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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION DAN CERJANEC, RODRIGO BRAVO, MARK MODLIN, and WILLIAM WINFREY, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Case No. 17-10619
Plaintiffs,
Hon. Laurie J. Michelson
vs FCA US LLC, Defendant. AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLC Shereef H. Akeel (P54345) Hasan Kaakarli (P81099) Adam S. Akeel (P81328) Attorneys for Plaintiff 888 W. Big Beaver Road, Suite 420 Troy, MI 48084 (248) 269-9595 shereef@akeelvalentine.com hasan@akeelvalentine.com adam@akeelvalentine.com
MILLER CANFIELD Jerome R. Watson (P27082) Misbah Shahid (P73450) Attorneys for Defendant 150 W. Jefferson Ave., Suite 2500 Detroit, MI 48226 watson@millercanfield.com shahid@millercanfield.com
PITT, MCGEHEE, PALMER & RIVERS Michael L. Pitt (P24429) Megan A. Bonanni (P52079) Robert W. Palmer (P31704) Cary S. McGehee (P42318) Beth M. Rivers (P33614) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 117 W. Fourth Street, Ste. 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 (248) 398-9800
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. Daniel E. Turner (GA 719330) Jacqueline Phipps Polito (NY Bar No. 2582690) Tasha K. Inegbenebor (GA 382905)
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Attorneys for Defendant 3344 Peachtree Rd. NE, Ste. 1500 Atlanta, GA 30326 (404) 233-0330
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mpitt@pittlawpc.com mbonanni@pittlawpc.com rpalmer@pittlawpc.com cmcgehee@pittlawpc.com brivers@pittlawpc.com
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dturner@littler.com Admitted to the Eastern District of Michigan on June 23, 2011 jpolito@littler.com Admitted to the Eastern District of Michigan on May 18, 2017 tinegbenebor@litller.com Admitted to the Eastern District of Michigan on May 11, 2017
PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF REGARDING DISPUTED LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSED NOTICE NOW COME Plaintiffs, DAN CERJANEC, RODRIGO BRAVO, MARK MODLIN, and WILLIAM WINFREY, by and through their attorneys, AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLC, and PITT, MCGEHEE, PALMER, AND RIVERS, and hereby submit their Brief Regarding Disputed Language Contained in the Proposed Notice.
For the reasons stated in their Brief in Support, Plaintiffs
respectfully request that this Honorable Court GRANT Plaintiffs’ Motion and STRIKE the disputed language. Respectfully submitted, AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLC /s/: SHEREEF H. AKEEL By: Shereef H. Akeel (P54345) Hasan Kaakarli (P81099) Adam Akeel (P81328) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 888 West Big Beaver Road, Ste. 420 Troy, MI 48084 (248) 269-9595
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PITT, MCGEHEE, PALMER & RIVERS, P.C. Michael L. Pitt (P24429) Cary S. McGehee (P42318) Robert W. Palmer (P31704) Beth M. Rivers (P33614) Megan A. Bonanni (P52079) 117 W. Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 (248) 398-9800 Dated: August 9, 2019
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TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………v-iv INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………...1 APPLICABLE LAW AND ARGUMENT……………………………………...….2 I.
DEFENDANT’S COST PROVISION SHOULD BE EXCLUDED…….4 A. Defendant’s Cost Provision is Unnecessary, Could Confuse a Lay Person, and Would Chill Participation…………………………..5 B. If this Court Does Include a Cost Provision, the Provision Must Fully Inform the Potential Plaintiffs of the Specific Costs Included and Excluded, Under What Circumstances the Costs Could be Levied Against Them, and to What Extent the Individual Could be Responsible for Such Costs…………………………………………6
II.
