Abstract
Whatmoralobligations,ifany,dowehavetocorpsesgiventhattheTerminationThesis istrue,andthemoralactorceasestoexistatdeath?UsingBrecher’spromise-to-obligation paradigm,Iwilllayoutthewaysinwhichanobligationmayormaynotpersistafterthetimeof death. Iwillbeexaminingboththecasethatwehaveobligationstocorpsesandthecasethatwe donot,throughthequestionofwhetherornotcannibalismisamoraltransgressionand posthumousharmagainstacorpse.Iwillarguethatcorpsesdohavemoralinterestsandthatit followsthatthelivinghaveobligationstothem.However,theobligationnottoengagein cannibalismisnotstrongineverycaseandcouldbemorallypermissible.
1.Introduction
Humanpracticesofcannibalism,particularlyinWesternsociety,aretypicallyregardedas morallyreprehensible.Thediscoursesurroundingcannibalismseemstomisstherealityofthe practiceworldwide.Thebehaviorofeatingthedeadisnotmonolithic,andpriortocolonial intervention,thepraxisofcannibalismwasdiverseandspreadacrosslargeregions(Conklin 1995,76).Beingthatthepurposes,motives,rituals,andingestionmethodsaresodiverseand widespread,theinclinationforsometounderstandcannibalismasamonolithanddenouncethe practiceasawholeseemstobeoverstated(Lindenbaum2004,480).Themoralargumentagainst cannibalismmaybetrueforsometypologies,butIwillarguethattherearecannibalistic behaviorsthataremorallypermissible.
2.Cannibalism
Todeterminewhetherornotwehaveaffirmativemoralobligationstocorpsesinthecase ofcannibalism,itisnecessarytodefineexactlytheconditionsoftheact.Adistinctioncanbe madebetweenactiveandpassivecannibalism.Activecannibalismentailskillingthepersonwho istobeeaten(Lu2013,434).Passivecannibalismistheconsumptionofanalreadydeadperson. Tonotconflatethemoralityofkillingwiththemoralityofcannibalism,Iwillonlybefocusing onpassivecannibalism. Further,Iwillbefocusingonendo-cannibalisticpractices(Conklin 1995,75).Theactofeatingthedeadoccursonlywithinthedeceased'sownculture,andthe practiceasawholeisanalogoustothatofotherfunerarycustoms,suchasburying, mummification,orcremation.Thereisanunderstandingfromthedeceasedbeforetheydiethat thiscustommayalsoapplytothem,andtheimmoralactdoesnotstemfromaviolationof consentorexpressedwishesofthepersonbeforedeath.Forthispurpose,however,itdoesnot needtobeexplicitlystatedthatonewishestheirbodytobeeatenafterdeath. Thequestionisin theabsenceofawishtonotbeeaten,dowehaveanobligationnottoconsumethecorpse?Does cannibalismperseviolateamoralrightthecorpseholds?
3.Terminationthesis
Onedistinctionthatneedstobemadeisthatoftheexistencestatusofthedead.Forthe purposesofthispaper,IwillbeassumingthattheTerminationThesisasdefinedbyCody Gilmoreistrue.Thismeansthat“foranyxandatanyinstantt,ifxdiesatt,thenxceasestobe presentatt”(Gilmore2015,7).Iamalsoassumingthataconditionforexistenceisbeing present.Acorpseisthennotthesameasthedeceasedpersonandanymoralobligationstothe
corpsecouldpotentiallybeseparatefromthelivingmoralagent.Theissueiswhetherthemoral obligationsinquestioncanbegiventononexistentorpast-existententities.
4.MoralObligations
Toidentifyifobligationscanextendtopersonswhonolongerexist,moralobligations mustbedefined.Foundationally,thereisapromisingparadigm(Brecher2002,111).Ifoneparty makesapromisetoactacertainwaytowardsanotherparty,theynowhaveanobligationto fulfillthispromise.Assumingthatthereisapromisetoactinmoralways,implicitlyor explicitly,therearemoralobligationsthatextendfrommoralactorstootherparties.Thereare rights-basedobligations,wherethemoralrightsofapartymusteitherbeaffirmativelyupheldor notinterferedwith(Hanser2015,393).Respect-basedobligationsinvolverespectingthemorally permissibleendsofaperson(Winewski2004,268).Itisalsotruethatoneonlyoughttofulfill anobligationiftheycan.Ifenteringintoapromisetomake2+2=5,thefollowingobligation couldnotpossiblybefulfilled,andtheobligatedwouldnotbeatfaultorcommittingamoral wrongtofailtodoso.Itwouldalsoseemthatitispermissibletobreakanobligationifindoing so,agreatermoralwrongisavoided.Ifoneisobligatedtokillaninnocent,itwouldbe permissibletonotfulfillthatpromise.,
Inoneview,oncethepartythepromiseandobligationaredirectedtowardceasestoexist, sodotheobligationsthemselves.Apromiseisarelationalagreementtoactincertainwaysto certainagents.Withoutasubjectofanobligation,thereisnomeaningfulwaytoenforcethe promise,andthemoralweightofbetrayingthatpromisedoesnotseemtoexisteither.
