Avicenna - The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs 7.2

winter 2017 vol 7 no 2

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THE STANFORD JOURNAL ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS

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avicenna THE STANFORD JOURNAL ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS

WINTER 2017 VOL 7 NO 2

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Sevde Kaldıroğlu ’17 ASSOCIATE EDITORS Atussa Mohtasham ’18 Eva Grant ’19 Jennifer Peterson ’18 Kit Raya Ramgopal ’19 DESIGNER Carolyn Oliver ’17 WEB DEVELOPER Marika Elise Buchholz ’19 FINANCIAL OFFICER Ariana Qayumi ’18

Avicenna - The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs is a student-run journal founded in 2011 at Stanford University. As a nonsectarian, independent publication, Avicenna exists to portray Muslims not as silent objects but as knowing subjects, from the inside rather than the outside. Published in print and online, it aims to maintain a brave and academic agora where members of diverse communities, from different cultures, beliefs and ethnicities, can critically examine issues related to the Muslim world.

To contact Avicenna Editorial Board or to send text or image submissions, please email at avicenna.stanford@gmail.com.

Avicenna - The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs would like to thank the Associated Students of Stanford University (ASSU) for their support.

Front cover image: Photograph shot in the Islamic Society of San Francisco Mosque by Sevde Kaldıroğlu '17, Stanford University.

Back cover image: Photograph shot in Ayvalik, Turkey by Sevde Kaldıroğlu '17, Stanford University.

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CONTENTS Editor’s Note SEVDE KALDIROĞLU The New Heavens: Tracing the Decline of the Islamic Scientific Tradition UZAIR NAVID IFTIKHAR YG's "FDT" Got Me Through 2016 And For That He Deserved a Grammy MARYAM ELARBI

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Snapshots of Syrian Child Refugees in Jordan and Greece LAILA SOUDI

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Street Lights TARIQ EL-GABALAWY

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Radical Islam and Radical Islamophobes: a Q&A with Professor Abbas Milani on the "Muslim Ban" KIT RAMGOPAL

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The "Muslim Ban" Is Mad; We Need to Think About Why It Happened WALTER GOODWIN

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Where Are You From?

HAMZEH DAOUD Barriers and Facilitators to Seeking Mental Health Services Amongst Refugees in Greece LAILA SOUDI and DR. HANA ABU-HASSAN

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Editor’s Note On January 27th, the President of the United States signed an executive order banning the entry of individuals from a list of seven predominantly Muslim countries. On March 14th, the European Court of Justice allowed employers to ban religious symbols, including the hijab, at the workplace, arguing that such a ban would not constitute “discrimination”. As of today, more than 11 million Syrians have fled their country since the beginning of the civil war in 2011.1 Hate crimes and threats on marginalized communities, including Muslims, are increasing every day.

These are the headlines you read on newspapers. Single lines of facts you can easily consume and can put back on the shelf.

Here in this journal is what you don’t read in the headlines—what’s harder to digest.

Headlines rarely tell you about the impact of these policy changes and sociopolitical crises on the individuals they affect. Headlines don’t tell you how an Arab-American Muslim feels when they step onto the street on January 28th, knowing that a legal ban was just placed to keep people like them out of their homeland. Headlines don’t tell you about the silent and excruciating pain of a mother when she arrives at a refugee camp, having lost her child and husband along the way. Or about the fact that many of those people who face hostility in their host countries would do anything to regain the right to once again be able to exist in their homeland. News headlines don’t tell you about any of these; narratives do. In Avicenna’s Winter 2017 edition, you will find some of these narratives that will hopefully give you a chance to go beyond the headlines and try to understand the complexity of issues that exceeds the capacity of the 5 W’s2.

Given the urgency of the current political events taking place in the US, the Editorial Board has decided to devote a significant space in this edition to opinions around the “Muslim Ban” and its consequences on an individual and societal basis. To start this discussion, one of our associate editors, Kit Ramgopal, interviewed historian, author, and Professor Abbas Milani on the implications of the ban and the future of the Trump administration. In his op-ed, Walter Goodwin points out the trap of oversimplification in political arguments and diagnoses a double-sided ignorance in the two polarized political groups in the US. In her personal essay, Maryam Elarbi brings YG’s music into her discussion of white liberalism and its shortcomings on providing the necessary allyship that might be most useful to Muslim Americans like herself who are subjected to marginalization, especially following Donald Trump’s election.

The second issue of our seventh volume once again showcases a variety of different written genres and media. In his poem, Tariq El-Gabalawy illustrates the impact of social and political persecution in the psyche of an Arab Muslim-American man and evokes a reflection on the intersectionality of identities and problems. Hamzeh Daoud also uses the powerful form of poetic speech in his lyrical spoken word piece in which 1 “The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Its Repercussions for the EU.” Syrian Refugees. Web. 14 Mar. 2017.

2 What, who, where, when, why.

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he portrays a conversation between a Syrian mother and an officer at a refugee camp. Such lyricism continues in a non-verbal yet equally emphatic form in Laila Soudi’s photographs of Syrian refugee children in Jordan and Greece.

On the more academic side, Psychiatry researcher Laila Soudi and Assistant Professor of Medicine Dr. Hana Abu-Hassan share the preliminary findings of their scientific study on the mental health services among Syrian refugees in Greece. Taking a step back “Taş Kahve”, a traditional Turkish coffeehouse in Ayvalık. Photo by from the recent political Sevde Kaldıroğlu ’17. events in his article, Uzair Navid Iftikhar delves into the history of science and attempts to explore the root causes of the decline of the Islamic scientific tradition. Lastly, all of these thought-provoking vantage points are decorated with colorful snapshots from Turkey, Germany, and, quite locally, San Francisco, shot by Eva Grant and myself.

Having served as the editor-in-chief of this beautiful journal for three years, I am sad to say that this is my last editor’s note as I will be graduating at the end of spring. I am delighted to have learned greatly from the writers and contributors that have shared their diverse perspectives on this platform and the fruitful discussions that have arisen out of these. As we move forward, I am excited to introduce Avicenna’s next editor-inchief, Atussa Mohtasham ’18, who has been serving as a successful associate editor in the journal, and will continue Avicenna’s mission of meaningful academic and artistic dialogue around issues pertaining to Muslim peoples.

On a final note, I’d like to bring back Turkish author Oğuz Atay’s renowned line from my first editor’s note: “I’m here, dear reader. Where are you, I wonder?” I hope you always remain here, with an open mind and open heart; with me, with us, in solidarity.

Always here, Sevde Kaldıroğlu ’17 Editor-in-Chief

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The New Heavens : Tracing the Decline of the Islamic Scientific Tradition Uzair Navid Iftikhar B.S. Computer Science ’19, Stanford University

In 2007, science papers produced by the seven most scientifically prolific Muslimmajority nations received a total of 618,879 citations. By comparison, papers produced in the United States alone were cited over 35.6 million times.1 However, the destitution signaled by these bibliometrics belie a contrasting past: a period where Islamic civilization had operated as a beacon of knowledge and a vanguard of critical inquiry, otherwise known as the “Golden Age of Islamic Science.” The period following the 8th century ascension of the Abbasid caliphate saw the rise of great translation movements, allowing scholars of the Islamic world access to the Hellenistic tradition, featuring writings of giants such as Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Galen. This push from the ruling authorities toward exploring the realm of philosophy galvanized intellectuals in the region; soon, centers of scholarly pursuit were founded in major cities including Cairo and Damascus, as well as a large central library entitled the “House of Wisdom,” which was instituted by Caliph Al-Mam’un in Baghdad. From this point until at least the 13th century, protoscientists from these regions produced cutting-edge works of their own, from Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) who laid the foundations of aromatherapy via distillation, to Ibn al-Shatir whose mathematical theorems separating linear and circular motion are

thought to have inspired the Copernican revolution, and Ibn al-Nafis who challenged Galen’s conception of an invisible passage between the two ventricles and became the first to postulate pulmonary circulation.2 Studying this progression as well as the stark contrast to today’s bleak scenario raises a niggling conundrum: what led to the decline of this remarkable scientific tradition?

