Altum Sonatur: The Africa Edition

The Africa Edition Volume 8, Edition 2

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Nikolaj Cyon

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CONTENTS 4. Thoughts from the Editor 6. Does Xenophobia Exist at South African universities?

8. Home 10. Claiming the Incalculable: Namibians sue Germany for genocide

reparations

12. What Does a Revolution Look Like?

14. Legislating Homophobia in Uganda: The Ghost of a Colonial God 16. Match the Flag to the Country!

18. Dying to be White 19. Terms and Conditions 20. Humans of Kramer 22. Land, Space and Reclaim the City – A South African

Narrative

24. The ICC in Africa: Prosecutions, Politics and Prejudice

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THOUGHTS FROM THE EDITOR This edition – The Africa Edition – aims to bring the spotlight onto Africa. Western media and Western stories tend to dominate our media consumption, with news from other parts of Africa frequently taking a back seat. That is, if they are even reported at all. Even when they are reported, and even when Africa does become the focus, a problematic narrative often emerges.

The narrative, which has emerged largely from the West, is one that tends to homogenise Africa and sees Africa as a troubled continent, in desperate need of (Western) help. A place without agency or autonomy. This edition seeks to disrupt those narratives.

Both a celebration and a critique, an exploration and an evaluation, it aims to look at Africa not through the lens of the West, but through its own lens.

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To that end, instead of focusing exclusively on problems that exist on the continent, this edition hopes to provide a broader, more well-balanced view of Africa. We’ve also tried to include a diversity of perspectives from different parts of Africa. We realise it’s somewhat ironic that in part, we’re trying to combat this homogenising view of Africa with an edition entitled ‘The Africa Edition’ (what could be more homogenising?). But this edition is about Africa – African countries, places, people and those people’s lived realities.

Our edition covers a range of issues, from borders, reparations and land, to the role of the International Criminal Court in Africa, to xenophobia or ‘Afrophobia’. As you read through it, we hope it leaves you with some interesting questions. What does a revolution look like? What sort of role (if any) should Western countries be playing in post-colonial or neo-colonial Africa? What does the word ‘Africa’ mean – is it just a continent, or does it have a deeper identity? And what sorts of African identities are possible?

Emma Reinecke 5

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Does xenophobia exist at South African universities?

Words by Chanda Chungu

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enophobic violence first erupted in South Africa in August 2008.

Since then, several episodes of attacks on foreign nationals have occurred across the country. In total, more than 100 people have died since 2008. Very recently, the Minister of Police, Fikile Mbalula, made damning statements about foreigners who come to South Africa to commit acts of criminality.

His comments triggered much debate about xenophobia.

Given this state of affairs, there is no doubt that South Africa is intolerant of foreigners, especially those from the African continent.

Many universities and institutions of higher learning have strongly condemned xenophobia.

Furthermore, there have been several anti-xenophobia protests at UCT, as well as marches at the University of Johannesburg and the University of Witwatersrand.

Despite the joining of hands across our campuses in support of international students and academics at various tertiary institutions, it is worth questioning whether words of support can ever trump the (unfair) practices

and attitudes at our universities.

International students across institutions of higher learning often feel excluded. For example, international students are often excluded from accessing funding. Schemes such as the National Students Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) and several external bursary schemes exclude non-South African citizens from claiming financial support at undergraduate level. At some universities, academic excellence, such as being placed on the Dean’s Merit List, often leads to a financial reward that contributes toward your fee account – however, this benefit is reserved for citizens. Further, when it comes to spaces in residence, places are often reserved for citizens, with international students being given second priority. As a result, most international students face difficulty settling into the university system.

In 1997, countries in Southern Africa became signatories to a treaty which states that each university in the region must reserve a minimum of 5% of their places for international students from the region. The treaty furthermore stipulates that students from the region should pay the same fees as local students. Several universities have, however, subsequently deviated from this agreement by charging international students an additional “administration fee levy” notwithstanding the provisions of the treaty. Many South Africans perceive a relationship between their own socio-economic circumstances, and the presence of immigrants in South Africa. At university level, local students could see international students as taking up places and therefore

preventing more locals from being admitted. Very often, international students at South African universities are seen as competitors vying for the limited resources available. It is submitted that this belief that foreigners are competitors or a strain on resources, has manifested itself in university polices such as the fee policy described above.

At face value, it would seem as though disparities in treatment between South African and nonSouth African citizens perpetuate xenophobic attitudes. However, it is important to give a full picture of the situation at our universities. At UCT for example, despite being unable to provide financial support to undergraduate international students, the University has made ‘internationalisation at home’ a priority and one of its 6 strategic objectives. As a result, since 2009, UCT has developed the University Science, Humanities, Law & Engineering Partnerships in Africa (USHEPiA) programme, which seeks to promote collaboration between UCT and African scholars.