Obligationstononexistentpartiesdonotexist,andwewouldbemistakentosaypartyX is
obligatedtoactacertainwaytowardspartyY posthumously.Thisargumentiscapturedbythe ImmunityThesisgivenbyStevenLuperinasectiononretroactivewrongs:
1. IfattimeT,nothingwedowillfurther(impair)subjectS’sinterests,then,atT, wearenotobligatedtofurther(avoidimpairing)S’sinterests.
2. NothingwedoafterShasdiedwillfurther(impair)S’sinterests(immunity thesis)
3. SoafterShasdiedwearenotobligatedtofurther(avoidimpairing)S’sinterests. (Luper2015,332)
Alternatively,ifpartyX hasmadeamoralpromisetopartyY,thefollowingobligations mayextendpastpartyY’sexistenceorpresence. Inthisview,theobligationdoesnotnecessarily needanexistingsubject,butjustanexistingactor.Themoralweightoffulfillingorviolatinga promise,anditsassociatedobligationsexistsbecauseofthepromisecomingintoexistence,not necessarilyrelatedtothecontinuedexistencesubjectitwasdirectedat.Obligationsgiventothe livingregardingtheirbodywouldextendtothebodyitselfevenifthemoralsubjectnolonger exists.Themechanicsofthislingeringdutymustbeacontinuationoftheobligationthatwas formedfortheinterestoftheliving,oritmustbeacontinuationoftheobligationofthecorpseas anobject.Oncethebodyitselfandtheinterestsregardingthebodyaregone,itwouldagainseem likethereisnopossibilityoffurtheringorprotectingtheinterestsofthedeceasedperson.
Withoutdeterminingspecificallyeverymoralrulethatdoesexist,theseareobligations thatwemayhavetocorpsesthatarepotentiallyinconflictwiththeactofcannibalism.There maybeanobligationtoprotectacorpsefrompoortreatmentordegradationasaformof
property.Thenon-existentpersonatonepointwasinpossessionoftheirbody,andaftertheir death,theremaybeanatemporalobligationforotherstonotinterferewiththeconditionofthe corpse.Similarly,theremaybeanobligationtonotinfringeonbodilyrightsthatareheldbythe living.Whenthepersonexistsinlife,itcanbeassumedthattheyhavearighttobodily autonomyandphysicalsafety.Becausetheobligationnottocauseundueandunwantedharmto theperson’sbodyincludesconsumingthem,theobligationmayextendtothebody posthumously.Theremaybeanobligationtoupholdavirtueofcohesionorcompletenessofthe body,asthepersonwouldhavearighttothebodypartsthattheywishedtokeep(Winewski 2008,292).
Utilitarianobligationsrequireonlythattheactioncreatesmorebenefitsthanharm.This meansthattherecouldbeanobligationtousethecorpseasameansforwhateverpositiveends. Thereislittleobjectiontousingthecorpsebecausetheycannotbeharmedasmuchasothers maybebenefitted.Thepersonnolongerexistsandisn’tincludedinthecalculationofbenefitsto harms,andtheharmsdon’tseemtoberetroactivelyapplicabletotheexistingpersonbefore death.
5.AbsenceofObligationsView
We have no moral obligations to corpses. Ifobligationsneedanexistingandpresentsubjecttobecarriedout,itwouldbethecase thatwehavenomoralobligationstocorpses.Therecipientofthepromisecannolongerholdit, andthepromiserisfreefromduty.Corpseslackthequalityofbeingamoralagentandthereis noobligationtotreatthemacertainway,evenifitmightseemgoodtodoso.