1 Hoodbhoy, Pervez Amirali. “Science and the Islamic World – The Quest for Rapprochement.” Physics Today 60.8 (2007): 49-55. Web.

2 Saliba, George. Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2011. Print.

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For decades, historians of science have analyzed this topic from a variety of viewpoints, but have not reached a consensus. While a single-point hypothesis demarcating one event or development as the cause of this change is attractive for its simplicity, it would betray the nature of the discipline as it was: Islamic civilization was spread out across empires with different ruling authorities, social structures, and economic statures. The decline itself was, in a way, absolute, such that there was a shift in focus from the production of scientific literature to the production of more religious works, to the point where eventually, instead of exporting scientific knowledge to the Western world, the Islamic empire began to rely on importing it. However, it is also important to note that the timeframe over which this decline is thought to have occurred—between the 13th and 16th centuries—places it in temporal concurrence with the rise

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of European science, and some of the events that led to that boon, such as the emergence of a strong economy through the disruption of trade routes, are also thought to have catalyzed the process of decline. Thus, to edge toward unraveling the causes that led to this momentous shift, a two-pronged exploration is needed, delving into the sociopolitical changes that took place within the Islamic and European civilizations respectively, as well as the dynamics that affected both.

One frequently posited theory regarding the decline attributes its initiation to a work written by 11th century theologian Al-Ghazali, titled The Incoherence of Philosophers. In his critique of this idea, which he terms the “classical narrative,” George Saliba explains that “[Ghazali is considered] the initiator of an Islamic Orthodoxy of sorts, and thus his book symbolized the triumph of religious thought. The conclusion that is usually drawn from the success of Ghazali’s religious thought is that this triumph must have caused the death of its counterpart, the rational scientific thought.”3 A survey of Ghazali’s book does indeed highlight several ways in which it decries ideas that are fundamental to the pursuit of scientific development. For example, the idea that "the connection observed to exist between causes and effects is a necessary connection,"4 that is, the idea of cause and effect is refuted several times.

After referring to examples of miracles mentioned in the Qur'an such as Moses turning his staff into a serpent, and Jesus Christ reviving the dead, Ghazali proclaims that "he who thinks that the nature course of events is necessary and unchangeable calls all these miracles impossible."5 Scholars such as Huff appear justified in 3 Saliba, 234.

4 Al Ghazali. “Problem XVI, XVII.” The Incoherence of the Philosophers, translated by Sabih Ahmad Kamali. Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963. Print.

5 Al Ghazali. The Incoherence of the Philosophers, translated

by Sabih Ahmad Kamali. Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963. Print. 182.

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feeling that Ghazali’s intense critique and adoption of occasionalism seems to deal a serious blow to the cause of Islamic science because his writings make the foundations of critical inquiry seem incompatible with religious values. However, it seems somewhat presumptive to accept that one book singlehandedly unraveled a tradition cultivated over centuries; this also raises the question of why subsequent books such as The Incoherence of the Incoherence by Ibn Rushd (Averroes), who was also a prominent figure, did not have a comparable effect on society, rectifying the damage dealt by Ghazali. In fact, Saliba, cites the works of scholars such as Ibn al-Nafis and al-Tusi to illustrate that the quality of scientific literature produced in the post-Ghazali period exceeded that of past works, and remained on this trajectory until the 16th century.

This ambiguity invites a change in perspective: instead of seeing Al-Ghazali’s book as the cause of the decline, perhaps one should regard it as a symptom of it—a testament to the sociopolitical events of the previous century, which had set in motion a gradual shift in the collective perception of science. The 10th and 11th centuries saw factionalism in Islam take centerstage, as Shi’a factions ascended to gain a considerable degree of power, including the Buwayhid dynasty that rose to power in Iraq. Missionaries commissioned by the Fatimids also spread through a range of regions, from North Africa in the West to Afghanistan in the East.6 These events marked a departure from the norm because they implied that the caliphate was losing its significance as a model of overarching central power. Ira Lapidus describes that the rise of these factions “also prompted a literary and cultural renaissance in which Hellenistic, philosophical, and secular views flourished.”7 This also ties into the rise of 6 Lapidus, Ira M. Chapters 15-21. A History of Islamic Societies. New York: Cambridge UP, 1995. Print.

7 Lapidus, Chapters 15-21.

the Muʿtazila school of thought in the Iraqi region between the 8th and 10th centuries.

The followers of this ideology adopted a rationalistic approach, utilizing reason and independent thought to try and better understand the teachings of the Qur’an, in part by drawing upon the Hellenistic canon. In the words of Ira Lapidus, “[t]hey developed a metaphysics of being, a theory of the origin of the universe, a physics of created things, and a psychology of man— building on the teachings of Aristotle, Democritus, Empedocles, and other Greek philosophers.”8 However, these individuals clashed with the orthodox view on several issues, including the traditional belief in the “uncreated” nature of the Qur’an. Given these developments, in the early 11th century, Abbasid Caliph al-Qadir began working on mounting a reaction from the Sunni side, aiming to “restore the true practice of the faith.”9 The 10th century also saw the rise of the Ash’ari school of thought in opposition to the Mu’tazilites. While the Ash’aris did uphold the value of reason, they questioned the extent to which it could be utilized. Ira Lapidus explains that, “al-Ashʿari stressed the overwhelming importance of divine revelation and the humble quality of man’s own will and rational faculties.”10 As part of his effort to strengthen the Sunni hold, in 1019 AD, Caliph Al-Qadir denounced the Mu’tazali narrative including their rationalistic ideas regarding the Qur’an having been “created”, as well as attempts to re-interpret Qur’anic passages as symbolic.11 These circumstances can serve to explain what led Ghazali to pen his work in defense of orthodox theology over individual logic, and also act as an indication of how the general public could also have been similarly affected, as the role of logic and 8 Lapidus.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

reason became less significant and openended than it had once been considered. It would not be irrational to assume that this clash of ideologies, coupled with the tugof-war between sects, could have given rise to feelings of theological “protectionism” among society, as well as a general suspicion of new, seemingly external concepts such as the “foreign sciences”; in turn, this desire to prevent the apparent contamination of Islamic tradition would also have served the caliphate’s goal by helping preserve their position of power over the community. The closing of the 11th century also saw another cataclysmic event in world history: the rise of tensions between Islam and Christianity, with the initiation of the crusades to take control of the “holy land”. Even on a basic level, the religious nature of these wars would have catalyzed this desire to protect Islam against external influence.

Following Al-Qadir, minister Nizam alMulk took up the baton of championing the role of the caliphate as well as proliferating the Sunni religious ideology.