This mirrors programmes at other universities, such as Stellenbosch.

Stellenbosch established a Centre for Collaboration in Africa (CCA), which initiates and supports Stellenbosch’s strategic African academic initiatives.

UCT has also developed several Afro-centric programmes, such as Africa Month, and provides support for international student societies which have helped to develop an interest in the culture of other countries.

I have always understood xenophobia as borne from a lack of understanding. The eruption of xenophobic violence is evidence that South Africans do not fully understand that foreign nationals

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need to be treated with dignity and respect. This has led to stereotypes such as the belief that foreigners are all rich, or want to take jobs and opportunities away from South Africans, or have come here to spread violence. On the other side, foreign nationals have developed a dislike for South African citizens and a hate for the system.

The role in curbing hatred also extends to international students, who need to understand that due to limited resources, it is difficult for our universities to support all students. As a result of the injustices of the past, it is imperative that resources are directed at redressing historical inequality and ensuring that as many previously disadvantaged groups of persons have access to universities as possible. Linked to this, we also need to appreciate and be aware of what our universities

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are doing to develop academia in Africa through programmes such as those offered at UCT and Stellenbosch.

Xenophobic tendencies can be overcome. This needs to start by dismantling the acceptance of discriminatory stereotypes.

Attitudes can only be broken if we come to a common understanding that we are all brothers and sisters who have a role to play in South African society. Universities have taken steps to recognise the role which foreign students play but more can be done to break down cultural norms and barriers to ensure progress for all.

An important starting point would be to develop a mass drive to educate people about the importance of being united and upholding the notions of equality and dignity. I believe that if people understand that

mistreating another person affects that person’s dignity, we would make progress in destroying this terrible trend. I would like to end this piece with a quote from the case of Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka, where the South African Supreme Court of Appeal noted that: “[Human] dignity has no nationality. It is inherent in all people, citizens and non-citizens alike, simply because they are human beings. And while that person happens to be in this country, for whatever reason, [their human dignity] must be respected, and is protected, by section 10 of the Bill of Rights.�

#XenophobiaMustFall

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Home A poem by Maya Surya Pillay

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You do not leave home.

Home leaves you.

There is a story about home, which you own, and which lies at the foot of your bed every night.

There is a story of home, which home owns, and which lies face-down on the shore, fat with salt.

You do not say Je deteste les Americains even though it is the Americans who have drowned your brothers in salt-water, buried their bodies in the salt pans.

In English, you say It is the Americans and their blood money. Every red cell is a coin now, bright on the ground at the Americans’ feet.

You walked the length of the continent and the white men had buried knives in the ground where they had drawn the lines, all those years ago. They cut very deeply. When you reached the border they did not want to let you through, because you were covered in blood.

You do not say Je deteste les Sud-africains. You say les Sud-africains, ils faisent le xenophobie. Doing the xenophobia, like a dance, in which we lift our feet very high and let them crash down to the ground, as if crushing ants, so that you can hear it through the wall when you are sitting in the kitchen, and your fork stops on its way to your mouth.

You are afraid that you will wake one morning and see yourself lying face-down at the foot of your bed.

You do not use the word refugee, which I understand, because there is no refuge in a house you are afraid to leave, or in a hospital where the nurses do not speak your language, or on the cement floor of a soldier’s mouth, or facedown in salt-water.

You have heard, as I have heard, that the present crisis is of unprecedented proportions, and you have heard strange heads mouthing these words in the tone of home-owners watching ants die on the kitchen floor.

You do not want to have children until you’ve sorted out all the documents. You do not want to breastfeed the children when you have them because you are afraid that all that will come out will be a thin foam of salt-water.

You say home in English and all I can picture is the hot and featureless inside of a blister on a heel, and you know this, and I know you hate me for it, which is your right.

You do not leave home until home leaves you, in the night.

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Claiming the incalculable Namibians sue Germany for genocide reparations

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n what is widely recognised as the first genocide of the 20th century, roughly one hundred thousand Herero people, and ten thousand Nama people, were killed at the hands of the German colonial regime from 1904 to 1908.

It is estimated that 80% percent of the Herero population was wiped out by the genocide.

German soldiers’ invasion of Namibia was an application of the usual colonial formula: land grabs, cattle grabs, and the murder of any person who stood in their way. However, when the Herero and Nama people rebelled against German forces, German General Lothar van Trotha gave an order which was to be particularly devastating in its effect: “Shoot any Herero, with or without a rifle, with or without cattle”. As a result, tens of thousands of Herero and Nama were killed, or driven into the desert to starve, or placed in concentration camps to die. It is said that the concentration camp model was ‘tested’ in Namibia first before being applied a few decades later in Germany during the Holocaust.

