Fall 2021 Wellesley College Law Journal by Wellesley College Pre-Law Society

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CONTENTS LETTERS TO THE COMMUNITY Letter from the Presidents 4 Letter from the Editors 5

CIVIL RIGHTS Growth Suspended: Racially Biased Exclusionary Discipline in Illinois Public Schools and Nationwide

MICHAELA ABRAMS ’23

Why Police Reform Failed to Pass

ADELINE VAN BUSKIRK ’24

Prison Gerrymandering and How States are Attempting to Eliminate It

TERAN CHAPIS ’22

Pro-Attitudinal and Counter-Attitudinal Political Information on Social Media and its Effect on Political Polarization

SARAH GOLDMAN ’25

Is It Possible to Speak Truth in the Political Realm?

LAILA MOUSSA ’25

The Future of Abortion: Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Dobbs EMILY WILLIAMS ’22

IMMIGRATION The Illegality of the Migrant Protection Protocols and the Argument to Eliminate Them

ROSEMARIE GOLDSTEIN ’24

Petty Punishment: How U.S. Immigration Laws Criminalize Misdemeanors with Detention Camps

EMMA LEE ’24

Paving A Path to Citizenship: Undocumented Immigration Policy Reform in Request

CINDY PENG ’24

Some Options Are Better: Releasing Unaccompanied Minor at the Border

EMMA WINE ’24

FOREIGN POLICY Growth and Globalization: Trade, Environment, and Development in Paraguay

MARIELA DURAN ’23

From Swords to Fake News: Evaluating Contemporary Warfare Through an Islamic Lens

NUZAINA KHAN ’23

Montreal Protocol

ROXIE MILES ’23

The Coca Leaf and the MAS: Creating a New Path Forward for Bolivia’s Indigenous People ITZELT REYES ’23

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENTS December 23, 2021 Dear Wellesley Community, We are so excited to be able to publish the Fall 2021 edition of the Wellesley College Law Journal. The last journal we published was in Fall 2020, so we are overjoyed to be back and better than ever. We received excellent submissions to the Law Journal this semester and are proud of our contributors for their hard work and wise words. The future of law and policy is in good hands. An extra special thank you goes out to our wonderful Law Journal editors, Emily and Nerine, for working so diligently to publish the edition this year. It has been a challenging time, to say the least, but you two stepped up during the finals season to make the journal what it is. We are so proud. As we wrap up our first semester as co-presidents, we feel so lucky to lead the Pre-Law Society. Returning to pre-pandemic events and normally-scheduled programming has been wonderful, even if we can only see the top half of our members’ faces. To our general members, thank you for your passion and enthusiasm. To each of our Executive Board members, none of what we do could be accomplished without every single one of you. We are greatly looking forward to the coming semester. Looking ahead to the spring semester, the Pre-Law Society will enjoy a full semester of our wellloved events, including (but never limited to) resume workshops, movie night, craft night, Tea with a Lawyer, and many others. It is our honor to continue the historic events that are the hallmarks of our Society. Keep an eye out for our upcoming election season and Executive Board turnover, as well as the deadline to submit to the spring issue of the Law Journal. Remember that any piece of writing under 20 pages is eligible for submission, so long as it discusses topics related to law and/or policy. We love to see your submissions! As always, we are here to support you in your Pre-Law journey and are happy to answer any questions (or to direct you to someone who has a better answer). We are so proud of our community here at Wellesley, and we cannot wait to connect in the spring! Happy Reading, Hayley Moniz ’22 and Grace Woo ’23 2021-22 Wellesley Pre-Law Society Co-Presidents

LETTER FROM THE EDITORS December 23, 2021 Welcome to Volume 10 of the Wellesley College Pre-Law Society Law Journal! Published twice a year, the Wellesley College Law Journal is a premier location for students to publish their thoughts on politics and policy, civil and human rights, and general law. The Journal is a student publication by the Wellesley Pre-Law Society, featuring articles selected and edited by the Law Journal Editors. Facing Challenges • Creating Changes marks the first issue since our return as a campus to inperson learning. Navigating a second year of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, students have continued to adapt to ever-evolving circumstances without ceasing to confront prominent issues in the world. Challenges are far from over, and these pieces reflect a need, a hope, and a readiness for change. From policies to perspectives, we hope that the ideas and narratives featured in this issue inspire efforts to shape the future for the better. We are thrilled to present the Wellesley College community with the Fall 2021 edition of the Journal. We hope that these 14 articles inspire you to reflect on and engage with the world. Happy Reading! Emily Williams ’22 and Nerine Uyanik ’24 2021-22 Law Journal Co-Editors

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GROWTH SUSPENDED: RACIALLY BIASED EXCLUSIONARY DISCIPLINE IN ILLINOIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND NATIONWIDE BY MICHAELA H. ABRAMS

Chicago’s Segregation and Background on Exclusionary Discipline Chicago and its surrounding suburbs are one of the most segregated areas in America, and its schools reflect this: not only in their racial makeup but in the racial disparities in their disciplinary practices. Racial disparities in exclusionary discipline is not unique to Chicago: Nationwide, Black students are almost 4 times more likely to be suspended or expelled. According to the United States Department of Education (DOE), 6% of all K-12 students received one or more out-of-school suspensions, the percentage is 18% for black boys; 10% for black girls; 5% for white boys; and 2% for white girls. The trend is clear: Black students, boys especially, receive harsher discipline and are isolated from their peers at much higher rates than their White peers, even at the youngest ages. The DOE also reported that in 2014, Black boys were 19% of male preschool enrollment, but represented 45% of preschool suspensions. What is the effect of this pattern of exclusionary discipline on young people of color? The creation of a policing culture in schools feeds the “school-to-prison pipeline”: the cycle in which Black students in particular are suspended or expelled at high rates, then dropping out of school at higher rates, and being incarcerated at higher rates later in life. Chicago is an excellent location in which to study this subject, as rates of exclusionary discipline in Chicago are reflective of the nationwide racial disparities in school discipline: they are harshest in majority-Black schools. This paper will examine patterns of exclusionary discipline (suspension and expulsion) on nonwhite students in three Chicagoland public schools: The Noble Academy public charter school, North Chicago Community High School, and Lake Forest High School, discuss the effect on students of exclusionary discipline on students’ achievement, and discuss possible solutions. Introduction to three Chicagoland1 public high schools The Noble Academy The Noble Academy is one of 14 Chicago schools in the Noble Charter Network, and is known for its strict, often police-like teaching methods. Almost 94% of Noble Academy’s 439 students identify as Black or Hispanic, while less than 2% identify as white. However, over half of the Noble Network’s faculty (51.6) identify as white. In 2014, Noreen Ahmed-Ullah of the Chicago Tribune reported that “students are issued demerits for misdeeds like not sitting up straight ... They receive demerits for being as little as a minute or less late to school, having a permanent marker in their possession, or ‘rowdy or loud behavior.’” The Noble Academy is a perfect example of how students of color are so often over-policed in K-12 schools, especially by white teachers. In a city as segregated as Chicago, the demographics of this school are just as 1 “Chicagoland” in this text refers to the city of Chicago and the surrounding suburbs within an hour of the city

