which it was not originally intended. In short, the Tornado truly was a Multi-Role Combat Aircraft.
The deployment of the Tornado in the RAF reached its apogee in 1990, when the type equipped 11 strike/attack squadrons (of which eight were based in Germany) and seven air defence squadrons. However, the Options for Change defence review carried out that year resulted in the disbandment of Tornado GR 1 squadrons based at Laarbruch, in Germany, and the transfer of two squadrons from Marham, in Norfolk, to Lossiemouth, in Scotland, to convert to the anti-shipping role.
For the next 29 years, the operational focus of the Tornado ground attack squadrons was in the Middle East, with the Tornado GR 1 (and later GR 4) squadrons being involved in operations over Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria continuously from 1992. Meanwhile, the Tornado F 3 squadrons maintained operational Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) in Britain and the Falkland Islands, and also undertook deployments that saw jets patrol over the Balkans, the Baltic and Iraq.
After the re-organisation that followed the Options for Change review, the Order of Battle of the RAF Tornado Force was as follows in 1992;
A Mid-Life Update (MLU) in the late 1990s saw the Tornado GR 1 airframes being modified to Tornado GR 4 standard, which, amongst other things, gave the aircraft a full capability to employ ‘smart’ weapons such as the MBDA Storm Shadow and Dual-Mode Seeker (DMS) Brimstone missiles. The Tornado F 3 also saw continuous upgrades to its operational capability, including the Combat Sustainability Programme (CSP) in the early 2000s that introduced the new Link 16 Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) network as well as the capability to use the Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM) and Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) systems. However, throughout their post-Cold War career, both variants of the Tornado were limited by the pedestrian performance at medium-level of the airframe and their Turbo-Union RB199 engines.
Squadron disbandments gradually reduced the Tornado GR 1/4 force from eight squadrons in 1992 to just three by 2018. When the Tornado GR 4
ceased operations in March of the following year to make way for the Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning, the Tornado F 3 had already been phased out of service in favour of the Eurofighter Typhoon, with the last unit, No 111 Sqn, disbanding in March 2011.
CHAPTER ONE
Unfortunately for this plan, the US leadership of the Coalition formed to undertake this operation had already decreed that no aircraft were to operate below 10,000 ft. The Tornado Infra-Red Reconnaissance System had been specifically designed for low-level operations, so it was quickly apparent that the Tornado GR 1A was the wrong platform to use. Instead, the two existing GEC-Ferranti Thermal Imaging Airborne Laser Designator (TIALD) pods would be used by Tornado GR 1s as ‘mobile security cameras’ to film activity on the ground below the NFZ. The US/Coalition operation was known as Operation Southern Watch, and the British participation was codenamed Operation Jural. Six Tornado GR 1s from No 17 Sqn deployed to Dhahran, in Saudi Arabia, in August 1992 to commence operations.
The prototype TIALD pods used during Gulf War I had been replaced in service by two early production pods – these were despatched to Dhahran, where they were known as ‘Becky’ and ‘Rachel’.
The daily Operation Jural routine was to mount an operational four-ship made up of two pairs, each in turn comprising a TIALD-armed reconnaissance aircraft and a ‘shooter’ escort. All aircraft carried live guns and missiles. Once in Iraqi airspace, the four-ship would split into its constituent pairs to cover the reconnaissance task. Each TIALD aircraft was allocated a number of ‘points of interest’ in Iraq to film, as well as various line searches following roadways through the marsh area to the south of the Euphrates River and to the east of the southern reaches of the Tigris River.
At medium level, and with the navigator very much ‘heads in’ while monitoring the TIALD picture, the reconnaissance aircraft was vulnerable to attack either by fighter aircraft or SAMs, hence the need for the ‘shooter’ escort. In practice, the four Tornados would make up only part of a much larger Coalition package operating within the NFZ, and there was an almost continuous presence of Coalition air defence aircraft such as USAF F-15C Eagles and Armée de l’Air Mirage 2000Cs.
Each squadron was responsible for providing crews for a three-month period, but rather than the entire unit deploying for the whole period, a system of ‘roulement’ was introduced whereby crews were cycled through Dhahran for a six-week tour. Staggered starting dates for each pair of crews meant that there would be a continuous presence of locally experienced pilots and navigators. No 617 Sqn took over from No 17 Sqn, which, in turn, handed over to No 14 Sqn in November 1992.
