The Divine Attribute Of Omniscience Of Divine Essence

REPLYING OBJECTIONS ON DIVINE ATTRIBUTE OF OMNISCIENCE2017

THE OMNISCIENCE OF DIVINE ESSENCE THE EXISTENCE OF DIVINE ESSENCE HUSAM

A REPLY OF OBJECTIONS OF BOOK OF NICHOLAS EVERITT

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Preliminary A Omnipotence is a Special Case of Knowledge. Nescience and Omniscience are Opposites. Nescience and Knowledge are Contradictory. IF some Essence is not Nescience then it is a Knower. If it is not a Knower then it is Nescience. It is Per Se Absurd for an Individual Essence to be Nescience and Knowerin general and Nescience and Omniscience in Particular.

Preliminary B Omniscience meaneth Absolute Knowledge [‘AL “ILM ‘AL MUT:L-Q], This Knowledge Comprehendeth each and every Logical Thing or Logical Occurrence i.e each and ecvery Per Se Contingent, Per Se Absurd, Per Se Necessary and Necessary For Necessary [Neither Per Se Necessary Nor Per Se Contingent but Per Se Possible] with out any Exception. It comprehendeth each and every Per Se Contingent Time and any Event in time.

Preliminary C To Know a Thing is one thing and to Express it in sentences is an other thing. One and same thing that is known to two Rational Essence cannot be expressed by them by one and same Assertive/Affirmative and Negative sentence. This problem can be ascribed to the Attribute of Speech and Not to the Attribute of Knowledge.

Preliminary D Omniscience doeth not mean that all kind of knowledge that is found in Per Se Contingent Created Rational Essences are ascribed to Divine Essence. Per Se Contingent Created Finite Timeal Knowledge are denied for Divine Essence. There are many Intrinsic Properties and Essential Attributes of Finite Knowledges which are not found in Necessary for Necessary, Essential, Eternal and Infinite Knowledge, This cannot be used to argue against the Omniscience of Divine Knowledge.IF A Knowledge is Divine Knowledge then it Knoweth/Comprehendeth each and every Logical Thing/Occurrence and Event. It is not that it Comprehendeth/Knoweth a thing or an event as Known by a Finite Created Knowledge. Maulana: ‘Ashraf “Ali Tha:nvi a Great Scholar scholar pointed at this fact while discussing an issue whether “Ilm ‘Al Ghaib is a Communicable Attribute or an Incommunicable Attribute In his work H:ifz: ‘Al I:ma:n he presented a claim that a person can say that the Divine Knowledge is not limited Knowledge then a person can say that Divine Essence is not the Knower of ‘Al Ghaib in the meaning that Divine Knowledge is not Limited. He rejected this saying axiomatically. This means that meaning of Divine Knowledge is not that Divine Essence must have all kinds of Knowledge. But it meaneth that it must comprehendeth all types of events and ocuurrances.

Preliminary E The word “Now” is used in several meanings. One of them is that the Sentencer/Speaker ,the Sentence and the Event expressed in the Sentence all belong to one and same time. In this meaning the Divine Essence never saith the Word Now in any sentence. How ever there are several other meanings in which the word Now [‘A:n,/Al’A:n] may be used by be Divine Essence.

As to say that there are several theories about the Present,Past and Future of time. Baesd on them there are six cases.

1] According to most used theory Only Present Exists ;and Past and Future do not Exist.

2] According to some Present and Past Exist but Future Does not.

3] According to some Present and Future Exist but Past Does Not. 4] According to some Neither Present, Nor Future, Nor Past Exist.

5] According to some Future and Past Exist but Present does Not. 6] According to some all the three times/tenses Present,Pastand Future Exist.

These are the THEORIES and none of them is proved with certainty,yet each one of them is Per Se Contingent.

Divine Essence is beyond all types of time. If there are some types such that they are neither Present, Nor Future Nor Past and they are different from each other even then Divine Essence is Beyond times. Our discussion is based on the six stated above theories. If needed discussion on other Per Se Contingent Parts of times shall be discussed.

If 1 is the case then the word Now can be used for the Existing time.

If 2 is the case then the word now can be used in the meaning of the last Created and Existing Time which Exist. If an other time is created after it then the word Now can be used for it. If 3 is the case then the word Now can be used for the most prior existing time. If 3 is the case then the word now can be used for the time which exists and is created ,yet it is prior to all existing times.If 4 is the case then the time doeth not exist at least one which consist of three parts Pasr,Present and Future. So the word Now can be used for the Last Created Events. If 5 is the case then the word Now can be used for the Non Existing Time. If 6 is the case then choice of Past, Present and Future depends upon the Divine Will and Part Present and Future becomes a matter of choice. So what so ever times is chosen by Divine Essence as Present the word Now can be used for it. It must be noted that Past and Future both are finite so Neither Infinite Past Exists nor Infinite Future Exist in case atleast one of them Exists. So it means that Divine Essence Createth the future one after an other even if they are far away from Present.

All this assumes that Posteriori and Priority of times are more fundamental concepts than time. For Example Almost all theists believe that Divine Essence is Eternal and Time is not then this Implieth Priority Of Divine Essence and Posteriority of Time. This Implieth that these are

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more Fundamental Concepts. Maulana Qa:sim in His Work Tahdh:I ‘Anna:s have also implicitly advocated this View. This may be derived from his concept of three types of Finality and Firstness.

Preliminary F The Essence of a Suppositum is believed to be Absolutely Identical to the Suppositum , The Essence of a Substance is Supposed to be Absolutely Identical to the Substance, Similarly the Essence of an Essence is Absolutely Identical To the Very Essence it self. An Essence Is Subsistent. Divine Essence is Per Se Subsistent. If it is clearified that Per Sr Contingent Essence is Pe Se Subsistent then An Essence is a Per Se Subsistent . If not then An Essence is Subsistent whether Per Se or Not Per Se. Preliminary G The lines of argument of Nicholas goes as follow: It is per Se Absurd for Divine Essence to Know Indexicals. Every Non Indexical is an Indexical. So Divine Essence is ascribed by Nescience [Jahl] and Divine Essence is Nescient [ Ja:hil].

It may be noted that these lines are based on some Axioms of Nicholas’ System of arguments.

1]To Know time it is Per Se Necessary to be in Time.2] To Know a Thing /an Event in time it is Necessary to be in Time.

3]To Know time it is Per Se Necessary to be in Time.4] To Know a Thing /an Event in time it is Necessary to be in Time.

It is Per Se Absurd for Divine Essence to be in Time and In Space. So It is Per Se Absurd for Divine Essnce to Know Time. Space and things/events in at least one of them, In response one must note the following.

Divine Essence Knoweth what would Its Knowledge would have been If Logical Absurds were Logical Contingents and Logical Contingents were Logical Absurds, Logical Necessaries were Logical Absurds and Logical Absurds were Logical Necessaries , Logical Contingencies were Logical Necessaries and Logical Necessaries were Logical Contingencies. It is Clear that In such cases Divine Essence. So it is Not Per Se Absurd for Divine Essence to Know Indexicals, Since at best it may be said that it is Per Se Absurd to know Indexicals but Divine Essence Knoweth even Per Se Absurds, So It Knoweth What if It/He Knoweth them in the case they are Per Se Absurd to be Known. It is not Necessary to be in Time in order to Know Time. It is not Mecessary to be in Time in order to Know the things in time [Timeal Things]. It is not Necessary to be in Space in order to Know Space. It is not Necessary to be in Space in order to Know the things in Space [Spatial Things].

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This thing may be kept in mind and may be repeated latter at its proper places, where repeating/repeatation may seem to be necessary.

Preliminary H

Nicholas has a very Wrong approach of Indexicals. The Wrongness of His Approach is very obvious and when this wrongness is mixed with the wrongness of conception of Omniscience a very new form of fallacious arguments are generated. Nicholas has given more examples and did not discuss to the Axioms of his approach. Since he probably conceived the idea that this may expose the weaknesses of his System of arguments.

The Basic Ideas upon which the claim is based that Divine Essence cannot Know indexicals are numerically there.

1]Timeal Indexicals.According to the Critic of Divine Omniscience Divine Essence Cannot Know the Timeal Indexicals.

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The Timeal Indexical Imply that the event ε and, The Speaker both are in Time . The Special Case is that both are in one and same time. This is generally shewn by the word “Now” which is either a Preposition or an adverb or both. For example if an Intellegent Essence Saith :=”It is lightening Now” . It means that the Essence that is the Speaker and the Event both are in one and the same Time.

So if Speaker is in time t1 and the Event is in time t2 then t1=t2.

As the Divine Essence is Beyond All Possible Times then if Divine Essence Saith that “It is Lightening Now” then either it meaneth that The Event of Lightening is Beyond Time or Divine Essence is in Time. In this case it implieth that the event and the Divine Essence both are in One and the Same Time. Both of the meanings are equally false. Learned denouncer of Divine Essence and Divine Omniscience used this fallacy to refute Divine Essence which he considered as “Irrefutable Refutation Of Divine Essence and Divine POmniscience”.S 2] Spatial Indexicals:= Spatial Indexicals Imply that the Speaker and the Event both are in Space. Special Case is the use of the word Here.

For an Example if a Rational Essence saith :=”A is Here”.;It meaneth that the Speaker S and the Thing A both are in Space , and the distance between them is small, that is A is near to the Speaker some where in Space .

If Divine Essence Saith :” A is near” then it meaneth that Either Divine Essence is in some space or in all space, or the thing A is Beyond all Spaces. Both are false meanings.

3] Pronounal Indexicals.

This means that the Speaker and the Subject of the Pronoun both are in Time or both are in Space or both are in both.

Special Case the Pronoun I. If some saith “I feel pain” this means that the Speaker S and the Event E all are in Time and Space and the Subject of the Pronoun and the Speaker both are one and the same Rational Essence. In this case If Divine Essence Saith, “I feel pain” then this is false on several Gounds. 1] Divne Essence is not in time. 2] Divine Essence is not in Space. 3] Divine Essence is not the Subject of the Pronoun I. At best the Divine Essence may say “He/She/It feeleth pain.” But the Knowledge of the user of the Pronoun He/She/It cannot be same as the Knowledge of the Speaker of the Pronoun I. So there is some thing that the user of the Pronoun I Knoweth more then the user of the Pronoun He/She/It for the speaker of the Pronoun “1”. Further it implieth that the User and Speaker of the Pronouns is in time.

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Based on the fallacious Ideas the Critic of the Divine Omniscience denieth the Divine Omniscience. This is just an Illusion that the Non Divine Essences know some which the Divine Essence Knoweth Not. On excogitating minutely and nuclearly it is found that “There is nothing that is Known to Non Divine Essence that is not Known to Divine Essence. So these are the basic fallacies which serve as bases of all fallacious arguments, An other Fallacy which is often used is that:- If Essence in Time and Space cannot Know Existent That Transcendenteth Time and Space then One That Transcendenteth Time and Space cannot Know things that are in time and space.

There is really nothing that isnot KLnown to Divine Essence but Known to Essences in Time and Space, The arguments from Indexicals are the only arguments used by the Demouncers of Divine Omniscience.

Preliminary I

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Some ‘Ahlul Vuju:d Existantialists] believe that Divine Essence is the Mansaha:’ [Originator] and Manda:’ [Source] of each and every Per Se Contingent Thing and Event. Divine Essence Knoweth the very Mansha:’ Itself and two Know the Mansha:’ is Sufficient and equal to Know each and every other thing of whom the Divine Essence is the Mansha:’. In this case as Indexical Events and Things are also have a Coomon Mansha:’ and that is Divine Essence ,hence to Know the very Mansha:’ Itself is sufficient to Know each and every Indexical thing and indexical event what so ever, and if not sufficient then a perfect alternative. In this case the Omniscience in regard to indexicals may be defined and expressed as the Knowledge of Mansha:’.

PRELIMINARY J If it is accepted that Knowledge of every Rational Essence about one and same event/thing is not one and the same and it differs fromEssence to Essence, Divine Essence Knoweth each and every Indexical in Its Own Way and not in the Wayse of Non Divine Essences.

Divine Knowledge is Omniscience in the meaning each and every thing whether it be Logically Necessary,or it be Logically Contingent or it be Logically Absurd is known to Divine Essence exactly ,correctly, really and accurately. Ways may be different. Omniscience doet not mean that Divine Essence knoweth an event as a Non Divine Essence Knoweth it as a Non Divine Essence. So thing can be different.

Similarly Omniscience doeth not mean that Knowledge of each and every Non Divine Essence is ascribed to the Divine Essence as it is ascribed to the very Non Divine Essence, But it mean that what so ever that is Logically Necessary or Logically Absurd or Logically Contingent or Logically “Neither Necieesary nor Contingent” is Known to Divine Essence. So types of Knowledges are dissimilar but what so ever is known to any Non Divine Essence is Known to Divine Essence, So difference in type of Knowledge is not any thing which implieth Ignorance.

Preliminary K If it is suppesed that a Non Divine Essence E1 Knows an event E1 and knoweth some thing about it that Divine Essence Knoweth Not even then: 1]Divine Essence Knoweth the event Infintely more correctly and rightly that the Non Divine Knowledge if Non Divine Essence E1.

2]Divine Essence Knoweth the Knowledge of the the Non Divine Essence E1.

3] Divine Essence Knoweth What It Would have Known if It would be that Non Divine Essence .

4]Divine Essence Knoweth what would It Hath Known if It would Have Known what the Non Divine Essence Knoweth.

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It must be notede that Non Divine Essence Doeth Know each and every Logical Contingent, Logical Necessary, Logical Absurd, and it also Knoweth what if Logical Contingents were Logical Necessaries , What if Logical Contingents were Logical Absurds, What if Logical Absurds were Logical Contingents, What if Logical Absurds were Logical Necessaries, What if Logical Necessaries were Logical Absurds and What if Logical Necessaries were Logical Contingents.

Preliminary L It is not the case that a thing/ an Event that is Indexical is Known to Non Divine Essences but Not Known to Divine Essence. Rather it is Known to Both types of Essences whether Divine or Not Divine ,yet the differences in the KNOWELDGES of Knowing Essences do exist the Differences which exist in the Knowledges from one essence to an other essence and so on is due to the relations of these essences to the thing/event stated above. It is not the case that there exist /subsist infinite or indefinite number of sub-things subevents in each indexical event or thing such that each Knowing Essence knoweth only one of them and no two knowing essences have one and the same knowledge or the knowledge of one and the same sub-event or sub- thing existing/subsiting in the indexical

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event/thing. Rather the case is different. The only thing that can be said about these indexicals is that Knowledge of some Knowing Essences are better then the other essences and Knowledge of some Essences are worse then the other Essences. Omniscience of Divine Essence doeth not mean that all the Knowledges of all Logically Contingent Knowing Essences are ascribed to Divine Essence, Rather it meaneth that Divine Knowledge is the Absolutely Perfect Knowledge ,infinitely more perfect then any Non Divine Essence.

For example if a Non Divine Essence saith that “A is near me� the sayer may not know the exact distance of the very self of itself and the very thing, and on the contrary Divine Essence Knoweth the Exact Distance of them and also Knoweth the word near used for this distance.

Knowledge of an event is another event. For example a None Divine Essence E1 Knoweth a thing A and an other Non Divine Essence E2 Knoweth the Thing A, the thing A is common in both of the two Knowledges of two Knowing Essences ,yet it may be the case one of the two Essences Knoweth better then the other or one of the Essence Knoweth it worse then the other. It may be said in case of indexicals knowledge of no two Essences are equal, and taking any two Knowing essences such that each one of the two knoweth the said event /thing , one knoweth it better than the other or one knoweth it worse than the other. So different is not in the thing but in the different Knowledges of different Knowing Essences about one and the same thing/event. Each and every Knowledge of a Knowing Essence in regard to the stated above thing/event is a different event/thing. Now Divine Essence Not Only Knoweth the said Event/Thing infinitely more perfectly then any Non Divine Essence but also Knoweth each and every Knowledge in regard to the said Thing/Event. So Divine Essence Knoweth With the Pure Knowledge .

Preliminary M Let it be known that if it is accepted that an Indexical Event/Thing may have different Knowledges in regard to different Essences suth that each knowledge is ascribed to one and only Essence, then this means that the different Knowledges are events /things other then the said event/thing and are events /things other then that thing/event. There differences i.e the differences of these knowledges are only due to know the event/thing better or less better, worse or less worse. Now it is not the case that one essence has the knowledge of some thing which the other essence does not have. But it is the case that one Knoweth some Essence better or worse than the other Essence. If No Two Essence are equal in Knowledge then it doeth not imply that Divine Essence doeth not know it or that Divine Knowledge is not Omniscience. At best it implies that in case of indexicals , no two Knowing Essences in Time and Space have equal Knowledges, BUT this Doeth Not Imply that Divine Essence That is Beyond Time and Space Knoweth the INDEXICAL Event/Thing NOT. Preliminary N

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If it is excepted that no two Non Divine Essence have equal Knowledge of an Indexical then it is implied that Real Knowledge of an Indexical is Logically Impossible, and What so ever is called Knowledge is actually Ignorence. Pure or Real Knowledge of an Indexical becometh Logically Absurd. This is the only result of this approach of indexical. If every thing is supposed to be AN Indexical then there is no Knowledge of any thing at all. This is denial of the very knowledge itself. So it is clear that Indexicals may be discursive or may not be discursive but they are finite and definite things or events and they are one and the same . So they are known to a number of Knowing Essences. The differences of Knowledges of Knowing Essences in regard to them is not that one of them knows some thing about it that is not known to other but one of them knoweth it better then the other. But if it is accepted that it has sub-things in it and one of then knoweth it and the other one doeth not know it then this doeth not mean that it is not known to Divine Essence. So there is nothing in it that is not known since there are no such things in it. Different relations of the Knowing Essences imply different Types of perfect,semi perfect ,imperfect and semi imperfect knowledges. Divine Essence Knoweth the best and the the perfect knowledge. So the difference in knowledge is not in the meaning that one of the essences knoweth some thing that other essences do not know, but

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one of them knoweth better then the others. This thing is the only concept which is misused to negate Divine Knowledge of Divine Essence. So this is ncorrectg and all the arguments are ultimately based on this view.