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shocking as the residential demographics of the city. The school, however, has been praised by many Chicago authorities for its lower-than-average dropout rate and higher-than-average test scores and attendance. North Chicago Community High School North Chicago Community High School (NCCHS) is, despite what the name suggests, not in the city but about an hour north, in the Chicago suburbs. The median income for a family in the suburb is approximately $38,000 and 18% of children live below the poverty line. In the school, a staggering 99% of students are classified as economically disadvantaged. The racial demographics of this school are similar to the Noble Academy, with the vast majority of students identifying as Black or Hispanic, but it receives far less praise for its performance. The striking aspect of NCCHS is its surroundings. The school shares a geographical area with both the Great Lakes Naval Base and the North Chicago City Jail. Two of the most damaging aspects of the schooling of students of color is the school-to-prison pipeline and the over-recruitment of Black students for the military. If a school’s surroundings are at all indicative of the goals of a student’s education, NCCHS’s location seems to prepare students for either imprisonment or the military. Lake Forest High School Only ten minutes south of NCCHS in the suburb of Lake Forest, lies Lake Forest High School (LFHS). Converse to North Chicago, the suburb of Lake Forest is 87% White, and 41% of the town’s inhabitants have earned at least a graduate-level degree in school. The average salary for a man in Lake Forest is $149,000. At LFHS, only 2% of students are economically disadvantaged. The high school shares its town with a 4-year college. These three schools were chosen for their range of demographics, achievements, and disciplinary approaches. While LFHS and NCCHS are both large, traditional public high schools, there are stark differences between the two in terms of funding, racial demographics, and graduation rates. The Noble Academy is also a predominantly non-White public high school, but prides itself on its zero-tolerance policy in policing students’ behavior. Exclusionary Discipline as a Racialized Practice Nationwide, suspension and expulsion of students of color, particularly Black students, is much higher than their white peers. This is not the case because Black students break their schools’ rules more often than White students, the disproportionate disciplinary statistics are most notable in subjective infractions. The Harvard Civil Rights Project documented the racial imbalance in the rates of exclusionary discipline in 2000, and reported that “while black and white children were charged in equal proportions for weapon violations and white students had much higher drug charges, the discipline of black students soared in the most subjective categories, where the school official's determination that an infraction occurred may be tainted with bias or stereotypes.” The study concludes that suspensions and expulsions are handed out to Black students most often for offenses such as “loitering, disturbing peace, interfering or

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disturbing in any way with education” for which the interpretation is left to the teacher’s discretion. They are charged less often with offenses that have a clear definition, such as possession of drugs, weapons, or cellphones in class. Furthermore, the transgressions for which Black students are charged at disproportionate rates tend to have the most serious consequences, with “of the children charged with ‘Disturbing Schools,’ 70% were referred to a law enforcement agency” (Harvard). Statistics like these are important to consider when thinking about the schoolto-prison pipeline: the cycle through which Black students are suspended and expelled at higher rates, therefore have lower graduation rates, and higher chances than their White peers of being imprisoned later in life. The exclusionary discipline data for the three schools described above indicates a wide disparity between the suspension and expulsion practices in majority White, versus majority nonWhite high schools in Chicago. At Lake Forest High School in 2014, 18 students of the approximately 1,600 enrolled received one out-of-school suspension. In North Chicago Community High School that same year, 49 students of the approximately 740 enrolled received the same, single suspension. According to this data, approximately 1 percent of LFHS students were suspended once during the 2014-2015 school year, compared to about 6 percent of NCCHS students. It is worth noting that the overall rates of disciplinary action taken in 2014 were likely even higher, as the above data does not include expulsions, students with repeated suspensions, or students penalized for truancy. Some data regarding exclusionary discipline in Illinois Public Schools is absent from the Illinois School Board of Education online database, including data from the Noble Academy but the above data provides adequate insight into the racial disparity in disciplinary action in Chicago Schools. Restorative vs. Punitive Disciplinary action While LFHS and NCCHS employ suspensions and detentions, the discipline strategy at Noble Academy is much more punitive. Noble Academy fines students for infractions, a measure that, according to the school’s administration is effective, but for low-income families is not feasible: Marie Garay, a parent at a Noble Network school stated in an interview with the Chicago Tribune that ‘they were paying about $200 a year for detentions’. Fearful of more fines, her son skipped school, which caused him to fail his classes. “Parents like myself can't afford to pay these fines,” said Garay, after removing her children from the school. There are major financial reasons for high suspension and expulsion rates in Chicago, a city so segregated that race is often indicative of socioeconomic status. Majority non-White schools exist in majority non-White neighborhoods which generally have lower property taxes and therefore less funding per student in the public-school system. Take LFHS and NCCHS, which have operating expenses per student of $26,593 and $15,869, respectively (IL Report Card). Suspensions and expulsions are the cheapest discipline: they often require no behavioral specialists or counselors or any extra support on behalf of the school, unlike restorative measures. Programs that work to repair trust between students and educators, and peacefully work through conflict without the use of exclusionary discipline are called restorative justice programs (Carter). There are key differences between restorative and punitive intervention when a student

