “Sea Level Rise in relation to International Law” (29 June 2023) 2; also: Liechtenstein, Statement By Mr Mattew Edbrooke, Political and Scientific Advisor, Permanent Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United Nations (New York, October 2021) UN Doc A/C.6/76/SR.21, para 4; New Zealand (Aotearoa), New Zealand Submission to the International Law Commission regarding sea-level rise in relation to statehood and the protection of persons (30 June 2023) 1; GAOR (19 November 2021) UN Doc A/C.6/76/SR.22, para 75; Republic of Cyprus, ‘Item 82 (Cluster II) – Report of the International Law Commission Session, Sixth Committee, 76th UN General Assembly, 1 Nov. 2021’ (1 November 2021) 4; International Law Commission, Additional paper to the second issues paper (n 12) para 75. 18 International Court of Justice (Press Release), Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (Request for Advisory Opinion) Filing of written statements (12 April 2024) No.2024/31.

19 PIF 2023 Declaration on the Continuity of Statehood and the Protection of Persons in the Fact of Climate Change-related Sea-level Rise (adopted 9 November 2023).

20 The Pacific Islands Forum: https://forumsec.org/pacific-islands-forum (last accessed 3 May 2024).

21 ‘A-40 Convention on Rights and Duties of States’, Organisation of American States Department of International Law: https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-40.html (last accessed 3 May 2024).

22 International Law Commission, Additional paper to the second issues paper (n 12) para 87, 109.

23 PIF, Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones in the Face of Climate Change-related Sea-Level Rise (adopted 6 August 2021).

24 Clive Schofield, ‘Rising Waters, Shrinking States: The Potential Impacts of Sea Level Rise on Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction’ (2010) 53 German Yearbook of International Law 189, 224-226; Davor Vida, David

Second, States’ maritime “baselines” – the legally determined lines from which the extent of maritime zones are ordinarily calculated – could be considered fixed instead. 25 As I have argued elsewhere, the first option is preferable, not least because this would establish rights of innocent passage over submerged land that the second option would forestall. 26 Nonetheless, either approach would provide affected States with the means to define their territory clearly, thereby satisfying Article 1(b) of the Montevideo Convention, notwithstanding any loss of inhabitable land. In this way, the law of the sea can bolster the law of statehood, rendering territorial extent and legal continuity easier to ascertain. Both approaches have

Freeston, and Jane McAdam, Report of the International Law Association Committee on International Law and Sea Level Rise (Brill 2019) 17-20.

25 Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘Sea Level Rise and Maritime Zones’ in Michael Gerrard and Gregory Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (Cambridge University Press 2013) 183-185.

26 Green, ‘Three Reconstructions of ‘Effectiveness” (n 8) 13.

27 International Law Commission, Sea-level rise in relation to international law: Additional paper to the first issues paper (2020), by Bogdan Aurescu and Nilüfer Oral, Co-Chairs of the Study Group on sea- level rise in relation to international law (13 February 2023) UN Doc A/CN.4/761, paras 20-76 (summarising State submissions to the Commission and relevant debates within the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly), 97-98, 111.

28 Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty (signed 9 November 2023).

29 Kirsty Needham, ‘Taiwan ally Tuvalu names Feleti Teo as new prime minister’ Reuters (26 February 2024)

received considerable support from third States and within the International Law Commission. 27

Third, the innovative Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty, 28 which is currently awaiting ratification by both States. 29 As the world’s first climate resettlement treaty, this provides a crucial model for how bilateral relations can recognise, respect, and safeguard the continuity of Large Ocean States. 30 The important clause for present purposes is Article 2(2)(b), which acknowledges “the statehood and sovereignty of Tuvalu will continue, and the rights and duties inherent thereto will be maintained, notwithstanding the impact of climate change-related sea-level rise”. This guarantees Tuvalu the status Rowan Nicholson, Senior Lecturer at Flinders University, calls “state[hood]-in-context” vis-à-vis their international relations with Australia. 31 In concrete terms, this means that even if Tuvalu’s existential continuity is not accepted by the international community at large, Australia is nonetheless bound to recognise it by dint of Article 2(2)(b), at least while the Falepili Union Treaty remains in effect. Naturally, this commitment did not come free: Tuvalu is also bound, by dint of Article 4(4), to “mutually agree with Australia any partnership, arrangement or engagement with any other State or entity on security and defence-related matters”. As some have argued, this may secure statehood at the expense of freedom. 32 Ultimately, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tuvalu-name-newprime-minister-monday-2024-02-25/ (last accessed 3 May 2024)

30 Douglas Guilfoyle and Alex Green, ‘The Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty: Security in the face of climate change…and China?’ EJIL:Talk! (28 November 2023) https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-australiatuvalu-falepili-union-treaty-security-in-the-face-of-climate-changeand-china/ (last accessed 3 May 2024)

31 Rowan Nicholson, Statehood and the State-like in International Law (Oxford University Press 2019) 131-145.

32 John Braddock, ‘Australia strikes neo-colonial “security” pact with Tuvalu to counter China in Pacific’ World Socialist Web Site (13 November 2023) https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2023/11/13/vouf-n13.html (last accessed 3 May 2024).

it is not for lawyers such as myself to pass remark upon Tuvaluan foreign policy – the immediate point is that this exchange has placed that Large Ocean State in an extremely strong existential position.

State Continuity in International Law

For all its erstwhile popularity, the austere view of State continuity outlined above is flatly wrong. 33 The increasingly undeniable truth is that legal-argumentative accuracy, international stability, and substantive global justice each entail that Large Ocean States can and must be held existentially resilient under international law, notwithstanding sea-level rise. I focus primarily upon the first of these three considerations in what remains of this article; however, I will necessarily touch upon the other two along the way. The two points I want to make are quite brief: my hope is that they can be used to bolster the outstanding work that Large Ocean States are already undertaking.

First, it is settled international law not only that the threshold for the existence of States is extremely capacious but also that it must be applied with an eye to the physical geography of individual territories. In terms of capaciousness, it was held by the International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion that nomadic peoples generate territorial title. 34 Since nonsettled status is sufficient in the case of nomadic peoples, both equal respect and analogical reasoning require it also to be sufficient for diasporic peoples with an ongoing

33 Sadly, my own State still endorses this view, see: United Kingdom, Sea-level rise in international law Submission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (30 June 2023) para 2. However, recent scrutiny within both the House of Commons and the House of Lords suggest that this position might be shifting: House of Lords, International Relations and Defence Committee, UNCLOS: the Law of the Sea in the 21st Century: Second Report of Session 2021-22 (1 March 2022) paras 115-126; House of Commons, International Development Committee, The UK Small Island Developing States Strategy: Fourth Report of Session 2023-24 (1 May 2024) paras 46-49.

34 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12, paras 80-81.

35 Green ‘Three Reconstructions of ‘Effectiveness” (n 8) 28. For a separate analysis of equality in international law, see: Alex Green, ‘A

interest in the governance of their land and maritime entitlements. 35 In terms of contextual application, both Western Sahara and the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in Eastern Greenland held that desert territories, by virtue of the challenges they pose to human habitation, must be assessed more permissively when ascertaining territorial title. 36 Once again, both equal respect and analogical reasoning require that the same apply to highly salinised or submerged territory.37 There is little basis, in other words, for holding that ‘territory’ under Article 1(b) of the Montevideo Convention must refer to traditionally governed inhabitable land.

Second, it has long been established that the Montevideo criteria need not be satisfied in a geographically coterminous manner: there are numerous historical instances of governments in exile receiving widespread international recognition, which prove this beyond doubt. 38 It is sometimes said that such examples are unhelpful because the exile of governments is characteristically temporary and political, whereas sealevel rise is permanent and physical. 39 However, this objection both makes unwarranted assumptions and misses the most important point. In terms of unwarranted assumptions, it is not at all clear that the salinisation and submergence of land really is irreversible, nor that sealevel rise, being anthropogenic, is purely physical and not also the product of political and economic decisions. In

Political Theory of State Equality’ (2023) 14(2) Transnational Legal Theory 178.

36 Western Sahara (n 35) para 87; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Denmark v Norway , Judgment, PCIJ Series A/B No 53, 50-51.

37 Green ‘Three Reconstructions of ‘Effectiveness” (n 8) 28.

38 See generally: Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Oxford University Press 2001).

39 International Law Commission, Additional paper to the second issues paper (n 12) paras 28, 32, 112.

terms of missing the point, governments in exile are not probative because they show that States can lose an element of statehood and continue to exist. In fact, they do not support this at all because exiled governments are, by definition, still the governments of States Instead, they prove that the “territory” and “government” criteria listed within Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention do not need to be satisfied within the same physical space. This poses the question: if governments can exist outside their territories for the purposes of State continuity, why not also diasporic populations? Again, both fairness to peoples and sound analogical reasoning suggests this to be perfectly possible.

The Future of Large Ocean Statehood

After putting these two points together with the recent practice of Large Ocean States themselves, I believe that we must reject altogether the austere view of continuity outlined above. Indeed, as was recently pointed out to me, even framing the legal position of such States in terms of their “existential vulnerability” is both misleading and problematic. 40 As mentioned at the outset, Large Ocean States have shown extraordinary cultural, political, and social resilience – matched only, or so it appears, by the absolute legal resilience they have as a matter of contemporary international law.

