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ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Special Issue - June 2015

The Future Of NATO Young Perspectives On Key Challenges To The Alliance Last September, NATO leaders and partners from around the world gathered in Cardiff (UK) to discuss a wide range of challenges to international security. Although questions of global stability can rarely be seen as “business as usual”, the months leading up to the Summit and the decisions made in Wales made two points crystal-clear: First, a rapidly changing and highly fragile security environment calls for new thinking on what NATO’s functions and priorities are and what it should be capable of. Second, the political decision to maintain readiness on several fronts requires more than symbolic commitments from all allies and partners. This special issue reflects the Summit and its outcome from a different perspective: the transatlantic youth. Those that will shape the Alliance in the future provide us with new ideas on how to implement the decisions made at the Summit. Furthermore, several authors explicitly took up issues that were not discussed in Wales but should remain at – or even make it to – NATO’s future agenda. - Dr. Magdalena Kirchner Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

Group picture of the participants in the 2014 `Nato‘s Future‘ seminar in Berlin (Source YATA)

Contents: Young Perspectives Twenty-one students and young professionals from 16 NATO member and partner states share their views on the future of NATO and potential challenges the Alliance might face. In their essays, they highlight issues such as cyber, the Ukraine-conflict, the partnership with Russia and hybrid warfare. On November 4th 2014, the authors convened for a day-long seminar on NATO’s Future in Berlin.

NATO’s Future Today Are Those That Will Shape It Tomorrow Magdalena Kirchner (YATA Germany) discusses the role of the younger generation in NATO’s assessment of its future challenges - and opportunities. Addressing the generational gap should not only be a priority when it comes to raising public support for the alliance among member state constituencies. It furthermore provides NATO with a key source of innovation and inspiration for future endeavors.

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Wales 2014: NATO On A Pivot By Øystein Andresen

T

Turkey, determined to stand up for NATO’s members

he Wales Summit Declaration

with borders to conflict and war zones. Some NATO

stands out as an atypical document

members, albeit not through a NATO initiative, are

for NATO, given its crass rhetoric

supplying weapons to opposition forces and/or are par-

regarding the threats of Russian expansionism, cross-

ticipating in military operations in Iraq and Syria,

border terrorism from the Islamic State of Iraq and

bringing together an opposition strong enough to force

the Levant (ISIL) and heavy condemnation of the As-

ISIL from NATO’s borders. However, experts main-

sad regime in Syria. Collective defence is more im-

tain that ISIL cannot be defeated through air strikes and

portant than ever, but in a time of austerity in Europe

armed forces, but by stopping the recruitment of new

and with countries focusing more on domestic issues

members from the West and hence letting the self-

than they do on solidarity with Allies, the challenge is

declared state dissolve from within. This has an impact

to turn these threats into actions taken by Allied gov-

to NATO’s future and the security situation in Europe.

ernments.

The volume of the US defence expenditure currently

NATO was created to be a safe haven against

represents 73% of NATO’s total defence spending,

external threats, which in the Cold War were com-

leading the Alliance to heavy dependence on continued

munism and the Soviet Union. Now they are mainly

US investments in Europe. Should the US start consid-

represented by ISIL, international terrorism and Rus-

ering reducing their engagement in NATO, out of a

sian aggression following the globally condemned and

consideration that their interests are insufficiently rep-

illegal annexation of Crimea and recent initiatives for

resented and a desire to shift focus towards Pacific

talks on upgrading nuclear arms. Russia also faces a

Asia, Europe would most likely be facing an immediate

gigantic increase in defence expenditures, with an

security vacuum. Keeping in mind the Chinese territo-

extensive upgrade in the last years. This can be inter-

rial challenges against US allies such as Japan and South

preted as Russian ambitions to become a militarily

Korea, a US shift is inevitable and foreseeable. In that

superpower. One may, however, also argue that the

case the EU, with its Common Security and Defence

current military equipment is obsolete and has been

Policy (CSDP), needs to play a more prominent role in

so for decades, so an upgrade is purely inevitable in-

the European security architecture. CSDP has held var-

dependent of the situation in Crimea.

ious peacekeeping missions worldwide, but due to the

The uprising of ISIL, labelled as a terrorist organization by both the United Nations and the European Union, and its expansion in the region around Iraq and Syria, leads to new threats to NATO’s borders. The new NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made his first two official visits to Poland and Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

lack of troops and institutional framework, it does not have the same operational qualities as NATO possesses. EU’s largest countries, France, Germany and the UK, proved unable to agree in 2011 on the case of Libya. France also failed to play a constructive role as Hollande’s persistence to sell the Mistral-class warships to 2


Russia despite agreed EU sanctions jeopardized the EU’s

both regarding Russia, ISIL, a US pivot and possible

unity. Ultimately, however, France halted the delivery

consequences of Swedish and Finnish NATO member-

due to diplomatic pressure from Brussels and Berlin and

ship debates and potential accessions. For now, the

as a protest against Russia’s role in Ukraine. If Europe

consequences for European security remain uncertain.

wants to remain secure from external threats also within a NATO without the US, these conflicts need to be both prevented and resolved in a more efficient way than they have been until today. With two Scandinavian Secretary Generals consecutively, no one needs to remind Brussels that a focus on Sweden and Finland remains crucial to NATO’s future. Will the current undertakings by Russia in Ukraine lead to a serious NATO membership debate in these two countries? Russia and Finland share a border and have a long history of both cooperation and confrontation. Putin’s personal envoy has warned Finland that a Finnish NATO membership might lead to World War 3. At the same time there is an ongoing debate about NATO membership in Finland where the military sector advocates an application, in contrast to a reluctant majority in the population.

About the author Øystein Andresen holds a MA in modern Western European history from Kassel University and currently functions as President of YATA Norway. Since he graduated in 2011, he has worked for the Norwegian Ministry of Labour, the Norwegian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Vienna and the University of Oslo, which is his current professional position. Within his professional career he has specialized in project management and has been an active member of YATA and worked with security policy issues since 2012. Øystein has his specialty within EU affairs, the EU Common Security and Defence Policy and Nordic foreign and security policy in general.

Sweden’s new government recently confirmed Sweden’s neutrality policy and thus killed speculations about a Swedish NATO application. Recently, however, Russian military jets violated Swedish airspace leading to reactions from Swedish politicians. If NATO would need to mobilize in the Baltic States, both the Finnish and Swedish airspace and the Baltic sea will be of great strategic importance. Thus, an unclarified agreement of the permission to use this area to access the area of mobilization could turn Sweden and Finland into an unwanted security vacuum. The current threats to peace and stability in Europe from the East and South are serious. The Wales Summit Declaration in September announces measures to address these threats. Until the next Summit the Alliance will go through a difficult time with unclear outcomes Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

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Cyber Security—Lacking A Coherent Approach By Carolin Allenstein

T

The results of the Wales Summit regarding cyber

he nature of war has changed immense-

are defined in Articles 72 and 73 of the summit’s decla-

ly over the last couple of decades. Espe-

ration. It was emphasized that “[…] cyber-defence is

cially the technological progress result-

part of NATO’s core task of collective defence”. To

ed in an extensive dependence on cyber systems,

fulfil this task effectively the Enhanced Cyber Defence

which in turn bear great security vulnerabilities.

Policy (ECDP) was endorsed at the Summit. According

NATO placed cyber defence on its political agenda

to the ECDP, every member state is primarily respon-

for the first time at the Prague Summit in 2002.

sible to defend its own networks, with the assistance of

When in 2007 Estonia experienced several-week long

NATO and other member nations. Furthermore, the

cyber attacks, mostly directed against both govern-

declaration emphasized that member states have the

ment and private-sector web sites, NATO declared

responsibility and are committed to develop the needed

that urgent actions are needed and started to-

capabilities for the protection of national networks and

thoroughly debate the issue. As a result the Alliance

also to support other member states if necessary. It is,

approved its first policy on Cyber Defence in January

however, questionable in how far more advanced

2008.

member states are willing to reveal and use their cyber Nowadays, cyber plays an integral part of all

intelligence and capabilities in support of less advanced

wars and conflicts around the world. According to

member states. Their behaviour could be somehow

Jarno Limnéll, professor of cybersecurity at Finland's

similar to the nuclear extended deterrence dilemma,

Aalto University, it was high time for the Alliance to

where NATO member states in possession of nuclear

address three major cyber defence challenges at the

arms feared Soviet retaliation during the Cold War pe-

2014 NATO Wales Summit. Firstly, the Alliance

riod, if they would have made use of their weapons on

must address the development of their cyber capabili-

behalf of other states.

ties and secondly, find a way to integrate them effec-

The second cyber defence challenge was only

tively with other military and operational concepts for

briefly addressed in Article 73 of the declaration by

defence. Eventually, a coherent and clear interpreta-

acknowledging that the Alliance “will continue to inte-

tion of the famous Article 5 of the North Atlantic

grate cyber defence in NATO operations and opera-

Treaty must be agreed on, including a statement on

tional and contingency planning […]”.

how the collective defensive clause shall be handled in

Thirdly, the question as to when Article 5

the face of cyber threats. Particularly against the back-

would be invoked was addressed, but not satisfactory

drop of the Ukraine crisis, where Russia is intention-

answered. The Alliance agreed that a serious cyber at-

ally blurring the lines between war and peace with the

tack would eventually lead to the invocation of Article

aim to not trigger NATO’s collective defence clause,

5. However, the ambiguity remains about the degree of

such an interpretation is indispensable.

intensity and what kind of circumstances would trigger

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

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an Article 5 response. The decision will rest with the North Atlantic Council, which has the authority to decide

About the author

on a case-by-case basis. On the one hand, member states

Carolin Allenstein recently graduated with a Master

should not be too happy about such a formulation, be-

in International Security and Law from the University

cause as long as no actual threshold warranting Article 5

of Southern Denmark. In her thesis she wrote about

exists, they cannot be completely sure about the deploy-

sentencing at the ICTY. Previous to that, she complet-

ment of collective defence when they actually need it. On

ed a Bachelor in European Studies with a strong focus

the other hand, it would be dangerous to disclose what is

on Eastern Europe. Carolin has been on various study

accepted and what is not to potential opponents, especial-

trips to Russia and also spent an exchange semester in

ly in times where wars are taking place in so-called “grey

Murcia, Spain, where she studied at the Faculty of

zones”. The adversary would intentionally act just below

Law. She has interned at the Embassy of the Federal

the defined threshold, in order to avoid a collective de-

Republic Germany in Astana, Kazakhstan and at the

fence response. NATO will face challenges in the future,

German Bundestag for the politician Gernot Erler. At

when it eventually will have to define what amounts to a

the moment she is working at the German Atlantic

cyber attack. Also in terms of its reactions it will be diffi-

Association in Berlin.

cult to determine who waged the attack and how to react proportionately. Besides these three crucial areas, active engagement on cyber issues with relevant partner nations, other international organisations as well as with industry and NATO’s cyber defence education, training and exercise activities were underlined. The Heads of State and Government of the member countries touched upon the central issues of cyber defence previously anticipated by experts in this field. It must be criticized, though, that cyber defence seemed to play only a secondary role during the Wales Summit, as the policy formulations remained rather vague. It is now up to the member states to implement the policies in such a manner that NATO can transform into a dependable player in the cyber domain in the future.

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

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Financial Warfare – A Strategic Threat? By Dr. Matthias Bange

T

this strategy is short selling, i.e. to sell stocks you do

he future of modern covert warfare is

not own but borrow. Employing this strategy against an

asymmetric. So called “unrestricted

economy's main financial institutions has the potential

warfare” holds sway: sabotage, assassi-

to effectively shatter the trust in the whole financial

nations, special operations, psychological operations,

system and to create financial turmoil. For various rea-

attacks on critical infrastructure and cyber warfare.

sons Bear Stearns would be our first target. A classic

But one powerful weapon among the means of mod-

short selling strategy combined with a negative infor-

ern warfare is often forgotten and – even worse –

mation campaign is successful to shake the confidence

almost completely neglected by policy makers, strate-

into the bank's liquidity. The stock is pushed down

gy planners and even academia: Financial Warfare.

from almost 170 dollar in January 2007 to a mere 2

To understand what financial warfare is and

dollars in March 2008, so that to prevent further tur-

what it can do, maybe a scenario might help. Let us

moil eventually the Federal Reserve intervenes and

go back a few years and assume that the late-2000s

finds a buyer in JP Morgan.

financial crisis was not just a short-time failure in the

At the same time the peak of the housing bub-

long run of capitalism, but was intentionally triggered

ble is reached, making it ever more evident that with

by outside forces, in other words, that it was an act of

stagnating real estate prices many homeowners will not

financial warfare.

be able to pay their mortgages. Our next short selling

In this scenario the target, the financial system

campaign aims at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and

of the United States and the (Western) world, was

eventually at Lehman Brothers, a firm heavily engaged

fairly weak. The regulatory system was insufficient,

in the mortgage backed securities business. With Leh-

debts were piled up, money was cheap, interest rates

man Brothers eventually filing for bankruptcy, our cri-

low and the housing bubble was a home grown prob-

sis is there. Money flows cease and the trust in the fi-

lem that would have had to affect the financial system

nancial system evaporates. To mitigate the situation the

sooner or later. But would a “regular” crisis have

700 billion dollar Troubled Asset Relief Program

reached this extent? Let us for a moment assume that

(TARP) is set up, allowing the government to buy as-

there were “outside factors”. How could they have

sets and equity from banks and other financial firms.

done it? How would we do it? Our task in this scenar-

Leaving our scenario: A rising US national debt

io: We are back in the mid-2000s and want to attack

could be the ideal setting for the final stage of a finan-

the Western financial system.

cial war: to attack the dollar and try to trash its value.

First thing to do would be to test how weak the

But even if its status as the world’s reserve currency

financial system is. So called “Bear raids” would be

should not be shattered, the US still faces tremendous

our financial weapon of choice. The means to conduct

debt and budget cuts. This could weaken the US’ will

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

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to engage in conflicts abroad – nefarious forces around the world would stand to gain.