Fast forward 100 years, and Germany is finally coming to terms with its actions. German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced in 2016 that the German government would be formally recognising and apologising for the genocide of the Herero and Nama people. Since the announcement, the German and Namibian governments have entered into negotiations to decide on the terms of the apology, including whether the apology will have any expression in financial compensation.

Germany has long maintained it will not be paying reparations, but will rather continue to contribute to 10

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Words by Lauren Gildenhuys development schemes in Namibia.

Considering the fact that Germany has paid billions of dollars’ worth of reparations for the Holocaust, the refusal is surprising. Could it be that Germany is concerned about the floodgates of ‘colonial reparations’ it might unleash for its European counterparts?

In Namibia, as is the case in many countries worldwide, ethnic identity continues to be a stubborn fact of socio-political contexts. It is therefore generally recognised that the Ovambo people, Namibia’s majority ethnic group, form the majority of government representatives.

Since the negotiations taking place are between the German and Namibian governments alone, there are two parties that are glaringly absent from the negotiating table: representatives of the Nama and Herero people. Representatives from these groups have consistently petitioned to be included in the negotiations, but to no avail. They were frustrated not only by how the Namibian government was negotiating on their behalf and without their consent, but also by how the Namibian government was initially not insisting on reparations for the genocide.

Many Herero and Nama claimed that the dominance of the Ovambo in government meant that officials and diplomats did not sympathise with their claims.

So, in January 2017, the descendants of the massacred Herero and Nama took matters into their own hands: they filed a class action for reparations against Germany under the Alien Tort Statute in the New York District Court, claiming the ‘incalculable’ damage inflicted on the Herero

and Nama peoples by Germany.

Under the Alien Tort Statute, nonUS citizens may file claims before a US federal court for international law violations. It states that “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”.

The litigation pursued faces a number of potential obstacles.

Firstly, Germany is yet to respond to Judge Laura Swain’s issuing of a summons against Germany on 30 January 2017. Germany failed to send representatives to the pretrial conference which took place in March. Judge Swain served a second summons against Germany to appear before the court on 21 July, which is when the second pre-trial conference is to be held, but it is doubtful whether Germany will send legal representatives. A second issue is that the Namibian government itself has opposed the suit, in a clear attempt to preserve political relations with Germany and avoid compromising ongoing negotiations. The third obstacle to the Nama and Hereros’ claim, however, may be prove to be the most difficult to overcome: the US Supreme Court’s recent decision to restrict the scope of the Alien Tort Statute. In the 2013 decision of Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Court found that the statute was presumed not to apply to foreign conduct unless there was a clear link to the US – in other words, the statute is presumed not to apply extraterritorially.

This could be a major stumbling block to the Herero and Nama representatives’ case, as there is no obvious and direct link between the US, and Germany’s

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actions in the genocide. The representatives have argued that should Germany not respond to the second summons, Judge Swain will be required to hand down default judgment against Germany. However, given the limitation to the Statute above, and given the political implications of such a move, especially in current sensitive global political environment, it is unlikely the Namibians’ claim will be successful.

More fundamental is the question of how financial damages ought to be calculated for atrocities of such gravity. How does one put a price on thousands of deaths, rapes, and acts of torture? How does one assess the cost of the dispossession of land which continues to haunt Namibia’s deeply unequal society today? How does one quantify the utter degradation of a people’s dignity, and the annihilation of their culture, their history, their very existence?

In an interesting about-turn,

the Namibian government has recently demanded N$400 billion be paid as reparations by Germany.

Many dismiss this as an act of desperation, given the country’s dire fiscal health. This highlights how fraught the negotiations for the German apology are by political and economic concerns (commentators had interpreted the Namibian government’s initial resistance to the reparations claim as a politically prudent act – after all, Germany is Namibia’s greatest donator of foreign aid).

This leads us to consider the role which reparations could potentially play in the move to seek justice for colonialism. What would the move from colonial acts constituting genocide, to colonial acts generally, entail for a reparations claim? Are reparations even an appropriate form of compensation for the duration and extent of the oppression experienced by those subjected to colonial regimes? The danger of reparations is that, once they are paid, the obligations from which they arise extinguish – in

a sense, they set the oppressor free. Yet as the situation in South Africa and many other countries demonstrate, the legacies of colonialism run far deeper than what a few billion dollars could fix. Reparations, for a start, don’t result in land transfers. What’s more, the claiming of reparations is likely to become a political tool – waved about threateningly, but in the interest of foreign relations, never actually used. Then there’s also the question of whether they are really beneficial for those in whose name they are claimed (given most German aid does not reach Herero and Nama peoples in Namibia as it stands, it doesn’t take much guesswork to predict who would really benefit if reparations were to be paid to Namibia).

These are vexing questions which deserve proper consideration if we are to begin to imagine what justice for the colonial legacy might look like.