Preliminary O There are two approaches to indexicals. A]They are covertly Non Indexicals yet their representation changes from sentences to sentences as the from one Sentencing Essence to an other Sentencing Essence. That is their Knowledges do not change from Onr Knowing Essence to an other Knowing Essence.

B] They are different from Non Indexicals Their Knowledge changes from one Essence that Knoweth it to an other Essence That Knoweth It. If their Knowledges changes from Essence to Essence then it is not the meaning of Omniscience that Omniscent Essence must Know an Indexical with all the Knowledges of all Knowing Essences. This is Incorrect and Wrong.It only meaneth that Divine Omniscient Essence Knoweth it infinitely Perfectly and also knoweth all the Knowledges of all Non Divine Essences in regard to each and every Indexical Thing or Event or Both. In this reply both of them are used .

Preliminary P There is a difference between Knowledge and Belief. An Incorrect Knowledge is not a Knowledge but Ignorance. On the other hand a Belief may be incorrect or correct. How ever Knowledge is divided in to two types perfect or imperfect. For example if a human Essence died and it is not known how did he/The Human Essence die then it is not an incorrect knowledge but an imperfect Knowledge.

On the contrary if it is known that the Human Being died due to a certain disease then this is relatively better Knowledge. In imperfect Knowledge details are not known, what so ever is Known is correct and not incorrect. That is the reason in Theological Logic Probable Knowledge is not consider as Knowledge but Belief. A Knowledge Is Necessarily Certain. How ever certain Acts of Created Essences are based on ideas which has both components 1] Knowledge. 2]Beliefs. Such Ideas are not Knowledge. But Like Believes they are separate Attributes of Created Essences.

Preliminary Q In any response if some one ascends from his original claim and try to refute the argument of the opponent it is called ascension , and some times he descend from his original claim and this is called descension. For Example if some one believes that A is B and C is D, but in a discussion he assumes that C is Not D , for sake of argument ,yet proves A is B, then this is the example of the former. But in the case there is a proof A is B which use C is D , But if E is F is not believed by him but be his opponent and the opponent attempts to prove A is Not B by using E is F , and the defender attempts to prove that A is B while accepting E is F for sake of argument then it is Descension.

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Preliminary R

A more logical treatment of the subject may be given in upgrade versions of this Reply. But it is hoped that ‘Insha: ‘Allah this is/shall be sufficient reply .

Although it is written from Asharite and Maturidite [Ahlussunnah Diuband] Point of view but it may be used by any Theist .

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Note

1] The response In general in red or dark red in colour and Agency FB fonds. But at times it is in different colours and fonds.

When used otherwise it is finally bounded above and below by responses in RB fonds either in dark red or red.

Forms of th in verbs are used in regard to Divine Knowledge etc. and some time in non Divine Cases as Well. In Divine case it is a rules and in non divine cases it is used to shew emphasis.

The words and sentences of Nicholas Everitt are in Time New Roman fond and is in black colour.

2] In order to be more Technical the Words “Divine Essence” is used for the Supreme Existent. As Supreme Existent is It Self In Itself and in order to focus at the Divine Itness, the Pronun It , Itself is often used instead of Him or Himself for the Divine Essence.

3] A Per Se Subsistent is an Essence in the following pages.

4] It is hoped that by the Grace of Divine Essence “ Dha:tul Ba:ri:] the answers to the objection may convince the readers and studiers.

5] Improved versions of this response may be uploaded from time to time.

6] Mistakes of spellings and grammar may be found and may be eliminated latter.

Introduction

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Some writers claim that:= Omniscience generates puzzles at least as perplexing as those raised by omnipotence (see, for example, Stewart 1993: 32). This may be true, but as we will argue, the puzzles which have most troubled theistic writers really depend on their views in other areas of philosophy, and the issues that are really puzzling about divine omniscience have had very little attention.

Let the alleged puzzles be presented by Nicholas and let them be critically and strictly be analyzed.

It is customary to divide human knowledge into three categories: ability knowledge (knowing how to do things); knowledge by acquaintance (knowing objects, persons, places, etc.); and propositional knowledge (knowing truths) (see, for example, Everitt and Fisher 1995: 12). Some writers have insisted that a truly omniscient being ought to be all-knowing in all three categories (see Martin 1990: Chapter 12).

Divine Omniscience is a special rather exceptional case so it is different from different types of Created Knowledges.

Although there is some reason to take knowledge in this inclusive way (e.g. that if one does not, ordinary humans could know things which an omniscient being would not know), in what follows we shall focus exclusively on propositional knowledge.

Divine knowledge

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Just as for omnipotence we raised a prior question about the nature of God’s power, quite apart from its extent, and found that human experience gave some understanding of how it might be conceived, so we will find that a similar strategy works if we ask about the nature of God’s knowledge, quite apart from its extent.

Divine Omnipotence is discussed and it may be seen there.

There has been a good deal of discussion in recent years about how human propositional knowledge should be analysed, and one distinction which many authors have deployed is that between mediate or indirect knowledge, and immediate or direct knowledge. Some things we know on the basis of other things that we know. From a consideration of the relevant evidence, scientists infer that the theory of evolution is true. The jury infers from 286

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the evidence presented in court that the accused is guilty. Here, the knowledge which they arrive at is mediate or indirect because it is inferred from other facts presented as true. By contrast, other things that we know, we know without any process of inference at all – we just know ‘straight off’ or immediately. Suppose that I am now thinking of the number nine. How do I know that the proposition ‘I am now thinking of the number nine’ is true? A plausible negative answer would say that I know this immediately; I do not have to infer or deduce from something that that is what I am doing; there isn’t a method by the use of which I come to know this. I just know ‘straight off’.

Ideally, the theist would like to be able to say that all God’s knowledge is immediate , just as some human knowledge is immediate.

Divine Knowledge is Per Se Immediate and Eternal.

God does not have to work out, or infer or deduce or calculate anything which he knows. He does not come to know what he knows, if coming to know suggests any kind of temporal process, at the start of which he does not know some particular truth and at the end of which he does. Rather, he just knows everything which he knows, straight off, without needing to use a method of knowledge acquisition.

It must be known at this point that Divine Knowledge is self immediate yet Divine Essence Knoweth all the intermediates and mediums of Created Knowledge and their results as Knowns . Divine Omniscience is the Essential Attribute and it is Per Se Essential.

The analogy must not be pressed too far. My capacity to know anything will depend on my possession of a brain, and the theist clearly will not want to make a correlative claim about God’s knowledge.

Mind and Brains are not Divine Attributes.

When I know something immediately, there is doubtless some sort of physiological mechanism at work, even if I have no idea what it is; and the theist does not want to say

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that divine knowledge is similarly underpinned by any cognitive mechanisms. But the parallel does give us at least a partial understanding of what it is for God to know something. It does not of course give us an understanding of how God knows what he knows, but rather of what kind of relationship he stands in to what he knows.

With that as a preliminary let us turn directly to the question of divine omniscience.

Omniscience

llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll ll

Omniscience How, then, should omniscience be defined? Just as in our discussion of omnipotence, we can start with a simplistic conception :

Definition 1

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X is omniscient = For every true proposition, X knows that it is true.

This may be some what problematic. Divine Essence Knoweth every True Proposition and Every False Proposition and Knoweth that Which is True and Which is False. A proposition is a Sentence and it is a speech. The correct statement is above as stated in the Preliminaries.

Although this might seem immediately acceptable to the non-partisan observer, it faces some problems. We need to notice first one very elegant argument which has been advanced by Grim (Plantinga and Grim: 1993) designed to show that there cannot be a set of all true propositions, and hence that there cannot be an omniscient being who knows all the propositions in this set.

WHY CANTOR THEOREM AGAINST GOD DOES NOT WORK This alleged elegant argument is refuted by Professor Gary Mar in his work “Why Cantor Theorem Against God Does Not Work” in Pure Logical way. Lovers of RFC may see this beautiful logical work. But it must be sent that Morse Kelly Set theory is far more strong then RFC. Knowledge of Divine Essence doeth not constitueth a Set. It is beyond all RFC Sets. Alia’s Theorem does shew that there is a missing condition in Cantor’s theorem which when imposed maketh the Theorem valid on all sets that are Not Set of All Set. So arguments against Divine Omniscience from the Cantor theorem is incorrect.

Suppose that there were such a set of all truths, call it T. Consider now all the subsets of T. The set of all these subsets is what set theoreticians call the power set of T. To each set in the power set, there will correspond a truth. The truth might, for example, simply specify that there is a subset containing those particular members. So there will be as many truths as there are members of the power set. But it has been proved by Cantor that the power set of any set has more members than the set itself. So, the power set of T will have more members than T itself. So since each member of the power set of T has a truth correlated with it, there will be more truths than are contained in T itself, contrary to our initial assumption that T was the set of all truths. It follows that the very concept of the set of all truths is logically impossible: there cannot be any such set. Consequently there cannot be a being who knows the set of all truths.

This beautiful argument, which illustrates very neatly how debates about

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theism can be enriched by philosophical ideas coming from wholly unexpected directions, will persuade some at once that there cannot be an omniscient being, by Definition 1 of the term.

Cantor Theorem is not Applied to Divine Essence. First this theorem is applicable to RFC Sets and Not On MKS Classes.

Secondly It is not Applicable to Grothendiek Universes. Third Professor Gary Mar has proved that Cantor Theorem is useless against the Divine Knowledge. Alia’s Theorem modifies Cantor theorem with applying a missing Condition. Last and not the least Divine Knowledge Doeth not imply Set Of All Sets.

Since Cantor’s Theorem only proves that there is no Set of All Sets. Granted. Divine Knowledge Knoweth each and Every Set even if there is no Set of All Sets. That is Divine Knowledge is Beyond all Cantorian Sets. So it is Mathematically Absurd to suppose a Set of All Divine Knowns. Divine Essence Knoweth each and every set whether all the sets belong to a Set of All Sets [if Cantor’s Theorem is Incorrect] or they do not belong to such a Set [if Cantor’s Theorem is Correct] But in any case Divine Essence Knoweth each and Very Set with out any Exception.

So If Divine Omniscience is over each and every thing then these things do not constitute a set of all RFC Sets.

An other way is to say that Divine Essence Knoweth each and every set even if there is no such set such that each and every set beloneth to.

An other thing which Respected Nicholas did not mentioned is the Proposition given below: N= No One Knoweth that N is True.

It is said that if this statement is false then its negation is true . But if its negation is true then this negation implieth the truth of the original statement. This implies that it is true under all values. If a statement is true under all values then it is Logically True. If Logically True then True. If true then no one Knoweth its trueth including Divine Essence.

The proper answer to this argument is that this Statement does not deny the knowledge of any one who knows that it is logically true. So it is also Known to Divine Essence. An other response is that it is a complex statement and it contains itself infinite times.

Such a statement cannot have the laws of simple statements. Consider the statement.

N= No One Know that Law Of Contradiction is False.

Its Negation is ~N= Some do know that Law of Contradiction is False.

But both sides of this statement is false. Take an other example : P= No One Knoweth that N is Logicallay False, where N= No one Knoweth that N is True.

Now ~P=Some Do Know that N is False.

These type of statements in which there is a statement with in a statement may be False and its Negation is also equally false and its truth is Pseudo Truth. To our all theists brethren irrespective of their respective religions it is requested once for all that in Theological Logic they should add one more law of thought, Any thing which contradicteth Divine Omniscience is false so the Necessary Condition for the truth in general and Logical Truth in particular of any statement is that it doeth not imply that it is not known to Divine Essence. If a statement and its negation both imply this thing then they both are equally false. This shall amuse our theists brethren and may annoy Nicholas. Since its farmotre better to add some Laws equal to Laws of thought instead of making modifications in the definition of Divine Omniscience. But this is the last act, there are may before it and this may be used if no answer is left. I believe I shall be cursed for this proposal but to be cursed for Divine Essence by atheists is a blessing for theists..

But so far there is no need to use this principle. But it must be in the set of Axioms of Theological Logic even if it is not used.

This by itself would give theists a motive for wanting an alternative definition of omniscience (though see the response by Plantinga, op. cit.).

It is most humbly stated that why not to add an other axom itstead of changing the definition??? But even without such bold steps such objections are answered and replied.

But in practice they have been moved to this conclusion by other problems (as they see it) with Definition 1. In particular, many theists have thought that there are some grounds for thinking that there are true propositions which God cannot know.

There is no such statement. The alleged true statement if not known to Divine Essence is still known to Atheists? How? Are they not contradicting THE ALLEGED Truth of them.

So, given a prior commitment to the claim that God exists, and is omniscient, the theist would have to reject Definition 1.

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This is an incorrect supposition.

Of course, an alternative atheist conclusion which could be drawn immediately is that if there are truths which God could not know, then there could not be an omniscient God, and hence since omniscience is one of his defining properties, it will follow at once that God does not exist.

All Truth are Known to Divine Essence , the only thing is that all Knowns of Divine Essence do not belong to s Single Set IF RFC is supposed to be correct. There is Event that is not Known to Divine Essence. But one thing is correct. As Divine Knowledge is an Essential Divine Attribute, if it doeth not exist ,Divine Essence also doeth not Exist Since Negation of an Essential Attribute Per Se Essentially Implieth the Negation of Essence. But the same is not true for Relative and Moral Attributes. Their negation doeth not imply the negation of the Divine Essence.

But let us assume, at least provisionally that there is some modification of Definition 1 which is both intuitively acceptable (i.e. captures what we might prephilosophically think of as omniscience) and also has the consequence that there could be an omniscient being.

Modifications are Not Necessary. Since Divine Knowledge is defined as above see the Preliminaries.

The propositions which are thought to be beyond the reach of even divine omniscience are of two kinds: the first concerns the future free actions of humans, and the second concerns so-called indexicals. Which of these problems the theist regards as serious will depend in part on the view which she takes of God’s relations to time and space.

There is no problem at all in regard to time and space. If they are they are not serious ones. They shall be discussed on there proper place of discussions.

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Theists agree that eternity and omnipresence are two of God’s defining attributes; but as we saw in the previous chapter, each of these attributes can be taken in at least two different ways. God’s eternal existence might be either temporal or timeless, his omnipresence might be either spatial or non-spatial.

Omnipresence is a problematic Attribute. Divine Essence Existeth in Itself. So It is problematic to Say that I t hath Omnipresence and Immanence as Its Attributes. But If Omnipresence is taken as a Divine Attribute then it Must be Beyond time and Must Transcendent Time and Space.

Very broadly, there is thought to be one problem in combining divine omniscience with the temporal conception of eternity; and a different problem with combining divine omniscience with the timeless conception of eternity (although, as we shall see, this second problem can be extended to cover either conception of eternity).

They shall be seen at their proper place of reply ‘Insha: ‘Allah. There is no such problems at all. The Essential Attributes are related/Connected to Times and Spaces but not any Time and Not in any Space. They are NEITHER Unconnected NOR Unrelated.

We will deal with the first of these problems in the next section, and the second in the following sections. We will then consider other problems that are raised by the idea of divine omniscience.

Can God foreknow future free actions?

Divine Essence Doeth Know free Acts of Free Will/Intention.

The first problem arises when we combine Definition 1 with the temporal conception of eternity. The problem is this: if God knows on Monday that on Tuesday I will go to London, can my going to London really be free?

This depends on the claim that “ One that Implies a Logical Absurd is also Logical Absurd” or “Mustalzim Muh:a:l Muh:a:l” but this is not correct and this law of absurdity is not accepted by a number of Logicians and Philosophers of Theology.

For

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if he knows in advance what I am going to do, and he cannot be wrong, then when Tuesday comes, I will have to go to London. If I do not go, then God would have been wrong, and that is impossible (omniscient beings do not make mistakes). But if I have to go, then it cannot be true that I go freely. So, in general, if God knows in advance what our actions will be, then none of our actions can be free. Conversely, if some of our actions really are free, then God cannot know in advance what they will be, and hence cannot be omniscient.

This is a good example. But one line of the of answer is that if human freedom contradicteth Divine Essence then Free Will of the Human Being must be denied. May do so. So if one have to chose between Divine Existence and Free Human Will one must select the first and reject the second. But Let the question be reviewed . Let it be think again.

First let is be assumed that Nicholas as a free will to go to London on Tuesday. As Nicholas has the Free Will to Go to London and Not to go to London on Tuesday. So Will Of Nicholas is Free . His Will can chose to Go to London or to Chose Not to go to London on Tuesday. So far so good even to the standard of Nicholas. Now Consider that Nicholas choseth to go to London on Tuesday . This implies that the Will of Nicholas can chose whether to go to London or not to go to London on Tuestay.

Now If the Knowledge of Divine Essence which is since Eternity not just from Monday is studied there are different levels.

1] Divine Essence Knoweth that Nicholas Will Can Chose to Go To London and Can Chose Not to go to London one Tuesday.

So it is well and good and Divine Essence knoweth that Nicholas’ Will Can chose to go to London or not to go to London. That is Divine Essence Eternally Knoweth that Nicholas’ Will is free to chose to go to London or not to go to London on Tueday.

2] Divine Essence also Knoweth that Nocholas shall chose to go to London, that is Nicholas’ Will Shall chose to go to London due to its freedom.

Now the freedom of the Will of Nicholas to Chose to Go to London or Not to Go To London doeth not contradict Divine Omniscience.

The thing which contradicteth is to chose not to go to London on Tuesday. So free will of Nicholas is not contradicteth both one of the Contingent out comes of the free will is Contrdicteth. It must be noted that there is a very wrong concept that one that implieth a Logical Absurdity /Logical Contradiction is it self Logical Absurd. This is incorrect. It may be still Logical Contingent if the implication is Extrinsic and External. It may be noted that rather must be noted that Free Will to Chose Not to go to London on Tuesday doeth not imply to Chose Not to go to London. Other wise Nicholas cannot chose to go to Logon due to this implication, which if is must be intrinsic implication, So if there is no implication of the freedom to chose not to go to London on Tuesday and to chose to Not to go to London on Tuesday there is also no implication of this freedom and the Contradiction of Divine Knowledge. So the question is that in this case:1] The freedom of Nicholas’ Will not to chose to go to London or to Chose Not to go to London On Tuesday doeth not contradict Divine Knowledge . 2] To choose No to go to London or Not to chose to go to London contradicteth the Divine Knowledge. In such conditions the freedom of any Created Rational Suppositum is conserved inregard to Divine Knowledge.

