The Regulation of UAS and Their Integration into the NAS

The Regulation of UAS and Their Integration into the NAS Abstract The project explores the need for reconsidering present practices in the regulation of UAS and their integration into the NAS. In particular, the paper shows the efforts in place to ensure safety and efficiency in the use of the available airspace. It also discusses present approaches in regulation of command and control notions of UAS as they operate alongside legacy manned aircraft systems and environments. The paper elucidates the future of UAS capabilities in command and control and their relevance for relooking the current theory of operation for their integration into the NAS.

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8.2 UCDP It recommends the creation of safe testing airspaces, to expand and rapidly understand the emergency command and control technologies and approaches for the myriad of UAS applications and classes. Furthermore, coordination of UAS integration into the ATC mandates must not continue to overlook public safety and privacy issues, as well as safety of the payloads of the UAS. Moreover, the completion of mission and emergency protocols as contained in the link loss procedures presently in use must improve to allow for shared pilot operation and takeover as well as options for ground control centers and remote pilots to communicate with ATC for situational awareness of UAS that are on autopilot.

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The project relates to options for autonomous control for UAVs outside the prevailing standards arising from the current awareness and practices in the control of manned aircraft. The argument for this project is that there is a need to consider the command, control, and communication (C3) of unmanned air systems/vehicles (UAS/UAV) as a unique area instead of seeking to use manned systems, processes, and procedures for it. The belief is that there is a slow transition, but the increasing evidence will lead practitioners to consider splitting off the management and control to make it its own thing and even consider a separate regulatory body for the UAVs. Part of the project will consider C3 for UAS versus manned systems to contribute to the available literature and to assist in decision-making regarding the proposal for separating the two managerial and regulatory aspects.

The significance of the project is that data link and flight control coordination for UAS based on current C3 technologies can face challenges as to process, policies, and management practices for the national airspace are time-consuming. The conceptualization for C3 for UAS outside the current trend to merge C3 of these systems with that of existing manned systems is a necessary and timely endeavor. Many of the considerations for the control and command of UAS has to happen in the context of ensuring the UAS qualify for using the air traffic control system.

As such, the current approaches appear to retrofit regulations as well as accommodate new provisions to prevent dissonance with legacy systems that are relying on manned technologies.

The problem with the approach is that it negates the increasing advancement of the UAS payloads to even surpassed manned capabilities in some features. For instance, while manned systems benefit from humans' ability to quickly react to danger and maintain control. The

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unmanned systems can be effective at analyzing the danger path and avoiding the incidence of danger thanks to machine learning as well as other advancing technologies.

Perceived Need for a New C3 Subsystem/Methods & Options for Autonomous Control Understanding the impacts of UAS on air traffic control (ATC) when they are integrating into the national airspace system (NAS) is necessary and it forms the basis for considering a separate C3 management approach for UAS different from the one already in use for manned aircraft (Kamienski & Semanek, 2015). There is an increase in the request for use of controlled airspace by UAS. Moreover, there are larger UAS that are operating in busy controlled airspaces such as the Global Hawk and the Predator-class aircraft. The trend shows that the large UAS will continue to access the NAS. Meanwhile, there is a growing number of high-altitude longendurance (HALE) UAS joining the traffic.

Kamienski and Semanek (2015) showed there are influences of UAS in air traffic control such as in filing for flight plans in the long-duration missions. The flight profile of the UAS is also different in most situations from that of a traditional point-to-point equivalent in manned aircraft (Kamienski & Semanek, 2015). The controllers have to cope with the UAS that does not have a direct two-way radio connection with the ATC and they use latitude/longitude waypoints for defining their routes. The direction of the UAS development is such that there will be a human in the loop in the present settings for autonomy. Meanwhile, the two-way radio system in use in air traffic control systems has its foundation in the legacy-manned systems. The UAS method of operation is different from what is usually the case with manned aircraft that will use the common name fixes and waypoints. Controllers have to grapple with challenges arising because of the communication and control links used in UAS beyond the line of sight (BLOS).

