International Relations

25 Threat is in part a matter of (structural) capabilities. Between bipolar superpowers, threat perception may have a structural basis. Geography is a material feature of some threats. Ultimately, though, most threats are largely a matter of perception, of (non-structural) beliefs about the intentions of others.

Structure pushes in certain directions. Structural logics identify tendencies. Determinate predictions or explanations, however, require recourse to non-structural forces as well. Such NEO-CLASSICAL REALIST approaches begin with structure but focus attention on deviations from structuralist expectations or detailed predictions and explanations that escape the reach of structuralist accounts.

Consider “underbalancing.” States actually balance less than structural realism suggests they should. Why? Because balancing is expensive, states often try to “pass the buck,” compelling others to, out of selfinterest, provide collective defense. Underbalancing also often arises from domestic political considerations. Electorates or critical constituencies sometimes cannot be convinced to make necessary security expenditures. Leaders, fearing the domestic political consequences, may not even ask for what a rational security analysis indicates is required.

The offense-defense balance offer a third example of refinements to the basic structural logic, in this case relating the intensity of relative gains concerns to the nature of military technology.

Where defense has an advantage, as with medieval fortresses before cannon, offensive advances by an adversary can be counter-balanced relatively easily and cheaply. It is thus difficult to shift the balance in your favor, making threatening and destabilizing arms buildups less likely. In addition, defensive states may respond more slowly and in less threatening ways.

When offense has the advantage, though, balances tend may precarious. If changes in the armaments or military postures of adversaries are not countered rapidly and aggressively, the balance may be altered with surprising speed. Consider the interwar period, when the development of armor and air power were met with a disinclination of Germany’s enemies to increase military spending during the Great Depression.