The India-China Border Conflict, its Implications for the US, and Policy Recommendations for Washington

by Li Yin

A 2015 Council on Foreign Relations Contingency Planning Memorandum for Washington underscored the potential menaces of armed confrontations between China and India to U.S. security interests (Markey 2015). In the wake of heightened tensions between China and India due to deadly conflicts on their contested border in the region of Ladakh in both 2020 and early 2021, that risk remains and needs to be addressed (Dossani 2021). Conflict between China and India, who are both populous nuclear nations, threatens to disrupt the global economy, undermine regional development, and have considerable humanitarian consequences depending on its ultimate scale, which are all unfavorable results for Washington. Further, if India is weakened militarily and economically in the process, its value as a counterweight to China and the broader U.S. goal of countering China’s regional influence would also be undermined (Markey 2021). As China continues to challenge U.S. hegemony and the established rule-based order on the global stage, it is clear that the importance of closer US-India ties have only risen. This document advises that Washington should calibrate a balanced strategic partnership with India that effectively supports its democratic ally in the face of Chinese animosity, lessens the risks of renewed border tensions that unevenly benefit China, and protects U.S. interests (Markey). To help policymakers thoroughly comprehend the India-China border dispute and make informed decisions, the following memorandum compiles known facts about recent armed actions in the contested region, details the motives behind both nations’ actions, and outlines current de-escalation measures from both nations. The document also provides specific recommendations that urge the Biden administration to help improve India’s surveillance and cyber resilience in preparation for Chinese attacks, enhance the Indian economy to withstand possible Chinese economic coercion, and seek trilateral, diplomatic dialogue between the three nations about the peaceful resolution of future disputes.

2020 marked a tumultuous year that featured the deadliest China-India border clashes in over four decades (Dossani 2021). On June 15th, 2020, Chinese and Indian troops engaged in a brawl in the disputed area known as the Galwan River Valley in the northern Ladakh region of India (see Fig. 1). This confrontation left twenty Indian soldiers dead while causing an unspecified number of Chinese casualties. After the incident, China is suspected to have gained dominance of at least twenty square miles of Indian-controlled territory (Gokhale 2021). The immediate provocation for this confrontation was India's construction of a new road to a high-altitude air base on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 2019. The LAC is an ill-defined, 2100 mile long border north of India where the two nations are competing to build infrastructure. After the establishment of India’s new feeder road there, China had complained in May 2020 that it raised the likelihood of a quick forward deployment of troops against China. India ignored the complaint suggesting that it had the right to build infrastructure in all territories under its control, even if disputed (Dossani 2021). In response, a month later, China sent troops to the disputed area and approached Indian armed forces with violence. In the summer of 2020, each side deployed approximately 50,000 troops along the LAC. According to

BBC reports, the most recent India-China skirmish near the region occurred on January 20th, 2021. It took place along the border in India's Sikkim state, which is sandwiched between Bhutan and Nepal, and it led to injuries on both sides (BBC News 2021). Fortunately in February 2021, there was renewed hope for a peaceful solution to the most recent armed conflicts. The two sides agreed to a simultaneous military disengagement from one part of their contested border in the region of Ladakh. New Delhi and Beijing also agreed to withdraw to their permanent bases and cease patrolling up to the other side’s view of the LAC (Kim and Singh 2020). Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) expert Daniel Markey (2021) observes that this created a buffer zone about four miles long, and should reduce the immediate risks for an armed confrontation. Sadly, tensions between India and China are likely to remain high in the long run and warning indicators for conflict will continue to blink red (Panda 2021). After all, as Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar noted, 2020 left the China-India relationship “profoundly disturbed,” and both sides, at least covertly, remain fully committed to military strategies that may bring heavily armed forces into closer and deadlier contact once more (Markey 2021).

Figure 1. Map of the contested region between India and China.

In China’s strategic calculation, India’s position is definitely that of a growing global power. Initially, given that China is engaged in a deep struggle for strategic parity with America, it was hoping for stable relations with India, based on the Modi-Xi understandings of 2018. Yet China sees its land and maritime borders—including the LAC—as great vulnerabilities and considerably values its territorial integrity (Dossani 2021). Thus, from China’s perspective, India disrespected and damaged their relationship first through the unilateral declaration of the disputed territory of Ladakh as a union territory of India in August 2019 and its subsequent road-building activities. These actions provide India greater authority and undermine Beijing's influence across the border regions, much to China’s dismay (Panda 2021).

Now that India-China’s relations are strained, the South Asian country’s stature as a rising power threatens rather than advances China’s regional and global ambitions (Panda). It therefore makes sense that, according to Tanvi Madan from the Brookings Institution, China’s forcefulness against India’s borders stems from Beijing’s desire to warn against India further asserting itself and deepening its relations with the U.S. as well as to take advantage of India as it is “on the backfoot or distracted due to the coronavirus” (Madan 2020).