Delays in responses of the aircraft or the communication affect the maneuverability of the

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aircraft and the clearances by the controller. For instance, an obstacle detection and collision prevention system in a UAS will probably use sensors and do calculations in real-time to evaluate alternative pathways and use them. On the other hand, waiting for command prompts from the two-way radio system can be too long for an aircraft that is not following a designated path and may not have the right of way regarding the stagnant or oncoming obstacle. A capability to maneuver away from danger immediately to safeguard both the UAS and the other assets in its environment including other aircraft is an ideal outcome that the present command structures may limit. The challenges outlined so far also feature in the manned aircraft. However, they are prevalent in the UAS space especially as approaches to control, communicate and command remain inspired by the control environment of manned aircraft systems (Kamienski & Semanek, 2015).

In exploring the solution for command and control of UAS across the different classes of NAS, the paper will combine considerations for both military and civilian UAS. The paper will also evaluate capabilities in terms of operations and control and command not only of the UAS as single systems but also of the environment of UAS systems operating in the same space, and the inclusion or exclusion of air traffic control (ATC) involvement. Explorations for a management approach for C3 of UAS in a dynamic development environment seek to offer insights as to the ways that UAS capabilities can enhance collision avoidance and efficiency of airspace operations for both the FAA and pilots access the NAS. The evidence covered in the paper and the contributions by other theoretical suggestions from the literature show a need for integration of UAS command and control capabilities, shared awareness possibilities, and increased payload technologies to address in-flight communication needs and to establish new controller directives that can stay aligned with the unique features and needs of UAS operations.

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Identification of New Technologies, Methods, Processes, or Concepts Relating to the Perceived Need The focus on separating regulatory parameters of the UAS from the manned systems to make controller capabilities more responsive to UAS parameters for operations and safety does not necessarily focus on new technologies. Rather, the focus is on the understanding of available technologies, usage scenarios, capabilities for operations, and the way these features and concepts fit into the need for control to enhance airspace efficiency and avoid safety risks.

There are five major generalizations of missions undertaken by civilian UAS (Skrzypietz, 2012). The first one is a survey, maintenance, and management and it includes agricultural, mineral, fisheries, wildlife, aerial photo, power, and pipeline, mapping, and oceanography. The second one is law enforcement, and it covers policing, surveillance, traffic, and missing persons.

The third one is border or coastal patrol. Here, specific applications include anti-terrorism, port security, and counter-smuggling. The fourth category is communications and UAS on such missions have communication relays, media, news, advertising, and surrogate satellite payloads.

Lastly, there is disaster relief and it can include forest fires, search, and rescue, nuclear biochemical, and extreme weather.

The classification systems for UAS help to stratify them to required levels of airworthiness, equipage, and aircrew training standards, which then facilitates entry into the NAS (Homainejad & Rizos, 2015). Again, no single classification system exists to be sufficient in the present decentralized nature of the development and deployment of UAS into their respective missions. Current classifications consider the maximum weight of the system, the ceiling or altitude limitations, and the kinetic energy levels, which help to estimate the impact of the damage. The size of the UAS can have designations like micro, mini. There can also be a

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function or performance-centered designations like small UAS, tactical UAS, medium altitude – long endurance UAS, or high altitude UAS. The challenge with these approaches is that they assume a static sector and design of the UAS, as would be the case with manned systems.

However, developments in technologies and designs of UAS are allowing newer, smaller, and more capable systems.

The present setup of UAS development has them divided into two command perspectives. There is the use of radiofrequency line-of-site, and there is the beyond radiofrequency line-of-sight (Stansbury et al., 2008). However, in both instances is possible to have command and control independently or to have air traffic control. Under command and control, the UAS can have autonomy or it can fly by relying on datalinks. It can also fly according to link loss procedures. Under air traffic control, the UAS flies according to datalinks and link loss procedures. Lastly, datalinks efficacy depends on bandwidth and frequency usage.

