CODE | Subverting Truth for Power - Report Design

CONTENTS 4

INTRODUCTION 6

CURBING THE CHAOS: 6

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{Efforts to Counter False Information}

DISINFORMATION’S DANGEROUS GRIP ON ELECTIONS

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MANUFACTURING DISTRUST: {The Power of BIG Lies}

TARGETED TACTICS AND THE RISE OF MICROTARGETING RECOMMENDATIONS

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{Because Democracy Won’t Fix Itself!}

ABOUT CODE

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The Campaign On Digital Ethics (CODE) was born in a pivotal year for global democracy, with over 60 countries across the globe, heading to the polls.

As a proudly South African civil society organisation, CODE dedicated its formative months to actively monitoring and trying to combat false information during the 2024 general election. We worked alongside other stakeholders to address the wave of falsehoods that threatened to undermine our electoral process. However, despite many of these efforts being a significant step in the right direction, they were not enough to meaningfully stem the tide of lies and mistruths that spread during the election cycle.

Disinformation is no longer just a byproduct of political campaigns; it has become the oxygen fueling distrust and eroding the foundations of democracy in many countries.

In the 2024 election, disinformation wasn’t just a fringe tactic; it was a core strategy for some political parties.

The goal? To erode trust in electoral systems, leaving a fractured foundation on which democracy stands. And while politicians and media outlets have played their part in the spread of false information, the most insidious force may be the algorithms of social media platforms. These algorithms, designed to optimise engagement, have instead amplified targeted disinformation campaigns that manipulate voters and deepen societal divides.

This report delves into the multifaceted challenge of disinformation. In the first chapter, Curbing the Chaos, we unpack the different interventions that were implemented to prevent, combat, and confront false information during the election cycle.

In Disinformation’s Dangerous Grip on Elections, we explore how public trust in institutions like the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) has steadily declined, paving the way for dangerous narratives to take hold. The next chapter, Manufacturing Distrust: The Power of Big Lies, looks at how big lies have been used as a political survival strategy from some quarters.

In Targeted Tactics: The Rise of Microtargeting, we examine how digital advertising and microtargeting have been used in the 2024 political campaigns, enabling parties to deliver highly personalised—and sometimes misleading—messages to specific demographics.

This chapter highlights the risks of an electorate locked into echo chambers, isolated from differing viewpoints and fed a steady stream of manipulated information.

Finally, the report closes with recommendations, offering actionable steps for combating disinformation.

From strengthening transparency in digital advertising to holding tech platforms accountable, we outline the urgent measures needed to preserve electoral integrity.

Ultimately, based on our work of monitoring the false information landscape in the 2024 general election, one thing is clear: democracy cannot survive on lies.

To protect it, we must confront false information head-on, ensure transparency, and empower citizens to critically evaluate the information they encounter.

Note: This report has been crafted using the Smart Brevity technique, a writing style that prioritises clarity and conciseness while delivering the most critical information efficiently. The purpose of this approach is to ensure that readers can quickly grasp the key points, insights, and recommendations.

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{Efforts to Counter False Information} THE BIG PICTURE •

In 2024, more than half of the world’s population heads to the polls, making this a critical year for global democracy. However, the integrity of these elections is under severe threat as false information campaigns escalate.

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Disinformation has become a weapon used to distort facts, manipulate public opinion, and undermine trust in democratic processes. As a result, many elections around the world are at risk of being compromised, with voters swayed by misleading narratives designed to fracture democratic integrity.

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The rise of social media and digital platforms has created a breeding ground for false narratives.

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Social media algorithms amplify disinformation by prioritising sensational, engaging content, allowing false narratives to spread rapidly and reach large audiences.

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Countries like the US, UK, India, Philippines, and Brazil have seen the weaponisation of social media platforms, to spread disinformation in order to manipulate elections.

In this regard, the World Economic Forum warns that disinformation is the top short- and long-term risk to global stability.

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In South Africa, disinformation relating to corruption, immigration, and the Covid-19 pandemic, has been prominent and divisive.

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Ahead of a pivotal election, the IEC, civil society, government, and the media raised concerns about the growing threat of disinformation during the general election. These stakeholders feared that the spread of false narratives could undermine voter trust and the integrity of the democratic process.

