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65 Mr. Schneider told the Subcommittee that the numbers listed on the chart were not projections, but the numbers generated from actual, historical loan data. 172 As the chart makes clear, the least profitable loans for WaMu were government backed and fixed rate loans. Those loans were typically purchased by government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae which paid relatively low prices for them. Instead of focusing on those low margin loans, WaMu’s management looked to make profits elsewhere, and elected to focus on the most profitable loans, which were the Option ARM, home equity, and subprime loans. In 2005, subprime loans, with 150 basis points, were eight times more profitable than a fixed rate loan at 19 basis points and more than 10 times as profitable as government backed loans. The gain on sale data WaMu collected drove not only WaMu’s decision to focus on higher risk home loans, but also how the bank priced those loans for borrowers. In determining how much it would charge for a loan, the bank calculated first what price the loan would obtain on Wall Street. As Mr. Beck explained in his testimony before the Subcommittee: “Because WaMu’s capital markets organization was engaged in the secondary mortgage market, it had ready access to information regarding how the market priced loan products. Therefore my team helped determine the initial prices at which WaMu could offer loans by beginning with the applicable market prices for private or agency-backed mortgage securities and adding the various costs WaMu incurred in the origination, sale, and servicing of home loans.” 173

(5) Acknowledging Unsustainable Housing Price Increases In 2004, before WaMu implemented its High Risk Lending Strategy, the Chief Risk Officer Jim Vanasek expressed internally concern about the unsustainable rise in housing prices, loosening lending standards, and the possible consequences. On September 2, 2004, just months before the formal presentation of the High Risk Lending Strategy to the Board of Directors, Mr. Vanasek circulated a prescient memorandum to WaMu’s mortgage underwriting and appraisal staff, warning of a bubble in housing prices and encouraging tighter underwriting. The memorandum also captured a sense of the turmoil and pressure at WaMu. Under the subject heading, “Perspective,” Mr. Vanasek wrote: “I want to share just a few thoughts with all of you as we begin the month of September. Clearly you have gone through a difficult period of time with all of the changes in the mortgage area of the bank. Staff cuts and recent defections have only added to the stress. Mark Hillis [a Senior Risk Officer] and I are painfully aware of the toll that this has taken on some of you and have felt it is important to tell you that we recognize it has been and continues to be difficult.

172 173

Subcommittee interview of David Schneider (2/16/2010). April 13, 2010 Subcommittee Hearing at 53.


66 “In the midst of all this change and stress, patience is growing thin. We understand that. We also know that loan originators are pushing very hard for deals. But we need to put all of this in perspective. “At this point in the mortgage cycle with prices having increased far beyond the rate of increase in personal incomes, there clearly comes a time when prices must slow down or perhaps even decline. There have been so many warnings of a Housing Bubble that we all tend now to ignore them because thus far it has not happened. I am not in the business of forecasting, but I have a healthy respect for the underlying data which says ultimately this environment is no longer sustainable. Therefore I would conclude that now is not the time to be pushing appraisal values. If anything we should be a bit more conservative across the board. Kerry Killinger and Bill Longbrake [a Vice Chair of WaMu] have both expressed renewed concern over this issue. “This is a point where we should be much more careful about exceptions. It is highly questionable as to how strong this economy may be; there is clearly no consensus on Wall Street. If the economy stalls, the combination of low FICOs, high LTVs and inordinate numbers of exceptions will come back to haunt us.” 174 Mr. Vanasek was the senior-most risk officer at WaMu, and had frequent interactions with Mr. Killinger and the Board of Directors. While his concerns may have been heard, they were not heeded. Mr. Vanasek told the Subcommittee that, because of his predictions of a collapse in the housing market, he earned the derisive nickname “Dr. Doom.” 175 But evidence of a housing bubble was overwhelming by 2005. Over the prior ten years, housing prices had skyrocketed in an unprecedented fashion, as the following chart prepared by Paulson & Co. Inc., based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, demonstrates. 176

174

9/2/2004 Washington Mutual memorandum from Jim Vanasek, “Perspective,” Hearing Exhibit 4/13-78b. Subcommittee interview of Jim Vanasek (12/18/2009). 176 “Estimation of Housing Bubble,” PSI-Paulson&Co-02-00003, Hearing Exhibit 4/13-1j. 175


67

Mr. Vanasek shared his concerns with Mr. Killinger. At the Subcommittee’s hearing, Mr. Killinger testified: “Now, beginning in 2005, 2 years before the financial crisis hit, I was publicly and repeatedly warning of the risks of a potential housing downturn.” 177 In March 2005, he engaged in an email exchange with Mr. Vanasek, in which both agreed the United States was in the midst of a housing bubble. On March, 10, 2005, Mr. Vanasek emailed Mr. Killinger about many of the issues facing his risk management team, concluding: “My group is working as hard as I can reasonably ask any group to work and in several cases they are stretched to the absolute limit. Any words of support and appreciation would be very helpful to the morale of the group. These folks have stepped up to fixing any number of issues this year, many not at all of their own making.” 178 Mr. Killinger replied: “Thanks Jim. Overall, it appears we are making some good progress. Hopefully, the Regulators will agree that we are making some progress. I suspect the toughest thing for us will be to navigate through a period of high home prices, increased competitive conditions for reduced underwriting standards, and our need to grow the balance sheet. I 177 178

April 13, 2010 Subcommittee Hearing at 85. 3/2005 WaMu internal email chain, Hearing Exhibit 4/13-78.


68 have never seen such a high risk housing market as market after market thinks they are unique and for whatever reason are not likely to experience price declines. This typically signifies a bubble.” Mr. Vanasek agreed: “I could not agree more. All the classic signs are there and the likely outcome is probably not great. We would all like to think the air can come out of the balloon slowly but history would not lean you in that direction. Over the next month or so I am going to work hard on what I hope can be a lasting mechanism (legacy) for determining how much risk we can afford to take ….” Despite Mr. Killinger’s awareness that housing prices were unsustainable, could drop suddenly, and could make it difficult for borrowers to refinance or sell their homes, Mr. Killinger continued to push forward with WaMu’s High Risk Lending Strategy.

(6) Execution of the High Risk Lending Strategy WaMu formally adopted the High Risk Lending Strategy in January 2005. 179 Over the following two years, management significantly shifted the bank’s loan originations towards riskier loans as called for in the plan, but had to slow down the pace of implementation in the face of worsening market conditions. In retrospect, WaMu executives tried to portray their inability to fully execute the plan as a strategic choice rather than the result of a failed strategy. For example, Mr. Killinger testified at the Subcommittee hearing that the bank’s High Risk Lending Strategy was only contemplated, but not really executed: “First, we had an adjustment in our strategy that started in about 2004 to gradually increase the amount of home equity, subprime, commercial real estate, and multi-family loans that we could hold on the balance sheet. We had that long-term strategy, but … we quickly determined that the housing market was increasing in its risk, and we put most of those strategies for expansion on hold.” 180 Mr. Killinger’s claim that the High Risk Lending Strategy was put “on hold” is contradicted, however, by WaMu’s SEC filings, its internal documents, and the testimony of other WaMu executives. Washington Mutual’s SEC filings contain loan origination and acquisition data showing that the bank did implement its High Risk Lending Strategy. Although rising defaults and the 2007 collapse of the subprime secondary market prevented WaMu from fully executing its plans, WaMu dramatically shifted the composition of the loans it originated and purchased, nearly

179

See 3/13/2006 OTS Report of Examination, at OTSWMS06-008 0001677, Hearing Exhibit 4/16-94 [Sealed Exhibit]. 180 April 13, 2010 Subcommittee Hearing at 88.


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