Plan Colombia: Analyzing the Effects of Aerial Eradication of Coca Crop

By Grace Fang

Richard Nixon formally declared a “War on Drugs” in 1971. Since then, different anti-drug policies have been carried out in producer, transit, and consumer countries. Data from the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicate that Colombia was producing 74% of the world’s cocaine supply by 2000 and that the US is the largest consumer of cocaine (Rozo 2014). In September 1999, the governments of Colombia and the US launched a joint strategy to tackle the illegal business and organized crime groups under Plan Colombia. According to the US Government Accountability Office, the US funded an average of US $540 million per year for the military component of this plan between 2000 and 2008. The US government spent around US $6 billion from 2000 to 2010 (Rozo 2014). The Colombian government spent approximately US $812 million per year; together, these expenditures represented about 1.2% of Colombia’s average annual GDP between 2000 and 2008 (Mejia and Restrepo 2016). Thus Plan Colombia is the largest anti-drug policy that has ever been deployed in a drug-producing country. Plan Colombia included aerial spraying of herbicides to kill coca crops, manual eradication, control of chemical precursors used in the processing of coca plants into the cocaine drug, destruction of cocaine laboratories, and capturing of drug shipments (Rozo 2014). There were two main objectives: first, reduce production of illegal drugs by 50% within six years, and two, improve security conditions in regions that are controlled by illegal armed groups (Rozo 2014). By reducing the supply of Colombian cocaine, the availability of cocaine and its harms would be decreased worldwide.

Rational choice theory is the economic framework behind anti-drug policies. Put simply, economists view the decision to engage in illegal activities as rational, and thus suggest incentives and penalties, which would modify behavior (Mejia, Restropo, and Rozo 2017). When an activity becomes more costly or less profitable to engage in, individuals are less incentivized to engage in that activity. However, some may argue that criminals do not exhibit rational behavior, and there is a lack of evidence in this debate as a whole. Ibanez and Martinsson (2013) investigated individual motivations and measured behavioral responses to aerial spraying with a framed field experiment. A framed field experiment is an experiment with a nonstandard subject pool in “actual settings”, which means they make real-life decisions with real stakes. Ibanez and Martisson chose this due to the social norms associated with illegal activity. Sampling farmers familiar with coca cultivation was a preferable method for analyzing the effectiveness of anti-drug policies. In the framed field experiment, the participants were randomly and anonymously matched in groups of five. Each subject was given 10 experimental points that represented the amount of land, labor and capital available to them for investing in two agricultural activities: coca or cattle. They determined how much they wanted to invest in each. Each person participated in nine treatments that combined three different levels of incentives and three different levels of deterrences. The negative externalities generated by coca cultivation were included in the form of an externality that reduced the income for every subject in the group by 0.17. In total, 164 producers participated in

13 experimental sessions. The sample was representative of the rural Colombian population in terms of age and education level. Ibanez and Martinsson classified the producers’ behaviors into 4 types. They found that 38% of the participants are classified in the low level of morality and low level of risk aversion (Ibanez and Martinsson 2013). This type of producer (type 1) is very likely to invest in coca (about 90% did) and invest relatively larger amounts than other groups. Type 2 makes up 27%. They have a high moral cost and a high level of risk aversion. This type of participants are very unlikely to invest in coca (only 3% did) or invest relatively little. The remaining 35% of the participants are classified in two types that have different degrees of risk aversion and morality. The study found that one third of farmers have “moral costs” that are high enough to deter them from investing in coca and require no incentives (Ibanez and Martinsson 2013). Two fifths of the participants would require that the relative return of the legal activity were 1.8 times that from coca, or would require that the risk of eradication were above 60% to stop cultivating coca. The results suggest that incentives should be used in areas that are better integrated to markets, whereas deterrence should be used in economically depressed areas.