Describing a mission flown on 16 December, one pilot detailed a typical task for an Operation Jural sortie. This involved flying ‘across to the marshes to run up the road to Al Amarah, then back across the marshes, back up to Al Amarah to check out a barracks, across to look for a SA-2 SAM site in the middle of the desert, down to Nasiriyah to look for another troop concentration and then home’. A flight like this would last around three hours.
The winter weather was not altogether helpful for reconnaissance operations, and sorties frequently had to be curtailed or re-tasked when cloud obscured the ground. Nevertheless, the Tornado detachment flew nearly every day. This included Christmas and New Year’s Days, which was a new experience for crews used to the festive stand-downs of the Cold War! As a result, most crews flew about 40 hours a month during the detachment – well over twice the typical total for flying at Brüggen.
The high tempo of operations and relatively long sortie lengths swiftly brought up the landmark of 1000 hours flown by Tornado GR 1s on Operation Jural. This milestone was achieved on 29 November during the first trip in-theatre by Flt Lts D K Roxburgh, D J A Potter, K A Ward and Flg Off L P Williams of No 14 Sqn.
Although Coalition forces enjoyed air supremacy over southern Iraq, the Iraqi forces still represented a credible threat to individual aircraft operating in the NFZ. There were SA-3 SAM sites around some of the larger airfields, for example Basrah and Tallil, which were ‘no-go areas’ for Coalition aircraft, and Iraqi air defence radars monitored operations in the NFZ. IrAF fighters also periodically flew into the NFZ in the hope, perhaps, of finding an unescorted reconnaissance aircraft. It was for this reason that Coalition aircraft were always armed and flew in pairs while over Iraq.
The daily reconnaissance task had become routine by mid-December, but there were strong indications that the Iraqis intended to contest the NFZ. SAM systems were deployed south of the 32nd Parallel and, later in the month, IrAF fighters began to make high-speed dashes into the NFZ. Then, on 27 December, an IrAF MiG-25 was shot down by an American F-16D Fighting Falcon – the first air-to-air kill both for a USAF F-16 and for an AIM-120 AMRAAM. Although reconnaissance tasks continued, planning started for an air attack by Coalition aircraft to force the Iraqis to withdraw their air defence systems from the NFZ.
‘Some time later, when a Bomb Damage Assessment [BDA] photo of the target surfaced, it showed that while the first bomb did indeed go short by 100 ft, the second was a direct hit. What had been a square building was now missing most of its eastern and southern walls.’
Five days later, on 18 January, the four Tornados flew a second mission, this time in daylight, against the radar control building at An Najaf. ‘Our attack was planned from west to east, with the spiker actually running about two miles north of the NFZ on the run-in, as the target was so close to the line’, recalled Flg Off Craghill. ‘After release we would turn right, to be heading south, back inside the NFZ at bomb impact. We were spiker for the second pair again, the difference being that this time we would share the same target, such was its importance.
‘Again, the target was easy enough to find within the site once you had the road layout memorised from target study, but the difficulty lay in actually finding the site. Our maps didn’t show it very well, but the site was perched on the edge of a big ridge running north-south, forming a distinctive western boundary. As it was, on the run in to the target the lead spiker could not identify it, so they peeled off south to set up for a re-attack.
‘I eventually found the target area, which showed up much better with the TV sensor than IR – an advantage of the dual-capable TIALD pod. However, as we approached the bomber’s release point, I had broken out the site, but not our actual target. As I had the site layout memorised, I was confident of being able to find it, so when the bomber crew called that they were approaching release point, and “Cookie” enquired if I was “captured”, I replied “No, but I will be!” Cookie cleared the bomber to release. Now the pressure was really on, and I had to nail the target. I found the entrance to the compound, followed the main road from Baghdad into the site, turned south, then back west and – bingo! There was the target.
‘As “Cookie” counted down to impact time for me, I turned on the laser and waited. I actually saw the bombs come into the TIALD picture from the bottom left and blow through the sand wall surrounding the target, straight into the bunker. With three direct hits, I was confident of another kill, so I transmitted for the rest of my formation to hear “Touchdown, and the crowd goes wild!” Unfortunately, I keyed the wrong radio and the call went out on Strike Primary and was heard by every Coalition aircraft airborne! The AWACS crew responded with a confused “Uh, roger”, and we headed for home.’
The crisis in southern Iraq was quickly resolved and Operation Jural continued with its routine. By now, No 31 Sqn had taken over the reins at Dhahran, and Wg Cdr I Hall introduced the sensible requirement that all crews practised dummy attacks as well as their reconnaissance tasks while over Iraq in order to make sure that they would be ready, if called upon again, for offensive action. Against this backdrop, Operation Jural remained the main focus for each squadron’s activities.