About the author

As stated above, this is only a scenario how the

Dr. Matthias Bange is an officer in the German

late-2000s financial crisis could have been employed or

Armed Forces, who received his specialized training in

triggered by outside forces. It illustrates the potential

Psychological Operations. He has just returned from

damages of financial warfare and shows that everyone

Mali, where he served five months as Chief Infor-

with proper means would have been able to seriously in-

mation Operations Officer for the European Union

fluence the events of this crisis by pursuing the strategies

Training Mission Mali (EUTM MALI). His next assign-

described above.

ment will be in the analysis branch of the German

Stupefying is that even though the possible damages of financial warfare are tremendous, it almost plays no role in strategic considerations of countries whatsoever – maybe because of one central problem: How to distinguish between financial warfare and market activity? The late-2000s financial crisis example has shown that it could have been an attack that caused the turmoil, but

Armed Forces' Operational Communication Center, where he will focus on conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. He has studied history in Hamburg, Calgary and Montpellier and has just finished his PhD thesis on credit money creation at the Helmut Schmidt University in Hamburg. His next project will deal with financial warfare. Matthias academic interest is financial history.

that it would also be perfectly explainable with profitseeking actions of private market participants. Where to draw the line? When the outcome is the same, does the intention matter? Does it call for different responses, if private companies or foreign actors attack a financial system, the ones seeking profit, the others trying to harm a (potential) enemy? The matter is yet more complicated, because even if financial warfare was conducted as part of a foreign nation's attack strategy, it could easily be covered by the employment of brokers, foundations, hedge funds and shell companies, making it impossible to track down the kingpins of those attacks. All these problems given – a thorough investigation of financial warfare strategies is overdue.

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

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Time To Get Back In The Game NATO's Public Diplomacy Efforts For A Transatlantic 21st Century By Cedric Bierganns

liance's post-cold war transformation is the second par-

Sometimes they'll give a war and nobody will

amount perception challenge for the Atlantic Alliance.

come” Carl Sandburg's famous hyperbole has

As NATO's purpose is no longer self-evident, too many

become a bitter truth for NATO, which

ordinary people do not understand what the Alliance is

above all is a military as well as political organization

good for. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union

that heavily depends on broad public support in its

NATO's role has extended to partnership and crisis

democratic member states. As the Wales Summit

management. However, all too often NATO is publicly

2014 has shown, the Atlantic Alliance confronts three

still associated with hard power exclusively. This no-

urgent public perception challenges, which, if not

tion neglects the Alliance's various dimensions such as

adequately addressed, will compromise NATO's rep-

humanitarian assistance in Pakistan and Bosnia, coun-

utation, endanger its cohesiveness and finally make

tering piracy off the Horn of Africa and reconstruction

Article 5 an empty phrase.

in Afghanistan. Facing globalized insecurity issues such

The first public perception challenge is the in-

as terrorism in the Mediterranean, failed states, the

constant support for the Alliance and its specific mis-

quest for energy security and the challenges of cyber

sions. As the world slides back into Realpolitik after

space, the Alliance needs to authentically communicate

Russia’s annexation of Crimea, deterrence once again

its relevance in a post Cold War world and promote

can be a powerful instrument in conflict management.

the notion of NATO as a reliable and innovative part-

However, hard power that is not credibly under-

ner. This also might lay a foundation of trust and can

pinned by public support is perceived by both adver-

serve as a constructive approach with NATO partner

saries and allies alike as an idle threat. As recent poll

countries, particularly Russia. Given the recent turmoil

ratings indicate, only a minority in Germany approves

in Ukraine and the timeless critique of NATO's en-

Bundeswehr operations beyond the purpose of nation-

largement policy, it is essential to emphasize that

al self-defense and humanitarian aid. Others see

NATO is no military bloc anymore but rather an alli-

NATO as the last international organization that

ance of free and democratically legitimized nations op-

should lead in a crisis. Given the large number of Alli-

erating by consensus.

ance casualties in Afghanistan and the general opposi-

The third public perception challenge is the

tion towards military means in peace-loving and risk-

missing transatlantic narrative. A common narrative

averse continental Europe, NATO needs to generate

determines how people make sense of the world and is

public support by explaining why the military success

the vital glue that traditionally hold European and

of missions beyond NATO's borders matters at home.

American elites together. However, today's stereotype

The general lack of public awareness of the Al-

driven post-Cold-War »successor generation« in Eu-

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

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rope and the US shows no understanding for NATO's new security challenges and hardly knows anything about

About the author

the transatlantic values and solidarity that the Atlantic

Cedric Bierganns studied modern history, interna-

Alliance historically stands for. At this point, NATO's

tional relations and American studies in Bonn, St. An-

public diplomacy should develop a new grand narrative

drews and Washington State with a strong focus on

and explain to the future elites why the shared values of

transatlantic relations. His master's thesis deals with

»democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law«, as

the United States Information Agency's public diplo-

presented in the North Atlantic Treaty preamble, do mat-

macy activities in West Germany during the imple-

ter for them since NATO is the ultima ratio guardian of

mentation of the NATO Double-Track Decision in the

st

liberty and security in the 21 century. As it is only a

1980s. Cedric interned for the United Nations Region-

matter of time that rising powers challenge the transatlan-

al Information Centre (UNRIC) and the German Com-

tic narrative, which for so long consensually guaranteed

mission for UNESCO in Bonn. He also worked as a

America's hegemony and Europe's security, it is crucially

student assistant for a publisher. Cedric is not only a

important for NATO's outreach efforts to always lead the

YATA member, but also holds an active membership

public debate, set the agenda and shape the strategic envi-

of the German Council on Foreign Relations (YOUNG

ronment. Otherwise the Alliance will lose the interpreta-

DGAP NRW).

tional sovereignty it gained after 1945. In conclusion, Benjamin Franklin's bold prediction has never lost its relevance for the transatlantic community that must remain strong and unwavering: “We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.”

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

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The Aftermath Of Wales Summit Of NATO: Where To? By Eda Guney

A

complex because they are both traditional and non-

ccording to most IR specialists, NATO

traditional ones in character. These new threats have

is the most efficient and successful in-

the capacity of transcending the borders of one country

ternational military organization. Since

and hence become a threat for both regions as well as

its foundation in 1949, NATO has played a very cru-

global ones. Hence, in the Wales Summit Declaration,

cial role not just for peace and security but also for

the 28 Allies showed their determination to make a

values such as freedom and democracy. Until very

decisive effort to confront both today´s and tomor-

recently, some people were discussing whether

row´s rising threats. Therefore, two important deci-

NATO was still relevant

sions were necessary in

and necessary in the 21st

order to achieve these

century. But just as these

goals. NATO, in this re-

discussions were going

spect, has underlined once

on, new crises on the

again the importance of its

Western and Southern

collective security mission,

flanks of the alliance clear-

along with its other key

ly showed that NATO is

tasks: cooperative security

still needed for peace,

and crisis management. In

security, and stability.

NATO leaders at the 2014 Wales Summit (Source NATO)

Summit has given two cru-

This Summit was expected to focus on Afghanistan and NATO’s post military withdrawal from Afghan. The newly emerged security threats, namely the in-

this regard, the Wales

cial messages both to its members and to the outside world.

creasing terrorists threats against Western countries

First, concerning the members and international

changed this agenda. The rise of the Islamic State of

cohesion of NATO, the Alliance assured them that the

Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the crisis in Ukraine

U.S. and NATO’s extended deterrence is valid-and

drastically shifted the focus of the Summit which end-

precautions like NATO's Rapid Reaction Force etc.

ed up being dedicated to the threats at NATO’s East-

would be taken in this regard. The aim was here also to

ern and Southern flanks.

assure NATO’s allies that their individual security con-

We understand that NATO is in need of strengthening the Alliance’s present capabilities so that it could act as a credible deterrent against today’s complex and rising threats. Today’s threats are more Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

cerns-like Ukraine’s and others- will be dealt with. By this way, the principle of the Alliance’s indivisibility of security was emphasized and it is aimed to be strengthened. 10


Second, conveying a message also to the outside world, the summit stressed that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains credible and continuous. For instance, the recent stationing of Patriot Missiles to the South of Turkey in order to deter any possible assault from Syria, for instance, made the continuous guarantee of the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrence mechanism evident. NATO’s present decision to continue to have both a conventional and a nuclear arsenal is also the guarantee and the proof of the Alliance’s deterrence.

Eda is

Guney cur-

About the author

rently

obtaining her Bachelor in sociology at Galatasaray University. She was an exchange student at the Université Libre de Bruxelles in Brussels form 2013-2014. Eda has been involved with the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association of Turkey (YATA-TURK) for the last three years. Since September 2014 she is working as the president of YATA-TURK and also keeps providing reports and analyses for the YATA-TURK’s Facebook Page. Last year she worked as a communication coor-

Since the future is full of uncertainties, the Euro-

dinator for YATA-TURK during the preparations of

Atlantic community perceives the value of NATO being

the International Student Strategic Studies Seminar,

higher than ever. For this reason, NATO seems to work

organized by Yildiz Technical University. Since high

as the most successful international military organisation

school she is taking part in conferences on internation-

and also constantly up-grades itself. NATO will continue

al relations, peace and security as an assistant or partic-

to do these up-grades depending on the radically chang-

ipant.

ing geopolitical conditions in its environment. If we look at the past, during the Cold War and Post-Cold War years, NATO learned some crucial lessons and these lessons will help NATO to mature its overall security for both its members as well as to the world. In this regard, the alliance would be both trying to keep securing its own existence as well as continuing to build democratic, liberal, and secure areas of peace beyond its borders. To this end, the continuous work of NATO members together with partners will be very important and precious in order to create an area of peace and stability beyond the borders of NATO. The Wales Summit surely will be the starting point in this regard.

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

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NATO Wales Summit: Failure Or Success Story? By Ilgar Gurbanov

O

states and NATO’s competences contain mostly territori-

n 4 and 5 September, the Wales Sum-

al security and defense, energy security is of utmost im-

mit brought together the heads of

portance in terms of foreign policy making. Hence, vul-

NATO’s member states and partner

nerability in terms of energy security may hamper coher-

countries. The main outcome of the summit was that

ence and foreign policy formulation within NATO as

NATO is an alliance for Allied States only with political

well, since many members rely on a third country - most-

and geographical limits. The summit de-facto “declared”

ly on Russia - for their energy supply. This grants Russia a

Russia a main threat, relates to the security of only the

bargaining chip vis-à-vis individual states to lobby its in-

allies themselves.

terests within NATO.

Most operations of NATO served as the raison d’être

We should not forget that partners such as Azerbaijan

for the Alliance’s reputation. However, it was not that

and Georgia are important countries for many European

easy to pool capabilities and resources to send troops to

members of NATO in terms of supply and transportation

crisis points. Not all Allied States agree to contribute to

of energy resources, transit of military cargos from Af-

crisis management and certain states abstain because of

ghanistan, and play a bridge role between Central Asia

their national interests. Therefore, NATO cannot bring

and the Southern Caucasus. However, both countries

all the member states together to address crisis manage-

have territorial conflicts with their respective neighbors

ment with one voice.

Armenia and Russia. These conflicts make them vulnera-

A key reason was that there was always a cozy

ble to potential war, threats and attacks from aggressor

mentality within the Alliance, notably among its Eastern

countries. Therefore, it is important to protect critical

and Central European members based on the idea that

energy infrastructures and react properly.

the U.S. was the main security guarantor. At the Wales

The strategies formulated within NATO often

Summit, the Alliance decided to establish the Rapid Re-

neglect the partner countries by showing that “Article 5”

sponse Force that would be deployed immediately in

constitutes its main raison d’être, excluding security guar-

case of an unexpected eruption of the armed crisis at

antees for partner countries. Loud statements and deep

NATO’s external borders in order to protect its Allies.

concerns do not equal action. People are not impressed

This is also what the EU tried to establish since the early

by statements anymore. For partner states in the neigh-

2000s.

borhood, NATO became a declaratory actor. This means

The potential threat stemming from Russia and its

that NATO will not provide any security guarantees for

“imperialist dreams” should not be underestimated, but

its neighbors. It was obvious in the Russian-Georgian

alternative threats might emanate from radical Islam as

war, the annexation of Crimea, and the recent crisis in

well as territorial conflicts of partner countries, which

the Southeast of Ukraine. The Ukraine crisis proved that

might hamper their relationships with the Alliance.

edges of the security umbrella of NATO literally end at

Though energy is a national competence of the member

the NATO-Ukraine border. The same could apply to

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

12


Georgia as well. Despite the fact that Georgia is the biggest

and third, after the annexation of Crimea. In the first two

contributor to NATO operations, it could not receive an

cases, NATO decided to break the ice and continued re-

invitation to NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) yet,

lations. This shows how fragile NATO’s commitment is

while it has received “packages of cooperation”. However, if

for its partners. It may happen in the Ukrainian case as

NATO accelerated its ties with partners and accepted Geor-

well. Relations with Russia will be reconsidered again.

gia and Ukraine before 2008, maybe the Georgian occupa-

Much also depends on the position of the new Secretary

tion and the annexation of Ukrainian territory could have

General of NATO. Assuming that old habits die hard,

been prevented.

Russia, which did not stop with Georgia and Moldova,

NATO should not only rely on its “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) framework. In order not to lose ties with these partner countries, which are strategically important for the

won’t stop with Crimea either.