Thesentimentalityofthoseinvestedintheposthumouspersoncanbeappealedto,but thisdoesnotnecessarilygiveusinsightintowhetherornotwehaveamoralobligationtotreat thebodyinaspecificway Onemaybeinclinedtopointtowillsorlastwishesasconsentgiven bythelivingpersontoacertaintreatmentoftheircorpse,asweusuallyfeelobligatedtocarry outwhathasbeenwilled.However,thegeneralcontentsofwillsshouldbetakenintoaccount,as theyusuallycontainactsthattherecipientislikelytoagreewithandvalue(Brecher2002,350). Ifgivendirectiontodosomethingthatthebeneficiary’svaluesdonotalignwith,itmayseem likelessofanobligationandmoreofasuggestion.
Itmustalsobeaskedifconsentgivenbythelivingtoactsthatwillbecarriedoutafter theirdeathismeaningful.Consentisanexpressionofwillingnesstoexperiencesomething, whichisapsychologicalmindstate.Ifthepersonceasestoexistatdeath,theirpsychological mindstateswilllikelygowiththem.Ifconsentismorallyimportantbecauseoftheagent'sstate ofwillingnessatatime,andmindstatesareafeatureoflivingpeople,itwouldfollowthat corpsescannotbeinastateofconsentingtoanysortoftreatmentafterthepersonhasdied.We maytakeintoaccountconsentgivenbythepersonwhenliving,butconsentisnotasmorally transformativetoanactioninthecaseofdeathasitisinlife(Winewski2008,296).
6.Utilitarianism
Itmaybeirrelevantifwehaveobligationstocorpses,orwhatthoseobligationsmaybe. Inaconsequentialistframework,thegoodsofcannibalizationmayoutweightheharms,andit wouldbewarrantedtodoso.Thisiseasiestseeninsurvivalsituationswhereitseemslikeitis permissibletocannibalizesomeonealreadydeadtosustainthosewhoarestillindanger. Survivalwouldnotbetheonlyapplicablecase,however(TheNewYorkTimes1972).Ifthe
goodsprovidedbymortuarycannibalismwouldoutweighthegoodsofotherfunerarypractices andanyharms,itwouldbepermissibleorevennecessarytoeatthedeceased.
Itwouldalsoseemthatthemoralweightthatdirectharmstocorpsesholdwouldnotbear agreatburdenwhencomparedtobenefitstotheliving.Corpsesarenolongermoralagents,and whiletheymaybeofmoralinterest,thatdoesnotoutweighanybenefitstolivingpersons(Lu 2013,440).Othernon-personentitieslikeanimals,nature,fetuses,etc.,potentiallyhavemoral interests,butitis“inconsistentwiththepracticeofthevastmajorityofcontemporarytheoriststo treatthosesortsofthingsaspersonsorquasi-persons”(Lu2013).Iftheutilitariangoalisto maximizecertainbeneficialinterests,theinterestscorpsesmayormaynotholddonotseemto requirethatwedonotcannibalizethebody
Ofcourse,itisplausiblethattheactofcannibalismisinitselfaharm.Thephysical dangersofconsuminghumanflesh,especiallyofacorpsethathasbeendeceasedforsometime arepresent,evenifrare(RudolfandAntonovics2007).Inparticular,priondiseasewhichcan occurafternecrophagyofbraintissueiscompletelyfatalwithnocure,whichisabigriskto take.Thereisgoodreasontobelievethatautilitarianviewmayalsoprohibittheactof cannibalismonthatbasisalone.Thatdoesnotmeanthatpersetheactofcannibalismismorally wrong,andinthecaseofmoralobligationthephysicalharmsitposesdonotnecessarilyplaya factorinwhetherornotweshould.
7.PresenceofMoralObligationsView
Ifobligationsdonotneedanexistingsubject,wewouldhavemoralobligationsto corpses.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthereareobligationsgiventocorpsesthatwouldprohibit someonefromengagingincannibalism. Asoutlinedpreviously,thepotentialobligationsto
corpsesthatmaymakecannibalismmorallyimpermissibleare:anobligationtoprotectthe corpsefromharmorpoortreatmentasanobjectthatwasonceowned,anobligationtorespect thebodilyrightsthatalivingpersonwouldhave,and/oranobligationtoupholdavirtueof cohesionandnotseparatethecorpse.Thisisbynomeansacomprehensivelist,butitseems mostlikelythattheobligationswewouldhavetocorpseswouldberelatedtothebodyin particular.
Asstatedpreviously,themoralobligationonlyexistsaslongasthemeanstofulfillthe obligationexist.Forthecorpse,thiswouldmeanuntilthedegradationofthecorpsemakesitso itisnolongerpossibletoprotectanyinterestsregardingthephysicalbody.Respectforthe corpsemayextendpastthatpoint,butactsconcerningphysicalinterventionssuchascannibalism wouldalsonotbeabletobefulfilledorprotectedagainstpastacertainpointofdegradation.