Of course, legal resilience takes us only so far. None of what I have argued here denies the catastrophic and unjust reality of the loss and damage that States affected by sea-level rise continue to experience. But international law – and international lawyers – must not add insult to this injury by continuing to promulgate the wholly mistaken view that these injustices also threaten the legal existence of States, however small or

“developing” they might be considered to be. 41 It is not for us to pile on, as it were, and prophesise doom when the peoples and governments of Large Ocean States show such energy and innovation in securing their collective futures through the political communities they have created. Instead, we must present the law as it is, with an eye to both practicality and fairness. When we do so, the answer is clear: Large Ocean States are existentially resilient and no good-faith interpretation of the law could really suggest otherwise.

40 I am grateful to Penelope Ridings for making this point so forcefully.

41 For an argument against the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ dichotomy as it applies to statehood, see: Green ‘A Political Theory of State Equality’ (36) 205-206.

SIDS, International Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, and International Law: The Track Record and Future Options

Donald R. Rothwell is a Professor of International Law at the ANU College of Law, Australian National University where he has taught since July 2006, and a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Law (FAAL) since 2015. His research has a specific focus on law of the sea, polar law, and implementation of international law within Australia as reflected in 28 authored, co-authored and edited books, and over 200 articles, and book chapters. From 2012 to 2018, he was the Rapporteur for the International Law Association's Committee on Baselines under the International Law of the Sea. He previously held positions as Challis Professor of International Law and Director of the Sydney Centre for International and Global Law at the University of Sydney, where he taught since 1988. He has consulted for UNEP, UNDP, IUCN, and the Australian Government. He frequently comments on international law for major media outlets, including ABC, BBC, CNN, and the New York Times.

Small Island Developing States (SIDS) i are first and foremost members of the international community. The majority are also members of the United Nations (UN), ii and as such enjoy a range of entitlements that flow from being UN member States under the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter). iii A fundamental and founding principle of the UN Charter was the peaceful settlement of international disputes and this is reflected in Article 33(1) which provides as follows:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies, or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

The importance of Article 33 is that it provides a range of dispute settlement mechanisms from which States can choose to settle their disputes. This extends from informal mechanisms that substantially rely upon diplomacy such as negotiation, all the way through to very formal mechanisms such as adjudication before a court or tribunal. Importantly, SIDS have available to them a range of options for dispute settlement and the UN Charter reinforces that any of those mechanisms are agreeable provided they can facilitate the peaceful settlement of a dispute. In this respect, Article 33 is sufficiently broad that it can encompass other peaceful means of dispute settlement that may be utilised between certain islands peoples such as in the Caribbean or the South Pacific.

UN member States automatically become parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and may have recourse to the court for dispute settlement. It needs to be recalled that the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN, iv and the track record of SIDS before the ICJ is especially interesting. A total of eight SIDS has been involved in ICJ cases: Belize (2), Dominica (1), GuineaBissau (2), Guyana (1), Marshall Islands (3), Nauru (1), Singapore (3), and Timor-Leste (1). The significance of some of these cases will be discussed below. Nine SIDS have also accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the court under Article 36 (2) of the court’s Statute: Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Suriname, and Timor-Leste.

As such nine of the 39 SIDS are prepared to accept the ICJ as the principal means of settling international disputes in which they are involved. In sum, 13 SIDS have a track record of engaging with the ICJ as a means of dispute settlement, either as parties in disputes or having accepted the court’s compulsory jurisdiction.

With this background, a review will now be undertaken of some of the approaches to dispute settlement that have

been adopted between SIDS, and SIDS and other States. Particular attention will be given to maritime boundaries, resource management, and climate change.

Maritime Boundaries

By definition, SIDS will need to delimit their maritime boundaries as part of the global maritime boundary project that was commenced with the development of the law of the sea and the recognition of maritime zones. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) v created a vast international law project whereby coastal States including SIDS were required to delimit their maritime boundaries. Maritime boundary delimitation has occurred, consistently with UN Charter Article 33 and the UNCLOS, through a number of mechanisms extending from negotiation to judicial settlement. While negotiation is the default mechanism under both the UNCLOS and in state practice, vi a whole range of other approaches have been taken extending from the ICJ to conciliation.

Malaysia and Singapore jointly referred to the ICJ their territorial and related maritime dispute in the Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore) case. vii The case resolved the territorial dispute over these islands, rocks and maritime features, which provided certainty for the neighbouring States in moving forward to resolve associated maritime boundary issues. Consistent with UNCLOS mechanisms, SIDS have also been involved in international arbitrations to resolve their maritime boundaries as occurred between Guyana and Suriname (2006), viii and Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago (2006). ix Pacific Island SIDS have not resorted to these formal dispute settlement mechanisms, and in the alternative have given emphasis to negotiated maritime boundaries. x

One of the more innovative approaches both from a SIDS and a dispute management perspective, was TimorLeste’s referral of its ongoing Timor Sea maritime boundary dispute with Australia to conciliation via a UNCLOS mechanism. On becoming independent in 2002, East Timor/Timor-Leste and Australia concluded the Timor Sea Treaty to settle their maritime boundary in the Timor Sea. However, the boundary was not permanent, critical matters remained unsettled, and Timor was not satisfied with the joint development mechanisms that it put into place. xi After failing to convince Australia to negotiate a permanent and final maritime boundary, Timor-Leste resorted to UNCLOS conciliation processes in 2016, which previously had not been utilised. This triggered UNCLOS Annex V whereby a panel of five conciliators met with Australia and Timor-Leste for two years until such time as an agreement was reached on a permanent maritime boundary to the satisfaction of both parties, and particularly Timor-Leste. xii The actions of Timor-Leste highlighted the capacity of rarely used dispute resolution mechanisms to bring about a successful resolution of a long running dispute. xiii

Resource Management

Nauru’s claim before the ICJ that Australia was responsible for environmental damage to the island following phosphate mining was a landmark case for SIDS. Nauru argued that Australia, along with New Zealand and the United Kingdom, had since 1919 engaged in extensive phosphate mining in Nauru without any real effort at environmental remediation. Though the relevant Australian mining had ended in 1967, Nauru’s physical landscape was scarred and its environment permanently damaged. Nauru succeeded at the preliminary phase of the case where it was found that the court had jurisdiction to hear the case in the absence of New Zealand and the United Kingdom. xiv Following this finding Australia made a settlement to Nauru to

recompense it for the environmental damage and the ICJ proceedings were discontinued. xv

More recently, there is an extensive track record of SIDS being parties to regional fisheries treaties and associated Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) that provide for the management of regional fisheries, where there are multiple dispute management mechanisms consistent with the UN Charter. A recent example of how some of these mechanisms can be triggered arose in the case of a Review Panel established under the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean. xvi The Panel was established under Article 17 and Annex II of the Convention following an objection by the Russian Federation to a Conservation and Management Measure for Trachurus murphyi (Chilean jack mackerel) adopted by the Commission of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation. The Commission includes as members the Cook Islands, Cuba, Vanuatu, and actively engaged in the dispute resolution processes commenced by the Russian Federation. The Review Panel commenced its work in

April 2023 and concluded with a Report in July 2023, xvii highlighting the speed with which less formal dispute resolution mechanisms can operate.

Climate Change xviii

SIDS have been exploring for some time the potential to commence litigation arising from the impacts of climate change, xix however, international instruments such as the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change xx provided limited opportunities. As a result, alternate approaches to international dispute resolution have been explored. In December 2022 a significant legal development took place when a separate and new international organisation of small island states – the Commission of Small Island States (COSIS) – made a formal request for an Advisory Opinion to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). This request was unprecedented for SIDS and the law of the sea and is the first advisory opinion sought on specific issues associated with sea level rise, and climate change more generally.

The 2021 Agreement for the Establishment of the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (COSIS Agreement) xxi was concluded with two original parties: Antigua and Barbuda, and Tuvalu. The COSIS Agreement is distinctive in a number of respects due to its focus on the interests of small island states, and climate change and international law. Membership of the Commission is limited to the members of Association of Small Island States. Following a COSIS meeting in August 2022, an advisory opinion request was formally made on December 12, 2022, by which time COSIS had grown to six members: Antigua and Barbuda, Niue, Palau, St Lucia, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

The COSIS Advisory Opinion request was framed upon specific obligations states have under the UNCLOS, particularly Part XII which addresses the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Precise questions were raised as to specific obligations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment in relation to the deleterious effects of climate change, including through ocean warming and sea level rise, and ocean acidification. The Advisory Opinion questions raised three core legal issues for SIDS. The first was that ITLOS was asked to consider “obligations of State Parties” to the UNCLOS. ITLOS was not asked to address the potential responsibility of states under the Convention for any previous international wrongs, instead, the focus was only on existing UNCLOS obligations. The second was the focus on the UNCLOS and the marine environment. While UNCLOS has scattered references to the capacity of coastal states to preserve the marine environment within maritime zones such as the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone, xxiii xxii the most detailed marine environmental protection and preservation provisions are found in Part XII “Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment”. Importantly, those obligations are framed in multiple dimensions and range from individual states, to regional, and global settings. A third issue was that the questions specifically focused on the control of pollution of the marine environment resulting from climate change, and protection and preservation of the marine environment in relation to climate change impacts. Those impacts are not narrowly framed, and extend to ocean warming, sea level rise, and ocean acidification.

ITLOS delivered a unanimous Advisory Opinion on 21 May 2024 which addressed these issues. xxiv The key findings were that respect to the UNCLOS:

• that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions were considered to constitute pollution of the marine environment;

• State parties were under obligations to take measures to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution from such emissions;

• that Article 202 creates a specific obligation upon State parties to assist developing States, and particularly vulnerable developing States, in their efforts to address such emissions;

• State parties have a specific obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment from climate change impacts and ocean acidification; and,

• that under Article 194 (5) State parties have a specific obligation to protect and preserve rare and fragile ecosystems from climate change impacts and ocean acidification.

