2022_Preparing Australia for a potential surge in environmental migration

Australian Planner

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Preparing Australia for a potential surge in environmental migration

Julian Bolleter, Bill Grace & Robert Freestone

To cite this article: Julian Bolleter, Bill Grace & Robert Freestone (2022): Preparing Australia for a potential surge in environmental migration, Australian Planner, DOI: 10.1080/07293682.2022.2116061

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/07293682.2022.2116061

Published online: 01 Sep 2022.

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PreparingAustraliaforapotentialsurgeinenvironmentalmigration

JulianBolleter a,BillGrace a andRobertFreestone b

aTheAustralianUrbanDesignResearchCentre,UniversityofWesternAustralia,Perth,Australia;

bSchoolofBuiltEnvironment,University ofNewSouthWales,Sydney,Australia

ABSTRACT

Projectionsforthenumberofpeopledisplacedbyclimatechangegloballyarestartlingand varyfrom100millionto1billion;however,awidelyrepeatedpredictionisfor200million bythemid-twenty-firstcentury.Althoughdifficulttoestimate,someproportionofthese peoplewillcrossbordersandendupinGlobalNorthcountries.Thispaperoffersa provocationontheimplicationsforAustraliancities.ItreviewsAustralia’ssignificant strategicplanningpoliciesinlightofapossiblemid-futuresurgeinenvironmentalmigrants andconsidershowsuchpoliciescouldbetterprepareAustraliancities.Thepaperconcludes thataNationalUrbanPolicycouldstrengthenstrategicpreparednessforenvironmental migration.

Introduction

Climatechangeandmigrationinterconnectinmany ways(Hugo 2013).Theincreasingmanifestationsof climatechange – includingsea-levelrise,drought, heatstress, fire, floods,andcyclones – particularlyin theworld’spoorercountries – willresultinasizeable, affectedpopulationindecadestocome(IPCC 2021, 2022).AccordingtoareporttotheEuropeanParliament,GlobalSouthcountriesaremostvulnerableto climatechange(Kraler,Cernei,andNoak 2011),as increasingclimaterisksareprojectedtoexacerbate existingvulnerabilitiesandsocialinequalitiesand inequities(IPCC 2022).Thissituationcouldalso leadto ‘large-scaleanddisruptivepopulationmovements’ (Stern 2007).InfacttheIntergovernmental PanelonClimateChange(IPCC)echoessentiments thatthe ‘greatestsingleimpactofclimatechange couldbeonhumanmigration’ (InInternational OrganizationforMigration 2008,9).

Climatechangewilldisplaceaffectedpeoplewithin theirowncountries,whileotherswillcrossborders throughinformalmigrationsorinternationallycoordinatedprograms.Plannedmigrationwillnothappen quicklyorwithoutovercomingsubstantialpolitical challenges.HowwelltheGlobalNorthrespondsto thepredictedhumandisplacementimpactsoftheclimatecrisiswilldictatehow ‘wecansustainourselves inwhatwecallcivilisedhumansociety’ (Wennersten andRobbins 2017,32).

So,howshouldtheGlobalNorth,ingeneral, respondtothechallengesposedbythishumanitarian by-productofworseningglobalimpactsofclimate change?Expertshaverecognisedthe ‘climaterefugee’

ARTICLEHISTORY

Received17February2022

Accepted16August2022

KEYWORDS

Climatechange;climate changerefugees;climate migrants;environmental migrants;planning; Australiancities

problemsincethe1990s(Myers 1993),withlegal definitionaldebatessubsequentlycomprisingasignificantfractionoftheliterature(ForexampleInternationalOrganizationforMigration 2008). AustralianattentionhasfocusedontheregionalimplicationsandresponsibilitiesoftheinundationoflowlyingPacificIslandstates(Koser 2012).Thereisan acknowledgementofthechallengesemergingforcities regardingthecostsofdirectanddestructiveimpacts andthus ‘pressuresonurbaninfrastructurearising fromdomesticandinternationalclimate-related migrationandrefugee flows ’ (AEGN 2020). Managing immigrationmorebroadlyislinkedindeliblytobetter urbanplanning: ‘Ifwecannotmakeourcitieswork withextrapeople,fromdiversebackgrounds,public supportforimmigrationwillevaporate’ (O’Neiland Watts 2015,146).

Theimportanceofpreparationforpopulation changeonanationalscalecurrentlyliesintheevolutionoftheNationalPopulationandPlanningFramework.Thisproposalemergedin2019fromthe CouncilofAustralianGovernmentswithavisionto improvequalityoflife,supporteconomicgrowth, encouragecommunitycohesion,andensuresustainableurbanandregionalgrowth(CoalitionofAustralianGovernments 2019).TheformerMorrison CoalitionGovernmentaccepted,inprinciple,the importanceandtimelinessofdeveloping ‘anational planofsettlement,providinganationalvisionfor ourcitiesandregionsacrossthenext fiftyyears’ (AustralianGovernment 2020,4).ThenewAlbaneseLabor GovernmentelectedinMay2022haspledgedCommonwealthinvolvementinurbandevelopmentissues.

ThePlanningInstituteofAustralia(PIA)hasbeenan influentiallobbyistbehindFederalGovernmentinterventioninrecognisingthatthemultiplicityofcurrent planningstrategiesandpoliciesfromthethreetiersof governmentlacksarobustintegrativeandcohesive frameworktodeliverthevision – andresilienceto accommodatedownstreamshocks(PlanningInstitute ofAustralia 2018).

Thispaperlinksclimatechange,migration,andthe urbanenvironmenttoexamineasacriticalprovocationthelikelyglobalnatureandscaleofthechallenge forstrategicplanninginAustralia.Inparticular,we examineAustralia’spreparednessforsubstantial environmentalmigrationinthelightofitsimmigrationandplanningpolicies.Thecentralresearchquestionis:doAustralia’sfederalandstategovernment strategicplanningpoliciesallowforapossiblesurge inenvironmentalmigrantsprojectedmid-century? Subsequently,wediscusshowstrategicplanners couldbetterprepareAustraliancitiesandtownsfor apotentialsurgeinenvironmentalmigrationinthis century.Finally,wearguethatthecaseforincreasing Australia’shumanitarianintaketoabsorbenvironmentalmigrantshasamoralandcertainlyenvironmentaljusticedimension(Ahmed 2018).

Background

Driversofenvironmentalmigration

Theconnectionbetweenenvironmentalchangeand migrationisnotstraightforward – thenatureand scaleoftheenvironmentalimpactmatter.For example,short-term,morelocalisedeventsassociated withthegrowingintensityofnaturaldisasterssuchas tropicalcyclones,heavyrains,and floodsmaylead onlytointernalmigration(Koser 2012).However, slow-onsetmega-eventssuchaswarminganddrought (whichwilltriggerheatstressandaffectagricultural productivityandfreshwateraccess),sea-levelrise (whichrenderscoastalareasandislandsuninhabitable),andconsequentialstrugglesfornaturalresources (assourcesofconflict)maybelongtermdriversof internationalenvironmentalmigration(Rigaudetal. 2018).