About the author

Alliance, NATO may initiate new cooperation frameworks,

İlgar Gurbanov is a Contributing Columnist on Rus-

even if it will not contain a membership perspective. Five

sian and Energy Affairs for Strategic Outlook from Azer-

PfP-countries – Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine

baijan. He is an ENP Fellow from the European Commis-

– have territorial conflicts, which emanated from Russia’s

sion and recently graduated from the College of Europe

aggressive imperialism and flourished by Kremlin-led poli-

on International Relations and Diplomacy Studies with a

cies. However, even without membership, NATO may pro-

Master of Arts in Security and Justice Affairs. İlgar got his

mote its ties with partners by providing more training, ad-

bachelor and first master degree from the faculty of Inter-

vice and assistance opportunities in order to keep them clos-

national Economic Relations in Azerbaijan State Econom-

er to the Alliance, rather to keep them at a distance with

ic University. He has worked as a Teaching Assistant in

political statements only. This means, “keep partners on

the Azerbaijan State Economic University and as a Project

their tracks to NATO, but not in yet”. Actually, NATO’s

Consultant in the United Nations Development Program

neighborhood strategy constitutes a failure from its core.

in Azerbaijan. From 2008 to 2012, he worked and served

While enlargement aimed at pulling out post-Soviet coun-

in various international organizations, government bodies

tries from Russia’s orbit, it failed in doing so and certain

as a trainee and participated in the different programs and

countries found themselves in a trap of territorial conflicts.

projects organized by European NGOs. İlgar is an author

From the very beginning, Russia opposed NATO enlargement in what it considered its “area of influence”. Partnership between NATO and Russia was merely symbolic and the latest sanctions stalled Russia in its policy towards Ukraine.

of numerous articles and columns. His main research area is Russian Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Policy, Caspian basin, Arctic basin, South Caucasus region and NATO/EU policies towards neighbors.

The ongoing information war, the crisis in

Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, sanctions against Russia etc., leave very little possibility for future cooperation in the near future. While the allies do not aim at confrontation, there is no willingness to cooperate either. So far, bilateral relations between NATO and Russia were suspended three times. First, during NATO’s engagement in Kosovo, second, during the Russian-Georgian War, Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

13


Call For A Clearer Common NATO Cyber Security Policy By Maria Mundt Knudsen

T

ganizational information broker, the Allies are still

wo months ago, as the NATO Summit

missing concrete procedures in the case of a severe

2014 in Wales was approaching, it provided

cyber attack both above and below the threshold of

the Alliance with a much needed oppor-

Article 5.

tunity to review its political principles related to cyber defence, and hereby rethink strategy outside of its military comfort zone. And even though, we saw long awaited policy steps being made by signing the NATO Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy and initiating the NATO-Industry Cyber Partnership, the Alliance has shown that cyber defence continues to be a priority, but a priority that lacks a coherent and common policy among its members. If we take an even closer look at NATO’s policy developments and approaches as an international organization, towards a free and global, yet more secure cyber space, there has been progress, though at a slow pace and nowhere near a match to the breakneck speed of development of threats towards the Allies critical infrastructure. The summit declaration stressed that NATO had become a more fit, faster and flexible alliance, but that did not apply to the digital realm. Almost in the bottom of the agenda, we find paragraph 72 and 73, determining that a cyber attack could invoke Article 5. Some newspapers declared that was one of the most important steps made in NATO’s history in the field, and that the June 2014 Estonian proposal to create a NATO Cyber Range in Tallinn, was another step towards the missed pooling and sharing initiative. The truth is that far more important steps, such as the establishment of NCIRC and the information school in Italy, have already been made. Even though NATO, with extended information sharing, successfully could be the orAtlantic Voices, Special Issue

The problem is no longer that NATO lacks agreement on the danger of cyber attacks, but the greater problem is the missing link, the same scale of measure, between the civil, political and operational level among the Allies. Even today, only 14 members have established special cyber units within the armed forces. The lack of highly skilled military personnel with cyber security expertise, including lack of knowledge of technical terms on the political level, all comes down to the lack of common procedures and same measure of scale on all levels among the allies. When asked what could invoke an Article 5 response, one ambassador to NATO answered that it would have to be on the level of an armed force attack. Why is this approach problematic? Because even though it might seem like a step towards acknowledging the damage a cyber attack could do, it seems very unlikely that NAC could successfully defend an ally with its existing crisis management procedures. The problem is very simple. You cannot measure a cyber attack with armed forces – that would be going back to the basics when leaders called cyber attacks ‘cyber stuff’. NAC might after these procedures measure the attack in the proportion of deaths. But a real devastating cyber attack could do much more harm than such. By starting with recognizing that an effective NATO cyber defence needs its own intensity scale of measure, by for example placing 14


a cyber command under the SACEUR, NATO could take the lead as a mediator between private and public stake-

About the author

holders that all together will have the necessary capabilities to defend the allies. Furthermore, the recent attacks

Maria Mundt Knudsen is a Program Assistant at

on government stakeholders have shown that the future

the Atlantic Treaty Association. Maria is currently

wars will be the wireless wars, where viruses and mal-

pursuing her master's degree in Political Science at the

ware can shut down key infrastructure such as nuclear

University of Aarhus, Denmark. Maria obtained her

power plants, airports and other crucial government in-

bachelor's degree in Political Science with a major in

stitutions, and a deployment of armed forces will be of

Middle Eastern Studies and a focus on the classification

little effect here. Cyber attacks are the new way for non-

of terror organizations in the MENA region. Her pri-

state actors, such as terrorists and activists, to demand

mary academic and research focus includes counter-

the attention of their governments. All this calls for coop-

terrorism, NATO's strategic culture, cyber security,

eration across all sectors, including cooperation with the

intelligence, security and state-building in the MENA

EU and private stakeholders. But cooperation can only

region. Maria is the founder and president of

find a place with the same understanding of the basic

“International Politics – NOW” and a facilitator at the

frame in which the defence planning policy is conducted.

Security and Defence Agenda's Security Jam 2014.

25 years ago NATO had to protect its allies against the “Soviet threat”. This is the age of firewalls, and they are of such importance, that we need not only to talk about NATO developing practises and protecting its own network, because it has done so very effectively, but we also need to stress the need of standardisation of policies and capabilities between the Allies. The Wales Summit 2014 called for a NATO that prioritized a common cyber defence policy, and in order to do so, NATO has to go back to the basics and develop a scale that measures cyber attacks in its own realm, and to make sure that all allies are using the same scale to measure the attacks. This is not to say that recent developments within NATO’s cyber defence has not been successful, and the link to international law clearly stated so, but the very first step needs to be rethought, and defined with a common scale of measure on all levels in NATO and among the individual allies.

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

15


The Voice Of Women In Security And Defence By Magda Kocianova

T

ed to lead by example and some positive change has been

he issue of women in security and defence

achieved already, mainly in the framework of the Euro-

has been increasingly resonant in the last

Atlantic Partnership Council. Considerable changes have been

decade. Getting on board famous faces

done in operations where inclusion of women has also a sub-

such as Emma Watson to tackle gender inequality, and

stantial impact. Gender Advisors positions have been intro-

Angelina Jolie to fight sexual violence in conflicts, have

duced in ISAF and KFOR missions. Both the Afghan and Koso-

drawn increased attention to the overall role of women

var societies are perceived as traditionally male-dominated

in security. There have been innumerable debates on the

communities; therefore, broad gender mainstreaming and the

topic in Brussels and outside (see e.g. the network

inclusion of women on the tactical and operational level in

called Women in International Security), but has it real-

international and national forces have been marked as a mile-

ly led to a positive change?

stone. On the executive level at NATO HQ, different policies

In the security field of the Western world,

such as 2007 NATO’s Overarching Policy and 2009 Bi-

NATO plays the most important role and belongs to one

Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (pdf) serve as guidelines.

of those institutions attaching “a great importance” to

The political commitment formulated in NAC is key, howev-

the issue, which made it once again to the NATO Wales

er, it is up to individual NATO members to keep their govern-

Summit Declaration; nevertheless, it has remained at its

ments accountable. Only 17 NATO Allies and 10 partner

bottom, not at its top, casting some doubt to the seri-

countries have adopted the voluntary National Action Plan to

ousness of the mat-

integrate women into

ter. If the latest

military in combat or

NATO Summit in

non-combat units.

Wales was about re-

Without any doubt the

balancing the Alli-

greatest achievement has

ance in the new geo-

been the open dialogue

political

environ-

itself, which sends a

ment, it has failed to

strong message rejecting

tackle thoroughly the

this topic to be inferior

issue of the gender

Women in peace and security (Source NATO)

to other security topics.

balance within the

Yet, more could and should have been done at the Summit in

organisation and the question of how to build an institu-

Newport. Article 90 (out of 113 articles) of the Wales Summit

tion of today to deal with the issues of the future.

Declaration leaves the issue at the bottom of the agenda, fol-

Since the groundbreaking UN Security Council

lowed by the Open Door Policy, bilateral cooperation, and

Resolution 1325 in October 2000, women’s role during

environmental security. Article 90 echoes UNSCR1325,

and after conflicts has caught the spotlight. NATO start-

namely ‘women’s full and active participation in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts.’ Nothing inno-

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

16


vative has been brought to the table. Although the role of

The Summit in Wales was certainly not another

the civil society has been acknowledged, a concrete involve-

missed opportunity but it was an opportunity that was

ment of these groups, such as for example an establishment

not used to its fullest potential. It has also marked the

of a permanent advisory panel to NATO in the future,

internal change and reshuffling of the key positions. With

would be more constructive. At the same time, the fact that

including the issue of women in security and defence on

rights of women being the last thing (Article 8) on the

the highest political agenda of the Alliance but usually

Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, and the topic of

leaving it at the bottom, we are left to question whether

Women, Peace and Security being the last panel at the Fu-

it is really an important topic for discussion, one that is

ture Leaders Summit, raises a legitimate question of the

worth a prominent attention. It seems that other topics

topic remaining still the last thing on the NATO agenda.

steal the attention, not realising that no matter can be

Furthermore, out of 28 NATO Heads of State and Govern-

solved sustainably if 50 per cent of the population is left

ment attending the NATO Summit at the Celtic Manor Re-

out or marginalised in the process. NATO must continue

sort in Newport, Wales, 5 were female representatives

to be exemplary in this aspect. We can hear the voice of

(Danish Prime Minister, German Chancellor, Lithuanian

women in security and defence, now it is time for some

President, Norwegian Prime Minister, and Slovenian Prime

more concrete action.

Minister). Along the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, there were several female representatives at the ministerial level. Amid the talks of the latest Summit, some recent changes and their impact in years to come must be taken into account. First of all, the former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen was an eager supporter of the gender issues within the Alliance, gaining the Hillary Clinton Award in March 2014. However, the policy of the new Secretary General Stoltenberg remains to be seen in this regard, noting especially the fact that in his Annual Report 2014 he tackled the issue of women in security as the very last topic. Although he inherited most of the achievements mentioned in the Report, he could have outlined the importance of Women, Peace and Security better. Second of all, the post of the first Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, Mari SkĂĽre, finished at the end of September 2014 and MarriĂŤt Schuurman has taken the post with her policy yet to be shaped. Third, the first and only female Assistant

About the author Magda Kocianova holds a MSc in European Studies from the Institute of European Studies and an LLM in Public International Law from the University of Kent. She obtained her BA in International Relations & Diplomacy from the Anglo- American University. Magda currently trains with the DG Trade of the European Commissions. She worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and the Atlantic Treaty Association Secretariat in Brussels where she dealt with security policy. Prior to that she served as a Political Analyst at the Global Water Institute. Additionally, Magda co-organised two editions of the Model NATO Youth Summit in Brussels for 250 international participants in 2012 and 2013. Her professional interest focuses on transatlantic bonds, regional military cooperation, European security and defense, and women's participation in the security field.

Secretary General, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, left her post in October to run for a president of Croatia (which she won). All of these bring an internal change in NATO executive structures and it also brings a temporary uncertainty of the NATO policies in gender mainstreaming. Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

17


NATO After The Wales Summit A New Impulse For Smart Defense? By Hendrik Kuckat

A

differently with other armoured vehicles, aircraft or

t the Wales Summit, NATO’s mem-

equipment. Yet, there seems to be little intention to

bers agreed that military defence

radically change anything about this practice. In fact,

spending should be increased to at

many multinational defence industry projects are ra-

least 2 % of the respective nation’s GDP. While it

ther an argument against substantial cooperation than a

remains to be seen how exactly this project will be

success story: The Eurofighter, MEADS or the ar-

realized by the concerned countries, the fact that the

moured vehicle Boxer show how - more often than not

present security situation requires NATO to over

- costs explode, participating nations withdraw, and

think defence spending could very well initiate a pro-

orders are reduced - while other allied nations simulta-

ductive impulse to Smart Defence. NATO has a long

neously develop a similar system on their own.

standing history of ideas aiming to make the alliance

The reasons behind this are governments, pro-

more effective by having its members work together

tective of their national defence industries. Maybe the

more closely. Concepts such as ”pooling and sharing“

most dramatic display of this protective behaviour

are hard to implement with 28 partners, each insisting

could be witnessed when the merger negotiations be-

upon their own sovereignty. Not even the European

tween BAE and EADS were abandoned due to reserva-

Union can come to an agreement on a unanimous

tions of the involved governments just a few years ago.

opinion about most topics, so how could NATO get

To a rational observer, this seems strange - after all, it

there?

is easily achievable that all participating partners beneThe initially mentioned tense current security

situation poses a certain challenge to NATO and

fit from engaging in far-reaching defence industry cooperation.

should consequently lead to actions. While the funda-

The most obvious benefits deriving from such

mental problems keeping Smart Defence from gaining

cooperation are the subsequent economies of scale:

momentum remain unsolved (no comprehensive con-

The price per unit for a tank or an aircraft is substan-

sensus, too little trust, reluctance to give up sover-

tially lower when higher numbers of units are pro-

eignty), now could be the time to lay the foundation -

duced. This in turn enables governments to buy sys-

by engaging in actual, comprehensive cooperation in

tems either in a higher quality or quantity, without

the defence industry. This idea is not new, but history

having to take the rather unpopular step of increasing

shows that multinational defence projects are rarely

military spending. It also gives them the freedom to

successful, nor are they comprehensive. Roughly a

hold on to otherwise too expensive military capabilities

dozen different battle tanks are being used by the

and therefore not having to rely on partners for that

NATO members, and things aren’t looking much

particular capability. This antagonizes the concept of

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

18


”pooling and sharing“, but it possesses the appeal that a

NATO by managing their defence budgets more effi-

nation does not necessarily have to reduce their military

ciently.