As part of his policies, in the year 1063 AD, al-Mulk proposed the creation of educational institutes (madrasas) aimed at further disseminating the Sunni Islamic narrative, as well as pacifying the divide between schools of thought within Sunnism. Lapidus rightly postulates that, through this move, “Nizam al-Mulk probably aimed at state control over the Sunni movements and used the major legal and theological schools as a vehicle for political influence over the masses.”12 This aim at control through the spread of centralized theological ideals found itself at odds with individual rationality, and the rise of these schools itself is thought to have marked a step in the decline of Islamic science on several grounds.

Firstly, given the reasons for which they were created, they focused primarily on 12 Ibid.

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teaching theology, through the Qur’an and the Hadith (sayings of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad). All postulates of what would later become known as natural philosophy were termed “foreign sciences” and, based on different accounts, either taught with caution, or simply neglected.

This would have had a two-fold influence on scientific developments. First of all, this meant that this knowledge did not have a platform to reach the wide audience these schools were now targeting. Secondly, by creating these schools, the administration intended to produce a steady stream of students who could then become teachers or missionaries. This meant that there was a much greater incentive to study and later take a profession in theology.

While the caliphate had once boosted the study of science, which jump-started the Golden Age, this major shift in focus now signaled the end of that support. In the madrasas, which were funded through charitable endowments, the founder could utilize the concept of waqf, which meant that they could lay out their intentions and conditions, and as long as they were not in conflict with Islam, these would be upheld.13 George Makdisi also notes that, in the 12th century as resources became more concentrated toward theological leaders, centers of teaching for philosophy became sparse.14 A statistical study conducted by a Harvard University economist using metadata of books from the “Golden Age” at the Harvard Library, and a sample from 17th century Istanbul, also helps provide an objective insight into the changes that took place during this time. The results indicate a marked decline in the production of scientific works, and a discernible boom in religious works following the 12th century, 13 Huff, Toby E. The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. Print. 222.

14 Chaney, Eric. Religion and the Rise and Fall of Islamic Science. 2016. Harvard U, PhD dissertation. 21.

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in line with what would be expected given the rise of religious ideology and the lack of a sustainable system offering an education in science.15 At the same time, however, education was also making strides in medieval Europe.

Between the 11th and 12th centuries, universities as guilds of scholars and teachers were founded in Paris, France; Bologna, Italy; and Oxford, England.

While theology was a central focus, the curricula for these also drew heavily on philosophy, utilizing the knowledge gained through the Latin translation movements to access the writings of Greek giants such as Aristotle, as well as the likes of Averroes, who had been commentators upon these works. In addition to having a greater focus on philosophy than madrasas did, universities also enjoyed a greater degree of freedom and autonomy to define their mission and methodology. David Lindberg explains that some of the rights these universities had included “the right to establish standards and procedures, to fix the curriculum, to set fees and award degrees, and to determine who would be permitted to teach or study.”16 These also had standardized curricula and degrees, and networks of peripatetic teachers who could travel between these universities and teach. This created a spirit of universalism, as opposed to the particularism that had arisen in the madrasa system, and encouraged critical thought to a greater degree. In comparing the two systems, Toby Huff goes as far as suggesting that the Islamic legal system simply didn’t allow for the autonomy needed to establish institutes with such structures.17 The result of these developments was that, when the teaching of philosophy was sidestepped in Islamic 15 Chaney, 2.

16 Lindberg, David C. “The Rise of the Universities.” The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450. 2nd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007. Print.

17 Huff, 227.

society, European scholars began to pick up the trail. Perhaps the most interesting consequence of the difference between these educational systems was that, because of the sheer volume of scholars produced by European universities and the standardization that they utilized for their curriculum, their ideas now held a new degree of authority and theologians could no longer simply turn a blind eye, or suppress them entirely.

Comparing the trajectory of the development of European science to the events that took place in the Islamic community over the preceding centuries, this aforementioned degree of authority emerges as a significant difference.

Conflicts between theology and reason similar to those seen in Islamic societies also became increasingly prominent in Europe, especially in the 13th century.

For example, in 1210, sanctions were placed upon teaching Aristotelian natural philosophy at the university in Paris, because of allegation that masters in the Arts were teaching ideas related to pantheism. However, by 1230, teachers began to use Averroes’s commentaries instead of those by Avicenna to avoid NeoPlatonism.18 At the same time, masters such as Roger Bacon worked to lobby support for teaching philosophy, arguing that it could not only be useful as a tool for missionaries to prove Christian ideals, but also make other positive contributions to society, for example, by using astronomy to devise the calendar.19 Soon thereafter, the idea of Thomism arose, named after Thomas Aquinas who postulated that religion and science cannot be at odds with one another if both are interpreted correctly. He wrote that “even though… [philosophy] is inadequate to make known what is revealed by faith, nevertheless what is divinely taught to us by faith cannot be 18 Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science, “Resolution: Science as a Handmaiden.”

19 Ibid.

contrary to what we are endowed with by nature. One or the other would have to be false, and since we have both of them from God, he would be the cause of our error, which is impossible.”20 What is striking here is that even though Thomas Aquinas assigns a secondary role to philosophy in relation to theology, he does not specify that only philosophy could be wrong in cases of conflict; instead, Thomism urges revisiting both sides of the argument, the theological, and the philosophical.

However, Ghazali’s writings and the Caliph’s rulings against the Mu’tazilites suggested that Islamic theology did not allow such a compromise. In the caliphate, authority remained unwaveringly in the hands of the rulers, and because their rule was based on the Islamic faith, philosophers who fell out of their favor could do little to stand up for their works. Averroes himself faced this predicament when his writings were burnt by the caliph Yaqub alMansur in 1195 AD and he was banished following a disagreement.21 In contrast, then the fact that European scholars were able to reach an arrangement where both theology and philosophy could co-exist, seems rooted in the prominence that their scholarly community had gained, as well as the autonomy that their universities had.

It is also interesting to note that Aquinas was educated at the university in Paris, while Ghazali attended a madrasa.22 This is an example of the success of formalized education in disseminating ideas and molding societal thought.

In the 15th century, Portuguese traders found alternative routes connecting them to Southeast Asia, with Vasco De Gama’s discovery of the Cape of Good 20 Ibid.

21 “Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126-1198).” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web. 30 Jan. 2017.

22 Griffel, Frank. "Al-Ghazali." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, 22 Sept. 2014. Web. 28 Jan. 2017.

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Hope being particularly significant.

These developments now allowed trading companies from these regions to circumvent passing through the Middle East, and import luxury goods such as silk and spices on their own. This set in motion a shift in the global economy because it meant that the authorities of the Muslim empires in the Middle East could no longer profit from the trade occurring between the East and the West. Meanwhile, European centers of commerce became increasingly prosperous and well-established,23 especially with the wealth brought back after the discovery of the New World, which added to the widening gap between the economic stature—and hence the rate of scientific production—of Europe and the Islamic empires. Lapidus explains that “although the discovery of new routes to the Orient did not close the traditional Middle Eastern international routes, it created a revolution in the distribution of wealth.

23 Lapidus, Ira M. “The Global Context”. A History of Islamic Societies. New York: Cambridge UP, 1995. Print.

Left Image: (Mansurian illustration of the venous system, from a manuscript dating to 1488 AD): Huff, Toby E. The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West.