Intermsofheatstress,recentresearchhasbegunto identifyregionalhotspotswhereclimatechangewill havesevereconsequencesforhumanhealthandwellbeing(PalandEltahir 2016).Indeed,chronicheat stresscouldpotentiallycalltheviabilityofsome regionsintoquestion,particularlyinthetropicsand partsofthemid-latitudes(Coffel,Horton,andDe Sherbinin 2017).SuchregionsincludetheMiddle East(Bolleteretal. “Wet-BulbTemperature,” 2021; PalandEltahir 2016),northernSouthAmerica,CentralandEasternAfrica,andSouth-EastAsia.Moreover,theseregionsaresomeoftheworld’smost

heavilypopulated(Coffel,Horton,andDeSherbinin 2017).Theeffectsofpossiblelethalheatwavesare duetoelevatedtemperaturesandhumidity.High heatcombinedwithhighhumidityweakensthe humanbody’sabilitytocontrolitstemperatureby sweating(Steadman 1979).Urbanareasarealso knowntoexacerbatetheimpactsofextremeheat eventsthroughtheUrbanHeatIsland(UHI)phenomenon(Gardesetal. 2020).Thefurtherconcentration ofpopulationinurbanareas,whichmayalsobesubjecttoclimatechange-relatedheatstressthroughtheir morphology,posessignificantchallengesfroman adaptationplanningperspective(Andersonetal. 2018;Füssel 2007).

Sea-levelrisepresentssignificantthreatstocoastal areas – througherosion, flooding,permanentinundation,higherstormsurges,andsaltwaterintrusion.At thesametime,demographersprojectcoastalpopulationsandeconomiestoincreaseinthefollowing decades(Hurlimannetal. 2014),compoundingthe implicationsofthissituation.Recentprojections fromtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange (IPCC)arethatby2100GlobalMeanSeaLevel (GMSL)couldriseby0.5–0.9mundercurrentplausibleglobalgreenhousegasemissionstrajectories. However,risesto1.75m(duetoice-sheetuncertainties)arepossible(IPCC 2021).Regardless,givenhistoricgreenhousegasemissions,seaswillcontinueto riseforcenturies.Theconsequencesarealarming.At least10%oftheglobalpopulationlivesatanelevation within10mofexistingsealevel,withscarceresources inmanyGlobalSouthcountriesconstrainingadaptation(HindsleyandYoskowitz 2020).Alreadyvulnerable andmarginalisedgroupswilldirectly experiencetheimpactofenvironmentalchange becausetheyaremoreexposedtohazardsthrough lowhousingquality,lackhazard-mitigatinginfrastructuresuchaseffectivedrainageandhaveminimal accesstogovernmentassistance(Koser 2012).

Climate-inducedmigration

Theissuesofheatstressandsea-levelrise,amongst others,willinducesubstantialpopulationdisplacementglobally,resultingin flowsofwhattheInternationalOrganizationforMigrationterms ‘environmentalmigrants’.Thistermrefersto persons,who,forcompellingreasonsofsuddenor progressivechangesintheenvironmentthat adverselyaffecttheirlivesorlivingconditions,are obligedtoleavetheirhabitualhomes,orchosetodo so,eithertemporarilyorpermanently,andwho moveeitherwithintheircountryorabroad.(InternationalOrganizationforMigration 2008,14)

Inaddition,climate-inducedmigrationisasignificant componentofabroaderspectrumofpopulation

displacementdrivenbyvariousformsofenvironmentaldegradationandnaturaldisasters. Expertscontesttheprojectedscaleofmovement (Blacketal. 2008;InternalDisplacementMonitoring Centre 2022;WennerstenandRobbins 2017).Many areunderstandablynervousaboutestimatingthe scaleofenvironmentalmigration(Koser 2012).Estimatesoffutureemissionsarenotrobustenoughto makesolidpredictionsaboutthescaleofclimate changeanddataoncontemporarymigrationaretoo inaccuratetouseforforecasting(Koser 2012).Climate changecancompoundthreatsandworseninequalities,diminishlivelihoods,orintensifyconflict,makingitdifficulttodiscernenvironmentalfactorsin independentlypromptingmigration(Koser 2012).

Nonetheless,theindicativenumbersaretroubling. Oneauthoritativetabulationestimatesthat25.3 millionpeoplearealreadymadehomelessannually throughvariousdirectweather-relatednaturaldisasters(InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentre 2022).Anotherestimateofglobalcitizensalreadyclassifiableasenvironmentalmigrantsisashighas25 million(WennerstenandRobbins 2017).Estimates ofthesurgeinthis figureinaggregateby2050include projectionsof100millionbytheWorldsPeoplesConference(InBettini 2013);150million(1993)andthen 200million(2005)byNormanMyers;200millionby theInternationalOrganizationforMigration(2008); 309millionbytheUniversityofSussex(InBlack etal. 2008);and750millionbyPeterSinger(InMcAdamandBlocher 2016).ChristianAidclaimsinits widelycitedprojection ‘that,unlessstrongpreventativeactionistaken,betweennowand2050,climate changewillpushthenumberofdisplacedpeoplegloballytoatleast1billion’ (2007).

Myers’ initial(1993)predictionof150million environmentalmigrantssuccessfullydrewattention tothepossiblescaleoftheproblembutdrewcriticism asbeingalarmist.Nevertheless,themostwidely repeatedpredictionisashighas200million(BiermannandBoas 2010).This figureisalsotheInternationalOrganizationforMigrationprojectionfora planetwhichcontinuestobe ‘overwhelminglysourced fromfossil-fuelsupplieswithoutanysubstantialemissionreductionsorseriousattemptsatadaptation’ (InternationalOrganizationforMigration 2008).

Globalprojectionsoverlookparticularareasofvulnerability.Forexample,acomprehensiverecent analysisofclimate-inducedmigrationbytheWorld BankGroupforSub-SaharanAfrica,SouthAsiaand LatinAmericaconcludesthatclimatechangemay forceupto140millionpeopletobecomedisplaced withintheseregionsbymid-centuryandaccelerate afterthatifclimatechangeisnotmitigated(Rigaud etal. 2018).AccordingtotheAsianDevelopment Bank,almostallislandnationsinthePacificareconsidered ‘hotspots’ of environmentalimpact(Koser

Table1. Environmentalmigrantprojectionsto2050.

