-36philosophy and of human reason in general that there is still no cogent proof for the existence of things outside us.” The real scandal, Heidegger rebutted, “is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again.”18 Perhaps on this point at least, he was right. Béatrice Longuenesse New York University 1
Med II, ATVII, 25; AT IX-1, 19; CSMK, 27.
2
B131-32. Strictly speaking, starting with the “I think” in the Transcendental Deduction
is reversing the chronological order of Kant’s references to Descartes in the Critique of Pure Reason. For Kant’s criticism of the Cartesian move from “I think” to “I am a thing whose whole essence is to think” first occurs in the Paralogisms of pure Reason, in the A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, whereas explicit reference to the proposition “I think” occurs only in the B edition of the Transcendental Deduction. However, already in the A edition Kant insists on the relationship of all of our representations to the unity of apperception and the “pure representation ‘I’” (see in particular A117fn.) And it is clear that Kant’s criticism of Descartes in the Paralogisms, in the A edition of the Critique, is already grounded on Kant’s own view of “I” and “I think,” which finds a more systematic presentation in the B edition of the Transcendental Deduction. 3
See DM, AT VI, 32; CSMK, 127. Principles, AT VIII-1, 7; Med. II, AT VII, 25; AT
IX-1, 19. 4
AT VI, 32; CSMK, 127. AT VIII-1, 7.
5
See below, p.00.
6
These texts are respectively from Med III, AT VII, 38; AT IX-1, 30; CSMK, 27. Med
IV, AT VII, 58; AT IX-1, 46-47; CSMK II, 58. See also Fourth Responses, AT VII, 227; AT IX-1, 176; CSMK II, 160: “And what M. Arnauld adds is not contrary to what I say, namely that when I think I come to conclude that I am. (my emphasis, BL)” On these references, and for an illuminating analysis of Descartes’ argument, see Jean-Claude Pariente 1988.