In August 1994, the operational capability of the detachment was further improved with the introduction of a new reconnaissance sensor. No 14 Sqn was the first unit to use the Vinten Vicon pod – a ‘traditional’ photoreconnaissance pod with high-resolution cameras, enabling crews to cover points of interest more effectively than they could with the TIALD video. Aircraft still flew in pairs, but now one carried the Vicon pod, while the other carried the TIALD pod.
OPERATION DRIVER
In early October 1994, political and military tension in the Persian Gulf region increased once more after two armoured divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard were detected moving towards the Kuwaiti border. The British response to this was Operation Driver, which included the deployment of six additional Tornado GR 1s to Dhahran. Brüggen was notified on 6 October to prepare to despatch the aircraft, and five days later the Tornado reinforcements, accompanied by a VC10 carrying additional ground- and aircrew, arrived in Saudi Arabia.
The new aircraft and crews commenced operations on 13 October. Operation Driver sorties were usually flown as six-ships, and apart from the continued reconnaissance tasking, most missions took the form of a simulated LGB attack on military installations. However, the situation died down quickly and the extra aircraft trailed home on 9 November.
OPERATION WARDEN
The Tornado force also assumed responsibility for Operation Warden from RAF Jaguars and Harriers when those aircraft were required for operations over the Balkans in April 1995. Flying operations for Warden took place from the Turkish Air Force base at Incirlik, just outside Adana in the central south of the country. Without the strict Islamic laws of Saudi Arabia, and
with a rather more favourable climate, Incirlik proved to be a more pleasant location than Dhahran.
The first unit to deploy there was No 617 Sqn, and over the next year the British-based units took on Warden, while Brüggen squadrons assumed full responsibility for Jural. One unfortunate effect of doubling the number of operations was to stretch the supply chain even further. Another was that rather than covering a two-month period of operations, each unit now had to cover a four-month stint.
The northern NFZ was much smaller than its southern counterpart, covering the area of Iraq north of the 36th Parallel. It included the city of Mosul and the Zagros Mountains, which marked the borders with Turkey and Iran.
Tornado GR 1s refuel from a No 101 Sqn VC10K tanker over the Zagros Mountains prior to an Operation Warden mission into the northern NFZ in March 1996. The mountainous terrain in northern Iraq was a contrast to the low-lying desert and marshlands of the south (Andy Glover)
The sorties over the northern NFZ followed a similar pattern to missions over southern Iraq, but there were some notable differences. Firstly, reaching the crossing point into Iraq involved a transit of nearly 500 miles eastwards along the border between Turkey and Syria, or almost twice the distance from Dhahran to the Iraqi border in the south. Secondly, the terrain was markedly different. Under the southern NFZ, the ground was virtually all at sea level, but under the northern NFZ the mountains rose to 13,000 ft.
Mosul itself sat at their foot, astride the headwaters of the Tigris. However, one benefit of operations in the northern NFZ was that Iraqi forces were much less active in the area.
Despite the increased transit times, the smaller area of the northern NFZ meant that typical Operation Warden sortie lengths were about the same as those on Operation Jural – between two-and-a-half and three-and-a-half hours. Tanker support was provided by a VC10K, which was also based at Incirlik, and the Tornados carried out reconnaissance with both the TIALD pod and the Vicon pod over various Points of Interest. The flying was somewhat tedious, but at least the mountain scenery added some interest. ‘There was no lead-in training with the [Vicon] pod’, recalled Flt Lt L W Grout, who deployed with No 12 Sqn in December 1995, ‘all the training being done in-theatre shadowing the in-theatre guys. It was a steep learning curve, but we cracked it’.
Adorned with a squadron commander’s pennant beneath the cockpit and the markings of No 2 Sqn, this Tornado GR 1 was photographed during an Operation Warden sortie. It is painted in the all-grey camouflage scheme that was introduced in the late 1990s, reflecting the Tornado force’s shift in emphasis to medium-level operations. The aircraft is carrying a Vicon reconnaissance pod on the centreline pylon (Andy Glover)
OPERATION JURAL CONTINUES
The beginning of 1996 saw No 31 Sqn mounting Operation Jural from Dhahran and No 12 Sqn at Incirlik for Operation Warden. Perhaps the most significant event of that year from the Tornado GR 1 crews’ perspective was the bombing of Dhahran’s domestic accommodation site on 25 June. The truck-bomb attack, which killed a number of US personnel at the Khobar Towers complex, was carried out by Hezbollah. Thankfully, there were no British casualties, but Operation Jural in its entirety was moved to the
the light the engineers had to tow aircraft to the parking places’. The airfield was still in the semi-destroyed state in which it had been left after Gulf War I.
