Australia/Israel Review: Dec 2025-Feb 2026

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Volume 50 | No. 8

DECEMBER 2025 – FEBRUARY 2026

HORROR IN BONDI The aftermath of Australia's worst ever antisemitic attack

AFTER THE WAR: HOW THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED

BY TWO YEARS OF CONFLICT

IRAN AT A CROSSROADS: RULING CLERICAL REGIME FACES UNPRECEDENTED PRESSURES

THE REVIEW

MONSTERS AMONG US: CONFRONTING AUSTRALIA’S FAILURE REGARDING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS

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WITH COMPLIMENTS

With compliments

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EDITOR’S NOTE

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DECEMBER 2025 – FEBRUARY 2026

n Friday, December 12, this edition of the AIR Magazine was completely finished – edited, set, polished, proofed and ready to be published on the

morning of Monday, Dec. 15. It was full of good articles from some of our favourite authors on a variety of highly topical issues, and we were quite proud of what we had achieved.

And then, on the evening of Dec. 14, the Bondi massacre happened. And we knew we simply could not go to press without addressing this horror – likely the most significant single event that has ever happened to the Australian Jewish community. And we also knew we had to pay tribute to the 15 innocent victims.

It took several days to be able to provide the commentary and tributes we include in this edition, not least because detailed information was simply not available. We now hope we have done this horrifying massacre and its implications some measure of justice, given the limited information and very brief timeframe we have had available to us, in a special section of the magazine we have added.

Of course, our original content is still relevant and highly recommended, particularly: • Ahron Shapiro’s report from Kibbutz Be’eri and other Gaza envelope communities, as their populations return and begin to rebuild.

• Israel correspondent Ilan Evyatar’s look at the still complex issues and unfinished business in Gaza.

• Joel Burnie’s interview with former Israeli National Security Advisor Maj.Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, canvassing the Gaza situation, the state of the Iran-Israel conflict, the Abraham Accords and more.

• Top academic specialist Prof. David Menashri on how Iranian regime leaders are reacting to their setbacks in the conflict with Israel, and the severe water shortages and economic hardships now afflicting Iran.

• Julie Szego’s meditations on Australia’s tragic failure to bring to justice any of the hundreds of alleged Nazi war criminals who settled here after World War II. And so much more…

Your feedback is invited about all aspects of the AIR. Please be in touch at editorial@aijac.org.au.

Dr Tzvi Fleischer Editor 4

Volume 50 | No. 8

ON THE COVER

Mourners attend a vigil at a memorial at Bondi Beach in Sydney, December 15, 2025, a day after gunmen opened fire there, killing 15 people in an attack targeting the Jewish community (Image: AAP Image/ Bianca De Marchi)

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PUBLISHED BY THE AUSTRALIA/ISRAEL & JEWISH AFFAIRS COUNCIL (AIJAC) EDITORIAL CHAIRMAN DR COLIN RUBENSTEIN AM EDITOR-IN-CHIEF DR TZVI FLEISCHER STAFF WRITERS JAMIE HYAMS OAM, ALLON LEE, OVED LOBEL, JUSTIN AMLER, GALIT JONES, ALANA SCHETZER, DR BREN CARLILL

TABLE OF CONTENTS AFTER BONDI COLIN RUBENSTEIN

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SURVIVING BONDI ARSEN OSTROVSKY

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IN MEMORIAM AIJAC STAFF

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FROM THE EDITORIAL CHAIRMAN COLIN RUBENSTEIN

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SCRIBBLINGS TZVI FLEISCHER

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NATIONAL CHAIRMAN MARK LEIBLER AC

THE SCENE OF THE CRIME AHRON SHAPIRO

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NSW CHAIRMAN PAUL RUBENSTEIN

WAITING ON GAZA ILAN EVYATAR

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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DR COLIN RUBENSTEIN AM

INDISPENSABLE? ASAF ROMIROWSKY

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DIRECTOR OF POLICY AND RESEARCH DR TZVI FLEISCHER

THE TYRANNY OF PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION BREN CARLILL

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A HISTORIC CROSSROADS FOR IRAN DAVID MENASHRI

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A JIHADIST GOES TO THE WHITE HOUSE EYAL ZISSER

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IS THE LEBANON-ISRAEL CEASEFIRE DEAL DOOMED? OVED LOBEL

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THE HATE FILES RAN PORAT

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INTERVIEW: YAAKOV AMIDROR AIJAC STAFF

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BIBLIO FILE: HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT JULIE SZEGO

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BIBLIO FILE: LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHE RAN PORAT

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BIBLIO FILE: THE ‘X’ FACTOR ALLON LEE

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CINEFILE: THE DAY ISRAEL STOPPED BREATHING JUSTIN AMLER

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ESSAY: TRANSFORMED BY WAR ERAN LERMAN

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ASIA WATCH MICHAEL SHANNON

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EUROPA EUROPA ALEX BENJAMIN

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ISRAEL LIAISON: PETER ADLER FOUNDING CHAIRMEN: ISADOR MAGID AM (OBM), ROBERT ZABLUD (OBM)

WASHINGTON HEIGHTS DANIELLE PLETKA

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AIR NEW ZEALAND MIRIAM BELL

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MEDIA MATTERS ALLON LEE

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KEEPING FAITH RABBI RALPH GENENDE

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DATA THAT MATTERS

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PUBLISHING MANAGER MICHAEL SHANNON CORRESPONDENTS ISRAEL: ILAN EVYATAR NEW ZEALAND: MIRIAM BELL EUROPE: ALEX BENJAMIN UNITED STATES: DANIELLE PLETKA NATIONAL EDITORIAL BOARD KEITH BEVILLE, RABBI RALPH GENENDE OAM, GARY HERZ, MIRIAM LASKY, STEVE LIEBLICH, RABBI DR JOHN LEVI AC, HON HOWARD NATHAN AM KC

EXECUTIVE MANAGER JOEL BURNIE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS JAMIE HYAMS OAM DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL PROJECTS DR BREN CARLILL SENIOR POLICY ANALYST ALLON LEE POLICY ANALYSTS OVED LOBEL, JUSTIN AMLER, ALANA SCHETZER, GALIT JONES RESEARCH ASSOCIATE DR RAN PORAT DIGITAL MEDIA PRODUCER AREK DYBEL DIGITAL MEDIA EDITOR REBECCA DAVIS COMMUNICATIONS & EVENTS MANAGER DIONNE TAYLOR INTERFAITH & COMMUNITY LIAISON RABBI RALPH GENENDE OAM EVENTS COORDINATOR HELEN BRUSTMAN OAM ADMINISTRATION ROSEMARY SANDLER, RENA LANGBERG

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FROM THE EDITORIAL CHAIRMAN

AFTER BONDI COLIN RUBENSTEIN

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he murderous attack unleashed on the Chanukah by the Sea celebration at Sydney’s iconic Bondi Beach on December 14 was the worst act of terrorism ever perpetrated

on Australian soil, eclipsing infamous incidents such as the Sydney Hilton Hotel bombing in 1978 and the Lindt Café siege in Sydney in 2014. It was also the deadliest attack targeting Jews anywhere in the world since Hamas’ infamous pogrom on October 7, 2023.

Furthermore, it will also likely be remembered as the single most significant event in the history of Australia’s tight-knit Jewish community.

Everyone in our community will have been directly affected. Among AIJAC’s small staff, one individual was injured in the attacks – incoming Sydney office head Arsen Ostrovsky – while another staff member lost a cousin among the 15 dead.

And as a result of Bondi, the nature of our community will inevitably change irredeemably.

“The Australian Jewish community is resilient and courageous – but what happened at Bondi, combined with other recent events, will inevitably call into question for some whether an openly Jewish life in Australia will even remain viable in the future”

Our previously largely confident, joyful and optimistic nature – already under pressure over the last two years of escalating antisemitism, doxxing, boycotts, arson and graffiti attacks, harassment and violence – is now even further threatened. It would not be completely inappropriate to suggest that Bondi on December 14 represented the Australian Jewish community’s “October 7”.

The Australian Jewish community is resilient and courageous – but what happened at Bondi, combined with other recent events, will inevitably call into question for some whether 6

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Mourners attend a vigil at a memorial at Bondi Beach in Sydney, December 15, 2025, the day after gunmen opened fire there, killing 15 people in an attack targeting the Jewish community (Image: AAP Image/ Bianca De Marchi)

an openly Jewish life in Australia will even remain viable in the future.

Our synagogues, schools and other communal institutions already need to be kept under fortress-like security, including, frequently, armed guards.

And still we have had numerous attacks on synagogues over the past two years, including, most infamously, the destruction of the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne last year, as well as the targeting of restaurants, a childcare centre and schools.

Now, after Bondi – targeted, planned mass murder of Jews at one of Australia’s most iconic public places – the question must inevitably be asked: Is it safe for us to ever again have a Jewish communal gathering in any open air public space, no matter what security is put in place?

And then there is the lack of safe access for anyone visibly Jewish to most city centres in Australia on weekends over the past two years. Many of us, quite reasonably, felt it was simply unsafe to be in the vicinity of the hostile, volatile crowds there every week chanting slogans like “Globalise the Intifada”, or “All Zionists are terrorists.” And law enforcement officers appear to agree, frequently telling Jews to “move on” for their own safety when seen in the proximity of these demonstrations.

This is actually a trend that started already with the infamous Sydney Opera House “f-ck the Jews” demonstration on Oct. 9, 2023. The Opera House was illuminated to honour the 7

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largely Jewish victims of October 7 – but Jews were not welcome in the area. The antisemitic protesters – who of course were never prosecuted – were allowed by police to take over the streets of Sydney and effectively create a Jew-free zone.

This pattern of police restricting Jews to “protect them” and “keep the peace” has continued, as has the glaring lack of legal action. Blatantly antisemitic sermons by some clerics – including Wisam Haddad, the purported spiritual teacher of Bondi shooter Naveed Akram – were not prosecuted. Haddad only had to face court because Jewish groups brought a civil case against him. In recent court cases, individuals who have attacked synagogues, including the East Melbourne Synagogue arsonist and one of those responsible for the Adass Israel Synagogue firebombing, have been treated all too leniently by our judicial system.

“It is desperately important that Bondi must represent the beginning of a transformational watershed in Australia’s approach to the scourge of antisemitism that has plagued our country for more than two years. If it does not, this must raise very serious concerns about the future of Australia as a tolerant, multicultural liberal democracy”

Australian Jews have been proud contributors to this country from its earliest days, and overwhelmingly have great love and gratitude for it. But today, our reality appears to be: we cannot rely on being safe in our communal institutions, even under extremely tight security arrangements; we cannot hold outdoor communal events; we often cannot openly walk the streets of our cities in safety; and we cannot rely on either the police or the judiciary to change these realities. Given all this, frankly, the viability of open Australian Jewish life here looks somewhat precarious.

That is why it is desperately important that Bondi must represent the beginning of a transformational watershed in Australia’s approach to the scourge of antisemitism that has plagued our country for more than two years. If it does not, this must raise very serious concerns about the future of Australia as a tolerant, multicultural liberal democracy, as well as of our own community.

Our political leaders, including the Prime Minister, have all been making appropriately strong statements in the wake of the Bondi tragedy, and for this we are grateful. But now they must do what is necessary to preserve the vibrant, harmonious Australian society we love and celebrate.

This does not mean simply providing more money for security for Jewish institutions to seal themselves off from the murderous hatred that is bubbling away in parts of Australian society – nurtured and encouraged by the pathological and obsessive delegitimisation and 88

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demonisation of Israel and “Zionists” that has dominated much of our civil society. Instead, we need leadership and action designed to stop the murderous hatred from growing even further.

Let’s remember that it took until four days after the massacre for the Federal Government to issue even a partial response to the recommendations of its own Antisemitism Envoy, delivered back in July. State governments have made commitments related to new laws to control the ugly protests and then delayed implementing them or ended up watering them down.

The Antisemitism Envoy’s recommendations must now be fully implemented. Relevant state and federal laws must now be urgently tightened. Police must end their “keep the peace” approach, which allowed the haters to control the streets. But that should just be the start. For instance, a royal commission into Australia’s antisemitism crisis seems amply justified.

Like the rest of the Australian Jewish community, we are still processing the horror of what happened at Bondi – mourning the dead, trying to support the survivors, attempting to participate in picking up the pieces of our shattered communal life. But we do already know that things can never be the same for our community. And we also know that if we do not see a much more serious and urgent approach to the national antisemitism crisis from our governments, law enforcement and civil society bodies, it is overwhelmingly likely that the forces that culminated in Bondi will get even worse – placing Australia’s open, democratic and tolerant society at great risk.

WATCH: AIJAC Executive Manager Joel Burnie spoke to Sky News’ Gabriella Power about the factors that contributed to the Bondi massacre

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SURVIVING BONDI ARSEN OSTROVSKY

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aving endured two years of terrorist attacks, sirens, and missiles, drones and rockets since the horrors of October 7, 2023, I thought I was moving my wife and two young

daughters to the safest and most peaceful place in the world when we decided to return to Australia less than one month ago.

“Abba [Hebrew for 'dad'], does that mean no more boomies?” my eight-year-old daughter asked me when I informed her of the move – “boomies” being her short-hand for the constant explosions and attacks that comprised her day-to-day experience in Israel during the war. I told her it was boomie-free. I could not have imagined that we were actually going straight from the frying pan into the fire.

I was returning to Australia in part to help combat the rising antisemitism in the country in my incoming role as the head of the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) Sydney office.

“I thought I was moving my wife and two young daughters to the safest and most peaceful place in the world when we decided to return to Australia less than one month ago”

Chanukah by the Sea is an annual well-attended event hosted by the local Chabad at the iconic Bondi Beach to mark the first night of Chanukah, featuring a carnival-like atmosphere for children with food, a petting zoo, face painting, music, bouncy castles and other entertainment.

I had just gone to get some food while my family sat down to watch the lighting of the menorah when the carnage began. I turned and ran towards my wife and children and was shot in the head. The doctors later told me that the difference between life and death was 10 10

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Arsen Ostrovsky took this photo for his family while not knowing if he would survive the attack (Image: Arsen Ostrovsky)

mere millimetres, and that it was a “a miracle” that I had survived.

At the time, all I knew was that I was bleeding heavily out of my head and had fallen on the ground. I snapped a selfie to send to my wife with the message “Love you” appended, not knowing if I’d ever see her or the children again. It took 15 minutes, the longest 15 minutes of my life, before I could get in contact with her and learned that she and the children were safe.

As it turned out, I was one of the lucky ones. Fifteen others, including a 10-year-old child, Matilda, as well as Holocaust survivor Alex Kleytman, tragically lost their lives, and dozens, including children, like me, spent time in the hospital recovering from gunshot wounds. In the minutes between 6:42 and 6:48 that evening, many people lost everything.

The doctors say I will make a full recovery. They mean physically; I do not know if I will ever forget the screams, the blood and the terror. I saw bodies and parts all around me, and although I have spent years telling stories of terrorism and resilience and advocating for survivors of attacks, I would never have guessed that I would become a victim myself, and on Bondi Beach of all places!

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One of the reasons I returned here was because I had watched from afar with growing frustration as the Australian Government failed to respond effectively, if at all, to the exploding antisemitism following Hamas’ massacre and pogrom on October 7, 2023.

I watched with horror as antisemitic protesters marched to the Opera House screaming “f_ck the Jews!”, as the police told Jews to stay clear of the area instead of stopping the protesters. Things only got worse from there, on campus and on our streets, with arsons, vandalism, assaults and harassment creating an impossible atmosphere for Jews.

I needed to join this fight.

“On the beach that day, I saw horror, but I also saw heroism. People risking their lives to help the wounded, to comfort people, to stop the attackers.

Some, such as Boris and Sofia Gurman and Reuven Morrison, were killed as a result. A kind man helped staunch my bleeding head by ripping off his shirt. That’s the real Australia.”

The Jewish community has been warning the Government for two years that the normalisation of antisemitism would inevitably end in bloodshed. Laws went unenforced, emboldening extremists. Instead of a crackdown, the Government escalated its denunciations of Israel and decided to recognise a Palestinian state, hoping to appease the extremism it has allowed to fester unencumbered.

What happened at Bondi was a natural culmination of this Government’s feckless virtue signalling.

The Jewish community does not need to hear that “There is no place for antisemitism in Australia” again. It needs decisive action. It needs political will. Most importantly, Islamist extremism must be confronted head on.

We now know the father-son terrorist duo were Islamic State loyalists, and that the son, Naveed Akram, was affiliated with local networks that promoted Jihad and Islamic State advocacy for more than a decade.

How have the hate preachers suffered no consequences? How are they allowed to continue radicalising and spewing hate? How did it take a court case by the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) just to get some of their public antisemitic lectures finally taken offline in mid-2025?

I look forward to assuming my role at AIJAC soon and helping ensure this changes.

Because it must change.

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This murderous attack needs to be a watershed, marking the end of appeasement and the beginning of real action, of real consequences, so that Australia can remain a place where Jewish life can flourish freely.

On the beach that day, I saw horror, but I also saw heroism. People risking their lives to help the wounded, to comfort people, to stop the attackers. Some, such as Boris and Sofia Gurman and Reuven Morrison, were killed as a result. A kind man helped staunch my bleeding head by ripping off his shirt.

That’s the real Australia. Not the jihadism of the hate preachers and their followers, and not the virulent anti-Israel protesters and their murderous slogans.

The last X post by Rabbi Eli Schlanger – who was murdered in the attack and leaves behind a wife and five children, including a two-month-old baby – reads: “The best response to antisemitism. Happy Chanukah!” above a music video of him dancing by an electric menorah on his car.

He was right, and I thought of him as I lit my menorah in the hospital – the ultimate symbol of Jewish resilience and endurance, representing how light will triumph over darkness.

But it will take real leadership to ensure that this story has a happy ending.

This was and remains the lucky country, and I am determined to show my daughter that it is indeed a place without “boomies”, where she and all Jews can live securely.

WATCH: AIJAC Communications Manager Dionne Taylor spoke with CNN’s Richard Quest about her experience in proximity to the Bondi massacre

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IN MEMORIAM We remember the 15 Bondi victims

AIJAC STAFF

ALEX KLEYTMAN Alex Kleytman, 87, was a Holocaust survivor. He was shot whilst shielding his wife, Larisa. The couple had been married for almost 50 years and were regulars at the local Chabad synagogue. Kleytman, along with his mother and younger brother, survived the Holocaust in Siberia.

Kleytman and his wife emigrated from Ukraine decades ago and have two children and 11 grandchildren. Larisa also survived the Holocaust.

Larisa said, “He came on Bondi Beach to celebrate Chanukah, for us it was always a very, very good celebration, for many, many years.

“Today in the middle of the celebrations (there were) shots and unfortunately my husband was killed.”

MATILDA Matilda, 10, whose last name has been withheld by request of her family, was marking the first day of Chanukah by eating cakes and playing with animals alongside her six-year-old sister, Summer, when the shots were fired.

Her father Michael later said, “I saw her go down and I crawled to her and took my shirt off and wrapped it around her… She was telling me it was hard to breathe. I was holding her.” She later died in hospital. Her father thanked the police, paramedics and doctors who tried to save her, and said Summer was struggling to understand the loss of her sister and did not want to look at photographs. “She just wants everything to be purple – it was Matilda’s favourite colour.”

Matilda’s family moved to Australia from Ukraine. She was the family’s first child born in Australia; her parents chose her uniquely Australian name as a tribute to their new home.

Her aunt Lina posted on Facebook, “A great tragedy has happened to my family: yesterday my beloved niece Matilda was killed during a terrorist attack in Bondi beach. I don’t know how we survive such grief.”

She was a student at Harmony Russian School of Sydney, in Bellevue Hill.

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RABBI ELI SCHLANGER Rabbi Eli Schlanger, 41 was known as the ‘Bondi Rabbi’ and helped organise the Chanukah event at Bondi Beach. He was an assistant rabbi at the Chabad synagogue in Bondi. He was also a chaplain at Corrective Services NSW, having joined in 2022.

British-born, he was a father of five; his youngest is just two-months-old.

He is reported to have recently sent the message regarding antisemitism, “In the face of darkness, the way forward is to ‘be more Jewish, act more Jewish, and appear more Jewish.’”

His friend, Eliezer Tewel, posted a tribute to social media: “He was just doing his job.

Showing up. Being the constant, reliable presence for his community. This is about my friend who is gone. It hurts. It’s confusing.”

NSW Opposition Leader Kellie Sloane described Schlanger as “a beautiful man and a great leader.”

During Chanukah last year, he posted on X a video of himself dancing, saying being joyful was the best way to fight antisemitism.

RABBI YAAKOV LEVITAN Rabbi Yaakov Levitan, 49, was Secretary of the Sydney Beth Din Centre [Jewish religious court] in Bondi Beach and worked at the BINA Centre of Jewish learning. He was married and the father of four children.

Like Schlanger, he was a key organiser of the Bondi Chanukah event. Community members described him as “The Man Who Made Everything Happen,” with the Chabad website writing, “If something needed to happen in Sydney’s Jewish community, Levitan made it happen.” Community member Avremi Joseph said of Levitan, “He was the spine of all Jewish organisations in Sydney.”

DAN ELKAYAM French citizen Dan Elkayam, 27, who grew up in the north-western suburbs of Paris, moved to Australia several years ago and was living with his girlfriend in Sydney’s east. He worked as an IT analyst for NBC Universal.

In Australia, he had involved himself with local community groups and clubs, including Arncliffe Aurora Football Club in southern Sydney, and was in their premier league squad for the upcoming 2026 season.

“Dan was a valued and deeply respected member of our football community. Our hearts are with his family, friends, teammates, and all those who loved him during this unimaginably difficult time,” the club wrote on Instagram. “Dan will always remain part of our club.”

He was Jewish and was celebrating Chanukah at the beach.

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REUVEN MORRISON Reuven Morrison emigrated to Australia from the Soviet Union in the 1970s before discovering his Jewish identity in Sydney, where he was a member of the Chabad community. Married with one daughter, he split his time between Melbourne, where he lived for many years and established a successful business, and Sydney.

Morrison was one of the four heroes who tried to confront the two gunmen responsible for the massacre. After Ahmed al-Ahmed (see below) disarmed the older terrorist, Sajid Akram, who had moved down from the footbridge that was the base for their attack, Morrison charged towards Sajid, throwing bricks at him as he retreated towards the bridge.

He was shot dead by the second gunman.

Morrison was described by Chabad as “A successful businessman whose main goal was to give away his earnings to charities dear to his heart.”

PETER MEAGHER Peter Meagher, 61, also known as Marzo, was a former police officer and rugby union player. A photographer, his friends described him as ‘the loveliest of men’. After hanging up his rugby boots, he took up a volunteer role as manager at the Randwick Rugby Club.

His friend of 30 years, Steve Keys, said Meagher retired from NSW Police a few years ago and opened his own corporate photography business, Marzo Photography. He was reportedly on assignment at Bondi Beach at the time of the attack.

Keys posted on Facebook about his friend: “Peter not only served our country upholding our safety and laws. He actively gave back to society through his love of our sport, giving tirelessly.”

TIBOR WEITZEN Tibor Weitzen, 78, was a great-grandfather. He attended the Bondi Beach Chanukah event with his wife and grandchildren. He died whilst shielding his wife, Eva, who survived.

His granddaughter told the media that the family is “shattered” by his death.

“Just devastating. Honestly, I’ve got no words,” she said. “And we were just yesterday with him. We had coffee at Bondi Junction with him yesterday... I didn’t know this was going to be, you know, the last day.”

Weitzen was a “beloved” member of the Bondi Chabad synagogue, according to the organisation.

His granddaughter Leor Amzalak told the ABC that he was “the best you could ask for.”

Weitzen had migrated to Australia from Israel in 1988.

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MARIKA POGANY Marika Pogany, 82, was a dedicated volunteer at Sydney COA, a volunteer service for Jewish seniors, and had been awarded the Jewish Communal Appeal’s Mensch Award for delivering more than 12,000 kosher Meals on Wheels since the late 1990s.

Sydney COA described Pogany as a “truly remarkable and wonderful woman,” adding that they were “shattered by her loss.”

“For 29 years, she arrived at COA with her quiet smile and her steady kindness. She lifted the room simply by being in it. She asked for nothing and gave everything.

She showed us what true service looks like, and she did it without fanfare and without ever wanting attention.”

Slovakia’s former President Zuzana Čaputová, a close family friend of Pogány, said she was an “extraordinary woman who lived her life to the fullest” in a statement posted on the Slovak Jewish Association’s Facebook page on Monday. “In her last message to me, Marika said ‘Life is a fight, take it as it is.’”

BORIS AND SOFIA GURMAN Bondi couple Sofia Gurman, 61, and Boris Gurman, 69, were well-known to the local community, having lived just around the corner from where the terror attack occurred.

The Jewish-Russian couple, who were approaching their 35th wedding anniversary in January, were captured on dashboard cameras committing extraordinary acts of bravery in the first few moments of the attack. The pair were walking across Campbell Parade, and witnessed Sajid Akram carrying a gun and spreading an ISIS flag across the windscreen of his car. Boris then tackled Akram and disarmed him, with both falling to the ground; Boris is then seen getting up and grabbing the gun and hitting Akram with it. Akram then grabbed another nearby weapon and shot Boris; Sofia rushed to her husband and was then shot. Both died at the scene.

The couple’s family paid tribute to the pair, saying they felt “an overwhelming sense of pride” at their brave actions. In a statement they said, “We are heartbroken by the sudden and senseless loss of our beloved Boris and Sofia Gurman. We were looking forward to celebrating Sofia’s 62nd birthday on Wednesday 17th of December.

“Boris was a retired mechanic, known for his generosity, quiet strength and willingness to lend a hand to anyone in need. Sofia worked at Australia Post and was deeply loved by her colleagues and community.

“Bondi locals, together they lived honest, hardworking lives and treated everyone they met with kindness, warmth and respect.”

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EDITH BRUTMAN Edith Brutman was Vice-President of the New South Wales branch of the Jewish community organisation B’nai B’rith, which in a statement called her a “gracious woman and a devoted member.”

B’nai B’rith member Ernie Friedlander told the media about her friend: “She was a very clever lady, and she was very, very passionate about dealing with prejudice and discrimination. She was always there, and she had very strong opinions.”

Her family told the media, “Our beloved Edith was a woman of integrity who chose humanity, every day. She met prejudice with principle, and division with service.”

BORIS TETLEROYD Boris Tetleroyd, 68, was at Bondi Beach with his son, Yakov, for the Chanukah celebrations when the shooters opened fire. Both were shot. Tetleroyd did not survive his injuries, but his son is recovering in hospital.

Tetleroyd was an immigrant from the former Soviet Union and long-time Bondi resident. He worked for many years for Sydney Trains as an engineering application analyst.

Boris’ niece Leia Roitour said, “Our family is grieving the sudden and violent loss of a beloved husband and father in the Bondi attack.”

The family also said they were proud of their Jewish faith, but that “Recent years have been difficult and frightening for many in our community. This tragedy has shaken us deeply. Still, we do not seek blame or division. We seek understanding, compassion, and the ability to move forward without having to hide who we are.”

Social media posts show Tetleroyd as a lover of Australian nature, often sharing photographs of animals he encountered on bushwalks.

ADAM SMYTH Adam Smyth, 50, was a Bondi resident and father-of-four. He was walking with his wife Katrina when he was shot and killed in Bondi. Smyth's family sadly confirmed he died at the scene.

The family stated: "We are all trying to come to terms with the senseless shooting, of which Adam was a victim. No words can describe the pain of our loss.

"Adam and Katrina were living their best lives together. Their shared love of family and friends, travel and sport – if not always the same team – made their time together truly special."

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ONE OTHER VICTIM The name of one other victim, reportedly a 40-year-old man who died in hospital, had not been released by the family as we went to press. An Israeli citizen is reportedly among the dead according to Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is not clear whether this might be the same person.