2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. Print. 200.

Right Image: (The venous system as represented by Vesalius, 1543 AD.): Huff, 202.

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As a result, Europe would prosper on the captured gold and silver, spices, and other products of both the New World and the Old.”24 The Atlantic trade led to a further disruption, as it shifted the focus from the import of luxury goods, to the export of raw materials such as sugar. This was achieved by connecting colonized regions where farming and mining primarily took place, to prosperous cities where there would be demand for raw material.25 These developments put Europe dead-center in the global economy, creating further room for patronage of the sciences, which would be especially understandable given the invaluable role played by breakthroughs in navigation and weaponry in colonization and development.

Studying these events, and attempting to understand the shifts in ideologies that 24 Lapidus, "The Global Context".

25 Ibid.

took place across both European and Islamic societies, it seems that the decline of the Islamic scientific tradition cannot be traced down to a singular event or area. Instead, it seems to have stemmed from a variety of factors. These included ideological elements such as the (rather successful) campaign launched by alQadir to promote religious sentiment and the apparent clash between philosophy and faith, as well as socioeconomic ones such as the subsequent incentivizing (and relative ease) of pursuing a theological education and the later loss of prosperity due to conquests. As opposed to Europe, it seems that there was an inability in the Islamic regions to nurture a system where students could, firstly, easily receive a standardized education, and secondly, have access to opportunities following this education. In addition to this, the loss of scholarly works to war and the impediment against new developments because of constraints on activities such as dissection and drawing would have further slowed down progress.

Finally, the loss of economic power and the boon in European prosperity would have dealt a final blow, by making the patronage of science seem unaffordable in the face of a recession. On the other hand, science had been able to gain importance and support in Europe over this timeframe, and scholars had been able to gain enough prominence and credibility that although their more radical ideas such as heliocentricism and evolution would be met with opposition, they would never be fully suppressed on the level seen, for example, by Averroes; the foundations for this can perhaps be found in al-Qadir’s original denunciation of “allegorical explanations of the Quran.”26 From the evidence surveyed, it seems that this combination of factors led to a reversal of the flow of information by the 16th century.

26 Lapidus, Chapter 21.

Looking at the state of scientific production in Islamic societies today, it seems tragic that the same constraints still seem to be holding down developments in many countries. For example, in something that can be seen as concerning a nod to the argument made by Al-Ghazali a millennium ago, a conference on “scientific miracles” was held in Pakistan in October 1987, including papers such as “Revelation of Some Modern Oceanographic Phenomena in Holy Qur'an.”27 The economic argument also still stands, because as compared to the global average of 2.124%, Pakistan only allocated 0.29% of its GDP to research in 2013.28 Over the past four decades, this era has been continually studied through a kaleidoscope of unexamined literature and narratives, which has led historians to revisit and revise theories in light of new data. David Lindberg argues that, even today, “[t]housands of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish manuscripts remain in libraries from Europe to the Middle East, unexamined. What they may contain we have no way of knowing until we look.”29 The one thing these developments have certainly proven is that, while we can now start to understand part of the dynamics that were at play during this period, it is very likely that there still remain “unknown unknowns” which necessitate a thorough research effort, in order to truly untangle the web of interactions leading up to this paradigm shift.

a

27 Hoodbhoy, Pervez Amirali. “They Call It Islamic Science.” (1987). Eqbal Ahmad Centre for Public Education.

Web. 28 Jan. 2017.

28 “Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP).”

World Bank. Web. 30 Jan. 2017.

29 Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science, “The Fate of Islamic Science.”

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YG’s “FDT” Got Me Through 2016 And For That He Deserved a Grammy Maryam Elarbi B.A. International Relations, Minor in History ’15, Bryn Mawr College

Personal Essay I’ve always wanted to be the kind of person who naturally fell into disciplined routines. My twin brother is that person.

Every night, I watch him prep his lunch (turkey wrap), iron his shirt and pants (“it’s a vibe”), and get his gym bag together. He’s mastered the art of routine. I, on the other hand, seem strangely incapable of “getting it together,” so to speak. I’d much rather scroll through Twitter and Facebook one more time. Nevertheless, on January 19th, 2017, I became that person—the disciplined kind—for one glorious night… sans packed lunch (perfection doesn’t happen overnight). At 7:10pm, I halfjokingly tweeted:

“Obv wearing all black tomorrow in mourning. Minus my red nails and hijab, representing the blood of my fascist enemies. #Inauguration”.

Given that Donald Trump would become President of the Republic the following day, I needed a uniform to reflect my feelings.

I hit send and dove headfirst into my closet, searching, until finally, I emerged laden with the promised “all-black” attire.

Black pants, black Old Navy top, and an oversized black cardigan. My nails were painted red (the polish was OPI’s “Color So Hot It Berns”, which obviously meant 14 avicenna

Bernie Sanders… to me…) and a solid red scarf was my hijab of choice. The look was topped off by my worn red Doc Martens. I felt really good about it.

The next morning, I got up earlier than usual and got dressed for work. Corny though it may be, I felt emboldened.

Upon getting into the car, I quickly did my makeup in the car and decided to go heavy on the dark lip color. Once my winged liquid liner came to a perfect point, and my mascara was applied, I proceeded to open up Spotify and pulled up “FDT” by YG. YG is an American rapper from Compton, California, and an outspoken opponent of Donald Trump. You can probably guess then what FDT stands for. Because as strong and angry as I felt, the reality was, I was equally as tired and anxious. But I had to get to work. By the time I pulled up to the Starbucks drive-thru, I was on my second replay of the song and could barely hear myself order. I pulled up to the window to retrieve my order with the volume nearly at maximum because I wanted everyone to know where I stood that day—the baristas, the patrons, everyone.

I had rearranged my schedule so that I could leave early on Friday, because I had made the decision to attend the Women’s March,

in spite of its controversy. In preparation for the march, I decided that I would carry a sign. I initially had planned on carrying a sign that read “FYI: I voted for Jill Not Hill” because I didn’t want to be lumped in with the masses of leftist politicians whose positions are in no way representative of me or my view of social justice. Despite the way it rolled off the tongue so easily, I knew it wasn’t the sign. So, I spent a few more days thinking about it. On my commute to and from work, and before going to sleep at night, I racked my brain to think of something clever, subversive, and not mainstream. Finally, two days before the inauguration, it came to me. My sign was going to read: “YG Got Robbed of a Grammy #FuckDonaldTrump”. An obvious reference to the name of the song, but also, a reflection of my innermost feelings towards the 45th President.

Here’s the thing: I’m not joking when I say FDT should’ve won a Grammy. That song was a saving grace for me in 2016 (and now 2017). For a year and a half, I had to endure not only 45’s racist vitriol, but I also had to cope with liberal politics which failed to create an inclusive or relevant campaign. It was astounding to me that Trump wasn’t shut out like the petulant child he behaved like, but rather, he was given a platform to keep at it. Meanwhile, seemingly to protect themselves from legal ramifications, the media refused to call him out for what he was: a racist white supremacist. One of the great failures of this country is the failure to teach people how to identify (and subsequently reject) racism and racist behavior. We remain so firmly rooted in white supremacy, and thus, fail generation after generation because we don’t teach people how to identify racist behavior.