For now, we ought to keep our attention focused on Germany’s rapidly approaching court date with history.

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WHAT DOES A REVOLUTION LOOK LIKE? Algerian Revolution, 1954 Egypt, Arab Spring Uprisings, 2011

WHAT DOES A REVOLU

Uganda, Idi Amin dictatorship begins, 1971 Egypt, Arab Spring Uprisings, 2011 Nigerian, Biafran Civil War, 1967 Zimbabwe, Chimurenga, 1896 Morocco, the Green March, 1975 Ghanaian Independence Day, 1957

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VOLUTION LOOK LIKE?

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Legislating Homophobia in Uganda: The Ghost of a Colonial God

By Natasha Dusabe

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ostcolonial homophobia is life-threatening for the people of Uganda who transgress heterosexual norms. In October 2009, the Anti-Homosexuality Bill was introduced before the Parliament of Uganda. Despite significant condemnation, largely from non-governmental and human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the Bill was signed into law on the 24th of February 2014. Shortly after being passed, however, the Constitutional Court of Uganda declared it invalid on procedural grounds. Now that a reformed version of the Bill is back in Parliament, it is unclear if it will be passed this time round. Should the reformed Bill be successfully passed it would legitimise, institutionalise and increase the profound and endemic discrimination suffered by the LBGTQI+ community.

The 2009 Bill initially sentenced those convicted of the ‘offence of homosexuality’ to death. When passed as the Anti-Homosexuality Act, it substituted the death penalty for life imprisonment. The Act also made the ‘promotion of homosexuality’ an offence. This clause was intended to curb the publishing of any information related to same-sex sexual practices.

It also criminalised ‘knowledge of homosexual activities’. This made it a legal requirement for a person to report homosexuals to the police within 25 hours or face a fine and/or up to three years imprisonment. The Act stated that a person who ‘aids, abets, counsels or procures another person to engage in act of homosexuality’ could receive a penalty of up to seven years’ imprisonment. Similarly, a person who conducted a marriage ceremony between persons of the same sex could be imprisoned for a maximum of seven years. The Act was aggressive in its intent. It clearly promoted hatred, intolerance and violence. How does Uganda find itself in this political and social

moment post-independence? How did it come to receive the title of ‘the worst place in the world to be gay?’

Homosexuality pre-dates the colonial project; sex between consenting adults of the same sex has been documented in most African societies. Among the Pangwe people of present-day Cameroon and Gabon, homosexual intercourse was practised between males of all ages. It was believed to be a way to transmit wealth. Sudan’s Zande tribe had a tradition of warriors marrying boys and paying a bride price, as they would for girl brides, to their parents. When the boy grew up, he too became a warrior and took a boywife. In this same tribe homosexuality was practised in polygamous households. In the 18th century the Khoikhoi of South Africa used the word koetsire to describe men considered sexually receptive to other men, and soregus was the word they used for a friendship which involved same-sex masturbation. Countless other examples exist.

Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, has himself stated that homosexuality existed prior to Europeans arriving in Uganda. He went on to claim that homosexuals “were not persecuted” before colonisation. Europe imported legalised homophobia. To engage

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DAI KUROKAWA/EPA with questions of postcolonial homophobia we must understand the nature and shortcomings of the formal process of decolonisation.

The legacy of European dominance remains evident in national boarders, political infrastructures, education, economies, moralities and the law.

The Act and the ideology behind it can be traced directly to the colonial project. English law identified homosexuality as punishable by law in 1533. The legal frameworks that criminalise homophobia in Uganda were established after colonisation in 1894. The Ugandan Penal Code imposed during the colonial era criminalised consensual sex between individuals of the same sex (Section 145 of the Penal Code Act 7). This demonization of homosexuality in Europe is largely attributed to the rise of Christianity and the merging of Church and State in medieval Europe. Homosexuality, as a biblical sin, was considered immoral and was therefore legally prohibited by the State.

Not only was the law imposed upon the peoples of Uganda, but they, like many other colonised people,

were subjected to psychological indoctrination. This was particularly a result of the missionary project which accompanied colonialism.

Thousands of missionary schools and churches taught Christian values and morality to the majority of the Ugandan population. Many of these schools still remain. The impact of the imposition of a collective morality on the psyche of Ugandans is undeniable and its legacy lives on today. Traditional faiths and cultural practices were aggressively replaced with the colonisers’ religion and moralities.

