HOW ANARCHY UNDERMINES THE RATIONALE OF WORLDING IR

HOW ANARCHY UNDERMINES THE RATIONALE OF WORLDING IR Introduction The current international relations (IR) field is shaped by Western ideas and practices, and its literature does not include the contributions of non-western countries to the international order.

Theories such as realism that explain the anarchical society are based on a racialised perception of non-western political systems as primitive. They also focus on the experiences of great powers only while ignoring other states. The main objective of worlding IR is to incorporate ideas from the non-western world to ensure that the discipline covers and explains relationships among societies and nations in every part of the world (Acharya 2014). In an anarchical society without any central authority, the states’ pursuit of their national interests undermines the rationale of worlding IR.

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The Rationale of Worlding IR There are six goals of worlding IR. The first aim is to achieve a new understanding of universalism as the current meaning is influenced by western ideas. The current universalism is particularistic, implying that a set of European ideas apply to all human beings (Acharya 2014).

This idea of universalism suppresses diversity. Instead, pluralistic universalism, which acknowledges and respects diversity and pursues a common ground among nations, should be adopted. This will foster cooperation among nations. Another goal of worlding IR is to ensure that the field is based on world history, ideas, practices, and intellectual perspectives rather than on the West only (Acharya 2014). Perspectives from other non-western societies should be brought into the IR discipline. Worlding IR also aims to absorb rather than replace existing IR knowledge, methods, and theories into a new discourse based on insights from all over the world (Acharya 2014). As a result, IR theories will be relevant to non-western nations.

The fourth goal of worlding IR is to focus on regions as regionalism and universalism complement each other. Institutions such as the African Union and European Union complement the United Nation’s roles, including peacekeeping, conflict management, and humanitarian operations. Studying regions include how they self-organise and relate to each other (Acharya 2014). Regional diversity will be acknowledged, and cooperation achieved through worlding IR. The fifth objective of worlding IR is to ensure that the discipline is not based on cultural exceptionalism and insularity. Exceptionalism involves presenting the attributes of a social group as collectively distinctive, similar, and superior to others (Acharya 2014). On the other hand, insularity is ignorance of people, ideas, and cultures outside one’s experience. An enhanced understanding of different groups and cultures will foster cooperation among them. The sixth objective of worlding IR is to take a comprehensive notion of and diverse forms of agency.

Agency has been perceived as a standard of civilisation whose distinctive element was the states’ ability to manage power balance, wage war, defend their sovereignty, enforce compliance, and negotiate treaties (Acharya 2014). This notion, which the European colonial powers formulated, did not consider the fact that there were sophisticated statecraft forms in numerous early nonWestern civilisations.

How Anarchy Undermines the Rationale of Worlding IR The anarchical nature of states undermines the goals of worlding IR because great powers are always looking for an opportunity to gain power over others, with their final aim being hegemony. Every state takes the course it believes will best serve its national interests, whether through force or not (Waltz 1979). The international system is anarchichal in that it consists of independent nations without a central authority governing them (Mearsheimer 2001). Thus, the struggle for power among these states undermines the objectives of worlding IR by hindering global interdependence and cooperation.

According to realists, achieving world peace is desirable but is difficult to attain based on three assumptions. The first assumption is that states are the key actors in world politics. This implies that great world powers shape and dominate international politics and cause major wars. The second assumption is that the great powers’ behaviour is caused by external factors rather than their internal features. Thus, foreign policies are shaped by the external environment, which includes the international system’s structure (Mearsheimer 2001). The third assumption is that states are in competition for power.

Five assumptions explain why states pursue power with the aim of achieving hegemony. The first is that states exist in an anarchic international system without a higher ruling body.

Secondly, great powers have an offensive military capability that they can use to destroy or hurt

each other. States have different levels of military might, which make them potentially harmful to each other. Thirdly, states can never be sure about the intentions of others. Thus, no state is certain whether another one will attack it using its military capability. Although nations may not necessarily have aggressive intentions towards others, that judgment cannot be made with 100 per cent certainty (Mearsheimer 2001). Moreover, a state may have nonthreatening intentions towards others but turn hostile within a short time. Thus, states can never be certain that others do not have hostile intentions which they can act on using their offensive military capabilities.

