DNV stated that its tests of the blue pod in its as‐received condition demonstrated that “the 27 Volt battery in the Blue Pod had insufficient charge to activate the solenoid 103B.” DNV noted that there were no records showing that the batteries in the AMF system were tested during a factory acceptance test in June 2009. 353 DNV further noted that tests for the 27‐volt battery conducted in July 2010 (when the BOP was retrieved) “reported the battery level to be out of specification.” 354 The Deepwater Horizon crew did not have the ability to monitor the subsea electronic module (“SEM”) battery power supply, although the Panel is aware of technology that exists that would allow Transocean to perform this monitoring. If the crew had been able to monitor the SEM power supply, they could have known the real time condition of the AMF batteries. Two other theories regarding the failure of the BOP stack were advanced during JIT hearings. The first is that the hydraulic systems that powered the BSR did not have enough power to cause the blind shear rams to fully close and seal. A Cameron representative stated: There is a possibility that the shear ram could have been functioned not through the high pressure circuit but through the manifold pressure, which would be 1,500 PSI, and itʹs possible that if that happened, we wouldnʹt have near enough hydraulic force pressure ‐ you could not generate enough force with that pressure to cut the pipe. In fact, itʹs very likely that the pipe would only be dented and not shear all the way through, exposing the ram to the flows that we all have heard about. Itʹs also possible that for whatever reason the hydraulic system wasnʹt up to the game that day and didnʹt have sufficient pressure to close it. It is possible that the solenoid valve, which when tested by DNV in Michoud, operated intermittently, sometimes it wouldnʹt operate at all and other times it would operate for a handful of seconds. And it is possible that if the deadman fired and the solenoid valve did exactly what it did at Michoud, that the ram could have partially deployed and not gone all the way across. 355
Id. Id. at 170. 355 McWhorter testimony at 144‐45. 353 354
143