Manufacturers of UAS provided different options for control and command of their UAS using possible communication links that may or may not appear as part of the FAA regulations for different airspaces in the NAS. The interoperability capabilities then leave much of the decision-making to pilots and the operators of the ground control stations for the UAS to ensure adherence to airspace regulations in their respective operation jurisdictions. For instance, the Boeing Insitu ScanEagle is a small long-endurance low altitude UAS that is 20kg heavy and the highest speed is 148 km/l. the first flight was in June 2002 (UAV Factory, 2021). The manufacturer also classifies it as an autonomous unmanned reconnaissance vehicle and its wingspan is 10 feet while its length is 5 feet. Some UAS are runway independent and have long endurance. The Penguin C UAS has a maximum takeoff weight of 23 kg causing it to be an FAA-regulated UAS as a small UAV (UAV Factory, 2021). In addition, it does fall under the

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International Traffic in Arms Regulations and its design allows it to have over 20 hours of endurance and a 100km range. It can operate below freezing and in extremely hot conditions (UAV Factory, 2021). It is available commercially with an optional ground control station, which is an off-road trailer with a hydraulic 15-meter mast with an advanced tracking antenna equipped with a digital MIMO data link and mesh networking (UAV Factory, 2021).

Ensuring the safety and reliability of the missions of the UAS amid the variations in standards for control that specific development teams are pursuing is challenging. Integration of the UAS to the NAS is important and is a current focus for regulators. Modification of the existing guidance materials can lead to an effective verification of the airworthiness of the UAS (Stansbury et al., 2008). At the same time, coming up with an expandable and improving standard for the classification of UAS amid the changing nature of missions, payloads, safety, and reliability is also critical. Advancement in control beyond the line-of-sight operations would be an area to look into as mobile ground stations, shared awareness between UAS, and increase in the endurance and range of the UAS become possible.

Modern UAS have manual remote control and autopilot technologies, which then makes them marketable to a wide range of customers (Stansbury et al., 2008). The remote control is ideal for the low-range line of sight (LOS) and high endurance UAS will usually have autopilot with the plight plan existing in the UAS program. The ground station pilot is not in the C2 loop until when there is a need to take manual control of the C2. The high endurance UAS have link loss procedures requiring them to loiter and find the path to return to base. They will still be operating in autopilot mode as they return to base. They would be incapable of incorporating air traffic control during this mode (Stansbury et al., 2008). Instead, air traffic control may communicate with the pilot in the ground station for the subsequent manual takeover of the C2.

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Unfortunately, the air traffic control does not have an inherent design for this new C2 situation that UAS brings.

Provision of Specified Requirements Associated with the Perceived Need The understanding of the operating space of UAS presently features many references to the control and management of the airspace and air traffic that includes manned aircraft systems.

Moving beyond this management thought and into a model that evolves together with the operational dynamics and boundaries of the UAS ecosystem is necessary. Meanwhile, in addressing the UAS ecosystem’s control, command, and communication concerns, it is necessary to do so about the safety and efficiency of the airspace. Already, the FAA and the air traffic control (ATC) provide manned aircraft with specific conditions that allow interoperability within airspaces safely and efficiently.

UAS needs to comply with similar requirements regarding airworthiness, operator training, and documentation. They should also behave indistinguishably from manned aircraft regarding air traffic management (Dalamagkidis et al., 2012). There is a range of technologyrelated issues that need adequate resolutions before UAS can have unrestricted access to the National Airspace System (NAS). UAS technology is far from mature. The FAA and other aviation agencies are taking a careful, conservative approach. Concerns about UAS regulation consider the current FAR and if UAS can have substantially different characteristics that require new regulation. FAR does not specify UAS, its regulations nevertheless assume equal application to all aircraft categories (Dalamagkidis et al., 2012).

Findings by the FAA CoE for General Aviation Research (CGAR) in 2007 found out that only 30% of the current manned aviation regulation applied to UAS. In addition, 54% of the regulation could apply but needed revisions and 16% of the regulations did not apply, and these

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gaps show there is a need for much work in separating and streamlining regulations to address UAS specifications (Dalamagkidis et al., 2012).

The present regulatory environment suggests that incoming UAS operating under both LOS and BLOS environments and with autopilot or remote pilot must have two-way communication capabilities to allow the issuance and reception of the control directives by air traffic control. There must be a way to direct link loss operation through programming of the flight path back to the ground station and to ensure a safe landing. There is also the limitation imposed by two-way radio communication demands depending on the access airspace, which in itself limits some UAS from the corresponding airspace.