Source Year Refugeeprojection (2050)

WorldPeoplesConference 2010100,000,000

InternationalOrganizationfor Migration

NormanMyers

UniversityofSussex

PeterSinger

ChristianAid

2008 200,000,000

2005 200,000,000

2008 309,000,000

2016 750,000,000

2007 1,000,000,000

2012).Inonestudy,estimatesforthenumberof peoplepredictedtobedisplacedinandfromPacific Islandcountriesduetoenvironmentalchangeby 2050rangefrom665,000to1,725,000(Koser 2012).

Table1 summarisestheseglobalpredictionsfor environmentalmigrantnumberstomid-century. Givenhistoricgreenhousegasemissionsalone,itis importanttonotethattheclimatewillcontinueto changeforcenturies(IPCC 2021).Therefore,global populationdistributionsmustadaptasthissituation playsoutacrosscenturies,letalonedecades.Projectionsforanextraordinarynumberofenvironmental migrantswilllikelyoccur;themainuncertaintyis when.

TheIPCChasreleasedevenmoreworryingdataon climatechangewhichsuggestsclimatechangeis ‘widespread,rapid,andintensifying’ (IPCC 2021).So itisplausiblethatdespiteinitialscepticism,theprojectionbyMyers(2005)of200millioncouldevenbean underestimate.

AccordingtotheWorldBank,climatechangewill displacemostpeopleintheircountries(Rigaudetal. 2018).Forexample,inthepastfewdecades,much oftheinternalenvironmentalmigrationinPacific Islandcountrieshasmovedpeoplefromruralareas tocities(Koser 2012).However,therearereasonsto questionhowmanydisplacedpersonswillremain in-country.First, ‘stepwise’ migration,whereruralurbanmigrationheraldsanincreaseininternational migration,isawidelyobservedphenomenon(Koser 2012).Second,climatechangemayforceinternaldisplacementonpeoplelackingthemeanstomakecrossbordermoves(Wiegel 2017).Third,anddependingon thegeographyoftheaffectedcountries,thehealth impactsofseverelevelsofheatstresscouldmean thatinternaldisplacementisoftennotasolution becauseextremeheatstressmayoccuracrossentire countriesorevenregions(PalandEltahir 2016). Fourth,theabilityofthesourcecountrytocopeeconomicallywillconstraintherefugeenumbersthatgovernmentscandealwithinternally.Moreover,and fifthly,otherfactorssuchasviolenceandwarfarein competitionforresourcescancompoundthe situation.

Thelargerthenumbers,thegreatertheglobal pressure.Thissituationwillleadtoincreasingextranationaldeparturesandexpectationsforcountriesof

theGlobalNorthtocontributeresourcestothe accommodationofinternaldisplacementandto receivetheirfairsharesofinternationalenvironmental migrants.

Undoubtedly,theexistingpopulationsintheGlobalNorthwillresistthispressureforvariousreasons, includingxenophobia.Moreover,thatresistanceis likelytogrowinproportiontothenumbers.Thissituationmaycontributetomanydisplacedpeoplebeing trappedinthirdcountrieswhichthemselvesstruggle tocopebutcannotorwillnotrepelthemputtingdisplacedpeopleatriskof ‘significantimpactsonphysical andmentalhealth’ (AustralianHumanRightsCommission 2014).Thissituationwillfurtherpressure theGlobalNorthtoacceptenvironmentalmigrants, butthatwilltaketimeandremainpoliticallyfractious.

Asconditionsworsenoverthecomingcentury, peoplewillundoubtedlycrossbordersinformallyor throughrelocationsplannedbytheinternationalcommunity.Themigrationstreamislikelytobeincremental,negotiatedandmanagedratherthantsunami-like (Rossi 2017).Giventheuncertaintiesoffutureclimate andthecomplexityoftheunderlyingdynamics,itis impossibletoknowhowmanypeoplewillbecome environmentalmigrants.Nonetheless,itissafeto assumethataproportionwillarrive,formallyorinformally,atthebordersofprosperousWesternnations. Asawealthycountrywithalargelandmass,Australia willbeoneofthecountriesfacingpressuretoaccept climate-inducedenvironmentalmigrants.Belowwe speculateonpossibleimpactsandpreparednessin thecaseofAustralia.

MigrationintheAustraliancontext

TogetherwithCanada,theUnitedStatesandNew Zealand,Australiaisa ‘traditional’ immigration country.Thesecountrieshaveanestablishedrecord ofplannedimmigration,extendingover200years witharemarkableupsurgeinimmigrationpost WorldWarTwo(Hugo 2014).Indeed,Australiahas alonghistoryofwelcomingmigrants,andsuccessive wavesofmigrantshelpedfuelthegrowthofAustralia’ s citiesandsuburbs(Davison 2010).Asaresult,Australiaisoneofthemostsuccessfulmulticulturalsocieties intheworld.Australia’simmigrationsoaredthrough pro-activenation-buildingrecruitmentinthepostWorldWarTwoperiod.Inthreedecades,some threemillionmigrantsandrefugeesarrived.Many werefromareasexperiencingorrecoveringfrompoliticalturmoilorwar,suchasEasternEurope,Chile, Cyprus,VietnamandTimor.Sincethemid-1990s, migrationpolicyhaschangedtoincreasethefocus onskilledmigrantstobolsterthe ‘nationalstockof humancapitalandenhancenationalproductivity andcompetitiveness’ (Hugo 2014,875).

Despitetherelativesuccessofimmigrationpolicies, ‘borderprotection’ issueshavebecomehighlypoliticised.Forexample,duringthe2001federalelection, atoughborderprotectionstanceconsolidatedthevictoryoftheLiberal-NationalCoalitionandsawtherise of ‘anti-immigration’ parties,suchasOneNation (BilodeauandFadol 2011).Theissueofrefugeeresettlementhasbeenparticularlycontentious.Indeed, peopleseekingasylumbyboatarenowdescribedin Australianlegislationas ‘illegal’ maritimearrivals eventhougheveryonehastherighttoseekasylum underinternationallaw.Moreover,theyaredepicted byallfederalgovernmentsasposingasignificant threattobordersecurity,eventhoughmostresearch hasfoundrefugeesinneedofprotection(McAdam andChong 2019,50).Nonetheless,successivegovernmentshaveusedtheclaimof ‘stoppingtheboats’ to boostelectoralfortunes(McAdamandChong 2019, 2).Indeed,onthedayoftherecentfederalelection thenPrimeMinisterScottMorrisoninstructedthe AustralianBorderForcetopubliciseaninterception ofasuspectedasylumseekerboatpresumablyto boostvotes(Greene 2022).Partisanpoliticaldiscoursesdrawinglinksbetweenasylumseekersandterrorismalsoturnedpublicopinionagainst humanitarianmigrantsfromMuslimcountries (Schech 2014).

Nevertheless,Australia’srelativegeographicisolation,combinedwithsophisticatedbordersurveillancesystems,hasresultedinoneoftheworld’ s mosttightlymanagedmigrationsystems(Hugo 2014).ThetotalpermanentMigrationProgramoutcomefor2018–2019,priortotheCovid-19pandemic, was160,323placeswith18,762resettlementvisasin thehumanitarianprogram(DepartmentofHome Affairs 2019).