capabilities while maintaining a given defence budget and

NATO governments insist on their national au-

can generally use that budget more effectively. If nothing

tarky in terms of their defence industry, even though

else, comprehensive defence industry cooperation is cur-

NATO’s and especially the European Union’s mem-

rently at least not unimaginable, as opposed to compre-

bers already have such close partnerships nowadays

hensive ”pooling and sharing“. (And one thing might very

that there indeed is no more need for national autar-

well lead to the other.) A pleasant side-effect would be

chy. On the contrary - comprehensive defence indus-

actual interoperability and the ensuing combined train-

try cooperation is likely to send out a strong message,

ing.

leading to closer cooperation in other fields as well as Since such a movement would drive many defence

visibly strengthening the respective friendships. Either

companies into either bankruptcy or high specialization,

engaging in extensive defence industry cooperation

it seems understandable why politicians are typically re-

(with all its benefits) or protecting one’s national de-

luctant to choose to go down that road. This is why the

fence industry: You can’t have the cake and eat it - and

current security situation also offers the chance to break

now is the opportunity to make the right choice.

out of this inefficient circle and value collective security higher than artificially protecting one’s own national de-

About the author

fence industry (whose size commonly does not justify the

Hendrik Kuckat is currently deployed as a platoon

received preferential treatment anyway).

leader in the reconnaissance company of the Jägerba-

Another part of Smart Defence, just like of many

taillon 291, an infantry battalion of the German-Franco

concepts before, is ”burden sharing“. The United States’

Brigade stationed just south of Strasbourg. He joined

contribution to NATO is still many times higher than that

the army in 2006 as a conscript, and after a few months

of any other country (and three times as high as the com-

he opted for the officer career. In 2008, he began stud-

bined contribution of all European NATO members).

ying Economics and Organizational Sciences at the

The fact that the U.S. bears this much of NATO’s burden

University of the German Armed Forces in Munich.

is certainly not the organization’s biggest problem; the

During his studies, he completed internships in the

fact that the other nations do not contribute more is far

U.S. and in Indonesia (in the field of international trade

more profound, especially considering the U.S.’ ”pivot to

and NGOs, respectively). He obtained his Master’s

Asia“. While European NATO countries seemingly are

degree in 2012 and continued his military career with

not able or willing to contribute more, they certainly are

various officer trainings, most of them specific recon-

not interested in taking advantage of comprehensive de-

naissance and military intelligence courses. In early

fence industry cooperation with the U.S. at the price of

2014, he was transferred to his current unit, at first

damaging their own defence industries - and vice versa.

mostly working in the military intelligence cell of the

Despite the aforementioned relative economic irrele-

battalion (which trained for potential deployments) and

vance of the defence industry (at least in Europe), gov-

assisting the company commander, until taking over his

ernments continue protecting theirs even though they

assigned platoon in the fall of 2014.

could conveniently bolster up the European role in Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

19


Towards a New European Security Architecture By Tobias Lechner

Y

ear after year: The evergreen during

the European security architecture?

NATO meetings on every level is the defense budget of European NATO

member states. Originally, a rule, it became a far away aim. At the end of the Wales summit, the member states agreed on “trying” to spend two percent of the GDP in ten years. Most European countries are small, but of course they have their own armies.

The hypothesis of this short paper is: Past efforts to establish deep defense cooperation in Europe failed, because a critical mass of possible member states were overstepped. It is not possible to build a European army, because the member states of the EU and NATO are too heterogeneous. Therefore, if states want a deep cooperation, they must come together on a lower lev-

These armies are incredibly expensive, outdated,

el. Two European countries succeeded in beginning to

and ineffective. Most parts of the defense budget is

build a common army: Germany and the Netherlands

used

for

(referred to as the

personnel

costs. NATO must en-

“German-Dutch

courage member states

model”). The two

to build stronger coop-

countries will likely

eration. Synergies could

extend their liaison,

be used and money

in order to save mon-

could be saved in an

ey and benefit from

unimaginable

extent.

other advantages. If

Temporarily, there are

we see this German-

already different forms

Dutch form of coop-

of

eration as a possible

cooperation,

e.g.

British-French coopera-

Military cooperation (Source NATO)

model

for

other

states, we have to

tion; the European Union developed a “Common Security and Defense Poli-

draw up some requirements (the stricter they are, the

cy” approach with the headword “pooling and shar-

more stable such cooperation will be in the long-term):

ing”; and there is the NATO concept of SMART de-

fense. “More with less”, is the slogan used in speeches

political relations and they must have close cul-

by politicians. But in fact, European countries do not use these possibilities; they are afraid of having to give up a little bit of sovereignty. What’s the problem with Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

The countries must have long-term excellent tural-historical linkages.

The countries must share the same basic values and principles (e.g. rule of law, democracy, plu20


ralism, social market economy, liberal society, strong civil society). •

The countries should be as close as possible geographically.

If there are more participating countries, the cooperation must not exceed the so-called critical mass. The more countries participate, the more unstable the project will be. Under the described circumstances, a common ar-

my of various countries creates a win-win situation. Where are possibilities for very deep and very stable security cooperation? Surely, the German-Dutch cooperation could be extended also geographically. Next to the Netherlands, also Belgium and Luxembourg would fulfill

About the author Tobias Lechner is a Master student at Andrássy University, Budapest in the field of international relations. He holds a Magister’s degree in history and German studies of University of Innsbruck, Austria. For the program Korean-EU Leaders for Global Education he spent 2012 one semester at Chungbuk National University in South Korea. Last year, he participated in a Common Security and Defence Orientation Course, organized by the Collège Européen de Sécurité et de Défense, Brussels. This summer, he worked as intern in the German embassy in Chisinau, Moldova. He is especially interested in the future of defense and of security matters related to religious extremism.

the requirements, and most likely they would be interested in joining such cooperation. Similar some Scandinavian states (especially Denmark and Norway); and eventually, also the Baltic States could be part: They are comparatively small and therefore need some protection. In sum, we have now around ten states fulfilling the criteria in Northern Europe. I suppose, the critical mass is reached, a further enlargement would be counterproductive. But similar transnational cooperation between countries with strong ties is possible across Europe. Simultaneously, the military must be modernized: Instead of spending money on high salaries, money should be spent for innovative techniques. With a common military budget there could be so much more done.

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

21


Re2lections on NATO’s Nuclear Future By Andreas Lutsch

T

capability only. Apparently, most new member states in

he new strategic concept and the Deterrence

Central and Eastern Europe insisted that forward deployed

and Defence Posture Review report (DDPR)

sub-strategic US nuclear weapons in Europe are necessary.

demonstrated that NATO achieved consen-

Besides nuclear posture, NATO had also developed peculiar

sus after years of controversial debate that “as long as there

structures and mechanisms during the Cold War to ex-

are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a

change views on sensitive nuclear issues, to develop nuclear

nuclear alliance”. At the same time, NATO made a com-

weapons related guidelines and policies and to facilitate alli-

mitment to “create the conditions” for a world without

ance cohesion. The DDPR exercise highlighted the value of

nuclear weapons. The backbone of NATO security will

nuclear consultation in NATO as a mechanism to compro-

continue to be provided by US extended nuclear deter-

mise on delicate nuclear issues, even if positions and inter-

rence. This principle carries fundamental political and stra-

ests of individual allies diverged sometimes sharply. Given

tegic weight. To maintain the security of all Allies, the

the severe tensions between NATO and Russia due to the

Alliance will continue to rely on the US nuclear umbrella -

Ukraine crisis, the renewed sense of potential instability at

probably for an indefinite period, given the nuclear policies

the Eastern borders of the alliance and the chance of Iran

and strategies not only of Russia, China and North Korea

going nuclear, collective defense and deterrence in NATO

but also of the Western nuclear powers and especially of

will be of highest politico-military importance in the future -

France.

especially in the perception of those who would be most Given the legacies of the Cold War the US umbrel-

la not only includes a correspondent US declaratory policy with its core to threaten the use of nuclear weapons initially, to react defensively to an attack against the US or its NATO allies with conventional, biological or chemical weapons. The umbrella still involves forward deployed US nuclear weapons under US custody in several NATO countries which were already member states before 1989/1990

directly affected by aggressive Russian policy or a nuclear Iran. US extended nuclear deterrence will continue to constitute the very core of collective defense and deterrence vis -à-vis Russia. As hitherto, it will be supplemented by the Western nuclear powers’ deterrents which also contribute to increase uncertainty about NATO’s reactions in the worst and probably unlikely case of direct hostilities against NATO.

while some of the host countries still supply delivery vehi-

Even though we lack knowledge about Soviet views

cles according to the nuclear sharing arrangement. In some

on US extended nuclear deterrence during the Cold War,

cases and at least in the medium term, related moderniza-

the fact remains that NATO’s position was at no time chal-

tion decisions will have to be made by certain host coun-

lenged militarily by the Soviet Union, besides ongoing geo-

tries, which - especially in the case of cessation of individu-

political rivalries and Moscow’s continuous efforts to erode

al nuclear sharing arrangements - may have wide-ranging

NATO’s cohesion and to split the US off its Western Euro-

implications for NATO’s nuclear structures and the alli-

pean allies. In this regard, extended nuclear deterrence may

ance’s credibility. In any case, the DDPR Report demon-

have been important, if not essential, to maintain alliance

strated that it is not sufficient in the allies’ perception that

security and stability. Nowadays, non-nuclear protégés who

the US will maintain an ‘over the horizon’ strategic nuclear

profit from the nuclear umbrella of the US within the frame-

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

22


work of NATO may also conclude from the recent

new member states in the region of the (former) Rus-

Ukrainian crisis that nuclear weapons matter to provide

sian/Soviet zone of interest who have a strong need for

for the security of states. They may conclude that nuclear

strategic reassurance. It is likely that the assumed re-

weapons matter, even if nuclear deterrence is not operat-

quirements of extended nuclear deterrence credibility

ed by a state itself, i.e. even if a state benefits from

will differ in the future if one assumes that the Russian

(inherently less credible) nuclear deterrence, which is

perception is probably or very likely to be different

operated by a nuclear protector state that acts as a trustee

from the perception of NATO allies. Historical experi-

of its allies. Ukraine, in contrast, gave up its control of

ence suggests that non-nuclear protégé-states in ex-

former Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory and rati-

tended deterrence relationships notably urge the pro-

fied the NPT on 5 Dec. 1994. In return, the three NPT

tector state to take measures steadily to reinforce de-

depository states (the US, the UK and Russia) signed the

terrence credibility. As a result, NATO became an

Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances on the

alliance which remained to be interwoven in its nuclear

same day. The memorandum could be understood as a

dimension even after the Cold War. Thus, as long as

guarantee of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and as a pledge

US allies in the 21st century will continue to regard the

not to use force against Ukraine as an exemplary state in

US nuclear umbrella as indispensable, the global zero

terms

agenda may linger as an unrealizable and potentially

of

non-proliferation

policy.

Russian

neo-

imperialism and the annexation of Crimea violated the given nuclear order of the post-Cold War era. It highlighted the potential value of nuclear weapons in national

destabilizing vision.

About the author

security strategy, which also led to debates within

Andreas Lutsch works as an Assistant Professor at

Ukraine and expert circles in the West whether it was

the University of Würzburg, where he teaches German

prudent or counterproductive for Ukraine to take over

and transatlantic history of the 19th and 20th Centu-

the position as a denuclearized non-nuclear weapons

ries. He wrote a Phd dissertation on West Germany’s

state. The Crimean crisis also showed that non-

nuclear policy during the 1960s and 1970s. Besides

proliferation policy in a nuclear world may be accompa-

that he conducted archival research in the US, the UK,

nied by military power projection of nuclear ‘haves’

Belgium and Germany with a focus on recently declas-

against non-nuclear states that are unprotected in terms

sified governmental files. He is a member of the Nu-

of (extended) nuclear deterrence, even if security assur-

clear Proliferation International History Project, which

ances (like renunciation of forces waivers etc.) were giv-

is directed by the Woodrow Wilson International Cen-

en beforehand by atomic powers.

ter for Scholars, Washington DC. This project as well

Given the most fundamental challenge to EuroAtlantic security since the end of the Cold War, due to Russian policy vis-à-vis Ukraine, and given the fact that the overall role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy had

as his own research is devoted to develop a new and more empirically oriented understanding of the nuclear age, which may also shape our understanding of problems of the second nuclear age.

been dramatically reduced since the early 1990s, the nuclear dimension of alliance will remain to be of cardinal importance in the future - especially in the perception of Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

23


Views On The Wales Summit And Its Impact On The Future Of NATO By Aylin Matlé

T

territorial defence or out-of-area operations. In addi-

he NSA-scandal is only one of many

tion, all three tasks are closely intertwined and conse-

issues overshadowing relations on both

quently supportive of one another.

sides of the Atlantic – especially bur-

Since NATO is still a defence alliance at its core,

dening German-American ties in recent times. The

the other two core tasks are essentially a means to bol-

future of NATO is equally uncertain, at least its stra-

ster the protection of its member states by both con-

tegic orientation in the years and decades ahead. Alt-

taining crises potentially threatening the Alliance and

hough the Wales Summit and the subsequent declara-

by establishing partnerships to contribute to crisis man-

tion have shed light on NATO’s general course of

agement. Thus NATO must remain prepared to as-

action, i.e. the reaffirmation of its three core tasks

sume all three of its core tasks. This being said, it yet

agreed on in its 2010 Strategic Concept, the question

remains to be seen how exactly NATO’s principles

of details and implementation has yet to be debated

ought to be put into practice.

and agreed on. In light of

In other words: What will hap-

the

in

pen to the Alliance once its last

Ukraine and the ensuing

troops will have been with-

reemphasis on NATO’s

drawn from Afghanistan? Is

collective defence, it is of

there any conceivable chance of

particular importance to

NATO members to agree on

find common ground on

deploying troops to out-of-area

how to square the two oth-

theatres again in the near- or

current

crisis

er core tasks – crisis man-

NATO‘s relation with Ukraine (Source NATO)

agement and cooperative

medium-term

future?

