Notes

34 | Revisiting Targeting in Social Assistance

that secular changes in technology do not ensure progress; progress is always the result of political will and administrative effort, resources as important as the budget in producing good social policy outcomes.

Notes

1. The Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection brings together the

World Bank and the International Labour Organization with the African

Union, Food and Agriculture Organization, European Commission, HelpAge,

Inter-American Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Save the Children, United Nations Development

Programme–International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, United Nations

Children’s Fund, and others, along with Belgian, Finnish, French, and German cooperation (https://www.usp2030.org/gimi/USP2030.action). 2. Less any transactions for having applied to or psychic costs of having been excluded from the program. 3. The estimates are simple in the sense that they do not consider behavioral responses to the programs. 4. http://www.worldbank.org/aspire/. 5. ASPIRE focuses on data from traditional International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association client countries, so its coverage of high-income countries is not the full set for the world (for example, the earliest industrializers, Australia, Europe, Japan, North America, and so forth). Thus, the higher income sometime-borrowers from the World

Bank for which ASPIRE reports survey data for the period since 2014 are Chile,

Croatia, Panama, and Uruguay. 6. Some of these programs may intend to cover more than just the poorest quintile; the matching of program size to that of the target population is a point taken up in Message 7. This message instead makes the point that programs that are very small will never have a significant impact on covering the poor regardless of how well their eligibility screening works, while those that are very large will cover the poor but the poor’s share of the total benefits will be limited. 7. Two conditional cash transfer programs are observed in Panama’s 2018

Encuesta de Mercado Laboral: Red de Oportunidades, which covers 5.7 percent of the total population, and SENAPAN, a smaller program covering less than 1 percent of the population. Panama also has two additional programs targeted to poor individuals: Programa Ángel Guardián (for people with disabilities) and

B/.120 a los 65 (for adults 65 years and older who do not receive a contributory pension). Although Panama’s government considers the programs as conditional cash transfers due to the inclusion of conditions, ASPIRE classifies them as social pensions since their conditions are not related to investments in human capital, such as school attendance, immunizations, health checkups, and so forth. See annex 2C in chapter 2.