WHAT WAS DONE To proactively counter the foreseeable threats that disinformation posed to South Africa’s electoral process, the following initiatives were undertaken: •

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The IEC partnered with Media Monitoring Africa (MMA), Google, Meta, and TikTok to combat disinformation. The different parties signed a framework of cooperation which promoted collaboration between organisations, and where referrals could be made for content removal on the platforms, if they were classified as disinformation.

Media Monitoring Africa encouraged the public to report mis/disinformation to their Real 411 platform. These complaints were assessed by a panel of experts, and where complaints were defined as disinformation,

social media platforms were requested to remove the content.

Additionally, the IEC and MMA launched a civic tech tool called PAdRe, which provides users with a repository of political ads and tracks digital advertising spends by political parties.

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Africa Check convened a factchecking coalition, consisting of fact-checking bodies, media outlets, and civil society organisations. Additionally, Africa Check conducted training with journalists and media practitioners on how to debunk and pre-bunk information.

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In an effort to improve digital literacy among the electorate, CODE conducted in-person and hybrid workshops with members of the public on how to spot electoral-related disinformation, and where to report it.

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The Centre for Analytical and Behavioural Change (CABC) produced bi-weekly social listening reports, which monitored online conversations and picked up on emerging narratives.

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Murmur provided real-time intelligence and trend tracking in the run-up to elections. Additionally, Murmur conducted an investigation into the role of influencers in distorting public discourse and its threat to democracy.

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News24 and the Daily Maverick produced various fact-checks of election claims.

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The Government Communications and Information System (GCIS) convened a multi-stakeholder coalition, called the National Communication Partnership, consisting of government departments, civil society organisations, and law enforcement entities, to combat and prevent disinformation.

KEY TAKEAWAYS •

The initiatives taken, such as the framework of cooperation between the IEC and digital platforms, as well as digital literacy efforts, are crucial steps in the right direction and must be scaled up for future elections.

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Despite these numerous, valiant efforts, these interventions proved somewhat insufficient to counter the widespread disinformation that permeated the 2024 election, highlighting the need for more robust and faster interventions.

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Even when content was removed from platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, it was often too late. Users had already downloaded or screenshotted the false information, sharing it across platforms like X.com and WhatsApp, creating a hydra effect, where taking down one piece of content led to many more emerging.

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The full extent of disinformation on digital platforms remains unclear, as encrypted messaging services like WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal prevent monitoring, making it difficult to track how widely false information was shared and its overall impact on public opinion.

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There is a need to introduce programmes that create digital literacy and awareness of the dangers of social media at a population level, including considering it as part of the life orientation course taught in schools.

Social media platform X.com was not a signatory to the framework of cooperation, and electoral-related disinformation spread rapidly on the platform.

According to an interim report released by the MMA, 68% of complaints deemed to be disinformation were shared on X.com.

THE BOTTOM LINE •

Combating disinformation requires an “all-ofsociety” approach, with stakeholders like the IEC, government, all social media platforms, civil society, and media collaborating to create a more resilient information ecosystem.

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Future strategies must involve real-time monitoring, faster response mechanisms, and improved crossplatform collaboration to effectively manage and curb the spread of false information.

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DISINFORMATION’S DANGEROUS GRIP ON ELECTIONS THEBIG BIG PICTURE THE PICTURE

WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

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According to the Human Sciences Research Council, the general public’s trust in the IEC has been declining over the years, following a similar trend of distrust in public institutions over the last decade.

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South Africa experienced high levels of electoral-related disinformation during the 2024 general elections.

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Similarly, a 2023 Afrobarometer survey found that the IEC musters trust among fewer than three in 10 citizens (30%).

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In the run-up to the elections, various politicians and political parties stoked doubt in the credibility of the IEC to run a free and fair elections.

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The 2023 Edelmen Trust Barometer highlights that only 46% of South African respondents view the media as a reliable source of trustworthy information. Additionally, journalists in South Africa are viewed with distrust, scoring 37/100 on the trust barometer.

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The intention of those creating and spreading disinformation was to create distrust in the country’s electoral processes. This distrust is likely to be exploited in future elections.

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The instigators seen as the most prominent peddlers of electoral disinformation were members and supporters of the MK Party.

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Prominent themes that emerged in the false content had elements of xenophobia, and encouraged mistrust in the IEC.

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A report by the Reuters Institute, highlighted that information and media consumption patterns have changed in South Africa, where most people access news online and on social media.

Lastly, following a global trend, online influencers (mega and micro) in South Africa are altering the information environment, prioritising building social clout over integrity and authenticity of information.