Ironically, as Christianity’s moral dominance declined in Europe with the separation of Church and State, the British now reject homophobic laws as discriminatory, and threaten to withdraw aid from countries like Uganda which have such laws. In October 2011, for example, in a BBC interview, British Prime Minister David Cameron stated that the UK “wants to see countries that receive

our aid adhering to proper human rights. And that includes how people treat gay and lesbian people.” Here the UK places itself in a position to offer guidance and enlightenment, without any acknowledgement that it engineered the very problem it now reprimands. Such statements demonstrate the paradoxical way in which the Global North and Global South relate in a postcolonial world. The effect of this is to turn postcolonial homophobia into a site of protest for certain African leaders, who denounce neocolonial politics and claim that African sovereignty demands that the Western world not interfere in their governments’ treatment of homosexual people.

This is the problem we face when trying to re-imagine the continent. The historical context makes the situation difficult to navigate in countries like Uganda. All the while, members of the LBGQTI+ community continue to face violence from the State and the community.

In order to shift consciousness as a continent it is important that we interrogate the sources of morality that influence our law. The institutionalisation of homophobia during the colonial period in Uganda makes changes to the status quo extremely difficult to achieve. That is, homophobia became entirely entrenched not only in legal doctrine but also in educational systems and the social, religious and cultural discourses of the country.

To dismantle such an embedded and institutionalised attitude is an extremely challenging task for a nation to undertake.

For this reason and others, it becomes clear that decolonisation, in the fundamental sense, was largely postponed in the 1960s.

Though difficult, the task now for those committed to the decolonial project, is to deconstruct not only legal infrastructures that oppress, but also to unlearn moralities that are the source of violence towards the LBGQTI+ community. In doing so, Uganda could create a truly postcolonial appreciation of the sexuality spectrum. Though easier said than done, it is matter of life and death in Uganda, and must be attended to urgently.

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Below are the ags of all the African countries recognised by the African Union.

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Find the answers: Facebook: @Altum.Sonatur.UCT | Instagram: @AltumSonaturUCT | Twitter: @AltumSonatur

Label the Flag with the correct Country!

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Dying to be White Words by Kudiwa Natalie Shonhiwa kin bleaching with lightening or whitening creams is a common phenomenon throughout Africa.

Since the 1960s, both men and women, light or dark skinned, have been using these creams to gain access to privileges associated with having fair skin. With the cost of ‘legal’ skin treatments sometimes exceeding $3 000, many Africans resort to cheap and highly dangerous creams and concoctions to achieve their desired complexion. The cost for many, however, has been death – and for the lucky ones, life-long scarring. Despite impressive regulation attempts by many African nations, the use of these creams is rising exponentially.

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One of the most dangerous substances found in skin lightening products is hydroquinone, which is ordinarily used as an agent to develop photographs. Its side effects include severe burning and thinning of the skin, as well diseases such as vitiligo. High levels of mercury and steroids can also be found in skin lighteners. Mercury in the body has been linked to kidney failure, and the regular use of steroids has resulted in the development of numerous skin-related cancers.

Cote d’Ivoire spearheaded the legal regulation of lighteners by completely banning the use skin lighteners in 2015. South Africa, to date, has the toughest laws against skin lightening. Creams using hydroquinone as an agent were banned in 1980, and the use of skin lightening creams was recently banned altogether. A prohibition on the advertisement of cosmetics that claim to effect skin lightening has also been introduced. The Medicines Control Council of Zimbabwe requires all drugs used in the country to be registered via the Council. Since most skin lighteners’ compositional drugs are illegal substances, they do not meet the registration requirements and thus such products cannot be distributed within the country.

Unfortunately, all these laws and regulations remain paper tigers in the face of the distribution of these illicit substances. A 2016 South African Journal of Science study on the use of skin lightening products reflects that a staggering 72.4% of women in Nigeria use skin lightening creams (based on a study of 400 women). In South Africa, 32% of women (based on a study of 600) use one or more skin lightening creams. Congo is the distribution hub of skin lightening products, and with African borders remaining largely porous, it is usually easy to smuggle products from Congo, to Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. It is clear that the law is limited in its ability to regulate effectively the use and continental distribution of these substances.

A trip down to any salon or hair vendor in Mowbray will confirm the worst. Most shops, especially the common favourite, A-Z Cosmetics in Mowbray, sell over 15 different brands of lighteners, from CaroLite, to Lemonvate, to Diproson. There is also a wide variety of skin lightening soaps on offer.

The overwhelming demand for lightening products has prompted opportunistic street vendors and hairdressers to sell their own self-made concoctions. These mixes contain a number of different products and are affectionately termed “lunch boxes” in Zimbabwe as they are often mixed and packaged in a lunch box type-container when sold informally.

The problem is profound. Colonialism and its psychological effects on Africans’ conceptions of beauty is undeniably the root of the skin bleaching problem on the continent. Colonialism positioned blackness as uneducated, savage, ugly and deeply inferior – and the further away you can get from that blackness, physically, the better off you are. Internalised colonial thinking displayed on social media platforms constitutes a secondary reason for bleaching today. The proud use of ‘team yellow bone’ (identification with fair-skinned black bodies) in one’s Twitter bio re-affirms the colonial ideology. Lately, the hyper-sexualisation of dark skin has become commonplace on social media, where dark-skinned women are only considered beautiful when they apply an obscene amount of makeup (highlighter) onto their cheek bones. Colourism now has a new form through which to rear its ugly head.