INCLUSION OF THE TERMS “FORCED RANKING” AND “CALIBRATION” WOULD SERVE TO CONFUSE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS AND IS NOT NECESSARY TO THE CLASS DEFINITION…………………………………………………………….8
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………...12
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Cases Allen v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 2009 WL 10680388 (E.D. Mich. June 29, 2009) ................................................... 4 Avila v. Northport Car Wash, 774 F.Supp.2d 450 (E.D.N.Y.2011) ....................................................................... 5 Bath v. Red Vision Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 2436100 (D.N.J. May 29, 2014)............................................................. 5 Case v. Danos & Curole Marine Contractors, L.L.C., 2015 WL 1978653 (E.D. La. May 4, 2015) ........................................................... 5 Chapman v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 2012 WL 1067736 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2012) .................................................. 5, 8 Crescenzo v. O-Tex Pumping, LLC, 2016 WL 3277226 (S.D. Ohio June 15, 2016) ....................................................... 7 Gieseke v First Horizon Home Loan, 2006 WL 2919076 (D Kan Oct 11, 2006) .............................................................. 3 Guzman v. VLM, Inc., 2007 WL 2994278 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007) ........................................................ 5 Hall v. U.S. Cargo & Courier Serv., LLC, 299 F. Supp. 3d 888 (S.D. Ohio 2018) ................................................................... 5 Hardesty v. Kroger Co., 2016 WL 3906236 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2016) ................................................... 3, 5 Hart v. U.S. Bank NA, 2013 WL 5965637 (D. Ariz. Nov. 8, 2013) ........................................................... 5 Hoffman-LaRoche Inc v Sperling, 493 US 165 (1989).................................................................................................. 2 Hussein v. Capital Bldg. Servs. Grp., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1182 (D. Minn. 2015) .................................................................. 5 Johnston v J &B Mechanical LLC, 2017 WL 3841654 (WD Ky 2017) ....................................................................... 10 King v ITT Continental Baking Co , 1986 WL 2628 (ND Ill 1986) ............................................................................. 3, 5 Knispel v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 2012 WL 553722 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2012) ................................................... 4, 8 Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., 252 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (D.N.M. 2017) ..................................................................... 7 v
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Littlefield v. Dealer Warranty Servs., LLC, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (E.D. Mo. 2010) .................................................................. 5 Martinez v. Cargill Meat, 265 F.R.D. 490 (D. Neb. 2009) .............................................................................. 5 Ratliff v. Pason Sys. USA Corp., 196 F. Supp. 3d 699 (S.D. Tex. 2016) .................................................................... 5 Roberts v. S.B. S. Welding, L.L.C., 140 F. Supp. 3d 601 (N.D. Tex. 2015) ................................................................... 7 Rogers v. WEBstaurant Store, Inc., 2018 WL 3058882 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2018) ....................................................... 3 Sexton v. Franklin First Fin., Ltd., 2009 WL 1706535 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2009) ........................................................ 5 Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank, 276 F.R.D. 210 (S.D. Ohio 2011) ........................................................................... 3 Whitlow v. Crescent Consulting, LLC, 322 F.R.D. 417 (W.D. Okla. 2017) .................................................................... 7, 8 Williams v. King Bee Delivery, LLC, 2017 WL 987452 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 14, 2017) ........................................................ 11
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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF FACTS On February 23, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Conditional Certification, Judicial Notice, and Motion to Compel. (Dkt. 40). On July 19, 2019, this Court ordered the parties to “either submit an agreed-upon notice to potential class members or…provide simultaneous briefing on the portions of the notice that are agreed upon and the portions that are disputed, discussing each side’s position.” (Dkt. 90). Since then, the parties have exchanged various versions of proposed notices and have successfully agreed upon most of the language contained in the latest draft. There does, however, remain two issues of dispute. The first issue pertains to the following bolded language which Defendant seeks to include: If you choose to join this lawsuit, you will be bound by the judgment whether it is favorable or unfavorable. While the lawsuit is proceeding, you may be required to respond to written discovery, provide information, sit for depositions, and testify in court. If Plaintiffs lose, you may be liable for FCA US’s costs of litigation. (“Cost Provision”). Plaintiffs, however, seek to exclude the bolded Cost Provision from the notice that is to be sent to potential class members. The second outstanding issue pertains to the following bolded language which Defendant argues should be included as an element of the class definition: Plaintiffs have brought this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and all other employees whom they claim are similarly situated to them. Specifically, their lawsuit has been brought on behalf of any current and former FCA US employee who meets the following criteria: 1
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1. Hired by FCA US before April 25, 1996; 2. Held a job title of either Senior Manager, Senior Professional, Mid-Level Professional, and/or Professional in any year since 2014; and 3. As a result of the purported forced ranking during the calibration component of the PLM employee performance rating process received, a final PLM rating of 5 or below while holding any of the job titles above and was age 55 or older when the final PLM rating was received. (“Causation Provision”). Plaintiffs, however, seek to exclude this bolded Causation Provision from the notice that is to be sent to potential class members. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court strike the above-referenced bolded language. APPLICABLE LAW AND ARGUMENT The purpose of an opt-in notice is to provide accurate information. HoffmanLaRoche Inc v Sperling 493 US 165, 170 (1989) (“accurate and timely notice must be provided to potential plaintiffs so that they can make informed decisions about whether to participate”).