AIJAC mourns and pays tribute to this individual as well.

THE WOUNDED The Bondi attack left more than 40 people wounded.

Among them is 43-year-old fruiterer Ahmed al-Ahmed, who rightfully won global fame after video emerged of him heroically tackling and disarming one of the terrorists. Ahmed was then reportedly shot a total of five times, but is expected to make a full recovery.

Another notable casualty is police officer Jack Hibbert, who was shot twice and lost sight in one eye as a result. Fellow police officer Scott Dyson was also shot twice and remains in intensive care.

AIJAC’s incoming Sydney office head Arsen Ostrovsky, a human rights lawyer, narrowly escaped death when a bullet grazed his head, sending him to hospital for several days. [Read his account here] Sadly, it is not possible to pay tribute to all the other injured victims here by name, but they deserve all support, prayers and good wishes.

WATCH: AIJAC Executive Director Dr Colin Rubenstein told Sky News that antisemitism in Australia has become normalised

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FROM THE EDITORIAL CHAIRMAN

DISARMAMENT BLUES COLIN RUBENSTEIN

DR COLIN RUBENSTEIN is the Executive Director of the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council

F

or the first time in two years, Israel’s northern and southern fronts are relatively quiet, but no one should mistake this lull for genuine peace. On both borders, the core prob-

lem remains: two heavily armed Islamist armies – Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza – still exist, still aspire to Israel’s destruction, and still enjoy financial and military support from powerful foreign patrons.

The Trump Administration’s 20-point plan for Gaza, now endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution, at least names the problem clearly. It speaks of full Hamas disarmament, and an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and reformed Palestinian security forces taking over governance while Gaza is rebuilt. On paper, it fully realises Israel’s two indispensable aims from the Gaza war – getting the hostages released, and ending Hamas rule over Gaza and the military threat it explicitly poses to the Jewish state.

As we go to print, all but one murdered hostage are now out, and that is a great achievement. But the other aims are at least as important. And sadly, there is little sign that the international community is willing to do what the words of the peace plan actually require in this respect.

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Hamas is re-entrenching in the areas from which the IDF has withdrawn, and the group is openly rearming and reasserting control.

What’s more, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, in a public address in Istanbul on December 5, not only made it clear that the goal remains to destroy Israel, but specifically rejected both disarmament and any international oversight of Gaza.

In the face of this reality, Lebanon provides a salutary lesson. Despite the UN Security Council passing a series of binding resolutions over decades demanding the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon and insisting that only the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL operate south of the Litani River, Hezbollah was allowed to simply ignore these demands. It rebuilt its arsenal under UNIFIL’s nose, dug attack tunnels into Israel, and imported and produced tens of thousands of rockets and precision-guided missiles.

UNIFIL was never given the capabilities, rules of engagement or political backing needed to confront Hezbollah. Ultimately, UNIFIL didn’t merely fail to disarm Hezbollah, it acted (sometimes, apparently intentionally) as its shield.

“Instead of constantly screaming ‛stop’ at Israeli attempts to forcibly disarm Hamas, it should be made clear that a renewed Israeli Gaza offensive, with full international backing, would be the inevitable consequence of continued Hamas rejection of central aspects of a peace plan that it ostensibly agreed to.”

Israel dramatically weakened Hezbollah in October and November last year but, a year on, Hezbollah is rearming fast, and both the LAF and the international community are still prioritising avoiding any confrontation with Hezbollah.

Lebanon is therefore a cautionary tale for Gaza. The ISF, if ever deployed, faces the real risk of becoming UNIFIL 2.0. The force remains largely notional: no agreed size, no clear command structure, and – crucially – no states eager to contribute troops who might have to confront armed militants in crowded Palestinian cities.

If Western and Arab governments insist their soldiers must not directly face Hamas gunmen, then the ISF will, by design, avoid the very areas where Hamas maintains control. That is not disarmament; it is partition – and a guarantee of renewed conflict once Hamas has recovered.

The parallel plan to hand day-to-day policing to a newly trained Palestinian force faces similar problems. Many of the officers being trained are former PA policemen from Gaza who have been on the Palestinian Authority’s payroll since Hamas’ 2007 coup. But PA security forces – often corrupt or sympathetic to “resistance” – are the same ones that have lost control of most of the northern West Bank in recent years, allowing cities likes Jenin and Nablus to become citadels of Hamas-linked terror gangs.

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Meanwhile, the external enablers of Hamas and Hezbollah remain largely untouched and determined to rebuild them. Iran is already moving to rebuild Hezbollah’s depleted ranks and arsenals, and transferring funds to Hamas via Turkey.

In Gaza, Qatar continues to position itself as indispensable – funding reconstruction, hosting Hamas’ leadership, and providing the movement with media, diplomatic and financial lifelines. Another Hamas ally, Turkey, is also seeking to play a major role.

Under these conditions, Israel simply cannot, on its own, “solve” the problem of Hamas and Hezbollah. It can continue to degrade their military capabilities, kill key commanders, and impose real costs on their Iranian sponsors. But both groups draw legitimacy from societal milieus that largely accept their maximalist goal of replacing Israel with Palestine (see Bren Carlill’s piece on Palestinian public opinion), and material support from regional patrons for whom they are valuable strategic assets.

That does not mean disarmament is impossible. However, it does mean it will only happen if the democratic world finally treats the existence of these parallel Islamist armies as intolerable – not just for Israel, but for any hope of regional stability.

Instead of issuing endless statements instructing Israel how and when to fight, and treating the disarmament of Hamas and Hezbollah as an afterthought, Western leaders must put the onus squarely where it belongs: on the terrorist movements, their state sponsors, and the governments that shield them.

Reconstruction funding, diplomatic recognition and, in Lebanon’s case, IMF rescue packWATCH: Justin Amler on the international hypocrisy towards Palestinians as South Africa keeps a plane full of Gazans on the tarmac for 12 hours

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ages, should all be explicitly conditional on concrete, verifiable steps to dismantle illegal armed forces and asserting state monopolies on violence.

For Gaza, that means an ISF with a clear mandate to confront any armed group outside a reconstituted, reformed Palestinian security structure; a genuinely vetted local police; and a long-term international effort to overhaul an education and media environment that has taught hatred and glorified “resistance” and martyrdom for decades.

Instead of constantly screaming “stop” at Israeli attempts to forcibly disarm Hamas, it should be made clear that a renewed Israeli Gaza offensive, with full international backing, would be the inevitable consequence of continued Hamas rejection of central aspects of a peace plan that it ostensibly agreed to.

Australia, as a close ally of the United States and a respected middle power, has a voice in shaping this debate. Canberra should use that voice in Washington, New York and European capitals to insist that any talk of ceasefires, stability or “two-state solutions” be anchored in the hard but unavoidable reality that terror armies cannot be wished away, contained indefinitely, or integrated into political processes.

Any genuine hope for peace for both Israel and the Palestinians begins – and either succeeds or fails – with the disarmament of these terror groups.

AIJAC MOURNS DAVID PRYCEJONES

W

e at AIJAC were greatly saddened to hear of the passing of author, journalist and historian David Pryce-Jones, a long-standing friend and colleague, who died on No-

vember 17, aged 89. David was a wonderful writer, speaker and analyst, and a genuinely delightful and highly principled person.

He was a passionate Zionist and critic of antisemitism, and wrote regularly and incisively on those two subjects. He authored numerous books, both fiction and non-fiction, worked for many years as a special correspondent for the UK’s Daily Telegraph, had stints at the Financial Times and Spectator, and was also a long-time senior editor for the US magazine, National Review.

We were pleased to often republish his works – which were always elegantly written, keenly perceptive and infused with his firm moral outlook.

We were also privileged to host him in Australia on a number of occasions. His presentations were always thoughtful, highly articulate, stimulating and enjoyed by all. His most invaluable contribution was in providing his unique perspective, whether addressing audiences of influential listeners such as MPs and journalists, or to our supporters or media outlets.

We send our deepest condolences to David’s family. He will be greatly missed.

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SCRIBBLINGS TZVI FLEISCHER AID: IT WILL NEVER BE ENOUGH UN agencies continue to complain that not enough aid is going into Gaza. For instance, UNICEF spokesperson Tess Ingram gave a media conference on December 8 to say there were still many children suffering malnutrition in Gaza, blaming insufficient aid access. She admitted things have improved since the ceasefire, but complained ob-

Palestinians carrying food aid received from an aid point in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip (Image: Shutterstock/ Anas Mohammed)

stacles remain, citing delays and denials of cargo

by creating a sense of urgency, and to deflect blame

at crossings, route closures and ongoing security

from their own inability to get aid to those who most

challenges. “We have seen some improvement, but

need it. And because extreme anti-Israel bias has

we continue to call for all of the available crossings

been baked into all UN institutions for decades.

into the Gaza Strip to be open,” she said.

But here’s the thing. According to the US-led body now coordinating aid entry into Gaza, the Civil-Mil-

CONFIRMED: NGOS WERE CO-OPTED BY HAMAS

itary Coordination Center (CMCC), an average of

Many commentators have ignored – or even dis-

800 aid trucks a day have been entering Gaza since

missed – Israeli claims that supposedly humanitar-

the ceasefire started on Oct. 10. That’s well beyond

ian NGOs working in Gaza were cooperating with

the 500-600 trucks that UN agencies previously de-

Hamas and facilitating its goals. There is now con-

manded enter. What’s more, as this column docu-

crete proof that this was indeed the case.

mented last edition, even that demand was absurd

NGO Monitor has just published a report based

because before the Gaza war, in 2022, only about

on Hamas’ own internal documents, detailing its

293 trucks entered Gaza a day, of which an average

elaborate and largely successful scheme for con-

of just 73 carried food.

trolling the actions of all NGOs operating in Gaza.

What’s more, during the ceasefire in January and

The documents cover the years 2018-2022 and

February of 2025, more than 600 trucks were entering

originate with the Hamas Interior Security Mecha-

daily – and this led to a massive stockpile of excess

nism (ISM), a unit within the Hamas Ministry of In-

food aid being built up in Gaza warehouses, enough to

terior and National Security (MoINS).

supply the whole Gaza population for several months.

And they show that Hamas demanded all NGOs

So 600 trucks daily was clearly more than enough

in Gaza have a “guarantor”, a local Gazan, approved

to prevent any hunger, but now the UN says the 800

by MoINS, to serve as the point of contact between

trucks entering daily are still not enough.

Hamas authorities and NGOs. Hamas required that

The lesson is: whatever the situation on the ground

such “guarantors” hold senior administrative posi-

in Gaza, UN agencies will always scream that the aid

tions within the NGO, such as director, deputy direc-

is not enough – and blame supposed Israeli policies.

tor, or board chair, ensuring access to the highest

That’s what they do, both to try to get more donations

levels of the NGO’s local branches and operations.

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Many of these “guarantors” who served as se-

to 18 by the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-

nior NGO officials were Hamas members or sup-

Arab Cooperation at Tel Aviv University shows that

porters, or employed by Hamas-affiliated authori-

fully 75% of them want the predominantly Arab

ties. Among the NGOs listed in Hamas ISM internal

political parties to seek to join the governing co-

documents as having such a Hamas-controlled

alition after Israel’s next election. This is amazing

guarantor are MAP-UK, Human Appeal, CIVITAS,

because, until the Islamist Ra’am party joined the

the International Medical Corps, the Norwegian

Bennett Government in 2021, no Arab party had

Refugee Council and Handicap International.

previously done so, and the idea was largely taboo

What’s more, Hamas’ ISM used these “guarantors”

among Israeli Arab politicians. Now, more Israeli Ar-

as intelligence assets to report on everything the

abs want them to join than before the Gaza War – in

NGO was doing, describing controlling them as “an

May 2023, the percentage who wanted Arab parties

outstanding security-intelligence accomplishment.”

to be part of Israel’s governing coalition was 63%.

Hamas also demanded scrutiny of all NGO finances,

And what’s the key political issue for the Israeli

presumably to make sure they directed money and

Arabs polled? It’s not the plight of Gaza, nor the need

work to Hamas-approved companies and individu-

for Palestinian self-determination. A large majority,

als. The documents also mention at least one case

74%, said the most important political issue for them

where an OXFAM irrigation project was made to con-

was improving law and order (Israeli Arab towns have

form with Hamas’ military preparations in the area.

suffered badly from violence and disorder caused by

Yet no NGO seems to have blown the whistle

organised crime gangs in recent years). Only 7.6%

about these arrangements for cooperating with

said it was resolving the Palestinian issue.

Hamas at the time, even though they must have

One more interesting statistic from that poll –

been aware of them. And they continue to deny

73.4% of respondents said their personal economic

their reality today, despite the Hamas documents

situation is either “quite good” or “very good”.

proving the opposite.

Meanwhile, the IDF has also reported some good news regarding the minority section of Israel’s

MORE GOOD NEWS ON MINORITY RELATIONS IN ISRAEL

population in the form of increased enlistment.

More than 85% of Israeli Druze males are drafted

Readers of the AIR are probably aware that one

into IDF, which is not that surprising as Druze males

piece of good news coming out of two years of war

are, like Israeli Jews, subject to compulsory con-

in Gaza is that the Abraham Accords emerged from

scription. But that’s an increase from pre-war con-

it intact. Israeli economic, security and cultural re-

scription levels of 80%.

lationships with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco not

But more impressively, some 60% of Bedouin

only continued during the conflict, but look likely to

Arab youths (again, meaning males, females al-

grow further in the near future.

most never serve) – overwhelmingly Muslim – are

But another increasingly positive relationship

serving in the IDF. And Bedouin are not subject to

which does not seem to have been adversely affected

conscription, so these are volunteers. And there

by the conflict is the improving relationship between

has also been a sharp rise in Arab Israeli Christians

Israel’s Arab minority and the nation as a whole.

volunteering for the IDF, with a three-fold increase

A poll of Arab Israelis undertaken from Nov. 13

in just the last year.

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WITH COMPLIMENTS

With Compliments

Ivany

Investment Group T +61 3 9866 3066 F +61 3 9866 2766 Level 14, 10 Queens Road (PO Box 7638 St Kilda Road) Melbourne Victoria 3004

www.ivanyinvest.com.au Tel: (02) 9358 6366 Fax: (02) 9358 6377

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THE SCENE OF THE CRIME A return to the decimated Gaza border communities

AHRON SHAPIRO

Road signs on the approach to Kibbutz Be'eri (Image: Ahron Shapiro)

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S

tepping down from the bus at the junction for

not completely different than they were before

Kibbutz Be’eri along Israel’s Route 232 near

the war. Renewed Hamas attacks in the form of

the Gaza border, two things greet you: The first

rockets, mortars, tunnel warfare, incendiary kites,

is the bus stop’s bomb shelter – which has been

drones and hostage-taking attempts can’t be ruled

turned into a makeshift shrine for the people who

out – especially in the mid-to-long term.

had fled from the nearby Nova festival on October

What do the Gaza border communities think

7 and were murdered by Hamas inside. The sec-

about rebuilding even as Hamas reestablishes itself

ond, across the road and off to the right, is a whim-

in Gaza? For the answer to this question and many

sical metal sculpture.

others, I arranged to meet Kibbutz Be’eri member

To be precise, it’s a giant bicycle several metres high, complete with a rider and tractor tyres for

Danny Majzner, brother of Galit Carbone – the only Australian citizen murdered on October 7.

wheels. Its weathered red paint and motif tell me it was placed there before, when Be’eri was known

THE RETURN

as Israel’s mountain biking mecca. Before Hamas

In the immediate aftermath of October 7, the Is-

murdered 101 residents, before 30 hostages were

raeli Government created the Tkuma (resurrection)

taken from the area. Simply before.

Administration to handle the immediate and long-

Yet these days – for the first time since that

term needs of the evacuated residents. At first, it

cursed morning – this kibbutz and other hard-hit

was most involved in the immediate need to ar-

Gaza border communities are experiencing the stir-

range hotel and temporary housing solutions. The

rings of the day after.

horizon of returning to life on the Gaza border was

A degree of closure arrived with the sudden, al-

distant.

most surreal return of the last 20 living hostages

Today, its activities have a great deal to do with

during the US-brokered ceasefire and prisoner re-

reviving and expanding the kibbutzim and making

lease agreement in October 2025, followed by the

the entire region, including the city of Sderot, once

gradual recovery of all but one of the 28 deceased

again a special place to live – which creates dilem-

hostages.

mas in terms of balancing the need to memorialise

With the return of Dror Or and his burial in late

the victims of October 7 while giving the residents

November, the last murdered member of Kibbutz

and newcomers a future that isn’t defined by the

Be’eri was finally laid to rest in its cemetery. How-

massacre.

ever, the circle has not yet been entirely closed. As

After October 7, Israel evacuated all towns and

of press time, the remains of Ran Gvili, an Israeli po-

cities within seven kilometres of the Gaza border.

lice counter-terror officer killed defending Kibbutz

By the end of November 2023, it narrowed that

Alumim, are still held in Gaza.

mandatory evacuation zone to 4 km. However, it

Meanwhile, the IDF’s withdrawal to an agreedupon “yellow line” as part of the deal left Hamas

wasn’t until June 2025 that the IDF declared it was safe to return to all areas.

in control of about half of the Gaza Strip, and the

Whether people themselves were keen on living

chances of it disarming are low. This means the

so close to the front was another story. Until the

threats posed by Hamas against the country’s

ceasefire, the jarring sounds of nearby artillery guns

south post-war, while unquestionably reduced, are

and other explosive blasts remained inescapable.

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Nonetheless, more than 90% of the Gaza envelope’s 64,000-strong population had moved back by September 2025. Yet Kibbutz Nahal Oz has only just begun its return, while Be’eri, Kfar Aza, Kissufim and Holit aren’t expected to be repopulated until next year. Nir Oz, which had one-quarter of its residents killed or taken hostage and almost all of its homes severely damaged or destroyed, will only be ready to reopen in 2027.

NOVA’S MAKESHIFT MEMORIAL Surprisingly, Tkuma has not been involved with developing the poignant memorial at the Nova festival site. That arose from a grassroots level. Grieving families and friends started coming and leaving photos and makeshift obituaries there. Seeing a need, artist Amir Chodorov is credited for helping design the space, unifying the elements and weatherproofing them. The NGO KKL-JNF, on whose parkland the site sits, invested millions in developing infrastructure like a paved access road, parking lot and semi-circular seating areas off to the side where guides – often Nova survivors themselves – today tell their stories to visiting groups.

Meir Zohar, the father of a Nova victim and representative for the families, who was heavily involved in the site’s development, told Ynet in March that

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Kibbutz Be'eri resident Danny Majzner (Image: Ahron Shapiro)

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The bus stop bomb shelter outside Be'eri in which 16 people fleeing the nearby Nova music festival were massacred – now a makeshift monument (Image: Ahron Shapiro)

when he first brought his daughter’s picture to the site, a KKL-JNF manager he met empathised about the lack of a proper dignified memorial. “[He told me] ‘Forget about [government] decisions, forget about bureaucracy, let’s do this together.’” And so it was. “My dream is that there will be a museum here, like [Israel’s Holocaust museum] Yad Vashem,” he continued, “that the burnt cars [the 1,500 Hamas incinerated] which are on display [currently at nearby Moshav Tekuma] will come here and even the [bus] shelters [where people were murdered].”

Since the Nova memorial has officially become the most visited site in Israel – more than even Masada or Caesarea – one can see some logic to unifying October 7 memorials into one central location along the highway that connects all the massacre sites.

Danny Majzner, however, doesn’t agree.

REMEMBRANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION Danny, like most Be’eri members today, currently lives temporarily in Kibbutz Hazerim, 40 minutes away. But he visits Be’eri often.

Arriving early for our meeting at Be’eri, I stopped at the landmark La Medavesh (“For the Peddler”) bike shop and kiosk outside the gates and checked 31

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over my notes on my laptop.

When Danny arrived, he told me that Be’eri, like several other devastated kibbutzim, hasn’t made up its mind whether to preserve any of its own ravaged homes or start with a clean slate.

From his perspective, he believes that while the Nova memorial is important, it’s not the right place to tell the story of what happened at Be’eri.

“I hope that the kibbutz will be sensitive enough to leave one [ravaged] duplex up for the next generations. Otherwise, if we take everything down, there’s nothing to show to my grandkids what happened here.

“People say ‘we don’t want to walk in museums,’ and I can understand, yet something happened here, for goodness’ sake!” [Subsequent to this encounter, the members of Be'eri voted 196-146 to demolish and replace all but one of the homes heavily damaged on October 7- Ed.] In any case, while about 120 of the worst damaged homes remain standing, some kibbutz members have made themselves available to take small, pre-organised groups to bear witness to the destruction and hear the stories of those who died from those who survived.

It should be emphasised, however, that visitors are not welcome to enter

Israel is looking to revitalise a system whereby soldiers live and work in agricultural border villages, thus hopefully improving their security (Image: Ahron Shapiro)

Be’eri or any other kibbutz affected by October 7 uninvited and unescorted.

Danny suggested that he, too, would show me a couple of homes of people killed, and tell me the stories behind them, and then we’d find a place to sit in the shade and talk some more.

“With the war apparently ending with Hamas remaining in its part of Gaza, how does a community that suffered so much return to live in a place where Hamas has vowed to attack again and again?”

I have to say, my first impression of Be’eri was that it’s really spacious and naturally beautiful. Danny tells me that before October 7, they liked to say that it was 90% heaven and 10% hell. The “hell”, of course, was when the rockets 32

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and mortars would come, sending kids running to the bomb shelter with 15 seconds’ notice. Yet nothing prepared them for the attack that was to come.

Initially, as we drive around, nothing seems amiss. It’s lovingly landscaped with lots of flowers and greenery, tall hedges and trees that mask the full extent of the damage from many vantage points.

It’s also buzzing with activity, which Danny explained was almost entirely day trippers who come down to handle kibbutz business, but return to Hazerim at night.

Soon we get to a road that splits two neighbourhoods, Kerem (“vineyard”) and Zeitim (“olives”). Here, we stop, and from the looks of it, every house in sight was besieged and destroyed. Danny tells me Hamas saw to it that practically everyone in this area was either murdered, kidnapped, or both.

He takes me to two homes of victims. Either visit could be a feature story in its own right, but I’ll have to be concise and link to some longer stories (click through to see the stories of: Vivian Silver; Maayan & Yuval Bar; Sgt. Ariel One of the 120 homes in Be'eri that were heavily damaged on October 7, and whose fate is now being decided by Kibbutz members (Image: Ahron Shapiro)

Ohana; and Lt. Nave Lax).

The first home was that of Canadian-Israeli Vivian Silver, a peace activist who advocated for Gazans and took them for treatment in hospitals in Israel.

I take a minute of silence in the safe room where her body was found, burnt beyond recognition.

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Nearby, I enter the devastated home of Yuval and Mayan Bar, both killed on October 7. The following day, two IDF soldiers, Ariel Ohana and Naveh Lax, were themselves killed here in a battle trying to regain control of their house. The house has become a unique space for remembering both the victims of Be’eri and those who lost their lives trying to save them and reclaim their homes.

AN OLD SECURITY IDEA REVIVED The relationship between the kibbutz and the army is destined to grow closer in the future.

One of the matters under discussion is a revival of Nahal “garinim” (seeds) – soldiers who will commit to live and work on border kibbutzim for a year, serving in a combat unit for 20 months, and then returning for another year. This program, which was active from the country’s independence until the 1990s, was thought to have become obsolete with the advent of modern warfare.

Post-October 7, these squads will bolster the kibbutz emergency response teams that were never designed to fend off a major infiltration. Some will surely remain and rejuvenate the kibbutz.

We rested on the shady grass, and here I saved the hardest question for last – the one that had been on my mind since I arrived. With the war apparently ending with Hamas remaining in its part of Gaza, how does a community that suffered so much return to live in a place where Hamas has vowed to attack again and again?

“It is a problem,” Danny sighed, “because my daughter, son-in-law and granddaughter [truly want] to come back here, yet, in this situation, where there are still 10,000 or 15,000 Hamas terrorists in Gaza, and they still rule Gaza, they

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WATCH: Rebecca Davis interviews Liz Hirsh Naftali, whose three-year-old great-niece, Abigail Mor Edan, was orphaned and taken hostage into Gaza on October 7

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have no intentions of coming back here. And it’s a problem because probably by mid-2027 we’ll [all] have to leave the temporary residence in Hazerim, and people will have to make decisions.”

Danny has already made his own.

He’s coming back. Not to his old place, but perhaps sentimentally, to a damaged one that belonged to his friend Ziv Shopen. Ziv was in Tel Aviv on October 7 but rushed back to try to help save people in the kibbutz, and was tragically killed.

A monument from a happier time outside Kibbutz Be'eri, when the village was best known as a centre for mountain biking, instead of a massacre site (Image: Ahron Shapiro)

Danny showed it to me from the car.

“See it’s that one,” he pointed, “with the bullet [holes]. This is going to be my house. I’m waiting for the permits [to renovate].”

To which I said nothing. I found myself at a loss for words.

Our last stop was the new neighbourhood, where 70 homes are under construction. The idea is for the members who lost their homes to live in them first.

Soon, though, the kibbutz will be accepting new members. While Danny estimates that 20% of the Be’eri survivors may ultimately choose not to return, from reports there is a waiting list, not just here, but for all the Gaza border kibbutzim, of people applying to join. The demand exceeds their absorption capacity, and the kibbutzim are now on track to come back larger, younger and stronger.

FORWARD… Despite the best intentions of Tkuma, according to reports, bureaucratic issues have sometimes held up payments, leaving the kibbutzim to raise money on their own to ensure reconstruction gets done on time and the way they need it to be.

Danny hinted this was true for Be’eri, as well. The kibbutz’s fundraising campaign can be found online at “rebuildbeeri.org”.

As I made my way back to the bus stop and then to the train station in Sderot, my mind swimming with emotion as I tried to make sense of what I had seen and heard, I found myself lingering again in front of that famous bicycle sculpture – which for some reason, looked very different.

When I arrived, the artwork looked like a heartbreaking relic of Be’eri’s past, when it was famous for mountain biking, not as a site of mass-murder. Yet after all I had seen and heard, I felt like it spoke more to its promising future.

You see, one of the features of a mountain bicycle is that it can’t be ridden backward. Only forward.

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WAITING ON GAZA Optimists see the chance for a new regional architecture, while pessimists expect further conflict. Both agree on one point: much now depends upon Washington's resolve.

ILAN EVYATAR

Gazans receiving aid: Things are quieter since the ceasefire, but a full end to the war requires implementing "Phase two", including Hamas' disarmament (Image: Anas Mohammed/ Shutterstock)

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A

s the dust settles over the rubble of Gaza, the

half of Gaza beyond the “yellow line” to which Is-

Middle East finds itself suspended between

raeli forces withdrew under the Trump plan. Or else

two possible futures.

it could decide that the time has come to finish the

Optimists still believe President Trump can push

job militarily, now unrestrained by the concern over

through a new regional architecture, beginning with

the fate of the hostages that shaped the pace of the

Gaza and culminating in an expansion of the Abra-

war up until the ceasefire implemented on Oct. 10.

ham Accords to incorporate Saudi Arabia and then

The United States, however, remains determined

other Arab and Muslim states. Across the region,

to push its plan through. Washington invested

however, a darker interpretation dominates: that the

political capital and diplomatic muscle into push-

post-war landscape points not toward renewal but

ing through UN Security Council Resolution 2803,

a relapse, with further rounds of conflict looming

passed on Nov. 17. This resolution endorses the

over Gaza, Jerusalem, Beirut and Teheran. Nearly

Trump Administration’s “Comprehensive Plan to

two months after the ceasefire, an initial balance

End the Gaza Conflict” and authorises the estab-

sheet is emerging, which reveals a fragile equilib-

lishment of the ISF and a “Board of Peace” to over-

rium that could collapse at any moment.

see Gaza’s future.

