Test bank for the norton introduction to philosophy 2nd by rosen

Test Bank for The Norton Introduction to Philosophy 2nd by Rosen

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Chapter 8 What is Consciousness?

TRUE/FALSE 1. Jackson thinks that the mind is a different kind of substance than the body.

a. True b. False ANS: F DIF: Difficult REF: p. 371 TOP: Epiphenomenal Qualia, Jackson | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Understanding 2. Chalmers thinks that denying physicalism is unscientific.

a. True b. False ANS: F DIF: Medium REF: p. 391 TOP: The Hard Problem of Consciousness, Chalmers | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Understanding 3. Tye thinks that it is clear that philosophical zombies are possible.

a. True b. False ANS: F DIF: Medium REF: p. 400 TOP: The Puzzle of Transparency, Tye | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Understanding MULTIPLE CHOICE 1. According to Nagel, the reductive accounts of physicalism currently proposed a. all fail to provide a reduction of the mental to the physical. b. all fail to provide a reduction of the physical to the mental. c. mostly succeed in providing a reduction of the mental to the physical. d. mostly succeed in providing a reduction of the physical to the mental.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: pp. 357-358 TOP: What is it Like to Be a Bat? Nagel | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Understanding 2. Nagel thinks that a reduction of the mental to the physical can succeed only if a. mental states do not exist. b. physical states are immaterial. c. physical descriptions can adequately capture what it is like to have a mental state. d. mental descriptions of what it is like can be expressed in human language.

ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: pp. 362-363 TOP: What is it Like to Be a Bat? Nagel | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Understanding 3. Nagel's argument against reduction hinges on an incommensurability between

a. b. c. d.

mental and physical states. the subjective and objective characters of experience. physical laws and psychological laws. physicalism and epiphenomenalism.

ANS: B DIF: Medium REF: pp. 361-363 TOP: What is it Like to Be a Bat? Nagel | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Analyzing 4. One way to challenge Nagel’s position would be to argue that Nagel claims that when we try to

imagine what it is like to be a bat, it is possible a. for us to imagine having different experiences. b. for bats to imagine having different experiences. c. to imagine what it would be like for us to behave like a bat. d. to imagine having a bat’s experiences.

ANS: D DIF: Medium REF: p. 359 TOP: What is it Like to Be a Bat? Nagel | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Evaluating 5. What would Nagel say about a science fiction example where a human's consciousness was

transferred to a dog's body? a. This is the only way that a human could learn what it is like to be a dog. b. This is one way, but not the only way, that a human could learn what it is like to be a dog. c. This is only one way for a human to learn how they might behave as a dog. d. This is one way for a human to have experiences with the same subjective character as a dog.

ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: p. 359 TOP: What is it Like to Be a Bat? Nagel | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Applying 6. Why does Mary’s learning something when she leaves the black-and-white room pose a

problem for physicalism? a. She already knows the physical and mental properties in question. b. She already knows all of the physical information. c. She already knows all of the information. d. She already knows all of the mental information.

ANS: B DIF: Medium REF: p. 368 TOP: Epiphenomenal Qualia, Jackson | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Understanding 7. One way to challenge Jackson’s Knowledge argument is to argue that a. Mary does not actually learn anything new when she leaves the room. b. Mary did not know all of the information when she was in the room. c. Mary could not learn all of the physical information in the room. d. Mary could not know what qualia are like in the room.

ANS: A DIF: Medium REF: pp. 368-369 TOP: Epiphenomenal Qualia, Jackson | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Analyzing/Evaluating

8. Jackson uses an example of a particular sort of phenomenon to rebut the objection that we come

to know about other minds on the basis of people’s behavior. Which of the following is another example of the sort that Jackson uses? a. Inferring from the fact that classmate A knows what Jackson said that classmate B also knows what Jackson said. b. Inferring that someone feels pain based on the person’s reactions to a hot stove. c. Inferring that someone can know what pain is by watching someone else exhibit certain behavior. d. Inferring from the fact that a classmate says something that what they said is true.