Notices, however, should not be legal treatises. Nor
should they dissuade or discourage employees from participating in, or receiving the benefits of, collective actions. Yet that would be the effect of Defendant’s proposed language.
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Before addressing the specific points of disagreement, as a general proposition, it is recognized that notice of an ADEA collective action represents the plaintiff’s communication to the collective. King v ITT Continental Baking Co 1986 WL 2628 (ND Ill 1986). Thus, absent reasonable objections by either the Defendant or the Court, Plaintiffs should be allowed to use the language of their choice in the notice. Id at *6. In fact, courts have routinely rebuffed attempts by defendants to rewrite a plaintiff’s proposed notice. See e.g. Heitmann v City of Chicago 2004 WL “1718420 (ND Ill July 30, 2004) (“Although Defendant’s proposed notice and consent forms would be adequate, the court will not order Plaintiff to use the Defendant’s proposed forms”); Gieseke v First Horizon Home Loan Co 2006 WL 2919076 (D Kan Oct 11, 2006) (where parties submit competing forms, the court should “issue its ruling using plaintiffs’ notice as a starting point”) “Notice to putative [ADEA] collective action class members must be ‘[a]ccurate,’ should not ‘cause confusion,’ and should be crafted so as ‘to avoid any misunderstanding...as to the status of the lawsuit.’ ” Hardesty v. Kroger Co., 2016 WL 3906236, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2016) (quoting Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank, 276 F.R.D. 210, 214 (S.D. Ohio 2011)). Furthermore, Courts should not approve the issuance of a notice that would unduly “discourage[] potential plaintiffs from joining the suit or chill[] participation in the collective action.” 3
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Rogers v. WEBstaurant Store, Inc., 2018 WL 3058882, at *6 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2018). As discussed below, Defendant’sCost Provision and Causation Provision must be excluded as they would cause confusion and discourage potential plaintiffs from participating in this lawsuit. I.
DEFENDANT’S COST PROVISION SHOULD BE EXCLUDED As stated above, Defendant seeks to include the following bolded language
in the notice to be sent to potential collective action members, While the lawsuit is proceeding, you may be required to respond to written discovery, provide information, sit for depositions, and testify in court. If Plaintiffs lose, you may be liable for FCA US’s costs of litigation. To justify inclusion of the cost provision, Defendant cites two unpublished decisions from this Circuit: Knispel v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 2012 WL 553722, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2012)1 and Allen v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 2009 WL 10680388, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 29, 2009).2
Neither case is binding or
dispositive of this issue. As discussed below, many district courts throughout the county (including this circuit) have found such cost provisions unwarranted. Knispel is a FLSA case, not an ADEA case, that only relied on two unpublished cases from the Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio dating back to 2006 and 2011. The decision cited no statutory authority pursuant to which Plaintiffs would be liable for costs. 2 In Allen, the parties apparently agreed to include a cost provision so the court never discussed the authority by which the plaintiffs would be responsible for costs or fees of the defendant. 4 1
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A.