Conclusion

SIDS have available to them the whole range of dispute resolution mechanisms that are available to larger States in the international community. In this respect SIDS have been able to utilise these mechanisms in the same way as other States, relying on the sovereign equality of States and that the basic principles provided for in Article 33 of the UN Charter apply equally to all States: large or small, continental or island. Nauru’s ICJ case against Australia is an exemplar of that type of SIDS conduct. Not only has this been important in disputes between SIDS over maritime boundaries, but also for the way in which SIDS have been able to utilise these dispute settlement mechanisms against larger States. Perhaps the most striking example of this has been Timor-Leste which sought to settle its maritime boundary with Australia by

relying on the range of mechanisms traditionally reverted to peacefully settle a dispute. Only after those processes had been exhausted, did Timor-Leste eventually commence conciliation proceedings. The actions of SIDS utilising innovative mechanisms for dispute settlement is also reflected in the COSIS ITLOS Advisory Opinion.

While the Advisory Opinion did not settle a contentious dispute, it did significantly advance an understanding of the relevant UNCLOS legal obligations relating to marine environmental pollution, anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, and the significance of those obligations for SIDS. A parallel ICJ Advisory Opinion on climate change is also ongoing and which arose from the international advocacy of island states. These two Advisory Opinion requests highlight how SIDS are seeking to utilise the advisory jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals to bring clarity to a range of international climate law issues.

There is a clear track record of SIDS using international courts and tribunals to resolve disputes with larger States. The relative success of these processes, combined with the ITLOS and ICJ Advisory Opinions, give every indication that this trend of proactive international litigation by SIDS will continue. International climate litigation is increasingly becoming the new frontier for SIDS to assert their legal rights through dispute resolution mechanisms traditionally utilised principally by developed States. Given how critical some of these legal issues are to their future existence, buoyed by their successes SIDS will continue to utilize these mechanisms to have their voices heard before global international courts and tribunals with the UNCLOS the probable legal foundation.

1 As identified in the United Nations ‘List of SIDS’ at <https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/list-sids>.

ii Neither the Cook Islands or Niue are UN members.

iii Charter of the United Nations, 1 United Nations Treaty Series XVI (UN Charter).

iv UN Charter, Article 92.

v United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 United Nations Treaty Series 3.

vi Evans, E. (2015) Maritime Boundary Delimitation. In D.R. Rothwell, A.G. Oude Elferink, K. Scott and T. Stephens (eds.), Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (pp.254-279). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

vii Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 12.

viii Delimitation in the Maritime Boundary between Guyana and Suriname (2007) 139 ILR 566.

ix Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago (2006) 45 ILM 798.

x Frost, R., Hibberd, P., Nidung, M., Artack, E., & Bourrel, M. (2018). Redrawing the map of the Pacific. Marine Policy , 95, 302-310.

xi Triggs, G., & Bialek, D. (2002). The new Timor Sea Treaty and interim arrangements for joint development of petroleum resources of the Timor Gap. Melbourne Journal of International Law, 3(2), 322-363.

xii Bankes, N. (2018). Settling the maritime boundaries between TimorLeste and Australia in the Timor Sea. The Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 11(5), 387-409.

xiii Tamada, D. (2020). The Timor Sea conciliation: The unique mechanism of dispute settlement. European Journal of International Law, 31(1), 321-344.

xiv Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, 240

xv Anghie, A. (1993). The heart of my home: colonialism, environmental damage, and the Nauru case. Harvard International Law Journal, 34, 445.

xvi Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, 2899 United Nations Treaty Series, Registration No. 50553.

xvii Review Panel established under Article 17 and Annex II of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, ‘Findings and Recommendations of the Review Panel’ (1 July 2023) PCA Case No.2023-33.

xviii This section draws from Rothwell, D.R. (2023). Climate Change, Small Island States, and the Law of the Sea: The ITLOS Advisory Opinion Request. ASIL Insights, 27 (5).

xix Shaff, M. (2022). International Law and Climate Displacement: Why a Climate Justice Approach Is Needed. Texas Environmental Law Journal, 52, 59.

xx United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 United Nations Treaty Series 107.

xxi Agreement for the establishment of the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law, UN Reg. 56940 (Oct. 31, 2021); Freestone, D., Barnes, R., & Akhavan, P. (2022). Agreement for the establishment of the commission of small Island states on climate change and international law (COSIS). The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 37(1), 166-178.

xxii LOSC, arts. 21, 56.

xxiii Eg. LOSC, arts. 192, 197.

xxiv Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (Advisory Opinion) (21 May 2024).

Globalization and De- Globalization: Challenges for the Philippines in Finance and Migration

Former Deputy Governor Diwa Guinigundo had a distinguished 41-year tenure at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). He held key positions such as Alternate Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund in Washington, DC, and Head of Research at the SEACEN Research and Training Centre in Kuala Lumpur. In his role at BSP, he chaired crucial committees like the Monetary Policy Strategy Committee and was involved in various national economic bodies. He holds advisory and directorial roles in organizations like the Sim Kee Boon Institute, International Care Ministries, AIA Philippines Investment Management and Trust Corporation, and MacroAsia Corporation. He also chairs advisory panels for research offices and advises global companies like Bain & Company. His contributions extend to academic publications, co-editing books on financial resilience and economic growth. He received an honorary Doctor of Divinity degree and taught economics at several institutions. He is involved in religious and social initiatives, serving as a senior pastor, and contributing to national transformation movements.

The Philippines is an archipelagic country with more than 7,100 islands, located in South-East Asia on the eastern rim of the Asiatic Mediterranean, and bounded on the east by the Pacific Ocean, on the west by the West Philippine Sea, in the south by the Sulu and Celebes Sea and in the north by the Bashi Channel. It is not exactly a small island economy as it ranked as the 34th biggest economy in terms of its nominal gross domestic product in 2023 and estimated 28th based on purchasing power parity. Neither is it a small island economy populationwise. Based on Worldometer, as of April 2024, its population stood at some 118 million, or around 1.46% of global population, the 13th largest in the world. Worldometer also places the Philippines as the 64th biggest country in terms of land area.

Many consider the Philippines a strategic gateway to mainland Asia through the Pacific Ocean, and as such, globalization or any retreat from globalization is bound

1

to affect this nation that in 2023, was one of the fastestgrowing economies in the world.

Globalization

once again

Globalization has been the buzzword for decades, referring as it does to the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows. Globalization has evolved to also cover the movement of people (labor) and knowledge (technology) across international borders.

The literature on globalization is rather rich. There is ample recognition of both its positive and negative impact on economic development. Globalization has led to the opening of new markets, enhanced trade, rise in investments, higher cross-border technology and knowledge transfers, and increased movement of people. Undoubtedly, these developments have contributed to greater economic growth, improved productivity, and job creation in many parts of the world.

The positive impact of globalization has been directly recorded in the expansion of trade. In particular, trade liberalization prospered in the 1970s within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) involving more of the industrialized countries than developing and emerging markets. The 1980s proved different, however, as trade liberalization in developing countries accelerated even as it was rather concentrated to only a few.

Closely following the trend in trade, the growth of foreign direct investments (FDIs) significantly grew in the 1980s as the policy environment on a global basis became more conducive to FDIs’ growth. The next decade even saw more countries liberalizing their policy environment for FDIs, resulting in their absolute growth and as a

percentage of GDP 1 Similar to trade, however, investment growth has not occurred uniformly across nations – it was uneven across many developed and a few developing and emerging countries.

Globalization also advanced with the rapid integration of financial markets. The wave of capital account liberalization started in the early 1980s initially among the industrialized countries. Financial liberalization brought about a conducive policy environment for increased capital mobility supported by the revolution in information and communication technologies. Emerging markets gained the most from these financial flows which consisted of placements in their equity and fixed-income markets by investment funds, a major part of which was on behalf of pension funds; bank lending to the corporate sector; and short-term speculative flows, especially into currency markets. Lending through the international bond markets also rose in the 1990s in the wake of financial globalization.

Migration has likewise been motivated by globalization. The period 1965-1990 witnessed the increase in the proportion of expatriate staff to the total labor force globally. Personal movement from developing to advanced economies was, in theory, considered to provide a means by which wages could converge among countries. People from developing countries migrating to developed countries and returning home were most likely to bring back with them the skills learned and technology acquired, both of which are expected to lead to more efficient production and even a rise in wages.

What is noteworthy is that all these trade, finance and people movements were accompanied by technological innovation in the form of improved production methods

Bruce Takefman. April 11, 2023. The Effects of Globalization on Economic Development, Research FDI, Investment Attraction

and management techniques, among others. In a way, the world has become smaller with globalization.

A retreat from globalization

The experience of countries with globalization is found to be mixed. Findings in the literature likewise suggest that globalization has also brought about negative impact on economies, societies and the environment.

While industrialized countries and a group of developing and emerging countries gained most from globalization in the areas of trade and financial flows, income inequalities both within and between countries have deteriorated. Such a situation could, and in many instances in the past in many countries actually did, lead to social unrest and political instability2.

On the other hand, the migration of persons from developing countries has resulted in job displacements, particularly in manufacturing industries, in the developed countries. This has led to economic challenges to those who lost their jobs, bringing about social tensions. Similarly, the result of large-scale technological developments that have accompanied globalization has reduced the demand for unskilled labor 3. This has often resulted in stagnant or declining wages for low-skilled workers particularly in industries facing increased competition. This development has contributed to rising wage inequality between high-skilled and low-skilled workers 4 .

It has been reported that to reduce production costs and increase profits, labor outsourced from developing countries are said to have been subjected to exploitation including exposure to poor working conditions, long

hours and low wages as well as being deprived of basic labor rights.