Bleaching is about more than getting lighter. It is a reflection of our internalised self-hatred.

Unlearning European standards of beauty is the most effective step in healing and preserving the vanishing dark body. This too, is a process of decolonisation. We should no longer be dying to be white.

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*Are white South Africans African?

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Compiled by: Asiphe Mdutywa and Kelsey Pailman

Humans of Kramer Question: What does your home country have which South Africa does not?

Ellen Lweya - Malawi “In Malawi, every person is part of one big family. I remember visiting my grandmother in a village where it is preferable for women to wear dresses.

Although I wore jeans, all the people in the village were so welcoming and accommodating towards me. ”

Richa Khataw - Kenya “We have a finance minister who actually completed his term! Also, Kenya has a more inclusive and welcoming society, especially when it comes to foreign nationals. Lastly, contrary to popular belief, Kenya has better beaches!”

Lebogang Maragelo - Somalia “Somalian people have the ability to narrate deeply traumatic things in a lyrical and beautiful manner. This contributes to collective (rather than individualistic) healing.”

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Nyasha Gift Nyatsambo - Zimbabwe “In Zim, we have a better standard of cooking pap (sadza). We also have a very functional police force. Our police have even been subcontracted for revenue collection. Also, most importantly, we have the land over there!”

Tima Otu Anwana - Nigeria “In Nigeria, traditional attire is formal wear at work. People don’t only wear traditional clothing to cultural events. Our music also has such a vibe! Oh, and let us not forget about our very beautiful men.”

Tasimba Mhuka Maisva - Zimbabwe “When I walk in Zimbabwe, I feel like I belong. In terms of safety, I don’t feel under threat, even during the night. Zim is characterised by busy working days and busy working nights. There are often street vendors and markets during the evening and so, with so many people around, there is never a feeling of isolation.”

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Words by Priyanka Naidoo

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Land, Space and Reclaim the City – A South African Narrative O

ur history is painfully etched into the landscape. It is a story of land, labour, and most importantly, dispossession – a story that is still being written in South Africa’s current constitutional dispensation. The Republic of South Africa was carved up and divided by the imaginary lines of the Union Government in 1910. This laid the foundation for spatial apartheid, which was cemented during the Apartheid era, and which can still be seen today.

Land and labour are an integral element of economic development in any country. South Africa’s history has split access to land and the division of labour along racial lines, which has influenced how our society has developed. In order for us to understand spatial apartheid we have to look back through our history and the legislation used. The Natives’ Land Act of 1913 was by far the most draconian piece of legislation passed in this era. It codified injustice by ensuring that the white minority had exclusive use of the majority of the Union’s land, leaving less than 13% of the land for Black South Africans to settle on despite the fact that they made up 80% of the population. Migrant labour, forced evictions, and the introduction of the Group Areas Act tore families apart, uprooted communities, and displaced thousands of people. The Group Areas Act created restrictions which, in effect, made access to land and other essential services dependent upon a person’s racial classification. The consequences of this are still present in post-Apartheid South Africa.

Visually the outlines of the Group Areas Act are still evident today, as most People of Colour have been unable to afford property in so called ‘white areas’.

These ‘white areas’ are often the ones closest to the city, with access to resources such as schools, hospitals, accessible transport systems and running water. Access to these resources has a direct impact on a person’s quality of life and opportunities for development.

It is widely known that there is a housing crisis in Cape Town. We needn’t look further than our own university to see this. In January last year, a shack was erected at the foot of Jammie Stairs. This was in direct response to UCT’s continuous exclusion of black students, and to the student housing crisis. This was symbolic on many levels, one being that the tactical placement of the shack led to the plinth where the Rhodes statue once sat. It further represented black dispossession and the experiences of those who had been evicted and forced to live in squalor. As Mbali Matandela said, “most white UCT students have never seen a shack so close to their privilege.”

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Beyond our university, it is evident that the City of Cape Town has not risen to the challenge facing it.

No form of rent-control has been introduced, and no subsidized housing is available in the city. This is the reason why campaigns such as Reclaim the City (RTC) are pivotal in our constitutional democracy.