Under Phase Two of the 20-point Trump plan an-

The US has also invested operational resources,

nounced on September 29, an International Stabi-

setting up the Civil-Military Coordination Centre in

lisation Force (ISF) is supposed to gradually move

Kiryat Gat in southern Israel to prepare for the next

into the Strip – making it possible for the IDF to

phase in Gaza.

withdraw from the areas it currently controls – and facilitate rebuilding.

Indeed, the increased US involvement on the ground over recent months led Israel’s opposition

But any sustainable “day after” depends entirely

leader Yair Lapid to accuse PM Binyamin Netanyahu

on Hamas’ disarmament – something the organisa-

of turning Israel “into a vassal state that received

tion has no intention of granting. In fact, Hamas has

dictates regarding its security” from Washington.

stated clearly that if the ISF attempts to disarm it,

Netanyahu dismissed the accusation as “hogwash”.

it will be treated as a “foreign occupier”. Every re-

There is reason to believe that Washington to-

gional actor that might play a stabilising role, from

day increasingly understands that its plan may only

the UAE to Morocco to Indonesia, has privately

become implementable if the current equilibrium

admitted what they refuse to say publicly: none of

breaks. A renewal of hostilities – whether because

their forces will enter Gaza while Hamas retains

of a deliberate decision by Israel or a Hamas mis-

its military infrastructure. The only states that have

calculation – may inadvertently create the condi-

expressed willingness to deploy troops, Qatar and

tions the US plan requires: a Gaza in which Hamas’

Turkey, are unacceptable to Israel because of their

military infrastructure is degraded to the point

entrenched political alignment with Hamas and the

where an international force can safely deploy, re-

Muslim Brotherhood. From Jerusalem’s perspective,

construction can begin and governance can shift.

the presence of either state would be a continuation

It is a paradoxical but increasingly acknowledged

or even amplification of the problem, not a solution.

reality in both Washington and Jerusalem: the US

This reality leaves Israel facing two grim pros-

“peace plan” may need the war to resume in order

pects. It could watch Hamas remain in power in the

to succeed.

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Given the current suspended state, Saudi Arabia’s diplomacy offers a revealing indicator. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman returned from his Nov. 18-19 visit to Washington with a significant weapons package, including an agreement on the

ion of both Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.

I

nside Israel, the political reality is equally welldefined. An overwhelming majority of Israelis

oppose any form of Palestinian statehood with-

sale of F-35 fighter jets that could challenge Israel’s

out wholesale changes in Palestinian political cul-

military superiority, without offering any movement

ture and leadership, changes no one believes are

toward normalisation with Israel. (Though the US

likely soon, despite Palestinian Authority Chair-

has subsequently made it clear delivery of F-35s

man Mahmoud Abbas’ promises of reform. Yet be-

will only be possible after normalisation, and for

neath the surface, relations between Israel and key

practical reason would take at least five years.)

Arab capitals remain far more resilient than public

The message from the Saudis could not be

statements suggest. Intelligence channels remain

clearer. Despite Trump pushing strongly for Riyadh

active. Military dialogue continues. Respect for

to join the Abraham Accords, without a credible

Israeli military capabilities has grown. But no one

roadmap on the Palestinian issue, the Saudis will

is prepared to unlock a new regional architecture

not take the next step for the time being. They can-

based on these realities while Gaza’s political fu-

not do so with Gaza still aflame in the public opin-

ture remains uncertain.

A show of force as Hamas seeks to reassert its authority in the portion of Gaza outside Israeli control (Image: Anas Mohammed/ Shutterstock)

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Meanwhile, if Gaza remains frozen, Lebanon is

gotiations. Instead, it is accelerating efforts to rebuild

heating up. Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah’s

its ballistic missile arsenal and air defences and its

Chief of Staff, Haytham Ali Tabatabai, on Nov. 24

rhetoric is becoming increasingly bellicose.

sent shockwaves through Beirut’s political and

Taken together, the regional picture defies easy

military establishment. Within Israel’s security es-

categorisation. Israel has altered the strategic land-

tablishment, the consensus is blunt: the Lebanese

scape. Hamas is weakened. Hezbollah’s leadership

state cannot and will not dismantle Hezbollah’s

has suffered major blows. Iranian militias abroad

military infrastructure. A new round of conflict is

and military forces at home have absorbed real

therefore widely expected, sooner rather than later.

damage. Israel’s deterrence, shattered on October

Talk of Lebanon entering the circle of normalisa-

7, has been partially restored.

tion seems premature for the moment, although here

And yet the foundations of any “new Middle

again, further Israeli erosion of Hezbollah’s capabili-

East” appear elusive. Gaza’s future is unresolved.

ties could perhaps create conditions for progress.

Lebanon is edging toward conflict. Syria is broken.

Meanwhile, despite the possibility of a resump-

Iran is rebuilding.

tion of war with Hezbollah, Israeli and Lebanese government representatives met in the coastal town of Naqoura near the Israeli border on Dec. 3, the first direct meeting between the sides in over 30 years. They agreed to hold further talks by the end of the month.

There has also been talk of a possible security agreement between Israel and Syria, but this too seems detached from current realities, despite Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa – a former jihadist

“For all the noise elsewhere – Lebanon, Syria, Iran’s rearmament – the strategic hinge remains Gaza. As long as Hamas retains guns, tunnels and territorial control, no Arab state will normalise, no international force will deploy and no new regional architecture can materialise”

– being warmly received in Washington. On Nov. 27, Israeli forces conducted an arrest operation in Beit Jinn, in the buffer zone on the Syrian side of Mount

However, for all the noise elsewhere – Lebanon,

Hermon, and clashed with dozens of gunmen be-

Syria, Iran’s rearmament – the strategic hinge re-

lieved to be from the Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood

mains Gaza. As long as Hamas retains guns, tunnels

affiliated Jamaa al-Islamiya. Several Israeli soldiers

and territorial control, no Arab state will normalise,

were injured, some seriously, and as many as 20 of

no international force will deploy and no new regional

the gunmen were wounded. Israeli military sources

architecture can materialise. Gaza will continue to

said the group had been planning attacks on Israeli

influence what comes next for the region. How that

outposts and possibly even a cross-border attack.

unfolds – through negotiation or a return to fighting

Iran, too, is regrouping rather than retreating. Since

– remains unclear. Much will depend on Washing-

the June 2025 war with Israel and the American strike

ton’s resolve to see its plan through, and willingness

known as Operation Midnight Hammer – which to-

to credibly threaten, and if necessary then support, a

gether destroyed much of its nuclear infrastructure

return to Israeli military operations in Gaza if that is

– Teheran has shown little interest in returning to ne-

what is required to see the plan implemented.

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INDISPENSABLE? UNRWA after the Gaza conflict

ASAF ROMIROWSKY

W

hat is a refugee? The 1951 UN Refugee Convention says it is someone outside their country of nationality with a ‘well-founded fear of

being persecuted’ for reasons of race, religion, nationality, social group membership, or political opinion. Yet beyond this legalistic criteria, all definitions include the sense that it is a temporary and undesirable status. The notion that refugees would wish to end their presumed displacement is taken as axiomatic. Yet this is not so for Palestinians, for whom the word “refugee” marks a critical part of their national identity.

The refugees’ narrative, which became an integral part of the Palestinian national storyline as a whole, was completely crystallised less than 18 months after the start of their “exile” in 1947-48: They bore no responsibility whatsoever for their unfortunate fate; their own political processes and decisions, and those of their leaders, were not seen as at all relevant.

The Arab states bore significant responsibility for the situation, having encouraged and facilitated the refugees’ flight. But the ultimate villain in this Palestinian narrative was none other than the United Nations, which had passed the November 1947 partition resolution that supposedly set in motion the chain of events leading to the Palestinian Arab catastrophe, or the Nakba. As such, it has an obligation to maintain the refugees until the state of affairs is resolved in their favour by complete and total repatriation, along with compensation.

The United Nations’ initial policy towards the refugees of resettlement and reintegration, which once held such promise, was quickly superceded – replaced by the intractable and legally-baseless insistence on a “right ASAF ROMIROWSKY is the Executive Director of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East (SPME) & the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA).

40

of return”, a demand which remains the ultimate obstacle to any durable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

The international institution charged with aiding the refugees, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), has worked for decades against their resettlement in the Arab countries

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Hamas or other groups designated as terrorist organisations by the US. Several of these employees, such as Faisal Ali Mussalem Al-Naami, participated in the October 7 massacre. A social worker on UNRWA’s full-time payroll, Naami is was also a member of Hamas’ Nuseirat battalion. Security camera footage clearly shows him entering Israel’s Kibbutz Be’eri, slaughUNRWA claims to be a UN agency, but its Palestinian clients have taken it over, making it a facilitator and driver of rejectionism (Image: Anas Mohammed/ Shutterstock)

where Palestinians are located.

tering innocent civilians and kidnapping others.

Mohammad Abu Itiwi, an UNRWA employee since 2022, is seen chasing down survivors of the Supernova music festival and attacking a group of young adults, killing 16 and kidnapping four.

UNRWA has done this by moving from refugee

The list goes on, and it goes all the way to the top.

relief to an education and healthcare mission, by de-

While there is no record that Hamas leader and Oc-

vising its own redefinitions of who a refugee is and

tober 7 mastermind Yahya Sinwar was employed by

by greatly expanding its legal mandates to “protect”

UNRWA, the passport of UNRWA teacher Hani Zou-

and represent refugees.

rob, who was in Egypt at the time of Sinwar’s death,

As a result, the Palestinian clients of UNRWA

was found near the Hamas leader’s body. There was

have gradually taken over the organisation and have

no better get out of jail free card for a terrorist, as

undermined what was originally an international re-

Sinwar clearly understood, than to hide under the all-

lief effort, created in naïve good faith. And they have

too-welcoming wings of UNRWA.

done this with the complicity of the UN General As-

Traditionally, one of the few constants in Ameri-

sembly. From a temporary relief and works program,

can foreign policy had been deference to UNRWA, at

UNRWA has, by its own admission, proudly evolved

least up until the first Trump Administration. Now, in

into a broad social welfare organisation for Palestin-

the context of the Trump Administration’s 20-point

ian society. It has succeeded to such an extent that,

peace plan, there is concern that UNRWA will try to

according to UNRWA itself, “there is little or no sig-

weasel itself back in and resume its previous de-

nificant difference between the standard of living of

structive role in Gaza.

refugees and non-refugees in the WBGS [West Bank

Trump’s peace place plan does permit UN agen-

and Gaza Strip], Jordan, or Syria.” And it has become

cies to participate in humanitarian aid activity and

a facilitator and ideological driver of Palestinian re-

does not specifically forbid a role to UNRWA. Posi-

jectionism and terrorist violence.

tively, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has made it clear that UNRWA must not play a role in post-war

UNRWA & OCTOBER 7

Gaza. In addition, Ambassador Jeff Bartos, the US

Following the October 7 massacre in southern

Representative for UN Management and Reform,

Israel, UNRWA ties to terrorism were exposed. Of

recently confirmed that “the United States opposes

the 12,521 UNRWA employees in the Gaza Strip, at

the renewal of the UNRWA mandate.”

least 1,462, or 12%, are bona fide members of either

Moreover, the US Inspector-General has initiated 41

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WATCH: Rebecca Davis discusses a UN official's denials of sexual violence committed on October 7

tions Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East except on the condition that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency take

a probe titled “Operation Stop the Carousel”, which is

all possible measures to assure that no part of the

designed to guarantee that UNRWA employees can-

United States contribution shall be used to furnish

not recycle and repurpose themselves to work for

assistance to any refugee who is receiving military

other UN agencies. If Hamas-linked UNRWA employ-

training as a member of the so-called Palestine Lib-

ees are found, the Inspector-General will report them

eration Army or any other guerrilla type organisation

to federal officials and potentially hand them over to

or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.”

the Department of Justice for criminal action.

The above policies are necessary and long overdue. In the past, the US followed the international

Under the Biden Administration, the DOJ decided to ignore the will of Congress and follow Europe and re-fund UNRWA.

community in placing UNRWA in a different and

Lines about UNRWA’s indispensability were re-

higher category, with untouchable funding, unvet-

peated during the Biden years. Biden’s National

table employees and senior managers who illegally

Security Council spokesperson John Kirby claimed

lobby in the US for support. The hope is that now

that “in light of the fact that there is still an ongo-

under the Trump Administration, this impunity is

ing crisis in Gaza and the essential role that UNRWA

ending.

does play in the distribution of life-saving assis-

The US has defined Hamas as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation since Oct. 8, 1997, but American law-

tance, we continue to support funding for UNRWA, with appropriate safeguards.”

makers have focused on UNRWA’s relationship with

However, UNRWA’s ties to terror go back de-

terrorism since the 1960s. Section 301(c) of the 1961

cades, as do its denials. Despite wiring running

Foreign Assistance Act stated, “No contributions by

through the floor of UNRWA’s main Gaza headquar-

the United States shall be made to the United Na-

ters to power a Hamas server farm below the build-

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ing, and the 2014 incident in which the parking lot

Despite being provided with overwhelming evi-

of that same headquarters collapsed as a result of

dence of the organisation’s complicity in the mur-

Hamas’ underground construction, UNRWA’s Com-

der and kidnapping of innocent Israelis on October

missioner-General Philippe Lazzarini claimed to be

7, the United Nations stonewalled the investigation,

unaware that Hamas was responsible for any of it.

only admitting timidly that it had identified nine

After such incidents, UNRWA simply “unequivocally”

UNRWA employees who “may have” been involved

condemns the unnamed “group or groups respon-

in the massacre.

sible for this flagrant violation of the inviolability of

They admitted nothing regarding UNRWA’s

its premises under international law” and carries on

schools, which have repeatedly been shown to be

turning a blind eye to them.

hotbeds of incitement and indoctrination, teaching

Worse

yet,

UN

Secretary-General

Antonio

young Gazans to hate Jews and plan to harm them.

Guterres vexingly admitted, “Of course there are tun-

UNRWA’s schools have literally gone so far as to dis-

nels below the premises of UNRWA” – seeming to

seminate educational materials praising Adolf Hitler.

think that was perfectly fine.

Everyone in UNRWA knew and lied, just as ev-

LEARNING FROM PAST MISTAKES

eryone in Gaza knew that Hamas was constructing

Now is the time to learn from the mistakes of the

a 500 kilometre tunnel network that diverted con-

past and not repeat the ignorance and arrogance

struction materials and goods from international

of the Biden White House that signed onto a “state-

aid. The international community, through UNRWA,

ment of shared commitments” that affirmed US

funded a vast portion of Hamas operations and also

support for the agency.

freed it to focus on terrorism rather than health and education.

As the conversation has now moved into what comes the day after in Gaza, UNRWA absolutely cannot be a part of the solution. UNRWA’s ethos of

BUILT-IN CORRUPTION

entitlement and the Palestinian identity as perma-

Lies and corruption were built into UNRWA

nent refugees – pending the destruction of Israel –

from the very beginning. The organisation’s ever-

cannot continue if there is to be any hope of future

expanding missions revolved around the slippery

peaceful coexistence. A concrete step to ending the

term “rehabilitation”, and its unilateral redefinition

current war in Gaza, rather than merely pausing it

of “refugee” to include almost all Palestinians and

until Hamas rebuilds and rearms, is to end UNRWA.

their descendants always meant that it was going to

UNRWA should have died decades ago.

be corrupted for local gain and would play along for

UNRWA has been dedicated to perpetuating the

its survival. It thus kept Palestinians in stasis, while

Palestinian refugees forever, thus ensuring that the

inculcating a perpetual victimhood mentality.

conflict will never end. What’s more, UNRWA, now

Back in February 2024, Israeli security docu-

in its 75th year, is clearly a shadow-state-like organ-

ments showed that at least 440 of UNRWA’s 13,000

isation which obviates the need for Palestinians to

employees in Gaza were Hamas terrorists. An addi-

build accountable institutions.

tional 2,000 were registered Hamas operatives, and

Anyone committed to ending the war in Gaza

more than 7,000 had immediate family members

should demand, first and foremost, an end to

who are active in Hamas.

UNRWA as well.

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THE TYRANNY OF PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION Why Trump's Gaza plan likely won't work BREN CARLILL

O

n November 17, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, endorsing the US

WHAT IS THE PALESTINIAN CENTER FOR POLICY AND SURVEY RESEARCH?

Trump Administration’s ambitious blueprint for

The PCPSR has been conducting surveys of Pal-

Gaza’s post-war future. Its vision is sweeping: a

estinians since 1993. Substantially funded by the

sustained ceasefire; a technocratic Palestinian

Konrad Adenauer Foundation, its research is trusted

committee to administer Gaza’s civil affairs; an

by Israeli, Palestinian and American academics and

International Stabilisation Force (ISF); Palestinian

policymakers. The PCPSR typically conducts sur-

Authority (PA) reform; and a political horizon for

veys every three months (though the two-year Gaza

eventual Palestinian statehood.

war has disrupted this regularity).

While there are many things that could go wrong

While many of the questions in each PCPSR sur-

with the plan, here is one that few talk about: It pre-

vey are about the issues of the day, many others

sumes Palestinians will accept demilitarisation and

are repeated on a regular basis. Some are repeated

non-violence, international oversight, the PA return-

in almost every survey. This enables researchers

ing to Gaza and a shift from armed confrontation to

to capture trends in Palestinian public opinion over

diplomacy.

long periods of time.

But years of public opinion surveys suggest that few of these will be acceptable to most Palestin-

The AIR has tracked responses to PCPSR surveys since the beginning of 2014.

ians. Across 11 years of polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), reviewed by the Australia/Israel Review, Palestinians repeatedly express preferences that contradict the major pillars of the plan.

CEASEFIRE, VIOLENCE AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMED ACTION UNSCR 2803 assumes that Hamas will sustain the ceasefire “in good faith and without delay.” Yet more than a decade of PCPSR polling shows that

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The Palestinian street is overwhelmingly hostile to numerous measures essential for moving the Trump peace plan forward (Image: Jose Hernandez/ Shutterstock)

Palestinians don’t want Hamas to do this.

Support for attacking Israeli civilians has remained remarkably stable. Between the beginning of 2014 and September 2023, a long-term average of 50% of Palestinians supported attacks on Israeli civilians inside Israel, with 46% opposed.

Other related questions reveal similar results.

Asked in almost every survey to choose between

lis, a majority always supported these attacks.

The notion that the post-Gaza war environment will produce a sudden, durable shift toward non-violence is not supported by any aspect of the polling record.

armed struggle, negotiations or “non-violent resis-

Indeed, across six PCPSR polls since October 7,

tance” as the best or most effective way to achieve

majorities in the West Bank consistently said that

statehood, violence was almost always the most

Hamas’ decision to launch the attack was “correct”,

popular, with an average of 43%, compared with

and support for these attacks in Gaza – after gradu-

28% who chose negotiations and 22% who chose

ally falling – rose again in October 2025.

non-violence.

Asked in June 2020 to choose between with-

DEMILITARISATION

drawing from the Oslo agreements, returning to

A centrepiece of UNSCR 2803 is the demilitari-

armed struggle, resorting to peaceful resistance,

sation of Gaza. The ISF is tasked with ensuring “the

adopting a one-state solution or returning to nego-

permanent decommissioning of weapons,” the de-

tiations, a plurality chose armed struggle.

struction of offensive infrastructure and the preven-

Asked on various occasions about bombs on Is-

tion of any reconstruction of armed capability. The

raeli buses, and attempts to stab or run over Israe-

future of Gaza, as envisaged by the resolution, is 45

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Palestinian opinion on armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel

explicitly non-militarised.

But Palestinian public opinion reflects the opposite preference.

Strip even if this is a condition for the war to not return?” Seventy-eight per cent of West Bank Palestinians and 55% of Gazans opposed this.

PCPSR polling is unequivocal: Palestinians don’t want a demilitarised state. Asked in December 2014, December 2015 and December 2018 about

GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY, THE PA AND TECHNOCRATS

the concept, they rejected it by an average of 70%.

UNSCR 2803 envisions Gaza being run by a

Other polls show that majorities also oppose

technocratic, apolitical committee supervised by a

disarming Hamas and other armed groups, even

‘Board of Peace’, until a reformed PA can assume

when disarmament is tied to statehood. Most Pal-

control.

estinians also reject the idea that the PA should

Around 80% of Palestinians say the PA is cor-

have a monopoly over armed force. For instance,

rupt. And majorities say the PA violates freedoms.

in December 2022, 87% of Palestinians said that

Most Palestinians describe the PA as a burden on

PA security forces did not have the right to disarm

the Palestinian people. Overwhelming majorities

armed groups in order to prevent them from carry-

say PA President Mahmoud Abbas should resign.

ing out attacks against Israelis.

While Abbas, associated with endemic corrup-

In October 2025, Palestinians were asked, “Do

tion, is deeply unpopular, clean technocrats fare

you support the element in the Trump plan that

no better. Salam Fayyad – widely respected inter-

demands the disarmament of Hamas in the Gaza

nationally – is consistently unpopular. By contrast,

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convicted terrorist Marwan Barghouti remains the

tional auspices, to run Gaza.

most popular figure, with former Hamas leader in

In the same survey, 52% of Palestinians (includ-

Gaza Ismail Haniyeh – until his death – being the

ing 45% of Gazans) opposed a role for the PA in

second most popular.

which it would coordinate the administration of the

The Palestinian public tends to reward violent credentials over administrative competence.

Gaza Strip with such a committee.

In good news for the PA and international hopes,

In September 2024, Palestinians were asked

opposition to the return of the PA to Gaza has

about international plans for a “revitalised” PA with

dropped from 70% in September last year to 41%

international and Arab support. Seventy-three per

in October this year. However, despite this bare-

cent of Palestinians said they were against this

majority acceptance of the PA assuming control of

plan.

Gaza, the fact that technocrats and the current PA

Moreover, a majority of Palestinians do not be-

leadership are so unpopular and that only half of

lieve that the PA is currently reforming, despite its

Gazans support the idea of a technocratic commit-

announcements about doing so. Further, a majority

tee (and very few Palestinians believe the PA will

don’t believe that the PA will hold elections within

reform) undermines the international community’s

12 months of the ceasefire beginning, despite it

assumptions about Gaza’s future governance.

promising to do so. ber 2025, only 45% supported the plan’s call for a

FOREIGN FORCES, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND EXTERNAL CONTROL

technocratic Palestinian committee, under interna-

UNSCR 2803 authorises a multinational ‘In-

Asked specifically about Trump’s plan, in Octo-

WATCH: Bren Carlill explains how 11 years of polls show Palestinians oppose Abbas’ reform pledges

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DECEMBER 2025–FEBRUARY 2026

ternational Stabilisation Force’ to temporarily as-

tinians opposed armed forces from Egypt, Jordan

sume security control over Gaza. Notwithstanding

“and other Arab and Islamic countries” to maintain

the reported difficulties in recruiting countries to

security in Gaza and disarm Hamas.

join what amounts to (on paper, at least) a peace-

Opposition dropped slightly in a separate ques-

enforcing force, for the plan to work Palestinians

tion that asked about foreign Arab forces policing

must accept a foreign security presence enforcing

Gaza but excluded disarming Hamas – this time

demilitarisation, securing borders, training police

only 47% of Gazans opposed it.

and coordinating with Israel and Egypt.

Polling shows they do not.

What does this mean? It means that if a peaceenforcing force is actually sent to Gaza, its efforts

“If a peace-enforcing force is actually sent to Gaza, its efforts to disarm Hamas will not have the backing of the local population – while Hamas’ violent attempts to resist such disarmament will have local support”

In December 2023, 60% of Gazans (and 77% of

to disarm Hamas will not have the backing of the

West Bank Palestinians) said they opposed the idea

local population – while Hamas’ violent attempts

of an Arab security contingent helping the PA main-

to resist such disarmament will have local support.

tain security after the war. Asked a similar but more specific question in June 2024, 77% of Gazans (and

A TWO-STATE HORIZON?

73% of West Bank Palestinians) said no to “If the

Another key assumption in UNSCR 2803 is that

West Bank and the Gaza Strip are unified under the

Palestinians want to move toward a negotiated

control of the Palestinian Authority, would you sup-

two-state outcome.

port the deployment of an Arab security contingent

But support for a two-state outcome has long

from countries like Egypt or Jordan to provide sup-

been in the minority in Palestinian opinion surveys.

port for the PA and help maintain security?” Again,

Support drops further when details are added.

in May 2025, 65% of Palestinians rejected the idea

Over the years (particularly between March 2014 and

of Jordan and Egypt providing forces to help main-

December 2016, and again in December 2018, March

tain security of Gaza.

2019 and March 2020) numerous possible two-state

It’s not just Jordanian and Egyptian forces. In

scenarios – usually based on proposals floated by the

March 2024, 76% of Gazans (and 53% of West Bank

international community – have been detailed in sur-

Palestinians) were against the idea of “the immedi-

veys: only small minorities support them.

ate deployment of an international force under the

In October 2025, Palestinians were asked, “Do

UN flag to temporarily police the Gaza Strip and

you support or oppose the establishment of an in-

bring about an Israeli withdrawal.”

dependent Palestinian state on the borders of June

In October 2025, in the context of the Trump

4, 1967, one that would be demilitarised, with East

plan, 52% of Gazans and 78% of West Bank Pales-

Jerusalem as its capital, with limited land swaps

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so that it can live in peace with the State of Israel,

In almost every survey since the start of 2014,

with international guarantees?” Overall, 55% of Pal-

Palestinians were asked who they’d vote for in Par-

estinians opposed this. (That said, a small majority

liamentary elections if the same candidates as in

– 61% – of Gazans supported this, compared with

the 2006 election were available to them. Hamas

only 33% in the West Bank.)

remained popular throughout, with its popularity

Resolution 2803 therefore rests on a political horizon that the majority of Palestinians do not support.

skyrocketing immediately after October 7.

While support for Hamas has dropped since then, it has merely returned to its pre-war levels.

Meanwhile, support for Fatah plummeted during

THE MAIN PROBLEM IS HAMAS

the same period, and never recovered.

Underlying all of these problems is Hamas. The

Similarly, a question asked in almost every sur-

problem is not simply that it is a well-armed and

vey for 11 years, about support for political parties,

ideologically-committed organisation backed by

saw support for Hamas spike as a result of the Oc-

Turkey, Qatar and Iran, but that it remains popular

tober 7 attacks, and stay high.

among Palestinians.

Since 2021, when the question was first asked,

In October 2025, a plurality of Palestinians said

more Palestinians have reported that they see

their support for Hamas had increased since Oc-

Hamas as deserving of representing them rather

tober 7.

than Fatah.

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In December 2023, March 2024 and June 2024, Palestinians were asked who they would prefer

dominance was their preferred outcome to the war.

seeing in control of Gaza. An average of 45% of Ga-

UNSCR 2803 imagines a technocratically-gov-

zans (and 70% of West Bank Palestinians) chose

erned, demilitarised, diplomatically-oriented, inter-

Hamas.

nationally-supported transition toward Palestinian

Asked five times between March 2024 and Oc-

self-determination.

tober 2025 if they were satisfied with Fatah’s and

Palestinian public opinion points elsewhere:

Hamas’ performance in the war, an average of 26%

Violence is seen as effective, diplomacy is not.

of Palestinians said they were satisfied with Fa-

Demilitarisation is unpopular. Foreign forces are

tah’s performance, compared with 66% who said

unwanted. Technocrats lack legitimacy. The PA is

they were satisfied with Hamas’ performance. If

rejected. Hamas retains support. And a two-state

we disaggregate the data, to just look at Gazan re-

outcome isn’t desired.

sponses, 31% say they are satisfied with Fatah’s

Trump’s ‘Comprehensive Plan’ for Gaza, now en-

performance, compared with a satisfaction rate of

dorsed by a Security Council resolution, faces many

52% for Hamas.

challenges. But arguably the greatest challenge –

Indeed, an average of 49% of Gazans (and

almost never discussed – is that the Palestinian

68% of West Bank Palestinians), in March, June

public rejects all of the elements that it requires to

and September 2024, said the return of Hamas

succeed.