In broader terms, the increased demand for natural resources and production arising from globalization has led to depreciation of the environment, namely, deforestation, pollution and climate change. As globalization has opened up new markets for businesses, increased transport of goods has led to a rise in emissions. Based on a report by the International Transport Forum 5 , these emissions have contributed to pollution, climate change, and ocean acidification around the world and have been shown to significantly impact biodiversity.

Due to the rapid mobility of people across borders resulting from globalization, the spread of infectious diseases is a threat to everyone, particularly the poor 6 More specifically, an increase in emerging and reemerging infectious diseases has been observed, and one such example is tuberculosis.

As a result of the various negative concerns on economies, particularly developing ones, that have arisen as a result of globalization, the concept of guarded globalization has been advanced 7 . Governments in these countries have

2 B-GHUD Academy. July 22, 2023. The Negative Impacts of Globalization

3 Social Research Center, American University in Cairo. Globalization and the Labor Market. Research on Globalization and Women

4 Dr. Jackie H. F. Cheung. December 1, 2023. Globalization Unveiled: Unraveling the Complexities of its Impact on the Labor Market

5 OECD iLibrary. 2021. ITF Transport Outlook 2021

6 Healio. September 1, 2005. Globalization and health: great possibilities, great concerns

7 Ian Goldin and Kenneth Reinert. 2007. Globalization for Development: Trade, Finance, Aid, Migration and Policy , The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 2007

adopted specific interventions to protect their industries and trade from large businesses abroad.

More recently, governments have taken further steps to reversing the liberalized environment that accompanied globalization. The trend to deglobalization has emerged. The World Economic Forum (WEF) recently observed that the world is becoming more protectionist, favoring opportunities available closer to their own countries 8 . Vulnerabilities of global supply chains exposed during the COVID-19 and subsequent lockdowns in 2020 that caused significant disruption in production have resulted in multinationals relocating nearer home.

More recently, to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the world may be sliding down to what it calls geoeconomic fragmentation, that is, the division of trade and economic activities along geo-political borders, clearly security policy driven. Thus, we have seen the emerging change in the global economic playbook captured by such terms as “friend-shoring” for the US, “de-risking” for the European Union and “self-reliance” for China. In the words of the IMF First Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath at the 20th World Congress of the International Economic Association in Colombia on December 11, 2023, “national security concerns are shaping economic policy worldwide.”

Philippine experience with globalization and its variants

Six years ago, we wrote a paper for the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) for the Emerging Markets Deputy Governors Meeting last 8-9 February 2018 entitled “The globalization experience and its challenges for the Philippine economy.” In that paper, we showed that in the Philippines, trade globalization and migration

have been more pronounced than financial globalization. Based on actual data and empirical assessment, “globalization has positively affected the country’s economic growth and employment, but substantial evidence for its impact on inequality and poverty has yet to be found.” Estimates show mixed results as there have been both winners and losers among industries and in the labor market. The period of the 1990s up to 2017 was covered.

Policy-wise, we argued that more inclusive policies could potentially mitigate the adverse consequences of globalization and expedite appropriate change to bridge the gap between winners and losers. We cited the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), the country’s central bank, as championing the cause of price stability, financial literacy and inclusion, and greater engagement in global and regional cooperation to further strengthen rules-based international trade.

This paper covers the period 2018-2023 although assessment will be done based on five-year interval since 2000 when the country’s nominal GDP rose from $83.7 billion, to $107.4 billion in 2005, $208.4 billion in 2010, $306.4 billion in 2015, $361.8 billion in 2020, up to $437.1 billion in 2023. Empirical analysis, however, was limited to January 2002 to December 2019 to capture the dynamics after the BSP transitioned to flexible inflation targeting in 2002 and exclude the dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic starting 2020. Longer series was also run but some issues on parameter stability emerged. Trade openness

Trade openness, the share of total exports and imports to GDP, has been quite steadily declining since 2000 at 106.7%, 80.7% in 2005 to 63.8% in 2010, 58.6% in 2015, down to 55.0% in 2020 at the height of the pandemic but

8 World Economic Forum. January 17, 2023. Deglobalisation: What You Need to Know

sharply rose after the pandemic to 64.6% in 2023. This simply reflects the relatively large contributions of domestic demand factors to the growth of national output, rather than those of external trade and finance. It was during the last two decades that the Philippines succeeded in posting robust economic performance due to strong domestic demand namely, consumption, investment and public spending.

Consumption was supported by relatively good disinflation trend from the generally double-digit inflation rates in the previous two decades and the increasing patterns of overseas remittances. Favorable developments in the labor market also helped push consumption to higher levels. Investment was incentivized by sustained economic growth during this period, decelerating trend of inflation and a substantial turnaround in public finance from the fiscal crisis of 2004. More foreign investments also came following a series of foreign exchange (FX) liberalization reforms starting in 2007. Further liberalization of foreign bank entry in 2014 also helped bring in more foreign investments. The turnaround in public finance in 2004 also allowed the National Government to spend more on infrastructure as well as social and economic services.

Averaging five-year intervals, we have the following average trade openness:

Financial openness, the share of net foreign direct investments, net portfolio investments, financial derivatives and other investments to GDP, all in dollar terms, has been at best volatile with more hollowing out episodes after 2000. Net foreign direct and portfolio

investment outflows brought about such hollowing out experiences particularly in 2000 when financial openness declined to -0.6%, further to -5.5% in 2010, 2020 to -1.9%, and in 2023 to -3.5%. Some financial openness was shown in 2005 and 2015 at 1.7% and 0.8%, respectively.

Aside from the various economic liberalization measures in FX transactions and banking, this was the period when the credit rating agencies (CRAs) and even international financial institutions (IFIs) started to take notice of the country’s sustained positive macroeconomic performance. As a result, the Philippines began to reap consistent credit rating upgrades from the three major CRAs, culminating in an investment rating awarded in March 2013 by Fitch by upgrading the Philippines’ credit rating from BB+ to BBB-.

This is most interesting because FX liberalization efforts and policy and structural reforms reached higher gears during the first two decades of the 2000s and should have attracted more inflows of foreign investments. More favorable macroeconomic outcome should have also brought in an increasing share of foreign investments in Southeast Asia. This is clearly not the case with the Philippines.

Thus, if we get the average of five-year intervals through 2020, we get the following trend away from financial openness:

Other Capital flow openness

External liabilities to GDP ratio is also a good indicator of how debt has become more accessible to both corporates and the sovereign in helping fund both their requirements for capital. They cover both loans and

bonds. The country’s external debt rose from $58.4 billion in 2000, to $58.7 billion in 2005, $65.3 billion in 2010, $76.3 billion in 2015, to $98.5 billion at the height of the pandemic in 2020 to $111.2 billion in 2022. Relative to GDP, the ratio has steadily declined from 72.5% in 2000, 55.7% in 2005, 32.3% in 2010, 25.7% in 2015 and 28.5% in 2020.

This must be the favorable outcome of the National Government’s thrust towards limiting reliance on foreign funds relative to domestic borrowing. During the Asian Financial Crisis, both government and private sector borrowers realized the difficulties associated with the “original sin” of incurring loans in foreign currency. However, after the pandemic, reliance on foreign capital markets resumed.

Averaging the ratio between external liabilities and GDP yields the following chart, a descending pattern from the 2000s to the 2015s, but a clear recovery in the 2020s.

Other capital flows openness

The trend away from trade openness, is not unique in the Philippines. Compared to their initial points in the 2000s, the 2020s’ trend was one of a shift away from being globally open in trade, except for Vietnam which recorded increasing expansion in global trade since the 2010s. In the case of Thailand, it was very much engaged in global trade in the first decade but some decline ensued in the 2015s and 2020s. Malaysia, on the other hand, showed declining trend in trade openness from the 2000s to 2015s, only to recover some feeble ground in the 2020s.

Financial openness is even worse. Vietnam has been financially closed if we are to consider the negativity of the ratios since 2000. Thailand was not financially open in

the decade from 2005 to 2014 but showed some recovery in the last ten years. Meanwhile, Malaysia was financially open for the entire period.

With no data available for Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand did not show a definite trend towards openness with respect to other external liabilities. Vietnam, for instance, was more open in the 2000s but was less so in the succeeding years, although the trend was improving until the 2020s. Vietnam has been cited for its success in drawing more foreign capital to fund its big infrastructure projects and other capital requirements for its huge efforts in enhancing the ease of doing business and minimizing uncertainty in policy. Thailand’s trend is quite volatile, up and down by succession during the fiveyear interval in the last two decades. One can only think of the volatile political situation in that country.

Impact of globalization on the Philippines’ economic growth

Globalization has been felt in the Philippines in the area of trade, finance and migration. One of the justifications for liberalizing the national economy to open it up to foreign participation has been its positive impact on economic growth, and by implication, job creation and economic livelihood. In this section, we examine the impact of trade openness, financial openness, and migration on economic growth in the Philippines, by estimating the following equation:

Y denotes real GDP per capita, and X is a vector of explanatory variables. X is composed of the following variables that represent different dimensions of globalization: total trade-to-GDP as proxy for trade openness; net financial account-to-GDP, including financial assets and liabilities between residents and non-

residents, covering direct investments, portfolio investments, financial derivatives, and other investments as proxy to financial openness; and finally, personal remittances-to-GDP as proxy for migration, with the assumption that greater migration will translate to more remittances being sent home. For all three variables, a higher ratio is taken to indicate a higher degree of economic openness.