RTC is a campaign for affordable housing in the inner city and surrounds in Cape Town. The campaign has brought to light issues of gentrification, evictions and the lack of affordable housing. RTC have unequivocally stated that the State has a positive duty to make affordable housing available to poor and working class citizens, and in the process, to dismantle spatial apartheid. The campaign has made many gains and has even received international media attention. Its focus has been on the use and alienation of prime public land, and more specifically on the sale of Tafelberg in Sea Point. The Provincial Cabinet commissioned a study on the feasibility of building mixed-income housing on the Tafelberg site. The commission eventually came to the conclusion that 270 housing units could in fact be built on the site. This meant that 270 families who would not be able to live in the city otherwise, would be able to do so if the site was built. However, despite wide public objection through petitions and popular protest about the sale, Cabinet proceeded with it. This decision by Cabinet inevitably contributes to the demarcation of Sea Point for the White and Wealthy.

Property listing sites such as Property24.com indicate that renting a one-bedroom apartment in Sea Point can cost anything between R12 000 and R18 000 a month (without electricity and water). This is both too small for a family to live in, as well as too expensive for single-income households and working class families.

Here we find the consequences of the Apartheid regime’s spatial planning playing out. Black people are once again forced to find housing far away from the city and commute long distances to work. For the above reasons it is evident that Cape Town is still divided along racial and therefore economic lines, making spatial apartheid a reality in 2017.

Dispossession has come to characterise our country. There is political dissonance between those who govern and those who are governed, which perpetuates the systemic inequality inherited from our colonial past. If we truly wish to dismantle the legacy of Apartheid, restoration needs to take place as well as the desegregation of ‘white only’ suburbs. Until then, “the City that works for you” will continue to work only for a few.

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The ICC in Africa:

Prosecutions, Politics and Prejudice Words by Tefo Mosienyane

biased towards African states, and has raised questions about the extent to which African states have a moral duty to cooperate with the Court. In reviewing the hile a recent South role of the ICC in Africa, it is African High Court necessary to consider closely ruling in Democratic Alliance v its prosecutorial patterns, its Minister of International Relations relationship with the Security and Cooperation and Others Council, and its tendency to (Council for the Advancement reinforce harmful neocolonial of the South African Constitution relationships.

Intervening) has forced the The ICC was founded to South African government to retract its request to withdraw prosecute war crimes, crimes from the International Criminal against humanity, and genocide Court (ICC), it still remains (for brevity, these will collectively South Africa’s intention to leave be referred to as ‘mass the ICC. This has resurrected atrocities’). While 37 individuals debate on whether the ICC is to date have been indicted by

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the ICC, all but one of those indicted have been African, and every person prosecuted has been from Africa. It is difficult to believe Africans have the monopoly over these particular crimes. One of the contributing factors to the waning legitimacy of the ICC among Africans is the selectivity of the cases pursued by the ICC. Article 13 (a) and 14 (a) of the Rome Statute empowers the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to conduct investigations into situations referred to the Office by a party state. Similarly, Articles 13 (b) and 13 (c) provide for the United Nations Security Council and the

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OTP, respectively, to refer nation states to the ICC. The Security Council’s decision to refer Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, and to bring charges against Uhuru Kenyatta, President of Kenya, for election violence, may be contrasted with its decision to announce three days before the release of the Chilcot Report that Tony Blair, former British Prime Minster, would not be subject to investigation or referral irrespective of the findings of the inquiry. At the time, the Chilcot Report was anticipated to come eerily close to embroiling Blair in the commission of war crimes and participating in an illegal war. The Court’s dismissal of the Chilcot Report has raised questions about the sincerity of the investigations it pursues.

Some suggest Blair was not ‘African enough’ for the ICC. Similarly, the ICC’s relationship with the Security Council, particularly the Permanent Five, three of whom are not party to the Rome Statute, often politicises who is pursued and who is not. Most importantly, the ICC reinforces notions of neocolonial domination in its saviouristic justification for the

cases it pursues, the manner in the ICC faces a jurisdictional which conflict is portrayed, and problem, as those countries are the power relations on display. not party to the Rome Statute.

While these arguments are valid to an extent, the criticisms of the Before critiquing the ICC, ICC are far more compelling. it is worthwhile to consider first A first point to note is that the arguments which are in favour of, and which to a point the self-referrals system remains attempt to excuse, the ICC’s deeply problematic; Uganda’s role in Africa. Advocates of the relationship with the ICC ICC often highlight that the 34 underscores this. Referees, like African states that are party to Uganda, have used the ICC as the Rome Statute ratified it by a tool to settle political disputes their own volition. Moreover, and gain political legitimacy for two of the individuals convicted controversial decisions. Uganda by the ICC were referred by was the first African state to African party states, and those cooperate with the ICC, and party states had invited the ICC invited the Court to investigate to conduct investigations and Uganda’s longstanding conflict pursue criminal cases. It is often with The Lord’s Resistance a moot point that all those tried Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda. and investigated have been The practical limitations of the complicit in heinous human rights ICC, namely the prosecutors violations, whether or not the and investigators’ reliance on ICC is the appropriate platform the referring state’s security to try these violations. While apparatuses, access to crime only Africans have been tried scenes and enforcement of ICCand convicted, it is important to issued warrants, binds the Court note that the ICC has conducted into a dependency relationship To investigations on four continents. with the referring state. secure this cooperation, the ICC Lastly, in non-African states such as Syria, North Korea, Myanmar often offers de facto immunity to and Papua New Guinea, where the referring state. While well mass atrocities have taken place documented atrocities have been and continue to take place, committed by both the Ugandan

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government forces and the LRA, Museveni has used the cover of the ICC to present state violence as law enforcement, and to criminalise political adversaries.