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Zooming in: ZOOMING IN

When analysing the CABC’s social listening reports, the following online narratives emerged with the intention to cause distrust in the IEC and electoral processes: •

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A post that received 148 000 views on X.com falsely accused President Cyril Ramaphosa of inviting the UN and the US to South Africa ahead of an impending civil war.

In a post that has since been deleted, false claims were spread alleging that the CIA will interfere in KwaZulu-Natal to make sure votes don’t go to any party except the ANC, and that the local police are secretly working with foreign powers to make this happen.

After a meeting between the IEC and the American ambassador to South Africa, where the ambassador shared a picture of the group on X.com, many people, including well-known figures like Ntsiki Mazwai, claimed that the IEC was “captured” by America.

The Democratic Alliance, through calling on Western leaders to closely monitor South Africa’s election, made inferences that the IEC is unable to run a free and fair election.

The IEC is biased towards the ANC: •

In now removed TikTok videos, content creators alleged that the IEC has been captured by the ANC.

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Arise South Africa leader Mpho Dagada, in a now deleted video on X.com that received over 400 000 views at the time, alleged that the ANC is trying to steal the election, due to the IEC’s legal requirement on parties to obtain thousands of signatures in order to contest elections at a national level and in each province.

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Anonymous influencers alleged that the voting ballot was leaked, and that the MK Party was absent from the ballot. One account, whose post received over 120 000 views, alleged that Chief Justice Zondo and President Ramaphosa had instructed the IEC to remove the MK Party from the ballot.

MP and United Democratic Movement president Bantu Holomisa claimed that the elections are being rigged due to the IEC allegedly using members of the South African Democratic Teachers Union to “run the country’s elections”.

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The MK Party called for the resignation of IEC Commissioner Janet Love, who they alleged is a close friend of President Ramaphosa. This was further amplified by then deputy EFF president Floyd Shivambu, who accused the IEC, under the leadership of Ms Love, of “playing politics”.

Votes were rigged / stolen: •

Foreign interference in the IEC: •

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Multiple videos and posts emerged of alleged rigging and stolen votes. These trends dominated X.com on election day and beyond.

IMPACT ON FUTURE ELECTIONS

Impact on future elections: •

Currently, public trust in the IEC is low, with less than 30% confidence. Disinformation campaigns, fueled by distrust in media and democratic institutions, will likely worsen in future elections.

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We can expect continued false narratives accusing the IEC of foreign interference, bias, and vote rigging.

These efforts aim to undermine electoral credibility and deepen voter mistrust.

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This growing distrust could lead to lower voter turnout, civil unrest, and challenges to election legitimacy, threatening the democratic process in South Africa.

Bottom line:

THE BOTTOM LINE •

False information poses a threat to democratic processes.

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Distrust in public institutions and the media is being fuelled and exploited by those seeking political advantage.

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If pervasive levels of distrust are not addressed in relation to the media and democratic institutions, we can expect that false information will become endemic in our society.

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Social media companies show little will to find sustainable solutions to fix their algorithms that promote outrage and sensationalism over credible information.

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On 30 May, Duduzile Sambudla-Zuma posted on X.com that: “I Will Say This With No Fear… @IECSouthAfrica Is Part And Parcel Of Helping The ANC Of Ramaphosa And The DA In Rigging The Election Results”. On 2 June, Sambudla-Zuma posted: “There has been a crime in South Africa…

The crime scene is the @IECSouthAfrica”.

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A day after the election results were announced, Jacob Zuma told supporters: “We don’t want people to die. We want to show them [the IEC] that we are South Africans. We will correct them…

We are number one. We produced big votes.

We are silently working on this matter. We have won these elections. We want to rule the country how we want.”

The MK Party made a direct application to the Constitutional Court, where it alleged that “hundreds of thousands of votes” were stolen from it during the elections. The court subsequently dismissed the application as meritless, and noted that the party had failed to present any evidence to establish a prima facie case that the election was not free and fair.

They suggest that under African law, their actions, which involve significant misconduct and corruption, would not be punishable. This strategy is an attempt to evade accountability and shift blame onto the legal framework itself, rather than addressing the serious charges against them. By doing so, they aim to undermine public trust in the current legal system and position themselves as defenders of a supposedly more just, culturally relevant legal order.