For India, China’s rapid growth in recent decades and its superior military capacities make for an inherently unequal relationship between the two nations from the start. In the past, China has been willing to accommodate India on an equal basis in some cases, such as joint exploration for oil in Sudan, and the establishment of the New Development Bank. But there are numerous other instances that exhibit China’s unwillingness to accommodate India, such as permanent membership of the Security Council and the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In these cases, India can seldom grasp much leverage to pressure the Xi administration to act in ways that boost Indian interests (Dossani 2021). Hence, New Delhi gradually grew tired of its disproportionate and disadvantageous relationship with Beijing. Moreover, the Belt and Road Initiative, an immense Chinese strategic initiative to develop the infrastructure of partner countries, has driven a deep wedge between India and China (Dossani 2021). The BRI’s presence is most pronounced in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and the Maldives. India is alarmed at such Chinese activities in its traditional zone of influence, some of which, such as roads in Pakistan-controlled territory that it claims and ports in Sri Lanka, may be used to support China’s military defense needs. As a result, the Modi administration is seeking to reassert its strength and authority in the region by facing China head on in the border conflict. With animosities between two nations brewing over the past few years, and both Xi and Modi confronting more reasons for opposition than collaboration, it is understandable that insistent tension and even violence sparked before composed negotiations (Singh 2021).

In 2020 and into 2021, both China and India extended their land border confrontation into other areas of their bilateral relationship as non-military signals to discourage military escalation (Markey 2021). Chinese signaling included engineering a brief but debilitating October 2020 electrical blackout in Mumbai through a cyberattack by Chinese hackers. New Delhi is reportedly considering further measures to curb and scrutinize imports, including to prevent Chinese goods from being routed through third countries (Madan 2020). The Sino-Indian technology sector ties have also been affected. The amendments to Indian investment rules will adversely affect Chinese technology companies interested or operating in India. In addition, India has banned a number of Chinese apps on the grounds that they are “prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of state and public order” (“Government Bans 59 Mobile Apps” 2020). These include TikTok, almost a third of whose total downloads surprisingly come from India, as well as AliPay. Unfortunately, these Indian attempts to coerce China non-militarily are proven to be more detrimental than effective. India’s economic and technological punishments against China intensified Indian concerns about its economic overdependence on China (Madan 2020). Though Prime Minister Modi made grand claims about his future plans of economic

atmanirbharta (self-reliance), there have been questions about India’s actual ability to reduce dependence on China, and the enormous costs that will entail—particularly as India deals with economic fallout from the pandemic (Panda 2021). There are also worries about supply disruptions, especially since Modi has been emphasizing the importance of India replacing China’s role in global value chains. Certainly, although India and China intended these nonmilitary gestures to de-escalate armed confrontations along their border, those signals ultimately indicated how future crises could spill over into other areas and exacerbate rather than calm a crisis (Markey 2021). This failure on both sides to thoroughly manage the 2020 border dispute through non-violent methods shatters a useful precedent. Indeed, China-India relations have entered a new, more precarious, and unpredictable era (Feng 2021).

Ashley Tellis, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that by its brazen actions, Beijing has forced New Delhi to join the rest of Asia in figuring out how to deal with the newest turn in China's “salami-slicing tactics,” a broad pattern of aggressive Chinese actions in the past few months around the Pacific Rim region that threatens American allies (Press Trust of India 2020). These actions include moving forward with the National Security Law in Hong Kong, targeting imports of barley, beef and wine from Australia, sending “suspicious aircrafts heading to Japan’s airspace,” and ramming Vietnamese shing boats in the South China Sea (Madan 2020). Should China be able to maintain the upper hand in the current Sino-India border crisis without consequences, it would mean that China can continue to successfully subvert the rule-based status quo in the region, which would go against American interests and the benefits of U.S. allies. Hence, as urged by Vijay Gokhale (2021), a senior fellow at Carnegie India and previous foreign secretary of India, it is imperative for the United States to join hands with a like-minded democratic India and retaliate against the Xi administration’s hostile efforts. However, the Biden administration also needs to keep in mind the perils of a tighter relationship with New Delhi. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Indian military escalations with China have demonstrated an unusually high streak of nationalistic ambition and risk-acceptance (Markey 2021). Feeding already-aggressive Indian tendencies would only increase the likelihood that China would respond by accelerating its deployment of increased forces along the land border. Together, these behaviors would raise the stakes of China-India land border conflict, and would lead the United States to more easily be drawn into a Sino-Indian armed confrontation (Madan 2020). While aiming to reduce India’s vulnerability to Chinese coercion and assault, U.S. support should avoid emboldening India militarily to extend its strategic aims and act during any future crisis in ways that threaten U.S. interests, thereby lessening the likelihood that the United States would be placed in the uncomfortable position of either living up to its commitments and being drawn into a direct confrontation with China or backing off commitments and damaging US-India relations (Markey 2021). Overall, the U.S. should work with India primarily to balance and deter China, and ensure a rules-based and multipolar order prevails in the region (Singh 2021). To do so, this memorandum specifically advises that:

● The United States should, as recommended by Markey, prioritize assistance that improves India’s ability to anticipate and parry Chinese military moves, without promoting major Indian investments in offensive capabilities that may lead to violent conflicts (2021). It is

advantageous for India to gain a greater capacity to gather and assess intelligence on Chinese forces along an extremely long and treacherous border. By sharing new or modified U.S. unmanned surveillance and sensor technologies with New Delhi, Washington can cost-effectively help Indian forces garner early warnings of Chinese territorial encroachments. U.S. and Indian army engineers should also co-develop new ground sensors designed specifically for use in the difficult terrain along the China-India border. In addition,

Washington should fast-track and facilitate the expansion of US-compatible, secure communications terminals in India that can improve the timely provision of classified and sensitive information collected from U.S. platforms. ● The Biden administration should work with India and other regional allies to identify and develop a coordinated multi-party response strategy for the purpose of enhancing India’s ability to deter and withstand possible Chinese economic coercion tactics. Brookings expert

Tanvi Madan (2022) recommends that Washington needs to primarily seek support from its

Quad partners, such as Australia and Japan, who experience comparable hostilities from

Beijing and are similarly reliant on China in terms of trade. Together, these nations should identify short-term arrangements for alternative sourcing of critical industrial inputs in case

China disrupts supply chains, and gradually shift their economic dependency on China to each other. Meanwhile, as Delhi displays desire to reduce its economic dependence on China, the United States can encourage its own companies to enter budding Indian markets. ● It is appropriate for the United States to seek diplomatic opportunities that remove obstacles to the peaceful resolution of disputes between China and India. It is unlikely that there will be scope for India and China to resume their “Developmental Partnership,” which was introduced during President Xi’s state visit to India in September 2014 (Ministry of External

Affairs, Government of India 2014). Still, as recommended by Dr. Jagannath Panda from the

East Asia at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi,

Washington should forthrightly express to Beijing its concerns about the dangers associated with China-India crisis escalation and explain that its support to New Delhi will be defensive and not assaultive in nature (Panda 2021). Through official diplomacy and tracking conversations between Chinese and U.S. experts on South Asia, the United States should also

“seek a better understanding of specific Chinese aims and insecurities in South Asia as a means to better anticipate likely Chinese responses to Indian policies and developments in

India-Pakistan relations” (Markey 2021). ● Washington should meanwhile prepare its own policymakers for the possibility of a new

China-India armed crisis as early as this upcoming summer, as predicted by Markey. Senior officials in the Biden administration should acclimate their teams to the new normal in

China-India tensions through intelligence briefings and a simulation exercise to comprehensively emphasize the web of potential escalation paths that “link China-India border conflict to India-Pakistan tensions, maritime disputes, economic and diplomatic reprisals, and even cyberwar” (Markey 2021).

The United States has been the guarantor of regional order in Asia since the Japanese surrender in 1945. China always considered the United States as an ideological enemy, but U.S. technology and capital were needed for China’s modernization, and therefore Beijing adjusted to U.S. hegemony until it gained its own strengths. On the other hand, India and America may not always have common positions, but their differences were never ideological, and India considers

the United States a critical partner in its own ongoing modernization. As China now prepares to completely challenge U.S. dominance worldwide and Sino-American relations are strained, tensions between New Delhi and Beijing are also escalating after the 2017 Dokham standoff between India and China in Bhutan. The death of twenty Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese soldiers in a 2020 violent face-off along the LAC, especially, marks an irreversible inflection point in the seventy-year relationship between Asia’s largest modern states (Kim and Singh, 2020). At present, it is foreseeable that China-India relations will stay at a comparatively low level (Feng 2021). During a time of heightened hostilities, U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific is hugely capable of shaping the course of future India-China relations and the power dynamics in the region (Singh 2021). A robust U.S. response and backing of India could help deter the threats that China’s actions along the Indian border pose to the rules-based order in the Pacific Rim; it will also make Washington a more attractive partner, increasing like-minded countries’ willingness to work with the U.S. and to share burdens in situations to come (Gokhale 2021). Thus, it is in the Biden administration’s best interest to provide military surveillance assistance to Indian border troops, help India withstand potential Chinese economic coercion, seek diplomatic opportunities for peaceful Beijing/New Delhi negotiations, and prepare its own foreign policy officials for the possibility of a new China-India crisis in the near future.

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