Now the question is that what if Nicholas’ Will chose not to go to London, or doeth not chose to go to London,? In this case it meaneth not that Divine Knowledge becometh wrong and incorrect but it was eternally wrong and incorrect. But if it Was Eternally Correct then Nicholas’ Will can chose not to go to London but shall not chose not to go to London without loss of its freedom.

So it is hoped that the entire problem is based upon some supposed problem in the freedom but there is none.

This line of thought has proved very seductive to many theists. Some have drawn the conclusion that since God is omniscient by Definition 1, he does know our future actions, and hence that we are not really free after all.

Others have said that since we are free, our actions are not knowable in advance, and given that God is omniscient, it follows that Definition 1 of omniscience is faulty: you can be omniscient even if there are things which you do not know.

The author of Reconstruction of Thought In Islam has used this approach . But this is incorrect and is a wrong Idea.

Others again have tried to show that although we are free, God can know in advance what we will do, and hence it is possible to retain Definition 1 after all – at least as far as this problem is concerned. We will argue that theists have been unnecessarily concerned about divine fore-

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knowledge of free action: the two concepts are not in any conflict.

We need first to be clearer about what the issue is supposed to be. The problem is not that the initial argument shows that omniscience is a selfcontradictory concept.

It is accepted that Omniscience is neither Self Contradictory nor a Paradox.

Nor is the problem quite that omniscience is incompatible with the temporal conception of eternity.

An other thing is also accepted that is is not incompatible. This implieth that it is Compatible and Confirmable to Temporal Acts and Events.

More nearly, the problem is supposed to be that omniscience and the temporal conception of eternity and human free will (on a certain understanding of that idea) are incompatible. But even this formulation is not quite right. A better way of putting it is that, as traditionally conceived, the problem is generated by divine foreknowledge of free action (whether or not that is accompanied by omniscience) with an existence in time (whether or not that is existence at all times). Putting it this way enables us to see that the problem does not arise for divine foreknowledge in particular: if it arises at all, it arises for any foreknowledge of free action. If God’s knowledge on Monday of what I will do OMNISCIENCE

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289 on Tuesday is a threat to the freedom of my Tuesday action, then Fred’s similar knowledge on Monday presents an exactly parallel threat to my freedom.

This is correct that if any correct knowledge contradicteth Freedom then this is not necessary Divine, it may be Non Divine as well.

If there is a threat at all, it arises from foreknowledge per se, no matter who has it.

But is there a threat at all? We can present the argument that worries the theist as follows: Argument A (1) God knows on Monday that I will go to London on Tuesday (premise).

(2) Necessarily, if God knows on Monday that I will go to London on Tuesday, then I will go to London on Tuesday (premise). So: (3) Necessarily, I will go to London on Tuesday (from (1) and (2)). So: (4) If I go to London on Tuesday, I do not go freely (from (3)).

But argument A is a simple logical fallacy. In general, one cannot infer ‘Necessarily q’ from the two premises ‘Necessarily if p, then q’ and ‘p’. The necessity of the conditional does not imply the necessity of the consequent, even when the antecedent is true. All that follows from 1 and 2 is (5) I will go to London on Tuesday.

This is correct. How ever a number of scholars did commit this mistake.

The crucial difference between (3) and (5) is the disappearance from (5) of any necessity about my going to London, and hence the disappearance of any threat to my freedom from action from the fact of God’s foreknowledge. It is not as if God’s foreknowledge exerts some irresistible causal

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power that gets a grip of me on Tuesday and forces me to go to London. His foreknowledge exerts no freedom-removing pressure at all. I do not go to London in virtue of God’s foreknowledge; rather, God foreknows in virtue of what I do. If God foreknows that I will do X, then it follows that I do not do not-X. What does not follow is that I cannot do not-X. What knowledge of a proposition requires is the truth of the proposition known; it does not require the necessary truth of the proposition.

We noted above that the problem does not arise specifically from divine foreknowledge. We can now add that it does not even arise from knowledge It must be noted that If Divine Essence Doeth Know that X shall do an act with its free Will then if X doeth it with out free Will implieth a flaw in Divine Knowledge. . For consider the following (bad) argument: Argument B (6) God remembers on Wednesday that I went to London on Tuesday (premise).

Divine Essence Knoweth . To rename the Knoweth by Remembereth is some what problematic. But if it is some thing which meaneth Knoweth then with suitable notes it may be accepted.

(7) Necessarily, if God remembers on Wednesday that I went to London on Tuesday, then I went to London on Tuesday (premise).

The remembering is not a Divine Attribute since Omniscience is Sufficient so the word Remembering may be used in the meaning of Perpetual Divine Knowledge about an event say “To Go To Some Place when a Created Timeal and Spatial Essence Did Go some where in Past”.

So: OMNISCIENCE

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290 (8) Necessarily, I went to London on Tuesday (from (6) and (7)). So: (9) If I went to London on Tuesday, I did not go freely (from (8)).

All that follows from (6) and (7) is that I went to London on Tuesday, not that it was necessary that I went to London on Tuesday. So the argument is invalid. But if Argument A were valid, then Argument B would be too.

That the problem does not spring from epistemic concepts (knowledge, remembrance, etc.). can be seen when we look at the following argument: Argument C (10) It is true on Monday that I will go to London on Tuesday (premise).

(11) Necessarily, if it is true on Monday that I will go to London on Tuesday, then I will go to London on Tuesday (premise). So: (12) Necessarily, I will go to London on Tuesday (from (10) and (11)). So: (4) If I go to London on Tuesday, I do not go freely (from (3)).

If Argument C were sound, it would show that it is mere truth, not specifically foreknowledge, nor divine foreknowledge, nor remembrance, which is incompatible with free action. But of course the argument is hopeless. (3) does not follow from (10) and (11), any more than it follows from (1) and

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(2). All that follows from (10) and (11) is that I will go to London on Tuesday; and that conclusion is compatible with my going freely.

The real source of the pseudo-puzzle about foreknowledge of free action lies in the fact that we can describe events and states of affairs which happen at one time, using descriptions which are true of those events only in virtue of what happens at other times, either earlier or later. Consider the sentence (S) David Hume’s father, Joseph, was born in 1681.

This gives a true description of an event which happened in 1681. However, one of the truth conditions of what it says (namely, that Joseph would later beget David) concerns 1711, the year of David Hume’s birth. But this does not mean that when 1711 arrived, Joseph was somehow compelled to beget David because of the truth (as we can now express it) that David’s father was born in 1681. It is in virtue of Joseph’s begetting David in 1711 that (S) is true; it is not in virtue of the truth of (S) that Joseph did the begetting that he did. Events are truth-makers for propositions; propositions are not necessitators of events.

This is correct so no need of making further discussion on this particular issue. How ever the essence of basis of this objection on the freedom of Will of Created Rational Supposita say Human Being or Jin Being or Angelic Beings (to some extent) is based upon the following controversial principle: Any thing which implieth a Logically Absurd is Logically Absurd or in other sentences “One that Implieth a Logically Absurd is Logically Absurd” or If A Implieth B and B is Logically Absurd then A is also Logically Absurd”.

But these are incorrect Principles and cannot be accepted. If Divine Essence Knoweth that Events ‫ س‬and S are Per Se Contingent, If Divine Essence Knoweth that Event ‫ س‬doeth Occureth and even S doeth not Occur. Now if Event atleast one of the two events ‫ س‬And S is Not Per Se Contingent then this Per Se Implieth that Divine Knowledge is Nescience or Ignorance. But if the Event ‫س‬ Ocurreth Not or Event S Occureth then these Extrinsically Imply a Flaw Upon/In Divine Knowledge or Imperfection Upon/In Divine Knowledge. Accrding to the Rules of Implications , If A Implieth B Intrinsically /Per Se Necessarily/Absolutely/Logically , and B is Per Se Absurd/Logically Absurd then A is also Logically Absurd. But if A Implieth B Extrinsically/Per Se Contigently/ Relatively/ Practically ,B is Per Se Absurd, and there is no additionally Implication which maketh it Per Se Absurd , then it is Per Se Contingent. So it is in Power of Divine and Non Divine Essences. Since the Extrinsic Implications doeth not and can not make of Self Contingent a Self Absurd. Such a mistake was commited by the author of Reconstruction of Thought In Islam when the Author Denied the Divine Knowledge to Cpmprehend each and every thing.

Many theists have tried to show that there is a deeper worry about divine foreknowledge and freedom than this account allows.

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But it is hard to see that there is a real problem here.

OMNISCIENCE

Can God know the truth of indexicals?

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Divine Essence Knoweth Indexicals Divine Essence Doeth Know the events which are expressed by indexical sentences, and sentences are Speech an other Attribute , that is other than Knowledge.

The second category of propositions which arguably present a challenge to the possibility of an omniscient being are those which contain indexical expressions. The problem is this: we are familiar with the thought that for some sentences, whether they say something true is independent of who says them, or when and where they are said. For example, if I say ‘Water boils at 100

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C’, you can express the very same fact by using the very same sentence.

So too can anyone else, and they can use that sentence at any time, and in any place to express the same fact. Or if you say ‘It is better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all’, I can express the very same thought by using the very same sentence – and again, where and when I or anyone else uses that sentence makes no difference to the fact which we thereby state. By contrast, there are other sentences which are such that whether the sentence says something true depends essentially on when or where or by whom it is said.

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An Indexical may be defined as :- a : varying in reference with the individual speaker <the indexical words I,he,she,it, there here, now,then etc. > It is also used in the meaning “

associated 2.

with or identifying an individual speaker < indexical features of speech> For Example if a Per Se Contingent Created Rational Essence C1 saith “I Am I Am ,the Word I is used for C1. If and other Per Se Contingent Created Rational Essence C2 Saith I Am I Am , the word I in this case is used for C2 and not for C1. But the same Occurrence[Va:qi”] in the meaning “C1 Is C1 Is” canbe Expressed by C2 either is “C1 Is C1 “or “It is It is”. So the problem with these Pronouns is that they are Variables and their subject may change from Speaker of the sentence to the Speaker of the Sentence.

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The Occurrence or the Truth or Reality is Constant and same yet the sentences expressing and sentencing them may vary from Speaker to Speaker.

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The same words may mean differently in different sentences spoken or written or expressed or sentenced by different speaker, that is their subjects may be subject of change and variation.

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For example, if you say ‘I am hot’, I cannot state the same fact by using the same sentence. I have to say not ‘I am hot’ but ‘You are hot’.

If one Essence C1 saith that It is hot or warm or cold or wet etc the VERY same event cannot be expressed by the very same pronoun I by an other Essence say C2. The Essence C2 hath to use sentences like “C1 is Hot” or “It is Hot” or “He /She is Hot” etc.

But one thing must be clarified once for all . They all do represent one and the same Occurrence. So it must be noted and remarked that a Single Object of Knowledge is known to different Knowers yet they express them by different sentences. So the Sentences of Speech differ from one another. But not the known. So the problem is with the Attribute of Speech and not with the Attribute of Knowledge. This meaneth that once and the sam event cannot be expressed and cannot be sentenced by two Knowers if it in one ane Same Sentence. If the shall attempt to express it by once and same or similar sentences and if one of the sentence spoken by any one of the two is true and other is false. That is one known event cannot be expressed by two different Knowers of the Event. The problem is in the Attribute of Speech and not in the Attribute of Knowledge.

Again, if you say today ‘Today it is raining’, and I want to express the same thought tomorrow, I cannot use the same sentence you used (another sentence token of the same type): The problem of these types of sentences is that an event cannot be stated or sentenced by same words and sentences and speech(es).But this does not mean that Divine Essence doeth not know these events. Suppose that X is standing at time t0. Let it be supposed that He Said that “I am Standing” at time t0. Let is be supposed tha Y said for X “He is Standing at time T0” or “X is Standing” at time t0. So Y cannot use the sentence used by X, for X. What does this means . It only means that different sentences are relative to their speakers but the correspond to one and same truth. Divine Essence Knoweth that X is standing at t0. It also

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Knoweth that X said the sentence “I am Standing” at time t0. So there is no problem of the knowledge, as for as the truth of the sentence is known. It is the confusion of speech and knowledge, two different attributes.

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I have to use a different sentence and say ‘Yesterday, it was raining’ – just as the weather forecaster expressing yesterday the same thought, has to use yet another sentence and say ‘Tomorrow it will rain’.

Words that have this feature (what they refer to, and hence the truth of sentences containing them, depends essentially on the user, or the time and place of utterance) are called indexicals, and sentences in which they occur are indexical sentences.

This is a proof that while the event is constant , the sentences describing and sentencing them are different depending upon different setencers and speakers. In other sentence one and the same event is signified by different sentences depending upon different speakers. The Event is Absolutely Identical yet the sentences are different. In this case a different may be pointed out when the event hath occurred and when it is occurring. So this difference can be known to Divine Essence, Since if an event is occurring and when it is not occurring are two different types of events. If Presentists view is taken, the event is gone out of Existence and Hath been annihilated . Annihilation of an event is another event. So if event is not existing at some time t0 then Divine Per Se Subsistent Existent Knoweth that the Event hath occurred and is not Existing. The connection of Divine Knowledge with the Created Time and the Created event in time doeth exist. It is not the case that as Divine Kowledge is beyond Time it hath no connection/relation with things in time and the very time that is not in an other time.

It seems that corresponding to indexical sentences (to some at least, and perhaps to all) there is a non-indexical sentence (or perhaps several such sentences) which says very roughly the same thing as the indexical. To see what these non-indexicals are like, let us first introduce the idea of a tenseless verb form.

The introduction of tenseless verb [some time Mad:ari” is used to shew it] is a good thing yet it does not prove what is intended and attempted to be proved.

Let us use the present tense form to mean not just ‘is now . . . ’ but ‘is, was, or will be’. For example, instead of saying ‘I am hot’, I could say ‘Everitt is (timelessly) hot on 17 March 2003 at 5.23 p.m.’ or ‘The lecturer speaking in room 3.02 on the 76th day of 2003 is hot’ or ‘The only person standing in room 3.02 of the Arts Block, UEA at 5.30 p.m. on St Patrick’s Day 2003 is (timelessly) hot’.

Everitt is not Timelessly Hot rather Erevitt is Hot in Time η , Yet is Knowledge is A Beyond Time Attribe Of Divine Essence. So it must be noted that Knowledge of an Event in Time May be Beyond Time , and this cannot be sentenced as “Everitt is timelessly Hot. Rather It is Known that Everitt is (Hot in any ) Time η and the Knowledge this Knowledge is Per Se Beyond Time.

Divine Essence and Divine Attribute of Knowledge is beyond time and space yet Divine Essence Knoweth Indexicals in Time and Space. However There is a difference between to Know Things in Time and Space Beyond Time and and Act Timelessly in Time and Space. If some one is Hot or Warm timelessly on x Monday 17 of some Year this means he is timelessly hot or warm in Time. This is an other thing. If Divine Essence Knoweth Beyond time that a Timeal Essence is Hot on Monday 17 th March 2017 then this is an other thing . This is to Know Time and things embedded in Time yet being Time.

These would be nonindexical sentences which say very roughly what the original indexical sentence said; and they are sentences which you or anyone else could use now or at any other time to state very roughly the same fact that I was stating when I used the indexical. Let us call such sentences ‘the correlates’ of the corresponding indexical sentence.

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In Theological Discussions Present Tense is often used in Beyond Time Truths and Realities. Like Divine Essence is One. In the Eternity Divine Essence is alone . Some time Past Tense is also used for Beyond Tense meaning. Like In the Eternity there was no one with Divine Essence. Some time even future tense is also used in the very same meaning, EG. If Divine Essence annihilates Every Contingent Essence the Divine Essence Shall Be Alone. Know it must be noted that if ‫ ع‬is an Event in time T and C is a Created Essence at time T. As the Knowledge K of the Created Essence is also in time T , The C can say in a continuous sentence that “Event ‫ ع‬is Occurring Now”. As the knowledge of C is also Per Se Contingent then the Knowledge of the Contingent Essence Per Se Contingent not to Exist. If it doeth not Exist then there is no influence or effect on the Event ‫ ع‬. This shews that Occurance of the event is independent of the K of C. So Divine Knowledge Knoweth the event that is independent of the Knowledge K of the Essence C. The only difference is that the Knowledge K is in time if it existeth and Divine Knowledge is beyond time. So there is no thing /Event that is in Non Divine Knowledge but not in Divine Knowledge. If the event would have been in Non Divine Knowledge not in Divine Knowledge then this would have been a valid argument. But it is not so. Additionally the Non Divine Knowledge is also in Divine Knowledge, not as a Divine Attribute but as a Known of the Divine Knowledge. So Divine Essence knoweth not only the event but also the Knowledge of the Non Divine Essence about the event ‫ ع‬. Sothere is no occurrence/event not known to Divine Knowledge. Hence the objection is incorrect. It has been stated above that if the Eternal Knowledge knoweth not an event as a Non Eternal Knowledge then it knoweth the event as an Eternal Knowledge. So the negation is of the state/act of Knowing as a non Eternal Knowledge. This does shew that Not Knowing as a Imperfect Knowledge is no event. But even then it is Known, Since to know as a Non Eternal and Imperfect Knowledge is Per Se Absurd Upon Divine Essence and upon Divine Knowledge,yet Divine Essence Knoweth each and every Absurd including it. So it is also known as the Eternal Knowledge Knoweth any Absurd Per SE. So there is no Event Left. The word “Now” only means that the Contingent Knowledge , the Contingent Knower, the Contingent Event and Contingent Relations of the event to the Contingent Knowledge of the Contingent Knower all are in one and same Contingent Time. It must be noted that the connections and relations of the Contingent Event to the Contingent Knowledge are different from the relations and connections of Eternal Knowledge , but as the relations and connections of the contingent knowledge are imperfect they imply imperfection of the Contingent Knowledge and are implied from it [Bi-implication/Tala:zum].