Other control variables in X include gross fixed capital formation-to-GDP, government expenditure-to-GDP, consumer price Index, and global financial crisis (GFC) dummy9. All variables are expressed in log so that the short-run and long-run coefficients, aik and bik, respectively, represent elasticities. Annex Table 1 lists the sources of the variables used in the estimation.

The equation is estimated using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model for the years 2002-2019, using monthly frequency. The ARDL model was preferred because it is superior to traditional statistical methods for the assessment of long- and short-run relationships. For one, this approach can accommodate both endogenous and exogenous explanatory variables and can be used even if the variables are of different orders, as long as they are either I(0) or I(1). In addition, the ARDL approach remains efficient and provides unbiased parameter estimates even if used in small sample data sizes (Pesaran et al., 2001).

The approach involves two steps. The first step examines the existence of cointegration or long–run relationship among the variables in the model using the ARDL bounds

9 GFC dummy=1 for January 2008 to December 2009; =0, otherwise

10 In the ARDL bounds test, the estimated F- statistic value is compared with two sets of critical values of the upper- and lower bounds. If the value of the F- statistic is higher than the upper-bound critical value, then the null hypothesis is rejected. If it lies between the two critical values, the conclusion is indecisive. If the F-statistic is lower than the lower-bound critical value, the null hypothesis is accepted.

11 The ECMt-1 term signifies the speed of adjustment towards the longrun equilibrium. A negative (between -1 and 0) and statistically significant term indicates a convergence from the short run to the long

test under the null hypothesis of no cointegration 10. The second step estimates the long run, along with the associated error correction model (ECM) term and the short-run coefficients 11 . Prior to estimation of the equation, all variables were validated to be either I(0) or I(1). Hence, the ARDL model is appropriate.

The following table shows the estimation results. The Fbounds test suggests a cointegration or long-run relationship among the variables used in the model. Meanwhile, the ECM term is within the range of -1 and 0 and is statistically significant, signifying convergence from the short run to the long run and that the estimation is not explosive.

Table 1. Impact of Different Dimensions of Globalization on Philippine Economic Growth, 2002

January

-2019 December

In the long-run, greater trade and financial account openness have positive effects on economic development 12 . Trade openness provides an expanded

run. Otherwise, the error correction term is explosive and indicates model misspecification.

12 Indicators of trade and financial account openness based on de jure measures were considered to account for the impact of laws, regulations, and policies, but were found to be statistically insignificant. A possible reason is that de jure measures change infrequently.

market for domestic products and allows the importation of cheaper goods from the rest of the world. However, our empirical estimate shows that trade openness is statistically insignificant, perhaps signifying that the country’s trade openness can further be enhanced for the economy to fully reap the benefits of international trade.

Meanwhile, financial account openness allows inflows of different types of investments from other countries that help support the funding needs of the domestic economy. Our empirical estimate shows a statistically significant impact of financial account openness 13 on economic growth. Notable is that the coefficient for financial account openness is more than 1, implying that economic growth is highly responsive to financial account openness. Since financial account openness encompasses different dimensions of capital flows (direct, portfolio, financial derivatives, other investments), it could have a widespread impact on the different sectors of the economy.

However, in the short run, both trade and financial account openness could adversely affect economic development. This suggests that there could be adjustment effects as the country opens its economy to the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, greater remittances-to-GDP have a negative impact on economic development, both in the short run and long run 14. The literature suggests that labor effort may suffer with transfers. Likewise, the eventual impact on the economy of remittances depends on the how it is eventually used by the recipients (Burgess and Haksar, 2005). 15

All up, globalization can work

if we make it work

The Philippines, like its other ASEAN neighbors have experienced varying degrees of globalization in the areas of trade, finance and migration. There are indications of increased global participation in these areas although it has been uneven in the last 20 years. While expectations, both in theory and practice, are one of positive consequences of increased globalization on economic growth, this is not always true.

Our empirical results show that in the short run, there could even be negative results from trade and financial openness because adjustments in the economy to external factors could come at a cost. On the other hand, greater migration of persons like the Philippines’ Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) show negative implications both now and in the future. This specific result seems counterintuitive because remittances are supposed to augment private consumption, investment and even public spending. Instead, we see results contrary to this prior view. It means remittances can be positive if they are properly harnessed to boost domestic demand. However, if OFW remittances create perverse incentives against working by recipient families of OFWs, their social value could be limited if not adverse

Annexe Table 1. Source of Variables

13 Since all the variables are expressed in logarithms, the coefficients could be interpreted as elasticity.

14 The ratio of migrant workers to the country’s total labor force was used as an alternative measure of migration, but this variable was not statistically significant, both in the short and long run.

15 As a further robustness check, equation (1) was re-estimated using a longer sample period – 2000-2023, to include the pre-inflation targeting years and the period of the COVID -19 pandemic. However, the estimates do not pass the test for parameter stability, primarily driven by the pandemic years.

Navigating Diplomatic Challenges: Small Island Development Countries in a Global Context

Naren Prasad is Head of Education & Training with the Research Department of the International Labour Organization (ILO). He leads ILO’s Trainings on evidence-based policymaking for decent work. He has a wide experience working as an economist, researcher and expert trainer with various United Nations agencies in different regions. Naren has published on recent of social policy, employment and labour market, small island countries, middle class and privatization of public services. He is passionate about promoting social justice and decent work, and continues to drive initiatives that empower individuals through knowledge, echoing the transformative impact education can have on lives and communities. He hails from Fiji and holds a PhD in Economics (Université de Paris IIPanthéon Assas).

Small Island Developing States (SIDS) face a myriad of challenges on the diplomatic stage, stemming from their limited domestic resource base, small domestic market, narrow range of exports, high degree of structural openness, and economic vulnerability. The unique characteristics of SIDS, such as “islandness” and geographical isolation, further exacerbate these challenges. High emigration rates, lack of policy autonomy, and diminished negotiating power also play critical roles. In international relations and diplomacy, these countries grapple with issues ranging from limited human resource capacity and expertise to lack of representation, dependency on aid and assistance, and security concerns. This article delves into the diplomatic landscape of SIDS, drawing insights from the work of

Prasad (2003, 2004, 2009, 2013, 2023), Baldacchino (1993, 2000), Cooper & Shaw (2009), and others, to understand the complexities they face and the strategies they employ to overcome them.

The limited resources of SIDS present a significant obstacle, with severe constraints in terms of natural resources, financial capital, and human resources. The inherent smallness and islandness of these states, along with their small populations, restrict economic diversification and development. Prasad (2004, 2013, 2023) highlights how resource scarcity hampers the ability of SIDS to address pressing socio-economic challenges, such as poverty alleviation, healthcare, and education. This scarcity not only impacts their domestic capabilities but also limits their influence in international arenas, where resource allocation and robust infrastructures often determine the level of participation and effectiveness. Consequently, the lack of technical know-how and human resources necessary for complex diplomatic negotiations further constrains their diplomatic capabilities.

Adding to these challenges is geographical isolation, which exacerbates the difficulties faced by SIDS. This isolation impedes trade, connectivity, and access to markets. Baldacchino (1993, 1998, 2000) underscores the significance of geography in shaping the destiny of small island nations, noting how remoteness limits their integration into regional and global networks. This isolation often hinders economic development and complicates diplomatic engagements, making it difficult for SIDS to participate effectively in international forums. The logistical hurdles posed by their geographical locations mean that SIDS must often rely heavily on digital communication and innovative solutions to maintain their presence on the world stage. This geographical constraint, coupled with limited capacity and expertise, creates a cycle where their concerns are not

adequately addressed due to insufficient influence and representation.

Economic vulnerability is another critical issue for SIDS, exacerbated by factors like climate change, natural disasters, and external shocks. Cooper (2009) emphasizes the vulnerability of SIDS to economic fluctuations and external pressures, which often leave them at the mercy of more powerful actors in international negotiations. Their limited economic clout undermines their bargaining power, making it challenging to advocate for their interests on issues like trade, climate change mitigation, and debt relief. This vulnerability requires SIDS to form strategic alliances and coalitions, often leveraging their collective voice to amplify their concerns and push for favorable outcomes in global negotiations.

Furthermore, dependency on foreign aid and assistance to meet development needs further entrenches the dependency of many SIDS on external actors. Bertram (2006) discusses the implications of aid dependency for SIDS, noting how it can undermine their sovereignty and perpetuate a cycle of dependence. While aid can provide much-needed support, it often comes with strings attached, imposing conditions that may not align with the long-term interests of SIDS. This dependency is exacerbated by their limited resources and capacity, making it difficult for them to negotiate terms that fully serve their interests.

Transitioning from economic challenges to security concerns, SIDS also face significant threats including climate change, transnational crime, and geopolitical tensions. Prasad (2009) explores the security implications of climate change for SIDS, highlighting the risks posed by rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and environmental degradation. These threats not only jeopardize the livelihoods of SIDS populations but also exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, necessitating

coordinated international responses. The interplay between security concerns and dependency on aid further complicates their diplomatic landscape, as SIDS must navigate external support while addressing critical security issues.

Diplomatic challenges faced by SIDS are multifaceted and deeply interconnected. Limited capacity and expertise, lack of representation, dependency on aid, and pressing security concerns collectively shape the diplomatic landscape of SIDS. Understanding these complexities is crucial for developing strategies that empower SIDS to effectively engage on the global stage and advocate for their unique needs amidst adversity. Despite these formidable obstacles, SIDS continue to demonstrate resilience and innovation in their efforts to secure sustainable development and assert their presence in the international community. The resilience and innovation displayed by SIDS highlight their commitment to overcoming adversity and achieving sustainable development. This resilience, coupled with strategic international engagement, can help SIDS address their unique challenges and contribute more effectively to global diplomacy.