Fourthly, the states’ main goal is survival to ensure that they maintain their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Survival takes precedence over other motives because if a state is subjugated, it will be unable to pursue other goals. Thus, security is the most important goal pursued by states. The final assumption is that great powers act rationally by considering how to survive in their external environment. They consider their actions and those of other states and their impact on their survival strategy (Mearsheimer 2001). When these five assumptions are considered together, they create incentives for states to behave aggressively towards each other, resulting in three behaviour patterns of fear, power maximisation, and self-help.

One of the behaviours exhibited by states based on the five assumptions is fear. States are fearful and suspicious of each other. They do not trust each other and always anticipate danger such as war. Thus, states view each other as potential enemies. For example, France and the United Kingdom were worried about Germany’s reunification after the Cold War even though the three powers have been allies for over four decades (Mearsheimer 2001). The two nations were afraid of the potential dangers that would be posed by a united Germany. States are suspicious of each other because the goal of each is survival, and they may have the motive to attack since they possess the military capability to do so. Thus, states need to be alert at all times to avoid falling

victim to other nations. Political competition could lead to war which could cause the mass killing of troops and civilians and the destruction of states. Thus, states fear each other as they perceive others as potentially deadly adversaries (Mearsheimer 2001). Since states possess weapons and there is uncertainty regarding when they can be used against others, they fear each other and are reluctant to cooperate and trust one another (Booth & Wheeler 2007). The lack of cooperation and trust undermines the goals of worlding IR. Self-help is another behaviour exhibited by states because of the inexistence of a central authority that can help them when they are threatened by others. Therefore, since states cannot rely on others for security when they face attacks, they perceive themselves as alone and vulnerable. Thus, each state seeks to guarantee its survival through self-help behaviour (Mearsheimer 2001). Some of the self-help mechanisms used by states to enforce international obligations include threats, negotiation, and retaliation (Donnelly 2000). Although some states form alliances, these are temporary unions of convenience as allies may turn on each other at any time. For example, during World War II (WWII), the Soviet Union, the US, and China formed an alliance to fight against Japan and Germany. However, after WWII, alliances changed as, during the Cold War, the US worked together with Japan and West Germany against the Soviet Union and China. Thus, in a self-help system, states pursue their national interests rather than those of other nations or the international community. States have to act selfishly in a self-help world by striving to become more powerful than others to ensure their survival. A powerful state is not likely to face attacks and threats to its survival from its rivals. Thus, states desire to become hegemons as this guarantees them survival. The other states will be afraid of suffering military defeat if they attack a more powerful nation. For example, Mexico or Canada cannot attack the US as it is more powerful than them (Mearsheimer 2001). The self-help behaviour of

states in anarchy undermines worlding IR as western nations are unwilling to consider the interests and perspectives of other countries.

The third type of behaviour is that states seek to maximise power by paying attention to its distribution. They seek opportunities to change the power balance by obtaining additional power increments against other states. They use various methods to change the balance of power, including economic, military, and diplomatic. States deal with each other through a zero-sum mentality as one’s gain is another’s loss in power (Mearsheimer 2001). The goal of each state is to win in the power competition so that they can dominate the others. Thus, states have aggressive intentions against each other because survival is their ultimate objective. Even after gaining more military power over other states, a great power continues seeking opportunities to acquire more and only stops after achieving hegemony. A hegemon is a powerful state that dominates others in the globe or region. For example, the US is a regional hegemon as no other nation in the Western Hemisphere has enough military power to challenge it (Mearsheimer 2001). In 1999, Bill Clinton stated that the US was the most powerful force for prosperity, peace, freedom, and democracy and that its responsibility was to maintain that role by working for the benefit of Americans and other people worldwide (Cooley & Nexon 2020). Regional hegemons such as the US strive to prevent others from achieving such power. For instance, the US played a part in preventing various states from becoming regional hegemons, including Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan (Mearsheimer 2001). Regional hegemons are afraid that another state dominating another region may challenge them. The US is considered to be a global hegemon, and the system after the Cold war and the Soviet Union collapse is unipolar. Initially, it was bipolar as there were two great powers. However, some realists consider the system to be multipolar as although the US is more powerful than other states, there are other great powers,

including Russia and China (Mearsheimer 2007). States with a substantial level of power without dominating the system continue to feel insecure because it is not easy to determine the amount of relative power they need to have over their rivals to become secure. Moreover, it is difficult to establish the future distribution of power among states. A state’s capabilities can change over time, and it is not easy to forecast the level and direction of changes in power balance. For instance, many western states did not anticipate the Soviet Union’s collapse as they feared that it might generate more wealth than the US, resulting in a power shift against it and its allies.

