become an actor of the Black Sea stage due to the inteOn April 2, 2014, President Putin canceled gration of Greece and Turkey (1952), and later bolthe 1997 and 2010 Russian-Ukrainian agreements stered by the Bulgarian and Romanian accession to on the Black Sea fleet, which consequently terminatmembership (2004). However, during the Cold War ed the ‘Sevastopol rebate’, but has not cancelled the Black Sea used to be a ‘Soviet Lake’, today, it is far both the 2009 and the 2013 agreements. Consefrom being a NATO lake. The latest developments in quently, Alexey Miller, the chairman of the manageUkraine have confirmed the failure of the EU Eastern ment committee of Gazprom, stated that, “starting Partnership on the one hand, and the inability to expand from the second quarter of 2014, the gas price for NATO eastward, by integrating neither Ukraine, nor Ukraine would increase by nearly 44%.” Despite the Georgia, for the foreseeable future. However, NATO’s fact that Kiev has sought to diversify its gas imports role as a protector of its members in Eastern Europe and over the past years, Russia still provides 60% of its in the Black Sea is increasing. After its proactive role in natural gas to Ukraine, and in 2013, Kiev imported the Black Sea during most of the 2000s, the US has 21,6 bcm of natural gas from Russia. Moreover, deprioritized the Black Sea since the election of Presi50% of the Russian gas exported to the European dent Barack Obama. Today, Union (EU) transits the main drivers of Washingthrough Ukraine, and ton’s involvement in the reMoscow has supplied gion remain energy security, nearly 32% of the gas and NATO ballistic missile consumed in Europe in defense (BMD) with compo2010. According to the nents located in Turkey and 2009 agreement, Romania. Ukraine still has to pay Beyond the so-called annually, until 2019, the ‘Pivot to Asia’, Washington price of at least 41,6 bcm needs Moscow’s active coopa year, which is far more eration on international issues than its 2013 domestic such as arms control, in Iran consumption. At the post Russian Black Sea Fleet (Photo: BBC) or Afghanistan. Washington is ‘April 2’ rate, it means thus unlikely to challenge Russia in its ‘sphere of priviKiev would have to pay a minimum of $16 billion a leged interests’, and as a result, the US influence has year. retrenched from the Black Sea stage during the past In the context of the contraction of the GDP years. Instead, the US is pushing the EU to take the lead in Ukraine (-3% forecast for 2014 according to the in the region and is trying to engage Turkey to solve a Ukrainian Ministry of Economy), the end of the set of conflicts plaguing the area (Nagorno-Karabakh, rebate is likely to worsen the Ukrainian economic Cyprus). situation, and to complicate the political stabilizaGiven the inability of the EU to manage its Black tion of the country. Only a cooperation between Sea environment, the coming NATO retrenchment on Russia, the EU and the US may improve the situathe protection and the reinsurance of its Eastern Eurotion. pean members, and the waning influence of the US in the area, the Black Sea is likely to see in the short term Cooperation In The Black Sea: Toward A an enhanced Russian-Turkish security condominium Greater Russian-Turkish Security Condoover the region. minium? Since 1991, Turkey has reinvested in its Black Sea First, it should be noticed that today, there is strategic stage by playing an active role in the maritime no Black Sea security architecture, and that the use realm. According to the 1936 Montreux Convention, of the hard power remains an option to achieve poAnkara is the master of the Straights (Bosporus and Darlitical goals in the region. The main stakeholders danelles), and today, the Turkish fleet remains the most shaping today Black Sea security dynamics (are both effective and powerful navy in the region. Ankara has local) – Russia, Turkey, NATO and the EU- and been very cautious in involving all the littoral states in external, like the United States (US). NATO has any maritime security arrangement, including Russia, Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4
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