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exhibits rowdy behavior: punitive intervention may include a student being ordered to leave a classroom and suspended or sent to detention by a school administrator. In extreme cases, police officers may be called into the school. Restorative justice looks quite different: According to one researcher, a school that successfully implemented restorative justice techniques “used Title I discretionary funds to hire a full-time interventionist. This person deals with attendance and behavior and develops individualized plans in conjunction with students, families, and teachers. He or she also tutors after school and during summer school. When a disciplinary problem does arise, a supervised study hall at 7:30am (before classes) is assigned” (Harvard, 2000). Restorative justice programming is effective, safe, and presents no long-term consequences to a student’s academic success, but it is not feasible in all schools. It requires individual attention from an educator, which can only be provided if the educator has a small class of students and adequate time to step away from the rest of their class. Because of this, restorative justice techniques are more likely to be implemented in particularly well-funded public schools and private schools. Since majority-Black schools in neighborhoods with lower estate tax like NCCHS receive much lower funding than majority-White schools in wealthy neighborhoods, they often lack the resources to implement restorative discipline and instead resort to suspending students from school as their first course-of-action. Effects of punitive discipline on students and the school-to-prison pipeline The negative effects of exclusionary discipline on children is profound and becoming harsher with time. In Susan Black’s piece “Locked Out: Why Suspension and Expulsion Should Be Your Court of Last Resort” she describes the increasing number of not just expulsions, but arrests, usually of Black children, sometimes as young as kindergarten-aged: “What was once considered a schoolyard scuffle can now land a student in juvenile court or, even worse, in prison. In some instances, this occurs regardless of age, intent, circumstances, severity of the act, or harm caused. In many instances, school districts are simply transferring their disciplinary authority to law enforcement officials.” She continues to describe a particularly disturbing case in which an 11-year-old girl in Columbia, South Carolina was arrested for bringing a knife to school in her lunchbox to cut her chicken. The conclusion drawn by Black’s research as well as many others’ is clear: the increasingly popular method of “zero-tolerance” discipline by schools in Chicago and across the nation does not keep students out of jail when they grow up, instead it results in high dropout and incarceration rates for students of color. In short, the process is a school-to-prison pipeline without any time between school and prison, a system in which children can be dropped off at school one morning and be arrested and driven to the police station before the afternoon. Conclusions and psychological effects of exclusionary discipline A researcher can use the data collected in reference to the three aforementioned high schools to assume that there is a racial disparity in rates of suspension in Chicagoland high schools, but it is necessary, too, to understand the causes and psychological effects of exclusionary discipline on students. The causes of this racial disparity are systemic, and while opponents of a reconfiguring of school discipline practices may point to Black students’ higher

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rates of absenteeism to detract from the poignancy of the racial disparities in discipline, that too is rooted in deep-seeded inequity. Research from the journal Preventive Medicine found that children who experience food insecurity at home are up to eleven times more likely to have unexcused absences from school than their food-secure peers (Jackson & Testa). Herbert Kohl, in his piece “I Won’t Learn from You” describes the tactics that poorly-treated students use to actively avoid learning from their teachers. The decisions that the children in his piece make to refuse to learn a new language, or actively unlearn skills like reading and writing, are the result of students believing that their school doesn’t care for their well-being, and from the internalization of stereotypes that they are unintelligent or unable to understand their lessons in school. While exclusionary discipline has very concrete consequences, including high dropout and incarceration rates, the psychological effects of school suspensions on Black students run just as deep. The Noble Academy’s pride in its police-like methods of fining, suspending and expelling students at incredibly high rates indicates their focus on pushing their predominately-Black student body away from individualism and into uniformity. While NCCHS and LFHS are classic examples of the racial divide in school discipline, The Noble Academy represents a concerning trend of police-like behavior from school administrators in a city already so fractured by police brutality. Finally, a school’s disciplinary records are a reliable measure of what the school’s administration and educators see as the purpose of schooling: A school that employs the same measures as The Noble Academy prepares students to navigate the judicial system and follow strict rules and guidelines for their behavior. However, the schools discussed in Carter’s work researching restorative justice prepare students for healthy conflict-resolution, creative thinking, and trust-building between students and those in power.

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References Jackson, D. B., & Testa, A. (2020). Household food insecurity and preschool suspension/expulsion in the United States. Preventive Medicine, 106283. American Psychological Association Zero Tolerance Task Force (2008). Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in Schools? American Psychologist, Vol. 63, No. 9, 852–862. Loeson, D (2013). Disturbing Inequities: Exploring the Relationship Between Racial Disparities in Special Education Identification and Discipline. UCLA Center for Civil Rights Remedies. Stevens, W. David (2015). Discipline Practices in Chicago Schools: Trends in the Use of Suspensions and Arrests. The University of Chicago Consortium on Chicago School Research. Opportunities Suspended: The Devastating Consequences of Zero Tolerance and School Discipline (2000). The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University. Carter, P. et. al. (2017). You Can’t Fix What You Don’t Look At: Acknowledging Race in Addressing Racial Discipline Disparities. Urban Education, Vol. 52(2) 207–235 Shalaby, C. Troublemakers: Lessons in Freedom from Young Children at School (2017). The New Press. Kohl, H. “I Won’t Learn from You” and Other Thoughts on Creative Maladjustment (1991). The New Press.

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WHY POLICE REFORM FAILED TO PASS BY ADELINE VAN BUSKIRK In September of 2021, a Washington Post (WP) article recounted the recent collapse of a police reform bill in Congress (Sonmez, 2021). Despite widespread public support for reform in Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests over the summer, the parties were unable to compromise. In this essay, I will use political science research to explain this outcome. Specifically, I will explain why Democrats and Republicans find compromise difficult, why protests did not bring the expected results, and why reversing established policy is challenging. The WP article recounts that Democrats and Republicans found it “impossible to agree,” even on “minor provisions” of the bill (Sonmez). Mason observes this partisan unwillingness to compromise and explains that between 1972 and 2000, parties have become more divided along social and racial lines (p. 39). Partisanship has become an identity, which causes partisans to focus on victory over the opponent more than the good of the nation (p. 6). Because the police reform bill is so closely tied to the racial divide, it actuates partisan social identities, making compromise unlikely. Further, the racial nature of the bill encourages Republican leaders to demonstrate allegiance to their White constituents. Valentino observed that racialized rhetoric, whether explicit or implicit, was effective in garnering support among Republican voters (p. 766). So politicians like Senator Tim Scott, the lead Republican negotiator, have something to gain electorally from publicly expressing disagreement with the bill. Scott, who is Black, can also benefit from ‘Racial Distancing,’ or using racial rhetoric to separate oneself from their racial group (Stephens-Dougan, p. 26). This tactic reveals to White voters that Black politicians are not beholden to their race. Thus, Scott may have been thinking about the ‘White vote’ when he negotiated the bill to its demise. However, the collapse of the bill cannot be explained by partisan differences in the electorate alone, especially considering the bipartisan support for police reform. Even a year after George Floyd’s murder, most Americans supported reform, and half of Republicans supported the Chauvin verdict (Montanaro, 2021). But electoral support, especially in the form of protest, only brings legislative change under specific circumstances and in specific ways. The WP article recounts the magnitude and passion of the BLM protests but concedes that the movement “lost momentum” over time. Gillion explains that several characteristics of protest are necessary to capture the attention of politicians (2013, p. 24). That protests persist over time is important because “a constant appeal to government indicates citizens are dedicated to political change” (Gillion, p. 25). Although some of the police reform protests were short-lived, others had all of the necessary elements to make an impression upon politicians. Gillion observes that these protests can make a difference in congressional decision-making, but only on an individual level (p. 71). Representatives only respond to constituent behavior within their own districts, so, according to Gillion’s research, the districts where ongoing BLM protests occurred likely saw the largest increase in support from