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Defendant’s Cost Provision is Unnecessary, Could Confuse a Lay Person, and Would Chill Participation When confronted with similar Cost Provisions, courts have held that such
language is “unnecessary and potentially confusing” Sexton v. Franklin First Fin., Ltd., 2009 WL 1706535, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2009), particularly given the “remote possibility that costs will be other than de minimus…[Therefore,] such language is inappropriate…[as it] may have an in terrorem effect that is disproportionate to the actual likelihood that costs…will occur in any significant degree.” Guzman v. VLM, Inc., 2007 WL 2994278, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007). District Courts throughout the country have also found that “the threat of payment of defense costs to absent class members if [the defendant] prevails is out of proportion to the risk and including such a warning could have a chilling effect on participation in the collective action.” Hussein v. Capital Bldg. Servs. Grp., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1196 (D. Minn. 2015).3
Hall v. U.S. Cargo & Courier Serv., LLC, 299 F. Supp. 3d 888, 898 (S.D. Ohio 2018)(“Plaintiffs contend that the inclusion of such information is inappropriate and could unfairly dissuade potential class members from participating in the action. The Court agrees.”); see Ratliff v. Pason Sys. USA Corp., 196 F. Supp. 3d 699, 700–01 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (collecting cases); Littlefield v. Dealer Warranty Servs., LLC, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1019 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (“DWS requests that the notice inform potential plaintiffs of the possible costs they might incur by joining the lawsuit. Because this notice might discourage plaintiffs from joining the litigation, the request is denied.”); Hart v. U.S. Bank NA, 2013 WL 5965637, at *7 5 3
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Here, Plaintiffs seek to issue notice to thousands of potential opt-in plaintiffs. To include language indicating that each individual could be responsible for payment of Defendant’s costs (even though such costs would likely be de minimus when spread amongst the class) is substantially out of proportion to the risk of that occurring and would only serve as a scare tactic to dissuade potential members from participating in this lawsuit. As such, this Court should strike Defendant’s Cost Provision from the notice to be sent to FCA employees. B.
If this Court Does Include a Cost Provision, the Provision Must Fully Inform the Potential Plaintiffs of the Specific Costs Included and Excluded, Under What Circumstances the Costs Could be Levied Against Them, and to What Extent the Individual Could be Responsible for Such Costs
(D. Ariz. Nov. 8, 2013) (“The Court is unconvinced that including language regarding potential costs of unsuccessful litigation would accomplish anything other than chilling an interested plaintiff from seeking more information.”); Bath v. Red Vision Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 2436100, at *7 (D.N.J. May 29, 2014) (“Furthermore, a statement in the notice that highlights the opt-in plaintiffs' discovery obligations and possibility of having to pay defense costs is unwarranted. Such statements have the potential of chilling participation in the collective action.”); Hardesty v. Kroger Co., 2016 WL 3906236, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2016) (excluding the proposed language as it could be “confusing” to the “average recipient”); King v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., No. 84 C 3410, 1986 WL 2628, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 1986) (“The Court finds that inclusion of such a statement would unreasonably chill participation in this action by potential class members.”); Martinez v. Cargill Meat Sols., 265 F.R.D. 490, 500 (D. Neb. 2009) (same); Chapman v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 2012 WL 1067736, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2012) (same); Avila v. Northport Car Wash, 774 F.Supp.2d 450, 456 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (same);; Case v. Danos & Curole Marine Contractors, L.L.C., No. 14-2775, 2015 WL 1978653, at *8 (E.D. La. May 4, 2015) (same). 6
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As stated, Defendant seeks to dissuade potential opt-in plaintiffs by informing them that, if Defendant prevails, each individual may be liable for Defendant’s litigation costs. Such language should not be permitted. However, if it is, this Court should require the addition of language that would 1) inform the potential plaintiffs of the specific costs that could be sought if Defendant prevails; 2) inform the potential plaintiffs of the costs that would be excluded if Defendant prevails (i.e. attorney fees)4; 3) inform the potential plaintiffs of the exact circumstances under which Defendant may be able to seek costs; and 4) inform the potential plaintiffs that, if Defendant prevails, any potential recovery of costs would be spread amongst the class. Indeed, as explained by one court, “a bare warning that participants may be responsible for litigation costs, without further elaboration, risks unnecessarily deterring potential plaintiffs from opting into the case. The Court therefore concludes that the notices in this case must identify the specific costs for which potential class members could be held liable should they lose. The notices may also indicate that opt-in plaintiffs will not be held liable for attorney's fees.”