And

what about NATO’s response

security – with the Alliance’s Article 5 responsibility.

to Russia’s latest aggressions in Crimea and Eastern

Despite the dramatic demonstration of its continual

parts of Ukraine? The Alliances’ firm condemnation of

significance for the Alliance, NATO should beware of

Moscow’s demeanour notwithstanding it is yet to be

solely focusing on collective defence in the years to

seen how resolved all 28 member states are with re-

come. After all, none of the operations the Allied

gard to its collective defence pledge. It is safe to say

member states are currently engaged in were planned

that Russia’s hybrid warfare not only requires a reas-

for, which should dissuade NATO from the miscon-

surance of NATO’s commitment to defend its Central

ception that the Alliance’s capabilities will not be

and Eastern European allies as expressed in the Readi-

asked for in the future – whether it will pertain to

ness Action Plan already. Instead, the threat posed by

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

24


this rather new approach to belligerence necessitates an

tion we as Europeans and Americans can fall back on

adaption of NATO’s military strategic posture and its

together when it comes to our security and moreover

approach to territorial defence. Hence the Alliance’s

our freedom. Despite necessary – sometimes more

Very High Readiness Joint Task Force for example will

technical – discussions about the future orientation of

have to be transformed as to enable the rapidly deploya-

NATO, we should never forget what the transatlantic

ble infantry brigade to be prepared to fend off different

community constitutes at its heart: A community of

threat scenarios emanating from Russia. In addition, it is

shared values avowing for the protection of its citizens’

reasonable if not necessary to contemplate how member

liberties.

countries like France or Spain would act in a scenario of Putin furthering his aggressions by attempting to annex

About the author

parts of the Baltic States for example, members of NATO as well. Put differently: Will NATO engage in hybrid

Aylin Matlé recently finished her MA in War Studies

warfare in the Baltics if provoked by Putin’s so-called

at King’s College London. Prior to completing her

little green men? And perhaps more importantly: Is the

postgraduate studies she graduated from Zeppelin Uni-

Alliance even prepared to turn rhetoric into action?

versität, Friedrichshafen with a BA in Public Manage-

All these are questions demanding a clear-cut answer as to what NATO should emphasize on strategically in the future. All these are questions concerning matters of war and peace – a distinction most citizens living in NATO member states fortunately did not have to worry about for decades. To ensure that the comfortable situation we find ourselves in continues, I consider the development of strategic thinking of utter importance, especially in my generation. After all, it seems long overdue

ment and Governance. Her thesis addressed the impact of the Libya campaign 2011 on the future of NATO. In addition to her major Aylin minored in Communication and Cultural Management. In the course of her BA studies Aylin interned with the Konrad-Adenauer foundation (KAS) in their offices in Berlin and London among others. Before starting her studies in London she worked with the KAS as a student employee assisting the coordinator for foreign and security policy.

to seriously deliberate issues such as (nuclear) deterrence in the 21st century, which will be a main responsibility of people my age. The Wales summit represents a solid impetus for contemplating NATO’s future. However, it is high time to implement the resolutions agreed on to shape the direction of the Alliance in a responsible manner. A manner clearly articulating how the allies want to assume their responsibilities committed to and reiterated at the summit. A manner, which allows for NATO to remain prepared in order to protect its member states from already discernible adversaries and – perhaps more importantly – from unknown threats yet to emerge and be identified. After all, NATO has been the only instituAtlantic Voices, Special Issue

25


NATO’s Uncertain Future – Waiting for Godot? By Moritz Moelle

L

ooking at the current crises the international community is confronted with in various parts of the world - such as the

Ukraine-Russia issue, the threat posed by the terrorist group known as ISIS or the various conflicts in Africa - NATO is remarkably absent. Other national and international actors are steering the wheel whilst NATO is taking the backseat.

ered it necessary to deploy German patriot rockets to Southern Turkey in order to pick off potentially fired rockets from Syria, there was no official reaction or action by NATO with regard to advances and land gains of ISIS which is pushing toward the immediate border of Syria and Turkey. On the contrary, the Western Alliance is not involved in the airstrikes on ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Although one might be tempted to understand this aloofness as an expression of a politi-

With regard to Ukraine and the illegal occupa-

cal move – including neigbouring Arab countries in the

tion and annexation of Crimea by Russia, the limita-

airstrikes and not acting through NATO as a policy to

tions of NATO’s capabilities became evident. An or-

counter potential claims by ISIS that it would be a war

ganization founded on the principle of collective mili-

of Western States against them – it nevertheless raises

tary defence with very limited competences and capa-

the question of NATO’s legitimacy if it is not even re-

bilities in non-military matters, all NATO could do

acting to a crisis just beyond its geographical borders.

was to watch the events unfold from the sidelines. The suspension of cooperation with Russia over the Ukraine issue led to further isolation of NATO as the OSCE is now steering the political negotiations with NATO whereas the EU has adopted economic sanctions against Russia. The adoption of the Readiness Action Plan as part of the Wales Summit is nothing but a fig leaf. However, the plan is not sufficient to reassure the Baltic members of NATO, nor does it address the fundamental problem of declining defence budgets due to expenses cuts. Germany is currently not even able to fulfill its obligations under the North -Atlantic Treaty.

Unfortunately the African continent remains a hub for conflicts. Within the past two years, new conflicts have emerged in no less than three countries: Mali, the Central African Republic and in South Sudan. The international community has taken a concerted approach in order to tackle these crises both politically and military on the basis of cooperation between a variety of international organizations including the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS and the EU. On 28 July 2014, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2167 on the future of partnerships between the UN and regional organisations in peacekeeping operations which does not even contain a single reference to

An even bigger threat to the security of the

NATO. Of course, there are good reasons why NATO

North-Atlantic Treaty area and the wider internation-

is not being more active on the African continent, one

al community is currently posed by ISIS. Once again,

being that it is not within the geographical scope of the

NATO is remarkably absent. Whereas NATO consid-

Euro-Atlantic area. Nevertheless this fact has not pre-

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

26


vented NATO from deploying out of area missions. Furthermore, the European NATO members prefer engaging themselves in Africa militarily and in other forms through the EU. These three crises show that NATO is running the risks of becoming irrelevant in an area which is at the core of its purpose of existence and legitimacy. The NATO Wales Summit Declaration is a first step in the right direction by containing a definitive commitment to increased cooperation of NATO with other international actors such as the United Nations and the European Union. However, more steps are necessary. One important aspect is NATO-EU cooperation, which has been seriously hampered by division over the Cyprus issue in the past few years. A reactivation of the Berlin Plus Agreements would be one first step for NATO to return to the world

About the author Moritz Moelle is a PhD Candidate in International Law at the Universities of Geneva and Leiden. His thesis analyses the Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations in peacekeeping operations and the involved questions of international responsibility. As part of his PhD research, he was a visiting fellow at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge and a visiting scholar at Columbia Law School, New York. Moreover, he has worked as an assistant to Prof. Dr. Georg Nolte, in the International Law Commission of the UN and as a trainee for the peacekeeping training program of UNITAR. He was also a legal intern at ITLOS and an assistant editor of the Leiden Journal of International Law. Prior to starting his PhD, he gained a master’s degrees in International and European Law and in Public International Law from the Universities of Geneva and Leiden, as well as the equivalent of the LL.B.

stage in crisis management operations. Pooling and Sharing Initiatives also require urgent implementation and NATO should engage in a serious dialogue with all international stakeholders, including the United Nations and in particular recently created international organizations about the future of partnerships and potential niches for all organisations and a division of labour in the field of crisis management operation. So what is NATO waiting for? May it indeed be Godot?

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

27


The Future Of NATO - De2ining The Right Way Forward for the Alliance By Tomáš A. Nagy

N

based on an even balance of two functional pillars. The

early a quarter century after the fall

first pillar is based on the reiteration and reinforcement

of communism, NATO once again

of Article 5 core objectives. The second pillar is repre-

finds itself in confrontation with Rus-

sented by NATO´s continual determination to contrib-

sia. Since the end of the bipolar world, Europe has

ute to security beyond its own boundaries and to act as

witnessed the expansion of a zone of peace, prolifera-

a stability provider around the globe when its core in-

tion of democratic principles, enhancement of stabil-

terests are being threatened from the outside. Un-

ity and economic prosperity in an extent which had

doubtedly, Russia never really found comfort in nei-

been rare in its own history. However, with govern-

ther of the pillars. The crisis in Ukraine shows the Alli-

ments focused more on addressing the symptoms and

ance that it must do both – enhance its internal cohe-

the causes of the ongoing economic downturn – the

sion but also to do a better job in anticipating emerging

relevance of defense has been largely downgraded on

threats from outside. While the events in Ukraine rep-

the list of national priorities and so decreased the ap-

resent a crucially important challenge to NATO-Russia

petite to invest in our own security – and that usually

relations, it is also apparent that Ukraine is more a

comes with a geo-political price to pay.

symptom of the clash rather than the main causal fac-

The crisis in Ukraine has created a fundamental-

tor. Even if the conflict in Ukraine could be settled and

ly new security reality on the “old continent“. Since

a lasting peace setting found, it is still rational to as-

the invasion of Crimea it became largely obvious to

sume that the potential for confrontation between Rus-

everyone that the transatlantic community is being

sia and the West will not disappear all of the sudden.

challenged by a revisionist power – one that clearly

The Alliance must do its best to avoid the reinforce-

intends to impose a new geo-political paradigm based

ment of perceptions of a “gray zone” of instable and

on power, intimidation and supremacy. More than

manipulable states between its own territory and Rus-

anything else, the Kremlin is interested in establishing

sia. While, due to a lasting lack of crucial consensus of

a recognized exclusive zone of privileged interest –

NATO member states, further enlargement is likely off

one in which they want freedom to manoeuvre with-

the table for the imminent future, the Alliance should

out outside interference and to uphold the existence

reassure countries like Georgia and Moldova that en-

of different pseudo-democratic, illiberal and authori-

largement will have its rational pace and will not be

tarian regimes.

stopped indefinitely even if it would be disliked by

NATO, on the other side, is facing, after more than a decade of expeditionary orientation, the beginning of a novel chapter in its history. As formalized at the Wales Summit, the future of the Alliance will be Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

Russia. Over the course of the past twenty years NATO’s open door policy represented a significant stabilization tool and thus should not be perceived as a provocation against anybody - including the Russian 28


Federation. Exactly on the opposite side of the argument,

About the author

everyone - including Moscow– has to some degree bene-

Tomáš

fited from the stability, security and prosperity of the

Nagy is an Associate Fellow for Transatlantic Security,

"new Europe". The expansion of the Alliance from 16 to

Institutions and Governance at the Central European

28 members was was made possible because of the com-

Policy Institute - where he contributes to the develop-

bination of two factors. First, NATO had found both

ment of a promising research centre that intends to

courage and appetite for making itself the greatest securi-

integrate policy research and advocacy capacities of the

ty-oriented alliance ever - even when it came with politi-

region. Previously, he worked on issues related to Af-

cal cost and created diplomatic hurdles with Russia. Sec-

ghanistan and the role of Central European allies in the

ondly, the region itself was willing to embark on a chal-

stabilization process. Moreover, he is a frequent com-

lenging transformation process to make a step through

mentator on security politics in national press and tele-

the "open door" of the Alliance. This must remain to be

vision. Besides policy research activities, he contribut-

the core principle of NATO, even when facing a consid-

ed to the organization of the annual Globsec interna-

erably different Russia than the one it did two decades

tional security conferences and to the prestigious trans-

ago. NATO’s enlargement will not be directed against

atlantic Marshall Memorial Fellowship. He previously

Russia and its existence. The main lesson learned from

cooperated with the Bratislava office of the German

the history of Europe is that division creates potential for

Marshall Fund of the US - as administrative assistant

instability and insecurity. NATO must not accept new

and junior researcher. Mr. Nagy studied International

dividing lines on the European continent and thus must

Relations, European Politics and International Security

stand by the principles that made it survive over the

at the Metropolitan University Prague, Sciences Po

course of previous decades.

Paris and the University of St. Andrews.

NATO soberly recognized the implication of the conflict in Ukraine, the revisionist nature of Russian foreign policy, self-critically recognized the daunting state of shrinking defensive capabilities and made a solid step toward a new chapter in the history. The essence of the new chapter in the history of the Alliance is defined by the change of NATO´s orientation from being an organization of expeditionary crisis management to an Alliance that aims to revive the internal security reassurances of its own members. The result of this shift in NATO´s raison d´être are Article 5 security guarantees that acquired a more complex meaning than ever before.

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

29

A.


NATO Must Promote It's Own Narrative By Chris Olsen

T

he future of the Alliance will be determined by not only how NATO confronts immediate challenges, but also

whether it is able to bring a unified sense of identity and clarity of narrative to bear when dealing with new challenges. The preamble to the Washington Treaty

face both current and future challenges, NATO must consolidate and promote its own narrative of purpose, emphasizing core liberal-democratic values and a shared history, and encourage individual member states to communicate to their populations that NATO is an essential part of their national identity.

establishes that NATO is an alliance of states “…

The Wales Summit Declaration took suitably firm

determined to safeguard the freedom, common herit-

positions on Russia and the self-proclaimed Islamic

age and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the

State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In addition to the

principles of democracy, individual liberty and the

redeployment of physical assets and the advancement

rule of law.” Born out of the trauma of World War II,

of cooperation and interoperability, NATO should

this narrative of common heritage and civilization was

have taken steps to confront Russian misinformation

self-evident to both national leaders and domestic

and historical revisionism surrounding the recent

populations at the time.

events in Eastern Europe (see – Novorossiya). While

Through the Cold War, NATO’s identity shifted from an alliance for collective defense to an alliance diametrically opposed to the Soviet Union and members of the Warsaw Pact. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO at times has struggled to maintain a shared sense of purpose, seen in the public as a holdover from a bygone era of mutually assured destruction. The intent of the NATO Summit in Wales was originally to focus on both the drawdown of ISAF forces in Afghanistan, and NATO’s future engagement with the global community. With Russia’s challenge to European peace and security at the top of the summit agenda instead, NATO no longer needed to examine its mission and purpose. It could once again be an alliance predicated on being in opposition to Russia. However, NATO’s narrative of purpose should not be contingent on outside influence. To

most in the West see Russian propaganda for what it is, Putin’s information warfare continues to play a large role in the situation on the ground. ISIL makes similarly impressive use of social media in creating its historical narrative. In its efforts to establish a so-called caliphate, ISIL is engaging in a significant media campaign, appealing to an often-warped historical narrative. In the future, NATO will need a much more proactive, Public Diplomacy Division to compete with modern information warfare globally, and it cannot have this without a compelling narrative of purpose. Additionally, ISIL will challenge NATO consensus on out-of-area engagement. Tensions between Turkey, Kurdish forces, and a United States led coalition containing many NATO Member and Partner countries, could put a strain on any future NATO efforts to contribute to the fight against ISIL. Nevertheless, with conflict along the Turkish-Syrian border, and a terrorist organization that

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

30


has thus far ignored international borders, NATO must

“common heritage,” NATO will be well prepared for

be ready to confront ISIL, should it engage Turkey di-

the challenges yet to come.

rectly and trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Moving forward from the Wales Summit, the approval of the Readiness Action Plan and changes to the NATO Response Force (NRF), including the establishment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), is a promising step towards deterring further Russian encroachments towards NATO member states. Although it would also serve as an effective deterrent, the stated goal of all member states reaching the two percent defense expenditure guideline within ten years is unlikely to occur without either new incentives or meaningful repercussions for not doing so.