There is little empirical microeconomic evidence on the effectiveness of this program; most of the related research are of theoretical models adjusted with aggregated data in simulations or econometric analysis based on time series (Rozo 2014). Mejia et al. (2017) states that the most positive (in favor of) estimate of the effectiveness of spraying indicates that for each additional hectare sprayed, coca cultivation is reduced by about 0.035 hectares; meaning, in order to reduce one hectare of coca, almost 30 hectares would have to be sprayed, at a cost of approximately US $74,000. These studies all conclude that the destruction of coca crops is an ineffective strategy; however, these studies may be limited by endogeneity (correlation with an error term, for example with an omitted variable or simultaneity bias, when the outcome variable is a predictor not a response) with the usage of aggregate data and theoretical assumptions. Rozo (2013) uses satellite information on the location of coca crops between 2000 and 2010 in Colombia to identify the effectiveness of herbicide spraying. The data collection was done by the Integrated Monitoring System of Illicit Crops of the UNODC. Rozo also studies the effects in the short term (12 months) and medium term (24 to 36 months) to check if spraying leads to coca production in neighboring areas. Rozo also uses governmental sources to identify the effects of the program on homicide rates, forced displacement, school enrollment and dropout rates, infant mortality, and poverty rates. Rozo’s results suggest that coca cultivation is reduced by 0.07 hectares per additional hectare sprayed, but the negative externalities and spillovers of this program ensures that the costs are far higher than potential benefits (2013). Rozo uses the variation created by restrictions (indigenous territories and natural parks are restricted from spraying) and time variation of US anti-drug expenditures to isolate the exogenous variable of spraying (2013). Rozo’s results suggest that to eradicate 1 hectare of coca per square kilometers, spraying will have to increase by 14.3 hectares per square kilometers (2014). She also found no evidence that coca production increases in neighboring areas, suggesting that producers are going further distances from the treated area, or even to other countries with less enforcement (Rozo 2014). Spraying worsens the welfare conditions in targeted areas: when the area sprayed increases by 1%, poverty rates increase by 0.22% (Rozo 2014). Spraying also results in worsened educational and health conditions: a 1% increase reduced secondary school enrollment by 0.11% and

increased dropout rates by 0.04% (Rozo 2014). Evidence shows that households perceived a drop in their income when crops were sprayed (Tobon and Restrepo 2011; Espinosa 2009). This suggests that older children had to compensate for the income shock. Rodriguez (2020) also researched the effects of aerial spraying on child labor, school attendance, and education from 2008 to 2021. Rodriguez uses a model which includes the days in which high speed wind made spraying difficult to correct for selection bias. The results showed that aerial spraying was associated with a 1% increase in the probability that children aged 12-17 would work instead of attending school (Rodriguez 2020). It was also associated with a 0.15% increase in the probability that older siblings would fall behind in school, and a 5% increase in the probability that younger siblings would drop out (Rodriguez 2020). Various studies claim that the primary reason for child labor is poverty, which is particularly relevant considering coca-growing households have high levels of poverty. Coca cultivation also occurs in regions with less access to public services and lower-quality state institutions, which includes schooling. This compounds considering that children who work in illegal markets are more likely to continue that type of work later on in life (Sviatschi 2019). Rozo also found that when area sprayed increases by 1%, infant mortality increases by 0.07%; this could be a combination of herbicide exposure or income shock (2014). Rozo’s results also indicate an increase of violence after implementation; area sprayed increasing by 1% correlated with the increase of homicide rates by 0.67% and the number of individuals displaced by 4.97 (2014). This could be explained by the military inspections that take place prior to aerial spraying, which increases the likelihood of confrontation between law enforcement and drug traffickers. This could also be explained by traffickers retaliating to coca eradication. These effects appear to disappear in the long term. Rozo and Mejia later worked together to publish this research in The World Bank Economic Review. Mejia, Rozo, and Restrepo (2017) used satellite data between 2000 and 2010; they used the 10km band near the border of Ecuador that was restricted from spraying to identify the effectiveness of that variable on coca production. They found significant, but small, deterrent effects of spraying (Mejia et al. 2017). The regression discontinuity method estimated that the area within the restricted band was approximately 10% less likely to be sprayed than the area neighboring it; farmers responded by planting 0.3 less hectares per square kilometer in the sprayed region (Mejia et al. 2017). A different methodology (conditional differences in differences estimator) yielded a similar result, with an average of 0.22 less hectares per square kilometer planted in the sprayed region (Mejia et al. 2017). They concluded that spraying one additional hectare reduces coca cultivation by 0.022 to 0.030 hectares in a year (Mejia et al. 2017).