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A HISTORIC CROSSROADS FOR IRAN Regime under unprecedented pressure following 12-Day War

DAVID MENASHRI

T

he Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 – followed by war in Gaza as well as with each member of Iran’s “resistance front”,

culminating in the “12-Day War” between Israel and Iran in June this year – changed the regional architecture, and carried dramatic consequences for Iran.

Although Iran has been at the centre of worldwide public attention since 1979, it remains an enigma. It is a complex country, wrapped in mystery, and there are still significant unknown elements in resolving its riddles.

Even if we accept that interest is the key to understanding Iranian policy, crucial questions remain – whose interest shapes policy: the interests of Islam, Iran, the ruling elite, or the Supreme Leader? Who determines what the interests are at any given time?

This article attempts to shed light on the dramatic changes in Iran.

While attention has largely been focused on Iran’s regional ambitions, its nuclear program and animosity to the United States and Israel, this paper will focus on domestic realities and politics, which are essential to unDAVID MENASHRI, Professor Emeritus at Tel Aviv University, is the Founding Director of the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies and remains a Senior Research Fellow at Tel Aviv University (TAU). He is the author or editor of ten books on modern Iran.

52

derstanding the complexities of the Iranian state and society. After all, as famed British photojournalist Don McCullin noted, “It’s all local”.

A TRIANGULAR IDENTITY The historical legacy of Iran is grounded on triangular layers of identity – Persian, imperial and monarchical; medieval, Islamic and Shi’ite; new, modern and Western – which together shaped modern Iran. Vacillating

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Iran's young people are simply not interested in the religious themes the regime is trying to push on them (Image: Shutterstock)

between the three layers of identity resulted in a complex mixture of nationalism, Islam and Western ideas. The first two are anchored in Iran’s sense of exclusiveness, superiority and grandiose aspi-

depends on the position of those in power at any

rations as the first world empire and as the cher-

given time.

ished children of Allah. This sense of preeminence

Like other ideological movements, upon assum-

is often typified by disdain and arrogance toward

ing power and facing the complex demands of gov-

neighbours, in addition to a sense of deprivation

ernance, the Islamic Republic was forced to adapt

and victimhood.

itself to newly emerging realities. In 1987, Khomeini

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (who reigned

went as far as sanctioning the authority of the state

from 1941-1979) tried to minimise the place of

“to destroy a mosque” or to suspend the practice of

religion in the public sphere, to glorify imperial

the five pillars of Islam, if the state’s interests so re-

Persian civilisation and westernise Iran. Founder

quired. Moreover, it is unclear how Iran’s assertion

of the current Islamic regime Ayatollah Ruhollah

that there is no difference between Muslims, either

Khomeini (1979-1989) focused on Islamic heritage

in ethnic or sectarian affiliation, complies with the

and worked to suppress Persian heritage and cul-

constitution, which states that only a Shi‘ite of Ira-

tivate hatred towards the West. The Shah failed to

nian origin can hold office as president. How can

hide the legacy of the Imam Hossein, the founder

one reconcile rejection of national divisions within

of Shi’ism, while Khomeini was unable to distance

the Islamic world with the insistence that the nearby

society from the legacy of King Cyrus the Great or

Gulf must be called “Persian”?

ignore the influence of Western science and tech-

At home, while the regime was building on its

nology. Ultimately, the weight of each component

“successes” in the war with Israel and the US, pub53

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lic fury has increased. Many have opposed Iran’s adventures beyond its borders, and the sacrifices in lives and resources to support allies and proxies, alongside the unfulfilled expectations from the Islamic Revolution in terms of securing freedom and welfare. This led to public disenchantment and fury, which in turn led to protests. While the slogan of the 1979 revolution was “Islam is the solution,” by

Anti-regime protests in 2022, suppressed, but representing an underlying demand for political change, not just reforms (Image: X)

2009 many wondered, “Is Islam the solution?” and recently, many concluded that Islam, as practised

ple stood against foreign aggression – to defend Iran,

under Islamic rule, is not the solution. Already in

not the Islamic Republic. Under the circumstances,

2015, President Hassan Rouhani had stated that

Khamenei felt obliged to keep the people closer to

Iran’s “main enemy” is neither the US nor Israel, but

the Government for the sake of the homeland.

unemployment, inflation, drought and ecological

“Baraye” (“for” or “because”), the anthem of the

crisis. In 2020, former Foreign Minister Mohammad

2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, captured

Javad Zarif called for “conceptual remodeling”, “re-

the hearts of people upon its release. It created

gime innovation” and a “paradigm shift”.

national intimacy by citing events that were shared

After the 12-Day War, the regime tried and failed

by all. Ayatollah Abdullah Javadi-Amoli said, “If the

to display a façade of “business as usual”. Yet many

nation rises up, we have no way to escape.” It’s a

have distanced themselves from revolutionary ide-

perverse paradox for the theocracy, he said: The

als and turned to Iranian nationalism.

Islamic Revolution has produced a secularising

The regime viewed concessions to the opposi-

nemesis. The 2022 movement was secular and de-

tion as a recipe for toppling the regime itself. The

manded change and a guarantee for basic rights –

first reason for this was tactical. Mehdi Bazargan,

political change, not just reform.

Iran’s first PM after the 1979 revolution, recalled

Khomeini’s great-grandson, Ahmed, gave his

that when, in the early days of the revolution, he

eldest daughter the name “Iran”, signalling a pref-

complained about the lack of freedom, Ayatollah

erence for names related to the homeland over

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, former President and

Islamic names. The nationalism that was viewed

regime powerbroker, replied, “When the Shah gave

as anti-Islamic by the father of the revolution has

us freedom, we drove him out of the country. We

turned into an ideal for the youth. Ahmed’s father,

shall not repeat his mistake.” More importantly,

Hassan, and other descendants of Khomeini, have

the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union made cur-

long condemned the Government’s policy.

rent Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei deter-

Other descendants of the regime’s top officials

mined to make sure Iran did not meet a similar fate.

have also become critical of it. Prof. Hamzeh Sa-

However, the new realities since 2024 convinced

favi, son of the former chief of the Revolutionary

Khamenei to better heed the popular voice, even

Guards Yahya Rahim Safavi, believes that after the

while simultaneously suppressing dissident voices

12-Day War, the theocracy must moderate its hard-

far from the public eye.

line ideological tenets, even its hostility to the US

Despite frustration with the Government, the peo54

and Israel. He also supported Saudi Arabia in con-

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ditioning recognition of Israel on its acceptance of

cially women, and a laxity in maintaining the rules

a two-state solution. Faezeh Hashemi (daughter of

of modesty, with more freedom in the streets and

Rafsanjani) said that “ideally, Iran should move to-

at public events. Writing about thousands of young

wards a secular system.” Hassan Younesi, son of a

men and women, hair uncovered and dressed in

former intelligence minister, while loyal to the sys-

jeans and short-sleeved tops, dancing and sing-

tem, is critical of its policies.

ing at outdoor pop concerts, observers wonder, “Is

Sadegh Ziba Kalam, one of the most adamant

this Teheran?” Women and girls keep pushing the

critics of the regime, accused it of investing a for-

boundaries – looser hijab, uncovered hair in public

tune to support proxies, and even stated that he

spaces – despite “chastity” campaigns. The public

would “recognise Israel”. Iran blames Israel for the

is becoming more open in its disobedience to reli-

October 7 war, he said in a video debate. Yet from its

gious laws – as can be seen at the recent marathon

first day, it spent a fortune to combat Israel. True, he

event on the island of Kish (Nov. 29). During the

concluded, we have missiles and advanced UAVs.

race, some 2,000 women (running separately from

But what about life itself? Where are we heading?

the 3,000 men) were pictured competing without

To which he answered, “Nowhere!”

the mandatory hijab, and authorities have threat-

Yet, they all seem to agree that the real result of these competing visions will come only after Khamenei passes from the scene.

ened participants with consequences.

In some instances, the authorities have moved to shutting down events, cancelling concerts or imposing fines on organisers. Khamenei has ordered

AFTER KHAMENEI

the Government to bring the youth and women

Today, Khamenei looks weak, pale and desper-

“back in line”. Despite this demand, President

ate – showing signs of age (86), the burden of gov-

Masoud Pezeshkian’s associates say the Govern-

ernment responsibilities, the shock of the war and

ment does not plan to “use the failed methods of

a long time living underground. Regime insiders

the past.” Still, political dissent is not tolerated – ex-

have turned on each other and even voiced veiled

ecutions and death sentences are frequent.

criticism of Khamenei. Two interconnected factors drove the escalating conflict: who will wield power after Khamenei’s death, and how each faction can protect its wealth and power.

CYRUS THE GREAT RETURNS The most momentous symbols of the imperial past are undoubtedly King Cyrus the Great and the

As Prof. Mahmood Sariolghalam observed, re-

historical monuments associated with him – Perse-

alpolitik is the underpinning of Iran’s foreign policy,

polis and Cyrus’ Tomb in Pasargadae, near Shiraz.

and regime security is the core preoccupation of

Ayatollah Khalkhali, the first head of the Revolu-

statecraft. Sharing power is not a Persian tradition.

tionary Court, called Cyrus a “Jew boy” and a “sod-

The internal standoff is not about belief systems,

omite”. Provoked by his call, people in Shiraz started

but about competing clusters of power seeking to

moving towards Persepolis to raze the ruins. In a

exploit a richly endowed country.

radio speech, the Governor of Fars cautioned that

Throughout Iran, especially in the big cities – and even more so in the capital Teheran – there is a greater boldness on the part of young people, espe-

“To destroy Persepolis you will have to pass over my dead body” (Bahar News, 8 July 2017).

The regime has been particularly sensitive to the 55

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events conducted at the foot of Cyrus’ tomb, which

it embarked on a pathetic cognitive engineering

is identified with the last Shah, who opened a cele-

campaign to convince the people of its supposed

bration of the 2,500th anniversary of the monarchy

“victories”. A monument unveiled in November

there in 1971. It is also a place of pilgrimage for op-

2025 at Enqelab Square depicted the Sasanian King

ponents of the regime, mainly to mark Cyrus’ birth-

Shapur I on horseback and the Roman Emperor

day, on Oct. 29. The regime tries to prevent such

Valerian kneeling before him. Another billboard

gatherings, but the events continue.

showed a Shapur-like king standing in triumph, Is-

Even at the height of the euphoria following the revolution’s victory, the regime did not seek to can-

raeli PM Netanyahu kneeling in front of him, with the promise that “history will repeat itself.”

cel the Persian New Year or undermine its centrality

The dramatic change in the regime attitude to

as a major holiday. On the last Wednesday before

nationalism was most evident in the Ashura cer-

Nowruz, Iranians celebrate Chaharshanbe Souri, a

emony in Imam Khomeini Mosque on June 5.

Zoroastrian tradition best known for jumping over

Khamenei asked the famous eulogist Karimi Mam-

fire to remove negative energy and evil in life, allow-

douh to recite the unofficial nationalist anthem “Ey

ing for a new start. After the revolution, these cele-

Iran”, greatly cherished by opposition circles and in

brations were outlawed, but nevertheless could not

the diaspora. Historically, the nationalist anthems

be prevented. Gradually, they returned to the streets

and religious laments have been perceived as sty-

openly and often became a forum for expressing

listically and ideologically distinct: the former ex-

grievances with the regime.

pressing patriotic fervour, the latter a testament of

The ritual was rebranded by activists as expressing the people’s willingness to walk through the fire of uprising against the regime.

religious devotion.

The anthem’s warm reception among Iranians signals a symbolic convergence between the two.

In recent years, more people celebrate Hallow-

Khamenei’s speech signalled a turn toward nation-

een, another sign of desire to connect with the

alism, and regime outlets vigorously picked up the

“global stage”. The Iranian Chamber of Guilds bans

theme, toning down their references to religion and

the sale of goods related to Halloween as a way to

disseminating ubiquitous images of heroes from

protect the culture and religion. Nevertheless, the

the pre-Islamic epic, the Shahnameh. Preference

parties go on, and the number of participants is

for national identity over religion has also been re-

growing.

vealed in the slogans of protests from the last de-

Khamenei has often expressed disdain for Iran’s

cade: “Neither Islam nor Qur’an, I will sacrifice my

pre-Islamic past. Yet, just days after the Israeli on-

life for Iran;” “freedom, independence, Iranian [not

slaught against Iran in June, he praised the coun-

Islamic] Republic,” and lastly, “Death to Khamenei”.

try’s “ancient civilisation” and its “cultural and civilisational wealth.” A billboard newly installed in

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Teheran praises an ancient Persian king, while an-

Iran has faced numerous challenges in the socio-

other depicts the mythical figure of Arash the Ar-

economic sphere during the past few years. The re-

cher. While the Government has used nationalist

instated sanctions have increased the already high

themes before, it has never been on quite this scale.

inflation rate, resulting in the currency plummeting.

In the aftermath of Iran’s stinging defeat in June,

Pezeshkian admitted a year ago that he feared that

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Recent ceremonies led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have featured much more nationalist themes, and fewer religious ones (Image: Khamenei.ir)

the economic situation would lead to the collapse of the regime.

Simultaneously, the Iranian water crisis is reaching boiling point, as the authorities have begun to

siderable advantages: they control revolutionary in-

ration water in Teheran. Pezeshkian believes that

stitutions, and they do not shy away from violently

people might have to evacuate the city, as the

suppressing their opponents in the name of religion.

country is experiencing the worst drought in six

On the other side are the “children of the revolu-

decades. Iran is also currently experiencing some

tion,” who have seen the first fruits of their struggle

of the most severe land subsidence anywhere in

and are also determined to win the crucial battle. In

the world. In several regions, especially around Te-

many respects they have an advantage: they bring

heran, Karaj and central Iran, the ground is sinking

with them new hope to achieve the unfulfilled revo-

at alarming rates due to overpumping of subterra-

lutionary aspirations to promote social justice and

nean water. There is also the threat of sinkholes –

political justice – bread and freedom. They have

ground collapse caused by the loss of support in

broad public support. The people and history are on

the soil beneath the surface.

their side.

The Islamic Republic is at a historical juncture.

As for the Iranian triangle of identities – Iran,

Public support for the regime and the status of the

Islam and Western influence – the latter currently

clerics has never been at such a low point. The June

seems to have the upper hand. The task of the

2025 war was a turning point, in which they lost all

next leadership, whoever it might be, will be to bet-

their assets, power and prestige. Yet, the ruling elite

ter blend those three heritages, which cannot be

are determined to maintain power. They have con-

separated.

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A JIHADIST GOES TO THE WHITE HOUSE Syria's Ahmed al-Shara'a and Israel

EYAL ZISSER

T

his month marks one year since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the rise of Ahmed al-Shara’a to power in Syria. On November 27,

2024, the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon came into effect. That same day, the Front for the Liberation of al-Sham, the leading rebel organisation in Syria, led by Ahmed al-Shara’a, then still known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani, launched a surprise attack on Bashar alAssad’s regime. Within 12 days, the group managed to topple the regime and conquer most of Syria. On Dec. 8, Bashar fled to Moscow, where he was granted political asylum by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Less than a year later, on Nov. 10, 2025, Shara’a was received with honour at the White House by President Donald Trump. The visit to the White House, which led to the lifting of all economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Syria during the days of Bashar al-Assad, as well as the cancellation of the US$10 million bounty on Shara’a’s head for his past involvement in terrorism, was the culmination of a process of gaining global legitimacy for the new Syrian regime.

Shara’a’s rise to power in Syria last December raised concerns in Israel because the man was a jihadist. According to his own testimony, the outbreak of the Second Intifada in the early 2000s led him to adopt a radical Islamist worldview, to move from Syria to Iraq in early 2003 and join the PROF. EYAL ZISSER is the Vice Rector of Tel Aviv University and the holder of the Yona and Dina Ettinger Chair in Contemporary History of the Middle East.

58

ranks of al-Qaeda to fight the American forces that occupied that country.

When he returned to Syria in 2012 after the outbreak of the civil war, he founded the al-Nusra Front as the Syrian branch of what would shortly become the Islamic State, although in the following years he began to moderate his tone.

He broke away from ISIS and al-Qaeda, and his men, who at one point

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controlled the Syrian Golan Heights, were careful to keep the border with Israel quiet. At the same time, his rise to power in Damascus was a severe

Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara'a during the celebration of the revolution's victory (Image: Mohammad Bash/ Shutterstock)

blow to Iran and Hezbollah, who lost an important stronghold and a vital link that connected Teheran

regime from gaining control over them.

to Beirut. For Shara’a, both Iran and Hezbollah were

Israel also attacked Syrian airports that were

enemies due to the assistance they provided to

reported to have been handed over to the Turks,

Bashar al-Assad in his war against the rebels and

due to Israel’s fear of a Turkish military presence

their involvement in the massacre of hundreds of

on Syrian soil that would replace the Iranian pres-

thousands of Syrians by the Assad regime.

ence and limit Israel’s freedom of military action

From the moment he came to power, Shara’a

there. After all, relations between Israel and Turkey

sent messages of reassurance to Israel and repeat-

are currently in a severe crisis – although they have

edly made it clear that Syria, a ruined country with-

not been completely cut off. There is still a dialogue

out an army, wants to maintain peaceful relations

between the two countries mediated by the United

with its neighbours.

States and Azerbaijan, which maintains friendly re-

For its part, Israel treated him with suspicion, and

lations with both Turkey and Israel.

even before he entered Damascus and took office,

Not long after Shara’a seized power in Damas-

it rushed to take control of the border strip between

cus, talks began between Israel and Syria, mediated

the two countries in order to prevent the possibility

by the United States and the UAE, to try to reach a

of a terrorist attack on its territory. The IDF also at-

security agreement that would ensure peace along

tacked and destroyed the former regime’s military

the border and perhaps constitute a first step to-

equipment, tanks and airplanes to prevent the new

wards Syria joining the Abraham Accords. However, 59

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every time these talks made progress, events occurred that led to a halt or setback.

Trump famously had declared during his first term that Syria does not really interest him; that

For example, in the Spring of 2025, clashes broke

it is only “sand and death”, and its residents are

out between Shara’a’s forces and the Druze popula-

immersed in tribal conflicts with no hope or end

tion in the south of the country. The Druze are not

in sight; and that he therefore has no intention of

Muslims, and as with the Alawites, many Muslims,

interfering in what is happening in that country.

and certainly the jihadist circles to which Shara’a

But Trump has apparently become convinced that

belonged in the past, consider them infidels. During

Shara’a is the right person to rule Syria precisely be-

these clashes, massacres were committed against

cause of his jihadist background. After all, Shara’a

the Druze civilian population, and Israel, under pres-

is marketing himself to Trump as someone who

sure from Israel’s Druze community, rushed to mo-

will bring an end to the bloody war in Syria, fight

bilise on behalf of the Druze in Syria, attacking al-

ISIS terrorism, faithfully serve American interests

Shara’a’s forces. The American Administration was

and even sign an agreement with Israel (although

quick to intervene again.

not a peace deal, at least not now). It seems that

N

Trump also listened to Turkish President Erdogan eedless to say, the current American Admin-

and the Emir of Qatar, whom he described as his

istration sees Shara’a as a partner and as the

good friends, and who, as is well known, have ex-

right person to rule Syria. Trump even described

tended their patronage to Shara’a and are seeking

him after their first meeting in Saudi Arabia in May

to gain influence in Syria through him.

2025 as a “good guy”.

Despite the understandable concern in Israel af-

Trump says he sees former jihadist Ahmed al-Shara’a as a "good guy" (Image: Whitehouse.gov/ Truth Social)

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ter the events of October 7, Shara’a does not cur-

However, it seems likely that progress in Israeli-

rently appear to pose a threat, and certainly not an

Syrian relations towards actual peace will have to

immediate and direct one, since he heads a ruined

wait until a breakthrough is achieved in Israel’s rela-

country lacking any substantive army and contin-

tions with the wider Arab world. Saudi Arabia will

ues to see Hezbollah and Iran as hated enemies and

set the tone, when it feels that the Gaza issue is be-

the main threat facing his regime. But after October

hind us and there is no fear of the renewal of hostili-

7, Israel is not willing to take risks. Moreover, do-

ties on Gaza’s border with Israel. After Saudi Arabia,

mestic political considerations often interfere with

Syria and even Lebanon may join the peace process

Israel’s decision-making, including, in this case, the

and the Abraham Accords.

pressure from the Druze community in Israel on the Government to increase its involvement in what is happening in Syria and even try to establish a safe passage and a corridor to provide aid from Israel to the Druze Mountains region in southern Syria.

Different approaches to what is happening in Syria can be seen within the Israeli security and political system, some of which stem from a fundamental lack of trust in Ahmed al-Shara’a, given the man’s jihadist past. Other approaches stem from a belief that Syria is a lost cause and will never recover, and Israel can exploit Syrian weak-

“Different approaches to what is happening in Syria can be seen within the Israeli security and political system, some of which stem from a fundamental lack of trust in Ahmed alShara’a, given the man’s jihadist past.

Other approaches stem from a belief that Syria is a lost cause”

ness to serve its own interests. For example, there are some Israeli analysts who promote the idea of breaking up the Syrian state into sectarian statelets – Druze, Kurdish, Sunni and Alawite – with the hope

Of course, in the past, the Golan Heights issue

that some of these will maintain friendly relations

was a major obstacle to achieving any Israeli-Syr-

with Israel.

ian peace agreement. Israel captured the Heights

Is it possible to trust Shara’a? The answer is not

from the Syrians during the Six Day War in June

at all clear. Israel will have to carefully monitor his

1967, officially annexing them in December 1981,

deeds and actions, not just his statements, and pre-

and in March 2019, US President Trump recog-

vent a terrorist entity becoming established in Syria.

nised Israeli sovereignty over the territory. Now, re-

In the meantime, the status quo continues along

ports are coming out of Damascus that al-Shara’a

the Israeli-Syrian border, and although the Trump

might be willing to soften Damascus’ traditional

Administration embraces the new regime in Damas-

stance on this issue. However, as mentioned, any

cus, this will not necessarily lead to a breakthrough

progress will almost certainly have to wait until: 1.

in the negotiations between Syria and Israel. It is to

a security agreement that will keep the Israeli-Syr-

be assumed and hoped that through mediation and

ian border quiet is signed; and 2. a breakthrough

American pressure, a security arrangement will be

in wider Israeli-Arab relations is achieved in which

reached that will maintain quiet along the border.

Syria can also take part.

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IS THE LEBANONISRAEL CEASEFIRE DEAL DOOMED? Disarmament falters as Hezbollah rebuilds OVED LOBEL

O

n November 23, Israel assassinated Hezbol-

founder. Mughniyeh was assassinated that year in

lah’s new military chief Haytham Ali Tabataba’i

Damascus in a joint CIA-Mossad operation.

in the group’s stronghold of Dahiyeh in Beirut.

Previously, Tabataba’i, sanctioned by the US

Tabataba’i, appointed Hezbollah’s Chief of Gen-

since late 2016 with a US$5 million bounty on his

eral Staff following the November 2024 ceasefire,

head, oversaw Hezbollah’s special forces in both

was a first-generation Hezbollah operative from

Yemen and Syria, where he was unsuccessfully tar-

the 1980s. He commanded its Intervention Force,

geted in January 2015.

which was merged with Hezbollah’s special forces

Tabataba’i’s assassination represents a serious

and eponymously renamed the Radwan force in

escalation, and caps off a year of near-daily, pro-

2008 after the nom de guerre of Imad Mughni-

gressively intensifying Israeli strikes against He-

yeh, Hezbollah’s first military chief and the force’s

zbollah operatives and infrastructure. These have killed more than 370 Hezbollah members, including senior commanders, in 2025.

The Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth reported that, in addition to airstrikes, there have been approximately 1,200 ground raids by the IDF this year – an average of three to five per day.

The assassination also follows at least a month of warnings from both

Eliminated: Hezbollah military chief Haytham Ali Tabataba’i (Image: Hezbollah/ X)

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the US and Israel that, should the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Leba-

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nese Government fail to uphold the ceasefire deal’s

Foreign intelligence officials reportedly believe

requirements to disarm Hezbollah, Israel would act,

that, despite the interdiction efforts of the new Syr-

with US support.

ian Government, Iran’s smuggling routes to Hezbol-

The LAF and Lebanese Government duly failed

lah have been partially reestablished. Weapons are

to take any significant action against Hezbollah,

also allegedly streaming in via seaports or being

prompting ever more expansive Israeli operations,

manufactured locally, while the US Treasury Depart-

culminating in the assassination of the fourth Hez-

ment claims that Iran has succeeded in transferring

bollah military chief in just over a year. Tabataba’i’s

more than US$1 billion to Hezbollah since January.

predecessors, Fuad Shukr, Ibrahim Aqil and Ali

However, it still doesn’t have the strength to re-

Karaki, were successively eliminated in the span of

taliate against Israel and prefers not to risk substan-

three months in late 2024.

tial disruption to its rebuilding efforts. In addition,

However, the group is unlikely to retaliate, at

the mass destruction and displacement that would

least in any significant manner, instead focusing

occur across Lebanon should the battle once again

on rearming, recruiting and shoring up domestic

escalate would not endear Hezbollah to its support-

legitimacy.

ers, much less other Lebanese, many of whom have yet to rebuild their lives after the 2024 escalation.

Finally, the Tabataba’i strike, along with the relentless targeting of hundreds of other operatives, demonstrates that Hezbollah has still been unsuc-

“The inexorable failure of Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah was all but built into the 2024 ceasefire agreement”

cessful in addressing its comprehensive penetration by Israeli intelligence.

A YEAR OF DISARMAMENT THEATRE The inexorable failure of Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah was all but built into the 2024 ceasefire agreement.

On Nov. 13, 2024, I warned of the infeasibility of

Hezbollah is succeeding on all these fronts, ac-

any deal predicated on UN Security Council Resolu-

cording to Western and Israeli intelligence officials,

tion 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah

with the latter telling the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs

war and called, inter alia, for the disarmament of

and Defence Committee in a classified briefing that

Hezbollah:

Hezbollah is rearming faster than Israel can bomb

Like the government it is meant to serve, the

it as well as increasing its domestic legitimacy.

LAF is closer to a cripplingly sectarian fiction

An August poll by Hezbollah’s think tank, the

than an independent entity… The LAF cannot

Consultative Centre for Documentation and Stud-

and will not disarm Hezbollah or even obstruct

ies, showed 96% of Shi’ites, 50% of Sunnis, nearly

its activities… Any proposed diplomatic solu-

50% of Druze and about a third of Christians reject

tion to the current war based on the fatally

the disarmament of Hezbollah “without a defensive

flawed formula of 1701 is doomed to fail.

strategy” against Israel.

Notwithstanding this reality – which no serious 63

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The Lebanese Armed Forces on the streets of Beirut (Image: Paul Saad/ Shutterstock)

This would be true even if Hezbollah’s Shi’ite support base didn’t comprise a substantial part of

observer could question – the ceasefire deal even-

the LAF and the organisation and its allies weren’t

tually signed in late November 2024 revolved en-

represented in the current Government.

tirely around 1701.

This is why it took Lebanon nine months from

Since its inception, the LAF has been a “neutral

the November 2024 ceasefire deal to even officially

army”. This is because, being a microcosm of Leba-

order the LAF to come up with a plan for implement-

non itself, if it ever tried to take any significant or

ing it, which it only did under heavy US pressure, and

controversial actions, it would shatter along con-

another month before such a plan was presented.

fessional lines, as indeed it did during Lebanon’s

Hezbollah obviously rejects the plan.

decades-long civil war, which only ended in 1990.