Are we too consumed with pretending it doesn’t exist? I think so. It was devastating to be in a position where I had to fight for

my humanity every day against the gaslighting efforts of those around me from both sides. About a year prior to Election Day, I made the final decision that I would not be voting for Clinton in the election.

Too many times, she had crossed the line into areas that are moral non-starters for me. I found myself engaging in tireless conversations with people on the Left who seemed prepared to accept Hillary without a critical engagement with her or her platform. I’m not saying people shouldn’t have voted for her—everyone’s vote is individual and personal, and I have immense respect for my friends who felt that their vote was a strategic move to keep Trump out. My issue was with folks who seemed incapable of hearing my concerns and views. Every time I posted about my frustration with Clinton or with the DNC on Facebook, swarms of wellmeaning white people urged me to see the good intentions. When I called out both Bill and Hillary Clinton for their dehumanization of Muslim-Americans— effectively reducing our value as citizens to our efficacy in combating terrorism (in two separate speeches, on two separate days)—I was presented with more reasons why I should still support the party, despite clear evidence that the party did not represent my personal interests.

Furthermore, I was never asked by those calling themselves allies how they could help. Instead, they did what they thought was best, which unsurprisingly was not in line with what I needed. They may have said they rejected 45 and his policies, but time after time they were prepared to “give him a chance” and “hear out his voters.” Just like when they ignored my concerns over Hillary, their engagement with “The Other Side” was another reminder that violations against my humanity, my faith, and other marginalized folks was not a deal-breaker for them. No, what they preferred was that the stanford journal on muslim affairs

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we stayed quiet and docile, so they could discuss the state of America with the other white folks across the table.

In a world where respectability politics reign, the marginalized are expected to endure oppression while staying polite about it. We can’t call out our oppressors, because they might be nice people, who don’t know better, who are “trying”. While the rest of us are expected to live up to impossible standards of enduring and resisting oppression, the people for whose humanity is fully validated by existing power structures get free passes. The power dynamics at play go completely unaddressed. I shared online that I had chosen to vote third party because the Democratic Party violated my morals, both personally in that its leadership had publicly dehumanized Muslims on more than one occasion, but also economically and socially given its various foreign ties and proposed plans. Shortly thereafter commenters, some of them white women with whom I had marched in the Women’s March, felt comfortable telling me that given my decision, I had no right to publicly be upset about Trump online. In other words, because I didn’t do what they believed was necessary to keep him out, I should stay quiet. Never mind the fact that: 1) his policies would directly impact me and people who looked like me, but 2) the same forces that propelled him forward were many of the same that propelled Hillary. I’ve had to deal with multiple white women having public meltdowns on my page because I refuse to accept their neoliberal colonial commentary. Frankly, it’s exhausting. Finally, on November 9th I broke down in the bathroom alone. My grief was not going to be shared with the people who for so long had attempted to silence my voice, and who had been complicit in creating the conditions that 16 avicenna

made a Trump presidency possible. Our grief was not the same. They cried because their faith in a democratic (capitalist, white supremacist) system had been shaken. I cried because I felt truly unsafe in the spaces I call home. What I needed on November 9th, and again on January 20th was not a call for “respectful dialogue” or to “hear the other side out.” I needed an unapologetic rejection of everything 45 had come to represent. I needed to hear “Fuck Donald Trump” over and over by someone who wasn’t me. That’s what YG did, and continues to do, for me and others.

Now it is more important than ever to have voices that do no succumb to the arbitrary rules with white capitalist respectability at the center. YG’s song speaks to me so strongly, because it makes me feel acknowledged and loved. It makes me feel like finally, there’s something in the public consciousness that fully rejects everything Trump stands for, and really stands up for the people. That track is a reminder that my humanity is recognized and validated, and that we can, and should, reject Trump with all the anger and passion we can muster, because otherwise, the cycle with continue to repeat itself. YG’s “FDT” is going to mean something important when this period of time is read about in the history books. Maybe then he’ll get the recognition he deserves.

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Snapshots of Syrian Child Refugees in Jordan and Greece Laila Soudi, MSc in Global Health Sciences ’15, University of California, San Francisco; Psychiatry researcher at Stanford University School of Medicine

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Street Lights Tariq El-Gabalawy B.A. Linguistics ’13, University of California, Santa Cruz

I stopped dreaming of the night’s sky Because installed streetlights burned my eyes whenever I tried to look up past them To the celestial accouterments that adorned my imagination Marking the gates of heaven like the neon lights of Vegas welcome prospective sinners I’d like to think that heaven is like Vegas A place where my vices won’t keep me from thoughtless indulgence But deep down I know heaven isn’t so circus circus cheap And I haven’t started trying hard enough Cause trying at all is hard enough.

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And most of me doesn’t want to I’ve been told my entire life I ain't worth it I’ve been told my entire life that I’m a rag-headed terrorist Whose mother and aunts wouldn’t know their rights, Even if they used those rights to wrap their heads.

Whose father and uncles use their beards to hide bombs at airports So, who cares if the search isn’t really random?

Whose mosques are so often frequented by FBI agents who babysit us Muslims because we aren’t grown up enough to watch over ourselves And who was told by a man with an American flag bandana that we really really really need to find Jesus.

And I started to believe it all.

I stopped dreaming of the night and embraced the synthetic glare of streetlights, Even though the moon and stars never burned me I traded myself away for a “real” American Just to purge thoughts of fabricated insecurities I stopped hoping for sun-shiny bounty Even when loved ones would tell me, Look up Every time you open your eyes, Look up Because no matter how many times the sun’s fire burns them Night will come and bring the serenity of the moon’s kiss Leaving her fragrant essence dripping from the willow branches, Hanging from your eyelids, You will know kindness but not if you hide from tyrants behind a furrowed brow You have abandoned hoping because you have mistaken hope for a tree bearing a fruit called blindness.

Only to discover every oasis melts into a mirage

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as soon as you hold the water close enough to your lips.

No. Hope is the apparatus holding flesh back from blanketing your iris, Forcing you to look up wide eyed through cataracts at the sun Until your shouts for justice scare the sun westward while beckoning the moon from the east But my dreams, stopped calling for the moon Because installed streetlights burned my eyes Whenever I tried to look up past them To the celestial accouterments that adorned my imagination.

Photos by Eva Grant '19

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Radical Islam and Radical Islamophobes A Q&A with Professor Abbas Milani on the “Muslim Ban” Kit Ramgopal B.A. International Relations, Minor in Ethics in Society and Middle Eastern Languages and Culture ’19, Stanford University

Professor Abbas Milani is an Iranian-American historian and author, who currently serves as Professor in the Stanford Global Studies division, director of the Iranian Studies program, and research fellow at the Hoover Institution. Milani was born in Iran and taught at the University of Tehran until 1986. His expertise include Iranian politics, international security, and U.S.-Iran relations. He was a political prisoner under the Shah in the 1970s, exiled during the Iranian revolution in the 1980s, and now serves as research fellow and co-director of the Hoover Institution’s Iranian Democracy Project.

He recently co-authored an article for The Atlantic with Professor Michael McFaul on President Trump’s “Muslim ban.”

Kit Ramgopal: To start off, I’d like to ask you about the effects of the Muslim ban on the Islamic groups they’re actually targeted towards. Do you believe that the ban will stem the movement of these terrorist groups?