Various courts have required the inclusion of language that fees will not be included as a potential “cost of litigation”. Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., 252 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1128 (D.N.M. 2017); Whitlow v. Crescent Consulting, LLC, 322 F.R.D. 417, 424 (W.D. Okla. 2017); Crescenzo v. O-Tex Pumping, LLC, 2016 WL 3277226, at *6 (S.D. Ohio June 15, 2016). Regardless, under the ADEA there is no statutory authority that would allow Defendant to recover such fees. 7 4
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Roberts v. S.B. S. Welding, L.L.C., 140 F. Supp. 3d 601 (N.D. Tex. 2015). Similarly, as recently explained by another district court, [T]he Notice need not warn putative plaintiffs about their potential responsibility for Defendant's costs. The issue of costs is not amenable to a simple short statement. Defendant's proposed notice gives no indication of what those costs could be; indeed, the costs might be negligible when spread among the class. Yet the potential opt-ins might be chilled from joining the action based on unfounded and uniformed fears of large costs. Whitlow v. Crescent Consulting, LLC, 322 F.R.D. 417, 424 (W.D. Okla. 2017). Chapman v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 2012 WL 1067736, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2012) (same). Here, Defendant has argued “in order to make an informed decision about whether to opt-in, [potential plaintiffs] should be made aware that there is a possibility that they may be liable for a defendant's costs of litigation.” Knispel, supra.
If this Court were to adopt Defendant’s position and include a Cost
Provision, then it should ensure that potential plaintiffs are actually “fully informed” of the specific costs that could/could not be sought by Defendant, under what circumstances those costs could be sought, and to what extent those costs would be attributed to each individual plaintiff. II.
INCLUSION OF THE TERMS “FORCED RANKING” AND “CALIBRATION” WOULD SERVE TO CONFUSE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS AND IS NOT NECESSARY TO THE CLASS DEFINITION
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The parties have been unable to agree on the language defining the individuals to whom the notice is addressed or the definition of the class. While the Plaintiffs seek to use simple language addressed to laypersons without a detailed understanding of how the Defendant’s PLM system works and how Defendant determined their PLM ratings, Defendant wants to include reference to the “forced ranking” and “calibration component” of the PLM. This language is unnecessary, confusing to the average potential collective member and inconsistent with the Court’s ruling.5 Plaintiffs anticipate that Defendant’s justification for including this language is that Plaintiffs will ultimately have to prove that the individual received a low score due to the forced ranking during the calibration process. However, the Plaintiffs’ ultimate legal burden of proving causation (which will be decided after discovery is completed and light is shone on Defendant’s PLM process and calibration sessions), should not impact to whom notice is directed or the class definition. The purpose of notice is to inform prospective plaintiffs of the action and give them accurate information so that they can make an informed choice as to whether to participate, not to deter participation by including confusing legal or technical terminology in the release. FCA employees and potential collective members are It is even inconsistent with the position of Defendant’s counsel who admitted during oral argument on the motion for conditional certification that there is no need to talk about forced ranking at this point in the proceedings. (Dkt 72, Page ID 2789, Transcript p 54) 9 5
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not privy to the details of the PLM employment rating process and how the final rating was achieved. The employee is only made aware of his or her final score. The inclusion of this extra language in the notice is too technical and legalistic and “could confuse potential opt-in plaintiffs and deter them from participating in the action” if they are led to believe that they must know specifically how or why they received the low score in order to join the action. Johnston v J &B Mechanical LLC, 2017 WL 3841654 (WD Ky 2017). Instead of narrowing the class definition, courts have held that “defining the Notice Group in broader terms best serves the remedial objectives of the” ADEA. Williams v King