Presentation of Potential Interoperability and Control Options for Unmanned Systems Based on the Operational Environment and Availability of New Technology, Methods, Processes, or Concepts Shared awareness for airborne UAS is becoming a critical operational strategy to ensure the safety and reliability of the system as well as the life and property that are around the UAS flight. The improvement of the visibility of unmanned systems in 3D affects the extent to which regulations and standards can influence safety and reliability. Already, developments in air-to-air data links improve shared situational awareness (Pasaoglu et al., 2016). They enhance capabilities for control of UAS beyond the current capabilities. They affect present classifications and allow integration of missions of UAS beyond the traditional categories. Thus, static regulations as they apply to manned systems can be insufficient when applied to the dynamic UAS technologies, and payloads as well as missions.

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Appropriateness of the Current Control Setup for UAS in NAS and Noticeable Limitations/Constraints Regulations for the EU airspace and the US airspace point to the current control setup for UAS. The EU regulations appear specific to the accommodation of UAS especially in civilian operations in unregulated airspaces of what would be equivalent to class G airspace in the NAS. A review of the current control setup shows the shortcomings of the NAS. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has guidelines for unmanned aircraft systems to allow easy access (EASA, 2021). The easy access rules published by EASA range from regulations targeting large airplanes, continuing airworthiness, air operations among others. The rules for UAS by the EASA are to ease operations in the ‘open’ and ‘specific’ categories. The rules provide a separate approach to dealing with C3 conditions and instructions for UAS outside the traditional airspace environment. The regulations present three subcategories of UAS as A1, A2, and A3 based on operational limitations, requirements for remote pilot, and technical requirements for UAS (EASA, 2021). There are considerations of the UAS operation such as when starting a flight from a natural elevation and the need to keep the UAS within 120 meters from the closest point on earth with the adaptation of the distance reflecting the features of the terrain. There is also the consideration for horizontal distance, such as there should be at least 50 meters from any artificial obstacle taller than 105 meters (EASA, 2021). The use of subcategories for the UAS also allows the regulations to specify characteristics of flights in the subcategory on issues such as air safety, insurance, security, privacy and data protection, and operational procedures as well as human performance limitations. The rules present considerations for operational limitations. Another regulated area is the acquisition of theoretical knowledge by the remote pilot for operations of the respective subcategories of UAS.

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The regulations for the C3 for UAS are critical given the increased tendency to use unmanned aircraft over high-risk conditions like flights over populated areas. A certification approach implemented by the EASA would apply to drones fitting specific takeoff weight range operated autonomously or via a remote pilot. Similar regulation approaches are available for passenger-carrying VTOL aircraft (Garrett-Glaser, 2020). The separation of the regulations to relate to the dynamics of the C3 and payloads for the respective categories and subcategories of the UAS highlights a trend in the right direction. Thanks to the approaches by the EASA in regulating UAS flight, it is possible to calculate and estimate the acceptable quantitative probability of various failure conditions according to population density in a defined area of operation (Garrett-Glaser, 2020). Risk management according to the classification of failure condition can indicate no safety effect, minor, major, hazardous, and catastrophic impact. The probability of the risk is also likely to influence strategy and affect mitigation as part of a certification process, which then ensures that even as implementation of UAS operations increase, there are designs that become the go-to guides when evaluating an unmanned aircraft’s failure conditions.

The FAA fact sheet on small UAS regulations Part 107 indicates the operating requirements, registration, pilot certification, drone certification, airspace authorization, and guidelines for accessing the FAA DroneZone, which is an online shop for drone registration and waivers for airspace authorizations. Operations of UAS in the United States have to follow airspace regulations and there are several classes of controlled airspace supported by air traffic control (ATC) service (FAA, 2016). Airspace class G is 1200 feet or less above the surface and it features uncontrolled airspace. In this airspace, the visual flight rules (VFR) minimums must apply. Much of the UAS regulation under the FAA relates to airspace G, and the UAS in the

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controlled airspace have to abide by the ATC and other regulations for C3 as per their respective National Airspace System features (FAA, 2016).

The ATC coordinates the use of the airspace by coordinating with the controller within the jurisdiction area of the control, the controller receiving the transfer of control, and any intervening controllers where the aircraft will pass. The ATC also issues control instructions to an aircraft through sources other than through another controller. These sources can be aeronautical radio, FSS, or another pilot (FAA, 2016). When issuing such control instructions, the ATC ensures that necessary coordination is in place as accomplished by the other controllers as mentioned earlier. The different airspace classes also provide visual flight rules according to weather minimums. The air traffic system is responsible for maintaining a high degree of safety and efficiency. There is oversight by the FAA and the flight regulations ensure sufficient control of aircraft operations leading to the safest aviation system in the world.