But if so then the objection becometh that if Divine Knowledge is not Imperfect then it is not Omniscience. This meaning of Omniscience is never used by theists in general. So the result is that the Divine Knowledge Knoweth the Event at it is and is beyond time. So this does not mean that Divine Knowledge doeth not know the event. It only meaneth that “Only it Knoweth The Event Perfectly”. This is a fallacy and an allusion of mind that None Divine Essence knows thing not known to Divine Essence. When discussed and analyzed there is no thing that is Known by Non Divine Essence but Not Known By Divine Essence. It is shewn above and may be shewn below that there is nothing no event that is not in Divine Essence but in Non Divine ESSENCE. Now the timeless verb invented can express the idea that the Knower is not in any time and Transcendenteth all Logically Contingent Times and Logically Contingent Dimensions of time. So if so then the speaker can sentence these types of sentences. Since the time and the event in time do exist . Time does exist in no time. Now knowing that Divine Essence Knoweth the every same event being Beyond time, this means that one and the same event is known to two different Knowers, one in time who/which when use the word Now use in the meaning that it/he/she is also in time, the other one Who/Which if uses the Word Know Maketh a Necessary Exception for Itself/Himself from being in Time. How ever as time it self is not in any other time otherwise there is implied in infinite series such that each and every time is in an other time, Divine Essence can use the word Now in a meaning which implieth that the Speaker and the Knower is Beyond time. But even this doeth not imply that Divine Essence doeth not know some thing. So the question is what thing/which thing is not known to Divine Essence, if the Divine Essence is not in any time. The answer is there is nothing. If other views about time are taken the time-less or beyond time existent may use the word Now by the difference of past present and future. How ever if time is itself Non Existent and just a supposition things become wrse for the Anti Divine Objection Makers. Perhaps what ws initially intended by the learned objection makers was that if Divine Essence saith “Now” it meaneth the event is in no time, but it is in time. When the same word is spoken or written in a speech by a Non Divine Essence that is in time it meaneth that the event is in time. But it is not implied. As it is explained above to express an event in a sentence is one thing and to know an event is an other thing. It must be noted that expressing an event say E1 in a sentence is an other event say E2. The Knowledge of these events is some thing that is neither.

It is an obvious truth that we express much of the knowledge that we have using indexical sentences.

There is a difference between Knowledge and Expressions of Knowledge. These are two different things.To confuse two Attributes Nounly Knowledge and Speech [Sentence] is incorrect and wrong.

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There is a difference between an event in time and its relation to a Finite Created Non Eternal Non Absolute Knowledge in tine and relations of the very same event in time to an Infinite Uncreated Eternal and Absolute Knowledge that is Beyond [Ma: Vara:’] all Times [‘Azzama:n’Al Vaqt]. The former stated knowledge is Imperfect and latter stated Knowledge is Perfect.

And we can divide these indexicals into three main groups: personal indexicals, spatial indexicals, and temporal indexicals, thus: (1) personal: I, me, mine, you, yours, he/she, his/hers, etc.

If a Rational Essence that is in time is feeling some pain the Rational Essence can say that “I am Feeling pain” But if another Rational Essence that is also in time saith the same event it may say “It/He/She is feeling pain”.Sentences are different but the signify one and the same event. So in this case the event is known but the sentences expressing this one and same event may differ relative to different expressor. But such differences does not imply that one event is known by one Knower is not known by an other knower. How ever in practical one who feels the pain knows it more perfectly [relative perfection] then the one who is not feeling it. Yet knowing the pain of the other with out being a subject of any pain ;AND knowing it equally as the feeler of the pain knows is Logically Contingent and not Logically Absurd. Unfortunately this is an issue that is beyond the scope of this discussion. So to save one self from entering an other debate it is assumed to be true. Sine feeling is just a source of knowledge. Same knowledge can be obtained and attained by different sources not necessarily practical but just Not Logically Absurd. There is Logical Absurdity it it.

(2) spatial: here, there, to the left, to the right, nearer, further, this, that, etc.

Now it is an other problem that must be discussed in required detail with the minimum requirement considered.

If a thingT is on the right side of a Rational body Essence B1 in time the Rational Essence may say “It is on my Right Side”. But the very same sentence cannot be said by an other Rational Essence B2 of same type to which it is on the left side. So this means that the relative approach of different sentencers and staters may be imperfect approaches to an event. In the case of Divine Essence the Divine Per Se Subsistent Existent the location of the body in Space yet the Divine Essence does not expresseth it by saying that “It is on my right side or it is on my left side” . Since Divine Essence is beyond all Spaces. So the thing is neither to the left side of the Divine Essence nor on the right side of the Divine Essence. If Divine Essence saith so then it shall be a false statement/sentence. But it does Not mean that None Divine Essences Know some thing which Divine Essence Doeth Not Know. Additionally Divine Essence Knoweth that it is on the right side of B1 and left side of B2. Divine Essence additionally Knoweth what so ever is known by B1 and B2 and repective Knowledges of each one of B1 and B2 in ABOUT the Body T[Assuming that the thing T is also a Body]. So there is nothing which canbe pointed out as known to atleast one Non Divine Essence yet Not Known to the Divine Essence. Even if B1 andB2 if both of them do cease to have the Attribute of Knowledge and do become Nescient simultaneously and immediately , even then there is no event and no occurrace not known to Divine Essence what so ever. It is just an illusion of mind that there is something not known to Divine Essence yet when studied clearly there is no such event as supposed to be out of the Divine Attribute of Knowledge. So there is nothing not known to Divine Essence whether there are some Non Divine Essences [at least one] to Know there Spetial Things Spatially specially or there is none.

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Indexicals are imperfect representations or Expressions of Imperfect Knowledges of Finite Essences. Attempts to deny Absolute Knowledge ogf Divine Essence on the bases of Indexical Things and Indexical Events are incorrect , since they are based on incorrect conception of Indexicals them selves.

(3) temporal: now, in the past, in the future, today, yesterday, tomorrow, soon, and all tensed verbs.

This is the basic problem and it is discussed on primarily basis in this discussion.

With these preliminaries, we can now raise the question about divine omniscience: on the timeless conception of divine eternity, can God know the

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truths which we know when we express our knowledge using temporal indexical sentences?

In Principle Divine Essence Knoweth them Necessarily and Essentially. The problem is not in Knowing them but in expressing them.

Althouth it appears to be a confusion in the mind of the learned objecton maker it is hidden delirately.

The difficulty is this: Suppose I say ‘It is now raining’. I can know that

that says something true, in part because I am a being in time who can produce the sentence at one time (when it is raining) and not at an earlier or later time (when it is not raining). But if God is timeless, he cannot do anything at a time .

Divine Essence and Divine Essential Attributes are beyond all Possible Dimensions of time but Divine Acts are not Necessary Beyond time. According to some time itself is a Divine Act. So to claim that Divine Essence if timeless rather beyond time so Divine Essence cannot do any thing in time is a claim with out any Proof. How ever to say some thing IS A DIFFERENT CASE AND IT MUST BE DISCUSSED. Suppose that an event E0 is occurring at time T0. Suppose that there is a Created Essence B0. Let the B0 Knoweth at the time T0 that the event E0 is occurring at time T0. Now B0 cans say “Event E0 is Occurring Now”. But the Knowledge of B0 is Per Se Contingent. So it is Per Se Contingent that B0 Knoweth that event E0 is occurring, and it is Per Se Contingent that the B0 doeth not Know that the Event E0 is not Occurring. This implietht that the occurrence of E0 is independent of the Knowledge of the Created Essence. It may know or it may not know. This sheweth that the occurrence of the event E0 is independent of the knowledge of K0 of B0.So if the same event E0 is known by Divine Essence by the Eternal Beyond time Knowledge , the thing E0 in the Non Divine Knowledge is also in Divine Knowledge. The word now in any sentence is not the part of the event E0. So as far as the event E0 is concern there is not a single thing that is known to the Non Divine Essence and Not Known to Divine Essence. Now let it be seen that the knowledge of B0 say K0 about the event is also known by Divine Essence. Divine Knowledge not only comprehendeth the theven occurring but also the knowledge of the Non Divine Essence that E0 is occurring now. But know is not the part of the event. It is the part of the knowledge about the event. So it is not known as a part of the event. So there is nothing that is known to Non Divine Essence but not nown to Divine Essence. So this alleged argument against Divine Omniscience faileth and is invalid. So if it is raining in time t0 and Divine Essence is Beyond time ,Divine Essence can say the very same sentence in the meaning that the event of raining is in time which may be considered as present in some respect. Once again it is the problem of once view about time ,whether he considereth Past as future as non existents or considers them as existents. Of course Divine Essence doeth not mean that the event of raing is not in any time what so ever.

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In particular, he cannot even have the thought ‘It is raining Now As it is stated above : There is a difference between an event in time and its relation to a Finite Created Non Eternal Non Absolute Knowledge in tine and relations of the very same event in time to an Infinite Uncreated Eternal and Absolute Knowledge that is Beyond [Ma: Vara:’] all Times [‘Azzama:n’Al Vaqt]. The former stated knowledge is Imperfect and latter stated Knowledge is Perfect. If it is raining then Divine Essence Knoweth the event the Non Divine Essence also knows this event only the relations and connections are different .

So this is just am illusion of mind that there is some thing/event Not Known By Divine Essence. Yet there is none. The objection is really based on the weak basis of an other claim that if Divine Knowledge doeth not have the same type of connections which the Non Divine Knowledges have then this implieth that Divine Essence Doeth not Know the event. But this is incorrect. This only means that if Perfect Knowledge is not imperfect it is not a Omniscience. This is a fallacy. One must see that: The formally stated Knowledge [i.e of Non Diivne Essence] is imperfect and Latter Stated Knowledge [i.e of Divine Essence] is Perfect. So the Created Essence Knows the event imperfectly and Uncreated Essence Knoweth the Event Perfectly. The word Now, and other indexicals used by the Non Divine Essence implies imperfection. Negation of intrinsic Attributes of Imperfections in case of Non Divine Knowledges is necessary from Perfect Knowledge. Omniscience doeth not mean that imperfections of Non Divine Knowledge are associated with Perfect Knowledge. However Perfect Knowledgfe knoweth imperfections. To to Imperfections is one

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thing and to be imperfect is another thing. So this revert to its basic principle [‘As:l/‘Us:u:l] that “If Perfect Knowledge is not imperfect then it is not Perfect. This claim is incorrect in itself. This is If B A is not Not B then then it is Not B. This is a fallacy. ’, and hence he cannot think that thought to be true, or know it to be true.

The problem is multifold. Is thought /Idea a Divine Attribute? It is a controversial issue.

But still there are some question. One of them is that if it is , even then it must be different from Divine Knowledge. So with out this thought Divine Knowledge can comprehend the event.

This is a point which needs to be discussed in some detail.

Suppose that there is a Per Se Contingent Created Rational Essence say E1 in/at TIME t0 . Suppose that it is raining at time t0.

Suppose that E1 saith “ It is raining” or more explicitly “It is raining Now”. A Declarative Assertive / Declarative Affirmative Sentence. So it meaneth that “ At time t0 it is raining and the Speaker/Sentencer of the Sentence of Speech, Its/his/her Knowledge all are in the time t0.

Now an any Speaker or Sentencer whether it be C1 or another one say C2 which/who is in time t1 such that t0<t1 saith the same event , the Essence saith “It was raining” or more explicitly “It was raining then” or even more explicitly “It was raining at time t0”. The event or Occurrence is one and the same, so it is known by a number of Mutually Distinct Essences yet one and the same event is expressed by different Sentences.

The word “Now” is used to express that the Speaker , the Sentence , Knowledge of the Speaker and the Event all are in one and the same time say t0.

Now The very same event of raining is Known to Divine Essence. How ever the Divine Essence does not Signifieth it by the sentence which includeth the word Now in the very same meaning. So as for as Divine Knowledge is concern It knoweth to the very same occurrence yet the sentence is different. So the sentence if used by the Divine Essence with the word “Now” must have a Per Se Necessary Exception for the Divine Essence and the Divine Essential Attribute Of Knowledge. So any thing which is known by the Essence C1 is also Known by Divine Essence. The difference is in the type of Knowledge. The Knowledge of Created Essence is Finite, Created, Relative, Timeal ,and Not Eternal, and the Knowledge of Divine Essence is Infinite, Uncreated, Absolute, Beyond Time and Eternal. So the type of Knowledge is different but Knowns are the same. So the any thing in Non Eternal Knowledge is also in Eternal Knowledge . Objection would have been valid if some thing in Non Divine Knowledge be not in Divine Knowledge. But this is not the case.

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We may concede for the moment (although I will later challenge this concession) that he can think, and know to be true, one or more correlates of that indexical sentence.

Many things including this challenge shall be studied critically.

He can think to himself and know to be true the non-indexical sentence ‘It is (timelessly) raining on 17 March at 5.15 p.m.’.

But he cannot know the very thing that I know when I know ‘It is now raining’; This is an old claim in new form. The claim is that Divine Essence cannot know the events in time. The word thought is some thing other then knowledge. The question is whether Thought is a Divine Attribute or it is not is an other issue, but How can it be said that it is Per Se Absurd that the Divine Essence knoweth the very same thing that Nicholas knoweth when it is raining. The thing which is the Nicholas’ Knowledge is not the Knowledge of Divine Essence but the Known of Divine Essence and Divine Knowledge.

Things must be seen in this perspective. When Nicholas says “ It is raining” at any given time say t0 and the sentence is true , then Divine Essence also Knoweth that it is raining at time t0 and that Nicholas’s is saying that it is raining at time t0. So which thing skipeth from Divine Knowledge, which is presented as Divine Essence cannot know.

It may be repeated that Divine Essence doeth know the very same event exactly at it is , and the Non Divine Essence also Knoweth it. The only difference is in the type of Knowledge.

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As Divine Essence Knoweth the same event which the Non Divine Essence in Time Knows, so as for the event is concern it is known by both alike. Now the problem is to express by sentences. Where as a Non Divine Timeal Essence can express it by saying “ It is raining Now at 5.15 on March April” Divine Essence can express the very same event by other types of sentences. Keeping the Event of Raining as Constant and fixed there is no question that Divine Essence Knoweth Not what that the Non Divine Essence Knows. But the problem is that the Divine Essence cannot Express with the same sentence. So a sentence is not an Attribute of Knowledge but of Speech. At best it is a problem of Omniscpeech and not of Omniscience. It can be restated as follow: The Divine Essence and the Non Divine Essence both know one and the same event say the event of raining but the Divine Essence cannot Express the event by a sentence in which the word “Now” existeth as a part of the Sentence if the meaning of the Sentence is true.

As the Per Se Contingency of Speaking a False Statement is accepted by Majority of ‘Ahlussunnah since they believe that ‘Al Kala:m ‘Al Lafz:i: is Temporal , so this is no problem. Divine Essence is not an Omnispeaker in regard to Divine Verbal Speech [‘Al Cala:m ‘Al Lafz:i:]. So this is a different thing. for he cannot know the truth which I could express by saying ‘It is now 5.15 p.m. on 17 March’.

The truth is conserved but the same truth is expressed as It is raining at 5.15pm on March 19 of year Z CE. So the very same truth is expressed as stated above. How ever the word now implieth the fact of at this or that time. Divine Essence doeth know that Nicholas uses the stated sentence to express the event. It must be known that truth and realities are truth and realities even if no sentence is used for them .So if it is raining at the given time or stated above time and no one says it in any sentence what so ever , it is still true and real. So change of sentences does not implieth chabge of truth and realities.

These sentences all signify one and same reality and truth what so ever it may be. If a truth or a reality cannot be expressed by the sentence which is used by a Sentencer A or Speaker A by any other Sentencer or Speaker say B, it does mean that it is the problem of Speech(es) and Sentences but not of Knowledge. So the truth is known yet the very same Speech if Spoken cannot be used by any other Sentencer or Speaker.

So there are truths which a timeless being could not know.

This is just an incorrect claim. One must disagree from respected Nicholas . The Truth is Known to Divine Essence but it cannot be expressed by these types of sentences unless and otherwise they become false. The reason is that the words like “Now” in these sentences imply that the Knower, the Knowledge of the Knower, the Event, and the relation of event with the knowledge all are in time and in one and same time. As Divine Essence is Eternal and not Sempiternal this type of sentence if spoken by Divine Existence is false. Although Divine Essence can speak a false statement in regard to ‘Al Cala:m ‘Al Lafz:i: yet in these meanings the statement is false. But once again one and the same event is known by the Knower That is Beyond time With the Knowledge that is Beyond Time, and the Knower that is in time with the knowledge that is in time.

3] If events have no identity of their own then this means that they violate law of identity. This may be the reason some did try to deny Law of Identity or atleast tried to find some Exceptions where the law is not valid. But Indexicals do obey them. So if there is no unique identity of an Indexical Event/Thing X then it means that they are purely relative and it changes its identity relative to different Essences or Knowledges of different Essences or both. So if an Indexical Event/Thing E is Ea relative to an Essence A , and Eb relative to the Essence B , then it is not Eb in relation to A and not Ea in relation to Essence B. So what is the result? Ea and Eb are just relatively Identical. Now this is the only thing that an Indexical Thing/Event can be. There is nothing C that is Absolutely Identical to E. So in this case the following approaches are necessary. The real Identity of the Event /Thing E is in relation to Divine Essence I or Divine Knowledge K of Divine Essence. Now every thing is clear that Divine Essence or Divine Knowledge that is the Divine Essential Attribute of Divine Knowledge is the Real Identity.

However in this case one may say that Divine Essence Knoweth Indexical X as E and all the Non Divine Essences knew it as Ei relative to their Selves say Yi , the knowledges of Eyi say Ki’s are all imperfect Knowledges. How ever Divine Essence doeth Know the Knowledge Ki of each and every Non Divine Essence as well. With is approach indexicals are not a problem at all for the Divine Absolute Knowledge , whether the Relations are in relation to these essences, times, spaces or else.

So, no being can be both timeless and omniscient; so, God does not exist (on the timeless interpretation of his eternity).

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This is an incorrect result against Omniscience. To be Beyond Time doeth not Contradict to be Omniscience. A Beyond Time Existing Divine Essence is Omniscient Essence With Intrinsic Necessity.To be beyond time is one thing and to “not to know” any thing in Time is another thing and there is no implication like If One is Beyond Time then that Once cannot know things /events in time.

[Cannot meaneth Per Se Absurd I this particular Sentence]” .

A parallel argument applies to sentences with spatial indexicals.

An Proofs have been provided above as a definite and certain that this is incorrect conception .See immediate Above.