Prof. Abbas Milani: No, I don’t, because the countries that were banned have produced virtually none of the terrorist attacks on the United States. There’s fairly good statistics on which countries’ citizens were responsible, and the seven countries banned were responsible for zero number of attacks. In contrast, countries that were not banned—like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE—were responsible. But, in my view, even putting a country like Saudi Arabia or Egypt on a banned list is ill-advised because the citizens of those countries are not responsible for the behavior of a very

small radical minority. If anything, you need more of those citizens to come to the US and experience living in an open society.

The only way radical Islam is going to be defeated is if you mobilize, unite with, and further empower the majority of Muslims who are moderates to fight it together. This ban isolates and stigmatizes them. The ban is a perfect campaign slogan for radical Islamists who have consistently said that liberal democracy is a façade, that liberal democracies do not welcome Muslims, and the only safe harbor for Muslims is under the Islamic caliphate. Banning Muslims en masse like this only confirms that pernicious conspiracy theory.

Ramgopal: There have been several statements in the press that this ban is

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actually being used to fuel recruitment for groups like ISIS, who capitalize on this idea that Islam is incompatible with the West. Do you think there’s traction to that?

Milani: Oh absolutely. ISIS has a whole theory on this; it’s called the “grey zone.”

They say that the theory of the West as a safe harbor for Muslims is an illusion. They say, “In order for us to create the Islamic state, we have to disabuse Muslims of this illusion.”

And how are they going to do it? They’re going to carry out terrorist attacks that beget Islamophobia, that beget policies like banning. That fulfills the prophecy.

They create conditions for the fulfillment of their own prophecy.

Ramgopal: Do you think that the prophecy is becoming reality? Would you consider the West still a safe harbor for Muslims, under the Trump administration?

Milani: It’s less safe than it was before, but I still think that, for the majority of Muslims, the West is still a safe place. The reason I’m hesitant to answer this is that the West isn’t one monolithic phenomenon. When I used talk about how Muslims were mistreated in the West, the two countries that came to mind would be Germany and France. In Germany, the Turks who had lived there for three generations were denied the right to get a passport. And the country that I would mention as the only one that has successfully accommodated Muslims would be the United States. Because in the United States, it did not matter at all what country you were born in. This is a country where the covenant of citizenship is the constitution; not blood. Wherever you’re born, if you come here, and you say you will play by the rules of the constitution, and you abide by the rules, you can 24 avicenna

become a citizen. The only thing you can’t do is run for the Presidency. Now, with this ban, Germany is much more open to Muslims. Germany has taken 900,000 of them, the United States has taken 2,500 of the Syrians and Mr. Trump still complains.

The West isn’t monolithic.

But also, remember one very important historic fact. In 1,300 years of history of Islam and Judo-Christian relations, never ever had there been more Muslims living in the Christian world than there were Christians in the Muslim world.

Now we have almost 60 million Muslims living in the Christian world. This is a new phenomenon. Neither side has really learned the rules of how to live together but the place they had best learned it was the United States. The ban and some of the policies that are put in place are going to reverse that, unfortunately.

Ramgopal: In your experience, what turns a moderate Muslim into a radical Muslim?

How does that transition happen?

Milani: Well, there are all kinds of studies about this. Some people say it’s only the petty criminals, the marginalized—that’s not true. We also have a recent study called “Engineers of Jihad” that shows that sometimes the best and brightest kids in Muslim society also join. So you have a whole array of causes, including alienation, alienating aspects of globalism, unemployment, sense of betrayal regarding other ideologies, a generational problem, a sense of the West looking down on some of these Muslim societies… To me, no single cause can be picked out. Different people at different moments are pulled into this temptation. You see that the other side [the radical groups] works very methodically.

They sometimes spend months finding someone who fits the model, who is

disgruntled, who wants to do something [...].

If you’re ready to die, there’s very little that can be done to stop you from doing a disproportionate amount of damage.

People forget how much liberal democracy relies on the good will of everybody. You drive on a road and you abide by the rules.

The implicit assumption is that everyone else is also going to abide by the rules. The laws of liberal democracy work if these implicit assumptions are respected. One of those implicit assumptions is that life is valuable. If you think that life in this world is not valuable, and if you are willing to kill people for your cause, to wreak havoc—the more innocent they are, the better—you need a very, very small number of people.

Ramgopal: Looking at the ban as an academic, what worries you most? What are the things that Americans with the values you just stated—values founded in the covenant of citizenship—have to be worried about most?

Milani: At the Iranian Studies that I am running, we can no longer invite a third of our guests, so we have to reconfigure our program for spring. Our last invited guest for this winter quarter and several of our guests for next quarter are not going to be able to come. Our last guest for March was one of the most eminent Iranian poets of the last fifty years […] That’s a loss for our students, and a loss for the United States.

Now look at the number of companies in Silicon Valley run and founded by immigrants. Look at the number of physicians, look at the engineers, look at the laborers. The miracle of California economy would be absolutely unimaginable without immigrants.

The richness of American academia,

the richness of American science and technology is fueled by the immigrants.

Now that capital is not going to come to the US— it’s going to go to Canada, to Estonia, to Europe, to Spain. The long-term consequences for science, for discoveries, for scholarship, are monumental if the ban works. Many of the most important innovations in technology are made from foreign-born people, some born in Muslim countries.

Ramgopal: As students and/or citizens of America—watching this unfold, watching the Trump administration move further towards Islamophobic policies—what can we do right now?

Milani: We should do what President Obama said in his farewell speech.

Democracy needs to be defended. We need to be vigilant about what our rights are, and we need to vigorously and relentlessly defend the rights of not just ourselves, but everyone. If we don’t say loud and clear today that we are adamantly opposed to the desecration of Jewish graves, we won’t have the right to stand up when they go to desecrate Muslim graves. Every minority who has successfully defended their rights in society knows they have to defend the rights of others.

If we want to make sure Islamophobia doesn’t win, we have to vigorously oppose phobias against others as much as against Muslims. I still believe—I really honestly do—in the basic decency of the American populous and in the fundamental soundness of the democratic system. But I also know that it’s a very, very vulnerable system. It’s much more fragile. We can’t take our rights for granted. We’ll be okay, but we need to fight for it. I really believe that that was a very wise way for Obama to end his presidency. the stanford journal on muslim affairs

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Ramgopal: Do you think that the Trump presidency is headed towards authoritarianism?

Milani: I think it certainly has that tendency. I think he does not abide by the normal rules, and he certainly has a tendency towards populism, and populism can easily bleed into authoritarianism. I absolutely think that the attack on some of the most respectable media in this country and around the world—the BBC, the New York Times—and the attack on the judiciary are very dangerous. You can’t, as a President of the United States, attack the media as false news every time they say something you don’t like. That’s the worst kind of authoritarianism.

If I had this conversation two years ago, and you talked about the possibility of authoritarianism in America, I wouldn’t use any of these words. I would say, “Absolutely no, why do you even raise that question?” But now, I think you’d be foolish not to take Trump seriously and mobilize all the forces. He came at a moment where there was a lot of anger in this country and he successfully mobilized that anger.

He could have been, and still could be, a force for a lot of good. But he could also be a force for moving the country towards authoritarianism. So far, there isn’t any good indication that he’ll become the head of a movement that seeks to improve the status quo.