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their representatives. In districts with scarcer or shorter protest activity, representatives are less inclined to alter their issue positions, regardless of national activity. This rigidity results in path dependency. Path dependency is the phenomenon that “initial choices… lock institutions into paths of development,” so that established policy is hard to change (p. 542). While Jones-Correa critiques the concept, stating that policy is not “quite so automatic,” there are design elements of the federal government that make progress very difficult. The WP article mentions that the Democrats see the Senate filibuster as a barrier to passing legislation “on a simple majority vote” (Sonmez). The elaborate rules and exchange between chambers of Congress, when combined with the staunch individualism encouraged by the congressional election system, pose obstacles to solving collective dilemmas. So, once a policy such as qualified immunity or ‘no-knock’ warrants is established, it is unlikely that they get overturned. The WP article concludes by affirming that these issues will “return to the public eye” (Sonmez). I agree, but rather than reappearing on the federal level, I predict that local and state governments will push police reform legislation further. Historically, local governments have had success passing legislation among Federal inaction, because localities have more like-minded representatives. For example, when Housing and Urban Development failed to integrate housing in the 1970s, wealthy Montgomery county successfully desegregated by itself, and today remains below the national average for segregation (Hannah-Jones, 2015). While Hannah-Jones documented Federal neglect of housing integration, this example demonstrates that even over divisive racial issues (like police reform) local governments can bring meaningful change. JonesCorrea argues that state-level governments have power over legislation as well, citing the spread of Racially Restrictive Covenants in the 1920s through state governments (p. 543). Although this example demonstrates statewide support for a racially conservative policy, Jones-Correa’s observations about the role of state government may hold true for police reform. He explains that the federal government tends to “expand on policies that have already been introduced at the state or local levels,” rather than innovate policy themselves (p. 568). Jones-Correa’s thoughts bring optimism that police reform may return to Congress, but only after local and state governments serve as “political laboratories” (p. 568). Using evidence from political science, I explained why the police reform bill failed to pass Congress, despite widespread protest in approval. The ideological and racial divide between parties made it difficult for negotiators to compromise without conceding parts of their identities. However, more than just partisan divide determined this outcome, as there was public support for reform from both sides. The BLM protests did not have the expected impact because dissent only affects congresspeople when the action occurs in their own district; so, the localized protests likely did not have federal consequences. Further, the elaborate processes of Congress make changing entrenched policy difficult, causing path dependency. Despite all these barriers to reform at the national level, progress on the local and state level is possible and could pave the way for nationwide change in the future.

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References Sonmez, F., & DeBonis, M. (2021, September 23). No deal on bill to overhaul policing in aftermath of protests over killing of Black Americans. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/policing-george-floyd-congresslegislation/2021/09/22/36324a34-1bc9-11ec-a99a-5fea2b2da34b_story.html Valentino, Nicholas, Neuner, Fabian and L. Matthew Vandenbroek. 2018. “The Changing Norms of Racial Political Rhetoric and the End of Racial Priming” Journal of Politics. 80:3. Stephens-Dougan, LaFleur. 2020. Race to the Bottom: How Racial Appeals Work in American Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. pp. 26-37 and Chapter 4. Gillion, Daniel Q. 2013. The Political Power of Protest: Minority Activism and Shifts in Public Policy. New York, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press. 57-83. Jones-Correa, Michael. 2001. The Origins and Diffusion of Racial Restrictive Covenants. Political Science Quarterly. 115(4): 541-568. Hannah-Jones, Nikole (2015, June 25). Living Apart: How the Government Betrayed a Landmark Civil Rights Law. Propublica. https://www.propublica.org/article/living-apart-how-thegovernment-betrayed-a-landmark-civil-rights-law

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PRISON GERRYMANDERING & HOW STATES ARE ATTEMPTING TO ELIMINATE IT BY TERAN CHAPIS The United States Census Bureau counts incarcerated Americans where they were incarcerated, not where they lived before they were incarcerated. This has been common practice since 1850, but the massive increase in the prison population since the start of the wars on crime and drugs has increased the influence that inmate location has on political power and funding for areas with large prisons (Moreno, 2019). Although the Census Bureau has discussed counting prisoners where they lived before they were incarcerated, they have decided not to change the way that inmates are counted in the census. In recent years, states have attempted to end prison gerrymandering by changing the census data to correct for incarcerated populations. Maryland was the first state to pass a law mandating census data correction in 2010, and since then other states have followed. The Connecticut legislature has introduced multiple bills since 2010, but without success, and is currently arguing in court that not correcting census data for incarcerated populations when it comes to redistricting violates the 14th amendment. New York has passed similar legislation to Maryland, but has had issues with counting federal prisoners, and inmates who cannot provide a previous address. I will first introduce what gerrymandering is and how it can be prison-based. Then I will go into detail about how Maryland, Connecticut, and New York have attempted to end prison gerrymandering in their local and state congressional districts. When populations shift in the United States, districts have to be redrawn, whether it be municipal districts, state legislative districts, or U.S. congressional districts. The Constitution mandates that every ten years the total population of the country be counted, and that census data informs national, state, and local governments how populations have shifted. Our proportional representation of government relies on fair redistricting, to fulfill the requirement of every person casting one equal vote. However, districts can be drawn in such a way that benefit one party over another, and win more seats than that the percentage of voters in that area or state would have voted for. This is called “gerrymandering.” When states redistrict, most have the new district map drawn by the party in power, although some states have them drawn by an independent commission. “Packing” and “cracking” are the two common forms of gerrymandering. If Democrats “pack” Republicans into a few districts, fewer Republican officials could be elected than the actual percentage of Republicans in that state or that area. Or, if Republicans “crack” Democratic voters up by districting them into the surrounding Republican areas, it drowns out their votes by putting them in overwhelmingly Republican districts. The Supreme Court has never ruled partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional, and it ruled in Vieth v. Jubelirer that partisan gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable. However, racial gerrymandering, drawing districts based on race instead of party, was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Johnson, if the “predominant” factor in the way the districts are drawn is race. Another form of gerrymandering made common by the wars on crime and drugs is prison gerrymandering. Those who are incarcerated and have lost their right to vote due to a felony