7.1ProhibitionofCannibalism
The moral obligations that we have to corpses prohibit the act of cannibalism.
Theobligationtotreatthecorpsewithrespectseemstobethestrongestobligationthat wouldpreventcannibalism.Whilethenotionofwhatconstitutesrespectforapersonisculturally defined,itiscertainlytruethatthereareculturesandpersonsinwhichtheactofcannibalism wouldbeunderstoodasblatantdisrespect.Itcouldverywellbebodilydisrespectfultobite, cook,orconsumepartofsomeonewhoisalive,andthisobligationcouldbecarriedovertothe corpse.Morebroadly,itwouldbedisrespectfultotreatthecorpseasameremeanstoanend whenengagingincannibalism(Winewski2004,268).Engagingincannibalisminawaythat conveysdisrespectanddoesnotcontinuetotreatthebodytoits“morallypermissibleends”as WinewskiputsitinhissummationofKantianargumentagainstcannibalism,wouldconstitutea
moralwrongandviolationofourobligationtothecorpse.However,thisdependson,onceagain, arelationalunderstandingofthedeceasedviewonbodilyrespectandcannibalism,andonly supportscertainprohibitionsofcannibalismonthatbasis.
7.2AllowanceofCannibalism
The moral obligations that we have to corpses do not prohibit the act of cannibalism.
Iftheconcerniswithbodilyintegrity,aseitherapossessionorasitpertainstothebodily rightsoftheliving,theissuearisesthatthedecayofthecorpsecannotbestopped.Inany funerarypractice,theultimatefateofthecorpseistodecayfullyatsometime.Inacasket funeral,thecorpsewillonedaybreakdown.Ifcremated,thecorpseisdrasticallychangedandin manycases,theashesthatremainofthecorpsearedispersed.Inmummificationpractices,the bodyisseparatedandtreatedtolengthenthetimebeforecompletedecay,butitdoesnotstopthe corpsecompletely.Ifnothingisdonetothecorpseatall,itwillstillreachatimeithasfully decomposed.Thereareinstanceswheretheintegrityofthebodyseemscontrarytoitsown interest,asinthecaseofanautopsy(Winewski2008,291).Itseemsimpossibletorequirethat eitherafunerarypracticeorindividualactmustkeepthecorpseattheintegrityitwaswhenthe persondied.
Physicalharmtothebodycannotbewhycannibalismiswrong(Winewski2004,266).If ourobligationistonothurtthebody,itistotheextentthatthepersonisharmedbytheaction.
Wehaveanobligationtonoteatsomeonewhiletheyarealive,presumablybecausetheyhave notconsentedtoit,butalsobecauseitwouldcausethemphysicalpainandbecountertotheir interesttonotsuffer.Asstatedbefore,itdoesnotappearthatthecorpseitselfcanholdconsent towardsanact,orthattheconsentismorallytransformativetoanactatthatpoint.Itmaybethat
otherobligationsexistregardingharmstothebody,buteatingacorpsedoesnotseemtoconflict withtheobligationtonotcausepain.
Disrespecttothebodyisapotentialharm,asthelivinghaveintereststoberespected.It couldbethattheactofcannibalizationisunderstoodasrespectfultothepersonwhohasdied. Whatactsarerespectfulseemtoberelationalbetweenthesubjectoftherespect,andtheactor.
Aswithobligations,ifpartyX andpartyY bothhaveanunderstandingofwhatbeingrespectedis, andthatactiscarriedout,thenitwouldseemthatpartyX wouldberespectedandpartyY wouldbe respectful.ItisinpartyX’sinteresttobetreatedinacertainway,andthismayextendtotheactof cannibalism.Ifweareobligatedtotreatacorpsewithrespectasthedeadpersonwouldhave understoodit,itispossiblethattherearesituationswhereeatingthemispermissibleand expected.
Conclusion
Cannibalismasanactisnotpersemorallyreprehensible.Inboththecasethatwehave nomoralobligationstocorpses,andinthecasethatwedo,cannibalismispotentiallyamorally permissibleact.Itdoesnotappearthatthemoralobligationsthatwemayhavetocorpses necessarilyprohibittheactofcannibalism.Mortuarypracticesofcannibalismshouldnotbeseen asmorallyabhorrent,butascapableoffulfillingtheobligationtotreatthebodyofthedeceased withthesamesenseofrespectthatisawardedtothelivingmoralagent.
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