These findings all confirmed that rational choice theory holds true: deterrence discourages farmers from growing illicit crops. However these findings also conclude that the effects are too small and the spraying of crops is too costly. For each dollar the US spends on the spraying campaign, the Colombian government spends about $2.20 on the crew members and cleanup beforehand (Mejia et al. 2017). These figures imply that in order to reduce cocaine supply in retail markets by 1kg, about $1.6 million dollars need to be spent on aerial spraying campaigns, similar to the result reported by Mejia and Restrepo (2013) using a different methodology. In comparison, other policies, such as intercepting transports or prevention policies are more cost-effective (Mejia et al. 2017). The total area of coca production in Colombia decreased since 1990, but the quantity did not, due to increase of cocaine yield per hectare (UNODC 2018). In 2001, it was possible to

produce 4.2kg of cocaine per hectare of coca, whereas in 2010, it was possible to produce 5.1 to 6.8kg per hectare; indicating coca producers and traffickers were modifying their behavior in response to enforcement, thus ensuring a stable supply (Mejia et al. 2017). Ibanez and Klasen (2017) used a different methodology: panel data at the household level, instead of aggregated regional data. Using revealed preference data from interviews, they estimated the elasticity of coca cultivation supply. They also discovered that the supply of coca is inelastic to increases of the risk of eradication (Ibanez and Klasen 2017). Wholesale price of cocaine has also remained relatively stable, found through a model of downstream cocaine markets (Mejia and Restrepo 2016). They found that 1% reduction in coca cultivation reduces cocaine in the market by 0.0025%: an increase in the price of coca leaf due to deterrence only translates into a small increase in consumer prices; the demand is also inelastic, thus the small increase barely affects consumption (Mejia and Restrepo 2016). There is also downstream adjustment to the shock with substitutions towards other inputs of production, such as chemical precursors, transportation, or growing in other countries.

Since Plan Colombia was created in 1999, an average of 128,000 hectares of land has been sprayed each year, with a peak of 172,000 hectares in 2006 (Camacho and Mejia 2015). Spraying is carried out by American contractors using small aircrafts towards targeted areas where coca has been detected by satellite imagery. Spraying uses substances such as Roundup, a commercial weed killer, whose main active ingredient is glyphosate. This herbicide contains a surfactant, polyoxyethylene tallow amine (POEA), which assists glyphosate in penetrating the plant’s leaves. However, the surfactant used in Colombia is Cosmo-Flux 411f, which is not approved in the US since it was not subjected to the same testing requirements. Glyphosate inhibits an enzyme involved in the synthesis of amino acids, which kills the plant. Glyphosate is absorbed through foliage and is not effective otherwise, meaning the plant has to be actively growing. It is important to note that most studies isolate the chemical glyphosate to determine clear causative or correlative relationships with controlled variables. Thus, the mixture of glyphosate with other ingredients, such as POEA, or the product Roundup specifically, have had fewer experiments. In March 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) determined that there is evidence that glyphosate is carcinogenic to humans, specifically leading to increased risks for non-Hodgkin lymphoma. This led the IARC to reclassify glyphosate into category 2A: “probably carcinogenic to humans.” Colombia suspended spraying after this finding. Camacho and Mejia research the health effects of glyphosate spraying with data on spraying patterns with medical consultations, emergency room visits, hospitalizations, and procedures between 2003 to 2007, which came from all health service institutions in Colombia (2015). Camacho and Mejia note that most evidence on negative externalities comes from field work that has issues of internal and external validity, with confounding factors that make it difficult to isolate aerial spraying as a direct cause (2015). One of the biggest confounding factors is the spatial correlation between coca cultivation and spraying locations, which can be argued that coca cultivation is the generator for negative externalities. Camacho and Mejia tackles this issue with precise information on location and timing of spraying and enables a quasi-natural experiment in which they can establish a precise link between the date and magnitude with hospital visitation; they also observe individuals over a period of five years and are able to construct