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conviction are still counted in the population when districts are drawn. However, in the census, they are counted in the district where they are incarcerated, not where they lived when they were arrested. This means someone who is incarcerated could be counted in a different district from where they were living. They can be sent to a prison in a different state and be counted in a completely different state's population. Districts where prisons are built benefit from increased population numbers, but those incarcerated there on felony charges cannot vote. Two neighboring districts might have the same population, but one with a prison would have fewer eligible voters. However, those districts would both be able to elect the same representation. One blatant example of this is Anamosa, Iowa, which was divided into four wards for city council elections, with about 1370 people per ward. However, Ward 3 included a prison with over 1320 inmates. So there were actually fewer than 50 voting members in the district (Galloway, 2014). This is prison-based gerrymandering. Prison gerrymandering also disproportionately affects people of color. It especially disproportionately affects Black and Latinx men, because they have the highest rates of incarceration. According to a study by The Sentencing Project, Black Americans are incarcerated in state prisons 5.1 times more than rates of imprisonment of White Americans (Nellis, 2016). In Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, Vermont, and Wisconsin, the ratio is more than 10 to 1. In twelve states, more than half of the prison population is Black. Oklahoma has the highest Black incarceration rate in the nation: 1 in 15 Black males over 18 years old is in prison. Latinx Americans are also imprisoned 1.4 times more than White Americans. Latinx to White ethnic disparities are as high as 4.3 to 1 in Massachusetts, 3.9 to 1 in Connecticut, 3.3 to 1 in Pennsylvania, and 3.1 to 1 in New York (Nellis). This racial disparity in incarceration directly translates to a racial disparity in prison gerrymandering. Prison gerrymandering disproportionately affects people of color, in both the districts where they lived before incarceration where they are no longer counted, and the districts where prisons are built and they are, often in rural, suburban, and white areas. While rural communities are only 20% of the United States population, they house 60% of new prison construction (Galloway, p. 216). Federal legislation to end prison gerrymandering has been introduced in the US Congress, but has never passed. In 2009, Rep Gene Green (TX) introduced HR 2075: “Any individual who is incarcerated as of the date on which such census is taken shall be attributed to the place that was such individual’s last usual place of residence before such individual’s incarceration began,” starting with the 2020 Census. In 2013, HR 1537 was introduced, which would have required “that individuals in prison shall, for the purposes of a decennial census, be attributed to the last place of residence before incarceration.” With no ruling on prison gerrymandering from the Supreme Court, no change from the Census Bureau, and no federal legislation, states are attempting to eliminate prison gerrymandering in their state courts and legislatures. Maryland, Connecticut, and New York have attempted to correct census data to count prisoners where they were originally living, instead of where they are incarcerated. This not only redistributes population numbers for redistricting back to the districts inmates lived in, it also allocates more funding to those districts.

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In 2010, Maryland passed the “No Representation Without Population Act,” a first of its kind law requiring those who are incarcerated to be counted as residents of their home addresses, not where they are incarcerated. The law was challenged as unconstitutional in a lawsuit that made its way to the Supreme Court: Fletcher v. Lamone. The law was designed to correct census population data for prisoners incarcerated in Maryland who are not originally from Maryland, or who are from another district in Maryland. It requires Maryland to edit the data provided by the Census bureau before redistricting. Those incarcerated in Maryland must be counted at their last known residence before they are incarcerated. Those incarcerated in Maryland who are not from Maryland are excluded from the population count entirely. The only incarcerated individuals who are counted in the district in which the prison is located are those who lived in that district prior to incarceration or those without a known last address. As Justice Williams mentions in his concurrence (district court), The Howard University School of Law submitted an amicus brief on the “promulgation and purpose of the Act, emphasizing that the Act received the full support and advocacy of the NAACP of Maryland, the ACLU of Maryland, and the Legislative Black Caucus of Maryland.” The plaintiffs claim that the Act is unconstitutional because states must use unedited census data when redistricting, and that adjusting the number determined by the census violates Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution. However, the United States district court Maryland ruled that the law and census data manipulation did not violate the constitution, because while states are required to “use census data as a starting point,” they can modify the data before redistricting, as long as they do not do it in a “haphazard, inconsistent, or conjectural manner.” They ruled that “a State may choose to adjust the census data, so long as those adjustments are thoroughly documented and applied in a non-arbitrary fashion and they otherwise do not violate the Constitution.” The district court’s ruling in Fletcher also affirmed that the purpose of the Act is to correct “the fact that while the majority of the state's prisoners come from African–American areas, the state's prisons are located primarily in the majority white First and Sixth Districts. Prisons with large minority populations are placed in white districts that are ““overrepresented” compared to other districts.”” The opinion of the district court states “...according to the Census Bureau, prisoners are counted where they are incarcerated for pragmatic and administrative reasons, not legal ones.” The Census Bureau has explained that it would be too large a logistical challenge and too expensive to collect the prior residential address of all incarcerated citizens. They have estimated that it would cost about $250 million to conduct such a coordinated effort with all the prisons in the country. The Court's ruling mentions that although the Census Bureau is not willing to factor prisoners' home districts into their numbers, “it has supported efforts by States to do so... For the 2010 census, the Bureau released its population data for prisoners and other inhabitants of “group quarters” early to enable states to “leave the prisoners counted where the prisons are, delete them from redistricting formulas, or assign them to some other locale.”” In 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling in Fletcher, upholding the Maryland law. It was considered a significant win and a step closer to eliminating prison gerrymandering by civil rights and criminal justice reform organizations like the ACLU and

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Prison Policy Initiative. Since the No Representation Without Population Act was upheld, other states have passed similar laws, changing data they receive from the census to account for prison populations. California, Colorado, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, Tennessee, Virginia, New York, and Washington have all enacted prison gerrymandering legislation since the success of Maryland's law. Connecticut is a highly prison-gerrymandered state. According to the Quinnipiac Law Review, “forty-seven percent of incarcerated people in Connecticut come from its five most populous cities: Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven, Stamford, and Waterbury” but “sixty-five percent of Connecticut's inmate population... is located in prisons in five comparatively rural towns (Carroll, 2020, p. 587).” The majority of incarcerated people in Connecticut have been convicted of a felony, and therefore have lost their right to vote. Those who are incarcerated in Connecticut and have not lost their voting rights can still vote by absentee ballot in the districts they lived in before incarceration (Carroll, p. 588). Connecticut’s prison statistics also show racial disparity. Eighty percent of Connecticut’s population is white, but almost sixty-five percent of Connecticut's prison population are people of color (Carroll, p. 588). Connecticut General Statutes § 9-14 reads, “[n]o person shall be deemed to have lost his residence in any town by reason of his absence therefrom in any institution maintained by the state.” Therefore, Connecticut is required to count incarcerated citizens at their previous residence, not where they are incarcerated. However, the Connecticut legislature continues to use unmodified census data when it comes to redistricting, which counts incarcerated persons where they are in prison (Carroll, p. 588). The Connecticut legislature has tried to pass prison gerrymandering reform many times in recent years. In 2011, Connecticut House Bill 6606 would have directed the Connecticut Department of Corrections to provide the CT Secretary of State’s office with the prisoners' prior-residence information of all incarcerated people in the state. Then the Secretary of State’s office would have to adjust population data for each town and city. Even though the bill was popular, the Secretary of State's office stated at a public hearing that in “order for our office to accomplish this kind of population and data analysis, there would need to be significant investments made that quite frankly in our current budget climate are untenable” (Carroll, p. 589). Two more prison gerrymandering bills failed in 2013. The Secretary of State's office opposed them, citing lack of necessary software. In 2016, the State Judiciary Committee introduced State Bill 459 that would have adjusted population of incarcerated citizens as residents of their last town of residency, but it included a funding provision that clarified that the new redistricting data “shall be the basis for... the distribution of state or federal funds or other benefits” (Carroll, p. 589). The Judiciary Committee could not come to an agreement on the funding provision and the bill died in committee. In 2018, with legislative attempts shot down one after another and the 2020 census around the corner, the NAACP and Yale University Rule of Law Clinic filed a lawsuit challenging Connecticut’s prison gerrymandering: NAACP v. Merrill (Carroll, p. 590). Five members of the NAACP filed suit against Denise Merrill, Secretary of State, and Dannel Malloy, Governor. The plaintiffs argued that Connecticut’s state legislative redistricting plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment, due to prison based gerrymandering. They argued that local officials do not