The idea that any Essence that is Beyond Time cannot know any Thing /Event in Time as an Essence that is in Time Knoweth the Thing/Event is based on False and Fallacious Ideas taken as Preliminaries. Analyzation of these type of arguments does shew that such arguments are based on the suppositions taken as bases that Timeal Relations of the Essence and the Event/Thing in Time are Necessary Conditions in order to Know the Thing/Event in Time. If these Conditions are not satisfied then then the Knowledge of the said event /thing is Per Se Absurd. But these Relations are not the Necessary Conditions of Knowing any thing in Time. So the Principle upon which such arguments are based taking it as the basis is basically Wrong and Incorrect. So all those arguments based on this basis are incorrect and wrong since any thing based on an incorrect basis is wrong. Similarly it cane be argued in case of space that Spatial Relations are not Necessary Conditions as assumed in correctly. Those who are interested to see in written form are humbly requested to write themselves as an exercise.

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We have (at any one time) one and only one spatial position: we are not everywhere, and we are not nowhere. It is in relation to the position of the speaker/thinker (the producer of the token sentence) that terms like ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘to the left/right’, ‘over there’, ‘in front of me’, ‘behind me’, etc. are to be understood.

The words like here ,there, where, everywhere ,right, left etc. are relatives in space and are used to state special spatial relations.

These are parts of imperfect knowledges of imperfect Non Divine Essences. Let it be seen what are the Nicholas’ Objections in regard to Spatial Terms.

So if I say ‘ This building is on fire’ or ‘ Here is where the fire is’, I can say something true, because I can have a spatial relationship to the fire.

But the meaning of the word here implies that the Speaker and the event both are in Space or Space-Time Manifold or simply the Word Here implies that the Speaker, the event and the grammatical Object of the Transitive act all are in Time and Space, the every same meaning is known by Divine Essence exactly as it is, yet the choice of sentence whether it be an Declarative Assertive Sentence or Declarative Negative Sentence cannot be the same. Since if Divine Essences Uses the same Sentence to Express the very same Meaning this must imply that Divine Essence is also In Time or In Space or Both or in Time-Space Manifold. But Divine Essence is Per Se Beyond and Per Se Transcendent to Time , Space and Time Space Manifold. So Divine Essence may use a different Sentence. Yet there is nothing which the Created Rational Essence in Created Time and Created Space Knows which Uncreated Per Se Beyond Time and Per Se Transcendent Space Divine Essence Knoweth Not. So it is clear that the word implies some thing say a condition that is not found in Divine Essence say not satisfied by Divine Essence. So these implication are some thing extra from the piece of Knowledge of the event speaking strictly with out addition of any thing else. So these implications are addition to the meaning . So these Sentences cannot be used to refute the Divine Omniscience.

If I am to know to be true that here is where the fire is, then I must be located in the vicinity of the fire.

Once again one may dispute from this claim. This there is no implication between Knowing a Spatial or Timial thing and to be the Spatial or Timeal Thing.The claim of Such an Implication is incorrect. If no implication then all the alleged claims and argumentations/proofs become false and wrong respectively,which are presented by Nicholas Everitt in this regard.

One must analy But a being who was non-spatial could not be

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located in the vicinity of anything, and hence could not know what I know when I know that the fire is here.

Once again the Attributes of Speech/Sentence is confused by Attribute of Knowledge. Such confusions do not contradict Divine Omniscience. The next thing is that the defective,Imperfect and flawed Created Knowledges are different from Perfect and Uncreated Knowledge. What are said for some types of Knowledges are Finite , Flawed, Imperfect, Timed and Ctreated.

Omniscience doeth not mean that it is a Summation of all types of Knowledges. Rather is may be defined as follwow: IT IS A KNOWLEDGE. So this is a very incorrect conception. If there is some thing that is Known by a Contingent Created Essence in Contingent Created Time , it is Known to Uncreated Divine Essence Beyond it time. Only thing is that the Knowledgge of Contingent Essence is Imperfect and the Knowledge of Necessary Essence is Perfect. So if one supposes a classes of knowns of both Essences it is if any thing belongeth to the class of knowns of the contingent essence is belongeth to the class of knowns of Necessary Essence. The only difference is that there are more known elements . It must be noted that this is considered as knowing some thing in addition by the learned objection makers and this is incorrect.

It is assumed by the learned critic of Divine Essence that in order to Known an Event in Time or Space or Both it is Necessary to be in Time and space or to be located in some time and in some space. This is a claim which requireth a Proof. But to infer from the use of the the words like Here ,There, Where, Left, Right, Front ,Behind, Up, Down etc. is incorrect. As it is discussed above and may be discussed below since these are just the representations of Knowledge not the Real Knowledge It Self. Knowledge of Per Se Contingent Essences are imperfect analogues of Divine Knowledge. For example Divine Essence Knoweth that there is a Rational Essence E1 in Time T1 and an Event Occureth in Time T2 such that T1= T2 the very Knowledge is expressed by the Non Divine Essence E1 as follow:- “ The Event E1 is Occuring Now “. Similarly if there is a Non Divine Essence in Space S1 and a Body B1 is in Space B2 such that |S1-S2| >0 , is small [ i.e the distance between S1 and S2 is very small] then E1 can represent Knowledge as follow:=”It is Near Me”. But there is really nothing as assumed by the learned critic of Divine Knowledge that is Not Known to Divine Essence but Known the Non Divine Essence E1.

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Further, a being whose spatial relationship to the fire was exactly the same as his spatial relationship to everything else in the universe (because he was equally present everywhere) could not know any such thing.

This is based upon the very idea that each an every thing/event which is Indexical has infinite different Attributes/Properties/Qualities and a Essence in Time or Space Can Know Only and Only One of them.

Once again it is presupposed that If Some One Knows and Event or Thing In Time or Space or both or in Space Time Manifold and is it Self in some of them or all of them, then any thing Else if Knoweth it Exactly Alike the former thing , it must have the very same relations. But this is Just an Axiom of Nicholasian System of arguments, It is rejected. If rejected then all the arguments based on it do fail Necessarily.

This is incorrect. Additionally Divine Knowledge is not Unconnected and Unrelated, rather it is Connected and Related With the Time, Events/Things In Time, Space and Things In Space.

Again, we can for the moment concede in this context that God can think, and know to be true, one or more correlates of that indexical sentence.

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The word Can in this case If Implieth Per Se Contingency , then it means that Divine Attribute of Thinking /Idea is Not Eternal. And this is a Problem, It cannot not be accepted. If Thinking/Thought/Idea is an Attribute of Divine Essence then it must be Eternal, so this concept is rejected by theists eeven prior to atheists in general.

He can think to himself and know to be true the non-indexical sentence ‘It is raining in Norwich’. But he cannot know the very thing that I know when I in Norwich know ‘It is raining here’; for he cannot know the truth which I could express by saying ‘Norwich is here’. The problem thus arises from the fact that God’s relationship to space (being either everywhere or nowhere) is of the wrong sort to allow him to know to be true sentences which contain spatial indexicals.

One may refer to Preliminary G . These are discussed there in Essene and in Substance. It may be noted that the Learned Critic of Divine Knowledge does assume that in order to know an Indexical that is in Time and Space as Known by a Non Divine Essence in Time and Space the the Necessary Condition rather Per Se Necessary Condition is to have the very same timeal and spatial relations. Other wise the KLnowledge is either diffent or there is no knowledge of the Event at all. This is an incorrect supposition.

Perhaps provable in the Axiom System of Nicholas Everitt’s system but either not provable or disprovable in Theological systems.

Respected Critic of Divine Knowledge Nicholas Everitt considers the Imperfect Relations as Some Unique type of Knowledge Known to a Unique Non Divine Essence. But this cannot be accepted. Such a Consideration is proof less and unproved.

So there are truths which a nonspatial being could not know.

This claim with all its attempted proofs is wrong.

So, no being can be both non-spatial and omniscient; so, God does not exist (on the non-spatial interpretation of his omnipresence).

There is no proof that Divine Essence Doeth Not Know Indexicals. All the attempts only Shew that Divine Knowledge is different from Non Divine Knowledges and Knowledges of different Essences are Events Separate from the event that is Known by them and they are separate events themselves separate from the event that is known by them. So there is no negation of Divine Knowledge as assumed by Nichoas Everitt.

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Let us turn finally to personal indexicals. I can know certain things about myself and express them using personal indexicals – for example, I now have a slight ache in my leg, I am thinking of divine omniscience, I am looking forward to dinner, and so on. As before, we can provisionally allow that God can know the non-indexical correlates of these things I know. He can know, for example, ‘Everitt has a slight ache’ or ‘The lecturer in lecture theatre 3.02 has a slight ache’ etc. But since he cannot know that I am Everitt nor that I am the lecturer in room 3.02, it again turns out that there is a range of facts which I can know but God cannot.

This is one of the greatest fallacies ever commited even if there is no Divine Essence at all. Let there be a Non Divine Rational Essence S i.e Suppostum. Let it hath the Property/ Attribute P [say Pain] which is the Event as well in this case. Let this Essence Knoweth the the Attribute P. Now this Non Divine Rational Essence can say “I have the Attribute P”. Now the same event is Known to Divine Essence. But Divine Essence Knoweth it as follow: The None Divine Rational Essence S Hath the Attribute P. But as the Divine Essence is NOT the Non Divine Essence P, Divine Essence Knoweth that He/It [Divne Essence] is not the Non Divine Essence S, He/It [Divine Essence]Doeth not Posses the Attribute P. In case of Everitt Divine Essence Knoweth that He/It is not Ervitt ,He/It is Not the Lecturer in the Room at time x,at any time t. Divne Essence doeth not know that He is Everitt Since to know it is not Knowledge but a Compound Ignorence. Since it is incorrect that Divine Essence is Nicholas Ervitt. So the thing that is incorrect if known then it is ignorance. Raither Divine Essence Knoweth He is not the lecturer. How ever Divine Essence Knoweth that He/It is not the Lecturer in the room, He / Is Not Ervit. Talking more clearly there are two Only Logical Possibilities. Either Divine Essence is Ervitt or Divine Essence is not Ervitt. If Divine Essence is Ervitt then Divine Essence Must Know that He/It is Ervitt. If Divine Essence is not Ervitt then Divine Essence Must Know that He is Not Ervitt. Now if Divine Essence is not Ervitt then Divine Essence Knoweth that He Is Not Ervitt. If A is Not B then Not to Know A is B is not some thing which implieth Negation of Divine Omniscience.

Raither in this case to Know A is B is an Absolute Complex Ignirence, and Not Knowledge at all.

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But let it be suppose that Divine Essence Knoweth it then what is implied? It is implied that Divine Essence is Everitt . This is Per Se Absurd. It must be noted that if Divine Essence is Not Everitt [Noun of a Created Rational Essence] then to Know that Divine Essence is Everitt is not Knowledge, and if let it be supposed that Divine Essence is Eiveritt then to know that Divine Essence is Not Everitt is an Ignorence. But it is Logically Absurd for Divine Essence to be Everitt. And Divine Essence Knoweth that It is Logically Absurd that He/It is Everitt. It may be seen in the case, let there be no Curcular Squire, and No Triangular Circle. So If Divine Essence Doeth Not Know that there is a Circular square and there is no Triangular Circle it is not against Omniscience but it is the Omniscience rather direct implication of Omniscience. Since Divine Essence Knoweth that there is No Circular Squire, and there is no Triangular Circle. What is the point. It is the same question as follow: If Divine Essence doeth not Know that Not A is A and A is Not A then He/It is ignorant. Or if Divine Essence doeth not know the greatest real number then He/It is Ignorent.

If Divine Essence Doeth not Know that I am Everitt, then this means Divine Essence Doeth Know that Iam Not Everitt. How ever Divine Essence Doeth Know that it is INCORRECT that He/ It is Everitt. So this is the incorrect concept never taken by a Theist .

As with the problem about spatial indexicals, this problem about personal indexicals arises whatever conception of divine eternity one accepts.

So whereas the theist could solve the problem about temporal indexicals by moving to the duration conception of Godâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s eternity; or solve the problem about spatial indexicals by saying that God occupies some regions of space but not others, she is bound to be left with the problem about personal indexicals.

It may be noted that the original vlief is that Divine Essence is Per Se Beyond and Per Se Transcendent to Time and Space.

An objection to the argument from indexicals

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The argument as I have presented it so far has presupposed that someone who knows the truth of an indexical knows something different from what is known by someone who knows the truth of one or more of its non-indexical correlates.

If it is assumed that An Indexical Thing/Event is one whose knowledge varies from one Essence of Knower to an other Essence of Knower only then it can be said that what one Essence Knoweth about it no Essence that is distinct from it knoweth. This implieth that Knowledge of each and every knowing Essence differ from one an other. So in order to have one and the same knowledge about it the Essences must also be one and the same. But this means that there are infinite Attributes or Qualities such that only one of them is Per Se Contingent to be Known by One Essence . This is the only concept of Indexical which is the Basic Principle of the Concept that Divine Essence cannot be Omniscient. But this is not correct. So any thing that is based on it taking it as a Basis is incorrect and biased. The problem is that each one of the Knowing Essence have a different relation with one and the same thing. So there Knowledges do not differ in the meaning that one Knoweth some thing the other Knoweth it not. They only differ in the meaning that they are two different Knowledges cooresponding to two different Knowing Essences. Yet the known one is one and the same. Now the problem is that the denouncers of Divine Omniscience have incorrectly assumed that to know a thing means to know with a certain relation.So as the Divine Essence doeth not have Relations like the Imperfect Knowers ,It cannot Know it. Coming back to the position the Knowledge on a Non Divine Essence is not ascribable to Divine Essence yet the Known is Uniques , one and the same. Only Divine Relations of Divine Knowledge differ. So one and the same thing is known by two different Types of Knowledges. This is What the Belief of Omniscience is. In symbolic style â&#x20AC;&#x153; If A is Known to B by Knowledge K then A is Known to/by AE [Infinitely more perfectly] by the Knowledge AK [Absolute Knowledge]. It is not that the very same Attribute of Knowledge is Ascribed to AE [AbsoluteEssence].The Relations of Imperfect Knowledge to the Event/Thing and the Relations of Perfect Knowledge are different and in this they strictly differ. But it must be known that denouncers of Omniscience have committed a great error when they say that What is Known by A can be known by AA unless and other wise AA is A, AND a IS AA. This is just to say that Divine Knowledge cannot be Perfect Omniscience unless it is Imperfect or Summation or Integral of all Imperfect Knowledges. Once again there is a problem of misconception. Any

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how if this is the definition of Omniscience then it is not correct, and Theologians have defined Omniscience. Once again if the Knowledge of a thing changes from Essence to Essence , Knowledge of one Essence to Knowledge of an other Essence that is Distinct from it, this means that change in knowledge is due to change in relations , not that there is no unique Knowledge of this thing or event .So this means Knowledge of the thing according to some is the Thing Known With the Relation of Knowledge. Only then it can be said that Knowledge changes or alters from Essence to Essence. But this is not the meaning of Knowledge in which Divine Essence is ascribed by the words “Knowledge, Absolute Knowledge, Omniscience, “Al “Ilm ‘Al Kulli” etc. Actually these relations are Events, Occurrences and Acts other than the Event stated above. But it must be noted that Divine Essence also Knoweth all these Knowledges of these Essences as well. So there is really nothing that is not Known.

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To put it more tersely, we have presupposed that an indexical and its correlates do not say the same thing.

If an Indexical Event has two or more Correlates then this imply that there exist Different Correlations one for each correlate. This Correlation is a Relation as in the response and reply. It must be noted that this presupposed claim is incorrect, But if it is correct then it is a problem of Speech and Sentences and not of Knowledge.

That is why above I cautiously said that the correlates say very roughly the same as the indexicals, the implication being that they do not in fact say the same thing. Suppose the theist challenges this assumption.

First of all let it be not challenged and let it be accepted for Sake of an Argument.But even in this case the Divine Knowledge cannot be negated.

Let it be suppose that certan events are relative. They have no identity of there own. For example the event say ε is A1 with relative to Essence B1, A2 relative to A2 ,A3 relative to B3, A4 relative to B4 and so one. Let they be all Non Divine Essence.

Let it be A relative to Divine Essence B.Now it must be seen that Divine Essence Doeth Know:1] ε is A1 relative to B1, A2 relative to B2 and so on. Also it is A relative to B. As it is not A2 relative to B1, etc. Divine Essence Knoweth that it is not B2,B3,B4, etc relative to B1 etc. Never the less Divine Essence Knoweth that WHETHER it is Logically Contingent to be B2 or B3 etc. in relation of B1 or it is Logically Absurd to be B2 or B3 etc. relative to B1 or it is Logically Necessary.2] It may be the case that the Event ε may not be A1 relative to A1, A2relative to Essence B2, but it is A1 in relation to the Knowledge K1 of B1, SIMILARLY it is Ai in relation to the Knowledge Ki of the Essence Bi, where Ki is the Knowledge of ith Essence Bi , and K is the Knowledge of Divine Essence. In this case the same can be said for ε and its relation to K the Knowledge of Divine Essence. In this case the event is certainly Not Unique. It can only be explained in relation to the Knowledge of an Essence or relative to the Essence. But the case is this that Divine Essence Knoweth that it Ai in Relation to Bi , and It is A in relation to B [ the Divine Essence]. Now if these relations are supposed to be ceased. In this case there are only two Logically Contingent Alternatives. 1] It Ceaseth to be and becomes Non Existent.2] It becometh some thing C. In the first case Divine Essence Knowth even Non Existences and Non Existents [“Adma:t and Ma”du:ma:t].If it becometh C, then either it was Not C when it Hath the relations with different Essences or it was C when it hath relations stated above. If it did was C then It was never a Relative Event . Raither it was some thing C all the times. If it was not C and did not have any unique identity then it is clear that during Non Existence of each and every Relation it mutated from Relative to Non Relative thing. Any how in this case as it did not have have unique Identity but only relative identities, Divine Essence Knoweth each one of its relative identity in relation of respective Essences or Knowledges of respective Essences or both. So if Indexicals are of this type even then they are Known. In an other sentence if ε is not Aj in relation to β whether β is Bi or B, j=/=I, then Divine Essence Knoweth that it is not Aj relative to β. But if Divine Essence Knoweth Ai is relatively not Aj it cannot be expressed Divine Essence

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knowth not that Ai is Aj relative to Bi or Ki of Bi. Perhaps this is the extreme case and idexicals cannot be more relative then this mentioned supposed example. But even this doeth not Disprove Divine Absolute Knowledge.