Ramgopal: What’s a question that you wished people asked more when they’re talking about the Muslim ban; when they’re talking about Trump, when they’re talking about the fates of the victims of this new surge of Islamophobia? What’s something that people aren’t asking that they should be asking?

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Milani: I think the question that they should be asking is “Is there something called Islam?” There isn’t. We have “Islams”; we don’t have Islam. There are almost as many varieties of Islam as there are varieties of Christianity and Judaism and Buddhism. To me, to surmise that there is one Islam—whether you believe it to be all good or all evil—is the biggest source of misunderstanding.

When you reduce a complicated phenomenon to something that it is not reducible to, you’re preparing the ground for a stereotype. It’s only populists who offer simple solutions to complicated problems. Islam is a complicated, multifaceted phenomenon. At times it has created civilizations that were the centers of learning in the world, and at times it has created radical groups that burn people in the name of their faith.

At times you can follow the same pattern in Christianity. [In Shakespeare’s London] if you were caught at the wrong side of the faith question— a Jesuit, let’s say— and they caught you, the way they would punish you was they would hang you, but not hang you to be killed immediately.

They would hang you until near-death, and then they would take your heart out, and then they would cut your genitals and feed it to you, and then they would quarter you, chop your head off, and put your head on a spear in the middle of London town.

So, based on that, can I say Christianity believed in quartering people? No. It was a phase in Christianity, there were many “Christianities” then, and there are many “Christianities” today. Only two groups believe there is a notion called Islam: the Islamophobes and the radical Islamists.

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The "Muslim Ban" Is Mad; We Need to Think About Why It Happened Walter Goodwin B.S. Engineering ’18, Oxford University

Op-Ed The erosion of our sense of what is normal and abnormal is Trump’s biggest threat, and retention of our ideals and own ideas of normality is essential to counter Trump’s lasting influence on the world. Beyond an initial tantrum of executive orders— already being unpicked—his continued power depends on creating confusion between the real and unreal. A divided and poorly educated electorate is the problem we must tackle if we want to make this harder for him.

In getting elected, Trump exploited the gap between the real, complex causes of working class issues and the scapegoats that were already easy to find, having long been established by a media system that was already more entertainment than information. According to Trump, globalisation destroyed industrial America, Mexican crime and drugs have undermined society, and radical Islam poses the greatest threat to American lives. The first two are infantile oversimplifications, and the last is a direct lie.1 While Trump’s “Muslim Ban” is thankfully—for the moment—lifted, it has demonstrated that the world can be profoundly affected by the resonance of false ideas. Whether or not Trump himself 1 Since 2001, more Americans have been killed by toddlers than by Islamic terrorists. (See: Holden, Paul. “Shock Tactics: How the Arms Industry Trades on Our Fear of Terrorism.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 20 Mar. 2017. Web. 21 Mar. 2017.)

believes in what he says is no longer important; much of the electorate has shown itself willing to support these ideas, and it is this that shapes how a democracy works. It is a consolation that millions have marched in defiance, and that judges have done their best to halt Trump’s progress, but this is just putting our finger in the dyke. We need to consider again how Trump came to win a democratic mandate in the first place.

On the night of the election, I was with students from Stanford. Education was the thing that demographically united us, and it was to prove a key metric in this election, where voting patterns were much more divided by education than ever before.2 Our educational backgrounds made it statistically unsurprising that we radically opposed Trump and his policies.3 However, what did strike me, perhaps uniquely as a non-American, were the comments as the votes came in. “It’s literally just cows there,” scoffed somebody, after Texas was declared 2 A 16-point divide opened between college graduates (for Clinton) and others (for Trump). By contrast, in 2012, college graduates were actually 2 points more likely to vote Republican. (See: Tyson, Alec, and Shiva Maniam. “Behind Trump’s victory: Divisions by race, gender, education.” Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, 09 Nov. 2016. Web. 20 Feb. 2017.)

3 Before the election, a poll at Harvard showed that just 4 percent of Harvard seniors would vote for Trump. (See: Watros, Steven R., and Cordelia F. Mendez. “Class of 2016 By the Numbers.” The Harvard Crimson. The Harvard Crimson, Inc. Web. 03 Mar. 2017.)

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for Donald Trump, the 4.7 million human beings who voted Republican in Texas written off, blasé. “I’m not surprised, that’s what generations of inbreeding does,” joked another. How willing these modern, liberal students were to flippantly discredit millions of people while simultaneously holding their outrage at Trump’s own prejudiced and nasty policies surprised me. But it’s exactly this divide that Trump exploited.

Parallels between two very different types of xenophobia are clear. Democrat California now has a popular movement for devolution, while Republicans also want to build walls between themselves and people who’ve never actually done them any direct harm. The average elite student probably knows just as little about the inhabitants of rural Kansas as those inhabitants might about any of the seven countries on Trump’s travel ban. Middle Image source: Kent, David. “Wide Education Gaps in 2016 Preferences, among All Voters and among Whites.” Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, 09 Nov. 2016. Web. 20 Feb. 2017.

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Americans are right to feel distanced from an elite whose Stanford-educated children will write them off as a herd of inbred cattle.

Like Trump’s supporters, the rest of America is falling prey to oversimplification. Fight Trump’s policies, but please stop widening the enormous divide that has been opening in your country. This is the wound that needs to be examined and healed if we want to avoid all of this from happening again. Unbroken progress is not a divine right, and we all need to work bloody hard to make sure things don’t get worse.

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Where Are You From?

Hamzeh Daoud B.S. Symbolic Systems and B.A. Theater and Performance Studies ’20, Stanford University

Spoken Word A conversation between a refugee mother and an officer at a refugee camp Where are you from? He asks as though she is the first case he handles and there was a need to ask such a question She stands there, and as she stands there she blinks every now and then to give her cuticles the decency of rehydrating while her throat goes dry thinking of such a question As she takes a breath in, she feels the contractions of her muscles gravitating towards her heart, suffocating the very essence that makes up the very breath she was taking She feels the pulsating blood moving through her veins, tensing up every organ, every tissue and every cell until the only cell left unstrained is the one she is now held captive in For the first time since she came here, she feels… fear Where is she from?

A question she started thinking of whenever she wants to fathom her own sense of belonging

She knows she was born in a hospital in a small village in Syria, wouldn’t that make it an answer?

She is completely frozen. And with every tear that rolls down the side of her dry, scabby cheek, she remembers.

“Kids, time for dinner, I made you Kobbeh with Hummus, come on before it gets cold.”

“Habeebi, my love, keep making this house safe for us. Bahibak, I love you.”

“Habeebi, my love, where are you going? No, don’t go, you need to keep us safe, there are bombs out there. He’s killing us all, stay. Bahibak, I love you.”

“My son! NO! Not my boy! Not my baby! Not my little angel! Not you, my pride and joy, my young man! Habeebi.

Habeebi. Habeebi. Habeebi. No!” “Why are you telling me to leave you?

You said you were always going to keep us safe. Where should I go, where should I take her? She’s our daughter, she’s alive. I can’t do this.”

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“It’s okay habeebti, my darling, we’re almost there. Stop crying habeebti, it’s okay. I have no food left. I can’t habeebti.”

It was at that moment she knew an answer to the question: “Where are you from?” Could be met with aching silence.

“I know, I know, I know it’s hot, we’re almost there. It’s going to be okay. Baba will come soon. As soon as we get there he’ll come right after us.”