Therefore, since states are unable to determine the amount of power that is sufficient for them at present and in future, they ensure their security by trying to achieve hegemony to eliminate possibilities of attacks by other great powers. States will always seek opportunities to become hegemons regardless of the power they wield. Therefore, they will always act in an offensive manner against their rivals to gain as much power as they can. They always seek to take advantage of other nations and ensure that their rivals do not take advantage of them. They pay attention to both defence and offence as they think about conquering others while working to check aggressors from acquiring power at their expense. As a result, the world is in constant security competition as states are willing to gain an advantage over others through any means, including lying, employing brute force, and cheating (Mearsheimer 2001). Thus, peace and cooperation are difficult to achieve in such a world. The behaviour of seeking to maximise power undermines worlding IR as western nations seek to be hegemons even in IR discourse.

According to the security dilemma, as states strive to increase their security, they reduce that of other states. Therefore, states cannot increase their chances of survival without threatening their rivals’ survival. As states seek to be secure from the rivals’ impact of power, they try to gain more power. As a result, the other powers feel insecure and are compelled to also seek more

power. Thus, in a world of power competition, no state feels fully secure, and this results in the vicious cycle of the accumulation of power. Therefore, states can only survive in an anarchical system by taking advantage of their rivals and acquiring power at their expense (Mearsheimer 2001). Thus, the security dilemma cannot be solved as long as states are in an anarchic world.

States engage in calculated aggression against their rivals by thinking about the balance of power and how they will react to their moves. They weigh the risks and benefits of offence and wait for a better moment if the former outweighs the latter. However, sometimes states make miscalculations of power because of the lack of complete information due to deceptive practices.

Some states misrepresent their weaknesses or strengths to hide their true objectives. For instance, weak states can exaggerate their power to deter attacks from stronger rivals. Similarly, states with the intentions to attack others can emphasise their peaceful objectives and exaggerate their weakness to ensure the potential victims are not prepared to defend themselves from attacks.

States are also unsure about the performance of their forces in battle and the resolve of their allies and rivals (Mearsheimer 2001). An environment of constant pursuit of power and deception among states undermines worlding IR. It is difficult for great powers to be committed to the pursuit of peace and cooperation in the world because of two reasons. Firstly, it is difficult to agree on one method of promoting peace (Mearsheimer 2001. Worlding IR has not been achieved because scholars have never agreed on the features of the plan for having a peaceful world as there are numerous theories explaining peace and war. Policymakers have not reached an agreement on how to achieve a stable world.

For instance, there were disagreements at the Paris Peace Conference on how to achieve European stability after WWI. Another reason is that states are unwilling to abandon power considerations to promote international peace as they are unsure if their efforts will be

successful. The failure of their attempts can lead to negative consequences for neglecting power balance as they have no one to turn to if they are attacked by their rivals. Thus, few states are willing to take this risk. As a result, it is difficult for collective security schemes to succeed as they require states to abandon power balance concerns and act in the interest of the international community (Mearsheimer 2001). Therefore, the objectives of worlding IR, such as cooperation among states, are undermined.

States in an anarchical world are not likely to cooperate on matters such as security because of several complex requirements. Firstly, in a collective security system, states must be able to differentiate between victims and aggressors, which is difficult to determine. For instance, there is no agreement about which European nation started WWI (Mearsheimer 1995). Furthermore, not all aggression by states is wrong as sometimes it is warranted. Moreover, some states such as the US may be reluctant to turn against their allies, such as Israel, even if the international community brands them as aggressors. Moreover, collective efforts between states can be hampered by historical enmity between them. Another hindrance to collective security efforts is the difficulty in determining how the burden to confront aggressors will be shared. It is also difficult to ensure that states respond quickly to an aggressor due to planning and coordination challenges in a collective system. For instance, Kuwait waited for six months for the US to form a coalition to rescue it from Saddam Hussein. Moreover, states may be unwilling to enter into collective efforts to prevent the escalation of local problems into international conflicts.