SIDS often advocate for the interests and concerns of vulnerable states, particularly on issues such as climate change, sustainable development, and maritime security. They highlight the disproportionate impacts of global challenges on SIDS and advocate for international support, solidarity, and cooperation to address their specific needs and vulnerabilities. Maldives, Seychelles, Tuvalu, and Kiribati actively advocate for ambitious climate action in international forums like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). They highlight the existential threat posed by climate change, including sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and ocean acidification, and call for urgent global action to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and support

climate adaptation efforts. As a founding member of CARICOM, Barbados has successfully utilized its membership to influence collective bargaining power in international forums by collaborating with other Caribbean nations to advocate for regional interests, including climate change mitigation and sustainable development initiatives.

Building on their advocacy, SIDS form alliances and coalitions with like-minded countries and regional organizations to amplify their voices, increase their bargaining power, and advance common objectives on the global stage. Countries such as Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago collaborate through regional organizations such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to coordinate positions, share resources, and advocate for shared priorities in international forums. Through these alliances, they collaborate on issues such as trade, security, and disaster preparedness, pooling resources and coordinating policies to address common challenges.

SIDS actively participate in multilateral institutions and forums to shape global norms, policies, and agendas. They engage in diplomatic negotiations, consensusbuilding, and coalition-building to promote their interests, advance international cooperation, and address common challenges facing the international community. For example, countries like Fiji and Samoa have served as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, using their positions to address issues such as peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and sustainable development. Pacific island nations collaborate through regional organizations like the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) to share experiences and resources in areas such as disaster risk reduction, public health, and climate resilience, strengthening regional solidarity and mutual assistance.

To further enhance their diplomatic influence, SIDS prioritize regional integration efforts to enhance economic cooperation, political stability, and social cohesion within their respective regions. The PIF, comprising 18 members including small island states in the Pacific region, employs regional diplomatic strategies to address common challenges such as climate change, maritime security, and sustainable development. The PIF facilitates dialogue and cooperation among member states, using collective bargaining power to engage with major powers and international organizations. Similarly, CARICOM utilizes diplomatic strategies to address shared priorities such as trade liberalization, disaster resilience, and sustainable development. CARICOM engages in diplomacy with external partners, including major powers and international financial institutions, to advocate for Caribbean interests and mobilize support for regional initiatives.

Complementing these efforts, SIDS use their cultural heritage, natural beauty, and diplomatic charisma as sources of soft power to enhance their influence, attract investment, and build positive relationships with other countries. They promote cultural diplomacy, tourism, and people-to-people exchanges to showcase their unique identities, values, and contributions to the international community. Jamaica has played a leading role in advocating for health equity and access to essential medicines in international forums. As a vocal advocate for small island states' rights, Jamaica calls for increased international cooperation, technology transfer, and financial support to strengthen healthcare systems and address health disparities. Barbados, an island nation in the Caribbean, has demonstrated leadership in renewable energy diplomacy by setting ambitious targets for transitioning to clean and sustainable energy sources. The country aims to generate 100% of its electricity from

renewable sources by 2030, making it one of the most ambitious renewable energy targets in the world.

Navigating shifting geopolitical dynamics, SIDS adopt pragmatic and flexible diplomatic strategies. They balance relations with different countries and pursue a foreign policy of neutrality, non-alignment, or strategic autonomy to safeguard their sovereignty and security. SIDS forge strategic partnerships with larger countries, regional powers, and international organizations to advance their interests and gain support on key issues. By cultivating relationships with influential actors, small islands can leverage their diplomatic capital and access resources, expertise, and opportunities for development. The Maldives has utilized its strategic location in the Indian Ocean to engage in maritime diplomacy and promote ocean conservation initiatives. As a low-lying island nation vulnerable to rising sea levels, the Maldives advocates for ocean governance, marine biodiversity protection, and sustainable fisheries management.

In addition to diplomatic strategies, SIDS engage in economic diplomacy to cultivate strategic partnerships with international donors, development banks, and private investors to mobilize resources, build infrastructure, and stimulate economic diversification. Palau and the Bahamas promote blue economy initiatives to harness the economic potential of their marine

resources while ensuring environmental sustainability. They develop policies and partnerships to promote sustainable fisheries management, marine conservation, and eco-tourism, generating revenue and creating employment opportunities while preserving marine biodiversity and ecosystems. For example, Tuvalu and the Cook Islands negotiate fisheries agreements with countries like Japan and the United States, granting access to their exclusive economic zones in exchange for financial compensation and technical assistance in fisheries management. Seychelles has embraced blue economy diplomacy to harness its marine resources for sustainable development. By establishing marine protected areas, promoting sustainable fisheries practices, and investing in renewable energy projects, Seychelles showcases its leadership in ocean governance and dedication to environmental stewardship.

SIDS also leverage digital technologies and social media platforms to enhance their diplomatic outreach and engagement. By maintaining active digital presences, they can reach wider audiences, engage with stakeholders, and shape perceptions on the global stage. Through digital diplomacy, the Maldives has effectively raised awareness about climate change impacts on small island nations, advocating for international action to address climate-related challenges and mobilize support for climate adaptation and resilience-building efforts. Moreover, the Fijian government employs digital diplomacy to showcase its contributions to global peacekeeping efforts, disaster response, and sustainable development initiatives, positioning Fiji as a regional leader in multilateral diplomacy. Barbados utilizes digital diplomacy to engage with the diaspora community and promote investment opportunities in key sectors. The Barbadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs leverages social media platforms to communicate its positions on international issues, advocate for small island states'

interests in multilateral forums, and amplify its voice on global platforms.

Advocating for ambitious climate action, SIDS highlight the urgent need for mitigation, adaptation, and resiliencebuilding measures, urging larger countries to take responsibility for their carbon emissions and support climate finance initiatives. Fiji has emerged as a leader in climate diplomacy, leveraging its vulnerability to climate change to advocate for ambitious international action. Fiji's presidency of COP23 in 2017 showcased its commitment to global climate leadership. By hosting the conference and championing the Talanoa Dialogue, Fiji elevated the voices of small island states in climate negotiations and galvanized support for climate-resilient pathways. Tuvalu, a low-lying atoll nation in the Pacific, has been a vocal advocate for climate justice and the rights of small island states in international climate negotiations. Tuvalu has highlighted the existential threat posed by sea-level rise and ocean acidification to its survival, calling for urgent and ambitious action to limit global warming and protect vulnerable communities. Through diplomatic channels such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the United Nations General Assembly, Tuvalu raises awareness of the disproportionate impacts of climate change on SIDS and lobbies for increased climate finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building support.

Maintaining unity and solidarity within regional blocs and alliances, SIDS work together and speak with a unified voice to address common challenges, negotiate better deals, and assert their interests in international diplomacy. The AOSIS is a coalition of small island and low-lying coastal countries, representing their interests in global climate change negotiations and environmental issues. Member states of AOSIS, including Maldives, Seychelles, and Tuvalu, maintain unity and solidarity by collectively advocating for ambitious climate action and

climate justice. Through AOSIS, small island states demonstrate solidarity in addressing common challenges and mobilizing international support for climate adaptation and resilience-building efforts. Apart from the PIF and CARICOM, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) comprises ten member states in the Eastern Caribbean region, including small island nations like Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Antigua and Barbuda. OECS member states maintain unity and solidarity through regional cooperation mechanisms aimed at promoting economic integration, social development, and political stability.

Through the work of scholars such as Prasad, Baldacchino, and Cooper, we gain insights into the intricate dynamics shaping SIDS' diplomatic engagements and the strategies they deploy to overcome adversity. From advocating for vulnerable states and fostering regional integration to harnessing soft power and engaging in economic diplomacy, SIDS demonstrate a remarkable ability to adapt, collaborate, and assert their influence in global affairs. Moreover, SIDS use digital diplomacy as a powerful tool to enhance their diplomatic outreach, engage with diverse stakeholders, and amplify their voices on the global stage. Through active participation in social media platforms, virtual diplomatic events, and online forums, SIDS effectively exploit digital technologies to overcome geographical barriers, build international partnerships, and advocate for their priorities.

Despite the formidable challenges they face, SIDS exhibit a strong sense of unity, solidarity, and resilience in their diplomatic endeavours. By harnessing their collective strengths, strategic alliances, and diplomatic ingenuity, SIDS navigate the complexities of the international system, assert their relevance, and contribute meaningfully to global governance efforts. In essence, while the diplomatic terrain may be fraught with

obstacles for SIDS, their determination, adaptability, and innovative spirit enable them to carve out a distinct place on the world stage. As they continue to navigate the intricacies of international relations, SIDS demonstrate that size is not a determinant of diplomatic influence, and that with perseverance and strategic foresight, they can overcome challenges and shape a brighter future for themselves and the global community.

References

Baldacchino, G. (1993) 'Bursting the Bubble: The PseudoDevelopment Strategies of Micro-State', Development and Change 24 (1): 29-51.

Baldacchino, G. (2000) Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands: The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press).

Baldacchino, G. and G. Bertram. 2009. “The beak of the finch: Insights into the economic development of small economies.” The Round Table, Vol. 98, No. 401, pp. 141–160.

Baldacchino, G. and D. Milne. 2000. Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands. Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, Hampshire

Bertram, G . 2006. “Introduction: The MIRAB model in the twenty-first century.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 47, No. 1, p. 1.

Cooper A. F., & Shaw M. T (ed). 2009. The Diplomacies of Small States, Palgrave Macmillan London

Prasad, N. 2023. “Past, Current, and Future Social Transformation in Pacific Island Countries” in the Oxford Handbook of Governance and Public Management for Social Policy, Page 366-384, Oxford University Press

Prasad, N. 2013, Seeing Big: social policies in small states, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Programme Paper, no. 2013-3.