The “plan” was kept secret and so also were the

Since then, the highest priority of the LAF and

monthly progress reports it mandated. This is un-

Lebanese Government, which have hardly been

surprising, as the reality remains no such plan can

genuinely independent since the 1950s – moving

be implemented, and therefore no progress can be

from Egyptian to Syrian to Iranian domination –

publicly reported, despite claims by some Leba-

has been to prevent renewed civil war. No Israeli

nese sources. Rather, this has all been highly cho-

action or US sanctions will ever outweigh that cat-

reographed pageantry by the LAF, Lebanese Gov-

astrophic risk Therefore, neither the US nor Israel

ernment and Hezbollah to ward off US pressure

have the ability to pressure the Lebanese to imple-

and play for time, even as Hezbollah reconstitutes.

ment their disingenuous commitments to disarm

The LAF has extremely limited capabilities, as

Hezbollah.

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even Lebanese Information Minister Paul Morcos

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said when announcing the plan. The LAF is also

HAMAS’ HELPING HAND

logistically dependent on UNIFIL, the ineffective

The Lebanon-Hezbollah pantomime also in-

and hostile international force that has helped

cludes Hamas. Despite the LAF pretending to

enable the vast entrenchment of terrorist infra-

disarm some factions in the Palestinian refugee

structure along Israel’s northern border since the

camps with token arms collections, Hamas and

1970s. It’s not clear how the LAF will continue to

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) were not covered by

exist once UNIFIL begins withdrawing in January

the operation.

2027.

Growing Hamas activity in Lebanon led to an Is-

Morcos and LAF Commander Rodolphe Haykal

raeli strike on a Hamas recruitment centre in the Ein

also blamed Israel’s ongoing presence in Lebanon

El Hilweh camp near Sidon on Nov. 18, killing more

and attacks on Hezbollah for the delay in imple-

than a dozen operatives. Hamas had publicly adver-

mentation. A scheduled visit by Haykal to the US to

tised these locations during a recruitment drive in

discuss aid for the LAF in late November was can-

December 2023 for the “Vanguard of the Al-Aqsa

celled when the LAF released a statement saying

Flood” Hamas scouts.

“the Israeli enemy” was the main problem.

While Hamas has always had an extensive pres-

Meanwhile, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim

ence in Lebanon, there are now Israeli reports that

Qassem praised the LAF’s “balanced” approach

hundreds of Hamas fighters are being seconded to

“on the issue of weapons,” while Lebanese Presi-

Hezbollah’s Radwan force as part of its rebuilding

dent Joseph Aoun has repeatedly said since April

efforts.

that the LAF will never confront Hezbollah militar-

The past year should have illustrated, as if fur-

ily. He reiterated this at the UN in late September,

ther proof were needed, that 1701-based attempts

saying, “Resorting to force… is out of the question

to address Hezbollah’s arms are likely futile. Any ap-

under any circumstances, and cannot take place at

proach that hinges upon the LAF and the Lebanese

present.”

Government – more ornamental than functional

He further asserted, echoing Morcos and Haykal,

institutions – confronting Hezbollah will fail, some-

that the “main obstacle” for Lebanon was “the con-

thing only belatedly recognised by US envoy and

tinued Israeli occupation of the eight hills it has

Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack in November.

seized, as well as other Lebanese territories.”

The outcome of the Lebanese parliamentary

The LAF rejected the recent Israeli demand to

elections, scheduled for May 2026, could possibly

search for Hezbollah weapons in private homes,

change this assessment, assuming they actually

which is where most are stored. Furthermore, de-

take place and that Hezbollah does not win in the

spite Israel publicly revealing sweeping Hezbollah

areas it needs to as resoundingly as it has in the

rehabilitation efforts in the south, no action has

past.

been taken. Israel has also indirectly passed intel-

But barring a collapse of the Iranian regime or a

ligence on Hezbollah facilities and activities to the

complete transformation of the capabilities of Leb-

LAF, to no avail. There are even reports of the LAF

anon as a state, the only practical policy for Israel

warning Hezbollah to evacuate equipment before

for the foreseeable future remains threat manage-

Israeli strikes.

ment by way of constant strikes and raids, punctuated by larger escalations.

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THE HATE FILES Conspiracy theories continue to feature on Australian media platforms

RAN PORAT

F

or decades, incitement against Jews, extreme anti-Israel rhetoric and the spread of antisemitic content and conspiracy theories by

Australian media platforms targeting Arab and Muslim audiences have gone largely unchecked. The AIR has regularly highlighted some of the worst examples. Below are several of the most recent ones.

“ZIONISM PIGGYBACKS ON JUDAISM” Shayne Chester has a record of repeatedly making antisemitic arguments in the Australasian Muslim Times (AMUST). In his article “Zionists and the ‘Great Replacement Theory’” (September 29), Chester launches into a barrage of accusations against individuals and groups within the Jewish community.

He claims, for example, that “The Zionists are all-powerful and ruthless Holocaust deniers for Gaza,” and names Yaron Finkelstein, an advisor to the Liberal Party, in that context. Chester dismisses the rise in antisemitism in Australia, suggesting that Finkelstein employed it only as a “dead cat” political tactic “to divert attention from a negative topic (like genocide). ECAJ calls it their ‘local war’.”

His accusations continue. Chester accuses Jillian Segal, the Government’s Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism, of lying, asserting that DR RAN PORAT is an AIJAC research associate.

He is also a research associate at the Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation at Monash University and a research fellow at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Reichman University in Herzliya.

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her plan to address campus antisemitism is “built on untruths”. He says the claim that “64% of Jewish students experienced anti-Semitism on campus” is false and that “the fact-checked figure is 7%.” In reality, Chester is the one using incorrect data. According to a recent parliamentary inquiry, 66% of Jewish students reported experiencing antisemitism on campus. He also rejects ASIO’s finding that Iran was behind recent antisemitic attacks on the Jewish community, calling this conclusion an expression of “inherent Islamophobia”.

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To conclude his antisemitic diatribe, Chester asserts that “Zionists exploit” the human mind’s difficulty in holding two opposing ideas simultaneously.

He then attacks those who note that antisemites often use the term “Zionist” as a stand-in for “Jew”, specifically referencing former Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus. Chester compares this claim to saying that “if someone hates the gay cop Beau LaShayne Chester (Image: X)

marre-Condon who murdered two men, one must be homophobic” – a blatantly false and manipula-

tive analogy. He ends with: “Zionism piggybacks on Judaism, it is not hard to see the difference.”

AMUST’s editorial choices follow the same pattern. An opinion piece “Gaza Silenced: The Press Club and Australia’s Media Betrayal of Journalism” (Oct. 31) is accompanied by an openly antisemitic caricature by American illustrator Dwayne Booth (“Mr Fish”). The image portrays Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, wearing a shirt labelled “Israel”, buying naked corpses from the Angel of Death and decapitating them – a grotesque scene that evokes mediaeval antisemitic tropes, including the blood libel that Jews murder Christian children to use their blood in Passover matzah. The caricature also implies that Israel intentionally kills journalists, with a pile of “Press” helmets beside Netanyahu. Its style resembles the antisemitic illustrations of the Nazi Der Stürmer, depicting Jews with distorted, dehumanising features.

ISRAEL BEHIND 9/11 AND ISIS Daud Batchelor, a regular AMUST contributor and prolific spreader of antisemitic tropes and conspiracy theories, provides insight into the origins of this worldview in his article “Supporting Israel Today Is Definitely Un-Australian” (Oct. 30).

A Der Sturmer-like cartoon published in the Australasian Muslim Times

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He begins by admitting that he “woke up” after the September 11 attacks, inspired by the antisemitic book Pawns in the Game by English conspiracy theorist William Guy Carr, which draws heavily from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Batchelor claims that “Israeli Mossad were likely responsible for the laying of explosives that brought down three New York towers,” echoing the assertions of professional conspiracy theorist Alan Sabrosky.

“A conspiratorial video... claims that both al-Qaeda and Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa work ‛for the United States Government’, while ‛ISIS is an Israel and US government creation.’”

Later, in his condemnation of Israel, Batchelor repeats the debunked mid2024 claim that the Palestinian death toll in Gaza exceeds 186,000 – a falsehood based on a letter to The Lancet speculating that the death toll could rise that high in future. He concludes by offering his own explanation – if not justification – for the Hamas massacre of Israelis on October 7, 2023. He insists that “Israeli propagandists incorrectly present [the massacre] as the war’s origin,” but it was really “an act after 17 years of siege, 75 years of occupation, and more than a century of worsening genocidal actions by Zionists.” He also describes it as “militant resistance” triggered in part by “the increasing harassment of peaceful worshippers” at Al-Aqsa Mosque.

SYRIA-OUSLY CONSPIRATORIAL Presenting a similar conspiratorial narrative to that promoted by AMUST is a group of Australian supporters of deposed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, who operate the “Hands Off Syria” website and social media accounts. One prominent member is disgraced academic and Iran-affiliated activist Tim Anderson.

In November, the group’s Facebook account shared a conspiratorial video from a US-based anti-Israel X account (@MHTruthUltra). The speaker claims that both al-Qaeda and Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa work “for the United States Government”, while “ISIS is an Israel and US government creation.” He also suggests these organisations are used to kill Muslims and overthrow Arab governments “which only furthers Israel’s interest.”

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With compliments

CENTURY PLAZA TRADING

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THE INTERVIEW

THE KEY TO THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST An interview with retired Israeli Major-General Yaakov Amidror

AIJAC STAFF

M

aj. Gen. Yaakov Amidror (res.) is one of Israel's most highly regarded and sought-after experts on strategic and military affairs.

Gen. Amidror served as the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of Israel, as well as the head

of the National Security Council, from 2011-2013. During his 36-year career in the IDF, he served as Commander of IDF Military Colleges, Military Secretary to the Minister of Defence, and Director of the Intelligence Analysis Division. He has authored several books on intelligence and military strategy, including Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience. Today, he is the Anne and Greg Rosshandler Senior Fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Amidror spoke with AIJAC’s Joel Burnie in early December to discuss the strategic challenges for Israel and the region in the wake of Israel’s seven-front war with Hamas, its Iranian patrons and Iran’s many proxies, as well as the Trump Administration’s current plans designed to bring that conflict to an end.

Joel Burnie: As you know, Australia is geographically very, very far away from Israel. But we are eternally connected to what you and the Israeli people have endured over the past two years… We are all concerned with the current situation in Gaza. Can you give us some type of idea as to where we’re at now in terms of finishing up stage one and heading into stage two of the Trump plan?

What’s the situation on the ground there? And what do you see happening over the next couple of weeks and months?

Maj. Gen. Yaakov Amidror: I think that one element is very clear. Hamas in Gaza is not relevant as a threat to Israel…We succeeded to destroy its military positions and capabilities. And now Hamas has been encircled inside Gaza.

We are controlling more than 50% of the area… And the ability of Hamas today 70

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to launch an attack on Israel is almost zero…

The question is, what next? It’s not about the ability of Hamas to launch any attacks towards Israel. It’s about how we are disarming Hamas.

The Americans have a plan. According to their plan, international forces are supposed to come in.

Hamas is supposed to be disarmed by those forces and then [those forces will help] rebuild Gaza. From what we understand and what was declared

by Hamas, Hamas doesn’t have any intention to be disarmed.

And either the Americans will call it a big failure or they will try to put pressure on Hamas through Turkey and Qatar and the Egyptians and so on.

And Hamas will change its attitude towards the demand.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror (Image: BESA Centre)

Or [else] we [Israel] will have to come in… and destroy Hamas totally inside Gaza. We don’t know yet. We are discussing it with the Americans. The Americans have a headquarters in Kiryat Gat, not far from Gaza, inside Israel, and they are trying to coordinate all the efforts.

They want to begin with some change on the ground, in the area which is controlled by Israel, but most of the Palestinians are not living there… They are living… in the area which is under Hamas control. So even if something will be built [in the Israeli-controlled portion of Gaza], for 80% or 90% of the Palestinians, it’s not relevant.

And the decision should be taken, what we are doing [regarding] the area which is under control of Hamas, in which the vast majority of the Palestinians are living in unacceptable conditions, under the control of [the] brutal Hamas regime, [with a] very devastating housing situation.

We are ready to fight Hamas and to destroy it totally, to finish the job that we took upon ourselves after the seventh… of October. But the Americans have to decide how they want to proceed. We try to be as coordinated with Americans as possible, and our forces are maintaining what’s called the yellow line, which is the border between the part of Gaza which is under control of Hamas and the 71

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WATCH: Joel Burnie’s full interview with Yaakov Amidror

part of Gaza which is under our control… we have all the time in the world… we are not under pressure. We can continue with this situation a long time, and the Americans will have to make a decision. We are ready to do our job if we’ll be needed.

Joel Burnie: So there’s a lot to unpack there… firstly, as you say, Israel can currently stay in its current positioning inside Gaza for an extended period of time, which I guess not only buys Israel time, but it also buys time for the Americans to figure out a way, if they can, to demilitarise and take the weapons away from Hamas… What’s your faith in their ability to, with the leverage that they potentially have with Turkey and Qatar, to exert enough force on Hamas to demilitarise… without a military campaign to do it?

Amidror: I should be very cautious, because I didn’t believe that they [could] release all the hostages without a big operation, a real war… But they succeeded, so I have to be very cautious. If you ask, ‘What is my assessment?’

My assessment is that Hamas is not going to disarm itself, and the Americans don’t have the leverage to achieve it. But they did it in the past. So… maybe I’m wrong. I don’t know. But if you ask me to bet, I’m betting that the Americans do not succeed to disarm and demilitarise the area.

Joel Burnie: If they’re unsuccessful, do they then give some type of cover and legitimacy to Israel’s green light to go in and finish the job?

Amidror: This is what we are negotiating with them now, to understand how they see the future if they don’t succeed. If they succeed, it’s very easy. Interna72

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tional forces will come in, and Gaza will be rebuilt.

If they fail to put the pressure, to succeed with the pressure on disarming Hamas and demilitarise the area, the question, “Okay, what will happen next?”

Our offer will be to bring the IDF and to give the IDF the order to destroy Hamas.

Joel Burnie: And how long do you think that it will take the IDF to complete the objectives, given the fact that it appears as though, from most assessments, with all the hostages, bar one, now back in Israel, it removes certain hurdles and difficulties that the previous campaign had?

Amidror: It will take between a few weeks to months of intensive war to gain control of the area, and then half a year to cleanse it… it’s a very slow process, underground and above ground, to clean the area from all the remnants of Hamas. We did it in the area that we are controlling now, and we have more experience, but it will take a long time to deal with all the underground facilities, and the new recruited Hamas members that are under Hamas control now in the west side of the Gaza Strip.

Joel Burnie: The Americans are going to try and bring in other parties to assist in their objectives. They were successful with… Arab involvement in the 20-point plan that was signed in Egypt. What… role do certain countries need to play, namely Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, in assisting the Americans in avoiding the need for a military campaign to disarm Hamas and transition from phase one of the 20-point plan to phase two and phase three?

Amidror: The Americans use all these countries to put pressure on Hamas.

As I said, I don’t know if they will succeed or not.

We are very determined not to let the Turks and the Qataris to be involved in the next stage. We don’t want to see Turkey military forces inside Gaza and Turkey’s involvement in Gaza in the future. The Turks are very negative force, hostile to Israel… Can we prevent money comes from Qatar and Turkey to enter… probably not. But we don’t want to see Turkey and Qatar involved in the next stage.

Can they put pressure on Hamas to disarm itself? I don’t know.

I’m not sure that they really want it. I think it’s in the interest of both Turkey and Qatar that Hamas will remain a strong movement within the Palestinian society. Both agree with the Muslim Brotherhood ideas… So I think that ideologically and politically … it is the interest of Turkey… and Qatar that Hamas will remain a strong position inside the Gaza [Strip] and... Palestinian society. So I think that they are not relevant in the demand to get rid of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

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WILL IRAN REBUILD THE “RING OF FIRE”?

Joel Burnie: So a lot’s happened in the past two years. The seven front war was obviously widely covered. And Israel’s military and strategic achievements are also very well noted. You now live in a very, very different region to what you lived previous to the events of October 7, 2023. And I guess the major reason for that is Israel’s decisive action against Iran. We had the 12-Day War earlier in the year against Iran’s nuclear facilities… There is no doubt that the regime has been significantly weakened by Israeli military action, not just directly inside Iran’s borders, but also regionally. So can you just walk us through… what it actually means in the short term for Israel, but also what your expectations are of the Iranian regime, [as they] to try to rebuild from the great losses that they’ve experienced over the past 6 to 24 months?

Amidror: Before the seventh of October, we lived in a Middle East shaped by the Iranian strategy of the last 45 years… by the way, it’s not Khamenei, [but] Khomeini, who made the decision to [seek to] destroy Israel This led to a very clear and defined strategy with three legs: A nuclear umbrella; huge ability to launch ballistic missiles into Israel; and the most sophisticated leg was to build around Israel armies of proxies, a “ring of fire” that’s supposed… to crumble Israel. When the system [would] be ready, they [would] coordinate an attack which [would] be led by the Iranians while the Iranians [remained] far away.

The combination of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, what they tried to build in Syria, the Houthis and... militias from Iraq, all together coordinated by the Iranian plan, [was supposed to] crumble Israel.

So the Iranians build a whole Middle East around these ideas. We called it “Ring of Fire”. King Abdullah of Jordan called it the “Shi’ite Crescent”.

We destroyed all these elements of [Iran’s strategy]. None of them still exist.

We destroyed the proxies. They are not relevant as a threat to Israel. Hezbollah, which we are attacking every second day in Lebanon, still have 20 to 30% of their [capabilities] that they had before the war.

Hamas, as we just spoke about previously, [has been decimated].

Syria was taken out of the land bridge from Teheran to the Mediterranean.

They don’t have any land connection to Lebanon. They cannot bring back all the capabilities and the missiles and the weapon systems that Hezbollah had because there is [no] land bridge. They can smuggle from here and there, bring money, but they cannot go back to the [situation] before the seventh of October.

Even the Iraqis understood that they should stop the Shi’ite [militias] and since November 2024, nothing was launched from Iraq into Israel…

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Fire and smoke rise from an oil warehouse in Teheran, Iran, June 15, 2025 (Image: EPA/ Abedin Taherkenareh)

So the Iranians lost all the elements of their strategy – but Iran is a very, very sophisticated state. They are a wounded animal now and they have to make a decision. Do they go back to invest in the missiles, in the nuclear project or not?

Because the proxies they cannot rebuild. This element is lost forever, probably. If [Israel] will be determined enough, they cannot do [it] again.

But they can theoretically rebuild the missile project and produce the thousands of missiles that they had in mind before they [were] attacked by us in the 12-Day War [in June]. And they have to make a decision about the nuclear project.

They have some abilities to continue [uranium] enrichment. What they don’t have is the conversion system that we destroyed and then Americans put another nail into it in Isfahan. And they have to take a strategic decision [whether] they want to continue and take the risk that Israel and America will react in the future.

In terms of having any kind of ability to defend it, they have to rebuild their anti-aircraft system almost from the beginning. We destroyed more than 80% of what they had.

So it’s a long process… a process [over] years, not many years, but… years.

You have to add to that the domestic problematic situation of the Iranian regime. Their economy is collapsing.

They have a huge problem with providing water to the people in Iran. It’s a very dry year in the Middle East and it is especially felt by the Iranians inside Iran.

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So it’s a very complicated situation for the regime domestically and strategically and they have to make decisions, very tough decisions… And I’m sure that they are taking it into account that they might give us and the Americans… reason for another attack on Iran and they don’t have a good answer to the capabilities that Israel showed in the 12-Day [War].

Joel Burnie: So given that there’s a very coherent answer and very detailed, but given everything that you’ve just said, my assumption is that your conclusion would be that it’s unlikely that there will be another round of direct military confrontation in the next 12 months between the regime and Israel.

Amidror: No, I think that Israel should prepare itself for such a round. We don’t know what the Iranians decide and we have to be very careful not to [repeat] the same mistake that we did in the past… We should not let the Iranians rebuild those capabilities and come [in] at the last minute.

We made a mistake in giving the beast [a chance] to grow around us – Hezbollah in the north, Hamas in the south. We gave too much time to the Iranians to continue with their nuclear project, and they now have enriched uranium for at least five bombs. It was almost too late, and we should not make the same mistake again.

Joel Burnie: So it’s a good segue to my next question because it’s directly related to… the consequences of Iran’s regional failures… Israel’s efforts against Iran allowed for the weakening of the Assad regime in Syria, changing the government there, and the potential for some type of dialogue, some type of security arrangement with the Syrians and then even recently civilian dialogue with the Lebanese Government…

Where is Israel trying to lead… the bilateral relationship between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria given… the changes of the situation domestically in those two countries?

Amidror: With the Lebanese, we have an agreement and based on the agreement… and we have a side letter with the Americans which gives us the ability to react inside Lebanon.

And our expectation is that the Americans succeed in convincing the Lebanese Government to disarm [Hezbollah]… this is the big difference between Gaza and Lebanon. Lebanon has a government, it’s a state, it’s a member of the United Nations and they have all the rights and the capabilities to do what is needed… So our expectations are very clear. There is a government in Lebanon and this government should make the job of disarming Hezbollah.

If the Americans come to the conclusion that the Government of Lebanon 76

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cannot do it or does want to do… from our point of view… the operation is ready.

We know how to destroy more… of Hezbollah’s capabilities… Will it lead in the future to disarming this organisation because it will be even weaker and it will be easier for the Government of Lebanon to act against it? I don’t know. But… there is an agreement and the Lebanese Government is part of the agreement.

So let’s implement the agreement.

In Syria it is more complicated because in Syria we don’t know who is the regime. We know where the regime came from. It’s a combination of ISIS and al-Qaeda. They claim that they [have] changed. We don’t know…

So here we are puzzling what we are really facing. We decided from the beginning, one, not to let them to rebuild their military capabilities. This is why we bombed all the hardware of the old regime.

And we broadened the area that we are controlling in the Golan Heights. But we are negotiating with them all the time – a dialogue between us and them.

And we try to find the common ground that will guarantee our interest, including defending the Druze in the south. But mainly the security of Israel. And to let them to show the world and themselves that they are serious about building a new Syria, which is not extreme, led by ISIS and the al-Qaeda movement. We

SEE ALSO: Inside Israel’s UN Strategy: Jonathan Harounoff, Israel’s UN International Spokesperson, journalist and author, and Gabe Max, former Senior Speechwriter at the Permanent Mission of Israel to the UN, in conversation with AIJAC's Joel Burnie

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have to learn and to see. Here it would be judged by actions and what we will learn about their attitude towards issues like women and minorities and Israel.

Our red lines are very clear. Nothing which might threaten Israel will be built in the south close to Israel's border.

WHAT ARAB LEADERS SAY PRIVATELY Joel Burnie: All the things that we’ve just discussed, the one common element apart from Israel is the United States. And it’s very clear that the United States still remains Israel’s closest strategic ally for lots of reasons… The support that President Trump has offered Israel has been very, very strong. There are issues in the United States of which you would be very aware, of a potential split in the right.

How important is the relationship with the United States and where do you perceive it currently?

Amidror: It’s a relationship that we will have to work very, very hard to keep and to enhance.

Some Israelis don’t understand [this]… America is an independent sovereign state. And they have their own interests. And they’re [conducting] their

A crucial relationship: Israeli PM Netanyahu and US President Trump (Image: Whitehouse.gov/ Flickr)

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own elections. We are not determining for them who to elect and what is their interest.

And this is why it is so important to work with the Americans. Those who support Israel, to strengthen their relations to Israel, those who do not support Israel, to make them understand why the relations are so important for us and for America. And that should be done intensively all the time by every Israeli who meets Americans… to keep the strong relations that we have…

I think it’s very important. It’s crucial for Israel. And at the end of the day, if I may say, I think it’s the interest of the US, as well.

The Americans have huge problems in other areas of the world. And as Australians… you are closer than us to those problems.

If they want [to do] what they are calling “pivoting to the East,” they need stabilisation in the Middle East.

And the only real anchor of stability in the Middle East around which they can build for future stability is the State of Israel.

So no question the relations with America are crucial for Israel. No question that the good relations with our neighbours are very important for the future of Israel.

But when you look at it from Washington, I think that many people there understand that it is also [in] the interest of the US that around a strong Israel will be built a system which will stabilise the Middle East. They are calling it the Abraham Accords, but it is more than the Abraham Accords… It’s about stabilisation in the area.

Many Arab leaders understand it, even if they don’t say it publicly… What we hear from many leaders in the Middle East is “you should not stop. You have to destroy Hamas. You have to continue to destroy Iran.”

If both the Muslim Brotherhood [of which Hamas is a key party] and Iran will not be a threat to the regimes in the Middle East, the Middle East would be… in a much better situation…

And when you hear what the Saudis and the Emirates have to say about the Muslim Brotherhood, you understand that we are doing the job for them in the Middle East. It’s for us, first of all, but it is as well for them.

Joel Burnie: So the final question… in terms of expansion, in terms of what everyone hopes for, in terms of normalisation with lots of countries… in the past couple of weeks, [Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman] MBS had a big meeting with President Trump, [was promised] the sale of F-35s to the Saudis plus extras… [Given] what the Saudis were able to get from the United States without confirming that they were going to participate in a normalisation process, are you concerned about Trump’s relationship with MBS, or… do you think it’s a good thing that the Americans are dealing in earnest with the Saudis in the 79

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hope that they will ultimately normalise in the next couple of years?

Amidror: We have to look at the relations inside the Middle East as part of the overall international relations and rivalry between China and America.

And for us as Israelis, the more Arab countries will be related to America and not to the other axis, the better.

It’s not an alliance of democracies, it is an alliance which is led by the United States of America and versus the other axis, which is led by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea. The more the Arab countries will be related to the first group, the better for Israel.

“Many Arab leaders understand it, even if they don’t say it publicly… What we hear from many leaders in the Middle East is ‘You should not stop. You have to destroy Hamas. You have to continue to destroy Iran.’”

I remember a dialogue with [former Saudi Ambassador to the US] Prince Turki Al-Faisal in Washington a few years ago. And it was about the Palestinian issue. And he said, ”General, with our money and you with your money and our mind, we can change the Middle East.”

And I told him that I agree… we can change the Middle East, but the key is not to give the Palestinians the key [to] the future of the Middle East. If the Saudis continue to demand that the Palestinian issue will be solved, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, the meaning of it is they are giving the key [to] the future of the Middle East to the Palestinians, and the Palestinians will ask for… a huge price that Israel is not going to pay.

And then the future of the Middle East will be determined by the refusal of the Palestinians to be more flexible and to agree to something that Israel can give.

So in the end, the Arab states will have to make a decision…

What we have with the Emirates and Bahrain and Morocco is fantastic. I think it’s very good for them, as well. Otherwise, it could not survive all the pressure of the last two years…

But the Saudis and others will have to make a decision. Do they give the key for the future to the Palestinians?...

If the Arab States decide that they are not giving [the ability] to determine the future of the Middle East [to] the Palestinians, everything can happen… and we can build a new Middle East in which everyone will flourish. If they give the future of the Middle East to the Palestinians, it will be only negative results.

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BIBLIO FILE

HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT The monsters we let dwell amongst us

JULIE SZEGO

Nazis in Australia: The Special Investigations Unit, 1987-1994 Edited by Mark Aarons & Graham Blewitt Schwartz Books Pty Ltd, 2025, 367 pp. $33.99 [purchase here]

T

hough I’ve lived all my life in Melbourne, I didn’t know about the monsters hiding in plain sight at Fawkner Cemetery in the city’s north. There lie

almost 300 members of the notorious Latvian and Estonian SS Legions – volunteers in the Nazi-controlled death squads of 1943 to 1944.

One of the deceased, Karlis Ozols, directed the mass murder of 30,000 Jews and others. To take just one episode in his short but blood-stained career: in a forest outside of Minsk, truckloads of women were ordered to strip naked.