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represent those who are incarcerated because they do not visit prisons and serve their interests. They point out that if prisoners were counted where they lived before incarceration instead of where they are incarcerated, nine of Connecticut's legislative districts would actually have more than ten percent less citizens than Connecticut’s largest House district, which is outside the Supreme Court's “safe harbor” threshold (Carroll, p. 591). The defendants argued that basing redistricting on unmodified census data is constitutionally permissible. They argued that the population percentages only drastic change in the redistricting model the plaintiffs propose, and that “plaintiffs seek to manufacture a violation of “one person, one vote” that does not currently exist by dictating a population counting method that the legislature did not use and that the Supreme Court has made clear is not constitutionally required (Carroll, p. 591).” The plaintiffs filed to dismiss the case under the Eleventh Amendment, but Judge Warren Eginton refused to dismiss. They appealed the motion to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In September, 2019, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the Eleventh Amendment claim was unfounded, and remanded the case with instructions to the district court to refer future proceedings to a three-judge panel. The case is still ongoing. Another prison gerrymandering bill was introduced in the Connecticut House in January 2019, but was never voted on. Individual towns in Connecticut with the largest prisons have taken it upon themselves to correct for prison population when drawing municipal districts. Cheshire, a Connecticut town with a large prison, only counts registered voters when drawing municipal districts, because otherwise districts would be twenty percent incarcerated. Enfield, another town with a large prison, disregards the prison population when drawing districts to avoid districts that would otherwise be almost thirty percent incarcerated. Like many states, New York has passed a law similar to Maryland's “No Representation Without Population Act.” Previously New York’s prisons were highly gerrymandered. 91% of the prisoners in New York are incarcerated upstate, but only 24% of New York's prisoners are from there, while 66% of New York's prisoners are from New York City (Galloway, p. 214). Devon Galloway writes in the Columbia Journal of Race and Law: Seven New York state senate districts drawn after the 2000 Census met minimum population requirements only because they use prison populations as padding. Of the seven New York senate districts discussed above, four of the senators sat on the powerful Codes Committee where they opposed reforming the state's draconian Rockefeller drug law that boosted the state's prison population. The inflated populations of these senators' districts gave them little incentive to consider or pursue policies that might reduce the numbers of people sent to prison or the length of time they spend there. One of them, Republican New York state Senator Dale Volker, boasted that he was glad that the almost 9,000 people confined in his district cannot vote because ‘they would never vote for me.’ (2014, p. 214). One issue New York has faced implementing reform is with counting federal prisoners, similar to Maryland. Getting the necessary previous residence information of federal prisoners requires federal government cooperation. Maryland filed a Freedom of Information Act request to the Federal Bureau of Prisons to get the home addresses of federal prisoners incarcerated in

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Maryland. But the Bureau rejected the request and Maryland had to exclude around 1,500 federal prisoners from their data. Similarly, 2,471 federal prisoners were excluded from New York’s redistricting count (Galloway, p. 216). Another hurdle New York’s prison gerrymandering law has presented is how to count prisoners who do not have a full previous address. Prisoners who are homeless before incarceration cannot provide a previous address, and some inmates only provide an incomplete address. The New York State Legislative Task Force on Demographic Research and Reapportionment (LATFOR) stipulates that “in the event the inmates' prior residential addresses are unknown ... [or] were outside the state ... LATFOR ‘shall consider those persons to have been counted at an address unknown and persons at such unknown address shall not be included in such data set’ to be used to draw legislative districts.” Unlike Maryland who counts them in the district in which they are incarcerated, New York does not count inmates that cannot provide a full previous address at all. They are subtracted altogether when it comes to redistricting (Galloway, p. 216). Some who defend the choice not to count them cite the fact they cannot vote and claim it would counteract the purpose of counting inmates elsewhere. Others say they are not counted at all because prisoners are not as “integrated” into the community they are incarcerated in as other non-voting groups, such as undocumented immigrants (Galloway, p. 218). Justice Eugene P. Devine argues that they should not be counted because they are not permanently incarcerated in those districts. However, those who believe they should be counted where they are incarcerated cite Maryland’s success with doing so. They also argue that because non-voting persons are still supposed to be counted in redistricting, not counting them at all doesn’t solve the problem. Since federal legislation on prison gerrymandering has failed to pass the U.S. Congress, and the Supreme Court decided in Vieth v. Jubelirer that “partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts” (Chief Justice Roberts), states have been passing legislation to eliminate prison gerrymandering in their districts. Maryland was the first, and states all over the country have followed. Connecticut has not been as successful as Maryland, and after failing to pass legislation, brought the issue back to court. New York’s prison gerrymandering reform has roadblocks when it comes to counting federal prisoners, and prisoners without a complete previous address. Maryland, New York, and other states have not been successful in receiving the data from the federal government that is necessary to account for federal prisoners in their redistricting. It will take cooperation between state governments and between state and federal government to trade necessary information when it comes to counting federal prisoners, and state prisoners that previously lived in another state before incarceration. Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wisconsin all have pending prison gerrymandering bills in their state legislatures. And HR 3645, “Correct the Census Count Act,” was introduced to the U.S. Congress on July 9, 2019. If passed into law, it would require those who are incarcerated to be counted in the census at their last place of residence, not where they are incarcerated. Starting with the 2030 census, states would no longer have to alter census data to account for prison populations. The Census Bureau would be required to collect the previous addresses of those incarcerated, and effectively eliminate prison gerrymandering.