Over the next two days, the squadron established a dispersed operating base in one of the HAS sites. Each of the large HASs had an enormous hole in the roof, thanks to the attention of Coalition aircraft during Gulf War I. Despite the holes, the HASs provided ideal storage space for engineering equipment. In one HAS, the Operations and Engineering facilities were set up inside long tents, each of which was protected with sandbags. Initially, the aircraft were parked in the open outside the HASs, but later on, as the temperatures rose, lightweight shelters were constructed to protect airframes, engineers and aircrew from the sun.
Weapons were delivered to AAS and the TIALD pods being used by No 17 Sqn for Jural were flown in from Al Kharj. Forty-eight hours after arriving in Kuwait, No 14 Sqn declared itself ready for operations.
In the end, the Tornado GR 1s were not needed for attack operations. Diplomatic initiatives had quickly defused the crisis, and a new agreement between Iraq and UNSCOM was signed on 17 February. However, the squadron remained at AAS for the next three months to fly Jural-type sorties in the southern NFZ.
Within each pair of aircraft, the TIALD-equipped leader would also be loaded with two Paveway IIs and the wingman would carry the Vicon pod. Flying continued around the clock, and most crews flew a mixture of day and night missions. When compared to Dhahran or PSAB, AAS was much closer to Iraq, resulting in considerably reduced transit times to Iraqi airspace. Sortie times were therefore shorter than on previous detachments, typically being around two hours.
As had previously been the case, Coalition aircraft also carried out practice attacks on military installations whilst in Iraqi airspace. Occasionally, the Tornados were partnered with No 1 Sqn’s Harrier GR 7 aircraft, which were now operating ashore from Ahmad al-Jaber air base south of Kuwait City.
Operation Bolton duly subsumed Operation Jural, and it now included all RAF assets assigned to enforcing the southern NFZ. Thus, when No 12 Sqn took over responsibility for the Kuwait detachment in early May 1998, the Tornado GR 1 force was supporting three simultaneous operational
detachments – six aircraft remained at Incirlik for Operation Warden, six more were at PSAB, and a further 12 were at AAS for Bolton.
With a full calendar of training exercises and the MLU programme in full swing, the Tornado GR 1 squadrons would be stretched to cover all the commitments. Fortunately, responsibility for Operation Warden was returned to the Jaguar force at the end of September 1998, which released Lossiemouth- and Marham-based Tornado GR 1 units to share the Operation Bolton commitment over southern Iraq.
By the time No 14 Sqn resumed Operation Bolton from AAS in September 1998, political tension was mounting once more after Iraq had declared the previous month that it would not, after all, co-operate with UNSCOM. Following further diplomatic activity, on 31 October Iraq announced that it would cease all forms of interaction with UNSCOM. Even so, there was very little activity below the NFZ over the next two months, making the flying over Iraq pretty dull. At the beginning of November, No 14 Sqn handed over to No 12 Sqn.
After more diplomatic manoeuvring at the UN, the Iraqis reneged on an agreement to cooperate with UNSCOM, and on 14 November the US and British governments authorised the launch of an initial wave of strike aircraft. The Tornado GR 1 crews in Kuwait had planned and briefed their mission and were just about to walk for the sortie when they were cancelled. At the last minute, Iraq had agreed to ‘unconditional resumption of co-operation’ with UNSCOM, so the planned air strikes were called off. However, Iraqi co-operation was short-lived, and only a month later the political tension had escalated once more
In early November, Wg Cdr S G Barnes, commanding No 12 Sqn, had taken over as detachment commander at AAS and had ensured that a number of contingency plans were in place in case the unit was called upon again for operations. ‘As things progressed, and the op looked more likely’, recalled Wg Cdr Barnes, ‘the formation leaders were co-opted into the plan. Throughout, the squadron engineers were tremendous, producing the aircraft we needed for each wave. They moved equipment and weapons to satisfy the requirement for four aircraft per wave with TIALD pods (we only had four) where they could’.
and ‘Perfect Patch’ radars and two HQ buildings within the complex. Once again, the attackers were met with very light AAA and no SAMs were fired. When summarising the mission, Wg Cdr Barnes stated that ‘the plan “ran on rails” and all DPIs were hit successfully’.