individual-level panels that isolate genetic, behavioral, or other heterogeneities (2015). This rules out omitted variable biases present in cross-sectional studies. Since spraying campaigns cannot be anticipated, these events are exogenous shocks from the individual’s point of view, which strengthens the internal validity of results. They are able to include individual fixed effects, control for baseline health status, and determine that this is the closest to a randomized experiment that can be achieved (Camacho and Mejia 2015). They observed approximately 9.4 million individuals, more than 45 million doctor visits, and 2.5 million birth registrations; this large sample size assisted in robust and precise findings. They estimate individual fixed effects regressions that test the relationship between increase in probability of a health problem with exposure to herbicides for the same individual, with different exposure levels at different times. Camacho and Mejia concluded that glyphosate spraying is associated with significant increases in issues regarding dermatology, respiratory systems, and miscarriages (2015). They controlled for time-invariant characteristics such as place of residence, seasonal illnesses, or pre-existing health issues, resulting in a stronger interpretation of results that assert a causal relationship between glyphosate exposure and health issues. However, they are unable to conclude long-term effects such as lower life expectancy, quality of life, or productivity from this data. Their results imply that the aerial spraying of herbicides has a negative effect on the populations exposed (Camacho and Mejia 2015). There is a wide variety of medical and epidemiological literature on the health effects of glyphosate, but there is no definite consensus. Medical literature consists primarily of cross-sectional studies comparing health outcomes among those with and without exposure or laboratory animal experiments (Camacho and Mejia 2015). A main limitation is the inability to demonstrate direct causal relationships; positive correlations or associations are often biased with confounding factors. For example, these populations could have other risk behaviors such as smoking or alcohol consumption. Earlier we had established that coca-growing populations tend to be lower-income, rural, have less access to and lower-quality social goods and institutions, all while also facing more violence from militias or state law enforcement. These factors all compound and increase the probability for adverse health risks. Sanborn et al. (2007) reviewed 124 studies since 1992 and concluded that there is strong evidence pointing to positive associations between pesticide exposure and 3 non-cancer health outcomes, the strongest for neurological abnormalities, reproductive outcomes, and genotoxicity (ability to cause intracellular genetic damage). 10 dermatological studies were reviewed, highlighting higher prevalence of irritations, dermatitis, rashes, eye symptoms, and other skin disorders in exposed groups. Sanborn et al. (2007) found evidence of glyphosate exposure on neural disorders, abnormal reflexes, psychomotor dysfunction, mood changes, lowered cognitive function, and depression and anxiety. They also found a connection between exposure and later neurodegenerative diseases such as Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s. Sanborn et al. (2007) found positive associations between pesticide exposure and chromosome aberrations, which could present itself as miscarriage, birth defects, sperm abnormalities, or higher cancer probability. Most studies on non-Hodgkin lymphoma and leukemia showed positive associations with pesticide exposure, with glyphosate being a compound that has elevated risk (Sanborn et al. 2007).

Sherret (2005) reports anecdotal evidence of respiratory problems after aerial spraying which led to glyphosate inhalation, which is corroborated by experimental evidence on animals (Cox 1995). Cox asserts that glyphosate products are acutely toxic to animals, with Roundup

