Iran Nuclear Program

Iran Nuclear Program Introduction The government of Iran has been maintaining ever since its nuclear enrichment program came to light that it does not intend to develop nuclear weaponry and that its main objective is to acquire peaceful nuclear capabilities for power generation. Uranium enrichment is the process of increasing the percentage composition of the most radioactive isotope, U-235 from its natural composition of 0.72% in naturally occurring uranium to about 3-4% for power plant reactors and about 90% for weapons grade material. Iran’s Supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has banned any nuclear weapon development in the Islamic state by issuing a fatwa against the matter as it was banned under Islamic war. Indeed many regime leaders in Iran have been on record denouncing any nuclear weapons developments in the country, but the danger lies in their strong Islamic beliefs where the Ayatollah considers the survival of the republic as the ultimate religious value, some argue that nuclear weaponry is a real consideration for the leader if he were to feel that the nation’s survival depended on it.

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What has really made the possibility of Iran continually aiming towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons is the increasing radicalization of its political leadership whereby the election of hardliners such as President Ahmadinejad really seems to be pushing for military nuclear capability (Albright & Brannan, 2012). All these matters aside, there is no denying that Iran has made tremendous progress in the development of its nuclear capabilities by increasing its uranium enrichment activities, enriching the U-235 isotope beyond the 3-4% required for peaceful purposes, over the last decade (NIC, 2007). These enrichment activities have involved the concentration of. It is this development of the country’s fuel cycle of uranium that has made foreign government intelligence agencies to be skeptical of Iran’s true intensions, despite the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) constantly coming short of concrete evidence showing a clear-cut weapons program (Cordesman, 2011). Apart from foreign nations, Iran’s neighbors such as the UAE are becoming increasingly concerned on the effects of these nuclear ventures on the regions environmental safety and the overall balance of power in the Gulf. Iran’s nuclear program is not for peaceful purposes but is indeed geared towards military needs, why else would a government engage with a well known trafficker of nuclear technology for weaponry like Dr. Khan. This paper will argue as much by linking Iran with the Khan network, intelligence reports from Israeli and other international agencies and lastly its enrichment plants in Fordow and Natanz.

The Khan Network The UAE should be very concerned about intelligence reports that revealed that Iran was a major beneficiary of reactor centrifuges and technology that could be used to enrich uranium into weapons grade concentrations from the Khan network. Suspicion towards Iran went back to as early as 1990, but after it missed a UN deadline in late August of 2006 to comply with a

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cessation of the country’s nuclear program, speculation grew as to who Iran has been in contact with concerning its nuclear program (Slavin, 2011). American intelligence had uncovered that Iran, just like North Korea, had indeed been having extensive dealings with the Pakistani scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan in regard to a possibility of developing nuclear weapons (Kaplan, 2006).

Dr. Khan was a world renowned notorious criminal whom apart from helping his country develop nuclear capabilities was also active on the black market selling nuclear technology to the highest bidder. Khan’s network had constantly evaded security officials and intelligence agencies worldwide. But on October of 2003, Western Intelligence agencies were tipped by a source of a shipment destined for Libya and managed to get the centrifuge parts that were being shipped.

This seizure ensured the collapse of the nuclear proliferation network.

Despite the clamping down of the smuggling ring, key questions with regards to the exact extent to which Khan’s network had managed to propel the nuclear capabilities of Iran still remains unknown (Pollack & Perkovich, 2012). The government of Pakistan maintains that investigations into its dissident nuclear scientist have been closed after they sentenced him to house arrest. On the other hand, American officials still hold onto their claim that the smuggling network has been completely dismantled. But evidence presented by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) to a sub-committee of the American House of Representatives still does not consider the case as closed. The IAEA and other intelligence agencies of the western world have not been able to question Dr. Khan exhaustively and therefore the world has been left to speculate on issues that are very important as they pertain to the global safety (Kaplan, 2006).

Israeli intelligence doubts Iran's intentions Despite the very high probability of bias from Israeli sources, the UAE can not afford to ignore the kind of information that comes out of these sources. The Jewish nation considers Iran

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to be a major threat to its security and has been on record stating with near certainty that Iran is indeed developing its nuclear weapon capabilities (Slavin, 2011). Israeli intelligence has been highly suspicious of exactly what Iran is doing in its uranium enrichment plants, especially those that it did not disclose to the IAEA and only opened up to the international body after intelligence reports had disclosed of their existence. Facilities such as the Natanz and Fordow which after their discovery IAEA inspectors were allowed to inspect and came up with no concrete evidence to suggest sufficient enrichment levels of U-235 for weapons production (Cordesman, 2011).