Herded to the edge of a pit where two dozen men stood smoking and swigging from their vodka bottles, each was shot with a single bullet to the back of the head.

So unnerving was Ozols’ brutality, even the German SS described him and his men as, “a wild, almost bestial horde.”

Both Ozols and Fawkner Cemetery feature in a photographic inset midway through Nazis in Australia, a compilation of essays that tell the story of Australia’s Special Investigations Unit (SIU), set up by the Hawke Government. Between 1987 and 1994 the SIU’s tenacious professionals hunted the war criminals who had settled here after World War II. JULIE SZEGO is a freelance journalist and author. She writes a Substack newsletter: Szego Unplugged. Her non-fiction book, The Tainted Trial of Farah Jama, was shortlisted for the Victorian and NSW Premier’s Literary Awards for 2015.

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Ultimately, they failed. All the Nazi war criminals in Australia died as free men. Thereafter the Keating Government, citing high costs and paltry results, shut the unit down.

So, was all the effort for nothing? This is the question that animates the book.

The SIU was set up on the recommendations of an inquiry sparked by ABC investigative reporter Mark Aarons’ landmark series, “Nazis in Australia”.

In his foreword, Aarons recalls a conversation with Bob Greenwood QC,

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the head of the newly-established unit. Attorney-General Lionel Bowen had given Greenwood a choice between conducting an inquiry with the powers of a royal commission or pursuing criminal convictions.

“With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight,” Aarons reflects, “it might have been more effective if Bob had taken up the first option [an inquiry]. While the pursuit of justice might not have been served, the laying down of the facts was vital.”

Among the facts that have long exercised Aarons is how Nazi war criminals came to migrate to Australia in the first place. Immigration officials had turned a blind eye to dubious pasts at a time when the national ethos was one of “populate or perish”.

Worse, some war criminals were recruited as anti-Soviet informants for ASIO. Greenwood carried in his wallet a photograph showing the remnants of corpses in a mass grave excavated by the SIU. Asked why he took on the task of leading the unit, he’d would point to the photograph and say, “that’s why!” He died in 2001, and the book is dedicated to him.

The SIU examined 841 cases. Three suspects were identified as meeting the evidentiary threshold for charges. In the end, only one stood trial: Ivan Polyukhovich, a former forest warden in the Ukrainian village of Serniki.

As a consequence of adverse pre-trial rulings against the prosecution, an initial 13 charges against him were whittled down to two counts: the murder of a Jewish woman known as “the miller’s daughter” and her two children in either August or September 1942; and being “knowingly concerned” in the murder of between 553 and 850 of Serniki’s Jews.

Michael Wolf, a former deputy director of the American counterpart to the SIU and consultant to it, asks in his contribution

Head of the SIU Robert Greenwood QC (top); Ivan Polyukhovich: The only person brought to trial by the SIU

to the book, “How do you put together a brief against a forest warden who participated in murder in a tiny village buried deep in the marshes of Ukraine?”

Well, you head to the marshes. Gather witnesses. Dig up bodies. These were among the SIU’s singular achievements. In an arresting prologue, Richard Wright, the archaeologist who oversaw the exhumation at Serniki – assisted by his wife and fellow archaeologist, Sonia – recalls how “at two metres down, they found human remains. They called me over and I went down into the hole. What they found was a female skeleton with beautifully braided plaits of hair down to her waist.”

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That the excavations took place at all was evidence of the SIU’s deft management of the ever-suspicious Soviet authorities, personified in the enigmatic and formidable figure of the Moscow-based procurator (prosecutor), Madam Natalia Kolesnikov – aka “Madam Kalashnikov”.

Greenwood and his team convinced her to provide formal assistance to the SIU – a level of Soviet co-operation that elided the Nazi-hunting units of other Western countries.

The background of the Cold War meant that the Soviets propagandised about Western perfidy in harbouring the worst Nazi collaborators, while Soviet émigrés abroad in turn accused the SIU and its global counterparts of being communist dupes.

Nonetheless, in another diplomatic coup, the SIU secured permission for Ukrainian witnesses to travel to Australia to give evidence. But that’s where the victories ended. In a standout chapter, Professor Ludmila Stern, an interpreter, explains how the clash of culture and linguistic misunderstandings fatally undermined the witnesses’ courtroom testimonies.

Cross-examination made them feel like they were suspects. Where the lawyers sought information about dates or times of day, the witnesses referenced the state of crops or village festivals. Regional dialects sowed more confusion.

“No matter how egregious Hitler’s ‘Final Solution’,” reflects Grant Niemann, who spearheaded the Polyukhovich prosecution, “it might be difficult for an Adelaide jury to relate to something that happened in German-occupied Ukraine nearly 50 years earlier, during the course of a war only remotely connected to them, and in a theatre of war in which Australia played no role.”

By contrast, in the accused the jurors likely saw a fellow Adelaide resident; a “sick old man” who had survived an apparent suicide attempt. Prosecutor Greg James KC suffered blowback from his legal colleagues for even accepting the brief. And the media was hostile.

The jury did not take long to return a verdict of not guilty on both counts.

Co-editor Graham Blewitt, the SIU’s Director for roughly a year before its forced closure in 1992, is an indignant voice throughout. He practically accuses the trial judge of deliberately confusing the evidence of two witnesses during his summing up “to affirm in the jury’s mind how easy it was to make mistakes when it came to identification evidence.”

Karlis Ozols: "Bestial" Latvian SS officer who lived quietly in northern Melbourne (Image: Ashley Gilbertson)

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Blewitt takes particular aim at the Keating Government for closing the SIU just as it was rounding

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on its biggest prey, the “bestial” Latvian SS officer, Ozols – against whom, advised Peter Faris QC, the SIU had a prima facie case of genocide.

Here, Blewitt blames Director of Public Prosecutions Michael Rozenes for not “forcefully” insisting the Attorney-General provide resources to finalise the Ozols investigation. In the “post-Hawke world”, Blewitt writes, Jewish communal leaders such as Isi Leibler found they had “little leverage” in persuading the Government to reverse its decision to prematurely close the SIU. However the Government did not want to appear the “villain” in the face of the Jews’ fierce campaign.

“Greenwood carried in his wallet a photograph showing the remnants of corpses in a mass grave excavated by the SIU. Asked why he took on the task of leading the unit, he’d would point to the photograph and say, 'that’s why!'”

“What better cover,” Blewitt suggests, “than to make a highly respected Jewish barrister” – Rozenes – “the villain of the piece?”

Authorities using a high-ranking Jew to cloak their indifference to Jewish concerns – now, why does that feel almost paradigmatic?

For all the criticism that the prosecutions failed for coming decades too late, historian Jurgen Matthaus intriguingly argues the contrary: that they came too early. Too early to benefit from the opening of public archives in the post-Soviet Baltic states that helped shift the academic focus of Holocaust historians from the conduct of Nazi chiefs to that of low-level perpetrators who operated the machinery of death. This paved the way for successful prosecutions such as the 2011 conviction of Sobibor camp guard Ivan Demjanjuk in Germany.

And yet, Matthaus writes, “At the turn of the millennium, the Holocaust had not only become a rich field of scholarly endeavour but a contested ground for history wars.”

While Gaza is thankfully not mentioned, it was on my mind throughout. Ground zero for the “history wars” is surely the Holocaust scholars who weaponise the memory of the Shoah against Jews by branding Israel a modern-day Nazi state. Perhaps this is why Nazis in Australia left me with an elegiac sense of loss for the moral clarity of the Hawke era.

Wolf, the sentimental American, asks: “How could Australia say to its Jewish citizens that the murderers of their relatives in World War II by a person now resident in Australia did not matter because the prosecutions would be arduous or because the events had settled into history?”

With the exception of the SIU’s seven edifying years, the answer is: very easily.

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LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHE October 7 and its lessons for Israel

RAN PORAT

While Israel Slept: How Hamas Surprised the Most Powerful Military in the Middle East Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot St Martin's Press, 2025, 360 pp. $51.99 [purchase here]

I

n his 1988 book What Do You Care What Other People Think?, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman wrote: “I learned very early the difference between knowing the

name of something and knowing something.”

While Israel Slept: How Hamas Surprised the Most Powerful Military in the Middle East, by veteran Israeli security reporters Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot, was expected to provide the basis for both types of “knowing” Feynman described. Indeed, their detailed review clearly lays out much of WHAT happened leading to Hamas’ deadly attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and offers important insight into HOW it happened – with Israeli leaders and security officials completely misreading events and drawing catastrophically mistaken operational conclusions.

Yet by the end, the reader is left with one essential question unanswered: WHY did it happen? What was there inside Israel’s politics, society and culture in 2023 that permitted this catastrophe to occur? What caused such blindness across the army, government and other institutions and left Israel so vulnerable – like a sleeping beauty about to be violently awakened by murderous terrorists rather than a charming prince?

HAMAS’ CRUELTY EXPOSED Those who have been chanting pro-Palestinian or antisemitic slogans since the Gaza war began would benefit from reading this book’s revelations about Hamas’ true nature. For instance, pro-Palestinian LGBTQI+ supporters should note that Hamas documents recovered in Gaza contained “instructions for interrogating Palestinians suspected of being gay, lesbian, transgender, and bisexual. The level of barbarism described in the documents was shocking.”

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Other evidence exposes Hamas’ cynical use of civilians as human shields. One Gazan testified that a Hamas terrorist hid a bomb at the entrance to another Palestinian’s home. “‘If you don’t like it, get out of here,’ the Hamas operative told [the homeowner]. ‘It’s none of your business.’” The man replied: “How is it none of my business? These are my children; it’s not okay.” And the Hamas operative told him, “This is the explosive. I will plant it even if you don’t like it – and I’ll even put it between you and your wife.”

TUNNEL VISION However, the book’s main focus is Israel’s fundamental misperceptions – the “blindness” that plagued its military and intelligence community before October 7. Like peeling an onion, each chapter reveals more layers of misunderstanding that led Hamas to believe Israel could be destroyed, even as Israel believed itself secure.

The flawed Israeli mindset, amalgamated in what is known as the conceptzia (a set of beliefs and perception of the enemy’s intentions and capabilities, a term originally coined

IDF soldiers surround a Gaza tunnel during Operation Protective Edge, 2014 (Image: Isranet)

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after the 1973 Yom Kippur War), combined both overconfidence and underestimation of the enemy.

The authors show how both sides interpreted the same events in opposite ways. Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar concluded from 2014’s Operation Protective Edge – considered a success in Israel – that the IDF and the government feared high casualties and would therefore avoid invading Gaza. “Hamas is deterred”, Israeli officials claimed for years. Yet in truth, the opposite was more the case.

The book examines decades of Israeli strategy toward Gaza that ultimately proved counterproductive. The Hamas tunnel network is the most striking example. While Israel focused on destroying and preventing cross-border tunnels, it underestimated the military significance of the vast underground “metro” system within Gaza itself. When tunnel shafts were found in 2014, they were often simply ignored – because military units lacked equipment to deal with them or because doing so was not part of the operational goals they had been set.

Instead, Israel invested heavily in a defensive barrier along the Gaza border – above and below ground – believing it would ensure safety. “How wrong they were,” the authors note.

This overreliance on the technology of the “sophisticated” border barrier led to a reduced IDF troop presence in the area and also fostered complacency and cognitive stagnation. Thus, “no one ever imagined that thousands of terrorists would simply blow holes in the border fence and cross unopposed.”

Even after major conflicts in 2008-9, 2014 and 2021, Hamas quickly rebuilt its capabilities.

The IDF’s confidence and the government’s smugness after every operation against Hamas reflected a dangerous illusion of control on the Israeli side.

NETANYAHU: A TRAGIC FIGURE Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu emerges as a tragic figure at the centre of the October 7 story.

The book recalls his decision during his first premiership in 1996 not to request the US to extradite Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzouk – reportedly to “buy quiet” – even if it meant freeing a top terrorist. This was a recurring theme throughout Netanyahu’s career. He repeatedly prioritised short-term calm in and around Gaza over confronting Hamas directly – not only permitting cash transfers to pay civil servants but also downplaying financial sanctions designed to weaken Hamas.

Like most Israeli leaders, Netanyahu believed the Gaza problem could be contained (Image: GPO/ Flickr)

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To be fair, Netanyahu was hardly unique in this regard. As the authors explain: “Consecutive

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governments in Jerusalem believed that improved conditions in Gaza would lessen Hamas’s incentive to go to war against Israel.”

Netanyahu, however, took this further – believing Qatari money could “buy quiet”.

In addition, the book directs the spotlight towards Netanyahu’s broken promise in 2009 to “topple Hamas’ terror regime, and… restore security to the residents of Ashkelon, Ashdod, and Sderot, and to all of Israel.”

According to the book, his Gaza policy also appears to have had other, more political motivations – maintaining Hamas control of Gaza perpetuated Palestinian division and weakened prospects for Palestinian statehood. “Netanyahu embraced this ‘separation’ policy to the extent that Hamas became something of an Israeli asset,” the authors write.

Since October 7, the authors argue, it too often seemed that Netanyahu’s political considerations took precedence over the national interest. His fear of losing coalition partners delayed hostage deals and ceasefires, prolonging the war, they allege: “Time and again, throughout the conflict, Netanyahu placed political survival above national interest, allowing the war to extend unnecessarily.”

Despite such damning conclusions, the authors stop short of calling for a formal Commission of Inquiry into the failures that led up to October 7 – a demand most Israelis support but the Netanyahu Government appears determined to try to avoid. Instead, Katz and Bohbot note that “both the government and the IDF wash their hands of responsibility and blame the other” and argue that “everyone failed in the run-up to October 7. But it is the government’s job to supervise the military.”

A BIRD’S-EYE VIEW Near the book’s end, Katz and Bohbot acknowledge that “the failures that led to October 7 were systemic.” Yet they do not fully explain why these breakdowns occurred.

Other Israeli analysts have tried to tackle this critically important question. They point out that the Hamas attack exposed apathy, vanity, neglect and lack of preparedness across Israel’s military and civil defence systems. Deep social divisions and political infighting made Israel appear fragile, encouraging Hamas’ aggression. Years of leadership focused on political survival over long-term vision left the Palestinian question mired, allowing extremists to dominate the scene.

On a broader level, Israel’s societal failures mirrored trends across Western societies. A shift toward social isolation and ideological polarisation, where “I’m right and you’re stupid and/or evil,” has replaced dialogue and led to a further breakdown of social cohesion. The overreliance on technology and artificial intelligence, where decision-making was detached from human judgement, was also an important factor in the pre-October 7 failures.

Above all, the Israeli yearning for stability weakened society’s resolve to confront the danger it faces from extremists, who see the existing world order as oppressive and not only seek to destroy it, but often believe they have a divinely-commanded obligation to do so.

And that is a lesson not only for Israel, but also for the West, including Australia.

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THE "X" FACTOR Fine writing and trite sloganeering in service of a terrible cause

ALLON LEE

One Day, Everyone Will Have Always Been Against This Omar El Akkad Text Publishing, 2025, 208 pp. $32.99

W

hen dawn broke on October 7, 2023, not one person in Israel knew that, by day’s end, thousands of Hamas terrorists would cruelly massacre, rape and torture 1,200 men,

women and children in southern Israel, and abduct a further 251 back into Gaza.

Their villainy was broadcast to the world in real time, not only by GoPro-wearing terrorists screaming “Allahu Akbar”, but even by journalists employed by Al Jazeera and embedded with Hamas.

Hamas officials later boasted of their terrible deeds and promised to repeat them “again and again” until Israel is destroyed.

The very next day, in solidarity with Hamas, Iran’s Lebanese proxy Hezbollah started firing rockets into Israel.

Soon after, Yemen’s Houthi rebels, another Iranian-backed terror group, began firing missiles at Israel and at ships in the Red Sea belonging to countries deemed supportive of Israel.

Eventually, Israel would be fighting a multifront war, including directly against Iran, spanning the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. By any stretch of the imagination, it has cost the Jewish state huge amounts of blood and treasure.

Despite what the armchair critics have said, it is a war that Israel has fought with as much honour as war – always a horrible business made worse by an urban environment – allows.

Leading urban warfare experts, including West Point Academy’s Major (ret.) John Spencer and former commander of British forces in Afghanistan Colonel (ret.) Richard Kemp – neither of whom have skin in the game – have described the Israeli Defence Forces’ (IDF) efforts to minimise civilian casualties in Gaza as “unprecedented”.

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But you would never know any of this from reading One Day, Everyone Will Have Always Been Against This by Egyptian-Canadian journalist-turnednovelist Omar El Akkad.

Despite El Akkad’s skills as a writer, One Day is a nasty, brutish but thankfully shortish screed, stuffed with the usual anti-Israel and anti-Western half-baked slogans and self-righteous posturing, all of which wilts under minimal scrutiny.

The book’s genesis – or at least its title – starts on October 25, 2023,

A Hamas terrorist and a captured man at the Nova festival on October 7, 2023 (Image: Video footage posted on the Telegram channel South First Responders)

when El Akkad uploaded to his X account a short video showing a camera’s POV roving down a smashed-up street in Gaza with the caption: “One day, when it’s safe… everyone will have always been against this.” The post went viral.

In summary, the book argues that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a simple case of the coloniser versus the colonised, and the West has no right to support Israel at all, and certainly not its response to October 7.

El Akkad ‘explores’ – and rages – at what he considers the immoral complicity of Western governments and media in maintaining the status quo.

In a classic case of inversion, El Akkad first introduces October 7 this way: “Beginning in October of that year, the Israeli military… enacted a campaign of active genocide against the Palestinian people, one of the most openly, wantonly vicious campaigns in the near-century-long occupation, and easily the most well documented.”

Only then does he turn to October 7 itself, using anodyne language that provides an impersonal summary of what happened.

As with so many pro-Palestinian activists, the genocide accusation is thus not an analytical conclusion but a frame – a pre-emptive moral verdict – that allows him to invert victim and aggressor from the outset.

Instead of describing October 7 and its aftermath for what it is – a multifront war against Israel by Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” – he weaponises it, arguing that the whole conflict is only the latest instalment of Western-backed aggression against the region’s indigenous peoples.

The tone of the book grows ever shriller, blaming everyone and anyone but those most responsible for dragging Palestinians into the fire: Hamas.

Ignoring Israeli offers for peace that were rejected by Palestinian leaders and standing offers to negotiate peace, he attempts to contextualise October 7 by saying it was “orchestrated by exactly the kind of entity that thrives in the absence of anything resembling a future.”

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In El Akkad’s moral universe, Palestinians are entirely without agency. What’s worse, he places no responsibility on Hamas for any Palestinian deaths.

He disregards the fact that Hamas spent nearly two decades and billions of dollars building a vast subterranean tunnel network under Gaza’s civilian neighbourhoods, openly acknowledging it was only designed to protect its fighters and military hardware, not Palestinian civilians.

He expresses outrage over the deaths of Palestinian journalists in Gaza, who he says bravely reported during the conflict, but never addresses evidence that many worked for Hamas. He seems oblivious to the fact that Palestinian reporters virtually Omar El Akkad: Selective outrage that fails to grapple with realities

never filed stories or footage showing Hamas fighters or their military activity during the war.

He is outraged by Western media language that, in his view,

dehumanises Palestinians, but casually labels Israelis living in sovereign Israel as “settlers”. This, along with his assertion that Palestinians have suffered a century of occupation, strongly suggests that he views all of Israel as illegitimate and all Israelis as illegal occupiers.

This helps explain why he dismisses the Oslo Peace Process and Israeli offers to create a Palestinian state – offers Palestinian leaders rejected – as a mere footnote. He derides attempts by leaders such as former US President Bill Clinton to portray the Palestinians rejection of peace offers as a “failure of imagination”, calling it an example of a racist Western mentality “that certain people are incapable of responding to their mistreatment with grace.”

The accusation that Israel’s operations were geared toward implementing a predetermined policy of genocide is a calculated obscenity. First, because genocide requires intent, which Israel’s actions – issuing advance warnings, setting up safe zones and letting in aid – prove it did not have. Second, because it is a deliberate attempt to whitewash Hamas’ culpability for the death and destruction in Gaza.

Betraying his professional responsibilities, El Akkad writes that the International Court of Justice in January 2024 “rules that Israel must stand trial for genocide.” Contrary to his insinuation, the Court made no determination on the substance of the allegation – only that South Africa had a plausible right to bring the case, and Palestinians a right to be protected from genocide.

Interestingly, amid all his anti-Western ranting and talk of genocide, he has nothing to say about the decade-long internecine savagery of the Syrian civil war and its estimated 650,000 deaths.

W

hat, then, is El Akkad’s solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Love, apparently… especially the wonderful “love” of the Palestinian people. He writes: “Palestinians do

respond overwhelmingly with love… Just as the Black communities in much of the United 92

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States… responded overwhelmingly with love… Today I watched footage of a man kissing his son’s foot as he buried the body so torn apart by the missiles that the foot was one of the only pieces the father could find. Tell me this man doesn’t know love… Except it is a love that cannot be acknowledged by the empire.”

The “if only we show them love” argument might work if there were a genuine desire for conciliation. But this falls flat in the face of the ideology, rhetoric and behaviour of the mainstream Palestinian parties – Hamas and Fatah.

Of the former, October 7 surely shatters any delusion that it can ever be a viable peace partner.

"As with so many pro-Palestinian activists, the genocide accusation is thus not an analytical conclusion but a frame – a pre-emptive moral verdict – that allows him to invert victim and aggressor from the outset."

Then there is Fatah, which runs the Palestinian Authority. In the 32 years since it recognised Israel, it has proven itself no more committed to genuinely ending the conflict through dialogue and compromise than it was upon its founding in 1959. It has resorted to terror, rewarded it since the Oslo Accords and rejected numerous peace plans that met its publicly stated desire for a two-state resolution. Moreover, since October 7, numerous PA representatives have insisted Hamas is an indivisible part of the Palestinian polity and its future, and praised October 7. This hardly engenders optimism that Palestinian “love” is the answer.

Backtracking to El Akkad’s X posts – before the Oct. 25 one, his first reference to the massacre was a retweet on Oct. 11 that cast doubt on media reporting of atrocities. There were certainly no posts condemning October 7.

This lack of “love” for Jewish victims echoes a concern Edward Said raised in 2000 about the potential consequences if Palestinians achieved maximal political aims: “The question of what is going to be the fate of the Jews is very difficult for me. I really don’t know. It worries me.” El Akkad’s selective outrage and failure to grapple with realities further illustrates the book’s lack of seriousness in considering the ethical and real-world consequences of rejecting any Jewish right to self-determination and leaving Israel’s 8 million Jews to the “love” and mercy of the likes of Hamas.

Some readers may be dazzled by El Akkad’s self-righteous anger. Yet the irony of a book written to expose misinformation ending up reproducing many examples that support his own ideology makes it just another entry in the ever-growing catalogue of factually-challenged political polemics.

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CINE FILE

THE DAY ISRAEL STOPPED BREATHING What October 7 unleashed

JUSTIN AMLER

Red Alert Directed and co-written by Lior Chefetz and Ruth Efroni Keshet Media Group, Australian release thru Paramount+, 4 episodes

O

ctober 7, 2023, was the darkest day in Israel’s history. Hamas’ barbaric assault killed 1,200 people, many of them tortured or raped first, with 251 more kidnapped. Turning

such an atrocity into a fictionalised TV series was always going to be a monumental challenge. Yet co-creators Ruth Efroni and Lior Chefetz have crafted a show that captures, even if only partially, the human essence of that day – the chaos, confusion, and courage. And they did it without forgoing authenticity or respect.

Rather than attempting a sweeping, panoramic retelling – which would be nearly impossible – Red Alert focuses on ordinary people and the terror they endured: festivalgoers, police officers, kibbutz families, and citizens whose lives changed in an instant. Told across four episodes, the series follows four intertwining stories – the Yahalomi family, police officer Kobi and his wife Nofar, middle-aged mother Tali Hadad, and Ayoub, a Palestinian labourer trying to return home to Gaza. Through their eyes, viewers relive that horrifying day, feeling their disbelief, horror, and bewilderment.

The show unfolds almost in real time, immersing us in the frantic uncertainty of October 7. Although scripted, characters are based on real people, or an amalgamation of them. Director Lior Chefetz heightens authenticity by seamlessly weaving actual footage from that day into the narrative, blurring the line between fiction and reality.

Each episode begins in a deceptively peaceful moment – hours, sometimes minutes, before the massacre begins. We see Kobi and Nofar at a barbecue with friends; Ayoub chatting with his wife about opening a business; and Ohad Yahalomi letting his young daughter steer his car near their kibbutz. These quiet domestic scenes feel painfully ordinary – until the wail of the first red alert sirens, from which the show derives its name.

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A terrifying scene from "Red Alert" (Screenshot)

For Israelis living near Gaza, rushing to bomb shelters has long been routine. The series does a good job of capturing how such terror has been normalised over years of rocket fire – a detail likely to shock international audiences unfamiliar with Israel’s daily reality. Viewers are left to ask themselves: if this were happening in our own towns, would we accept it? How would or should our governments respond?

“Red Alert is not an easy show to watch. Nor is it a comfortable one. For Israelis, it would doubtless reopen wounds that have barely begun to heal. But it is must-see viewing nevertheless”

But soon, the characters realise this attack is different. The rockets don’t stop. The chaos intensifies. We watch Ohad frantically scroll through his kibbutz’s WhatsApp group, learning that terrorists have infiltrated the area. As the danger closes in, he makes the agonising decision to guard his family’s shelter with only a handgun – knowing full well what that might mean for him.

Elsewhere, Kobi’s wife Nofar, also a police officer, is at the Nova music festival, helping panicked partygoers flee through the fields of Re’im as gunfire erupts around them.

Kobi, who had just left the festival after an earlier drug bust, soon finds himself battling 95

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terrorists in the streets of Ofakim. In another storyline, Tali watches her off-duty soldier son grab his weapon and run toward danger. She becomes a lioness herself – ferrying the wounded to the hospital amid the carnage. Meanwhile, Ayoub hides with his baby in a small hut after his car is attacked, with real footage from that moment woven hauntingly into the episode.

The Yahalomi family’s story is perhaps the most heart-wrenching: Batsheva Yahalomi escapes an abduction attempt barefoot and in pyjamas, clutching her baby and small daughter, while her 12-year-old son is kidnapped into Gaza. Her desperate need to save her son and still protect her two small children illustrates the impossible choice facing her. This is not unique. Each family faces impossible choices, and the show captures their fear and resolve with painful honesty.

U

nlike many dramatisations that sensationalise real events, Red Alert does the opposite. It deliberately avoids showing the most graphic horrors – the sexual assaults, the

torture, the burning of families. This is not to sanitise them, but because the real events were far worse than fiction could ever depict. What it does show is the human cost of these horrors, as well as the panic, the confusion, the heroism.

The handheld camera work, tight framing, and muted colour palette amplify the claustrophobia and chaos. The editing, particularly the integration of real footage, provides the documentary realism that makes the series so haunting.

WATCH: The official trailer for “Red Alert”

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Rotem Sela plays Batsheva Yahalomi, who faces impossible choices as she struggles to save her three children (Screenshot)

The performances are raw and authentic. One can only imagine how difficult and personal this would be for the actors, and this is captured in each of their performances.

Sara Vino Elad is particularly effective as Tali Hadad, the no-nonsense Jewish mother who, difficult as it is, puts aside her personal needs, becoming a fierce warrior woman ferrying the wounded to hospital as terrorists continue to fire around her. She embodies the best of the Israeli spirit of that day – putting aside personal risk and safety to protect her community. She ended up saving 12 lives that day – one of many acts of selfless courage that define this series. Amid such unimaginable horror, countless true heroes emerged.

Red Alert is not an easy show to watch. Nor is it a comfortable one. For Israelis, it would doubtless reopen wounds that have barely begun to heal. But it is must-see viewing nevertheless – because it captures, even if imperfectly, the essence of the worst day in Israel’s modern history. While the series avoids politics or assigning blame for the failures of that day, it powerfully illustrates what it means to live beside an enemy devoted entirely to your country’s destruction. Its emotional finale – blending grief with courage – reminds us what true bravery looks like.