The challenge can go like this: we need to distinguish between what is known on the one hand, and the vehicle of knowledge or how the knowledge is expressed on the other. This is a distinction which is familiar to us from translation between languages. If I say ‘Today is Monday’ and you say ‘Aujourdhui est lundi’, then although we have used different sentences or different vehicles of knowledge, what we have said using those different sentences is the same. It would be a mistake to say that mere difference of sentence necessarily implied difference of what is said/known.

The objection Nicholas can made to challenge this challenge is that Indexicals are of not this nature. Nicholas can at best say that if an event is Non Indexical then this argument can be accepted. Yet if an event is indexical then this answer ceaseth to be correct.

This is the only answer which may be given . But in this case it may be responced that there is nothing indexical in reration to Divine Knowledge. If to suppose a thing indexical implieth that Divine Knowledge is Not Omniscience then An Indexical is not indexical to Divine Knowledge. Since in becomethas follw: Either Indexical or Omniscience. If omniscience then no Indexical atleast in relation to Divine Knowledge. So indexicals whal become relative. In regard to Non Perfect Knowledge they are Indexicals but in regard to Divine Knowledge they are not. How many times Nicholas has suggested change in definitions of Omnipotence or Omniscience but he did not suggest any change in the definition of Indexicals. Any how an Indexical is not Absolute but relative. So actual identity of indexical is in regard to Absolute Knowledge.

As stated above in Britanic Bold[ black colour Not B] page 21 , this is a misconception. Since if an Indexical is assumed then its Knowledge is assumed to be changed from Essence to Essence. It is not assumed that the meaning /knowledge is constant and conserved yet words in the sentences may be changed from one language to an other language , or change of words in sentences of one and same language. So the response may be seen as stated above.

Similarly if I know in 2003 that John F. Kennedy was killed 40 years ago, and what God knows is that Kennedy is (timelessly) killed in 1963, then (according to this line of reply) we know the same thing even though we express our knowledge in different sentences.

Now instead of discussing in general and abstract way the Learned Critic of Divine Omniscience attempts to provide some Examples.

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After all, it might be said, what makes my belief true is the very same historical events, or very same set of historical facts as makes God’s belief true.

That is a problematic dogma. Since Divine Essence Knoweth Itself by Itself BY Divine Absolute Knowledge, and It Doeth not Depend upon Historical Events. Note one must not confuse two different Attributes Belief and Knowledge.

A similar story (the theist might continue) goes for spatial and personal indexicals. If I know that the man facing me has a gun, and God knows something like ‘The man facing Everitt has (timelessly) a gun’, then there is just one set of people and one set of facts about them that make my belief and God’s belief true.

The Man has a Gun in Time not Timelessly a Gun , however the knowledge that the reated Essence has a Gun facing a target say Everitt is Beyond Time. These are two different thing fused and confused with one each other which is a fallacy.

So there are no good grounds for saying that my knowledge and God’s differ in content, and no reason to say that I know something which God cannot.

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This is a correct response to , since the indexical sentences differ from non indexical sentences not in the meaning that the event changes from Knower to Knower as claimed by Learned Nicholas Everitt , but it the sentences change from knower to knower that is sentence to sentence [One who maket a sentence].

Unfortunately for the theist, however, this second line of reply fails.

Let the alleged failure be studied.

Indexical sentences do not have the same content as non-indexicals, and knowing that an indexical sentence is true is not the same as knowing that its nonindexical pair is true.

It may be seen that this concept of Indexical Sentences is incorrect. Indexial sentence if defined as such must not be correct.

Suppose that A Rational Essence S1 is Pointinga t an other Rational Essence S2 by some ting say G, then this is the event. Suppose that this event is kept constant and fixted. Now S1 may express the event as follow:= The Rational Essence is Pointing at me by G. Divine Essence can say the very same Event that “ Rational Essence S1 is Pointing at Rational Essencew S2 by the thing G. This is just the difference and variation of sentences, not in the knowledge, Knowledge is one and same fixed and constant. So one must not accept this very claim that indexical sentences implieth change in meanings and knowledge,rather it implieth change in sentences in expressing one and the same event. Additionally Divine Essnce doeth Know each and every sentence of difference Rational Essence. The scholar has suggested a number of time change in the definitions of Omniscience. But he is unwilling to change the meaning of indexicals? Why ? One may challenge it as well. Indexical and Non Indexical may differ in some respects but the events are the same in each case. The difference is that sentence expressing one and same event in case of Indexicals may change from Speaker to Speaker, Sentencer to Sentencer, but not in the case of Non Indexicals. But every thing stops here perpetually once for all times. Last not the least if the alleged definition of indexical contradicteth the Divine Absolute Knowledge then instead of changing the definition of Divine Knowledge one may redefine Indexicals and Non Indexicals. This is an equal right.

Once again it must be reminded that if A is Not B then Omniscience Implieth that Divine Knowledge must Necessary be A is Not B and Not That A IS B, AND If A is Not B then Not to Know A is B is not some thing that is against Divine Omniscient Knowledge.

So Stating an Indexical Sentence only meaneth that an event is stated with some conditions and Knowing an event meaneth to know the very Event, and Knowing an Indexical Sentence spoken by an Essence in Time is another thing. These things are not one and the same. So any argument based on considering them as one and the same is incorrect.

To establish these claims, we can note in the first place that an indexical and any of its correlates fail to display the most basic requirement which must be met if two sentences are to say the same thing: there is no mutual entailment between them.

An entailment is not necessary in the meaning taken by the learned Anti Divine Objection Maker. This requirement is of Non Indexical Sentences. But if these requirements or Necessary and Sufficient Condition is not fulfilled then it does mean that One and Same event cannot be sentenced by different speakers and sentencers. It doeth not mean that the event itself is relative and it is different with respect to different knowers . Consider an example from Mathematics. Let P be a Distinct point in XY-

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Plain Let X1Y1, X2Y2,X3Y3,X4Y4,……,XnYn be n Cooarditale systems. Let its coordinates are (x1,y1),(x2,y2),(x3,y3), (x4,y,4),…..(xn,yn) corresponding to each Coordinate system. Now the point P is One and the same yet the coordinates do change from Coordinate System to Coordinate System. Now if there is no Absolute Coordinate System then it is incorrect to assume that Not to Know an Absolute Coordinate system is some thing which negates the Absolute Knowledge. On the Contrary if there is an Absolute Coordinate System then An Absolute Coordinate System is in the Divine Omnipotence. In this case each and every Point is known by the Absolute Coordinate System . How ever each and every point is also known by Non Absolute Coordinates Systems as well.

The sane is the case with the indexical events. Each one of them is Unique and Definite, yet its sentences changes from Knower to Knower. It is not the Knowledge that changes from Knower to Knower but the sentence about the event change from Speaker to Speaker. However this is a rough analogue but the truth is the same. The knowledge of the Point doeth not change but the coordinates changes.

The basic idea is that accordin to the Critic of Divine Omniscience , Things and Events are of two Types. 1] Non Indexicals. 2] Indexicals. Knowledges of Non Indexicals remain same and does not change fromone Knowing Essence to an other Knowing Essence. But on the Contrary the Knowledges CHANGE FROM one Rational Knowing Essence to An Other Knowing Essence and do not remain same. This implies that Knowledges of any two mutually distinct

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Essences about an Indexical Thing or Indexical Event must be different and no two mutually Distinct Essences have equal and the same Knowledges about an Event or a Thing that is claimed to be Indexical by the Learned Critic of Divine Knowledge. This implies that Divine Essence cannot Know about Indexicals what other Essences Know about it, in regard to one and the same Indexical Event or Thing or Both. This implies that Divine Knowledge is not Omniscience and not Absolute. This is the basic essence andsubstance of what they Learned Critic of Divine Essence wants to say as obvious from his work. A proper response is that: “ The Knowledge of Indexicals in Case Of Divine Essence differ in Degrees of Finite Perfections or Finite Imperfections.

So one and same the Indexical thing or event or both is Known to these Finite Imperfect Essences of Finite Imperfect Knowledges. As Knowledges of some Finite Essences are more then the Knowledges of some finite Essences or Knowledges of some are relatively more perfect then the knowledges of other finite Essences about these indexical events and things, there no other difference in the knowledges about a given particular unique indexical thing or event in regard its Knowledges by finite and imperfect Essences of finite and imperfect Knowledges. Knowledge Of Divine Essence is not the summation of all finite imperfect Knowledges stated above. Divine Knowledge Knoweth an Indexical Events or Things Itself by Itself With out any exception of any indexical Thing or Event. Divine Knowledge about these Indexicals is infinitely more perfect than the imperfect Knowledges of finite Essences.

This does not imply that there are [is] some things [thing] known to Non Divine Essences [Essence] about one and the same indexical Thing or Event or Both that are [is] not known to Divine Essence. Additionally Dvine Essence and Divine Knowledge Know all the Knowledges of these Imperect and Finite Essences not as Attributes of Divine Knowledge or Divine Essence but as the Knowns of Divine Attribute of Divine Essence.

Also it must be noted that Sentences expressing Knowledges of Finite Essences may differ from Finite Essence to Finite Essence but not the Knowledges of them. So to argue from Indexicals against Divine Knowledge is based on incorrect and wrong basis. Thus indexicals may be thought as follow: One and same sentence cannot be used by two or more Essences to express one and the same Knowledge about one and same Thing/Event that is known [i.e Indeexical Thing/Event]. It is Per Se Necessary that two or more Indexicals are Known by Divine Essence Directly as a Per Se Necessity of Divine Essence It Self By Itself. There is no entailment Per Se Necessary. So each one may be independent of any entailment.

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Take the two sentences: This is an example and let it be discussed in detail.

(A) Kennedy was killed 40 years ago.

This is a imperfect form of saying since this means that JFK was Assassinated 40 years before from the time X say 1963 in Gregorian System . So this is an incomplete sentence , if incomplete then imperfect, (B) Kennedy is (timelessly) killed in 1963.

JFK was not killed timelessly in 1963 CE but in Time, yet the Knowledge of Divine Essence about this event is Beyond Time . The distinction between the two is Obvious.

(B) is true every time it is said. But (A) was not true at any time in the past until 2003, and it will not be true at any time in the future after the end of 2003. Someone who knows that (B) is true cannot thereby deduce that (A) is true; Deduction is not necessary from B to know A. It is not necessary that if two events are known one of them is deduced from the other. It is not necessary that if there are two approaches to a single event then one of the two is deduce-able / deductable from the other. Also if a single event has two approaches one Non Indexical , and the other one Indexical , then it is not necessary that one is deduced from the other. As these things are not necessary , their respective knowledges are also not deduced-able /deductable.

Let it be seen in some what abstract way.

Suppose that an Event ε occurred in the time (α1,β1,γ1).

Suppose that in the time (α2,β2,γ2). The event occurred (Δα,Δβ, Δγ) time before it. Now this time is only true for (α2,β2,γ2). It is not true for any time (α3,β3,γ3). The actual event ε is Known by Divine Essence. The difference between the two times(α1,β1,γ1) and (α2,β2,γ2). is known by Divine Essence. Divine Essence doeth Know that the Event ε occurred (Δα,Δβ, Δγ) unit of time before (α2,β2,γ2).

Now (Δα,Δβ, Δγ)

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If Knowledge of Event ε occurring in (α1,β1,γ1) is not deductable from the knowledge that this event occurred (Δα,Δβ, Δγ) before (α2,β2, γ2) then this does not mean that it is not known. If a thing is known it is not necessarily deduceable/deductable. They may be independent from deductions.

Similarly the Knowledge the Event occurred (Δα,Δβ,Δγ) before (α2,β2,γ2) is not deductable from the knowledge that the event occurred in the year (α1,β1,γ1) then this does not mean that it is not known. If a thing is known it is not necessarily deduceable/deductable. They may be independent from deductions. It must be known that as there is a mathematical equation the knowledge is deductable and deduceable.

Note it is assumed that time has Three Dimensions and Space has also three Dimensions in this answer, since the arguments can be safely used for Three Dimensional Space , if Three Dimensional Time is assumed by stating that the similarly the same can be saind for three Dimensional Space. If one Dimensional Time is needed one my put the the last two values of 3-tupple as zero as it is a especial case of three dimensional time in this meaning.

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and someone who knows that (A) is true cannot thereby deduce that (B) is true.

There is an objection since the Mathematical Equation it self a proof of deduction. Since from any arbitrary time (αi,βi, γi) the difference is (Δαi,Δβi, Δγi). But id it is accepted thenThis only shews that A and B are not mutually deducible. But they are known.

What makes (A) true is not quite the same as what makes (B) true.

But this does not imply that they are not known.

For (A) refers to its own time of utterance as well as to what happened in 2003, whereas (B) does not. So there are times when (B) says something true and (A) does not. So someone who knows only (B) is ignorant of something which is known by someone who knows (A); and someone who knows only (A) is ignorant of something which is known by someone who knows (B).

Of course (B) can be deduced from (A), and (A) from (B) if the knower can know (C) The current year is 2003.

Divine Knowledge is not a Deductive Knowledge. Although Divine Essences doeth Know deductions , and Aprroximations as Knowns yet It is neither Deductive not Approximate. To Know some thing is one thing and to be some thing is another thing, to know some thing is one thing and to be ascribed wjth some thing is an other thing. Things are not deducted in divine knowledge to know. So Nocholas is analogueing Imperfect knowledges and Perfect Knowledge which is invalid if there is no Divine Knowledge.

But this is of no comfort to the theist. For (C) is itself an indexical sentence; and how a timeless God could know (C) raises the same problems as how he could know (A).

It must be noted that the questionof How is incorrect, Since Divine ESSENCE doeth not require a How. It is discussed that Indexicals can not be used to deny Divine Knowledge. If it is correct that it is Per Se Absurd to Know an Indexical then ANY THING THAT IMPLIETH Non Existence of Absolute Omniscience is it self Per Se Absurd. This implieth that they are really not Indexicals but Pesudo Indexicals .

But one may not need to go so far.

It is not just in their entailments that (A) and (B) differ. They also differ in their inductive relations.

Differences are one thing and Knowledge of differences are another thing. This is the point which is voluntarily or unvoluntarity missed several times.

From (A) I could plausibly infer inductively (D) No one who is now under 38 will remember the Kennedy assassination.

But I cannot infer (D) from (B). And if someone is trying to work out how long ago Kennedy was assassinated, she might reason to herself that (A) is probably true, on the ground that (E) I am now 46, and Kennedy was killed between my 5th and 8th birthdays.

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But (E) by itself would not be good inductive evidence for (B).

But if it is Known then It is Known by Intrinsic and Esoteric Necessity of Divine Knowledge, and not derived.

Nor is it just in their deductive and inductive relations that indexicals and their correlates differ. They differ also in their explanatory power.

Deduction is one thing and Knowledge is an other thing. For Exampe there are a set of Axioms such that any two of them are mutually independent and none can be derives /proved from the others. That is each one of them is absolutely independent. Then they can prove a number of theorems. Now it is possible that A Rational Essence Knows each one of the Axiom and each one of the theorem independent of deduction/proof of the theorems. So to know a theorem directly is one thing and to know by deduction/proof ia another thing and to know the proof is a thing other then these two things. So if an Essence knoweth a Theorem Directly and the Knowledge is not deductive and proofic even then THE Essence may know the Deductions and proofs directly.

Suppose we ask why Lee Harvey Oswald pulled the trigger as and when he did. We get the beginnings of an explanation if we attribute to him a cluster of beliefs, including the following: (F) That man is the President.

(G) If and only if I pull the trigger now , will I hit that man.

It would not be enough to attribute to Oswald such beliefs as: (H) The man seated on the left in the back of the third car is (timelessly) the President.

(I) If and only if I fire at 11.32, do I hit (timelessly) the President.

For suppose that Oswald does not also believe that now is 11.32. Then the fact that he believes (I) will not help to explain why he fires at 11.32. Indeed it will make it puzzling that he fires at 11.32, since he must have thought that he was firing at a time when he had no idea whether he would hit the President. Or suppose that he believes (H), but does not believe that that man (at whom he is pointing) is seated on the left in the back of the third car. Then (H) would not help to explain why Oswald shot that man, for he cannot think that that man (at whom he is aiming) is the President.

This is the imperfection of Finite Knowledge. Actual and Factual rather Real Event may be known by two types of Knowledge 1] Imperfect 2] Perfect/ The Properties of Imperfect Knowledge are not found in Perfect Knowledge. But the Learned Scholar is trying to deny Perfect Omniscience on the basis that it is beyond the imperfection and attributes of imperfections. A very strange thing but equally incorrect. So this may be seen in detail and discussed more accurately.

The moral is that if we are to explain peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s actions in part by reference to their beliefs, these beliefs will have to contain some indexicals, otherwise we will not be able to explain why they perform those actions at that time rather than earlier or later, or in that place rather than somewhere else.

First of all there is a difference between Knowledge and Belief.

Belief is not an Attribute Of Divine Essence unless and otherwise it is defined and its definition is strictly analyzed. But for the time being let it be true as according to some definition

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for an Essence in Time and Space. A belief may be true and may be false. So it is not knowledge which can not be false, since a false knowledge is not Knowledge but Ignorance and Nescience.So it is Per Se Contingent that an Essence may have some imperfect knowledge and based on this inperfect knowledge he may have some immediate believed. But these believes are not Knowledges . These are believes. To confuse both of them is a fallacy. Now these believes may involve some indexicals. This is not a problem. Indexicals are not such things which Divine Essence cannot Know or it is Per Se Absurd for the Divine Essence to Know It. SEE ABOVE. Now the question is about the explanation of their acts at a given time. It is a separate issue based on the indexical approach of a Rational Essence. Not only Human Essences can do amy things but Animal Essences can do many Voluntary Act. Only there Will is less perfect the will of Human Essences. To deny that Animals do not Have Will is as incorrect as to deny that they do not have sight or hearing. So the same problem is for them. But what sort of belief can be scribed to them? Coming back to the original position there is a large quantity of Discussion about human Will as well. It it free or it is not is an ancient Problem . as a solution of the problem if Divine Omniscience implieth that No Created Essence has a free will then there is nothing to accept it. So all the problems of Assassination of Present JFK can be responded on the basis to Not Free Will if Free Will implies Non Omniscience of Divine Essence. So the question is whether a free will contradicts Divine Omniscience or it does not or it impieth Limitations to Divine Knowledge of Divine Essence. If indexicals in the Contingent belief of the Contingent Essence implies Limitations in the Knowledge of Divine Essence then Contingent Essence cannot have a free will.