Moreover, requiring states to respond to aggressors automatically violates their sovereignty as they prefer to commit themselves if their self-interests are involved (Mearsheimer 1995). Lastly, responsible states may not help a nation under threat as they prefer to solve conflicts through economic sanctions and creative diplomacy rather than war.

Interests Served by Worlding IR in an Anarchical Society Worlding IR can serve some interests in an anarchical world. For example, the worlding IR objective of achieving cooperation among states can help nations in an anarchical society to take advantage of each other. For instance, great European powers cooperated before WWI. Moreover, the Soviet Union and the US cooperated before WWII until the Cold War broke out.

Besides, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany engaged in military and economic cooperation two years prior to the attack of the Red Army by Wehrmacht. Great powers cooperate for their interests, such as fighting a common enemy. For example, France, Russia, and the UK united to fight against Germany before WWI. Moreover, in 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany cooperated against Poland. Croatia and Serbia also agreed to cooperate and conquer Bosnia, although their plans were thwarted by the US and European powers (Mearsheimer 2001).

Therefore, in an anarchic world, allies and rivals can cooperate to serve their self-interests.

However, this cooperation is difficult to achieve because the states are concerned about cheating, and they must also consider how to share gains.

It is possible for states to live harmoniously in an anarchical world in various ways. Firstly, all nations can promote mutual relations through cooperation and social, cultural, and economic exchanges. Through positive interactions, stares can create a network of strategic partnerships that unites them (Yongtao 2012). Secondly, states can rely on diplomatic and peaceful means to resolve conflicts and disputes instead of resorting to force and violence. Thirdly, all states should work to develop security, political, and economic communities to contribute to the creation of a harmonious society through multilevel, multichannel, and multilateral cooperation and coordination. Moreover, countries should be tolerant towards others and respect diverse cultures (Yongtao 2012). Although liberalists perceive cooperation and the creation of institutions as

effective in promoting peace, realists claim that great powers form them to achieve their selfinterests (Mearsheimer 1995). Powerful states create institutions and influence them to increase their power and maintain it. For example, NATO has contributed towards averting the onset of WWIII and helping the West in winning the Cold War. However, this institution was just a manifestation of power distribution in Europe. This balance of power is what aided in maintaining stability, while NATO was used by the US as a tool to manage power against the threat of the Soviet Union (Mearsheimer 1995). Realists argue that NATO should be reconstructed or disbanded because the Soviet Union collapsed.

The order witnessed in the world political economy for twenty years after WWII was a result of shared self-interests originating from economic interdependence and the impacts of institutions.

Rational states with self-interests in a symbiotic situation with others value international regimes so that they can enhance their ability to enter mutually beneficial agreements with them (Koehane 2005). States prefer international institutions for several reasons. Firstly, weaker states choose to cooperate with others through an institution to get opportunities to have an effective voice with regard to stronger nations. On the other hand, stronger states accept institutionalisation as it allows them to exercise their hegemony efficiently under the guise of legal equality, resulting in less resistance to their proposals and preferences. For instance, Germany can use the European Union to exert its power discreetly and lawfully to dominate the other states without causing resentment or resistance from them (Brecher & Harvey 2002).

Conclusion Overall, states in an anarchical society pursue their national interests, which undermines the rationale of worlding IR. Although worlding IR aims to incorporate ideas from the non-western world to ensure that the discipline is balanced, states exist in an anarchical world in which they

are driven by their self-interests. Therefore, it is difficult to globalise the IR discipline as states pursue power with the aim of achieving hegemony. They exist in an anarchic international system without a higher ruling body, have an offensive military capability, can never be sure about the intentions of their rivals, pursue the main goal of survival, and act rationally by considering how to survive in their external environment. Although cooperation among states is difficult, sometimes they do it to serve their interest, such as gaining more power over other nations.

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