In class C airspace, there must be two-way radio communication with the ATC before entry. The aircraft must have two-way radio and a transponder with altitude reporting capability.

There is no requirement for the minimum pilot certificate (FAA, 2016). In the class D airspace, there must be two-way radio communication before entry and the aircraft must have a two-way radio. In addition, there is no minimum requirement for a pilot certificate in this and all lower airspace classes. In the class E airspace, the entry requirement is none for VFR and there is no specific requirement (FAA, 2016). Lastly, in the Class G airspace, there are no entry requirements and no equipment requirements. The implication is that UAS in class E and class G remain invisible under these regulations. However, there might be the need for automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) technology for the respective aircraft using the airspace (FAA, 2016). Additional control regulations for class G airspace are that the pilot of the

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airplane must make all turns of that airplane to the left when going to land at an airport that does not have an operating control tower (FAA, 2016). Such wording of the control requirements highlights the failure to recognize UAS space, which may not even be using the airports in the traditional sense but will still access the class G airspace.

The NAS includes people, equipment, automation, policies, and procedures for keeping air traffic efficient and safe (Kamienski & Semanek, 2015). The FAA plays a transformative role in enhancing the NAS. The plans include busier airspace in the future. One of the aims of the NAS is to ensure all aircraft see and avoid other aircraft.

Large UAS operate in Class A airspace but they lack to see and avoid. Mitigations for the shortcomings include the use of temporary flight restrictions, and reliance on group-based visual observers at the ground control stations (Kamienski & Semanek, 2015). There is also the incorporation of the ground-based sense and avoid systems. Besides that, the air traffic controllers are playing the role of separating all aircraft. The challenge for UAS in the airspace is that since the lack of UAS abilities for detecting and avoiding aircraft is not a problem when there is the air traffic control in class A, the concerns for regulations on controls fail to consider other classes where ATC is absent (Kamienski & Semanek, 2015). Furthermore, UAS traffic possesses challenges that the controller does not address in the class E and G airspace.

Specific Solutions or Research Strategy to Address the Perceived Need, Including a Theory of Operation, Any Appropriate Recommendations or Conclusions C3 in beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) operations is critical to realizing safety and reliability, which are two parameters for the regulations of UAS by the FAA. Meanwhile, situational awareness objectives demand the use of analytic tools for estimating vehicle range and endurance, current and possible command and control features while operating BVLOS, and

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the integrity of the communication link when the vehicle is in specific situations (McCrink & Gregory, 2021).

Possibilities for C3 for UAS continue to evolve with the advances in technologies for sense and avoidance. They allow UAS to fly alongside manned aircraft and to interact with air traffic control (ATC) within the present regulations. The ATC regulations monitor the location of the aircraft in the assigned airspace using radar and other communication and interact with pilots to ensure the safety of all operations within the shared airspace.

Already UAS allows for expanded ubiquitous coverage where the vehicles assist the existing communication, crate a shared situational awareness for enhanced control, and provide seamless wireless coverage within a serving area (Zeng et al., 2016). Such capabilities as illustrated below should extend to the communication with the ATC. It should assist in the management of the UAS in an assigned coverage area.

Figure 1: UAS assisted wireless communications (Zeng et al., 2016)

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Besides the possibilities of using UAS for wireless links, there are challenges with the technology and integration with standards. The normal communications of terrestrial systems that are stationary are only part of the capability demands of the UAS. Additionally, there is a need for control and non-payload communications (CNPC) links. They must adhere to stringent latency and security requirements to support safety-critical functions. These functions may include real-time control, collision and crash avoidance, shared-situational awareness, and delivery of the payload data to ground control stations.

Consequently, UAS faces challenges with resource management and security mechanisms. There is a need for specific mechanisms for UAV communication that also caters to their high mobility environment. Dynamic network topologies are more appropriate yet they remain sparsely and intermittently connected (Zeng et al., 2016). In link, loss processes the consistency of the data link and the programmability of an alternative flight path comes in handy.