Prasad, N. 2009, Small but smart: small states in global system, in Copper & Shaw (ed.), The Diplomacies in Small States, pp. 41-64, Palgrave-Macmillan, Chippenham

Prasad, N. 2004. “Escaping regulation, escaping convention: Development strategies in small economies.” World Economics, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 41–65. Prasad, N. 2003. “Small islands’ quest for economic development.” Asia-Pacific Development Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 47–67.

Challenges for Adult Continuing Education in Small States

Peter Mayo is Professor at the University of Malta and holds the UNESCO Chair in Global Adult Education. He has taught in Malta and internationally in Sociology of Education, Adult Continuing Education, Sociology in general, Higher education, Politics, International Relations, Comparative and International Education and Museum Education. He has published over a 150 papers either in refereed journals or as book chapters in many of the above areas, besides 25 books only 8 of which are edited. In 2019 he was inducted into the International Adult Continuing Education Hall of Fame.

Small states face several challenges, related to scale, in adult continuing education (ACE). They include lack of economies of scale, lack of precise and limited specialisations, restricted markets, high cost of duplication of resources and possible low international visibility among its potential drawbacks. To emphasise these is to entrench oneself in a deficit paradigm. To emphasise, on the contrary, the obverse, which can lead to alternative strategies and imaginative ones at that, is tantamount to bringing strengths to the international table – imaginative ways of going about things, perhaps, to use the overused and outworn cliché, ways of ‘thinking outside the box’, attributing agency to small state operators. It would involve thinking somewhat, but not exclusively, along the lines of what a small state innovator from Malta, Edward De Bono (2014) conceptualised as

‘Lateral Thinking’, seeing issues from different and not conventional angles, calling for disruptive reasoning with regard to what is taken for granted which often should mean taken for granted in large, culturally influential contexts far removed from those of micro or smaller ones. Among ACE’s perennial features are those of flexible specialisation, multifunctional approaches, intimacy, monopoly and migration. Many small states face these issues in terms of populations and restricted land mass, without setting arbitrary figures to distinguish them from others.

They are easily perceived as being ‘small’ in all of these physical aspects and not according to the various conceptualisations that derive from social constructivist approaches, where all kinds of small areas, such as small communities in larger jurisdictions or specific ethnic groups are brought into the equation (see chapters in Jules and Ressler, 2017). I am not dismissing this admittedly valuable approach which certainly calls into question arbitrary numerical cut off points, which smack of positivism, but I feel that it would deflect attention from the focus in this article, the small state condition. Many of them, such as islands in the Caribbean, the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean have been, for the most part, regarded as ‘developing nations’. It is easy to fall into the vulnerability trap when discussing features of life and social provision in small states, including education and more so adult education, the latter often considered the ‘Cinderella’ of the educational system. There are those who deliberately avoid this and imaginatively find ways to see potential weaknesses as strengths. Necessity is the mother of invention. A different paradigm of doing things can and has been conceived of in various writings on small states. In the context of Adult Continuing Education (henceforth ACE) within small states, multifunctionalism in terms of facilities and personnel deployment present indispensable strategies to address

the challenges of scale, resource scarcity and social intimacy. This approach not only enhances efficiency, maximising and creative use of resources but also fosters greater democratic and communal use of them. This applies to many different initiatives, ACE and community education being one of them. This calls for serious planning which at the same time does not smother any ongoing creative impulses to reap maximum communal advantages from the small state condition. The quality and specificity of education required by adult learners, including community members, is enhanced by flexibility and creative responses at the levels of strategy and quotidian praxis -reflection upon action for transformation into better and more democratic provision.

Multifunctionalism

Alan Rogers’ conceptual paper on ACE in Small States and Islands (Rogers, 1996) and Godfrey Baldacchino and me (Baldacchino and Mayo, 1996) and Didacus Jules (1994, 2013) conceived of adult continuing education in small states this way. They highlight multifunctional use of resources, flexibility in use of expertise, retooling of labour, exposure to distance education provision and migration (education for export and re-draining) as characteristics of education in small states. The cost per capita of resources, in small states, if used in a manner emulating larger states and territories, is higher than their cost for similar use in larger ones (Jules, 1994/5, p. 10). Logic would suggest that duplication is to be avoided with an option for multifunctional use of resources, including educational ones such as school buildings and their facilities. This can in theory help maximize their potential. They would steer away from languishing as idle capital for whole late afternoons and evenings and during holiday and summer recesses (Baldacchino and Mayo, 1996, p. 26).

In small territories and jurisdictions, besides isolated rural communities, schools host social functions. The school hall is a great community asset. Yet despite all this sound logic, in sync with small state-friendly thinking, this attitude does not always prevail. Individuals connected with specific resources jealously guard their patch of turf and feel reluctant to let go in the hands of others ready to avail themselves of the resources for multifunctional use. This has many times been my experience as coordinator of adult education in Malta in the late 80s to 1990. Many a head of school, during conventional school hours, can be reluctant to pass on the reins to other post-school hour-coordinators for adult education in the evening. As in all areas of life, one discovers ‘control freaks’. One would be wary however not to tar everyone with the same brush.

There were many who were cooperative and embraced adult education provision in their schools. Much depended on the values they upheld. Those who believed, following Eduard Lindeman, the USA adult educator, that lifelong education is a social act, were quite receptive to the initiatives. Others jealously guarded their control over resources and sought to restrict such facilities as the VCR (this was the very early 90s) to barely morning-school use let alone maximum school use throughout the day, including after conventional school hours. Of course, one must recognise the shared responsibility when different coordinators and educators are involved with the resources at different times during the day. The premium placed on cleanliness in the evening is key as Heads have often complained of finding cigarette butts and other thrash on their premises in the mornings. Having the same school caretakers throughout the day, as they relish extra sources of income in the evening, helps in facing these challenges, though, as always, people involved with schools, who need to wear different caps, with children and adults, require

preparation. This is not simply a matter of grafting adult education onto a predominantly conventional school system. This is not what ‘flexible specialisation’ really means, something difficult to grasp throughout the 1990 literacy campaign using conventional school premises Schools as Community Learning Centres

The different versions of Malta’s National Minimum Curriculum document (e.g. Ministry of Education, 1999) encouraged schools to be developed as community learning centres. This entailed teaching of schoolchildren in the morning and educational programs for/ with the rest of the community after conventional hours. There was a call to make multifunctional use of schools. Multifunctionalism is a desideratum for small states. (Farrugia and Attard, 1989; Farrugia, 2007, pp. 210, 211). Didacus Jules posits, “Resource limitations (financial and human) make it necessary for really creative solutions to be examined that enable the small state to maximize the use of these resources and achieve more with less.” (in Borg and Mayo, 1997, p.128)

There is the danger that a ‘deficit’ spin is placed on this kind of adult education provision. If left untouched, and therefore geared primarily to accommodate children, schools would not constitute appropriate learning settings for adult education. They can well foster a sense of adult schooling. The point regarding grafting ACE onto the school system made earlier cannot be overemphasised time and time again. The challenges here are great. Ministers are ready to offer the facilities they control to show their constituencies that THEY are carrying out the action on premises associated with them, rather than avail themselves of other communal spaces not under their control but perhaps more suited for ACE than a school left untouched. This represents a challenge. It requires a paradigm shift in the thinking, and therefore a creative re-conceptualization of the school as

community learning centre. It therefore requires work in this regard.

Failing such work, it would be better not to use schools at all. Adult learners might, in Myles Horton’s words, come across as “granddaddy longlegs” (Horton in Horton and Freire, 1990, 69), feeling infantilised to boot. Using Illich and Verne's (1976) phrase, they would be “imprisoned” in the community “classroom”. This would perpetuate the culture of schooling among those who might have been originally, when young, alienated by it (see Baldacchino and Mayo, 1995).

Donor agencies who appeal to a number of small states, forming part of the geographically ‘majority world’, favour funding for potential recipients’ formal education system (Jules, 1994). Interested small states can, as Jules (1994) suggests, circumvent this requirement by being developed as multipurpose educational agencies (Jules, 1994). They would operate in flexible settings that welcome persons of different ages.

A multipurpose community learning site therefore requires work to include spaces accommodating people of different ages, including rooms spacious enough which allow for adult settings and can of course be used by children, in adult rooms, for specific class events. It is more likely that students take to adult quarters kindly than the other way round. Of course, this applies to restructuring of schools, the most likely case scenario. In those situations, however, when new schools are built, a more imaginative architectural approach will be called for involving architects, educators, community development actors and other social actors working together - schools with a difference. They would be schools conceived and constructed as multipurpose community learning centres.

Architecture Set Up

The thinking behind the Maltese National Curriculum document was partly along these lines. The various documents to this effect laid emphasis on an imaginative architectural setting calling for flexibility.

The word has yet to be ‘made flesh’ and has disappeared from the latest, most recent version of a document setting yet another umpteenth agenda for a National Curriculum. The idea is however no ‘pie in the sky’. It has been put into operation in a state of similar size. Didacus Jules, in his former role of Permanent Secretary for Education in St Lucia, proposed a new architectural set up for the school as community centre. Its infrastructure was to incorporate school, auditorium, internet connectivity facilities, community library and other accoutrements. Another Caribbean small island state, Trinidad & Tobago took up and implemented the concept, with Dr Jules’ assistance.