WHY IT MATTERS

WHY IT MATTERS: •

Zuma and his allies continue to use Big Lies as a way to rally and maintain their base. By casting themselves as victims of a corrupt system, they appeal to segments of the population that feel disillusioned and marginalised. By framing themselves as defenders of African law against a colonial legal system, they position themselves as champions of cultural and national identity, further solidifying their support.

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The deliberate spread of Big Lies serves to undermine public trust in key democratic institutions, such as the IEC, the media, and the judiciary. By painting these institutions as biased or captured by foreign interests, Zuma and his party aim to delegitimise any actions taken against them, including legal proceedings and election results.

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Through the consistent use of disinformation, Zuma and his allies are attempting to construct an alternate reality where they are the heroes, fighting against an unjust system. This parallel reality is carefully crafted to distract from their misconduct and corruption by shifting the focus onto alleged conspiracies.

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At its core, Big Lies are a political survival strategy.

Zuma and his affiliates in the MK Party are facing legal challenges, and these are all attempts to shift the public narrative to their favour.

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While the use of Big Lies may provide short-term political gains, it carries significant long-term risks for South Africa’s democracy. The repeated assault on truth and institutions could lead to increased polarisation, social unrest, and a weakening of the rule of law. If unchecked, this strategy could erode the very fabric of South African society, leading to instability and undermining the progress made since the end of apartheid.

A HISTORY OF BIG LIES •

Former president Zuma and his connections have repeatedly used Big Lies as a strategy to influence public opinion on key issues.

Here are some examples: • An information influence campaign which was created by Bell Pottinger and introduced terms like “white monopoly capital” into the public discourse, sought to polarise the public on key issues of corruption related to then President Zuma, his family, and associates.

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The tentacles of Zuma’s network reached beyond online conversations into mainstream media, when the Sunday Times ran falsified stories relating to the supposed rogue unit at the South African Revenue Service, and the alleged Cato Manor death squads. These stories were written in an attempt to discredit prominent public servants and decimate law enforcement institutions.

In 2021, following Zuma’s sentencing to a three-month prison term for contempt of court, his family and associates used social media to stoke violence which led to hundreds of deaths and large-scale destruction in different provinces across the country. Some of the Big Lies told during this period sought to frame Zuma as a political prisoner.

The MK Party’s 2024 election platform includes a strong push to discredit Roman-Dutch law and replace it with “African law”. Zuma and his party allies are trying to convince the public that they have been unfairly judged under a colonial legal system they do not acknowledge.

THE BOTTOM LINE

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The big THE BIGpicture PICTURE

What you know: WHAT YOUneed NEEDto TO KNOW

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Digital advertising, especially on social media, has transformed political campaigning. Parties and candidates use targeted ads to reach specific groups with highly tailored messages.

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Using advanced data analytics and behavioural tracking, companies, organisations, and political parties can tailor adverts to specific audiences, based on age, location, interests, and browsing history creating messages that address different groups’ unique interests. This is called microtargeting.

During the 2024 general elections, the Democratic Alliance was the biggest spender on digital adverts, spending just over R11-million on adverts on Meta and Google. Newcomer Rise Mzansi spent over R3.5-million, and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) spent over R1.2-million.

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In the case of the FF+, it targeted their adverts to voters in the age group of 18-35 as its primary audience, with 98% of the party’s ads being used to target this age category. The FF+ microtargeted its ads based on information it receives about audience interests. For example, people who have liked the Kyknet, Huisgenoot, and Afrikaans Is Groot pages on Facebook and Instagram were likely to encounter FF+ adverts.

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Rise Mzansi chose to target women between 27 and 45 as its primary audience, in major urban areas like Johannesburg, Cape Town, eThekwini, Mbombela, and Bloemfontein.

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Microtargeting allows political parties to tailor their ads based on the browsing habits and interests of people, potentially locking voters into isolated bubbles of information. This tactic has been linked to political polarisation, as seen in the 2016 US election, and it’s becoming a common strategy in election campaigns across the world.

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Shadow SHADOW Campaigners: CAMPAIGNERS •

The Meta Ad Library provides insights into organisations which are not registered political parties, but are running extensive election-related adverts.

During the election cycle, shadow organisations were big spenders, sometimes spending more on political ads than actual parties who were contesting elections.

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In each of the below cases, none of the adverts in use directly encouraged users to vote for a particular party. However, from the messaging used in the ads, especially in the case of Ask South Africa, Constitutional Hill, Pledge To Vote SA, and We Are The People, there were subtle and not-so-subtle attempts to persuade people to vote for certain political parties.

