luteness of this characterization. Are there any tensions between Iranian-backed Iraqi Shiite fighters and native Syrian forces? If so, what impact could such rifts have on Syria’s war going forward? What challenges might reliance on these foreign actors present for the Assad regime if it retains control over some part of postwar Syria? Using theories of violence devolution, I contend that although security decentralization has enhanced the Assad regime’s ability to fight a prolonged civil war, the increased use of militias threatens to complicate its ability to control regime-held territories. In the case of the government’s use of Iraqi fighters, challenges to Syria’s central authority are already being manifested through the fighters’ feelings of resentment toward their Syrian colleagues and decisions to act independent of Syrian directives. In addition, I argue that the ideological heterogeneity within the ranks of the Iraqi militiamen as well as the stark contrast between their politico-religious vision and the Assad regime’s secular Ba’athist ideology introduce the potential for deeper challenges to Assad’s authority going forward. If these divisive
features are not skillfully negotiated and contained, they could remain an enduring source of conflict for Assad, even if he is able to eliminate rebel opposition. Theory Ideally, we would like to characterize the Iraqi Shiite pro-regime fighters in Syria according to a paramilitary typology to guide our assessment of their impact on regime control. However, the existing paramilitary literature is based on case studies that cannot be easily compared to the case of Iraqi Shiite fighters in Syria. Studies of pro-government militias are overwhelmingly concerned with homegrown militias operating within the territorial boundaries of the country in which they were formed, such as the Sudanese Janjaweed and the spectrum of Colombian paramilitary groups that formed in response to eln and farc rebels.7 Because the Iraqis in Syria come from militias that were founded and continue to operate in Iraq, many of the dimensions utilized to construct typologies are difficult to apply. For example, one study bases its typology on whether a militia was created by the state or local civilian initiatives;8 the Iraqi pro-Assad
militants were neither created at the behest of the Syrian government, nor were they formed in response to local Syrian demands. It might instead be useful to characterize the activities of Iraqi Shiite militants in Syria through a comparative study looking at other cases in which foreign fighters (excluding those officially enlisted in a foreign government’s military) have travelled to assist other governments in committing violent acts. Documented examples of this phenomenon include the French Foreign Legion, Moammar Qadhafi’s pan-African Islamic legion, Israel’s Mahal unit, and Bahrain’s recent employment of foreign Sunnis in the riot police and in Bahraini Special Forces. None of these cases brings to mind any clear instance of decreased state control or non-compliance. Although each case is situated in a distinct historical and institutional context, they all share one feature that is absent from the case of Iraqi Shiites in Syria: the foreigners were integrated into the ranks of the official security apparatus. To illustrate this key difference, it is helpful to consider Bahrain. Although it is not engaged in a bloody civil war anywhere near the
scale of Syria, Bahrain, like Syria, is mired in a conflict between anti-government protesters and a regime that has responded violently to their demands. Also similar to Syria, the conflict in Bahrain has been cast in largely sectarian terms, as the Sunni Khalifa family rules over a majority Shiite population. Syria receives formal support from the Irgc; Bahrain also received an envoy of Saudi and other Gulf soldiers, known as the Peninsula Shield. As early as 2011 it was reported that the Khalifas were recruiting non-military Sunnis from Pakistan, Yemen, and Jordan to assist in violent protest suppression.9 This measure has elicited complaints from various sectors of society who view it as an overtly sectarian move,10 but there have not been documented conflicts between foreign Sunni riot police and native Bahraini state personnel. The absence of conflict between foreign and native government forces in Bahrain, and its presence in Syria, might be in part due to fundamental differences in how foreign personnel are repackaged once they enter the country. While the foreign Sunnis in Bahrain are integrated into the state’s formal security apparatus, Iraqi Shi-
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