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References Carroll, Wilson T. “Prison Gerrymandering Reform in Connecticut,” Quinnipiac Law Review 38, no. 3 (2020): 579-604. Accessed December 14, 2020, Westlaw. Daley, David. “The Secret Files of the Master of Modern Republican Gerrymandering.” The New Yorker (New York City, NY), Sep. 6, 2019. Drake, John C. “Locked Up and Counted Out: Bringing an End to Prison-based Gerrymandering,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 37 (2011): 237-265. Accessed December 14, 2020, Westlaw. Editorial Board. “Visiting Professor Lectures on Photographer.” Exponent (West Lafayette, IN), Feb. 13, 2009. “Fletcher v. Lamone.” Prison Policy Initiative: Prison Gerrymandering Project. Accessed December 14, 2020. https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/fletcher/. Galloway, Devon. “The Numbers Matter: An Update to the Implementation of New York’s Prison Gerrymandering Law,” Columbia Journal of Race and Law 4, no. 2 (2014): 205-224. Accessed December 14, 2020, Westlaw. Moreno, Ivan. “Correction: Census-Prison Gerrymandering story,” The Associated Press (New York City, NY), Nov. 18, 2019. Nellis, Ashley. “The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons.” June 14, 2016. https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-justice-racial-and-ethnicdisparity-in-state-prisons/. Stevenson, Bryan. Just Mercy. United States: Spiegel & Grau, 2014. Thompson, Heather Ann. “How Prisons Change the Balance of Power in America.” The Atlantic (Boston, MA), Oct. 7, 2013. Wagner, Peter. “Beginning of the end for ‘prison-based gerrymandering’,” The Washington Post (Washington D.C.), Jul. 13, 2012.

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PRO-ATTITUDINAL AND COUNTER-ATTITUDINAL POLITICAL INFORMATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA AND ITS EFFECT ON POLITICAL POLARIZATION BY SARAH GOLDMAN

Abstract The relationship between pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal political information and political polarization has been much debated in the research community. In an attempt to clarify the relationship, this study used a field experiment design with a pre-test and a post-test to determine whether pro-attitudinal and/or counter-attitudinal information increase or decrease political polarization. After Democratic and Republican participants followed Twitter accounts that retweeted pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal political information for a month, on average all experimental groups, regardless of the information they were exposed to, became more politically polarized. Democrats assigned to the pro-attitudinal group, Democrats assigned to the counter-attitudinal group, Republicans assigned to the pro-attitudinal group, and Republicans assigned to the counter-attitudinal group all became more politically polarized on average by two distinct measures of political polarization (ideological and affective). For both Democratic groups, the results were statistically significant. However, not all of the results for Republicans were statistically significant. The results of this study can be used to narrow down the ways to address the growing issue of political polarization in the United States. Context The rise of social media as a source of political information has been noted with some apprehension by political analysts and average Americans alike. Over the past two decades, social media, or “platforms such as content sharing sites, social networking, and wikis to create, modify, share, and discuss Internet content” (Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 2011, p. 241), has become the most common news outlet for Americans aged 18-29. According to the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan public opinion polling think tank based in Washington, D.C., social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook have outpaced television, print newspapers, news websites, and radio as news outlets among young Americans (2018). This trend shows no sign of slowing. As exposure to news in the United States takes place increasingly on social media, access to political information is diversified both in terms of news sources and ideology (Flaxman, Goel, & Rao, 2019). Although in theory, this increased diversity of choice could expose people to a wider variety of viewpoints, the existing literature overwhelmingly suggests that it has the opposite effect. In fact, the existing literature generally concurs that the spread of online political information-especially on social media-has led to increased partisan selective exposure, defined as “[people] selecting media outlets sharing their political predispositions” (Stroud, 2010, p. 556).

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In other words, social media has led to the rise of self-created political echo chambers in which people avoid opinions that differ from their own. The consequences of this trend are well worth studying, given that exposure to political information on social media is increasing with every new generation (Pew, 2018). In fact, one of the most hotly contested consequences is an increase in political polarization. The little data that exists on the relationship between exposure to pro-attitudinal information (as caused by partisan selective exposure) versus counter-attitudinal information and political polarization is mixed, and most of the existing research has been conducted in either an offline setting or an online setting not exclusively focused on social media. The goal of this research is to determine that relationship on social media. Thus, the research question is as such: How does exposure to proattitudinal and counter-attitudinal political information on social media affect political polarization among high school students? Significance A link between pro-attitudinal and/or counter-attitudinal information and political polarization would be significant due to the range of adverse effects brought about by polarization. Affective and ideological polarization were the two main types of political polarization discussed in the related literature. Affective political polarization is defined as the “tendency of people identifying as Republicans or Democrats to view opposing partisans negatively and co-partisans positively” (Iyengar et. al, 2019, p. 1). Ideological political polarization is defined as “the difference between the policy positions of Democrats and Repuvlicans” (Iyengar et. al, 2019). Evidence shows that both types of polarization have been rising for decades in the United States; as documented by the Pew Research Center, the percentage of Republicans and Democrats who have “very unfavorable” views of the opposing party rose by 35% from 1994 to 2016 (2016), and by 2014, 92% of Republicans were ideologically to the right of the median Democrat and 94% of Democrats were ideologically to the left of the median Republican (2014)—a sharp increase from years past. This increase in affective and ideological political polarization is dangerous. Affective political polarization is concerning due to the fact that political scientists have long theorized that negative views of opposing partisans promote a lack of civility in political discourse. In fact, some researchers speculate that affective political polarization will incentivize elected officials to disparage the opposition rather than present rational arguments (Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz, 2006; Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018). Additionally, empirical studies have linked ideological polarization to legislative gridlock and voter disengagement (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz). In an increasingly tense political environment, clarifying the connection between pro-attitudinal and/or counter-attitudinal information and political polarization would be the first step in finding a possible solution. Review of the Related Literature

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The literature examined for this study focused on the connection between proattitudinal /counter-attitudinal political information and political polarization. Most sources were collected through political science journals such as the Annual Review of Political Science and the Journal of Politics using the following keywords: polarization, ideological polarization, affective polarization, partisan selective exposure, social media, pro-attitudinal, counterattitudinal. Sources from the Pew Research Center were also utilized for information discovery regarding recent trends in the United States in ideological/affective polarization and the use of social media as a news source. Partisan Selective Exposure It is seldom disputed among scholars who research partisan selective exposure that online news, especially social media, facilitates the ability to select information congenial to one’s own political beliefs. In an experimental study, Flaxman, Goel, & Rao found that exposure to political information on social media is more likely to lead to partisan selective exposure than other forms of online information exposure such as online news aggregators and online newspapers (2016). Strong empirical evidence corroborates Flaxman, Goel, & Rao’s findings: other researchers have concluded that political discussion on social media serves as an echo chamber and enables the selection and exposure to overwhelmingly pro-attitudinal information (Bakshy et. al, 2015; Conover et. al, 2011; Barberá et. al, 2015). Twitter is an oft-studied social media platform which exemplifies this finding; in a cluster analysis of Twitter retweets and mentions among and between Democratic and Republican Twitter users, researchers found that 85 percent of retweets on Twitter are made by people with the same political orientation (Barberá et. al). The vast majority of research concludes that social media causes both Democrats and Republicans alike to consume mainly pro-attitudinal political information. With the recent emergence of this trend, it is important to analyze and clarify its effects. The consequences of these information consumption patterns, specifically regarding their impact on individuals’ levels of political polarization, are heavily debated. Pro-attitudinal Versus Counter-attitudinal Information: Effects on Political Polarization While social media clearly enables the selection of mainly pro-attitudinal political information, the evidence regarding the relationship between pro-attitudinal information/counterattitudinal information and political polarization has been mixed. There are two main competing theories on the relationship; the first is that exposure to pro-attitudinal information increases affective and ideological polarization, while exposure to counter-attitudinal information decreases it. The second theory is that due to a “backfire effect” (Bail et. al, 2018), exposure to proattitudinal information and counter-attitudinal information leads to more positive attitudes toward one’s own parties and issues and more negative attitudes towards opposing parties/issues (thus leading to affective and ideological polarization). One of the first researchers to link partisan information consumption and polarization was Stroud (2010), who examined self-identified Democrat and Republican participants’ affective