However, in remotely piloted UAS, the link loss process might overlook shared situational awareness that can come in handy to allow another remote pilot to take over the aircraft and meet the NMAC safety codes. Even though multiple technologies are present to solve navigation remotely or automatically and to deal with link loss procedures, the ability to equip all UAS with such technologies is missing. Therefore, tradeoffs are necessary depending on the chosen operation range, the endurance of the aircraft, and its mission. In light of this, spacing and regulating UAS airspaces according to some of these parameters such as endurance and mission is an operational theory worth considering for UAS integration into segregated airspaces (Wang et al., 2021).

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Recommendations for Future Research Strategies to Better Understand the Issue and Add to the Collective Body of Knowledge Associated with Unmanned Systems Transitioning to separate airspace for UAS away from that of manned systems is impossible and the airspace resource must be available for all systems. Current efforts for the NAS are ideal and need to continue for the efficiency of use of the scarce resource and safety of all participants and assets. Safety concerns have been the underlying drivers for the integration of small unmanned aircraft systems into non-segregated airspace. Present regulations demand the detection and avoid systems fitted on the UAS as a safety feature and this goes on to limit the design and features of the UAS while also ensuring compliances among classes of UAS and across different systems. Fortunately, standardization of some of the DAA and other regulations also offers a predictable development environment. Customers can evaluate different available systems and offers from companies with objective categories.

Suggestions for further research of the command and control environment of the UAS in the present decade include the creation of separate restricted airspace demarcation to allow testing. Rather than expect the UAS under development with novel technologies for command and control to operate besides already regulated and standardized technologies, there should be separated airspace allowing the reach of the new limits of the UAS and the systems under research. Setting up the restricted airspace can pave the way for BVLOS flights for testing.

Another area needing research is the command and control of UAS is in the emergency protocols and their operationalization. The integration of the current link loss procedures is important for the safety of the UAS and should be a dominant feature in ideas about the expansion of the NAS to include more UAS operational dimensions. For instance, the development of DAA for the RAVEN project successfully added safety features and like

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extended communication links, and the use of Geo-fence/RTL when terminating the flight leading to the restriction of the UAS from flying away when on autopilot. Improvements in maneuverability before a near-midair collision (NMAC) occurs (Fang et al., 2018).

Transitioning to fully autonomous aircraft or air vehicles will also come with additional challenges and benefits regarding the safety of payloads and the aircraft. The use of autonomous flights requires more development on technologies for coordination including data links that provide reliable monitoring and allow ground stations or the cloud to handle additional data processing needs before sending the data back to the aircraft for minor processing to affect sense and avoidance maneuvers. Future research needs to review the efficacy of command and control through centralized management systems in light of the available opportunities for decentralized command. The decentralization includes having both the ATC and the pilot in the loop while also relying on the aircraft’s capabilities for autonomous flight to handle routine control demands.

Future research can also focus on the increase in the capabilities of the air traffic control in integrating communication and command terminology and incidences faced uniquely by UAS is important (Skrzypietz, 2012). If possible, there is a need for use of research data to ensure that regulators for NMAC safety issues are ahead of the curve on new developments (Fang et al., 2018). Rulings for retrofitting new safety features should also be in place in ways that can foster innovation in the UAS space by allowing sharing of technologies and their adoption. The UAS field is still in its innovation and adoption phases; thus, there might be many new approaches currently overlooked because they lack configurations to allow integration to mainstream systems. In this case, having provisional spaces for testing and using the approaches can be a

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welcomed way to allow their slow integration to the preferred and current management approach for air traffic control and the regulation of the NAS. As shown with the directives by the FAA to restrict flight over protected areas to lower security risks associated with unmanned aircraft systems, it is also necessary to consider public safety and rights to privacy. Even as the airspace remains the target for the integration of the UAS, there is also the public that needs protection regarding privacy and personal safety. Camera technologies, text recognition, machine learning, voice controls, and other payloads meant to improve the capability of UAS to fulfill their missions also create additional hurdles regarding compliance with safety regulations in the public environment where the UAS will operate (Wang et al., 2021). Future research should go on an exploration for operational development theories that go beyond the current regulations to corporate and demonstrate how they consider the new threats is also important especially for developers and testers of new UAS formats and their payloads. The expectation is that such developments would accelerate if there were dedicated airspaces for testing either through licensing or by other forms of regulation.

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