A distinctivepatternof ‘metropolitandominance’ definesAustralia’spopulationdistribution(Freestone 2013,236),withtwooutofeverythreepeopleresiding inthestatecapitalcitiesofSydney,Melbourne,Adelaide,Perth,Brisbane,andHobart(CentreforPopulation 2022).Buildingonprecedentselsewhere (Schech 2014),sincethemid-1990s,thefederalgovernmenthasalsoaimedtodirectimmigrantstosettle outsideofthemajorcapitalcitiesinsmallercitiesand towns.Indeed,policymakershavedevelopedacollectionofstate-specificandRegionalMigrationSchemes tofacilitategrowthinstrugglingareasandaddress regional-skilledlabourshortages(Hugo 2014;Ng andMetz 2015).Regionaldispersionofmigrantscan occurthroughregionalDesignatedAreaMigration Agreements,regionalprovisionalvisas,andDestinationAustraliaScholarshipsforinternationalstudents studyingatregionaluniversities(AustralianGovernment 2019).Moregenerally,ifindirectly,thereisa tacitendorsementofpopulationdecentralisation fromthemajorcapitalsthroughinvestmentsin

improvedrailandroadinfrastructureconnecting capitalcitiesandregionalcentres(AustralianGovernment 2019).

Communitysentiment

Despitethesubstantialcontributionsofmigrantsto Australiansociety,someAustraliansregardpopulationgrowth,mainlythroughimmigration,asproblematic.Pollingfrequentlyrevealsthataclearmajority regardsimmigrationlevelsastoohigh(Murphy 2018).Anauthoritativerecentpollfoundthatover two-thirdsofadultsdonotthinkAustralia ‘needs morepeople’,asubstantialincreasesince2010(Biddle 2019).Furthermore,researchconsistentlyidentifies thatnegativeattitudesamongAustralianstowards migrantsarebecomingmoreprevalent(Fozdar,Spittles,andHartley 2015).

Negativeopinionspartlystemfromentrenched immigrationdestinations.Nearly90%ofimmigrants liveinmajorcities,particularlySydneyandMelbourne,comparedtoaround66%oftheAustralian born(ButtonandRizvi 2018).Indeed,thepopulations ofthesetwomostsignificantmetropolitanareaswere growingbyover100,000eachyearpriortotheCovid19pandemic(BirrellandHealy 2018).Asaresult,residentsfeelsignificantimpactsofrisinghousing unaffordability,infrastructureprovision,androad congestion(BensonandBrown 2018;KellyandDonegan 2015;Seamer 2019).However,theseissuespartly resultfromotherfactors,suchasarelativelackof investmentinpublictransportandspeculativepropertyinvestmentspurredbynegativegearingpolicy. Nonetheless,inarecentAustralianNationalUniversitypoll,nearlynineoutoftenpeopleagreedor stronglyagreedthat ‘thecostofhousingistoohigh’ asareasonfornotincreasingthepopulation,alongside85%percentwhoagreedorstronglyagreed that ‘ourcitiesaretoocrowdedandthereistoo muchtraffic ’ (Biddle 2019).Ifasurgeofenvironmentalmigrationoccursandthenecessaryplanning isnotinplace,suchnegativesentimentwouldlikely becompounded.

Environmentalmigration

Anincreasednumberofenvironmentalmigrantswill likelyarriveinAustraliaduringthesubsequentdecadesduetoenvironmentalchangeinPacificIsland countriesandsouth-eastAsia.Forinstance,arelativelymodestsea-levelrisemaythreatenthevery existenceofTuvaluandKiribati.Inaddition,Pacific islandcountriesarealsohighlyvulnerabletodestructiveandunpredictabledisasters(LeeandZhang 2022) Duetothecombinationofthesefactors,significant displacementandmigrationpromptedbyenvironmentalchangeeffectsinsuchareasseemsanear

certainty.Moreover,astheregionaleconomicand politicalleader(Chinaaside),andthehubofsignificantestablishedmigrationnetworkswithmany affectedcountries,Australiaisboundtobecomeatargetdestinationformanyenvironmentalmigrants (Koser 2012). Australia,duetoitsbloatedpercapita greenhousegasemissions(Ahmed 2018)andcomparativelylowvulnerabilitytoclimatechange (Figure1)(IPCC 2021),willhaveamoralobligation toabsorbsubstantialenvironmentalmigration.

Methodology

So,wereturntoourcentralresearchquestion:Do Australia’sfederalandstategovernmentstrategic planningpoliciesallowforapossiblesurgeinenvironmentalmigrantsprojectedmid-century?Adoptinga descriptiveresearchstrategy(SwaffieldandDeming 2010),weconductedaliteraturereviewofcurrent Australianfederal,state,andmetropolitanstrategic planningpolicies.Thecriteriaforinclusionwere thattheywereauthoredbyrelevantStateorFederal Governmentdepartmentsandbroadlyrelatedto population/settlementpatternplanning.Thislargely qualitativeliteraturereviewbenchmarkedpolicies againsttwoprimaryconsiderations.

Firstly,presumingAustralia’shumanitarian migrationisexpandedinthefuture(throughchoice ornecessity),weanalysedwhetherpoliciesanticipated accommodationofdisruptivesurgesinpopulation growth,particularlythroughhumanitarianmigration. Thisassessmentwasconductedbyassessingwhether theplanningforfuturepopulationexceededthe relatedAustralianBureauofStatistics(ABS)seriesB (median)populationprojections(AustralianBureau ofStatistics 2017).Theseprojectionsarecontingent onassumptionsmadeaboutfuturelevelsoffertility, mortality,overseasmigrationandinternalmigration appliedtoabasepopulationand donot allowfor non-demographicfactors(suchasgovernmentpolicy decisions,climatechange-inducedmigration,catastrophes,wars,andepidemics)(AustralianBureauof Statistics 2017).Assuch,policieswhichdidnotplan forpopulationshigherthantheseABSprojections wereunlikelytohavethecapacitytoabsorbadditional populations.However,wehaveresistedbasingour analysisonaspecificprojectionofenvironmental migrantsgiventhecomplexitiesintroducedbylack of firmbaselinedemographicdataanduncertainty abouttheevolutionofclimatechange(International OrganizationforMigration 2008).However,wedid examinewhetherthepoliciesmadeanyreferencesto environmentalmigrationorincorporatedappropriate explorativescenarioplanningmethods(Goodspeed 2020),whichcouldcountenancefutureshiftsin migrationpatterns.Secondly,weconsideredwhether thepoliciescontainedstrategiestofacilitateand

Figure1. Observedhumanvulnerabilitytoclimatechange.Australiahasacomparativelylowvulnerabilitytoclimatechange comparedtoPacificIslandandAsiannationsintheregion.DatafromtheIPCC.

cultivateculturaldiversitythroughurbanplanning.A beliefthatfacilitatingasuccessfulmodelofcultural diversityrequiresspecificplanningactions(Talen 2012)predicatesthisanalysis.