Adult Educators

In Malta, schoolteachers frequently also serve as adult educators. This is a characteristic of small states. This was confirmed to me in a visit to Cyprus adult education centres in 1996, centres housed in schools (Symeonides, 1992). I saw such ‘doubling up’ even among educators in Valencia during workshops I held with them in 2004. This goes to show that these ‘doubling up’ features of adult continuing education apply also to contexts in larger states but are writ large in small ones (Baldacchino and Mayo, 1996). As for state-sponsored provision, teachers are paid an extra sum, added to their regular school teachers’ salary, for their ‘extra’ adult education work. Mass constraints, such as lack of economies of scale, place limits on the required specialisations. There is often not a large enough demand to justify the employment of fulltime adult educators.

The main point is not employing more personnel but increasing and diversifying capacity. Didacus Jules is instructive:

“...there is a common tendency to lament the human resource deficiencies of ministries of education in small states and invariably administrators call for

“more staff” to undertake vital functions. I have often argued that the challenge and the solution is not necessarily more staff but more capacity.” (Jules, in Borg and Mayo, 2007, p. 128).

The capacity of educators requires broadening and developing. Adult education could be just one activity in a large repertoire of tasks carried out by educators. Educators in Malta might teach school children during conventional school hours, adult learners in the evening and, in the case of English language teachers, foreign language students in the summer months in a thriving EFL and TESOL industry, or for those of other languages, evening and Saturday courses held at foreign language centres such as the Circulo Hispano Maltés, the German Circle or the Circolo Dante Alighieri. Add to this also private tuition to boot (Falzon & Busuttil, 1988; Bray,1999) and the required ‘skill set’ would be vast and varied.

The danger with this situation, as far as adult education is concerned, is that, without this skill set, they can reproduce, with adults, the methods used during conventional school hours with children. Again, one cannot tar everyone with the same brush as switching approaches is often a matter of common sense. The capacity of educators requires broadening and developing. Adult education could be just one activity in a large repertoire of tasks carried out by educators. Educators in Malta might teach school children during conventional school hours, adult learners in the evening and, in the case of English language teachers, foreign language students in the summer months in a thriving EFL and TESOL industry, or for those of other languages, evening and Saturday courses held at foreign language centres such as the Circulo Hispano Maltés, the German Circle or the Circolo Dante Alighieri. Add to this also private tuition to boot (Falzon & Busuttil, 1988; Bray,1999) and the required ‘skill set’ would be vast and varied. The danger with this situation, as far as adult education is

concerned, is that, without this skill set, they can reproduce, with adults, the methods used during conventional school hours with children. Again, one cannot tar everyone with the same brush as switching approaches is often a matter of common sense. My experience, as adult education administrator in Malta in the late 80s and 1990, suggests that many teachers prove adept at switching codes (Mayo, 2007, p, 24). The same experience and that of others, however, also showed that the contrary is true of certain adult educators in Malta (Mayo, 1994). This has rendered urgent the placing of emphasis on flexible specialisation (Brock, 1988, p. 306) in initial teacher education and continuing educator professional development programmes (CPD) at university or other teacher education and pedagogical academies. Of course, the difference in approach associated with the more progressive and innovative experience in learning with adults, involving starting from the participants existential situation and moving from there, engaging their culture and experience, relating what is learnt to everyday life, placing emphasis on dialogue and interpersonal communication, using the immediate environment and larger local community as a primary source of learning and educational resources, can apply also to working with children.

Intimacy

There are many other challenges affecting adult education in small states. There is the intimacy factor which one neglects at one’s peril, especially when one considers the stigma attached to certain aspects of adult basic education, still a reality in several countries, including small states, both those with rural-intensive and those with high-tech economies. In small intimate surroundings, people can be embarrassed to be seen attending adult literacy programmes. Again, Adult education would here be perceived as deficit oriented. One way of surmounting this is, when possible, by

enabling participants to attend such settings in other localities perhaps in other islands in a small island archipelago, or through distance learning home study. As indicated by a particular Jesuit-run community project in Malta, they can also be formally designated educator and formally designated adult learning participant at the same time. This necessitates one’s recognition of persons as being resourceful in their repertoire of skills, thus valuing what they possess and not simply what they lack.

In the Malta case, a person who worked in industry as chef but who was functionally illiterate taught cookery to adults at the centre while following adult literacy classes in the same building. Likewise, a formally well-educated adult literacy worker undertook digital literacy classes at the same centre where she had been teaching literacy: teachers and learners at the same time (Mayo, et al, 2008). This happened, albeit without having been planned beforehand. It is not an assumption derived out of nowhere. The insight derived from a particular experience at the Paulo Freire Institute at Zejtun, Malta, involving a cookery teacher-cum-literacy participant and a literacy educator-cum-computer learner. Being educator as well as learner can alter one’s status and selfimage, as was the case with the students at Don Lorenzo Milani’s celebrated school at Barbiana, Tuscany, Italy. Public school dropouts (read: pushed out), they taught the younger students what they had learnt from their own teacher – a tremendous boost for public school rejects who proved not only fit to learn but also to teach: a shot in the arm.

Intimacy marks adult continuing education in small states involving such other potentially stigmatised groups as prison inmates. Stigma accompanies them as they complete their term behind bars. This militates against their chances of their ever being employed again. Adult vocational education would focus, in this scenario, both during their serving time and soon after their

release, on skills for self-employment, to render them more in control of their own work destiny.

In small states, they would not have the possibility to move to another part of the country where their past remains relatively unknown. Save for their moving abroad, self-employment would be the most likely adult vocational option open to them. Otherwise, the tragedy highlighted in Edward Bond’s play Ollie’s Prison would crook a beckoning finger at them. As in the play, their prison experienced when locked up turns into a veritable, albeit metaphorical, prison when they start living as free persons outside.

Monopoly

Monopoly (Sultana and Baldacchino, 1994) presents another challenge to institutional provision in small states. For many years, certain forms of education and social provision could have been monopolised by one institution, if any. This applies to university credentialed adult continuing education. Advances in information technology, as part of the intensification of globalisation, where much occurs simultaneously and globally in real time, challenged this monopolistic juggernaut. Suddenly, international universities refined their online learning provision on a global scale bringing University Continuing Education to territories which previously had no higher education institution and, if they had, benefited from the monopolistic presence of one institution in the small state or the archipelago. Deregulation made this situation even more pronounced, especially in European Union Member States such as Cyprus and Malta which,

from no or only one institution, saw a mushrooming of a plethora of institutions reaching the bar set by the countries’ respective regulatory bodies and Quality Assurance agencies. Prior to 1989, Cyprus, in its nonoccupied side, had not a single University, as local students travelled to Greece and other universities, for their university education.

1992 saw the opening of the selective public University of Cyprus. This was followed later, coinciding with the country becoming a EUMS, by the transition of institutes as Intercollege and Frederick College into universities in their own right together with many others state-owned or private entities, including, among the former, an Open University. This is coupled with another group of universities, including campuses of Turkish and UK universities, in the Northern Republic of Cyprus (recognised only by Turkey), with an open border for a specific time during the day. There exists a large HE market in the Mediterranean’s third largest island.

Monopoly represents a double edge sword. It can secure employment opportunities but presents no alternatives in terms of provision and employment opportunities. Distance Education, especially among adults, offers alternatives but offers all the challenges of deregulation in terms of the economic viability and cultural relevance of the local provider.

Migration

Lack of employment opportunities and overpopulation led small states to proactively pursue an emigration policy over the years. This directly affected the development of adult education in the absence of a welldeveloped education system such as in Colonial Malta from the 1930s till 1960s. Adult education in the form of Basic Literacy classes in the English Language formed the backbone of ALE provision on the islands (Malta and Gozo) for thousands of Maltese who emigrated to British

colonies of settlement. (Vancell, 1997). Many came from rural backgrounds and were engaged in subsistence farming. Their adult education consisted, in addition to literacy in Basic English, also vocational education in rural settings as the receiving countries needed immigrant labour specifically for rural areas in places such as Manitoba and Queensland. A replica of an Australian bungalow was installed at the Migrant Training Centre in the Government farm at Ghammieri (York, 1986).

Malta transitioned over the years from a net exporter of labour power to a net importer of such power especially post 2002 with mass waves of immigration from SubSaharan Africa and certain parts of war torn countries such as Syria and Libya in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa). There are often expressed fears of an ‘Armageddon’, as people in small states, irrespective of a booming economy as is Malta’s tertiary economy, feel as though ‘they are being swamped’. This raises issues concerning adult education among migrants for inclusion but especially for relocation, therefore necessitating courses in the language and culture of potentially receiving countries. As with the rest of the educational system, in its formal and non-formal ways, including media provision, there is a crying need for efforts in antiracist education targeting different sectors of the population, including the Armed forces, health services and the Judiciary (Mayo, 2007; Mayo et al 2008).

The history of ACE in small states is connected with emigration, first to prepare people to seek pastures new and boost the economy through remittances and redraining through expertise obtained abroad. Then, in certain countries such as Cyprus and Malta, facing an economic boom in construction, immigration offers challenges for ACE possibly for relocation and inclusion. It poses challenges of a different kind for the autochthonous people, where education and ACE can

play an important role. The challenge is to learn to handle social difference, tackle racism head on and be disposed to learn from others.

Writ Large

Finally, the situation concerning employability in small states, especially small island states, has rendered such labour intensive areas as manufacturing a nonstarter. All education initiatives require retooling of labour in favour of high value added and certain products geared towards niche markets. This applies to adult continuing education as well. Malta for instance has shifted to areas such as igaming and pharmaceuticals, no longer dependent on manufacture as factories in this sector have closed. Once again, several of the foregoing challenges apply to different contexts in larger states but are writ large in smaller ones.

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