The Israelites are of the belief that the only reason that the Iranians are keen to agree on a fresh round of UN talks is because the Iran is under extreme domestic pressure as a result of the sanctions and trade embargos by the international community and so it feels squeezed. Previous talks on the issue have always ended up collapsing after hitting walls and Israel believe that Iran is only back to the negotiation table because it believes that there are other solutions on offer which do not necessarily involve abandoning its enrichment programs. According to the Israeli national security advisor, Yaakov Amidor, in a press release in early March 2012, Israel believes Iran is using the talks “as an umbrella under which it continues to develop its military capabilities” (Kershner, 2012).

Iran allowing UN inspectors to their nuclear facilities in Fordow and Natanz Iran has over the years been allowing IAEA inspectors access into its uranium enrichment facilities (Crail, 2009). Ever since its secret facilities were discovered in 2002, Iran has allowed the UN to take a closer look at its Fuel Enrichment Plants (FEP) in an effort to explain its intentions on enrichment activities. According to IAEA, Iran had submitted the correct design plants for its Natanz FEP Hall A, but did not give any details for Hall B in

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November 2011. Iran had given the inspectors an amount of 1787 kg of low enriched UF6 in the Natanz plant between October 15 and November 8, 2011 and had a total production of UF6 since February, 2007 of 4922 kg. Investigations by the IAEA verified and concluded that Iran had indeed given the right information in the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and that this particular facility was operating within the laid out requirements (IAEA, 2011). This information that Iran gave was aimed at opening up its facilities to the world, however, the fact that these facilities were hidden still raises a lot of suspicion as to why peaceful facilities were not revealed to the entire world in the first place.

With regard to the Fordow plant, Iran established it on September 2009 for the enrichment of Uranium Fluoride (UF6), which increases U-235 levels. The plant was to contain two cascades having a total of 174 centrifuges each. Although during the construction phase the Iranian government was strictly following the DIQ, the decision to upgrade the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) into a defense establishment has left many questions unanswered as to the exact intensions of Iran with regards to the facility (The CNN Wire Staff, 2012). The Iranian government argues that the inclusion of a missile defense system of the power plant site was to protect its energy sources from possible attacks. The thorough inspection of the Fordow FEP has been put forward by the Security Council for the resumption of the talks that broke down in 2011(Tag Archives, 2012).

Regional implications The leadership of Arabian countries within the Gulf is of the belief that the Iranians are using their civilian nuclear enrichment program as cover for development of a weapons program (Khaitous, 2008). With the exception of Syria, all of Iran’s neighbors strongly disapprove and are on record for calling for the denuclearizing of the Middle East. Among these nations are

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UAE, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia which make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

There is a real fear that with the rise in tensions between Israel and the Arab nations over the past few decades, especially with Iran, possibility of an ensuing war between nuclear capable neighbors could completely devastate and destabilize the entire region and lead to a catastrophic nuclear disaster similar to that in Japan during World War I (Cordesman, 2011).

The real threat to the region however lies in the delicate balance of power that exists in the region. Since the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the setting in the region is based on a precarious zero-sum game (Barzegar, 2010). This precarious set up is based on the policies of both Iran and Israel that any gain in the military capability of one of them, results in an automatic ceding of ground of the other. The result of this delicate situation is that in the entire region, only America and Iran have the capabilities of carrying out a full scale military operation in the Gulf.

Understandably, the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Iran will make it even more dominant in the region and none of its neighbors are looking forward to this situation (Khaitous, 2008).

Conclusion Iran’s claims that its nuclear enrichment program is purely for civilian purposes is at best suspect. The fact that operations in some of its nuclear FEP such as the Fordow plant are not completely above suspicion by the UN, the international community and the IAEA only goes further to show that the Iranian government is probably in the process of militarizing its nuclear program. It is in the entire Gulf region’s best interest not to support a nuclear capable Iran due to the adverse impacts it could have in the region in terms of balance of power and possible environmental impacts in the case of a fully fledged nuclear war breaking out between Israel and Iran.

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