‘Night 2 saw us doing a coordinated bombing run on the Al Kut Republican Guard barracks’, recalled Sqn Ldr Royce, ‘with a whole bunch of US bombers and the standard SEAD [Suppression of Enemy Air Defences] and fighter escorts. The Guards sent up quite a fierce AAA defence, but no missiles – I’m sure the EW assets had neutralised whatever they may have had to hand; I’d never seen so many HARMs fired at one sitting’. Once again, however, the difficulty in coordinating with the US Navy was illustrated when the formation of carrier aircraft ahead of the Tornados slipped back on their Time-on-Target. ‘We later calculated that their bombs were within ten seconds of dropping through our formation/canopies and hitting the lead aircraft’, reported Flg Off Robins.
The third wave carried out their attack in the early hours of 19 December. This successful mission, led by Flt Lt Griggs and Sqn Ldr Harris, was also tasked against targets in the Al Kut area.
On the third night of operations, the Tornados were armed with the new Paveway III 2000-lb weapon. ‘DPIs were running out, and I had argued (forcibly) with HQ that some of the targets were not worth risking lives over’, recalled Wg Cdr Barnes. ‘I had proposed sending a two-ship only, but we were re-allocated more sensible targets. The target area was Al Kut, close to the 32nd Parallel, and the targets were “Low Blow” and “Perfect Patch” radars and two HQ buildings – déjà vu.
‘There were real problems with coordination, as we couldn’t contact the carrier. We didn’t get the correct details and we ended up doing our own thing, deconflicted by height and time, but running in a clockwise direction, with the rest of the package going the opposite way. There was a lot of AAA en route, and particularly in the target area. SEAD reported some missiles fired at the package, but I did not see any. Three DPIs were hit, and No 3 guided his weapon safely into open desert, having misidentified the target.
‘I think this was the first operational use of Paveway III, and at the very least we validated tactics and procedures with this weapon. The groundcrew piped me into the shelter on our return [piper standing on top of the cab of one of the tractors], which was very emotional.’
A second wave led by Sqn Ldr Royce took off shortly after the first wave. This formation, tasked against bunkers and another radio relay station just outside Basra, was also loaded with Paveway IIIs. However, the mission was cancelled before the formation crossed the border into Iraq, and the aircraft returned to AAS with their weapons.
IRAQ AND NFZs
After a slightly delayed handover, No 12 Sqn was replaced by No 2 Sqn in Kuwait in early January 1999. Operation Desert Fox had been the first time that RAF aircraft had dropped bombs on targets in Iraq since the Operation Ingleton missions in early 1993, and it marked a massive change in policy by the Iraqi government. While it had been prepared to tolerate the southern NFZ in the post-Ingleton years, after Desert Fox the regime declared that it would no longer recognise the NFZ, and that it would engage aircraft flying over Iraqi territory. From then on attacks on Coalition aircraft became commonplace over southern Iraq, with both anti-aircraft guns and SAMs being fired.
‘AAA was a big threat, and prevalent’, reported Flt Lt L P Williams, a navigator with No 2 Sqn. ‘There were numerous occasions when you’d suddenly notice a new cloud formation appear near to you, then realise that it was 120 mm-odd calibre AAA airburst!’
The Rules of Engagement (RoE) for British Forces were changed, and a series of Response Options (ROs) were introduced, permitting limited offensive action over Iraq. The ROs ranged from RO1, which was an attack flown in direct response to an Iraqi act of aggression, to RO5, which was a pre-planned strike against an Iraqi installation or weapon system.
CHAPTER TWO
AIR DEFENCE OPERATIONS 1992–
2011
UK AIR DEFENCE (1992–2011)
Unlike the Tornado GR 1 in the nuclear strike role, the Tornado F 3 did fly operationally in its originally intended role. Throughout the aircraft’s RAF service, Tornado F 3 crews maintained Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) to ensure the security of the UK Air Defence Region (UKADR) – an area of more than 2000 square miles that includes the United Kingdom and the Faroe Islands. The Northern QRA, with responsibility for the North Sea and the UK-Faroes Gap, was mounted from Leuchars, in Scotland, while the Southern QRA, which covered the southwest approaches, was mounted from Coningsby, in Lincolnshire.
Tornado F 3 ZE808 from No 25 Sqn intercepts a Russian Tu-142MK ‘Bear-F’ in the early 1990s. The Tornado is armed with four AIM-9L Sidewinder AAMs attached to the underwing stub pylons and two Skyflash AAMs under the fuselage (Crown Copyright/OGL)
Normally, two aircraft were kept fully armed with crews at RS10 (ready to launch within ten minutes) at both QRA bases, with another back-up aircraft available at RS60 (60-minute readiness). However, if intelligence
