Leila Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and

larger populations in the Mountain’s neighbouring regions.7 Like all the other people of Ottoman Syria, Mount Lebanon’s people identified strongly with their religious identities, but, according to Ussama Makdisi, “subsumed [these] identities within a political and public space that accommodated differences of faith.”8 The Mountain’s people shared a common culture, as they were bound by the same customs and hierarchies, and they submitted to the same elites regardless of religious affiliation. The rugged terrain forced all the peasants to also occupy similar economic activities and hold a common respect for agricultural cycles.9 Overall, religious identities were not reflective of the Mountain’s political patterns, with tribal and kinship ties holding sway over political considerations. The Egyptian conquest of Ottoman Syria marked a discontinuity in the old Ottoman administrative system. Muhammad Ali’s army, commanded by his son, İbrahim Pasha, captured the city of Acre in 1831, capital of the Sidon eyalet, opening the way to conquer all of Ottoman Syria.10 Between 1831 and 1833, İbrahim Pasha quickly established control over Mount Lebanon and dismantled the decentralized pattern of politics that previously prevailed.11 In its place, İbrahim Pasha centralized the governance of Ottoman Syria into one centre in Damascus, where he established an Egyptian-model civil government.12 The new government reformed the management of finances in the Syrian lands, including Mount Lebanon, by replacing the tax farming system (Iltizam), from which local notables traditionally drew their revenues, with a system of salaried tax collectors that brought revenue directly to the state.13 This

7. Leila Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) 223-224. 8. Makdisi, Culture of Sectarianism, 29. 9. Ibid., 29. 10. Tuğçe Kayaal, “The issue of Ottoman centralisation and local reactions: political and ideological transformation of mount Lebanon between 1858 and 1900.” (Master of Arts (History), Sabanci University, 2013), 23-24. 11. Dick Dowes, The Ottomans in Syria, 91. 12. Moshe Maoz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861: The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society (London: Clarendon Press, 1968), p.12, 15-17.; Kayaal, “Ottoman Centralization,” 24. 13. Maoz, Ottoman Reform, 16-17.

degree of centralization was unprecedented in the Mountain’s recent history.

Egyptian officials repressed any dissent against their centralizing policies. As a region that previously enjoyed substantial independence, the old elite families of the Mountain objected to centralization. Their resistance to reforms led İbrahim Pasha to confiscate their properties and lands, and he forced many into exile. İbrahim Pasha warned the elite of Mount Lebanon, “Woe to you who disobeys me or who delays in doing my bidding.”14 Yet, this strategy prevented İbrahim Pasha from establishing control on the Mountain since, due to its remoteness, he needed to foster local alliances to facilitate his plan for centralization. Muhammad Ali consequently proposed to İbrahim Pasha that the task of “eradicating the rebels” on the Mountain could be made easier if he were to use the “Maronite mountaineers against the Druzes.”15 Following this suggestion, İbrahim Pasha requested, in a letter to the Maronite Patriarch, Youssef Boutros Hobaish, that the patriarch help select three hundred young Christian men from Jubbat Bsherri who were “famed for their bravery,” but he also stressed the necessity of their “obedience.”16 With his Christian troops ready, İbrahim Pasha gave them sixteen thousand rifles and ordered them to “[fight] the traitorous infidel Druze sect which denies the existence of God and his prophets. God willing, they and their property will become plunder for you, and you are to keep the weapons for eternity.”17 İbrahim Pasha appealed to the faith of the Maronites to win them as allies, despite being himself a Muslim, thus differentiating loyalties based on religious sect. İbrahim Pasha used religious distinction to fulfill his political objectives, labeling the Druze as “infidels,” and blessing the loyal Christians with the Pasha’s “eternal” blessing. The following decade expanded and cemented the growing division between the Maronites and the Druzes. As part of İbrahim Pasha’s divide and rule policies, he instated Bashir Shihab II, a

14. Makdisi, Culture of Sectarianism, 53, 192 n11. 15. Ibid., 54, 193 n18. 16. Ibid., 56, 193 n26. 17. Ibid., 56, 193 n27.

Maronite convert from a Druze-Sunni family, as the emir of the entire mountain.18 In so doing, İbrahim Pasha encouraged non-Muslim political participation to break the old pattern of Druze governance in Mount Lebanon.19 This became the first official mono-confessional system established between the Mountain’s communities as the emir had to be a Maronite.20 The Druze elites became increasingly marginalized, killed, or forced into temporary exile by İbrahim Pasha’s administration.21 The elites connected to Shihab, who were mostly Maronites, obtained the confiscated or abandoned Druze properties as a reward for their loyalty.22 Thus, in attempting to produce a loyal regime, the consolidation of Egyptian power sectarianized the government of Mount Lebanon. This decade of Egyptian occupation saw an increase in tensions between the politically-favoured Maronite elite and the politically-disadvantaged Druze elite. In 1833, after the Druze rebellion had been put down, İbrahim Pasha instructed Shihab that, “as regards the [returning] Druzes, let bygones be bygones. Do not harm them when they return to their homes. Allay their fears and set their minds at rest.”23 Shihab consequently allowed the Druze leaders to return, although he did not aid the Druze in the restoration of their privileges. Due to the Egyptian tax reforms, Druze elites lost their traditional Iltizam revenues and did not have the coercive power to fully restore their former positions. İbrahim Pasha simultaneously attempted to restore the old order by disarming Christian loyalists, a decision that was heavily resisted.24 Thus, tensions between the Maronite elite, who sought to retain their dominant positions, and the Druze, who hoped to restore both Ottoman rule and their traditional privileges, escalated during the remaining years of Egyptian occupation. After Egypt lost Mount Lebanon in 1841, both the Maronite

18. Fawaz, An Occasion for War, 15-16, 19, 26. 19. Maoz, Ottoman Reform, 17-20. 20. Makdisi, Culture of Sectarianism, 52, 54, 60-61, 63. 21. Ibid., 56. 22. Kayaal, “Ottoman Centralization,” 25-26. 23. Makdisi, Culture of Sectarianism, 56, 193 n28. 24. Kayaal, “Ottoman Centralization,” 25.; Makdisi, Culture of Sectarianism, 57.