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tive grounds. Kelley argues that these states remained committed to the ICC for two reasons. First, they prioritized human rights and justice rather than immediate material interests. Second, these states valued compliance with the ICC for its own sake. Most states with a high rule of law refused to sign the non-surrender agreement because doing so would violate the key terms of the Rome Statute and therefore previous commitments to the treaty.16 For states that refused to sign the agreement for the reasons explained here, normative commitments to the ICC remained strong despite the potential harm to the state parties’ national interests. In short, this suggests that the logic of appropriateness dominated for more than half of the ICC state parties, demonstrating a high level of normative commitment as a result. Kelley’s study, however, only explains part of the picture, falling short of testing full commitment. First, as Kelley acknowledges, most ICC state parties that did not sign the bilateral non-surrender agreement already had strong ties with the U.S., rendering the threat of withdrawing military aid toothless.17 The lack of a credLEOH WKUHDW PHDQW WKDW WKHVH FRXQWULHV ZHUH DEOH WR UHDIÀUP WKHLU FRPPLWPHQW WR WKH ICC without harming national interests. More importantly, it is not certain that state parities lacking bilateral non-surrender agreements would in fact arrest U.S. citizens in accordance with ICC statutes. Although the act of signing and ratifying a treaty itself incurs certain costs – conforPDWLRQ WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO VWDQGDUGV XQLQWHQGHG FRQVHTXHQFHV DQG OHVV à H[LELOLW\18 – VXFK FRVWV DUH QRW VXEVWDQWLDO XQWLO WKH VLJQDWRULHV ÀQG WKHLU FRPPLWPHQWV FKDOOHQJHG by other interests. For state parties to the ICC in particular, joining the institution by itself does not involve much cost. Unless a state is obliged to arrest one of its own citizens or an indicted foreign national in its territory, its commitment to the court does not entail many practical costs. Absent material challenges to member states’ FRPPLWPHQW WR WKH ,&& LW LV GLIÀFXOW WR GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU WKH ORJLF RI DSSURSULDWHness determines state behavior. Three Scenarios of Commitment In order to test member states’ normative commitments, it is necessary to examine situations in which states face a trade-off between protecting national interests and complying with the ICC obligations. I argue that the clearest indication of commitment from member states is whether they help the ICC arrest and try the indicted persons. This test is especially illuminating if immediate security or material interests are at stake for the state in question. For example, if a high-ranking member of the U.S. military were indicted by the ICC for war crimes in Iraq and traveled to Germany, an ICC state party that has not signed the non-surrender agreement with WKH 8 6 KRZ ZRXOG *HUPDQ\ UHVSRQG" ,Q WKLV VFHQDULR *HUPDQ\ ZRXOG UHYHDO LWV level of commitment to the ICC through its action (arrest him) or inaction (do nothing). In general, I can imagine three possible state responses to such a challenge to commitment to the ICC: (1)When the indicted is in its territory, a member state arrests and turns in that person to the ICC.