ANS: A DIF: Difficult REF: p. 372 TOP: Epiphenomenal Qualia, Jackson | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Applying 9. According to Churchland, Nagel’s argument begs the question because a. it is not certain what a bat’s experience would be like. b. it relies on the assumption that bats have subjective experience. c. it relies on the assumption that brain states are not mental states. d. it relies on the assumption that intentional properties are genuine properties of

objects.

ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: p. 378 TOP: Are Mental States Irreducible to Neurobiological States, Churchland | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Understanding 10. One might challenge Churchland’s response to Jackson’s Knowledge argument by arguing that a. we have empirical reasons for thinking that color vision creates qualia. b. we have a priori reasons for thinking that Mary knows all of neuroscience. c. we have a priori reasons for thinking that qualia exist. d. we have empirical reasons for thinking that one must have an experience in order to

know what it is like.

ANS: A DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 381-382 TOP: Are Mental States Irreducible to Neurobiological States, Churchland | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Analyzing/Evaluating 11. Why does Churchland think A and B can be identical even if no one knows this? a. She is using the term “identical” in the weak,non-philosophical sense (i.e., two

distinct things that look like each other). b. It may be that no one knows what properties A or B have. c. We may describe A differently than B and therefore not know that they are one and

the same thing. d. We may believe they are identical, but not know it.

ANS: B DIF: Medium REF: p. 378 TOP: Are Mental States Irreducible to Neurobiological States, Churchland | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Analyzing 12. Churchland’s claim about different ways of knowing would explain which of the following

phenomena? a. Knowing that the person you see in the mirror has a red shirt on without knowing

that you have a red shirt on b. Knowing how to ride a bike without being able to drive a car c. Knowing the answers to some questions on an exam without knowing the answers to others d. Knowing by way of reasoning alone without having experiences ANS: A DIF: Medium REF: pp. 379-381 TOP: Are Mental States Irreducible to Neurobiological States, Churchland | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Applying 13. How might one object to Chalmers's argument concerning philosophical zombies? a. By arguing that philosophical zombies are conscious b. By arguing that philosophical zombies are unconscious c. By arguing that philosophical zombies are impossible d. By arguing that philosophical zombies do not exist ANS: C DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 388-389 TOP: The Hard Problem of Consciousness, Chalmers | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Evaluating 14. Chalmers's argument concerning philosophical zombies is a version of a. the Knowledge argument. b. the Modal argument. c. the “What it is like” argument. d. the Epiphenomenal argument.

ANS: B DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 388-389 TOP: The Hard Problem of Consciousness, Chalmers | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Applying 15. Having representational content requires having a. conditions that can be correct about the world. b. conditions that cannot be correct about the world. c. conditions that are unstable. d. conditions that are stable.

ANS: A DIF: Medium REF: p. 396 TOP: The Puzzle of Transparency, Tye | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Understanding 16. According to Chalmers, we can explain functions by specifying a. a particular mechanism. b. a particular causal law. c. a particular function. d. a particular evolutionary trait.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: pp. 387 TOP: The Hard Problem of Consciousness, Chalmers | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Understanding 17. According to Tye, if you attempt to focus on your experience of reading this page, you will a. end up confused about what you are reading. b. end up noticing a variety of sensations that are part of your experience.

c. end up noticing features of the page that you are looking at. d. end up noticing other experiences that you were previously unaware of.

ANS: C DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 395-396 TOP: The Puzzle of Transparency, Tye | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Applying 18. According to Tye, one problem for strong representationalism is that a. it implies that qualia are immaterial. b. it implies that the phenomenal character of your experience is hidden from you. c. it implies that your experiences lack phenomenal character. d. it implies that in order to have any experience at all there must be representational

content.

ANS: B DIF: Medium REF: p. 397 TOP: The Puzzle of Transparency, Tye | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Evaluating 19. Tye thinks that it is possible to attend to a collection of objects a. without being conscious. b. without experiencing any qualia. c. without attending to individuals in the collection. d. without attending to the features of the collection.

ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: pp. 398-399 TOP: The Puzzle of Transparency, Tye | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Analyzing COMPLETION 1. Jackson thinks that in order to be true, _____ requires a too optimistic picture of our powers to

understand the world.

ANS: physicalism DIF: Medium REF: p. 373 TOP: Epiphenomenal Qualia, Jackson | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Remembering 2. According to Churchland, Nagel commits the _____ fallacy in his argument that we cannot

know what it is like to be a bat.

ANS: intentional DIF: Medium REF: p. 379 TOP: Are Mental States Irreducible to Neurobiological States, Churchland | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Remembering 3. Chalmers thinks that the really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of ____ .

ANS: experience

DIF: Medium REF: p. 385 TOP: The Hard Problem of Consciousness, Chalmers | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Remembering ESSAY 1. How is Jackson’s “Knowledge argument” different from what he calls the “Modal argument”?

Why might one think that the Knowledge argument is stronger?

ANS:

Answers will vary. A valid response should include discussion of Jackson’s Knowledge argument as well as the Modal argument. Additionally, a valid response should/might include discussion of one of Jackson’s examples used to motivate the Knowledge argument. Finally, a valid respond should/might include discussion of the fact that the Modal argument depends on an intuition about how things would be in another world where presumably the laws of nature are different than our own, as well as how this seems to be more susceptible to attack than his claims concerning the Knowledge argument.

DIF: Medium MSC: Evaluating

REF: pp. 366-374

TOP: Epiphenomenal Qualia, Jackson

2. How does Churchland object to Nagel’s argument? How might Nagel respond?

ANS:

Answers will vary. A valid response should/might include discussion of Churchland’s attack on Nagel’s argument (i.e., her claim that his argument fails because it commits the intentional fallacy). A valid response should/might include discussion of how Nagel might try to defend the claim that he does not commit the fallacy that Churchland charges him with. For instance, a valid response should/might include that Nagel could argue that his argument does not depend on properties that we take mental states to have, but instead depends upon objective properties of those experiences (e.g., the subjective experiences of a bat simply cannot be had by humans).

DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 356-365; 377-382 TOP: Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Analyzing/Evaluating

3. What are philosophical zombies? How does Chalmers think that philosophical zombies can be

used to argue against materialism/physicalism?

ANS:

Answers will vary. A valid response should include discussion of what philosophical zombies are (i.e., physically just like us but without conscious experience). Additionally, a valid response should include discussion of why Chalmers thinks that the possibility of philosophical zombies poses a problem for materialism (i.e., their possibility seems to show that material/physical facts do not exhaust all the facts there are).

DIF: Medium REF: pp. 384-391 MSC: Understanding

TOP: The Hard Problem of Consciousness, Chalmers

4. Chalmers argues that philosophical zombies provide the grounds for an argument against

materialism/physicalism.How might Churchland respond to this argument?

Test Bank for The Norton Introduction to Philosophy 2nd by Rosen

ANS:

Answers will vary. A valid response should include discussion of Chalmers's description of philosophical zombies. Additionally, a valid response should include discussion of Chalmers's claims about how philosophical zombies can be used to argue against materialism/physicalism.

Finally, a valid response should/might include discussion of how Churchland could object to this in a similar way to her objection to the Knowledge argument. That is, she could object that we do not know enough about all of the physical laws to determine whether it is really possible that there could be philosophical zombies at all.

DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 377-391 MSC: Applying/Evaluating

TOP: Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

5. Why does Tye think that the standard assumption is incorrect that there are three components to

visual experience?

ANS:

Answers will vary. A valid response should include discussion of Tye's description of the standard assumption. In particular, a valid response should include discussion of Tye's claim that it is standardly assumed that in visual experience there is (1) the external object, (2) the experience, and (3) a causal relationship between the object and the experience. A valid response should/might also include discussion of Tye's claims that this picture seems incorrect, because no matter how hard we try we cannot become aware of the experience. Instead, we are only aware of features of the object.

DIF: Easy MSC: Analyzing

REF: pp. 392-400

TOP: The Puzzle of Transparency, Tye

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