At a time when antisemitism is rising and denial of October 7 has become disturbingly common, Red Alert serves as both a memorial and a warning. It’s a small but vital window into the horrors that so many would rather forget – or deny.

Stream and watch here – https://www.paramountplus.com/au/shows/red-alert/ 97

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ESSAY

TRANSFORMED BY WAR Assessing what has changed in the Middle East since October 7

ERAN LERMAN

“I

t ain’t over till it’s over – and it’s never over” was legendary baseball player Yogi Berra’s most famous contribution to American folklore.

Nowhere is it as true as in the war-torn region of West Asia and North Africa, still referred to by the name the British gave it, the Middle East.

It ain’t over, even if US President Donald Trump proudly claims to have brought to an end a 3,000-year-old conflict.

It ain’t over, because the forces that started the war – on October 7, 2023, not three millennia ago – are still holding on to their guns in Gaza and in Lebanon, regardless of what the Americans and others ardently want to see happening. It ain’t over, because Iran has yet to abandon the costly and disastrous quest for the bomb.

But with UNSCR 2803 successfully adopted on November 17, 2025, the two-year war has formally come to an end – of sorts, for now. Or, at least, entered a pause long enough and stable enough to bring one of its most painful aspects, the hostage saga, to a close and to enable some form of stocktaking as to the astounding consequences of the fighting Colonel (res.) Dr ERAN LERMAN is Vice President of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. Previously, he served as Deputy Director for Foreign Policy and International Affairs at Israel’s National Security Council, and held several senior posts in IDF Military Intelligence.

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so far.

As 2025 draws to a close, the region is a very different place to what it was merely 26 months ago – the strategic balance between the forces contending for dominance in it has changed, with a potential impact well beyond the region’s borders. To understand the nature of this change, it is necessary to review the struggle for power between rival camps, which has unfolded since the early years of the previous decade, amidst violent upheavals in several key countries.

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MAPPING THE CAMPS, THEN AND NOW When the region went into the violent convulsion known, somewhat hopefully, as “the Arab Spring”, early in 2011, it soon became evident that the old mental map of states with their geopolitical interests and interactions was no longer relevant. Leaders who were there for decades, and had become almost synonymous with the countries they led, were brought down overnight. Countries fell apart amidst partisan warfare. New links were forged based on ideological affiliation – in line with what the theoreticians would call the constructionist frame of analysis (“ideas matter”).

Indeed, a good way to navigate the new landscape would have been then – and remains now – to categorise regional players by their ideological affiliation. Of six such “camps”, only three are still (in 2025) in active contention for hegemony in the region, as detailed below. As for the other three: The socialist pan-Arab nationalists (some of whom, like Saddam Hussein in his day, probably deserved to be thought of as “National Socialists”): For years, in the days of Nasser in Egypt and the Ba’ath in Syria and Iraq, this was the predominant school of thought about the region’s future. Its leaders seemed to tower over all others. Yet under Sadat, Egypt left that fold in the early 1970s; and those who remained became strongly associated, one and all, with the Soviets within the Cold War system. When the latter’s quick collapse in 1989-1991 left them adrift, some – like Saddam – tried to gain regional power on their own (which ended disastrously for him). Others, like Syria’s Hafez al-Assad (Bashar’s father), found another camp to join. Only relics (such as the now depleted the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – PFLP) remain of the forces that had once dominated the region like a colossus.

The war launched on October 7, 2023, fought under Islamist rather than nationalist banners, did little to revive these forces.

The true liberal democrats, to some extent encouraged by US President George W. Bush’s “agenda of liberty”, thought they saw a dawn of freedom in the spring of 2011, and played a major role in the drama of Tahrir Square in Egypt and elsewhere in the region. However, they soon proved to be unprepared to take power, and their influence faded (in Tunisia they did share power for a while, but it too is now under authoritarian rule). Again, the war with its inflamed passions did little to give strength to the remnants of this camp in the region or even among Muslims abroad.

At the other end of the spectrum, the Salafi Jihadists, such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State (Daesh in its Arab acronym), left their mark on the world on 9/11 and again with their rapid conquests in northern Syria and Iraq in 2014. But they were largely rendered marginal by the defeats they suffered at the hands of American-led coalition forces, in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq and Syria in 2015 onwards. True, the US effort in Afghanistan collapsed and the Taliban have regained power: the sorry manner in which the Americans left may have added to the self-assurance of Hamas and its likes as to the capacity of Western liberal societies to withstand losses. But Afghanistan today (recently embraced by India for its own geopoliti99

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cal reasons) is careful not to be perceived again as exporting terror, and the Salafi-Jihadists, even if they do live through the social networks and have a presence in the minds of radical Islamists in the West, no longer have a territorial base that would keep them in contention for regional hegemony.

THE IRANIAN CAMP AND THE IMPACT OF THE WAR Thus, a mapping of the war’s effect on the regional balance requires only glancing attention to the old nationalist radicals or the liberals, who largely remained silent in the face of Hamas’ atrocities.

As to the Salafi Jihadists, they did play a major role in the ranks of the opposition forces who swept away the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria in December 2024, and were thus key beneficiaries of the impact of the war, but they did not join the fighting. Indeed, in his new persona as a leader, still bearded but in a suit and friendly face towards the West, President Ahmed al-Sharaa seeks to put his Jihadi past behind him. His level of engagement with the Israeli Government is unprecedented (even if it has yet to produce a security agreement).

Only time will tell whether this transformation is profound or merely suit-deep.

Far more consequential, indeed central to the understanding of what the war has wrought, is the position of Iran and its “camp” of proxies. To understand why the present Islamic revo-

Iran's vast "camp of proxies", once celebrated, now greatly diminished (Image: Shutterstock)

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lutionary regime was a central player in creating the conditions for this war (even if it was not apparently a party to the specifics of Hamas’ plans), it is necessary to delve into its ideological imperatives – since no real geo-political or economic interests are behind its eliminationist position towards Israel.

For regime founder Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini in his day, and for his successor Ali Khamenei and his regime today, “being in the business of destroying Israel” is rooted in their innermost creed. In their version (or perversion) of the Shi’ite faith, a violent bid to turn it into a modern totalitarian template, Iran and its camp will be able to carry forward the elimination of the Jewish state (which they define as a cancer brought into the region by the “global arrogance” of the West) – a task that the existing Sunni regimes gave up on. It is not for nothing that for years, a major thoroughfare in Teheran was named after Khaled al-Islambuli, the assassin of President Sadat of Egypt, whose sin was to make peace with Israel. In other words, the quest for Israel’s destruction was not the result of any specific point of contention with the Jewish state: it was, and remains, a core aspect of the Islamic Revolution as such.

In order to pursue this existential mission, the Iranian regime pursued three channels of action – all of which ended up by being severely challenged, but not yet completely overturned, by the events of the war: Active pursuit of a nuclear military capability: The Iranian insistence on an active enrichment program, which over time had brought them closer and closer to having enough fissile material for a bomb, cannot be explained by any coherent civilian need. Modelled after the Pakistani project (whose designs were shared with them by the father of the Pakistani atomic bomb A. Q. Khan), it never made any sense in terms of its size and its nature other than as a bid for the bomb, even if the text of the 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), boldly asserted otherwise. True, Iran may well have other reasons to seek a nuclear capability: It has suffered at the hands of Iraq, had occasional rifts with Pakistan, has reasons to fear Russian power, and seeks to dominate its Arab Gulf neighbours. And yet a central purpose of the project, all along, has been to undo Israel’s perceived regional superiority so as to open up the avenues that would lead to its decline and destruction.

Forced, under the terms of the JCPOA, to abandon the plutonium track to a bomb, Iran was nevertheless adamant that it would keep the capacity to enrich uranium (i.e. using centrifuges to separate fissile U-235 from U-238). And once the Trump Administration turned its back on the JCPOA in 2018, the regime cast off, step by step, all restraints on enrichment.

By late 2024 there were also signs that it was activating the long-dormant weapons group, setting in motion the Israeli plans to stop it by force if necessary – and ultimately, Operation Rising Lion, known also as the “12-Day War” this past June.

The results were far-reaching, both in terms of the physical destruction wrought upon Iran’s nuclear facilities and as regards the fate of key scientists and engineers involved in the project. What was left of Iran’s existing stockpile is buried under rubble, and any serious 101

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attempts to retrieve it are bound to be detected and undone.

Notably, the Trump Administration joined the fray with a final assault on facilities Israel did not have the means to penetrate by bombing. What drove Operation “Midnight Hammer” was the realisation by the US that Iran has positioned itself as an ally, and indeed a weapons supplier, to Russia, in close coordination with other enemies of America. This “axis”, sometime referred to as the CRINK (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea) has emerged as an active challenger, and the US decision to move against it – based on years of planning by the US Central Command (CENTCOM) – struck effectively at its weakest point.

In the aftermath, Iran refused to accept a negotiated end to its nuclear venture – in return for the removal of sanctions, a deal that Trump quite clearly put on the table, having stopped Israel from pursuing its attacks any further. As a result, the three European partners to the JCPOA – after years of reluctance to follow America’s lead in putting “maximum pressure” on Iran – finally activated the so-called “snap-back” clause and re-instated sanctions (China and Russia, obviously, did not follow suit). It now remains to be seen whether the mounting pressure will bring Iran back to the negotiating table (possibly the outcome favoured by President Pezeshkian), or instead, in line with the Supreme Leader’s ideological obsession, Teheran will dig in its heels or even take the drastic step of leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

"For Iran, it was also important to build up an image of Israel as a weak and withering entity, internally divided and destined to collapse. This led Teheran to cross a threshold previously avoided and launch direct action against Israel, in April and October 2024. Yet the results were far from what Iran may have expected" Iran’s other tool designed to bring about Israel’s decline and fall was the proxy system – or, to use a term coined by Major General (res.) Yaakov Amidror, Israeli former National Security Advisor – the “ring of fire” built around Israel. Its most significant component was in Lebanon, held in the firm grip of a terror group fully subservient to Iran – Hezbollah, the “Party of God”, which combined political representation of the country’s underprivileged Shi’ites with the building of a massive military capacity, stronger than that of many states. To call it a “militia”, when it held some 150,000 rockets and missiles, was a serious understatement.

Neighbouring Syria – or rather, most of it – was held by a murderous regime beholden to Iran for its help against its own people. Even if the Assad clan was in fact secularist, and belonged to the Alawite sect that has long left the realm of Islam, it has been allied with Iran for decades because of their common enmity toward Saddam’s regime in Iraq, and served Iran as a conduit to Lebanon – and to Israel. Since 2013, the latter, in retaliation, had conducted 102

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The site of the attack that killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (Image: Mohamad Safa/ X)

a long series of air attacks on Iranian targets and convoys in Syria, which came to be known as the “Campaign Between the Wars.”

To the south of Syria, Iran sought, but failed, to destabilise Jordan so as to gain direct access to the Palestinians in the West Bank. Much further south, in Yemen, the radical Houthi Shi’a group which took over large parts of the country, was also, in many ways, an Iranian proxy, albeit with a will of its own. Its capacity to strike at far-away targets, both in Israel and in the Gulf monarchies, was clearly based on Iranian-supplied missile and drone technologies. Finally, in Gaza (not Shi’ite but radicalised), Iran has a fully-owned proxy – Palestinian Islamic Jihad – as well as working relationship with Hamas, even if in ideological terms that organisation is closer to the Muslim Brotherhood than to Iran’s version of Islamism.

All this was meant to erupt upon Israel at the appropriate moment and hasten its demise, with Iran staying safely behind the scenes. Yet something went wrong: Hamas’ leader, Yahya Sinwar, while sharing with Iran his general intentions, chose to keep both Teheran and Hezbollah’s leaders in the dark as to precisely when he was going to strike. There may well have been some solid logic behind this decision – and not just the vanity of being the standard bearer. Given the intensity of Israel’s intelligence effort in the north (which we now know came at the expense of taking the Hamas challenge seriously), he may have assumed – with good reason – that informing Hassan Nasrallah risked informing Israel’s sources.

Thus, by the time the war was underway, Hezbollah was caught unprepared – and when it had to make a choice as to its mode of action, a significant segment of the IDF reserves was 103

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already deployed in the north (and the Biden Administration issued a stern warning aimed at Hezbollah and Iran: “Don’t”).

Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah thus chose a low-to-mid-intensity option and it was only in September 2024 that Israel chose to escalate, not least because of the horrifying death of 12 Druze children in a rocket attack on a town in the Golan. Once this happened, the results followed fast and furious, with devastating effects for the Iranian axis of proxies.

Israel unleashed its pager attack, followed by the decapitation of Hezbollah’s leadership, the destruction of much of its infrastructure and a limited ground incursion that pushed it away from the border.

The dramatic reduction of its power – and reputation – made Hezbollah ineffectual in its other task in recent years; namely, helping Assad survive in Syria. When the opposition forces broke out of the Idlib enclave in the northwest in early December 2024, the regime simply disintegrated, driving an immense wedge into the heart of Iran’s proxy system. Israel moved in as well, to destroy remnants of Assad’s military power and take some commanding border areas: the new regime, despite its Jihadi antecedents, opted for talks, and Iran’s key position was undone.

While a ceasefire came into effect in November 2024 in Lebanon, the Israeli Air Force con-

Syrians celebrate the liberation of their country from the Assad regime (Image: Mohammed Bash/ Shutterstock)

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tinues to strike at will, with no effective response, at Hezbollah targets, with more than 300 killed in Hezbollah’s ranks within a year. Before 2023, Israel had cautiously avoided any action in Lebanon (while taking out targets in Syria), but now it no longer fears to strike there – even in Beirut itself, where the Hezbollah Chief of Staff was killed on Nov. 23 – or the Hezbollah strongholds of the Beqaa Valley. All of this is being done on the strength of a side letter by the US, authorising Israel to take preventive measures until such time as the Lebanese succeed at disarming Hezbollah. All this demonstrates clearly how much things have changed.

As for the Houthis, they too joined in with missile and drone attacks, which inflicted minor losses and frayed nerves in Israel, and with an anti-shipping campaign that in effect closed down Israel’s Port of Eilat. An American air campaign against them was cut short before bringing about an end to the attacks. Yet Israel, gradually rising to the challenge of effective operational intelligence in such a distant and alien landscape, struck the Houthis’ leadership during a cabinet meeting, and while they remain in power, their activism seems to have been modified, with the ceasefire nominally in place.

For Iran, it was also important to build up an image of Israel as a weak and withering entity, internally divided and destined to collapse. This led Teheran to cross a threshold previously avoided and launch direct action against Israel, in April and October 2024 (and obviously once Israel launched its own attacks in June 2025). Yet the results were far from what Iran may have expected: the missile and drone salvoes in 2024 were largely foiled, with regional and international players actually assisting Israel. And while significant damage was done by the missile attacks on Israel in June (including hits on the Weizmann Institute of Science and the Soroka Hospital in Beer Sheva), the loss of life, painful as it was, did not exceed 33 dead civilians. In Iran, this outcome – as compared to the devastating effect of Israel’s strikes, which led to massive exodus of citizens from Teheran – is apparently so disappointing that an elaborate fake campaign has been put in motion to inflate the casualty numbers from the Iranian strikes ten-fold and more. This in itself is a sign that the regime is aware that the events of the war shattered the myth of Israel’s helplessness and Iran’s impending rise.

In terms of the game of camps, there can be little doubt that the Iranian regime and its offshoots and affiliates have seen both their power and their prestige greatly reduced.

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THEIR FRIENDS In parallel, having recovered from the immense shock of October 7, Israel systematically reduced Hamas to a shadow of what it had been as a military force in in Gaza – even if it can terrorise the local population in areas still under its control. It was, almost inevitably, a brutal war, fought with much destruction in a densely populated area. As often happens in a prolonged conflict, attitudes hardened, and Israel mismanaged the complex task of providing humanitarian aid to people still under enemy rule (even if the accusations of deliberate starvation or “genocide” are baseless – rarely during wartime has such an effort been made to feed enemy areas). The intense attachment of the majority of Israelis to the cause of releas105

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ing the hostages held by Hamas was a limiting factor, and ultimately led to an American-induced ceasefire taking hold and the living hostages being released, with the IDF in control of more than half the Gaza Strip – but Hamas still holding the rest.

This is in turn a test of the legitimacy, durability, strength and reputation of the forces in the region which are, like Hamas, President Trump's relationship with Qatar is worrisome from an Israeli perspective (Image: Whitehouse.gov/ Flickr)

offshoots, affiliates or supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideology. On the face of it, UNSCR 2803 and the Trump 20-point plan that it endorsed mandate a

“phase two” – once the last hostage bodies are retrieved – in which Hamas will step down as a governing power, disarm and accept the dismantlement of its military infrastructure. But will it? There is, as these lines are being written, little cause for hope.

Part of the problem is that two key regional players, long associated with support for a version of Islamism across the region, and for Hamas in particular, actually enjoy a sympathetic attitude on the part of President Trump and his team. Qatar has certainly gone to some lengths to impress Trump as a dedicated friend (and moreover, it hosts the largest US airbase in the region), and during the war, did play a major role in negotiating the hostage releases. As for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, Trump says he has a “great” relationship with him and likes him, and has been quite willing to see Turkey take a leading role both in post-Assad Syria and in Gaza.

This is worrisome from an Israeli perspective for a range of reasons: Erdogan does not mince words when it comes to denouncing Israel and offering justifications for Hamas and its actions. Above all, this raises the prospect that the relative void created by the trouncing of Iran’s camp will be filled by forces, led by Erdogan and by the Qatari ruling family, who seek to promote a Sunni Islamist agenda – not only in the Palestinian context but also elsewhere.

Both were involved more than a decade ago in the struggle for hegemony in Egypt, supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and President Muhammad Morsi until he was overthrown by a combination of popular protest and military intervention on July 3, 2013 (His ouster was supported, in turn, by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia).

Since then, Erdogan’s attitudes have become more sophisticated, and he effectively courts the Saudis and Emiratis and even President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt, who he once called a usurper. Yet the basic faultline is still there, and Israel’s clear preference is to dissuade the Americans from doing anything that would further empower Ankara and Doha at the expense of others in the region who genuinely share Israel’s quest for stability and for the weakening of both Shi’ite and Sunni Islamist elements.

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THE “CAMP OF STABILITY” – AND ITS PROBLEMS Among the eight Arab and Muslim countries who endorsed the Trump plan and pushed for adoption of UNSCR 2803, five indeed belong to what can be called the “Camp of Stability”, alongside Israel and other interested parties (including the Eastern Mediterranean players, Greece and Cyprus, who fear Erdogan’s ambitions). These are Egypt, Jordan and the UAE (who signed peace treaties with Israel in 1979, 1994 and 2020 respectively – all of which held up despite the images generated by the war), as well as Saudi Arabia (with a solid relationship “under the table”, and persistent rumours about a pending breakthrough) and Indonesia, led by moderate Muslims and with a history of fighting radicals and of Israeli military assistance. Indonesian President Prabowo’s statement at the UNGA, calling for respect towards Israel’s security needs, is an interesting indication as to what may be coming.

Others in the region, including two more Abraham Accords signatories, Morocco and Bahrain, and in the Muslim world beyond it, may be troubled domestically by public responses to the plight of people in Gaza, but also do understand the need to defeat Hamas in a manner that will serve notice to the Islamists in general. Whether this commonality of interests – easily evident in the case of action against Iran, but less so when it comes to facing Hamas, Turkey and Qatar – can be translated into common action (and specifically contributing to the creation of alternative governance in Gaza) remains to be seen. Equally uncertain at this point is the fate of the American effort to bring about normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

A significant stumbling block, in this respect, is the question of a “credible path” (as suggested by UNSCR 2803) to an Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution. After all, in the taxonomy of forces suggested above, the Palestinian Authority (PA) under Mahmoud Abbas, “Abu Mazen”, is in effect on the side of the forces of stability. But in addition to the constraints of Israeli politics, and of the seething anger that many Israelis still feel two years later towards all who had shown sympathy towards the butchers of October 7, there are two practical problems that still stand in the way and make it difficult to find that “path”: 1. The Palestinian refusal, still adamant after all these years, to accept Israel as the embodiment of the right of the Jewish People to self-determination; and 2.The sheer corruption and incompetence of the PA as a government, which means that any attempt to burden it with the governance in Gaza is bound to be disastrous.

The key to the future thus lies with the international players, especially from the Camp of Stability, willing to offer a transitional authority in Gaza – perhaps coming into the areas held by the IDF first – and creating from amidst the ruins a promise for a better life for those who wish for it. This could create a better template for others in the region and beyond – thus opening that elusive “credible path” to two-states.

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Tel: (03) 9131 9200

With Compliments With compliments

PASAT

PROPERTIES

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ASIA WATCH MICHAEL SHANNON

welcome in national expressions of solidarity.

A more direct flashpoint emerged in July, when PAS Youth deputy chief Hafez Sabri, protesting the

AN EMERGING DIVIDE

Government’s proposed Urban Renewal Act (URA)

Malaysia’s multi-ethnic communal mix has long

– a plan that seeks to redevelop ageing urban

been a key driver of its politics. At over 30% of the

buildings, with guarantees of a “one-for-one” re-

population, the minority ethnic Chinese and Indian

placement for affected residents – likened poten-

communities are large – and successful – enough

tial Malay displacement to Palestinian expulsions:

to make the majority Malay population cling ever-

“When land is taken from Malays, it is the same as

more ferociously to the consolations of identity pol-

when Palestinians lose their homes. This is mod-

itics, claiming special entitlements as bumiputera

ern colonisation.” His remarks alarmed Chinese

– “sons of the soil.”

and Indian community groups, who accused him

The underlying resentment of many Malay Muslims towards the minority Chinese (and to a lesser

of weaponising the Palestinian crisis to inflame ethnic fears.

extent, the minority Indians as well), who are generally more urbanised and economically dominant, creates a clear incentive for politicians to play to Malay sensibilities, especially via expressions of solidarity with their global Muslim brethren and denunciations of an agreed-upon bogeyman – the Jewish nation-state of Israel.

Over recent months, Malaysian outrage over the human toll in Gaza has spilled into domestic politics in new ways — sharpening ethnic and religious

“Malaysian outrage over the human toll in Gaza has spilled into domestic politics in new ways — sharpening ethnic and religious divides, inflaming anxieties among non-Muslims and strengthening the hand of political Islam”

divides, inflaming anxieties among non-Muslims and strengthening the hand of political Islam.

Yet, thousands of PAS activists attached their

Nowhere was this more visible than in the es-

cause to a pro-Palestinian rally in Kuala Lumpur

calating rhetoric of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS),

in October, claiming that the country would fall

which intensified its portrayal of the Gaza war as

to “DAP control” (the Chinese-dominated Demo-

a religious obligation for Muslims. At several ral-

cratic Action Party) if the “Urban Robbery Act” were

lies, PAS leaders described the conflict in theologi-

passed, while marching with placards equating the

cal terms, insisting that Malaysians had a “duty as

proposed law with “stolen Palestinian land”.

Muslims” to stand with Palestinians.

A senior member of a Chinese civic organisation

At a February gathering in Kedah, a PAS state

commented, “Every issue is being Islamised now.

leader declared, “Defending Palestine is defending

Even housing policy is compared to Gaza. It sends

Islam. If we abandon them, we abandon our faith.”

a message that Malay-Muslim grievances are su-

The line drew thunderous applause, but also imme-

preme, and everyone else is peripheral.”

diate criticism from civil-society groups, who said

And yet the trend has continued. PAS MP Ah-

the message implied that non-Muslims were less

mad Marzuk Shaary’s Facebook post on October

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Solidarity with the Palestinian cause on the streets of Kuala Lumpur (Image: Shutterstock)

19 titled “Learning from Palestinian History: Let us

the Chinese). A possible motive behind this rheto-

not Repeat the Same Mistakes” claimed that Ma-

ric is to influence the urban Malay vote, where PAS

laysia’s Muslims have been “exiled from their own

has far less traction compared to rural or semi-ru-

homeland” by non-Muslims.

ral areas, but his remarks have been criticised as

Rewriting history, Marzuk claimed that Jewish immigrants (pendatang) had initially gone to Pal-

“extreme and unacceptable”, even from within the wider opposition coalition.

estine as visitors and were accepted on humani-

Meanwhile, pro-Palestinian rallies have contin-

tarian grounds by the noble-hearted Palestinians.

ued to attract Malaysians of all backgrounds, but

Eventually, they “controlled the economy, seized

the tone and symbolism have been shifting. Large

strategic cities, seized important lands, and finally

protests — often led by PAS, Muslim NGOs and

dominated politics.” Consequently, the Palestinians

hardline religious movements — increasingly fea-

became “refugees in their own land,” and “signs are

ture Islamic chants and banners equating Gaza

already beginning to appear” that this history is re-

with a universal Muslim struggle.

peating itself in Malaysia.

At the massive “Solidarity Bersama Gaza” rally

From Marzuk’s perspective — and that of his

in October, organised in solidarity with the Global

fellow party members — Malay-Muslims no longer

Sumud Flotilla activists, some Malay-Muslims felt it

have control over major resources, chiefly land and

was a spiritual moment – one 21-year-old attendee

properties. The pendatang to whom they have lost

told a reporter: “This is our ummah. Palestinians

these resources are the non-Malays (specifically

are our brothers. Their suffering is our suffering.”

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EUROPA EUROPA But non-Muslim attendees described a different experience. A Hindu university student who

ALEX BENJAMIN

joined for humanitarian reasons said she felt “out of place”, adding: “We support Palestine too. But

AUNTIE-DOTE REQUIRED

when every speech is about Muslims and the um-

“The BBC should provide duly accurate and

mah, you feel like you are not part of the narrative.”

impartial news, current affairs and factual

Some non-Muslims’ attendance at the rallies

programming to build people’s understanding

fell away through the year, not out of disagreement

of all parts of the United Kingdom and of the

with the cause, but discomfort with the increasingly

wider world.”

religious tone and PAS’s prominent role.

BBC Charter

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Government has tried to project a unifying message, reiterating Malaysia’s long-standing position: strident op-

Chopping and cutting a video of President Trump was the straw that broke this camel’s back.

position to Israel’s conduct, humanitarian support

As former Director of BBC Television Danny Co-

for Gaza and diplomatic backing for a two-state

hen put it, “If this kind of misleading editing had

solution.

originated in a Russian bot farm, the BBC would

But the Government faced pressure from all directions. Islamist groups accused Anwar of being

probably have described it as an attempt at election interference.”

too cautious; non-Muslims complained the Govern-

The Director of the BBC and the head of news

ment’s rhetoric increasingly leaned toward religious

fell on their swords. The damage to Auntie (as the

symbolism; while moderates in the governing Pak-

BBC is affectionately known in the UK) has seen an

atan Harapan coalition privately worried that PAS

increasing number of the public, who pay for the

was framing itself as “the true defender of Pales-

public broadcaster through TV licensing, call for

tine” — a potent narrative for Malay voters.

this funding to cease.