being even more toxic than glyphosate by itself due to the inclusion of the surfactant POEA (1995). Cox found that consuming glyphosate in animals caused various kinds of cell death, fetal loss, reproductive defects, and tumors over a long period of time (1995). The impact of glyphosate on animals should not be overlooked, considering the potential harms to household income that comes with sick or dead livestock. Espinosa (2009) provided anecdotal evidence of dead chickens, sick cows, contaminated water and ruined crops after aerial spraying. Rivera (2005) and Osorio (2003) found that eradication led to a loss of assets without reducing the coca crop cultivation; due to these conditions, farmers were even more incentivized to replant coca. Laboratory studies have researched the effects of glyphosate on human reproductive cells: Benachour and Seralini (2009) find that exposure at low doses (similar to residues in food) causes premature death in umbilical, embryonic, and placental cells. Cox (1995) found that there is decreased female fertility and lower birth weight in animals after ingestion of glyphosate-exposed products. Papers by Sanborn et al. (2007) and Regidor et al. (2004) indicate that exposure prior to conception is correlated with first-trimester miscarriages; direct exposure of large amounts to the father is also linked to higher risk of fetal death, with a larger effect in the three-month-period prior to conception. Sanborn et al. (2007) also report an association between herbicide spraying and lower levels of sperm concentration. Anencephaly, a birth defect in which a baby is born without parts of the brain and skull, has also been associated with direct exposure of the mother during the preconception period (three months prior and into the third month of pregnancy). However, many studies have come to the opposite conclusion. Solomon et al. (2007) indicate that the concentration of glyphosate used in aerial spraying in Colombia are low and don’t have significant risks to human health; contamination with water is infrequent, and contact with organisms other than plants is unlikely. Solomon et al. (2007) admits that glyphosate and Cosmo-Flux will be present in larger quantities on surface water that is sprayed, but claim that there is no information regarding surface water proximity to regions that are treated. Solomon et al. (2007) concludes that physical injury due to other reasons during coca eradication is much more adverse than glyphosate exposure, and that environmental risks are negligible. They do concede that overspraying poses moderate risks in aquatic organisms and that there is no data available regarding these occurrences (Solomon et al. 2007). Various studies that have tested glyphosate and Cosmo-Flux on amphibians also claim to have negligible toxic effects (Bernal, Solomon, and Carrasquilla 2009). Williams et al. (2012) also cite cross-sectional and laboratory studies suggesting that exposure is not related to reproduction, miscarriages or birth defects, finding no adverse effects in rats. Williams et al. (2000) state that glyphosate and Roundup is neither genotoxic or mutagenic when reacting with DNA. Mink et al. (2011) argues that there is no consistent pattern between exposure and any disease; most reported associations are “weak and not significantly different from 1.0”. The US EPA itself concluded that there is no harm towards infants, children, or adults from exposure to glyphosate residues (US EPA 2007). The World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) did not observe any evidence of neurotoxicity (WHO/FAO 2004). Mink et. al (2011) states that Mink has been a paid consultant with Monsanto and that their research was financially supported by Monsanto. Bernal, Solomon, and Carrasquilla (2009), Mink et al. (2011), and Williams et. al (2000) were all published in Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, a peer-reviewed journal associated with the National Institutes of Health. Critics claim that this journal is industry-backed and used to stall regulatory efforts (Zou 2016). The Center for Public Integrity found that articles

published in the journal are often written by scientists from consulting firms and that board members include private consultants (2016). This journal has been involved in numerous exposes regarding its ties to the tobacco industry as well. The US is also the largest contributor to the funding of WHO and the UN. This is not to discredit the scientific validity of these reports, but rather to shed transparency on potential conflicts of interest.

There are many negative spillovers of the aerial spraying program that have not been mentioned in this paper or have not been explored in-depth here. These include the breakdown of indigenous sovereignty and land laws, education and human capital, increased distrust in institutions, rise in carceral law enforcement, democratic erosion, and more. Prominent abolitionist organization Alliance for Global Justice (2018) notes the spread of the US prison model into South American nations under the War on Drugs era. The War on Drugs is also linked to militarized police arms and capacity, border militarization, introduction of longer sentencing and solitary confinement, increased poverty, neoliberal policies, and the establishment of more military bases. The exportation of this carceral structure is coined “prison imperialism” (“What Is Prison Imperialism” 2018). Plan Colombia has formalized a structure of enhanced militarization, surveillance, and an institutional relationship with the US in which these anti-narcotics models can be used abroad. This paper also highlights the limitations of scientific and economic research in the pursuit of wellbeing. Decades of damage and irreversible harm has been done to various individuals, households, and communities under Plan Colombia. One can only hope that in the future, institutions will follow the guidance of anti-drug economic policy research.

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