Bee Delivery, LLC 017 WL 987452 (ED Ky 2017). In Williams, the defendant-employer sought to limit the class definition in an FLSA case by requiring language that the individuals not only have been classified as independent contractors but have also worked more than 40 hours per week without receiving overtime wages. The court rejected defendant’s attempt to narrow the class definition concluding that: While both of these criteria are crucial to the ultimate success of Plaintiffs' overtime wages claim, the Court finds that defining the Notice Group in such a way could confuse potential opt-in plaintiffs and deter them from participating in this action. It seems likely that potential opt-in plaintiffs will remember that they were classified as independent contractors while working as delivery drivers, but they may not recall how many hours they worked in a given week. Moreover, defining the Notice Group in broader terms best serves the remedial 10
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objectives of the FLSA. If, after discovery, the parties find that an opt-in plaintiff was an independent contractor who did not work more than forty hours per week without receiving overtime wages, then he or she will simply be regarded as a member of the collective action with no damages. Williams v. King Bee Delivery, LLC, 2017 WL 987452, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 14, 2017). The same result should occur here. While discovery might demonstrate that an employee’s low rating was unrelated to the calibration process, that analysis should be reserved for a later day. At this juncture, employees know only of their PLM rating. Thus, references to forced ranking and calibration in the notice only serves to confuse potential plaintiffs and deter participation and should not be included. The Court also referred to this class (at this stage) as those employees who held the relevant job titles, were subject to the PLM process, were 55 or older, and who, starting in 2014, received scores of 5 or lower. (Dkt 72, Page ID 2803, Trans. P 68). Thus the phrase “As a result of the purported forced ranking during the calibration component of the PLM employee performance rating process received” is unnecessary and would only serve to confuse the average person. As such, this Causation Provision should be struck from the notice to be sent to potential opt-in plaintiffs.
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CONCLUSION For all the reasons given and authorities cited above, Plaintiffs’ request that the Court approve the form of notice and consent form attached as Exhibit A. Respectfully submitted, AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLC /s/: SHEREEF H. AKEEL By: Shereef H. Akeel (P54345) Hasan Kaakarli (P81099) Adam Akeel (P81328) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 888 West Big Beaver Road, Ste. 420 Troy, MI 48084 (248) 269-9595 PITT, MCGEHEE, PALMER & RIVERS, P.C. Michael L. Pitt (P24429) Cary S. McGehee (P42318) Robert W. Palmer (P31704) Beth M. Rivers (P33614) Megan A. Bonanni (P52079) 117 W. Fourth Street, Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 (248) 398-9800
Dated: August 9, 2019
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned says that on August 9, 2019 (s)he electronically filed a copy of the following document in the above-captioned matter by filing into the Eastern District Court Website: DOCUMENT(S): PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF REGARDING DISPUTED LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSED NOTICE and that same is being served upon counsel of record via the court’s electronic filing and electronic mail notification system as follows: Jerome R. Watson M. Misbah Shahid Daniel E. Turner Jacqueline Phipps Polito Tasha K. Inegbenebor
Watson@millercanfield.com Shahid@millercanfield.com dturner@littler.com jpolito@littler.com tinegbenebor@littler.com Respectfully submitted, AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLC /s/: SHEREEF H. AKEEL By: Shereef H. Akeel (P54345) Hasan Kaakarli (P81099) Adam S. Akeel (P81328) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 888 West Big Beaver Road, Ste. 420 Troy, MI 48084
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Michael L. Pitt (P24429) Megan A. Bonanni (P52079) Robert W. Palmer (P31704) Cary S. McGehee (P42318) Beth M. Rivers (P33614) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 117 W. Fourth Street, Ste. 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 (248) 398-9800
Dated: August 9, 2019
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