Theexplicitfocusoncapitalcitypoliciesacknowledgesthatthesecitiesreceivethevastbulkofimmigration(Tuli 2019),despitepoliciesfortheregional dispersionofmigrants(AustralianGovernment 2019).Wenotethelimitationsofourapproach.First, ourhigh-levelfocusomittedimportantworkbyAustralianLocalGovernmentswhohaveadoptedvarious policiesforfosteringmulticulturalcommunities throughvariousstrategies(ForexampleWelcoming Cities 2019).Theseareworthyefforts;however,they generallydonotincludeasubstantialspatialdimension (CommunityRelationsCommission&DLG 2000; WelcomingCities 2019),andbecauseofthenecessary brevityofthispaper,wehavebeenunabletoembody theseeffortsfully.Secondly,wedidnotextendourpolicyanalysistoincluderegionalcities,reflectingthatthe majorityofimmigrationisoccurringinthecapitalcities (Tuli 2019).Nonethelesswerecognisethatregional citiesalsohaveapotentiallycriticalroletoplay.Finally, ourapproachalsoomittedsubstantialanalysisofthe environmentalmigrationpotentiallygeneratedbyclimatechangewithinAustralia;however,thishasbeen discussedatlengthelsewhere(Bolleteretal. “Projected ExtremeHeatStress,” 2021).

Results

Plannedversusprojectedpopulationsand allowancesfordisruption

Intotal,wereviewed13strategicplanningpoliciesfor thenation,statesandmetropolitanareas(Table2). Thistableshowsthepoliciesreviewed,thefuture

plannedpopulationinthepolicyandtherelated ABSSeriesBpopulationprojectionfortheplanning horizon – notingtheSeriesBpopulationprojections donotallowfordisruptiveeventslikeclimatechange.

Ironically,thepreviousFederalGovernmentplanningstrategy, ‘PlanningforAustralia’sFuturePopulation’,providesnofuturepopulationprojections despitethereport’sclaimingtoaddressthis ‘big issue’ (AustralianGovernment 2019,5).Moreover, Australia’sforwardstrategicplanningforurbanpopulationgrowthisinconsistentatthestatelevel,andonly WesternAustralia,QueenslandandNewSouthWales havestateplanningstrategieswhichcomprehensively addressissuesofpopulationandsettlementpattern planning(notingtheAustralianCapitalTerritory hasaterritoryplan).

Elsewherethereisarelianceonanamalgamofsectoralplanningpoliciesordevolutiontoacompositeof regionalstrategies.Withrespecttothestateplanning strategies,theNSWstrategy(InfrastructureNew SouthWales 2018)plansforapopulationwellbelow thatprojectedbytheABSwhiletheWesternAustralianstrategyplansforapopulationmuchhigher whichindicatesacapacitytoabsorbpopulationsurges (WesternAustralianPlanningCommission 2014).

Concerningthemetropolitanpolicies,thefuture populationsplannedfor,inmanycases,arelessthan whattheABSprojectforthesametimeframe.This situationisevidentinplanningforGreaterSydney (GreaterSydneyCommission 2018),Melbourne(VictorianStateGovernment 2017)andtoalesserdegree Canberra(ACTGovernment 2018).Thissituation indicatesthatcurrentplanningmaynotcaterforexistingdemographictrends,letalonesignificantdisruptionbroughtaboutbyclimatechange.

Noneofthepoliciesconsideranyexploratoryscenariostoaddresstheuncertaintyoffutureevents,

Table2. Selectednational,stateandmetropolitanplanningstrategies.Datawasunavailableforcellsmarkedn/a.

PlanningforAustralia sFuturePopulation( 2019 )25,000,000n/an/an/an/a

WhitepaperfordevelopingnorthernAustralia( 2015b )1,300,0005,000,000n/a2060n/a

Stateplanningstrategies

WAStatePlanningStrategy2050( 2014 )2,500,0005,600,0004,023,26420501,500,000

QLDTheQueenslandPlan:a30-yearvisionforQueensland( 2014 )4,700,000n/a7,036,7152044n/a

includingsurgesinenvironmentalmigration.Instead, theyareexpressionsofexistingassumptionswithlimitedornorecognitionof ‘blackswan’ eventswhich maychallengeexistingassumptions.

NSWBuildingmomentum:StateInfrastructureStrategy2018 –2038( 2018 )7,700,0009,900,00010,338,2132038-440,000

Metropolitanplanningstrategies

OurGreaterSydney2056:AMetropolisofthreecities( 2018 )4,700,0008,000,0008,830,8472056-830,000

PlanMelbourne2017 –2050( 2017 )4,500,0007,900,0008,493,5342050-590,000

ShapingSEQ:SouthEastQueenslandRegionalPlan( 2017 )3,462,4005,349,000n/a2041n/a

PerthandPeel@3.5million( 2018 )2,000,0003,500,0003,358,5672050140,000

The30yearplanforGreaterAdelaide( 2017 )1,430,0001,970,0001,668,0752045300,000

ACTPlanningStrategy( 2018 )412,000589,000623,2422045-34,000

30-YearGreaterHobartPlan( 2022 )200,570260,570268,0532050-1500

GreaterDarwinPlan( 2012 )127,254188,951169,016202520,000

Moreover,somereportsdonotevenrefertoclimatechange,suchasthepreviousFederalGovernment’ s ‘PlanningforAustralia’sFuturePopulation’ (AustralianGovernment 2019).Thisomissionisnoteworthygiventhesubjectofthispaperandcontradicts thepreviousFederalGovernment’ sown ‘NationalClimateResilienceandAdaptionStrategy’ whichstates: ‘Climatechangedoesnotstopatcountryborders. TheeffectsofclimatechangearebeingfeltinAsia andthePacific,withimplicationsforAustralia’ s trade,migration,developmentandnationalsecurity’ (AustralianGovernment 2015a,71).

Likethe ‘PlanningforAustralia’sFuturePopulation’ report,theWhitePaper ‘OurNorth,Our Future’ fordevelopingnorthernAustraliamakes onlyscantreferencetoclimatechangeandthenprincipallyasathreattobiodiversity.Althoughitdoes refertonorthernAustralia’sroleinprovidinghumanitarianassistancetoneighbouringcountries,itsays nothingabouttheprospectofaccommodatingclimate change-inducedimmigrationinthenorthitself(AustralianGovernment 2015b).