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Pledge to Vote SA - this page has over 14 000 followers, and was created in January 2023. Since its creation, it has spent over R1.7-million on digital adverts on Meta. There is a high ad spend on groups aged 18-35 years old, who have shown interests online on issues relating to “elections”, “activism”, “voting”, “community issues”, and “social change”. Pledge to Vote SA has been running adverts to these targeted groups with a negative stance on BEE and the National Health Insurance - which were policy priorities of the ANC government. Some of its ads included the following messaging: “The National Health Insurance (NHI) is a ticking time bomb, threatening to nationalise your private health insurance, hospitals, and doctors.

The NHI will compromise the health and wellbeing of you and your loved ones. Pledge your vote in the upcoming 2024 election to vote out the NHI.” Although the NHI Bill is controversial, claims that the NHI will “nationalise private health insurance” are factually incorrect. At the bottom of the About Us page on its website, in discreet fashion, Pledge to Vote SA is identified as an initiative of the Institute for Race Relations (IRR). Additionally, linked to the IRR is another page called Ask South Africa, which has spent R610 000 on digital ads on Meta targeting the Northern Cape on issues related to loadshedding.

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We Are The People - this page was created in early April 2024, with adverts kicking off on 26 April. In a space of one month, the page ran adverts totalling R991 557. Without attaching itself to any particular political party, a video advert that We Are The People ran, was strikingly similar to that of Rise Mzansi.

The video features a segment about the economic pressures faced by single moms (a key policy issue for Rise Mzansi), states that “we need a new generation of leaders” (Rise’s main campaign theme is #WeNeedNewLeaders), and perhaps the most revealing aspect is the inclusion of the statement “Let’s vote for change, and to make 2024 our 1994” a statement coined by Rise Mzansi. When analysing the micro-targeting data, We Are The People was targeting the exact same demographics as Rise Mzansi - women aged between 27-45 years old.

We Are The People is a newly registered non-profit, who, according to funding disclosures to the IEC, donated R30-million to Rise Mzansi in the election period.

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Dear South Africa - this popular Facebook page, with over 200 000 likes, was created in 2018. A scan of the Dear South Africa website reveals it is a non-profit platform that encourages the public to “co-shape all government policies, amendments and proposals”.

Dear South Africa boasts that it has “many successful campaigns” and has “amassed a considerably large active participant network of over 1-million individuals across the country and beyond.” The website does not provide any information about people who work at Dear South Africa, who its funders are, or where it is based. In the run-up to elections, Dear South Africa spent R572 460 on 254 adverts. Some of its ads made the following false claims: “The frightening reality is that the IEC is now trying to take away your democratic right to vote for a party that will guarantee you that right to vote for a referendum on Cape independence.” According to the data, this advert reached between 125 000 and 150 000 people in the Western Cape.

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Constitutional Hill - this page might easily be confused with Constitution Hill or the Constitution Hill Trust in Braamfontein, Johannesburg. But an analysis of its adverts shows no connection to the historic site. In 30 days, commencing from early April, it spent R114 081 on 29 adverts. One ad noted that “a vote for Gayton McKenzie’s PA is a vote for the ANC to enable corruption while people can barely afford food prices.” Additionally, some ads include the term: “The DA difference” - with a positive sentiment towards the Democratic Alliance.

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Save Our South Africa - in the weeks preceding the elections, Save Our South Africa, a page that was created in March 2024, ran 72 adverts at a cost of R99 004. Its website is opaque with no information about its funders or its employees. Under the “About Us”, Save Our South Africa claims that it is “not just some movement; we’re a community standing together to give our people what they deserve”. A scan of its adverts indicate that the group is concerned about education and policing. One advert claims: “12 000 yearly cases of school-related corruption. Take back our schools. #YourVoteCanSaveSA”. All of Save Our South Africa’s ads target women between 18 and 40 years old. This page has subsequently been “unpublished” from Facebook.

Why WHY itITmatters: MATTERS •

Shadow organisations like those highlighted above, are influencing elections without transparency.

While they aren’t registered political parties, these groups run ads that subtly or overtly sway voter opinion, often outspending actual political parties.

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This lack of transparency poses a threat to democratic integrity, as voters may unknowingly be swayed by entities with undisclosed political ties or agendas.