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But as the Indexicals are not such thing thaty are Not Known to Divine Essence as discussed above and may be discussed below , the arguments become invalid in principle.

How ever a particular refutation may be liked to be seen by the readers and this may be done latter.

short, then, we can say that indexical sentences and their non-indexical correlates differ in three crucial respects: Divine Essence Doeth Know the differences clearly , immediately and directly, a point to be noted since Divine Essence is Omniscient, whether Divine Essence really exist or not that is not the question at this place, the question is if there is a Divine Essence then whether It knowth these difference or not , and the answer is in affirmation and assertion . in their deductive relations, in their inductive relations, and in their explanatory power. Because of these differences, an indexical sentence and its non-indexical correlate will play very different roles in a personâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s overall view of the world, It must be noted that to know a thing whether it is a small thing or a great thing or it is over all or not is one thing and a view is an other thing. A view may be incorrect and approximately correct. Divne Essence knoweth the event accurately and the views of the Created Essences as well. But these views are not not accurate knolwledges but approximate knowledges . These are also events and Divine Essene doeth Know them as well. As for the problem of deduction one may further see the problem more minutely. and hence the objection which tries to claim that the sentences are different expressions of a single truth, rather than the expression of different truths, must be rejected.

This objection may be Studied in Detail Since there are some problems in these lines of attempted arguments which must be pointed out and the basic fallacy behind all this may be refuted or denied.

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Indexicals of a Contingent Event that is in Contingent Time and in Contingent Space if known by a Contingent Essence may have relations with the Knowing Contingent Essence, and the said Essence may have the Knowledge of these relations that are themselves in Tine and Space. But the Divine Essence Doeth Not and Cannot Have these sorts of relations with the Event. These imperfect relations imply imperfect Knowledge. So the view of Created Rational Essences may Differ/ Vary from Rational Essence to Rational Essence. But these imperfect views are directly and indispensably implied by the Imperfect Relations STATED ABOVE. So the Knowledges of Contingent Essences are Imperfect in themselves. Now the Perfect Knowledge of an Event cannot be an imperfect Knowledge. Now either the View of the Imperfect Essence is just the Imperfect Knowledge or it is some thing generated by Imperfect Knowledge and Contingent Created Belief. In the first canse the negation of imperfectness directly imply the negation of such views. If views are some thing which are generated by Imperfect Knowledge and Imperfect Belief then Divine Knowledge doeth not fulfil this condition. Since it is Absolutely Perfect. Also belief is not an Attribute of Divine Essence, and if it is then the imperfect Views are not generated in this case.

So the learned scholar committed a fallacy that he confused negation of imperfect Knowledge as the negation of either the Perfect Knowledge or negation od Very Knowledge it self.

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The upshot of this line of objection to divine omniscience, then, is this: indexicals necessarily have a different content from even their closest correlates. So someone who knows the truth of an indexical sentence knows something different from what is known by someone who knows only the correlates. So someone who knows only the correlates is ignorant of what is known by someone who knows the indexicals.

This means as stated repeatedly that Either the Event E is Purely Relative to the Contingent Knowledges or its Knowledge is Purely relative to the Contingent Essences Knowing it, In the first case if it is supposed that No Knowing Essence Existeth then it is implied that the Event ceaseth and never Occurred. In the second case it is implied that if other Essences do not exist this Event also Not Exist. In this case One may say Essence E1 KNOWETH it as K1 and Essence E2 Knoweth it as K2 and so on but the question is if Divine Essence E Knoweth it Divine Knowledge AK is neither K1 nor K1. So What Do E1,E2 Know , Divine Essence E Doeth Not Know. But Omniscience is not to ascribe the Attributes of Per Se Contingent Created Knowledges of Non Divine Essences to Divine Essence.

But Divine Essence Knoweth K1 the Knowledge of E1 , K2 the Knowledge of E2 and so on. This is Omniscience, and it is not as assumed by the Learned Critics of Divine Omniscience.

If events have no identity of their own then this means that they violate law of identity. This may be the reason some did try to deny Law of Identity or atleast tried to find some Exceptions where the law is not valid. But Indexicals do obey them. So if there is no unique identity of an Indexical Event/Thing X then it means that they are purely relative and it changes its identity relative to different Essences or Knowledges of different Essences or both. So if an Indexical Event/Thing E is Ea relative to an Essence A , and Eb relative to the Essence B , then it is not Eb in relation to A and not Ea in relation to Essence B. So what is the result? Ea and Eb are just relatively Identical. Now this is the only thing that an Indexical Thing/Event can be. There is nothing C that is Absolutely Identical to E. So in this case the following approaches are necessary. The real Identity of the Event /Thing E is in relation to Divine Essence I or Divine Knowledge K of Divine Essence. Now every thing is clear that Divine Essence or Divine Knowledge that is the Divine Essential Attribute of Divine Knowledge is the Real Identity. However in this case one may say that Divine Essence Knoweth Indexical X as E and all the Non Divine Essences knew it as Ei relative to their Selves say Yi , the knowledges of Eyi say Kiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s are all imperfect Knowledges. How ever Divine Essence doeth Know the Knowledge Ki of each and every Non Divine Essence as well. With is approach indexicals are not a problem at all for the Divine Absolute Knowledge. Indexicals are incorrectly explained by the Denouncers of Divine Omniscience. It is a better way to explain that an Event is Indexical if sentences regarding to it vary from sentencer to sentencer , speaker to speaker. But Divine Essence doeth Know the knowledges of Imperfect Knowers. So there is no thing which can be said not to be known.

Once again it is o fuse and confuse the Indexical Knowledge of an Event and the Event as one and equating imperfect knowledges and the Perfect Knowledge. It is just to identify Imperfect as Perfect or consider Negation of Imperfection as Negation of Perfection.

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Let it be Supposed that There is an Event such that its Knowledge varies Necessarily from Knowing Essence to Knowing Essence. Let its Knowledge be K1 with respect to Essence E1, K2 with respect to Essence E2 and so on. Let it be Logically Absurd for E1 to have the Knowledge K2, for E2 to have the Knowledge K1 etc. Let Divine Essence E Its Knowledge K. As according to the Assumption IF Divine Essence is E1 then Divine Essence Necessary Hath the Knowledge K1. Let it be supposed that it is Logically Absurd for E to be E1. So the result is that it is Logically Absurd for Divine Essence to Have the Kniowledge K1. This Logically Imply that it is Logically Absurd for Divine Essence to Know K1 SINCE IT IS Logically Absurd for Divine Essence to be Ascribed by the Attribute of Knowledge K1. But it must be noted Divine Essence Knoweth each and every Per Se Absurd, each and every Per Se Contingent. So Divine Essence Per Se Necessarily Knoweth that What would have His Knowledge if The UnCreated Beyond Time Divine Essence Was a Created Non Divine Essence E1 in Time. Similarly the Knowledge about the Essence E2 and the alleged Indexible Event etc. So If Divine Essence E Knoweth Not What E1 Knows, Divine Essence Knoweth what would have been his Knowledge if It was E1 . So this is an exact substitute of Divine Knowledge

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and Divine Essence is Omniscience in this very meaning. So Divine Essence Knoweth “What If “ Correctly and Rightly”.So there is nothing that is not known to Divine Essence. Since If it is accepted that If Divine Essence Doeth Not Know what a Created Essence Knoweth an allegedly Indexical Event , Divine Essence Knoweth correctly and rightly what It Would Have Known if It Were thatVery Essence i.e Identical to that Non Divine Essence , in regard to the said Event. This is Necessary and Sufficient for Omniscience rather Logically Necessary and Logically Sufficient for some meaning of Omniscience and supposing that there is an Essence that is an Existent in this meaning of Omniscience , what is the argument that such an Essence Existeth Not. Divine Essence Knoweth what would Its Knowledge would have been If Logical Absirds were Logical Contingents and Logical Contingents were Logical Absurds,Logical Necessaries were Logical Absurds and Logical Absurds were Logical Necessaries , Logical Contingencies were Logical Necessaries and Logical Necessaries were Logical Contingencies. It is Clear that In such cases Divine Essence. So it is Not Per Se Absurd for Divine Essence to Know Indexicals, Since at best it may be said that it is Per Se Absurd to know Indexicals but Divine Essence Knoweth even Per Se Absurds, So It Knoweth What if It/He Knoweth them in the case they are Per Se Absurd to be Known.

I . What this shows is that the concept of omniscience (by Definition 1) is self-contradictory: there could not be an omniscient being.

It has been discussed that the basic flaw is in the interpretation of Indexicals. One may not agree with the Learned Scholar that an Event/Thing is such that it is not unique and its Knowledge varies or differs from Knower to Knower. Also it is not necessary to be in Time (Space) to Know an event in Time (Space).

He would have to exist at all places, in order to

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know all truths of the form.

Here is . . .’, and yet also not exist in all places, since then no place would be ‘here’ for him. In relation to time, he would have to exist at every time.

It is stated that Divine Omniscience DOES NOT REQUIRE to fulfill these conditions as alleged . But according to Some Divine Knowledge is in every Space and Divine Essence is Beyond All Spaces. What does this means. It may mean that Divine Knowledge is Per Se Associted With Divine Essence yet it is Connected to each and every Per Se Contingent Space and each and every Spatial Thing that Exist in each and every Space. With this connections Divine Essence Not Only Knoweth each and every Alleged Indexical and Hath the Perfect Knowledge if each one of them. So Knowledge of each one of them is correct. The only Problem is that the Knowledge of Indexical varies from Essence to Essence if the Allegation i.e Alleged Claim is assumed to be correct. But in this case Divine Essence Doeth Know each and every Contingent Knowledge of each and every Contingent Essence. So this is Omniscience.

So This objection on Absolute Knowledge is not correct as discussed above and may be discussed bellow as well.

An other approach is as follow: There are two types of Divine Knowledges, 1] That is in every Space . B] That is Associted With Divine Essence. Both of them are mutually connected . So the objection may become weak. Please consider them.

The same can be said in regard to Time as Well.

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An extension of the argument from indexicals As a final postscript to this line of criticism of classical theism, I want to raise one much more destructive criticism. The criticism which I have raised so far of divine omniscience has presupposed a distinction between indexical and non-indexical sentences, and allowed that God could know the truth of the non-indexical correlates of indexical sentences. It has denied only that he could know the indexical sentences themselves. The final criticism to consider is whether he could know the truth even of what we have been calling the non-indexical correlates. The reason for thinking that he could not is that what we have been calling the non-indexical correlates themselves arecovertly indexical.

This is the belief that Pure Non Indexicals are Per Se Absurd. And this is where the Learned Author wants to take his readers.

He thinks that every thing is indexical and there is not a single thing that is not indexical. If so then according to the Learned Author it is Logically Absurd for any thing to be Non Indexical. This is unacceptable concept. If the learned Critic has this right then an equal and opposite right is to deney Indexicals and to claim that that “ “what the learned author has been calling the indexical correlates themselves are covertly Non- indexical”.

This is an equal and opposite response and is correct if analysed. The actual arguments of the claim that Divine Essence cannot Know Indexicals are extracted in Preliminary “I”.AND these are what stated by the Critics of Divine Omniscience Implicitly and Allusionary.

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Let us see how this is so with temporal sentences first of all. Consider again (H) Everitt lectures (timelessly) on Monday.

Flaw: Ereritt does not lecture timelessly on Monday but in time on Monday.

What understanding can a timeless being have of the word ‘Monday’?

What is the basic idea of the meaning of Monday. If there is any then it is known to Divine Essene. To claim that the Idea of Monday can only be known to Non Divine Essences that are In Time is as incorrect as it seems to be . Suppose that there is no Idea behind the concept of Monday then what is the idea of very Monday. Nothing. So the argument fais. But if there is then it is Known to Divine Essnce. The fallacy the learned auther is coming is that the learned Author of the objection is presenting an interrogative phrase and wants a reply from from Theists . The question is whether there an idea or understanding of the words LIKE Sunday or Monday orTuesday or Wednesday or Thursday or Friday or Saturday,. If there are understandings about these words then they are Known to Non Divine Essences they are Known to Divine Essence, there is No Per Se Necessary Condition to be in Time in order to Know these Understanding. Now it may be descended from the original position to accept the view that there is no Unique understanding of a Noun of a Day say Monday and the Understanding differ from Rational Essence to Rational Essence or Rational Suppositum to Rational Suppositum then what is the result. Divine Essnce Must have a different Understanding of it. But the Contingent Understandings of each one of Contingent Essence stated above are Attributes of Contingent Essences and not the parts of the Event alleged to be Indexical in the sense accepted by the Learned Critic. So they are separate evens that is each understanding is a different event and Divine Essence Knoweth them.

Suppose he knows a number of truths about it –, for example, that it comes between Sunday and Tuesday, that it is for many people the first day of work after a short break, etc. Will that enable him to know which day is being referred to as ‘Monday’? It is true that if he knows which day is Sunday or Tuesday, and has a grasp of temporal indexicals such as ‘tomorrow’ and ‘yesterday’, he can pin down the reference of ‘Monday’ on any occasion of its use. But then the same problem could be raised in connection with his grasp of ‘Sunday’ and ‘Tuesday’. It seems that our grasp of each member of this set of weekday terms presupposes a grasp of some indexicals. The same is true of other temporal terms, such as the names of the months and the years.

This is in Principle an old Argument suited in new style that An Existent that is Beyond Time cannot Know Time” Since Monday or Tuesday are nothing but some units of Time. The question is it is Per Se Absurd for an Existent that is Beyond Time to Know Time or it is Not. If it is Not then What is the Proof. The answer is there is none. At best it can be chosen as an Independent Axiom in Some Anti Omniscience Axiom System, but if so it can be rejected and discarded from Pro-Omniscience Axiom System, If Divine Essence

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Knoweth Time Divine Essence Knoweth Units of Time like days and their Proper Nouns etc. So it is required to clarify whether it is an Axiom or a Theorem. If Axiom them why to insist that it may be accepted and added in the other Axiom Systems. If a theorem then it may be provable in Some Axiom System. So the Proof is required so that it is studied how it is proved and what are the parts of the Proof. Does it include and disputed Axiom in the in the Axiom System in which it is proved. Before presenting complete knowledge of every thing it is incorrect and such a claim is just a claim. An other thing is what is the correct Knowledge/Understanding of Monday that Divine Essence Doeth not /Cannot Know. Suppose that there is no unique understanding of the term and the meaning of the term changes from Rational Essence to Rational Essence in Time. So what does this means??

This only means that there are Indefinite /Infinte many meanings under a single term Monday. Different Users of the word Monday use it in a different Meaning. If it is so then it may be said that if a Rational Essence Uses it in one meaning an other Rational Essence cannot use in in the very same meaning, the latter stated Essence is compelled to use it in another meaning. But this only means that there are many meanings included under a single term say Monday. But there is no Problem that Divine Essence Knoweth each and every one of these meaning, yet if the Divine Essence useth in a number of meanings the sentences in which it is used must become False. So this is not a Problem of Omniscience but the problem of Attributes of Speech(es) and Sentences. The problem is that the Learned Objection Makers on the Divine Omniscience have not stated what they really want to say. It is evident that they want to say that eitherin Indexical Event is not Abolutely Unique and is Purely relative and varies from Knowing Essence to Knowing Essence or it is Unique but its Knowledge is not Unique and it Varies from Knowing Essence to Knowing Essence ot Both.

It is responded that analyzation of this argument yields that they have Confused relations with with events suggesting such conditions which if not satisfied ,implies not knowing of it in some regard. But this is an incorrect formation and it has been discussed above that such Ideas are incorrect and wrong. One may consider the concept of time in some detail. Suppose that each Unit Time is in perfect likeness to the Other Unit of Time. Yet it is Logically Contingent to assign a different Noun to each one of the Unit Times. Similarly it is Logically Contingent to Assign a Finite Number of Nouns in a periodic or cyclic manner. For example 1 to n are the nouns which are assigned to each unit time from the very beginning of time.Suppose that Timelessness is Timelessly Prior to the First of All (Created)Times. Let assign Noun 2 to the second (Created) Unit Time; and so on , to n th time the noun n is assigned.But for (n+1)th time the noun 1 is once again assigned and so on. This is what that is done in the Nouns of days of a week, froms Sunday to Sturday. [] It must be noted that the human beings have no special sense to distinguish Friday from Saturday and Thursday, and Sunday from Saturday and Monday. But this is all based upon calculations. Although Divine Essence Knoweth all calculations but Divine Knowledge is Per Se Direct and is Not Derived from Calculations. Similarly Divine Knowledge is Certain and Not Probable ,Yet Divine Knowledge Knoweth all Probabilities. So assigning of Nouns to Equal or Unequal or both types of periods of time is Logically Contingent Yet Divine Essence /Diovine Knowledge Knoweth all all Per Se Contingent Nouns,whether assigned or not, and also those that are assigned by Divine Essence Itself. As there is nothing which prevents A Beyond Time Essence/Knowledge to Know the Time , Parts of Time and Units of Time Per Se Directly. [ Note that sentences like Divine Essence Knoweth and Divine Knowledge Knoweth etc. are used in one and the same meaning.] ` Do similar considerations apply to our grasp of proper names? That may seem to depend on whether we think of proper names as purely referential or as abbreviated descriptions. If they are purely referential, then there will be a hidden indexical element in them. There will be some ‘baptismal’ occasion when the speakers of the language agree to call this or that object ‘the Grand Canyon’ or ‘the Eiffel Tower’ or ‘the River Thames’. For personal names, the idea of a baptism may be a good deal more literal. ‘I name this ship Fairy Mist ’ says the celebrity; ‘I baptise

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this child John Doe’ says the minister. If the referential theory of names is correct, it is in virtue of these indexically imbued occasions that the words have the reference that they subsequently do.

Whether Referential Theory of Nouns is correct or incorrect one may but this discussion aside since it is beyond the scope of the discussion yet the thing is that Indexicals are Not Unknowable to Divine Essence , and claim of Everitt is unacceptable. The alleged proofs provided by Nicholas are highly questionable, objectionable and debateable.