Ofthefederal,state,andmetropolitanplans,only WesternAustralia’sstateplanningstrategymakes anyreferencetopossiblesurgesinenvironmental migrationinadvocatingforinfrastructurethatcan ‘allowgreaterlogisticsaccessforhumanitarianormilitarypurposes’ inthecaseofrefugeesarrivingonWesternAustralia’snorthcoast(WesternAustralian PlanningCommission 2014,30).Insummary,while the ‘greatestsingleimpactofclimatechangecould beonhumanmigration’ (InInternationalOrganizationforMigration 2008,9),littleornomentionof thisloomingsituationismadeinthestrategicplanningforthenationanditssystemofcities.Thissituationisconcerningastheplanninghorizonforthese policiesextendstomid-century(Sydney’splan2056, MelbourneandPerth’splans2050,andAdelaide’ s plan2047),aperiodinwhichwidespreadenvironmental migrationwilllikelybeoccurring.

Strategiestofacilitateandcultivatecultural diversitythroughurbanplanning

Hereweconsiderthedegreetowhichthepoliciesseek tocultivatesuccessfulculturaldiversitythroughurban planning – somethingthatexpandedenvironmental immigrationwoulddemand.Notably,almostallthe policiespraiseAustralia’sculturaldiversity.For example,thepreviousFederalGovernment’sreport ‘PlanningforAustralia’sFuturePopulation’ (AustralianGovernment 2019,7)celebratesAustraliaasa ‘diverseharmoniousnation’ andadvocatesforan

Figure2. OnlyWesternAustralia,QueenslandandNewSouthWaleshavestateplanningstrategieswhichcomprehensively addressissuesofpopulationandsettlementpatternplanning.Theresultisajigsawofstatestrategies.

‘Australiathatwelcomesnewmigrants’ (whilesimultaneouslydocumentingafreezeinimmigrationlevels andacaponrefugeeplaces)(AustralianGovernment 2019,5).Nonetheless,whilecelebratingculturaldiversity,itattributesissuessuchasunaffordablehousing, trafficcongestion, ‘overcrowdedpublictransport’ , andalackof ‘sharedvaluesandideals’ toexcessive levelsofimmigration.

TheWesternAustralianandQueenslandplans bothcelebratediversity(StateofQueensland 2014; WesternAustralianPlanningCommission 2014). Moreover,oneoftheanticipated ‘outcomes’ ofthe WesternAustralianStatePlanningStrategyisthat ‘diversityisdisplayedinallsettlementstructures’ . Thisoutcomeispredicatedon ‘aspirations’ that ‘the demographicmake-upofacommunitydisplaysa mixofcultures,agecohorts,skillsandqualifications’ , ‘thereisarangeofopportunitiesforlocalcultural expression’,and finally,thatthereis ‘variationinthe builtformandarangeofsuitablespacesandplaces availableforculturalactivity’.Moreover,thestrategy callsfor ‘publicspacesandplacestoencourageparticipation,socialcohesionandasenseofplace’ (Western AustralianPlanningCommission 2014,92).

Thevariousmetropolitanplans(ACTGovernment 2018;DepartmentofPlanning 2017;Departmentof PlanningLandsandHeritage 2018;GreaterSydney Commission 2018)arealsoconsistentincelebrating culturaldiversity.Forexample,theSouthEast Queenslandplandeclaresthatthecommunity’ s ‘diversityandcharacterisastrengththathas – and undoubtedlywillcontinueto – underpinthesustainabilityandultimatesuccessoftheregion’ (DepartmentofInfrastructure,LocalGovernmentand Planning 2017,22).Melbourne’ s planningreport enthuses: ‘Melbourne’sculturaldiversityaddstothe city’svitalityandcreateseconomicandcultural

benefitsaswellasastrongerunderstandingofthe world’ (VictorianStateGovernment 2017,79).Despite theapparententhusiasmformulticulturalism,the ‘PlanMelbourne’ alsointroducesacautionarynote: ‘Melbournewillbenefitfrompopulationgrowth – if plansaremade,andactionsaretaken.Withoutadequateplanning,thecitywillbecomelessaffordable andliveable – riskingsocialcohesionandeconomic growth’ (VictorianStateGovernment 2017,45).

Insummary,despiteenthusiasticallyendorsing Australia’smulticulturalsociety,themetropolitan plansaregenerallymuteabouthowplannersmight spatiallyorganisecitiesandneighbourhoodstosupportincreasedimmigrationandmulticulturalism andmaintainsocialcohesioninthefaceoffuture surgesinmigration.

Discussion

OuranalysisrevealsthatAustralia’splanningstrategiesforcapitalcities,states,andthenationoften donothavesubstantialcapacityforaccommodating surgesinenvironmentalmigrationandaregenerally notfactoringinclimatechangedisruptiontoanysignificantdegree – ifatall.Moreover,theyofferlittle guidancetoplannersregardinghowtheyshould reconcileincreasingmulticulturalismwithspatial planning.Astotheformer,thisisunderstandable becauseprojectionsforenvironmentalmigrationare bothpoliticisedanduncertain(Koser 2012).However, thereareconsiderableriskstoperpetuatingsuch models.

So,howcouldFederalandStateGovernmenturban planningpoliciesbetterprepareAustraliancitiesand townsforasurgeinenvironmentalmigrationprojectedbymid-century?Keyliteraturesuggeststhat ‘forward-looking’ NationalUrbanPolicies(NUPs)

canhelpcitiesandnationsbemoreresilientby respondingtoacrisisandpreventingorpreparing forfuturecrises(OECD,UNHabitat,&UNOPS 2021a).Indeed,thereisgrowingrecognitionofthe potentialofNUPstoadvancetheUNSustainable DevelopmentGoals,particularlyGoal11devotedto ‘CitiesandCommunities’ andGoal13, ‘Climate Action’.Therearenow162countrieswithNUPs, althoughindifferentforms,atdifferentdevelopment stagesandwithvaryingthematicfoci(OECD,UN Habitat,&UNOPS 2021b).

TowardsanationalurbanpolicyforAustralia

OurpolicyreviewrevealedthatAustralia’splanningis uncoordinatedandjurisdictionallyfragmented.Asthe PIAcorrectlyidentifies, ‘Australianstates,territories, andlocalgovernmentsallhavedifferentviewsabout ourcommonfuture’ (Figure2).Theresultisthat ourcollectivecoverageofplanslookslikeaanincompletejigsaw(PlanningInstituteofAustralia 2018). Furthermore,planningframeworksarenotwellcoordinatedbetweenthevariousplanningscales,suchas nationaltostateandstatetocitylevelplanning.This situationisunderstandablebecausestrategicplanners donotcomprehensivelyreviewstrategiesatsetintervalsbutratheraccordingtotheirjurisdictions’ differentpoliticalandeconomiccycles.Asaresult,different policydocumentsworktodifferenttimeframesand projections.