The officer asks again: Where are you from?

“Habeebti wake up, we need to keep moving. Habeebti? Habeebti. No. Not you. No. You’re the reason I’m doing this, habeebti. Wake up. Wake up.

Habeebti. Habeebti no. NO. No.” “I am alone.”

“Hello officer.”

Photograph shot in Berlin, Germany by Sevde Kaldıroğlu '17.

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She answers: ...

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Barriers and Facilitators to Seeking Mental Health Services Amongst Refugees in Greece Laila Soudi, MSc: Psychiatry researcher at Stanford University School of Medicine, Mental Health Lead with the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) Dr. Hana Abu-Hassan, MBBS MRCGP JBFM: Family Medicine Consultant in the UK and Jordan, Assistant Professor of Medicine at University of Jordan.

Abstract In 2016, Greece received 169,459 refugees and migrants, the majority (87%) of whom came from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.1 Still suffering from the 2008 financial crisis, Greece was severely unprepared to host refugees after the European Union’s decision to shut the Balkan states. As a result, over 80,000 refugees remain in Greece today in conditions that have been compared to Nazi concentration camps. Through focus groups conducted on the border of Greece and Macedonia with refugees as well as representatives of major NGOs and the Greek Ministry of Health, the above named authors identified the major barriers and facilitators for providing and accessing physical and mental health services. While variable, major barriers identified included the following: lack of medical supplies, lack of Arabic-speaking personnel on the ground, lack of other basic necessities such as food, lack of trust among refugees themselves for medical professionals, and stigma in seeking mental health treatment.

Facilitators included a triage-based referral 1 “Most Common Nationalities of Mediterranean Sea Arrivals from January 2016.” Operational Portal – Refugee Situations. The UN Refugee Agency. Web. 17 Feb. 2017.

network among NGOs, proximity of clinic to refugee camp, and the presence mental health professionals from the same culture as refugees. Identifying the major barriers and facilitators to providing and seeking health services among NGOs, the ministry as well as refugees, respectively, is imperative in ensuring better health outcomes for refugees.

Introduction The number of displaced individuals today has never been higher, surpassing even post-World War II estimates. Today, there are over 65.3 million displaced individuals worldwide, including 22 million refugees, over half of whom are under 18.

In 2016, Greece received 169,459 refugees and migrants, the majority (87%) of whom came from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Still suffering from the 2008 financial crisis, Greece was severely unprepared to host refugees after the European Union’s overnight decision to shut the Balkan states on March 7, 2016. As a result, over 60,000 refugees, the majority of whom are Syrian, remain in Greece today in conditions that have been deemed “unfit for animals.” the stanford journal on muslim affairs

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Situational Analysis There is a tremendous lack of resources for refugees in Greece in terms of medical supplies and basic services such as food Image Source: Tasch, Barbara, and Mike Nudelman. “This Map Shows the Routes of Europe’s Refugee Nightmare – and How It’s Getting Worse.” Business Insider. Business Insider Inc., 15 Sept. 2015. Web. 17 Feb. 2017.

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and clean water. The single most pressing threat now is freezing conditions which have already resulted in several deaths across Greece. The majority of health services in Greece are being delivered by non-governmental organizations including the Syrian American Medical Society - Global Response, Doctors

Without Borders, the International Rescue Committee, and other small, local NGOs. The Greek law 4368/2016 extended the right to free access to healthcare and subsidized cost of medicine to refugees in Greece; the caveat, however, is that the law applies only to registered refugees/asylum seekers. Refugees must therefore obtain a tax registration number and a social security registration number. Access to health services is limited due to lack of transportation, cultural mediators, and referral pathways provided by national health system.

Methods Semi-structured focus group discussions were conducted with two groups (n=25 each) on the border of Greece and Macedonia with refugees as well as representatives of international NGOs and the Greek Ministry of Health to identify the major barriers and facilitators to providing and accessing medical and psychological health services. Focus group discussions were conducted to attain a first-hand perspective of refugees’ experiences. Open-ended questions were formulated based on discussions with refugees as well as service providers. Items included presence of any mental health symptoms, sources of help for any mental health problems, and the attitudes that encourage or prevent individuals from seeking treatment.

Results Several barriers and facilitators to seeking and providing mental health services were identified from the focus groups.

The prominent barriers on behalf of the refugees include the lack of medical supplies, lack of Arabic-speaking (or Farsi or other native language speaking)

personnel on the ground, the lack of other basic necessities such as food, lack of trust among refugees themselves for medical professionals, and stigma attached to seeking mental health treatment. Some of the identified facilitators included a triagebased referral network among NGOs on the ground to effectively meet the needs of the refugee population, proximity of a medical clinic to a refugee camp, and the presence of mental health professionals from the same culture as refugees.

Barriers to committing suicide in the face of such atrocious living conditions were also identified. Two specific barriers were identified amongst the majority of refugees, and they include (1) the role of their Muslim religion and (2) the fate of their children. This is demonstrated by the following quotes collected from the field:

“Had we known about the conditions in Greece while we were still in Syria, we would have stayed there. The only difference between the two places is that it would have been a fast death there versus the excruciatingly slow one here.

Every day in Greece, we are denied our humanity. We risked our lives and the lives of our children and almost drowned in the Mediterranean for security. Trust me, no one would expose their children to that unless there was no other option. But now, I wish I could go back to Syria. Take me back there, where I would at least die with some dignity.” –Mohammad, 45 “The conditions here are beyond anything we anticipated. We thought we would be met with opportunities to get jobs and enroll our children in school. Instead, we are here in the cold, eating rotten food, not having any sense of what’s going to happen to us. This is our fate—God is great. If it weren’t for our strong belief in God and the stanford journal on muslim affairs

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His plan for us, all of us would have died a long time ago.” – Ahmad, 25 “Who is going to take care of my child if I die? Every parent who decides to cross the Mediterranean Sea and risk their lives does so only for their children. We want our children to have better opportunities than we did back home. We want them to be in the best schools and to have good jobs, so they can raise their kids in a way we could not.” –Mariam, 32 Focus group discussions were also used to gather refugees’ thoughts on any lessons they would like to impart to the general public or any information they would like to share with others across the world. The following quotes were collected:

“It is so easy to judge us as refugees. It is so easy to look at us and imagine that you will never be in our shoes. You will never lose your home and sense of security and everything you have ever known. You are wrong. We also thought that a few years ago. We thought we had everything we wanted in a beautiful country we called home. Now we have nothing. The only thing we have is our family—well, the members who are still alive—and the clothes I am wearing right now. This could happen to you; it could happen to anyone.”

–Alaa, 20 “We need you to understand that we do not want to be in Europe or the United States. We just want to go back home.

No one wants to leave their home and be stranded in a land where they do not speak the language and where they are not welcomed. Stop the war in Syria today, and we will go back. We will be the generation that rebuilds everything.” –Manar, 16

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Discussion Greece has inexcusably failed to meet the humanitarian and medical needs of refugees across the country. Identifying the major barriers and facilitators to providing and seeking health services among NGOs, the ministry as well as refugees, respectively, is imperative in ensuring better health outcomes for refugees. Being aware of the barriers to committing suicide on behalf of refugees is important for any mental health implementation program for refugees.

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A P E O P L E ’ S P U B L I C AT I O N

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