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The funding and motives behind these ads are often opaque, leaving the electorate vulnerable to manipulation through targeted campaigns that spread misinformation or influence specific demographics.

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Ensuring transparency in political advertising is critical to maintaining trust in the electoral process.

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RECOMMENDATIONS {Because Democracy Won’t Fix Itself!} The implications of this disinformation wave will extend far beyond the 2024 election. Left unchecked, future elections like the upcoming 2026 local government elections may face even greater volatility, with trust in public institutions eroding further.

Voter turnout could plummet, and election results may increasingly be questioned, fostering an atmosphere ripe for civil unrest. If false narratives continue to shape our political landscape, the very fabric of South Africa’s democracy could unravel.

To this end, South Africa’s electoral processes and the integrity of its democracy must be protected.

CODE recommends the implementation of the following crucial measures:

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Criminalising the creation of dangerous disinformation

The 2024 general election was marred by numerous instances of disinformation. Given this, as well as the role that disinformation played during the Covid-19 pandemic and the July 2021 riots, it is becoming increasingly important that we introduce legislation that will hold the creators of dangerous disinformation criminally liable. Tight legal definitions will be required for what constitutes “dangerous” disinformation, specifying substantial risks of public harm, including threats to public health, public safety, democratic processes, and social cohesion.

This legislation, however, would need to be carefully constructed to ensure that a) it is not used as a tool to crack down on dissenting voices, b) it will not limit freedom of speech, satire, or artistic expression, and c) it will not punish those who spread the information because they believed it to be true.

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Implement a robust voter education and digital literacy campaign

To effectively combat false information during elections, a nationwide voter education campaign should be implemented, with a strong focus on digital literacy. This campaign should empower citizens to critically evaluate the information they encounter online, particularly on social media, and teach them how to identify and report false or misleading content. Partnerships between the IEC, civil society organisations, the media, government, and digital platforms could be developed to provide accessible resources on spotting disinformation, understanding electoral processes, and making informed voting decisions.

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Expand the Electoral Code of Conduct

The IEC should consider amending the section on “prohibited conduct” in its Electoral Code of Conduct to broaden the scope of the existing rule, which prohibits “publishing false information about other candidates or parties.”

This should be expanded to also prohibit the intentional creation of false information about electoral processes, ensuring a more comprehensive safeguard against disinformation during elections.

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Create regulations for digital political advertising

Given the growing prominence of digital advertising during elections, as well as the use of microtargeting tactics, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) should consider amending the Elections Broadcasts and Political Advertising Regulations to include guidelines for digital advertising.

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Promote transparency in digital advertising

ICASA, in consultation with the IEC and other stakeholders, should establish rules to promote transparency in digital advertising.

This would prevent shadow organisations from microtargeting voters without disclosing who is funding the ads or whether they are affiliated with or endorsing a particular political party.

Clear regulations are essential to ensure the electorate is fully informed about the sources and intentions behind the ads they encounter.

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Transparency by tech companies

Social media and digital platforms that have aided and abetted the spread of disinformation through their content recommendation systems, must do more to prevent the spread of false information. All social media companies should be required by law to implement comprehensive transparency measures, particularly during elections, to ensure accountability and trust in the information environment. This includes publicly disclosing all political advertisements in an easily accessible ad library that provides clear information on the funding sources, targeting criteria, and affiliations of those behind the ads. Platforms should also introduce transparency tools that allow users to see why they are being targeted by specific ads and who is responsible for creating and funding them.

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Real-time auditing of electoral false information

Collaborating with the IEC, government, law enforcement and civil society organisations, social media platforms should also commit to realtime monitoring of electoral periods to identify and curb the spread of harmful disinformation, ensuring that democratic processes are protected from manipulation and influence. Additionally, social media companies must regularly publish transparency reports that detail the volume, type, and nature of disinformation flagged, removed, or addressed on their platforms.

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X.com should be declared a high-risk platform for disinformation

Formerly known as Twitter, X.com has removed key safety measures that help prevent the spread of false information. Moreover, during the 2024 general election, the platform was one of the few social media companies who failed to collaborate with the IEC to curb the dissemination of harmful content during the election cycle. Disinformers used X.com to spread lies about the elections.

Until X.com takes meaningful steps to address its content recommendation algorithm and commits to partnering with the IEC and other stakeholders to counter dangerous disinformation, it should be recognised as a platform prone to misleading information and lies. The public should be clearly informed of the risks of using this platform.

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