asset package proved more successful, as did one in which new assets were accompanied by livestock services (de‐worming, vaccinations) plus a stipend of approximately £2.20 per month over 18 months, which removed the need to sell assets in order to meet regular needs (ODI). Another form of well‐established “productive social protection” are vouchers for farm inputs which entitle farmers to buy modern inputs (usually fertilizer and improved seeds) from participating input retailers at a subsidized price. Following the various supporters and detractors of Malawi’s large scale agricultural input subsidy program and reforms to that program, targeted input subsidies are now also accepted by the donor community as a way to boost smallholder productivity, provided the programs are “market‐smart” (World Bank 2007; Dorward and Chirwa 2011). Market‐smart input subsidies are part of a broader productivity enhancement program, have clear exit strategies, and most importantly, they are carefully targeted at overcoming market failures. Looking at the Tanzania input voucher program they reflect on the program’s simultaneous pursuit of multiple objectives (raising aggregate output versus raising poor farmers’ income), which each yields different targeting rules (targeting farmers with highest marginal productivity versus targeting poor farmers). They show that it leads to a targeting practice focused on the lowest common denominator that tries to serve all in theory, but serves none well in practice. They note that it is possible to overcome this dichotomy by targeting farmers with higher marginal productivity (most will happen to be small poor farmers) through the development of better proxies to target households with high marginal productivity (where the practice is in its infancy).
For every dollar spent on the PROCAMPO program in Mexico – a large cash transfer program targeted to compensate farmers from the impact of NAFTA ‐ household income increased by US $1.60 to US $2.40 of income (Sadoulet et al. 2001). This likely reflects the removal of credit constraints – 70% of the PROCAMPO respondents purchased agricultural inputs with these transfers.
In Bangladesh the BRAC, one of the largest NGOs has been targeting the ultra poor since 2002. The participants show greater rates of asset accumulation than non‐
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