Given the apparent aims of the ICC, this model is deeply flawed.

Moreover, the ICC’s complicated relationship with the United States, and the reality that the Court is essentially accountable to the Security Council rather than the party states of the Rome Statute, further entrenches the African bias of the court. While three of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council are not party to the Rome Statute, they are able to refer cases to the ICC through Article 13 (b) or to block them through their veto in the Security Council. Their veto capacities and capital in the international arena also indirectly insulates them from possible investigation and referral. Despite the US being a non-signatory and being barred from cooperating with the ICC through the American Service Members Protection Act, the US has employed the ICC to meet its own foreign policy objectives, which have skewed interventions into being more African-centric.

As Branch and Mamdani have both intimated, much of the ICC’s inaction in the Middle East and other non-African regions where mass atrocities have occurred has been the result of fears of US political retaliation for harming American foreign policy interests. At the same time, the US has not hesitated in assisting the ICC when it furthers its geopolitical interests, such as in the case of the US Forces’ handover of Dominic Ongwen to the Central African Republic.

serves to undermine two of the abovementioned defences of the ICC’s bias in Africa. Firstly, it is simply not true that jurisdictional limitations prevent the ICC from pursuing indictments and investigations of atrocities that occur in countries which aren’t party to the Rome Statute.

Although Sudan is not party to the Rome Statute, through Article 13 (c) of the Rome Statute, the former Lead Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, brought charges against Omar alBashir and issued a warrant for his arrest. Not only does this practice violate Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in that no country can be bound by the provisions of a treaty which it has not consented to and ratified, but it also contradicts the ICC’s claims that they have jurisdictional limitations on mass atrocities committed in non-party states. Realistically, the ICC’s jurisdictional limitations are those of the internal political mandates of the Permanent Five. Secondly, the normative framework perpetuates neocolonialism. The ICC is a Western court that tries African crimes and conveniently ignores the systemic causes and nuances of conflicts, including the role colonialism played in creating the conditions for conflict, and the role neocolonialism plays in the formation of Multinational Corporations profiting from conflict.

The ICC and Security Council have been able to maintain this charade through the exploitation of tired tropes of Africa being a violent nonspecific place, where barbaric and brutish savages slaughter the innocent who need a Western Saviour.

The ICC’s relationship Creating the false dichotomy with the Security Council also of perpetrators of violence as devoid of political rationale and 26

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necessarily savage contrasted with innocent victims revives centuries-long depictions of Africa as a Hobbesian State of Nature, where the ICC is the draconian Leviathan White Saviour. This sentiment is echoed by having the court based in The Hague, the de facto administrative and judicial capital of one of the most aggressive colonial nations. I maintain that endorsements of the ICC from the likes of Kofi Annan, or replacing Moreno-Ocampo with Fatou Bensouda to give the neocolonial institution an African façade, does not absolve it from its racist disposition but rather conjures the repressing role les Évolvés played in entrenching and normalising colonialism.

Although I do not dispute that those investigated are responsible for heinous acts of violence, and that it is appropriate for them to be held accountable, the ICC remains a deeply imperialistic tool that maintains colonial relations between states. The ICC’s prosecutions intentionally present Africans on trial as racist stereotypes, and depict its own role in the conflict as that of faultless saviour, further entrenching exploitative conditions. The ICC reworks concepts of humanitarianism, human rights and protection to reassert colonial dominance.

What of nations’ potential moral responsibilities to co-operate with the ICC? Let it be said that African nations do not have a moral obligation to help enforce their own subjugation.* * This article is an extract from an Honours research paper

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CONTRIBUTORS CONTRIBUTORS CONTRIBUTORS CONTRIBUTORS CONTRIBUTORS CONTRIBUTORS CONTRIBUTORS CONTRIBUTORS CONTRIBUTORS Chanda Chungu

Lauren Gildenhuys Deputy & Copy Editor

Kudiwa Natalie Shonhiwa

Priyanka Naidoo Social Media

Magazine Design IG: @thecapetownphotographer

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Maya Surya Pillay

Natasha Dusabe Senior Editor

Tefo Mosienyane

Cover: Ashley Jane Seymour 27

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LAUNCH EVENT: THE AFRICA EDITION

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