13. Maoz, Ottoman Reform

(Briggs, 2019). EUT also introduces utility functions U that assign a scalar value to each outcome. The utility value represents how valuable an outcome is to the DM, typically interpreted as a measure of personal preference by contemporary research (Peasgood, 2014). Combining the utility and probability of the outcome, we calculate a weighted average as the expected utility (EU) for an act A as follows, where O is the set of all outcomes o (Briggs, 2019). EUT argues that the DM should pick the act with the maximum EU in order to obtain the most satisfaction out of the decision.

As discussed in Section 1, EUT produces the optimal decision for the DM by maximizing the EU. Since the EU is directly calculated by taking a weighted average of the individual utilities of each outcome, EUT relies on the acquisition of clear and concrete mathematical values of utility. However, this section will address the problems with the utility function that assigns utility values as a measure of preference by the DM. Section 2.1 will discuss concerns with the inconsistencies in the assumptions of EUT. Section 2.2 will argue that utility as a numerical value for preference does not account for the multidimensional nature of utility. Section 2.3 will present the lack of consideration for emotions in EUT while the DM remains rational.

EUT was axiomatized by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 (Tversky, 1975). The four axioms of EUT on the DM’s preferences of outcomes are completeness, transitivity, independence, and continuity (Steele & Stefánsson, 2020). The axioms are assumed to be true as the basis for EUT (Levin, 2006). As EUT is a normative theory, it also assumes the DM to be rational and ideal. However, in certain situations, the rationality assumption seems to cause violations of the axioms and allow preferences that cause inconsistency within EUT (Briggs, 2019). If rationality implies the falseness of the axioms, but EUT requires the axioms for it to be a normative theory

for rational decision making, there would be a contradiction. Thus, the assumptions about the utilities or the DM’s preferences in EUT are flawed, causing problems in EUT being a normative theory. In the following sections, we will give two situations where rationality leads to a violation of transitivity and completeness axioms. We introduce the notation ≤ to represent the relation of a less or equal preference of the former option compared to the latter by the DM (Levin, 2006). 2.1.1 Rationality Violating Transitivity. Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer is an example of rationality violating the transitivity axiom (Andreou, 2015). The transitivity axiom defines that given three options X, Y, and Z, if X ≤ Y and Y ≤ Z, then X ≤ Z (Levin, 2006). Quinn’s puzzle features a self-torturer (ST) who has an electric device attached to them that they can operate to shock themselves. The device has settings from 0 to 1000 with increasing electric current shocking the ST. The ST is told that 0 is painless and 1000 triggers excruciating pain (for pain caused by the electric current). However, each time the setting increases only by 1, the difference in pain level is almost undetectable, meaning the ST will only be able to experience real pain if they make a big jump between settings. In addition, the ST is offered $100 every time they move up 1 in the setting. Rationally, the ST would want to maximize their financial gain while considering the pain level. The ST recognizes that if they increment only by 1 every time from 0 to 1000, the difference in pain with an incremented setting is imperceptible, but they are able to receive money with each increment. Thus, it is rationally permissible for the ST to give preference to the n+1 level over n for all n between 0 and 999. By the transitivity axiom, this pattern of preference implies that the ST prefers level 1000 to level 0. However, when choosing only between level 0 and level 1000, the ST is likely to give preference to level 0 as it is a big jump that would bring them unbearable pain that no amount of money can make up for, violating the transitivity axiom. Therefore, Quinn’s puzzle of the ST demonstrates that cyclic preferences can be rational while causing a violation of the transitivity axiom, which makes EUT inconsistent. 2.2.2 Rationality Violating Completeness. When the DM rationally finds two options incomparable or has different preferences based on different criteria, the completeness axiom may be violated