WhileAustraliahasmanagedtodelivercomparativelyliveablecitiesacrosssuchcomplexgovernance, itislikelyinadequateifconfrontedwiththefull effectsofclimatechange-inducedmigration.Ifthis occursatasignificantlevel – asAustraliahassome moralobligationtoaddress(Ahmed 2018) – itwill testthecapacityofAustraliancitiesandtheirplanning.ThelackofpreparednessoftheAustralianplanningsystemforsuchaspirationaltargetsisnotunique. Untilrecently,theinternationalcommunityhasgenerallyconcentratedonmitigatingclimatechangeby devisingemissionstargetsinsteadofplanningto adapttothemyriadimpactsofclimatechange.

Nonetheless,ifAustraliancitiescannotabsorbsuch populationincreasesinaplannedmanner,wecould expectthemtohavedetrimentaleffectsonthecohesivenessofAustraliansociety.Ontheground,this couldresultinacollapseofthemulticulturalidealof the ‘meltingpot’,resultinginsocio-culturalsegregation – oneexamplebeingthe ‘doughnut’ planning techniqueinFrenchtownsthatconcentratesmigrants ontheedgesofthecitiesorin ‘ghettos’ in ‘parallel’ societies (Murray 2017,114)(Figure3).Whilethe ‘meltingpot’ modelofmulticulturalismhasserved Australiawell,ithasitslimits – mainlyifsubstantial surgesandgeographicconcentrationsofmigration

occuroverashortperiodandtherequiredplanning isnotinplace.

Moreover,theliteratureonclimatechange-induced migrationisoftenalarmistandcanemployinflammatorylanguagedepictingintimidatinghordesof ‘climaterefugees’ inaclimatechange-induceddisaster. Commentatorswidelyusewordslike ‘catastrophe’ , ‘threat’ and ‘ urgency ’ (InHulme 2007).Theproblem isthatfuellingsuchfearscanleadto ‘denial,paralysis, apathyorevenperversereactivebehaviour’ (Hulme 2007).Moreover,alessthancreativeengagement withsuchissuesisunlikelytosucceedbecausepeople won ’tdiscarda flawedparadigm,despitemanysigns ofitsdeficiencies,untilabettermodelcanbefound (Kuhn 1996).So,whatwouldabetterplanningparadigmbe?Herewebrieflysketchwhatthiscouldbe atthenationalscale.

ThereisanurgentneedforaNationalUrbanPolicy (NUP)forAustralia’scitiesandregionsformany reasons.Fromtheviewpointdiscussedinthispaper, thisplanningcouldemergefromthesuggested NationalPopulationandPlanningFramework,albeit withagreaterfocusonplanningratherthanpurely demographicconsiderations(CoalitionofAustralian Governments 2019).ThePlanningInstituteofAustraliaalsopromotestheneedforsuchaNUP.Thescale ofplanningwouldrelyonaresurgenceoffederalgovernmentinterestinurbanissues(Oakley 2004). Indeed,suchplanningrequirescoordinationbetween national,state,andterritorygovernmentstodevisea bipartisanurbanstrategytodirecturbanisation.The Commonwealth-establishednational ‘Centrefor Population’ (CoalitionofAustralianGovernments 2019)could,inpart,developthisinconjunction withanationalpolicyframeworkonenvironmental migration(Koser 2012).

ANUPwouldseektodistributeafutureAustralian population(includingthatthroughenvironmental migration)toareaswiththehighestcarryingcapacity andexistingresidentswhowelcomepopulation growth. Formanyoftheirmoreestablishedresidents, themajorcitiesarealreadydisturbinglylarge.Allowingthemtoexpandfurtheris ‘nonsensicalandunacceptable’ forsuchresidentsandisresisted(Angel 2012,4).Therefore,newcomers – immigrantsfrom overseasormigrantsfromotherpartsofthecountry – arenotwelcomeandareseenas ‘nuisancesrather thanasassets’ (Angel 2012,4).Thismindsetcould partlyexplaintheunpopularityofmodelsconcentratingpopulationgrowthinlargecapitalcitiesand thepopularityofschemesthatdispersepopulation growthtoregionalareas(Bolleteretal. “Long-Term settlementScenarios,” 2021;Bolleteretal. 2022) (Figure4).AfutureAustralianNUPwouldneedto buildonthesepreferences.

WhilecurrentFederalGovernmentpoliciestargetingregionalpopulationdecentralisationmakemuch

Acollapseofthemulticulturalidealofthe ‘meltingpot’,canresultinsocio-culturalsegregationwheremigrantsare concentratedontheedgesofthecities.

sense(AustralianGovernment 2019),thelackofa coordinatingnationalscaleplanmeansthatinitiatives lacksystematicintegration.AcomprehensivesuitabilityanalysisofAustraliaconsideringeconomic, environmental,climaticandinfrastructuralfactors providesapotentiallyinstructivemodel(Bolleter etal. “InformingFutureAustralianSettlement,” 2021). StrategicplannersshouldpredicateafutureNUP forAustraliaonexploratoryscenarioplanning methods.Scenarioplanningisamethodoflongrangestrategicplanningthatdevelopsrepresentations ofmultiple,possiblefuturesofasystemtodevelop deeperinsightsintoemergingtrendsandissuesor informspecificdecisionsthroughmultiplescenarios (Goodspeed 2020).Scholarsofclimateadaptation planninghaveconcludedthatthisrequirescurtailing ‘thedeeplyembeddedpracticeofplanningforone

future’ (Woodruff 2016,445),andtheyarguethat exploratoryscenarioplanningholdsunrealised promisetoincorporateclimateuncertaintyinto plans(Goodspeed 2020).Byevaluatingaplausible rangeoffuturesandrelatedpolicies,plannersacquire areadyrepertoireofresponsestoinformsubsequent decision-makingiffutureclimateconditions ‘ veer off’ fromtheassumedcourse’ (Goodspeed 2020,xix).

Towardsastrategicplanningpolicyfor facilitatingculturaldiversity

Itisclearfromtheliteraturethatsuccessfullyaddressingdiversity(culturalorotherwise)requires(among otherthings)proactivespatialplanningatthemetropolitanandneighbourhoodscalesforbothcapital citiesandregionalcentres(MaginnandHamnett

Figure4. Recentsurveyresearchbytheauthorsindicatessubstantialsupportforpopulationdecentralisationawayfromlarge (capital)citiestosatellitecities.AfutureNUPcouldseektofacilitatesuchwell-supporteddecentralisation.

Figure3.

2016).Moreover,successfulculturaldiversityplanninganddesignaspectsareessentialbecausemarkets areunlikelytodeliverthisalone(Talen 2012).