About the author Chris Olsen is a Project Assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Young Atlanticist Program, where he contributes to the development of Atlantic Council programming for young and emerging leaders. Among other initiatives, he helped to organize and coordinate the 2014 NATO Emerging Leaders Working Group and the 2014 Future Leaders Summit alongside the NATO Summit in Wales. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Chris worked as an Economic Security Intern at the EastWest Institute. He received his BA in Inter-

Having all member states contribute their two per-

national Relations and History from James Madison

cent is critical to creating a sense of shared responsibility

University and minored in Middle Eastern Communi-

and ownership of the alliance. As former Secretary Gen-

ties and Migrations.

eral Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it at the Atlantic Council in July of 2014, “NATO is an insurance policy…All members must pay their premiums.” Moreover, the argument that defense spending should focus on the quality and effectiveness of spending, rather than achieving an arbitrary quantity of spending as a percentage of GDP, presumes that quality and quantity are mutually exclusive. All states should commit to their two percent, and make their contribution as effective or “smart” as possible. This may be fiscally challenging for some member states in the short term, and will require national leaders to forgo domestic political infighting and communicate NATO’s importance. Internally consolidating and agreeing upon its own narrative will challenge NATO. However, should NATO take advantage of the current shared sense of purpose between member states, reinvigorated by threats to security, and engage the public and a new generation of leaders by emphasizing core liberal-democratic values and a Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

31


The Climate Change & Global Security Nexus By Areva Paronjana

T

here is an abundance of security threats and challenges in our complicated global security environment. The NATO

Summit in Wales tried to address them all with issues ranging from the IS and post-2014 Afganistan, to concerns over the Cold War adversary Russia and its activities in Ukraine. These are all very serious security threats with grave consequences and are generally agreed to have been well handled at the September summit. There is, however a challenge that did not receive the attention it deserves – climate change. Climate change is not only the most overlooked security challenge, but potentially the most dangerous and irreversible one. Human-created climate change has already led to water and food shortages and climate catastrophes in certain parts of the world. Continued climate change will only worsen the situation causing more severe humanitarian crises, migration and will eventually fuel ethnic tensions and armed conflicts of economically desperate populations. Consequences caused by continuous climate chance are where national and international security is at stake. It is easier to find a solution to a challenge that has been generally recognised. It is different with security challenges that are unprecedented and invisible. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change in its Fifth Assessment Report clearly states: Human influence on climate change is clear. Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all components of the climate system. Limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

The climate change threat has a full spectrum of implications to the transatlantic community – direct and indirect ones, with short and long term consequences. With unseen heat waves, floods and other climate extremes over the past decades, North America and Europe have been directly affected by climate change and required to mobilise a quick emergency response. These climate changes will only become more

frequent

in

the

upcoming

decades.

Looking from an indirect perspective, the transatlantic community will see the already conflict battered countries in the Middle East, the South and East Africa and the South East Asia plunging into an increasingly deeper devastation due to water and food insecurity. That, coupled with overpopulation, economic hurdles and weak governments, has a potential to push these regions into armed conflicts and sore humanitarian crises. These seemingly remote developments can in fact have very tangible consequences for the transatlantic security. In the current situation of its over-reliance on imported energy resources, climate change has direct implications for energy security. It happens to be that most of the US and Europe’s oil and gas are being imported from volatile regions. Not only can the supply be disrupted as a result of a natural disaster, but the energy supply infrastructure in conflict regions may also come into the hands of militarised and illegitimate groups. Another direct impact of climate change initiated developments in conflict regions is migration. Immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers already cause serious problems mainly in Southern European countries. 32


There is no reason to believe that in case of worsening climate conditions and their impact of livelihood of populations in the poorer parts of the globe, there will be decreased levels of emigration to the wealthier countries. What makes climate change and its consequences overlooked is the invisible and unprecedented nature of it. Either due to short term gains or pure ignorance, there are still political leaders refusing to accept the realities of climate change and its disastrous nature. There are some basic underlying principles that have to be put in place to successfully overcome the threat of climate change and its implications for transatlantic security. First, climate change is a scientifically proven fact. Thus, all talks and discussions about the existence of climate change should be disregarded and the international

creased consumption. Consumption is currently the basis of our capitalist societies built on economic growth. Economic growth is directly linked to consumption, which is in turn linked to increased production and excessive use of energy resources. Unless unsustainable consumption is limited, all these other efforts of fighting climate change will not be fully effective. Climate change is not a local or regional threat, there is no short time solution and it cannot be solved with efforts of only some dedicated members of the international community. The climate change is not and cannot be addressed as a regular and typical security threat. This is a threat asking for both, a top down and bottom up approach.

community should stand strongly together against such

About the author

populist and potentially disastrous claims. Second, following the spirit of the first principle, there should be more discussions and debates about the dangers and threats of climate change and to its implications on national and international security. The public has to fully acknowledge the risks and be fully aware of the consequences of human made climate change. Third, the current leaders are responsible for creating a comprehensive energy policy, promoting not only fuel efficiency, but also the cleanliness of it. It should also create incentives for developing renewable and alternative future energy resources. The future leaders are responsible for implementing such an energy policy to its fullest.

Areva Paronjana has experience in EU’s foreign affairs and transatlantic security. She holds a MSc in Development and International Relations from Aaborg University in Denmark. She wrote her Master thesis about the causal mechanism of Taliban re-emergence in Afghanistan. Areva has worked as a research fellow at the Regional Studies Center, an Armenia-based think-tank. She then worked for the Security & Defence Agenda, a Brussels-based think-tank. Recently Areva worked for the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe and now deals with strategic communications at the European External Action Service.

Fourth, when debating climate change, the biggest and fastest growing developing nations contributing the most to climate change, like India, China, Brazil, South America, should always be engaged and on board even if disagreements exist. Probably the most important in solving climate change is promoting limited and deAtlantic Voices, Special Issue

33


A New Path for the Alliance By Matteo Pugliese

W

only military but also political cooperation. The role of

ith the fall of the Berlin Wall,

governments is to give a political sense of the Alliance,

the

of

a community of states that share some values on which

NATO has changed and for the

we cannot compromise: the rule of law, respect for

90s we saw a confused stage, with the advent of mul-

human rights, democracy, and freedom of expression.

tilateralism and the multiplication of potential

We must first eliminate all possible sources of criti-

threats. For about twenty years the threats have be-

cism, all lack of respect for human rights, in order to

come asymmetrical, involving non-state actors: the

not be criticized when we stand in defence of the rights

threat of international terrorism, the cyber threat, the

of civilians in third states, often dictatorships or au-

risk of regional destabilization due to failed states. In

thoritarian states. In addition, it is important to give

this context, NATO takes on a role of institution-

greater voice to the European members of the Alli-

building, in addition to the traditional Article 5.

ance, balancing the American voice. In compensation,

traditional

mission

However, a series of events at the end of the first decade of 2000 reported the central issue of the protection of the NATO member countries: econom-

as requested by the United States, European countries have a duty to increase defence spending in a smart way.

ic and political recovery of the Russian Federation

The attacks in New York, London, Madrid and

after the collapse in the nineties, the rise of new eco-

other European cities have shown how dangerous the

nomic and military powers such as China, the pres-

presence of mainly Islamic terrorist cells are in NATO

ence of new actors such as BRICS, potentially hostile

member countries. The citizens´ focus on their security

countries such as Iran, Assad's Syria, North Korea for

adds another risk: the authoritarian drift in our coun-

our allies of Seoul and Tokyo, the political chaos in

tries, giving up some freedom in exchange for more

the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, and, last but not

security. NATO countries must avoid that risk. NATO

least, the establishment of the Islamic State by ISIS.

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, when he was

The Wales Summit was a historic opportunity to

Prime Minister of Norway, after the terrible attacks of

change the priority of the last decade, dedicated to

right-wing extremist Anders Breivik, boldly said that

policies of global cooperation and the fight against

we cannot respond to extremism and terrorism with

terrorism. The Alliance cannot and should not bear

closure and authoritarianism, but with more freedom

the shortcomings and the slowness of the United Na-

and more democracy. The issue of cyber security is an

tions, it cannot be the 'global policeman', but it must

issue of cooperation between NATO and the European

take the responsibility to protect its citizens. The alli-

Union. It is an issue on which the traditional interpre-

ance, with the return of France in the integrated mil-

tation of Article V takes on a new nature and poses a

itary command and new countries as Albania and

question that is not easy to answer: what is a fact or a

Croatia, expands and resembles more and more not

set of facts that can under Article 5 indicate that there

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

34


is a real and imminent attack to trigger the defensive reaction? This is a concept always referred to during the

About the author

Matteo

years of the Cold war to defend the country from the

Pugliese is currently majoring in International law at

Soviet threat, although fortunately there was never need

the University of Genova. He also studied at the Pon-

to implement it. There is a second issue: we still have

tifical Catholic University of Chile and at the Universi-

national networks with non-uniform standards. The third

ty of Zagreb, focusing on comparative constitutional

issue, perhaps even more difficult than the two previous

law, political systems and human rights. Furthermore,

ones, is to create a doctrine on the use of the network

Matteo attended courses on human rights and interna-

and computing space because now this does not exist.

tional cooperation projects at the Shandong Jiaotong

There are countries that respect the freedom of the inter-

University of Jinan, China and at Kobuleti, Georgia,

net, while others limit it strongly in the name of security.

supported by the European Union. Matteo has been an

The new policies of President Putin, the annexa-

international observer in the district of Sofia, Bulgaria,

tion of the Crimea and the invasion of Eastern Ukraine, as

during the general election in 2013. He is active on

well as provocations towards the Baltic countries, Scandi-

NATO topics as president of the Yata Club of Genova,

navia and North America, make policy measures to pre-

Italy. Matteo writes for many magazines about geopoli-

vent a military escalation urgently needed. The task is to

tics and interviewed in this context the former foreign

protect NATO member countries being at risk, but also

minister Frattini when he was the Italian candidate as

to find a political solution and an agreement with Russia,

NATO Secretary General. Besides Italian, he speaks

which cannot compromise on respect for borders and

English, Spanish, French and a bit of Serbian-Croatian.

international conventions.

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

35


NATO´s Future Crisis Management: Lessons Learned From The Ukrainian Crisis By Anne Roth

R

of Russian interference in other post-Soviet states being

ussia´s illegal annexation of Crimea and its

home to Russian-speaking minorities, such as Moldova or

covert intervention in Eastern Ukraine

the Baltics. Russia´s aggressive violation of international law

have evoked memories – and rhetorical

has not only triggered strong calls for an enhanced military

reflexes – of the Cold War era. While the severe crisis in

presence at NATO´s Eastern flank; it has also illustrated that

Ukraine continues to keep Europe in suspense, it has al-

NATO´s original purpose of securing the European security

ready been recognized as a turning point in NATO´s post-

architecture through collective defence is far from anachro-

Cold War history. Having revealed weaknesses of the Alli-

nistic.

ance, it should not only be regarded as a challenge but also

Second, besides showing the topicality of traditional

as an opportunity for NATO to undertake necessary re-

security threats, Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine reflect a

forms.

new, hybrid form of warfare that goes beyond NATO´s tra-

In this sense, Russia´s actions have displayed features

ditional military doctrine. Such “hybrid warfare” in Eastern

that point to NATO´s future, rather than to its past. Many

Ukraine is characterized by systematic destabilization efforts

commentators have given the Alliance poor marks for its

that include ambiguous attacks fought by proxy, economic

crisis management in Ukraine. In the

pressure and threats regarding ener-

light of recent experiences, which

gy supply as well as cyber attacks

lessons might be derived from them

and an extensive disinformation

for NATO´s future? The way in

campaign. While the concept of non

which the crisis in Ukraine has un-

-linear warfare is usually applied to

folded - or rather Russia´s strategy

non-state actors such as terrorist

of exacerbating it- came as a surprise

groups, the Russian strategy of

to NATO and its member states. All

NATO—Russia relations (Source NATO)

the more, it is necessary to distil

“distraction, deception and destabilisation” (GenSec Rasmussen, June

those aspects that help to explain why the crisis promises

2014) has shown that it can be used by states as well. Partic-

to be a challenge to NATO that will carry after-effects,

ularly the absence of a clearly defined status (peace, intra-

regardless of its outcome.