Consequently, a being who is unable to know any indexically expressed truths will not be able to know which object is the Grand Canyon, or the Eiffel Tower, the Fairy Mist , or John Doe. However, when we touched on the issue of names in Chapter 1, we opted for the ‘abbreviated description’ view. So could a timeless God understand the descriptions for which a proper name is an abbreviation? One immediate problem for many proper names is that other proper names appear in the description which the original proper name abbreviates. The Grand Canyon is a canyon in the USA through which the Colorado River runs; the Eiffel Tower is a metallic structure in Paris ; John Doe is the son of James and Mary Doe ; and so on. Let us assume, however, that for every proper name, N, we can supply a set of descriptions in purely general terms which do not themselves use any other proper names, and which serve to pin down the meaning of ‘N’.

The question now to raise is whether a timeless God could ever understand the meaning of any of these general terms.

Neither these general terms implieth that Onw That Knoweth them is Not Beyond Time, Nor the Beyondness from Time of an Essence Implieth that the Essence is not the Knower if these stated above terms.Any thing which is argued by the learned critic of Divine Knowledge from the controversial use of indexicals is discussed above and may be found below. See them there.

Divine Knowledge Knoweth Indexicals Itself by Itself and every term general ornot Itself by Itself and there is not Intrinsic Implication of Genearal Term and Negation of Omniniscience what so ever.

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Could he understand the meaning of terms like ‘river’, ‘canyon’, ‘metal’ and ‘son’?

The Answer is that Divine Essence doeth Necessarily Know. The problem is with the wrong and incorrect approach to the Concept and Definition of Indexicals, To be Beyond Time and Space Implieth Not to be ignorant of General Terms and Indexicals in the least meaning.

We can agree for the sake of argument that the timeless being might know for each general term how it relates semantically to every other general term. Thus he might know that ‘river’ is semantically connected to ‘flowing’ and ‘water’, that ‘flowing’ is connected to ‘movement’, and ‘water’ to ‘colourless’ and ‘liquid’, and so on. He might know, as we could put it loosely, the content of a dictionary. But if he knew

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nothing of the form ‘ That is a river’ or ‘ That is some water’ or ‘ That is a so-and-so’, surely he would not know the meaning of the general terms?

The problems of indexicals like this or that is discussed above. It is shown that Indexicals imperfect form of Knowledge.

These terms are imployed to express concepts and Knowledges, yet they expresses them imperfectly. Terms are the parts of Speech and Speech is diferent from Knowledge.

For comparison, consider the situation of a standard speaker of English who is a non-speaker of Japanese and who is given a Japanese dictionary which allows her to match each Japanese word (which presents itself to her only as a set of distinctive squiggles) with another set of Japanese words (which she knows only as a further set of distinctive squiggles). Even if she can match every Japanese word with another Japanese word or phrase or sets of phrases which define the original word, it seems clear that this person has not so far learnt Japanese. To count as having learned Japanese, she must have some grasp of how at least some of the squiggles relate to the world ; and that requires her to have some means of identifying this or that piece of reality. It requires her to know the truth of sentences of the form ‘When the world is like this , this squiggle applies’.

This is a wrong analogy of Divine Knowledge . Divine Knowledge is not like Non Divine Knowledges so that dictionaries and Lexicons may be used as examples. This is certainly and incorrect example. In this example it is exposed that Speech is confused by Knowledge since language is included in Speech and not in Knowledge.

If this line of thought is correct, These lines of argument are not correct. it shows that a timeless existence would rule out knowledge not just of indexically expressed truths, but of truths in general, because a grasp of indexicals is essential to a grasp of the general terms by means of which non-indexical thoughts are expressed. Far from being omniscient, a timeless being would be hugely ignorant.

Every thing is discussed above that Divine Knowledge knoweth every thing directly and essentially. The interpretations of Indexicals such that they are not Known to Divine Essence is incorrect and wrong. It is not so that indexicals do not exist but this approach of indexicals that negateth Divine Knowledge is not correct and is incorrect.

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Even if God exists in time, and so will escape the original objection above to his knowledge of temporal indexical sentences, a parallel argument to the one above will show that he cannot know the truth of spatial or personal indexical sentences.

It must be noted at this point that such claims are based on the supposition That Divine Existence cannot Know time or Things in Time or both. As this is an incorrect assumption based on incorrect approaches to indexicals all things based on this basis are incorrect. [Bana:’Al Ba:t:il “Alal Ba:t:il].

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Point to be noted that Nicholas said every thing but did not refer to any definition of time or space or both so that one may see which definition of time or space implieth that to know an event in it the Essence of the Knower must also be in it other wise it is Per Se Absurd to Know any thing in it.

So use of some terms with out defining them does shew a fallacy that the learned critic secretly define them somehow that an Essence that is Beyond Time , Space and Time Space Manifold cannot Know things in time or space or both ot in their manifold.

Given the argument that our grasp of a wide range of general terms requires a grasp of indexicals, it will follow that even a God in time will be unable to know a wide range of truths.

It is not followed since the claim that it is followed is based on very wrong concept of indexicals.

No matter what other features a OMNISCIENCE

298 being has, he cannot be omniscient. So if omniscience is a defining feature of God, it will follow that God does not exist.

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Divine Essence does not Exist in Time. Since Time is just a Creation Of Divine Essence and The Essence of the Creator Doeth Not Exist in any Created Thing whether ithe Created This is an Attribute or an Essence . So a proper response is due upon those who believe Divine Essence in Time. Le them answer it in their own way.

Even if the theist rejects this extension of the argument from indexicals to cover all general terms as well, she will still be left with serious problems over divine omniscience.

Let it be seen what is the problem presented by the Learned Author.

For even if she can establish that God could know that someone answering your description exists, he could not know that you exist.

If Divine Essence Knoweth every thing Divine Essence Knoweth each and every Existing and Non Existing Essence. So the words like You, Thou [‘Anta] does not make any problem as assumed by the Learned Objection Maker .

Also if it is excepted that Indexicals are not known to Divine Essence in their own type , they are known through the types of Non Indexicals. Other wise it is implied that there are infinite indexicals prior to each and every indexical and this makes they entire knowledge as a Logically absurd Attribute.

He could not know that you are the person who answers that description. In that sense, he could not have any knowledge of or thoughts about any individuals, as distinct from types of individuals. And if he cannot have any thoughts about individuals, it will follow that he cannot care about any individuals. If he does not even know that you exist, it is not logically possible for him to care about what happens to you.

It is merely a repetition so one is requested to see above if he/she may need to review the above discussions, so instead of repeating the answers it is most humbly advised to see above once again.

A revised definition of omniscience At this point, the theist might wonder whether the problems with her position stem from an over-hasty acceptance of a flawed account of omniscience.

Is there some alternative to Definition 1? One possibility that at once suggests itself is:

Definition 2 X is omniscient = For every true proposition p, if it is logically possible for X to know that p (i.e. X’s knowing p is consistent with X’s defining properties), then X knows that p.

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Once again Nicholas is trying to motivate Theists to change the Diefinition. But to change the Definition of Absolute Knowledge is not so easy. How ever one must say that Ervitt has once again missed some points in regard to Divine Omniscience. Let they be seen one by one. 1) Divine Omniscience meaneth that All Per Se Absurds, Per Se Contingents, and Logical Necessaries are known of Divine Essence and Divine Knowledge regardless of their Existences or Non Existences.2) All Existences are Known to Divine Essence and Divine Knowledge regardless of their Per Se Necessity or Per Se Absurdity or Per Se Contingency.3) All Events which are Logically Contingent to occur and Shall occur are Known bu Divine Essence and Divine Omniscience. 4) Divine Essence Knoweth All the Per Se CONTINGENT DIMENSIONS of time. 5) Divine Essence Knoweth Time and Events in no time ( since time is it self an event and is in no time otherwise there are infinite numbe of times are implied and it is implied that each time is IN an other time).

6) Divine Omnisciene does not mean that Divine Essence is Attributed to all kinds of Knowledges whether they be Eternal or Not Eternal, Timeal or not Timeal, Spatial or Not Spatial. Temporal or Not Temporal , Created or Not Created ETC. Omniscience does not mean this thing.6) To know an event in time is one thing and to know an even as it is known by Imperfect Knowledge is an other thing. The indexical as stated by Nicholas are the imperfection of Created Knowledges, and Divine Knowledge is Uncreated and Perfect. So every thing reduces to the Claim that If Divine Knowledge is not Imperfect and Created then infinite number of things are not known to Divine Essence by Divine Essential Attribute of Knowledge. This is a very dangerous Fallacy based upon a fallacious misconception. Technically it is the fallacy of “WRONG BASED UPON THE BASIS OF WRONG” OR IN OTHER SENTENCE “ A IS THE BASIS OF B AND B IS BASED UPON A AND BOTH WRONG. BANA: ‘AL BAT:IL “ALAL BA:T:IL.” So it is better to define Nescient first and then to define Knower and then Omniscient, Tha is a logical way.

A Nescient is an Essence to Which every thing is Logically Absurd to Know, A Knower is an Essence to Which a Number [in the meaning one or more then one] of things are Not Logically Absurd to Know and the Essence Doeth Know all those that are not Logically Absurd to Know. An Omniscient is an Essence to Which Infinite Number of thing are Not Logically Asurd to Know and The Essence Knoweth all that are Not Logically Absurd.

In some other formations , If X is a thing and E is an Essence and E is not a Nescient then E is Omniscient. I ma be noted that there are several issues with this definition yet it is clear that the objection is answered as presented by the learned scholar. How ever it constitute a separate case that some new objections are proposed. But as one is dealing to a definition problem, if the Logic cannot define a concept this means there is a flaw in the definition system not in the concept. One may ask the Learned Scholar that suppose there is an Omniscient Existent then how can It be defined? If not then under this supposition Omniscient is beyond the Definition System of the Logic. Suppose that there is not Omniscient Existent then how can a deniar say there is “No Omniscient Existent”. In either case there is a problem in the definition system it is it unable to present a definition of a concept. But really it is the flaw in the definition and not in the system. Since one may define as follow: If X is Logically Not Absurd for an Essence E to be Known By It and there are infinite many Logical Things that are Not Logically Absurd for the Essence to be known by the Essence , and the Essence knoweth each and every logicl thing that is not logically absurd for it to know then it is OMNISCIENT. It is hopes that the problem is not as problematic as it seemed to be initially.

Acceptance of the Definition may incline some one to argue that in this case thre are two types of Omniscient Essences. 1] Nescent Omniscient.2] Non Nescent Omniscient. In this case Divine Essence is not Nescient Omniscient but Non- Nescient Omniscient. , irrespective if its Existence or Non Existence. In this case there is Only One Omniscient and that is Non – Nescient Omniscient. Monotheistic Religions discard the Concept of Created Divine Essence the can also discard the concept of Nescient Omniscient Essence as Well. But it may sound to may as a contradicting term. Additionally some other Definitions are given which may be considered for sake of argument if not for sake of belief.

Let E be an Essence such that it knoweth each and every thing that is Not Per Se Absurd to be Known by E then E is Omniscient. It may need a Modification. Let E be an Essence such that it knoweth each and every thing that is Not Per Se Absurd to be Known By E and there are infinite may such things that are not Per Se Absurd to be Known by E then E is Omniscient.

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If E be an Essence such that it knoweth each and every thing that is Not Per Se Absurd to be Known By E and there are infinite may such things that are not Per Se Absurd to be Known by E then E is Omniscient. The problem of “If “ is that it some time includes Null Sets and this is the point picked by the Objection Makers who so every they may be, so in this case one have to exclude null sets.

X is omniscient = For every true proposition p, if it is logi-cally Not Absurd for X to know that p and X is not Nescient (i.e. X’s knowing p is consistent withX’s defining properties), then X knows that p.

One may need an other claim/axiom that there is no thing that is Logically Absurd to be Known by an Infinite Knowledge.

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If there are some things which it is logically impossible for God to know, in virtue of the fact that by definition he is, There is none as discussed above. for example, non-temporal, or lacks a spatial position, then by Definition 2, the fact that he does not know them would not show that he was not omniscient.

It appears that Learned Scholar is trying to propose new and new definitions of Omniscience and is then trying to shew that Divine Essence doeth not Exist since there can be no Existent which can satisfy these definitions. This is incorrect. He would have consulted several Theological Logicians before making these definitions.

Equally, if it is logically impossible for anyone to know in advance what the free choices of a human agent will be, then the fact that God does not know what such choices are would not show that he is not omnipotent.

Once again the problem is that is there any thing that is Logically Absurd for Divine Essence to Know by Divine Omniscience? The examples are irrelevant and their alleged relevancy is based upon the basis of fallacy and misconception.

At first sight, this might seem to be an attractive compromise position for the theist. But it is clear that this definition will be subject to the same undermining line of argument that we applied to a similar definition of omnipotence. Suppose a ‘nescient’ being is one who by definition knows nothing. It will then be logically impossible for a nescient being to know anything. Yet a nescient being will count as omniscient by Definition 2: Once again the objection is incorrect, Nescent contradicteth Knowledgeful general, and Omniscient in Particular. Also if it is acceped even then it is not Logically Absurd of any Per Se Contingent to Know . Even it is Not Logically Absurd Upon Non Living Per Se Contingent Essences to Know , So this is an Objection which is Absolutely Wrong and Infinitely Incorrect.

A response to this objection is two fold at least. First it is better to modify this definition as follow: If A KNOWETH Necessarily all that, that is not Per Se Absurd for A to Know then A is Omniscient and Knowledge of A is Omniscience.

This definition does not include that an Nescient Individual. Any definition which cannot differentiate between Nescient and Omniscient is Incorrect and Wrong. One need to know that Omniscient is a special case of Scient and contradicts Nescient [Absolute Ignorent]. So any definition of Science [Knowledge] and Scient [Knower] which must be the general to include Omniscience and Omniscient. So any definition which does not differentiate between Omniscient and Nescient must be incorrect. It needs some modification to correct it. The same is true for Omnipotence. The Nescient Problem is discussed prior to this part of the argument see page 27 of this article , and it is advised to be seen once again if required.

if it

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is logically possible for the nescient being to know that p, then he knows that p – but for every proposition p, it can never be logically possible for the being to know that p.

This may be Per Se Absurd for Finite Knowledge. But this cannot be said for Infinite Knowledge. For Example P is known , and That P is Known and That That P is known etc, thisPer Se Implieth that the Knowledge of the Knower is Infinite and Absolute. In other sentence the Knowledge of the Knower is Omniscience.The objection would have been correct if the Knowledge of That P Implieth that There is no Knowledge of P. This is not the case. For further detai see page 27.

Definition 2 therefore has absurd consequences, and is to be rejected.

It is required to shew what is the actual problem. The true definition of Knowledge and Knower is first required and Omniscience and Omniscient [Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Knower] must be different and exclude Nescient and Nescience. It is discussed above see it there.

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Conclusion It thus becomes clear that the theist faces a number of serious problems in defending the existence of an omniscient God. Let it be seen what are those alleged serious problems.

If God’s eternity is construed atemporally, he will be ignorant of a wide range of truths.

This is a claim that if Divine Knowledge is Beyond Time, Eternal and then Divine Essence cannot know all the things , Truths and Realities. So one must be what are the alleged proofs of thses claims. It may be said that Atemporal means two things. A] Unconnected to time and things in time. B] To be beyond Time yet conneted with time and things in time. Divine Knowledge if it is atemporal it is in the second meaning.

He will certainly not know any temporally indexical truths.

This is once again based upon the basis of Misconception which is discussed above in some detail. See above. Also all of these is based on an other confusion that is to confuse Known and Knowledge. Detecting this Confusion may arguments become invalid once for all times and Beyond Time.

If his omnipresence is either his being non-spatial, or his existing everywhere in space, again he will be unable to know spatially indexical truths.

It is not necessary to be a Spatial Existent to know the Spatial Truths just as it is not necessary to know Timeal Truths to be in time as discussed above.How ever Omnipresence [H:d:u:r Va N-z:u:r] is interpreted in different ways and we take it Non Spatial Omnipresence which is Knowledge and Observation. The objection makers are begging the argument/question in this case. It is not necessary to be in time or space to know an event in time or space or both, and the indexical sentence which expresses he very event is an other event. A proposition about an event is an other event. Both are not the same. A is B is the Event. Ten the Sentence of Proposition “A is B” is some thing different and it is an other event.

It is also at least arguable that if his eternity and omnipresence are interpreted in these ways, he will not be

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able to know a very wide range of general truths either.

Yes it is also at least arguable that if his eternity and omnipresence are interpreted in these ways, he will be able to know a very each and every general truth .

Since he will not be able to have knowledge of us as individuals, neither will he be able to have any concern or care for any of us as individuals.

This is discussed above, please see it there . This is mere repitation of the claims which are discussed above.

As in the case of the other divine attributes which we have looked at, the theist can respond by

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seeking to limit the scope of ‘omniscient’ – in effect to say that someone can be omniscient, even if there are truths of which they are ignorant.

The author of Reconstruction Of Thought Have used this Approach in the third lecture of this book, yet the objection to this approach by Nicholas is correct.

But the sceptic is likely to feel that this is a case of moving the goalposts, and that a more honest response would be to say ‘God cannot be omniscient after all, and he cannot know nearly as much as we initially thought that he could’.

The objection although correct is based on the principle that Meaning of terms cannot be changed. But this is the point whether one need to dispute . How ever one must Explicitly state that he is using this term in this meaning/definition and not in that meanining/definition. If he is not informing it this is objectionable.

Further reading There is a large literature focusing on the relation between divine omniscience and future human free action. Mavrodes in Quinn and Taliaferro (1997) provides a brief but good overview of the problem about future free actions, and the problem about indexicals. In relation to the first, a good starting point is Pike (1965), which argues that given some assumptions, divine foreknowledge of future free actions is impossible. Other important contributions to that debate are Plantinga (1986b), Swinburne (1986) and Hasker (1989). The argument pursued in the text about indexicals was first defended in Perry (1979), but has since been criticised by, among others, Millikan (1990), Abbruzzese (1997) and Jacquette (1999). Abbruzzese also replies to the Grim argument from set theory described in the text, full details of which are at Plantinga and Grim (1993).

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The problem of some scholars is that they have chosen such Axioms in their Axiom System which go against Divine Omnipotence, So they must be pointed out immedialtely. By the Grace of Divine Essence one may response to any one who disbelieve in Divine Essence or any explaination of Indexicals which contradicteth Divine Absolute Knowledge,

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