Notes 1. In fact, agenda manipulation can ensure that the “best collective outcome” does not become policy. 2. “I’ll let you write the substance and you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw you every time.” See Regulatory Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (Patty and Penn 2008, 2). 3. For purposes of clarity, a majoritarian system is one in which public decisions require the consent of at least 50 percent plus one of voters. 4. The name comes from Marquis de Condorcet, a French philosopher who, in 1785, wrote a treatise entitled Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Decisions, where he defined the concept and explained for the first time the paradox of social choice and preference aggregation. 5. An “ideal point” refers to the policy desired by a certain actor, and any departures from it decrease his or her utility or overall gain. 6. Defined as a situation in which one actor (the agenda setter) has information that other actors do not possess. 7. The game and diagrams illustrating the “paradox of voting” are adapted from Poole (2011), http://voteview.com/paradox_of_voting.htm. 8. Source: (Duch 2009) and (Poole 2011) .
References Arrow, Kenneth. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale University Press. Bach, S., and S. S. Smith. 1988. Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives: Adaptation and Innovation in Special Rules. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1962. “The Two Faces of Power.” American Political Science Review 56 (4): 947–52. Duch, Raymond. 2009. “Formal Analysis Lecture Notes.” Nuffield College: Oxford, http://www.raymondduch.com/course/hilary2009/formalanalysis/ lecture_2009_06.pdf. Dummett, Michael. 1984. Voting Procedures. New York: Oxford University Press. Garrett, G., and B. Weingast. 1993. “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions.” In The Role of Ideas in Foreign Policy, ed. Judy Goldstein and Robert Keohane, 173–206. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Johnson, Paul. 1998. Social Choice. Theory and Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: A Sage University Paper. Kingdon, J. W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. London: Longman. Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
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