state - or interstate war) and an ambiguous opponent makes

Three characteristics of the current crisis stand out: First, and most fundamentally, Russia revived some of the classic concerns of European security by illegally annexing Crimea and violating Ukraine´s territorial integrity. After the Russian government had denied any intervention in the beginning, it later justified its actions referring to its obligation to protect Crimea´s Russian-speaking population. Of course, this argumentation has evoked fears Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

a coherent political and military response a challenging task. Finally, part of Russia’s hybrid strategy was an extensive media campaign. The Russian narrative that has been spread by every trick in the book was built on allegations of fascist Ukrainian troops, the Ukrainian government´s lack of legitimacy, and the praise of the determination of the Russian speaking population in Crimea to protect itself. This media component, embracing both traditional and social 36


media, has been called the “core of post-industrial war-

dress all other aspects of Russia’s hybrid strategy.

fare” (Bachmann/ Gunneriossen 2014, “Hybrid Wars”). In any

In the medium to long-term, Russia´s strategy in

case, the interplay between covert military operations and a

Eastern Ukraine points to a fundamental challenge for the

sophisticated disinformation campaign threatens to undermine

alliance: In order to cope with the non-military aspects of

NATO´s credibility if the Alliance does not proactively offer

such hybrid challenges, NATO must broaden its focus. This

an effective counter-narrative. Given that Russia has the ad-

requires enhanced cooperation with multilateral partners

vantage of being a single and highly centralized actor while

such as the EU and OSCE that can provide expertise lying

member states´ positions on an appropriate strategy vis- à-vis

beyond NATO´s competencies. Furthermore, NATO will

Russia traditionally diverge, the difficulty to formulate a

have to formulate a convincing narrative of its goals that

coherent narrative supported by all should not be underes-

generates public legitimacy beyond immediate crisis situa-

timated.

tions. The success of Russia´s disinformation campaign can

NATO should draw short-term and long-term lessons from this:

partly be explained by NATO´s insufficient access to political discourses in Russia and Ukraine. This can only be changed by putting greater emphasis on regional expertise,

In a short-term perspective, NATO must convincingly

particularly in NATO´s public diplomacy, to allow for not

reinforce the security guarantee for those member states locat-

only a profound monitoring of regional debates but also to

ed at its Eastern frontier. The “Readiness Action Plan” (RAP)

provide NATO with appropriate networks and access points

agreed upon by the member states at the Wales Summit is the

to make its counter-narrative heard.

right approach in this regard; it is designed to “provide a coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the changes in the security environment on NATO´s

About the author

border” (Wales Summit Declaration). This is a credible com-

Anne Roth studied Political Science and International Re-

mitment to Article 5, NATO’s core business. The Alliance’s

lations in Tuebingen, Moscow, Berlin and London, where

credibility being at stake in this matter, it will be one of the

she recently graduated from the London School of Econom-

most important tasks of NATO’s new Secretary General Jens

ics and Political Science (LSE). Currently, she is working as

Stoltenberg to ensure the necessary resources for swift imple-

a research assistant at the Center for Transnational Studies,

mentation of the RAP. Furthermore, beyond its own territory,

Foreign and Security Policy at Free University Berlin

NATO should offer vulnerable states in Eastern Europe sup-

(ATASP), while finishing her second Master´s degree at

port for internal stabilization and to strengthen and reform

Free University Berlin, Humboldt University Berlin and

their security sector. Drawing a clear line around NATO terri-

Potsdam University. In spring 2015, she will join the North

tory could, on the one hand, be understood by Russia as a sig-

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a Carlo Schmid

nal of neglect towards countries such as Moldova or Georgia.

fellow. Previously, Ms. Roth has gained professional experi-

On the other hand, an overhasty enlargement policy would

ence interning in the German Bundestag, the Research Insti-

lead to further escalation in the relationship with Russia. This

tute for Eastern Europe at Bremen University, the Peace

means membership should not be on the table for those states

Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), and the German Em-

for the time being. “Stability Partnerships” might be a feasible

bassy in Moscow.

middle way that could still help to deter further Russian interventions. A key task for NATO will be to better adapt its military doctrine accordingly and to develop mechanisms allowing for a quick and efficient response to situations such as Russia´s secret, but effective, annexation of Crimea – but also to adAtlantic Voices, Special Issue

37


NATO On Its Way To Becoming Too Big To Succeed By Paul Schaudt

T

ment, as it learned its lessons from the ISAF mission in

he decisions to enable NATO to better

Afghanistan. This make sense as most current crisis

deal with its core tasks of collective

management operations are located in very fragile set-

defense, crisis management, and coop-

tings that can be compared to Afghanistan; examples

erative security in the future made at the NATO Sum-

being Libya, Mali, Syria and Iraq in the response against

mit in Wales, are in further need for discussion. In

the so called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

view of the current events in Ukraine, North Africa

If we consider, however, how these missions were con-

and the Middle East, the military capability of NATO

ducted, we mostly find NATO acting by flying artillery

seems not to be the problem that renders the Alliance

and supporting local groups with emergency relief (e.g.

incapable of dealing with those issues effectively. In

Libya), weapons, or both (e.g. in the fight against ISIL).

fact there seems to be opposing assessments of the

This seems not to be the comprehensive approach that

above-mentioned challenges resulting in diverging

the NMS have committed themselves to in the declara-

political willingness amongst the member states in

tion, but rather a very limited one. This is not a call for

how to deal with them. Therefore, the agreement to

“boots on the ground” in those scenarios, but rather an

reach comparable defense spending efforts of 2% of

observation, which I would link to the preferences held

the GDP throughout the Alliance in order to stabilize

by NMS. It seems to me that NMS are not willing to

the capabilities of NATO in times of austerity seems

engage more in those scenarios, for reasons like an as-

to be less important. I would argue that the pressing

sessment of appropriates, or a response to public opin-

question in times of austerity is rather how much

ion at home. Especially in the context of appropriates

NATO Member States (NMS) are willing to engage

there seems to be a big gap between the understanding

comprehensively in crisis management scenarios and

of the often cited “Responsibly to Protect” (R2P) and a

that finding a common ground for these issues is pre-

more comprehensive view of a responsibility to re-

ceding discussions on enhancing NATO’s military

build, like practiced in Kosovo. I would however argue

effectiveness. I will highlight this point in the context

that the scope of the missions is in any case not a result

of some of NATO’s past and present crisis manage-

of missing military capability inherent to the NMS or

ment missions and put them in context to the Wales

NATO itself, which does not allow for any other kind

Declaration. All statements in the Wales Declaration

of involvement. A perfect example would be the

regarding NATO’s crisis management point at a deep-

NATO crisis management in Mali, where the approach

er cooperation and a need for higher military effec-

headed by France was at least in military terms very

tiveness to meet future crises (e.g. point 5, 71, 102 &

comprehensive and decisive.

103). The sole exception is point 99 of the Wales Declaration which states that NATO will continue to follow a comprehensive approach in its crisis manageAtlantic Voices, Special Issue

If we look at the case of Libya we find that military action by the NMS also met its goal in stopping the 38


mass killing of civilians by Gadhafi’s military, which is in

account what its members are willing to do with it, and

accordance with the goals of NATO. Nevertheless, this

not what they might wish to with it.

mission has not left behind a territory that satisfies NMS security concerns toward transnational terrorism. Libya resembles a failed state that most NMS define as a perfect ground for terrorist groups. The case highlights very well that NMS where relatively quick to find effective military measurement to achieve their primary goals yet the complementary economic and diplomatic tools to stabilize the situation after their involvement have been predominantly missing. NATO’s military effectiveness seems not to be of much concern for NMS to meet their actual goals in crisis management.

About the author Paul Schaudt obtained a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science and Economics in 2012. During his Bachelor studies, he worked as a conflict observer at the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. He also served as board member of the Forum for international Security Heidelberg until 2013. Since the fall of 2012, he is pursuing an M.A. in Political Science and Economics at the University of Heidelberg. In 2013 he was an exchange student at the San Diego

In sum, I think budgetary concerns regarding

State University in California. Currently Paul is work-

NATO’s capability have had prevalence at the Wales

ing on his thesis on the conflict escalation capability of

Summit and I believe that a clear consensus between

foreign aid. The thesis also captures his primary fields

NMS regarding their international involvement has to be

of interest, evolving around security studies, develop-

reached first. NMS need to evaluate how specifically they

ment studies, foreign aid, conflict studies, and interna-

want to react in scenarios of crisis management and how

tional political economy.

much they want to invest in order to satisfy their security goals. My conclusion is therefore that NMS need to find a common ground on how NATO’s crisis management shall look in the future, especially after military operations, and then develop the appropriate tools for burden sharing and increased effectiveness in accordance. If they decide that they will increasingly depend on economic and diplomatic tools, then more effective mechanisms have to be developed and deployed in these areas. Should they decide that its military operations will be limited to airstrikes then it makes sense to further increase the technological fungibility between allied forces in this field. Yet ready reaction forces on the ground make no sense if NMS do not want to deploy ground troops. So every dollar in that field will be wasted, no matter how efficiently spent. Finally the future of NATO like that of any international institution needs to be planned, while taking into Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

39


NATO After Wales: Where Is The EU? By Daniel Schnok

T

about the future of EU military engagement and

he immediate impact of the Wales

NATO’s role in it. Agreements between the two or-

Summit can be felt already as leading

ganizations have always pointed to the understanding

figures in European politics pledge their

that there should not be a duplication of any kind, be it

continued allegiance and support to the Alliance and its core functions. The Wales Summit declaration sums up the new spirit of necessity that is felt in European capitals when it comes to such protracted topics such as security and defence. Yes, suddenly NATO seems very necessary, after it was heavily criticized for its out of area operations mainly in Libya and Afghanistan. It seems that the Alliance is returning to its

organizational or in command structures. However, this was exactly the core of the debate as observers felt that the EU was copying and expanding structures that NATO had built over centuries. In the eyes of many experts the EU still had to learn and search for its own role instead of attempting to engage in a competition with NATO.

core mission and with it to the ideals and values that

Numerous agreements between the two organi-

come with it – the defence of Western democracy

zations cemented the awkward couple situation of both

and its ideals in an insecure world.

organizations. However, the recent Ukraine crisis has

However, NATO is not the only international organization that concentrates on peace, security and defence. Increasingly, the EU has stepped up a serious effort to gain expertise, influence and resources related to security and defence measures and boasts around 5 active military missions around the world, most of them located in Africa. In advance, the EU has established and staffed some new agencies and centres that influence European perspectives on security as well as the defence industry. In theory, the EU and NATO are natural partners, with a partially overlapping membership and shared values. Some have also suggested that both organizations could learn from each other. The EU could get military expertise while NATO could gain civilian insight especially into state-building and related measures in which the EU has a significant advantage of staff and professional expertise. Before Wales there was a significant debate Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

brought NATO to the forefront again, as the major security provider of Europe and North-America. The EU seemed to follow suit and imposed economic sanctions albeit on a small scale avoiding major trade or economic wars with the Russian Federation. NATO on the other hand has conducted a series of joint military trainings and has scheduled operations to reassure its allies in Eastern Europe. It seems that although the two organizations are interested in the same fields of security and defence, the EU has stirred away from the military part of operations and left the field to NATO. At Wales this distinction became once more very clear as the final declaration of the summit rarely mentions the EU, and – where it does – mostly in a context of partnering with other international institutions. Additionally, the cooperation and expansion of European defence capabilities is mentioned as one key area. However, this has been a goal for years and is only coming about in a much slower pace than anticipated. The Ukraine 40


crisis has changed in many ways the picture that NATO

ed effort has to be made to end a prolonged phase of

developed over a decade of war in Afghanistan. A turna-

competition between the organizations or the awkward

round has appeared to be probable from the era of out-of-

couple relation will prevail.

area operation towards a more confrontational East-West divide that foreshadows the possibility of conventional wars in Europe. However, there is more to the picture than is usually admitted as the fighting in Ukraine is until today mostly conducted by armed rebel-groups and specialized forces that are a rather new phenomenon but not an unfamiliar threat to NATO, drawing lessons from its engagement in Afghanistan.

About the author Daniel Schnok is a 24 year old Master of Public Policy student currently living in Berlin. He studies at the Hertie School of Governance and enjoys the broad offer of security policy relevant conferences, seminars and roundtable discussions the capital has to offer. He wrote his Bachelor thesis about EU-NATO coopera-

All these developments point to a sustained and pivot-

tion, which he analysed from a perspective of game

al change in the way Europeans view their security and

theory and in which he sought to prove that under spe-

how they engage with conventional and non-conventional

cific conditions NATO-EU cooperation might be im-

threats. NATO and the EU have responded very differ-

possible to achieve. His research interests include col-

ently to these developments, owed to their organizational

lective security, security structure of East Asia and the

set up, their internal sense of mission and of course the

economics of security.

states that are represented in their decision making bodies. However, the awkward cooperation between NATO and EU has to be reformed and thought over again, despite political impasse, and despite both organizations not having shown a big interest in sustained cooperation up to this point. A real strategic partnership between the EU and NATO after Wales could bring substantial synergy effects and could complement the strategic and civilian instruments that would be at the disposal of both the EU and NATO. The Wales Summit has pointed to interesting and strategically important changes as well as a solid recommitment to European defence and security, but the other big player in European security has been side-lined although it possesses important and decisive resources that could be beneficial. Consequently, the Wales Summit has produced important decisions and identified key areas in which NATO has to engage, but to only cooperate in armaments issues, and to write a report about NATO-EU relations is simply not enough. A substantiatAtlantic Voices, Special Issue

41


Next Generation Warfare: NATO And The Challenges Of Countering Hybrid Threats By Jenny Yang

A

ccording to former Russian General

linear forms of aggression can include mass disinfor-

Valery Gerasimov, military action in

mation campaigns, cyberattacks, the use of Special

the twenty-first century could begin

Forces often disguised as local partisans, local proxies,

with groups of troops operating in 'peacetime' with no

intimidation, and economic pressure.