When Anwar announced a major new aid pack-

Amongst them are a majority of British Jews,

age for Gaza in August, he urged Malaysians to

who have felt the full brunt of the kind of selective

maintain unity, saying: “Our compassion must not

chopping and editing of news that forced the BBC

divide us. This is a humanitarian crisis, not an ex-

into a fawning apology to the American President (a

cuse for communal politics.”

threatened US$1 billion lawsuit will do that). They,

But PAS leaders, including its influential cler-

however, do not expect anything similar.

ics, quickly pushed back. One senior PAS figure

The BBC’s coverage of Israel was never great

responded: “This is not only humanitarian. This is

to begin with, with accusations of a deep bias

jihad of the heart. Muslims must stand firm.”

against the Jewish state exposed time and time

For now, Malaysia remains broadly united in

again by groups like the Committee for Accuracy

sympathy for the Palestinians. But beneath the

in Middle East Reporting and Analysis (CAMERA),

flags, chants and speeches, two visions of solidar-

and Campaign Against Antisemitism. Auntie was

ity are emerging — one civil, and one religious. The

able to weather these occasional storms – like the

contest between them may shape Malaysia’s com-

periodic skirmishes in Gaza or the West Bank, they

munal cohesion in the years to come.

were short-lived and people moved on to the next

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news cycle.

strange defence which begs the question, does the

October 7 changed everything where the BBC

BBC not disapprove of Hamas’ actions? A strange

was concerned. The two-year war meant that its in-

defence also compounded by hypocrisy. The BBC

stitutional bias was exposed to daylight much lon-

had used the term “terror” attacks to describe 9/11

ger and was much harder to deny.

in the US, the 2005 London bombings and the 2015

After the worst pogrom against Jews since the Second World War, the Nova music festival and Kibbutz massacres, gang rapes and the kidnapping of 250 people into Gaza, Auntie just could not

Bataclan Theatre attack in Paris, to name but three counter-examples.

This dogmatic refusal set the tone for everything that followed.

bring itself to call it terrorism, or label Hamas ter-

This column could probably fill the entirety of the

rorists. In fact, it contorted itself into shapes befit-

AIR citing examples of this inherent bias. Thank-

ting a Twister champion to avoid using any such

fully, a forensic analysis of 2,500 BBC News head-

language.

lines on the conflict since October 7 by CAMERA

BBC journalists defended the corporation’s

saves me the trouble. It reveals a newsroom which

stance by pointing to its founding charter and claim-

has lost complete sight of any commitment to im-

ing that terrorism is a “loaded word which people

partiality in its portrayal of the conflict.

use about an outfit they disapprove of morally.” A

The CAMERA figures are stark. BBC headlines

An analysis of BBC headlines on Gaza tells a clear story of inherent bias (Image: Shutterstock)

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were three times more likely to be critical of Israel

the Middle East and Europe exploded in anger, with

than the terrorists of Hamas. Claims of “genocide”,

attacks on synagogues in Berlin and Tunisia, and

“famine” and “starvation” appeared 45 times, while

then-US President Joe Biden’s meeting with Arab

references to Hamas “war crimes” appeared ex-

leaders in Jordan cancelled.

actly once.

I didn’t even mention the BBC commissioning

Just a single headline covered a series of filmed

and airing a documentary, “Gaza: How to Survive

public executions by Hamas of their opponents. By

a Warzone,” which claimed to follow the lives of

contrast, 33 separate headlines in just two months

four young people affected by the conflict in Gaza.

promoted claims – unsupported by video or photo-

It was forced to remove the documentary from

graphic evidence – that Israel had killed civilians at

its BBC iPlayer soon after it was revealed that the

US-funded aid sites.

13-year-old narrator was the son of Hamas’ Deputy Minister of Agriculture.

Recently, I found myself reading an interview

“October 7 changed everything where the BBC was concerned. The two-year war meant that its institutional bias was exposed to daylight much longer and was much harder to deny.”

with David Byrne, the writer, visual artist and former lead singer of the band Talking Heads. He was lamenting the state of American media and how its political bias is just so obvious depending on the channel watched or paper read.

I take a different view. I actually much prefer such obvious bias. In America you can watch MSNBC or Fox News and know exactly what you are getting. Neither seeks to hide behind “impartiality”.

I cannot help but respect the honesty here. It allows

Then there was the Al-Ahli Hospital blast on Oct.

me, as a consumer, to make an informed choice.

17, 2023. “Hundreds feared dead or injured in Israeli

What is much more sinister is what the BBC is

airstrike on hospital in Gaza, Palestinian officials

doing. In openly denying any lapse in impartiality,

say,” screamed the alert, which failed to spell out

despite mountains of evidence to the contrary, it is

that “Palestinian officials” in fact meant Hamas.

being utterly dishonest.

The BBC tweet was swiftly and widely shared by,

The BBC’s refusal to do so has consequences.

among others, England’s leading clergyman at the

It is simply impossible to ignore the link between

time, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin

what is on its news feeds and the climate on the

Welby.

streets. This is especially true in the UK, where the

BBC News reporters speculated “It is hard to see what else this could be… given the size of the explosion, other than an Israeli airstrike or several airstrikes.”

BBC dons the cloak of impartiality and the fig leaf of its charter to such devastating effect.

Jews everywhere are continuing to pay the price for this disgusting charade. So too, sadly, is the Brit-

It was, as we all know, a Palestinian Islamic Ji-

ish public – where too many continue to labour un-

had rocket that fell short and hit the hospital car-

der the misapprehension that the BBC is a reliable

park. But the damage was done. Cities throughout

arbiter of truth when it is anything but.

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Students who spread antisemitic anti-Zionism on university campuses may have learned their hatred in secondary or even primary school (Image: Screenshot/ X)

WASHINGTON HEIGHTS DANIELLE PLETKA

ety, is the hostility to Jews, Zionism, and Israel being taught at the kindergarten through high school level. Per the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), “In 2023, antisemitic incidents at K-12 schools increased by 135% from the previous year to 1,162

SPEAKING OUT OF SCHOOL In the days and weeks after the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, Jews around the world were

incidents overall. Further, FBI data reveals that hate crimes in schools have more than doubled over the past five years.”

horrified to find that antisemitism – once believed

Part of the problem is certainly bigotry that chil-

marginalised under the principle of “never again” –

dren bring into school. Earlier this year, Muslim Stu-

was alive and flourishing. At first, the demonstra-

dent Associations (MSAs) at two northern Virginia

tions, attacks, and outpourings of hatred were put

high schools promoted club meetings with videos

down to Israel’s defensive war in Gaza. But two

of mock kidnappings, with hooded victims placed

years later, it is now clear that the “anti-Zionism”

in a car trunk. In the same school system, a guest

and anti-Israel upsurge is rooted in antisemitism

speaker allegedly went on an antisemitic tirade on

plain and simple. Still, the question remains: What

social media, tweeting: “I’m not racist I love every-

is the wellspring of this Jew hatred? The answer,

one. Except the yahood [Jews]” and “Never met a

in no small part, in the United States at least, is

Jew who didn’t have a huge nose” (This occurred

school.

prior to the October 7 attacks).

The wave of Jew hatred that flooded American

No surprise then that one of the school districts

campuses after October 7 was difficult to miss.

in the spotlight – Fairfax County, where I live – is

Less visible, but perhaps more corrosive to soci-

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tine (AMP), the umbrella organisation for Students

cally contextual” and blames it on right-wing white

for Justice in Palestine (SJP), a major on-campus

nationalism.

agitator.

Another section of the curriculum rewrites the

Two other districts are also in the sights of

history of the Zionist project, insisting that the Jews

the US House of Representatives Committee on

seeking to build a state wanted to exclude all non-

Education and the Workforce: Berkeley, California,

Jews: “Today’s violence did not begin on Oct. 7… It

and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (This is the same

did not begin with the Holocaust. No. It began with

committee that exposed the antisemitic double

the Zionist movement’s conviction that Palestine

standards at Harvard, MIT, and the University of

should be a Jewish-only country and that Palestin-

Pennsylvania.)

ians should disappear.”

In Berkeley unified school district (California), multiple instances of students chanting, “kill the Jews”, brought complaints to the Department of Education. In various school districts, the Hitler salute, swastikas, and verbal and physical assaults on Jewish students became de rigeur.

But where is this antisemitic hatred coming from? Home? Social media? Teachers?

At least in part, the answer is from elementary and high school teachers and administrators.

The three districts (among others) are con-

“It is difficult to escape the conclusion that American schools are incubating antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and Israel-hatred. Thus, students in universities arrive already primed for the intersectional Jew-hatred that is now endemic in academia”

nected to a content/curriculum publisher named “Rethinking Schools”, and in particular, its “Teaching Palestine” curriculum. The curriculum itself is

(The irony behind this revisionism is that it is

a far Left, borderline Marxist text that rails against

Hamas’ aim to create a Judenrein Palestinian state

the Jewish state in seven sections titled, “Why

in place of Israel. Indeed, the first Palestine Na-

Teach About Palestine,” “History of Palestine-Is-

tional Charter, predating the Six Day War and the

rael,” “Gaza”, “Israeli Apartheid and Settler Colo-

conquest of east Jerusalem, the West Bank, and

nialism,” “Challenging Zionism and Antisemitism,”

Gaza, specifically renounced claims to both the

“Solidarity with Palestine,” and “More Teaching

West Bank and Gaza. The aim of the Palestinian

Ideas and Resources.”

“national movement” was the eradication of the

A report by the North American Values Institute dives into the curriculum in depth, highlight-

Jewish state, not two states living peacefully side by side as advocates suggest.)

ing sections such as, “What Antisemitism Is and

In the United States, as in Australia, the issue

What It Is Not,” which refers to the historically

of Israel has become inextricable from the explo-

left-leaning ADL as a “conservative and right-wing

sion of antisemitism. And for supporters of Israel,

Jewish organization” that encourages Jews to see

the problem is not simply in the politics of the Left

themselves united against the rest of the world.

and far Right, but in the growing generational divide

The same section labels antisemitism as “histori-

over Israel.

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AIR NEW ZEALAND In the United States, the left/right divide is stark: 30% of those on the right and 74% on the

MIRIAM BELL

left have unfavourable views of Israel. (In Australia, those numbers are respectively 46% and

PRO-PALESTINIAN PROTESTS CROSS A LINE

90%.) Between 2022 and 2025, young Republi-

The aggressively anti-Israel posters that were

cans aged 18-49 have gone from 35% with neg-

widely plastered around many urban New Zealand

ative views of Israel to 50%. And that is in the

areas are tattered or gone; the heated public fer-

cohort that is more pro-Israel. (In the same poll,

vour around the Israel-Gaza war has eased since

older Republicans have only shifted from 19% to

the ceasefire began.

23% unfavourable.) The same Brookings Institu-

But, according to Jewish community leader Rob

tion report (based on a YouGov poll) reports that

Berg, the sentiment and rhetoric behind it have not

for Democrats in the younger age group, there

disappeared, and will re-emerge at a similar level

has been an increase from 62% to 71% in unfa-

the next time anything happens involving Israel and

vourable views of Israel.

the Palestinians.

Certainly, social media bears some of the blame

As with many other countries, the two years fol-

for massive shifts, particularly among younger peo-

lowing October 7 saw antisemitism explode in New

ple. And the Democratic Party in America, like La-

Zealand, alongside a disturbing normalisation of

bor in Australia, has increasingly shifted away from

language and tropes that vilify Israel, Israelis and

the centre and from its historic pro-Israel stances.

Jewish people.

Similarly, on the right, influencers like Tucker Carl-

However, in the weeks following Foreign Minis-

son and Joe Rogan have drawn younger, more

ter Winston Peters’ announcement on Sept. 27 that

populist Republicans towards a rabidly antisemitic,

New Zealand would not, at this time, recognise Pal-

anti-Israel point of view. But that doesn’t explain the

estinian statehood, protests against that decision

seismic shifts.

reached aggressive new heights.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that

Peters’ announcement at the United Nations in

American schools are incubating antisemitism,

September came after weeks of political and public

anti-Zionism, and Israel-hatred. Thus, students

debate and action around the issue. Many expected

in universities arrive already primed for the inter-

New Zealand’s Government would join Australia,

sectional Jew-hatred that is now endemic in ac-

Canada and the UK in recognising a Palestinian

ademia. And what does that mean for American

state.

support for Israel, which has heretofore been criti-

But Peters surprised. He said there were too

cal to the survival of the Jewish state? Nothing

many questions around a future state for recogni-

good.

tion to be prudent, and that a focus on recognition could “complicate efforts to secure a ceasefire by

DANIELLE PLETKA is a Distinguished Senior Fellow

pushing Israel and Hamas into even more intransi-

at Washington’s American Enterprise Institute, and

gent positions.”

the host, with Washington Post columnist Marc

New Zealand had long been a staunch advocate

Thiessen, of the podcast What the Hell is Going On?

of the two-state solution, and its position remained

along with the eponymous substack.

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ognise the State of Palestine, he said. But “what

Protesters in Wellington, 2025 (Image: NataliaCatalina.com/ Shutterstock)

is needed now more than ever is dialogue, diplomacy and leadership – not further conflict and extremism.”

while his partner was inside.

Attacks on politicians’ homes have been ex-

The NZ Jewish Council, and others, supported

tremely rare in New Zealand. Peters was furious,

the Government’s announcement, saying that “rec-

and became more so after the Green Party held

ognition should be the outcome of real progress to-

a conference, ostensibly on New Zealanders who

wards peace, not a substitute for it.”

participated in a flotilla to Gaza and were briefly de-

But opposition parties criticised the decision, with the Labour Party saying the decision was em-

tained by Israel, which featured one of the protesters involved in the targeting of his home.

barrassing and put New Zealand on the wrong side

On the anniversary of October 7, Peters made

of history. The Green Party said the Government

a “ministerial statement on the Middle East” to

should have “sent a clear message to Israel that the

Parliament. He said protest action following the

genocide needs to stop.”

Government’s decision “forms part of the demo-

And pro-Palestinian activists were vocally enraged.

cratic fabric of New Zealand, so long as it respects the laws of the land. But the violent targeting of

Less than a week after the announcement,

politicians’ private homes by some protesters was

more than 100 protesters set up outside Peters’

a disgrace; It has caused distress to our families

Auckland home with megaphones and drums. His

and disturbed the peace of our neighbours. Means

address was shared on social media, and eventu-

such as these corrupt the protesters’ ends, such

ally the house was attacked, and a window broken

as they are.”

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He also called out “those members of this House

but it would be a negligible amount,” he added.

who collude and collaborate with the very protest-

The vilification of Israel, especially on social

ers targeting politicians’ homes,” and said, “Do you

media and through the likes of Al Jazeera, was all

have no shame? Do you feel so morally righteous

playing out online and this made a greater impact

that you and your supporters are justified to break

on many people than what they saw outside Peters’

any law, any taboo, any political norm?”

house, he said.

“The lid of antisemitism has been opened, the cat is out of the bag, and we are all awake to this

“There was so much hysteria and inflammatory rhetoric around the Israel-Gaza conflict that people could decide breaking a window or screaming outside a house was nothing compared to a ‛genocide’, he said.”

‘new normal’. Because when something happens in Israel again this is the new starting point for it, so we need to be more aware than ever before.”

For Dane Giraud, an active member of the Jewish community and of the Free Speech Union, the protest outside Peters’ house definitely crossed a line. He says, “Peters was not there, but his partner was, and the protesters were prepared to make his neighbours’ lives a misery, too. It was intimidation.

The Australia/Israel Review talked to some mem-

“But it was a protest that told New Zealand a lot

bers of the Jewish community to get their views in

about who the protesters are, and it’s not nice… free

the aftermath.

speech enables them to show how vile they can

Rob Berg is the former President of the Zionist Federation of NZ and current President of the Jewish National Fund NZ, but the views he shared are his own.

be, how uninterested in debate they are, and how threatening they can be.”

There was so much hysteria and inflammatory rhetoric around the Israel-Gaza conflict that people

Berg said he was pleased with the Government’s

could decide breaking a window or screaming out-

decision not to recognise a Palestinian state at this

side a house was nothing compared to a “geno-

time: “The decision was a well-thought out and prin-

cide”, he said.

cipled decision, and the right decision to make in the face of what had led to it.”

Berg questioned whether the decision made a big difference in the broader scheme of things,

“It gives them permission to behave badly…

Those protesters have convinced themselves their behaviour is completely just because Israel is supposedly so bad.”

but said it was good to hear someone on the pub-

For Giraud, the real worry is the slow march of

lic stage say what Peters did, including the point

tropes, such as “Israel is an apartheid state” or “Is-

that recognising a Palestinian state would reward

rael is committing genocide,” turned into accepted

Hamas’ actions.

political opinion.

“Public discourse seems quieter post the cease-

That throws every Jew under the bus because it

fire and the protests at Peters’ house. It’s possible

means “we must all support apartheid if we don’t

the protests could have impacted on people’s view,

agree with [the protesters],” he said.

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MEDIA MATTERS ALLON LEE

FAILING MARKS AT THE ABC ABC Managing Director Hugh Marks’ inaugural National Press Club address (November 19) outlined his benchmarks for quality news and current

ABC broadcaster David Marr: Little pushback on contentious claims (Image: ABC website)

affairs.

Marks said a journalist’s “task and skill is to select the stories that matter and present the facts

Albanese said she hoped voters would hold Aus-

and relevant perspectives that equip people to

tralian politicians accountable for supporting Isra-

make up their own minds.”

el’s “settler colonial apartheid that in the last two

Given the seriousness of the accusation that Is-

years has turned genocidal.”

rael is guilty of genocide in Gaza – and the ABC’s

Marr might reasonably have noted that the

influence on public opinion – it is worth considering

Greens were heavily punished at the May 2025

whether recent coverage meets Marks’ test.

federal election for their extreme, anti-Israel

On Oct. 30, the UN Special Rapporteur on the

positions.

Palestinian territories Francesca Albanese was in-

Instead, he concurred when Albanese claimed,

terviewed on ABC Radio National’s “Late Night Live”

“Israel has deliberately targeted journalists, doc-

to discuss her latest report, “Gaza Genocide – a

tors, erasing all churches... destroying aid.” Her in-

Collective Crime.” Host David Marr largely deferred

sistence that “this genocide… has transformed me”

to Albanese as she made a series of sweeping

and that she had “never been an activist” is contra-

statements.

dicted by her long track record of outspoken anti-

“I think at the people’s level, yes, never had there been a hiatus so profound between the governments and the people… no one today understands Israel as other than an apartheid state, than a

Israel activism and past employment of antisemitic tropes. But Marr didn’t push back.

The ABC Ombudsman received nine complaints about this interview but rejected all of them.

criminal enterprise toward the Palestinians,” she

One major justification offered was that Marr’s

claimed, implying everyone wants Israel punished,

Nov. 2024 interview with Albanese had “canvassed

but governments are refusing to agree.

with [her] many of the [complainants’] issues” and

However, regular polling on behalf of Nine News-

remained accessible on the ABC website.

papers shows that Australians overwhelmingly

Another justification was that Marr had inter-

believe Hamas was responsible for the war and

viewed a guest in September 2025 who rejected the

continues to pose a threat. In August 2025, 44% op-

genocide accusation. But listening to the relevant

posed the Federal Government’s proposal to recog-

portion of that discussion, it’s fleeting and focused

nise a Palestinian state, while a further 32% agreed,

on whether the genocide accusation was antise-

“Australia should wait until Hamas is replaced and/

mitic – not on whether it was factually or legally

or when Palestine considers recognising Israel’s

valid. Treating this as adequate balance is a huge

right to exist first.”

stretch.

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On Dec. 3, Marr interviewed veteran human

dents – many of whom frequently appear in AIR

rights lawyer Geoffrey Robertson about his new

for their lapses in journalistic standards – for their

book World of War Crimes – Eyeless in Gaza and

2025 war coverage.

Beyond.

Another example of the ABC failing to meet

Robertson outlined why he thinks Israel and Is-

Marks’ benchmark was the Dec. 1 interview with

raeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu were guilty of war

sanctioned ICC Judge Kimberly Prost on “The Ra-

crimes, including genocide, but then disingenu-

dio National Hour.” Prost defended the Court by

ously urged that Netanyahu had “an arguable de-

explaining that the ICC operates according to the

fence and he should make it.”

principle of complementarity and “can only inter-

Robertson did correctly note that one of the cen-

vene and will only intervene where there is no state

tral legal challenges with “genocide is that you’ve

willing and able to do the investigations… But if

got to prove a genocidal intent, and you’ve got to

there’s a valid investigation by a state, the court has

prove it very strictly… You’ve got to infer a genocidal

no jurisdiction. So, there is no overreach.”

purpose from the statements made by leaders.”

The program did not inform listeners that Israel,

He cited as an example of this the case South

like other Western democracies, has a robust legal

Africa brought to the International Court of Justice

system, including a powerful and activist Supreme

in January 2024, which relied on quotes from Israeli

Court and the Military Advocate General (MAG)

leaders to demonstrate intent. “They led off with

Corps, which is investigating hundreds of alleged

quotes from the President and from other com-

incidents from the current war. Nor did it mention

manders about likening the Palestinians to animals

that the Trump Administration sanctioned the Court

who had for that reason to be put down,” Robertson

precisely because it bypassed this complementar-

said.

ity principle in issuing arrest warrants for Israeli PM

To correct his dismissive attitude, one can read

Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gal-

this February 2024 Times of Israel article where the

lant rather than waiting for Israel’s own processes.

quotes in question are examined. It shows they re-

There are many more examples, including one-

fer to Hamas fighters as animals – not Palestinian

sided interviews broadcast on the ABC with extrem-

civilians.

ist writer Omar El Akkad (see Biblio File).

Robertson continued flippantly, “What Israel

The pattern, however, is consistent: sweeping al-

says is, ‘Oh, we didn’t commit genocide because we

legations are platformed uncritically, relevant coun-

were really only concerned to kill Hamas people.’

ter-evidence is not raised and guests who assert

Politicide, rather than genocide.”

genocide are almost always given complete defer-

On the final episode of “Late Night Live” for 2025 (Dec. 4), Marr was joined by ABC Global Affairs Editor Laura Tingle, ABC Radio Sydney host Craig

ence, without pushback.

Can Hugh Marks seriously argue this satisfies his criteria for objective journalism?

Reucassel and independent journalist Hannah Fer-

If the answer is in the affirmative, are we then

guson, who has written many overtly anti-Israel

to presume that what he really means is that au-

articles. No one contradicted Ferguson when she

diences should defer to ABC employees who will

referred to the “genocide happening against Pales-

determine for us exactly what “facts and relevant

tinians.” Instead, the panel praised ABC correspon-

perspectives” are deemed acceptable?

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KEEPING FAITH RABBI RALPH GENENDE ENERGY AMIDST AGONY AIJAC’s latest religious leaders Rambam study tour arrived in Israel shortly after the commencement of the US-brokered ceasefire, announced on October 10. It was from the outset a remarkable time to be in Israel, reflected in the unseasonably sunny and warm autumnal days.

The group – which included Australian Protestant ministers, two Samoan Christian leaders based in NZ and a Hindu faith leader – found the cafes in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv spilling onto the pavement, the bougainvillea bursting from the walls and window boxes; and a warm almost spring-like energy all around. It felt like the ceasefire had opened the skies and let the sunshine and

Nova festival survivor Shalev Biton (Image: Ralph Genende)

laughter back into the heavy and grieving hearts of the people of Israel.

This trip was different from previous AIJAC clergy tours because we were not just introducing our participants to the rich and complicated interplay of religion and politics in Israel, but also exposing them to the trauma and triumphs of the country over the past two years. We were also exploring how interfaith relationships in Israel and beyond had been affected by the ongoing conflict.

For all the sunshine and warmth, the darkness and grief of the past two years were palpable and the signs of a wounded nation visible and present in every encounter and conversation.

Just a thin tissue separated the energy and the agony.

All around, the yellow banners and flags and empty chairs – representing the hostages – were ubiquitous. On virtually every bus stop, public wall and power pole were pictures of those killed on October 7, together with information about their lives and quotes reflecting their hopes and aspirations.

The TV stations every day featured families of the returned hostages. We were there as the body of Hadar Goldin was finally returned and poignantly laid to rest after 11 years and four months. Hostage Square was quiet and lonely, but the families of the two remaining deceased hostages were still there waiting with forbearance. They were especially appreciative of the friendship and support of non-Jews coming to Israel at this time – a sentiment we heard throughout our trip.

Of course, the Gaza envelope area is emblematic of the trauma, but it was also reflective of the triumph and resilience. At Kibbutz Be’eri, as we sat amidst the mute, burnt and broken houses, Australian born Danny Majzner spoke of his personal loss. As I sang the poignant 124

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El Maleh prayer in memory of his murdered sister,

levi’s contention that the source of almost all reli-

Galit Carbone, tears washed over us all. But Ma-

gious faiths emerges from Judaism and Hinduism.

jzner also spoke of his hope that the kibbutz would

We also met with an Israeli interfaith panel led

rebuild. The logo on his T shirt said it all: Build Be’eri

by Rabbi Dr Aharon Ariel Lavi of the Ohr Torah In-

Better. There are new houses going up and people

terfaith Centre, which works with religious leaders

are returning.

– especially Muslims – not only in Israel but also

At the Nova music festival massacre site, we

worldwide, including Australia.

sat in a circle around 24-year-old survivor Shalev,

Sheikh Imad al-Deen al-Massri of the Ahmadiyah

who narrowly escaped the rampage thanks to the

movement in Israel told us: “We must not stop talk-

shelter he was given by a courageous Bedouin. He

ing, for we are all pilgrims. You may be unable to

spoke with wisdom beyond his years about how

go out of your box of ideology but God speaks to

grateful he was to be alive: “I have learnt how to

all who recognise the different boxes of our many

find pockets of hope and strength when facing the

faiths.”

inevitable challenges and suffering of life.”

This sentiment was echoed by Father Piotr

I asked one of our Samoan participants to thank

Zelazko, the Patriarchal Vicar for Catholics in Is-

Shalev and she said the best way she could thank

rael, and Pastor Milena Hasselmann, Pastor at the

him was through song. The strains of her “Amaz-

Church of the Redeemer in the Old City of Jerusa-

ing Grace” rose hauntingly over the wretched land-

lem, who also runs a study program for students of

scape – encapsulating both the pathos of the place

theology from Germany at Hebrew University. The

and the faith, grace and courage of the survivors

war has not curtailed but rather strengthened inter-

and the families of the victims.

faith relationships in Israel.

Faith and fortitude characterised the whole trip

This trip reinforced my passionate belief that

– epitomising not only the participants, but also our

the wars in the Middle East and beyond will not be

outstanding presenters, many of them Israeli faith

resolved by politicians or military strategists alone.

leaders.

As Rabbi Jonathan Sacks would aver: Religion is an

There was the renowned Yossi Klein Halevi, who

essential part of the cause and it’s also a vital part

works at the Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem

of the solution. His words are reflective of the pro-

together with Muslim colleagues. Yossi is unafraid

phetic message: “not by strength but by the spirit of

of tackling the moral dilemmas of a war fought in

God” will war be won.

civilian areas (Hamas and Hezbollah’s chosen are-

The healing of Israel has long to go There is

nas). He is not uncritical of some of Israel’s con-

still tension and great public awareness that Iran,

duct but cogently points out the difference between

Hamas and Hezbollah, while subdued, have not

war as atrocity and war as tragedy. He asks, what is

given up their intention of harming Israel and Jews

the intent of a battle? He also pointed out that if you

everywhere.

want to accuse Israel of genocide and underplay its

Yet for all this there’s a deep spirit and remark-

enemies’ actions, then you need to think about the

able energy there. We left energised not only by the

implications for the future of Western countries like

sunshine and promise of some peace, but also by

Australia if extremism goes unchecked.

the soul of this remarkable country and its diverse

Our Hindu participant was buoyed by Klein Ha-

people.

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DATA THAT MATTERS AGREEMENT AMONG PALESTINIANS THAT HAMAS' DECISION TO LAUNCH ITS ATTACKS ON OCTOBER 7 WAS CORRECT, DECEMBER 2023 TO OCTOBER 2025

•

Data is sourced from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. The average number of people polled in each survey was 1342 across randomly-selected 'population clusters' that collectively represent the demographic balance of the West Bank's and Gaza's cities, towns, hamlets, refugee camps and shelters. Each survey involves face-to-face interviews, with data recorded electronically and immediately uploaded, preventing manipulation.

DAILY TERRORIST CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS IN GAZA, OCT. 10 TO DEC. 1, 2025

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Data collated by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). © JINSA, reprinted by permission, all rights reserved.

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