Australia’splanningforitsmajorcitiescelebrates culturaldiversityyetismainlymuteonhowdiversity should findexpressioninstrategicplanning(Maginn andHamnett 2016),aneedwhichisincreasingly recognisedbygovernment(Partridge 2022).Assuch urbanplannerswouldbenefitfrommorespatialguidance,ideallyprovidedattheFederalGovernment level,aboutplanningfordiversecommunities.Such planningshouldrecognisethat ‘diversityisapositive forceinaglobalsociety’ (Talen 2012,32)enabling, ratherthanspeakingfor,diversecommunities(Sandercock 1998).

Whatspatialprinciplescouldunderpinsuchplanning?Whileacomprehensiveexplorationisbeyond thescopeofthisnecessarilyconcisepaper,webriefly sketchoutsomeapproachesintermsofneighbourhood designbelow.Undera ‘separation’ approachtoneighbourhoodstructure,minoritygroupmemberscanseek topreservetheirownculturesandrejectadoptingthe hostcountry’sculture.Interactionbetweenimmigrants andhostcountrynationalsislimited,andtheexistence ofethnicenclavesresults(NgandMetz 2015,256).Conversely,underan ‘assimilation’ approach,membersof theminoritygroupabandontheircultureandadopt thehostcountry’sculture(NgandMetz 2015).Inthis model,plannerstendtosubsumedifferenceintoahomogenouswholeundertheguiseof ‘democraticmajority rule’ (InThompson 2003,277).Weavingbetweenseparationorassimilationapproaches,neighbourhooddesign shouldrecogniseculturalgroupsnaturallycoalescein particularneighbourhoodsbutmaximiseinteraction withsurroundingareasthroughmaintainingpermeable edgesanddevelopingsharedfacilitiesbetweenthe neighbourhoods.Thisapproachcouldensure ‘both dominantandminoritygroupmembersadoptand adapttoeachother’scultures’ (NgandMetz 2015,256). Ata finerscaleculturaldiversitycanalsobefacilitatedbyreconsideringsingle-usezoning,repetitionof similarbuildingtypes,minimumlotsizes,andcardominatedlandscapes(Talen 2012).Forinstance, manynewdwellings(e.g.,apartments)donotcater forextendedfamilyliving,apriorityformanynonEnglishspeakinggroups(Thompson 2003)..Incontrast, diversebuildingtypes,affordabilitylevels,uses, tenures,sizes,andageshelpsensureamixofrents andpricesforbothownersandrenters(Talen 2012) anddifferentfamilygroupings(Talen 2012).Greater flexibilityisneededinlandusezoningoflanduseto allowforoffices,workshops,andshopsinsuburban areas.Theseareascouldthenfacilitatestart-upentrepreneursconductingsmallbusinessesinresilient, small, flexibleunits,thekindsofsmallbusinesses essentialtomaintainingadiverseneighbourhood (Talen 2012).

Publicspacealsoprovidesanidealopportunityfor divergentpopulationsto ‘encounter’ eachother (Fincheretal. 2014).Theabilityofpublicspaceto facilitateeverydayinteractionsiscrucialforreconcilingandovercomingethnicandculturaldifferences (Amin 2002),counteringthedistrustorfearresidents mightbeharbouringaboutpeopleunlikethemselves (Talen 2012),andnurturingasenseofculturalbelonging(Sandercock 1998).Urbanspacesthatare flexible, adaptableandopentoconstantchange;whichencouragetheemergenceofinformal,spontaneousand unplannedusesofthepublicrealm;whichstimulate culturalexpression;andwhichcreateanatmosphere oftolerancetowarddifferenceandtheunknown throughtheconstructionofcommonplacesassistin thisprocess(SennettandSendra 2020).

Conclusion

Migrationisjustonepossibleadjustmenttoclimate change(Hugo 2012).However,withoutactionby GlobalNorthnationstoassistadaptationeffortsin vulnerablecountriestoproactivelyplanforthepossibilityoflarge-scaleimmigration,alikelyoutcomeis thatmostdisplacedpeoplewillendupincampsor fringehabitationsintheirowncountry.Alternatively, theywillbetrappedinothercountriesthatstruggleto accommodatetheirpresencebutcannotpreventtheir arrivalforonereasonoranother.

Wehavewrittenthispaperwithitsunderpinnings inthehypotheticalrealmtohighlightasetofinterrelatedissuesrequiringpolicyattention,guidedby availableindicativedataandwithoutthecertainty ofhardnumbers.Thetalkofmillionsofenvironmentalmigrantsmayormaynotbeanoverexaggeration,butinrelativeterms,bothmoralandpractical challengeslieahead.Australia’splanningsystemis ill-equippedtodealwithenvironmentalmigration atascalecommensuratewiththenation’scontributiontoclimatechangeandcapacitytoabsorb immigrants.Indeedithasyettorespondtothegrowingevidenceof,andprospectfor,internaldiscretionarymigrationwithinAustraliaalreadydrivenpartly byclimaticfactors,especiallyexcessiveheat(Johnston 2018;Pandey 2020).Acrosstheworld, ‘boldspeeches andelaboratecommitmentstothepursuitofnoble goalslikerefugeerights,environmentalprotection andsustainabledevelopmenttypicallyfallpreyto narrowgeopoliticalinterestswhenthetimeforaction comes ’ (InternationalOrganizationforMigration 2008,36).

Nonetheless,Australiahasapositiverecordof immigrationandrefugeeresettlement,andcurrent Australianstrategicplannersshouldproactively respondatthenational,stateandmetropolitan scalethroughaNUPtwinnedwithapolicyon environmentalmigration(Koser 2012)andsupported

byaspatialguidetofacilitatingsuccessful multiculturalism.

Therearesignificantbenefitstopreparinga NUPframeworkbeforesignificantenvironmental migrationratherthanduringoraftertheevent (Koser 2012).Indeed,theoftenhystericaldebate overunofficialboatarrivalsinAustraliademonstrates howevenarelativelysmallnumberofirregular migrantscandestabilisepublicconfidenceintheabilityoftheGovernmenttomanagemigration(Koser 2012).

Thetimeforsuchproactiveplanningaspartofa nationalsettlementvisionisnow.AsGleesonreminds usaboutclimatechange: ‘Wehaveachanceofsurvivingandevenlivingwell.However,forthattobepossible,wehavetomakeourlifeboatsseaworthynow’ . Wherearethelifeboats?Theyaresurelythecities, thefewcities,inwhichmostofourpopulationresides’ (Gleeson 2010,65).Inthespiritofshiftingtotheideal ofcitiesembodyingnotionsofclimatejustice(Steele etal. 2012),citiesandtownscanbe ‘lifeboats’ which wesharewithsomeoftheenvironmentalmigrants who,ingreaterorlessernumbers,willlikelybeforced torelocatearoundtheglobebymid-centuryand beyond.

Funding

ThisworkwassupportedbytheAustralianResearchCouncilDiscoveryProjectscheme[grantnumber: DP190101093].

ORCID

JulianBolleter http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1514-2007

BillGrace http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1305-7466

RobertFreestone http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4265-5059

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