Examples of

official declaration of war. The effectiveness of non-

asymmetrical warfare practiced by Russia include Esto-

military means in achieving strategic goals has sur-

nia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2014.

passed that of weapons or conventional warfare. In

In Ukraine, insignia-less soldiers seized political

this new strain of nonlinear warfare, precedence is

and communication buildings and declared independ-

given to psychological operations, information war-

ence from the Ukrainian state. Despite wearing Russian

fare, and decentralized civil-military combat units

military kit and driving vehicles with official license

with the objective of lessening reliance on conven-

plates, it was unclear whether they were local activists,

tional military force. Russian forces could then be

mercenaries, or soldiers acting without orders. The

deployed under the guise of domestic militants. In

problem posed to NATO is that such activities often

light of Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine, NATO is

fall below NATO’s response threshold. According to

understandably wary of this new ‘Putin Doctrine’,

Article V, "Parties agreed that an armed attack against

which casts Russia as the defender of the rights of

one or more of them in Europe or North America shall

Russian speakers. In reference to Russia’s relationship

be considered an attack against them all." In light of

with Ukraine and Belarus, Putin has asserted that:

ambiguous warfare, NATO must consider what consti-

“Essentially, we have a common church, a common

tutes an Article V attack and whether the adjective

spiritual source, and a common destiny.”

“armed” should be removed from the Washington

The current threat, described as ‘hybrid’, can

Treaty, given the fading importance of kinetic tools

vary from the usage of secret services, diplomacy, the

such as tanks, ships, and planes. In the event of an am-

media, proxies as well as provocation. The term hy-

biguous attack, it is imperative that NATO is able to

brid warfare was first used after the 2006 Lebanese

act swiftly, decisively, and in lockstep.

war, referring to a form of warfare that blends sub-

Countering hybrid threats is about improving

version and low-level political violence, usually falling

initial understanding and using existing capabilities in

below the threshold of conventional war. According

an innovative way to face a threat, rather than about

to the NATO capstone concept, "Hybrid threats are

new equipment or weapons systems. In the recent

those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simulta-

Wales Summit Declaration, the threat of hybrid war-

neously employ conventional and non-conventional

fare was duly addressed, acknowledging the importance

means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives." Non-

of NATO being able to effectively deter and respond to

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

42


hybrid warfare risks. Measures proposed by NATO fol-

mational aggression from “the Atlantic civilization led

lowing the Wales Summit include: enhancing strategic

by the USA.” However, according to professor Mark

communications, incorporating hybrid threats into exer-

Galeotti, this is not a new Cold War with its steadfast

cise scenarios, strengthening cooperation between NATO

ideological rivalry, but closer to the nineteenth-

and other organizations in the form of information shar-

century Great Game of imperial rivalry in Central

ing, political consultations, and staff-to-staff coordina-

Asia: "Like the Great Game, the struggles will be

tion. Moreover, the NATO Strategic Communications

fought using deniable covert actions political misdirec-

Centre of Excellence was opened this January in Latvia.

tion, economic leverage, propaganda, espionage hack-

In addition, situational awareness must be created by presenting a credible picture of the opponent and his or her long-term objectives. The public must be given a clear and unambiguous understanding of the threat as well as the time scale of any comprehensive campaign. NATO needs to strengthen command and control, guarantee

ers, mercenary agents, and useful dupes." In today’s uncertain security environment, it is more important than ever that NATO remain swift, adaptable, and innovative.

About the author

resilience and interoperability of cyber-systems, engage in

Jenny Yang graduated from Queen's University, with

counter-propaganda and define the role of special forces.

a BAH in Political Studies. She currently works at In-

According to Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House,

terpol's headquarters in Lyon, France in the Strategic

“having situational awareness, intelligence, being able to

Planning Directorate. She was invited by the Atlantic

share it quickly is incredibly important.” With accurate

Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina to attend the 2014

intelligence and a strong command and control, a country

NATO Summer School in the Balkans and has also

is able to respond quickly to an ambiguous threat. Com-

studied at the Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon on

batting non-linear threats also requires non-linear

the Ontario Rhone-Alpes Scholarship. Jenny has previ-

measures such as pressuring western governments to en-

ously worked as an advisor at an internship for the Em-

act stronger money laundering laws to root out corrupt

bassy of Canada to the Netherlands, in which she pro-

funds from Russia.

vided support to the Canadian Permanent Representa-

In what appears as a uniquely twenty-first century strategy, Russia has proven itself adept at manipulating

tion for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

information to suit its strategic interests. However, Russian information warfare is nothing new. Russian information warfare theory is based on ‘spetspropaganda’, which was first taught as a separate subject in 1942 at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, being removed from the curriculum in 1990s only to be reintroduced in 2000. Russian politicians and journalists have often argued that information warfare is necessary for the socalled “Russian/Eurasian civilization” to counteract inforAtlantic Voices, Special Issue

43


NATO’s future today are those who shape it tomorrow By Magdalena Kirchner

W

dialogue and two-way street education. What does collec-

hen NATO’s international and na-

tive defense really mean and what can be done to establish a

tional leaders talk about the future of

mutual

the alliance, they mostly refer to

generational terms? If our generation’s reality includes lan-

understanding

in

transnational

and

cross-

uncertainties, processes, whose

guage courses in Egypt and China, intern-

outcomes are unforeseeable yet, and

ships in South Africa and Russia, and jobs

to emerging challenges demanding

in Japan or Mexico, is Euro-Atlantic and

political and military adjustments.

territorial security really enough? And if

Much too little, they emphasize the

not, implying a greater commitment to

role of those, who will determine,

international crisis management and con-

how and to what extent NATO can

flict resolution, are we willing to invest

respond to those challenges and

political, military, and financial resources

who really constitute the future of

in what seems to be at a first glance the

the alliance. Twenty-five years after

security of others? The Atlantic Treaty

the Berlin Wall fell, nearly a third of those one billion people, whose

Participants of the `Nato‘s Future Seminar‘ (Source German Atlantic Association)

Association foresaw this issue in the early 90’s and as a response, founded its youth

security is an essential priority for NATO, have little or no

division, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association or YATA in

actual memory of the Cold War or political repression in

its respective 36 national associations. Since 1996, YATA

Europe. Growing up in times of peace or distant wars,

has served as a leading international platform for young pro-

NATO’s

youth weren’t

fessionals in security and defense,

familiar with vocabulary

working alongside our ATA seniors

such as deterrence or col-

and fellow youth organizations to en-

lective defense until very

sure that young professionals have a

recently, and only from

voice in the policy-making world and

history and political science

direct access to national and interna-

classes.

tional officials.

Moreover,

eco-

nomic uncertainties and

NATO’s Wales Summit was dominat-

high rates of youth unemployment

limit

popular

support for increased de-

ed by the crisis in Ukraine, the subseAreva Paronjana and Brigadier Meyer zum Felde (Source: German Atlantic Association)

fense spending and costly military missions especially among those, whose security might be at stake if the alliance fails to deliver on its promise to protect and defend its member states. What could be described as a generation gap within NATO, can only be overcome by increasing Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

quent collapse of the alliance’s partnership with Russia, and a situation

where closing a key chapter of crisis management (Afghanistan) was nearly overshadowed by a massive security and humanitarian crisis on NATO’s Southeastern flanks, in Syria and Iraq. And yet, other tasks are looming large – such as providing energy security, adjusting to security (and 44


political) challenges of the digital era, and integrating NATO’s

swallow does not make a summer”. In the same way, hold-

crisis management instruments into broader and comprehen-

ing one seminar that allows young citizens of NATO mem-

sive frameworks of conflict solution and post-conflict manage-

bers and partner countries to debate their own ideas with

ment. In the seminar, we therefore particularly turned to these

senior experts on an eye to eye level, will not suddenly

questions, as they share one essential feature – the necessity of

overcome the generational gap within the alliance. Especial-

NATO to broaden its scope and understanding of which threats demand our closest attention and how security can be attained in an era of such uncertainty.

ly in times like these, we have to invest in those that will shape and secure the implementation of its missions, on the one hand, and take their arguments and considerations seriously, on the other. The most important task, however, is

In order to strengthen the transnational as well as the

to maintain a substantial commitment to youth empower-

cross-generational debate on current security issues, the Ger-

ment and to assist young voices in becoming an audible and

man chapter of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA)

visible part of NATO’s future.

organized an international seminar on 04 November 2014 as a

About the author

side-event of the conference “NATO after the Wales Summit”, which took place the following day. Bringing together 41

Dr. Magdalena Kirchner serves as spokeswoman of

young professionals, scholars, senior experts, and NATO, as

YATA Germany and associated board member of the Ger-

well as government officials, from 16 member and partner

man Atlantic Association (GAA) since May 2014. Besides

states, the seminar served as a platform for fruitful and enrich-

YATA, she also coordinates the GAA’s transatlantic projects

ing debates during the day. Ever since, it became a forum for

and the event series “NATO Talk around the Brandenburger

an exchange of ideas and mutual understanding between for-

Tor.” In addition, Magdalena works as an editorial journalist

mer participants.

for the Security Policy Reader, jointly published by the Federal Ministry of Defense and the German Armed Forces as

During the preparation of the sem-

well as associate fellow of the Transatlantic

inar, individual members of YATA Ger-

Relations Program of the German Council of

many had been invited in an open call

Foreign Relations (DGAP), where she works

for panels to suggest three specific de-

on Security Politics in the Middle East and U.S.

bates that should be held during the

policy in the region. Magdalena obtains an

seminar. Those who had been selected

M.A. and a PhD in International Relations from

took positions as chairs or discussants

the University of Heidelberg. Until 2013, she

on their panels and played an important

served inter alia as a lecturer at the Institute for

role in the selection of speakers and

Political Science at the University of Heidel-

conceptualization of the discussion. Thirteen international and thirteen Ger-

Getting started for the workshops (Source YATA)

berg and as head of the Working Group "Conflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb" of

man participants were selected in a competitive application

the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research.

procedure and immediately started to interact with each other

In 2010 and 2012, she spent several months as a Visiting

via social media platforms, selected readings, and essays. The

Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and

latter, focusing both on the key topics of the seminar (energy

African Studies in Tel Aviv, the International Strategic Re-

security, cyber security, and crisis management) and the out-

search Organisation (USAK), as well as the Center for Mid-

come of the Wales summit, turned out extremely well-written

dle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM), both based in Anka-

and were distributed also among the 450 participants of the

ra. She is a member of the extended board of Women in

main conference the next day. With this special issue, we aim

International Security Germany.

at taking these important insights to a wider audience and making them heard as what they are – genuinely Atlantic Voices. In his famous Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle said that “one Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

45


NATO’s Future Seminar Sandemans New Europe for a “Walk around the Brandenburger Tor.” Together with tour guide Sam, n the eve of the seminar, an the group discovered the political Berlin by foot and informal get together in central gained fascinating insights on the city that was just Berlin helped the participants to get about to celebrate 25 years of the fall of the wall. A to know each other and generate a highly amicable joint lunch at the canteen of the ZDF (Second German working atmosphere for the upcoming days. Television) Berlin Studio gave the participants also the opportunity to take a glimpse at one of The first panel “NATO Germany’s biggest media and the Quest for Energy outlets, also home of the Security” started after some introductory remarks by famous Mainzelmännchen. The afternoon session YATA Germany’s “NATO and the Challenge spokeswoman, Dr. of Cyber Space” was coMagdalena Kirchner, and a chaired by Dr. Svenja Post first round of discussion and Alexis Below, among the participants. Research Fellows at the The debate was moderated Brandenburg Institute for by YATA membe rs Panel discussion on NATO and the Challenge of Cyber Space Society and Security. Alexande r Schrö der, (Source German Atlantic Association) First, Dr. Olaf Theiler, German Armed Forces, Head of the Section Future Analysis at the Bundeswehr and Martin Wölfel, Zeppelin University. First, Dr. Planning Office, stressed the ambivalent nature of the Marco Overhaus, Deputy Head of Research Division internet in terms of security. Furthermore, he and his “The Americas” (a.i.) of the German Institute for co-panelist Prof. Dr. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, International and Security Affairs provided the Chair of Public Law at the European University participants with key insights on the so called Shale Viadrina, agreed that the biggest challenge for NATO Revolution in the United States and its economic and regarding cyber security is the endemic attribution security-related implications. Second, Dr. Julijus problem. Liina Areng, Head of International Relations Grubliauskas, Energy Security Advisor at NATO’s at the Estonian Information System Authority, Emerging Security Challenges Division, argued that maintained that the capabilities to protect energy security might be a national issue at a first infrastructure against cyber-attacks is unevenly glance but is also on NATO’s agenda given its distributed among its members. Hence, a importance for the security of its members. Finally, comprehensive approach that also includes NATO-EU Sebastian Feyock, Program Officer at the German Council on Foreign Relations, stressed the cooperation in the field should be pursued. The concluding panel “NATO Crisis Management importance of energy diversification as a key factor in Revisited?”, chaired by Sebastian Feyock, centered on decreasing both vulnerability and independence. After the question, which lessons could be drawn from the a lively debate on how the member states could and ISAF mission in Afghanistan and how they could be should boost coordination and cooperation in the field integrated into future planning of such missions. Both of energy security, the participants were invited by By Magdalena Kirchner

O

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

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Dr. Stefan Oswald, head of division Afghanistan/Pakistan at the Federal Ministry of Cooperation and Development, and Nicholas Williams, head of the Afghanistan Team at NATO’s Operations Division, argued that the current situation in Afghanistan indicates that ISAF has been a successful mission. The key lesson, however, was that realistic goals must be set and commitments need to be sustainable. Tobias Hecht, Senior Project Coordinator at Transparency International Germany, pointed out that especially corruption constitutes a major threat to postconflict management and hence deserves further attention also in the planning process. After a full day of discussions, a conference dinner not only rounded off the seminar but also constituted a starting point for future engagements and exchange, both on a personal and institutional level. The seminar was co-sponsored by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, the German Atlantic Association, the Federal Academy for Security Policy, the Press- and Information Office of the German Federal Government and Sandemans New Europe Tours. Impressions of the first panel on energy security

Maria Mundt Knudsen, Eda Guney, Rowinda Appelman and

Magda Kocianova (Source Rowinda Appekman)

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue

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Atlantic Voices Special Issue - The Future of NATO  

The Future of NATO: Young perspectives On Key Challenges To The Alliance Twenty-one students and young professionals from 16 NATO member an...

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