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polarization (found through asking them about their reactions to 2004 presidential candidates Bush and Kerry; “national Democrat and Republican figures”, a method of measuring affective polarization). Then, after determining the political bias of different political information outlets (print newspapers, talk radio, cable news, and political internet), Stroud (2010) conducted a regression analysis on polarized political attitudes and partisan media. The data indicated that pro-attitudinal media exposure was linked to more polarized views of the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates, while counter-attitudinal media exposure was linked to less polarized views. Other researchers’ results have supported this conclusion; after analyzing Democrat and Republican participants’ online information consumption patterns and their levels of affective polarization, Garrett et. al (2014) found that in the United States, pro-attitudinal information is “associated with more polarized attitudes toward candidates and toward party supporters”, while counter-attitudinal information is associated with less polarized attitudes “at comparable levels” (p. 11). Stroud (2010) conducted groundbreaking research; however, a limitation of the study was the inconsistency of the foundations used for determining political bias of political information outlets. Self-identifications of hosts, content analysis, and newspapers’ endorsements for President were all used. Yet another limitation was that correlation between polarization and pro-attitudinal/counter-attitudinal information, not causation, was proven in the aforementioned studies. Unlike Stroud (2010) and Garrett et. al (2014), who relied on observational data to find a correlation, Levendusky (2013) conducted an original experimental study designed to “isolate the impact of partisan media on viewers’ attitudes”, thus finding causation (p. 611). Before and after exposing participants to video clips from pro-attitudinal, counter-attitudinal, or neutral media programs, Levendusky (2013) had participants complete a pre-test and a post-test, which was the same questionnaire, directly measuring participants’ change in ideological polarization after the experiment by asking about their positions on certain political issues. The results of the study aligned with those of Stroud (2010), although Levendusky (2013) focused on ideological and not affective polarization; Levendusky (2013) concluded that pro-attitudinal media leads to an increase in ideological polarization, theorizing that the increase was due to the biased presentation of the news from partisan sources as well as confirmation bias. However, no conclusion was reached on counter-attitudinal media’s effects on polarization. Levendusky (2013) stressed that “more work is needed to unpack and explore… the consequences of that exposure [to counter-attitudinal information]” (p. 620). In a study with a similar method, Guess and Coppock (2018) exposed Democrats and Republicans to pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal information in the form of online videos: the topics were gun control, the minimum wage, and capital punishment. For all three topics, both Democrats and Republicans became less ideologically polarized after watching the counter-attitudinal videos and more ideologically polarized after watching the pro-attitudinal videos (Guess & Coppock, 2018), thus supporting the conclusions of Stroud (2010). Arceneaux, Johnson, & Murphy (2012) had a method almost identical to that of Levendusky (2013), yet reached a different conclusion. These researchers found that after exposing participants to pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal political TV (such as the Rachel

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Maddow Show and the O’Reilly Factor), participants’ perceptions of the show’s hosts were more positive when the TV show gave them pro-attitudinal information and more negative when the TV show gave them counter-attitudinal information (Arceneaux, Johnson, & Murphy, 2012). The results suggest that exposure to both pro-attitudinal information and counter-attitudinal information worsen affective polarization. Similar research suggested that ideological polarization is also worsened as a result of counter-attitudinal information. For example, an experimental study exposing Republican participants to information that supported the Affordable Care Act, commonly called “Obamacare,” found that this counter-attitudinal news only worsened the participants’ views on the act (Nyhan, Reifler and Ubel, 2013). Although Arceneaux, Johnson, & Murphy (2012) studied affective polarization while Levendusky (2013) studied ideological polarization, there is also existing research focused on ideological polarization that counters Levendusky’s conclusions. In an experimental study, Hart, Nisbet, and Shanahan (2011) exposed Republican participants to information that supported environmental regulation; after information exposure, participants became more opposed to environmental regulation. Thus, exposure to counter-attitudinal political information caused an increase in ideological polarization among the participants in the aforementioned study. Polarization and Social Media The theory that pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal information exposure worsen political polarization was supported by the one study found in the reviewed literature that tested the effects of pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal information exposure on social media on political polarization: that of Bail et. al (2018). Bail et. al (2018) conducted a field experiment with a pre-test and a post-test. Before the one-month experimental period, participants’ levels of ideological polarization were measured with a survey instrument. The same survey, a prevalidated variation of the ideological consistency scale often used at the Pew Research Center, was given after the one-month experimental period to measure change in ideological polarization by asking participants to agree or disagree with ten statements about policy issues on a sevenpoint scale. The aforementioned ideological consistency scale was the most accurate measure of ideology as it measured liberal and conservative opinions with a variety of policy-related questions, minimizing measurement error that could potentially arise if a single question was asked (Shearer). The questions used on this survey were previously used in sixteen nationally representative surveys, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.91. (Bail et. al, 2018). Bail modified these questions to include a seven-point response scale as other researchers have concluded that allowing respondents to indicate extremity of opinion provides a more accurate measure of ideological polarization (Hill & Tausanovitch, 2015). Thus, while the Pew Research Center would calculate ideological polarization by assigning each liberal answer as -1 and each conservative answer as +1, the revised survey would calculate an answer of 5 as -1, an answer of 6 as -2, an answer of 3 as +1, an answer of 2 as +2, etc., with 4 (the neutral answer) being 0. The experimental design had self-identified Republican and Democrat participants over the age of 18 (found through survey recruitment) follow a Twitter bot retweeting counter-

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attitudinal political information for one month- either a Republican account (for Democrat participants) or a Democrat account (for Republican participants). Independents were not considered, as previous data suggested that partisan media led to polarization “not by turning moderates into extremists, but rather by further polarizing those who are already away from the political center” (Levendusky, 2013, p. 612). The Twitter bots exposed participants to tweets from accounts with opposing political ideologies (elected officials, opinion leaders, and media organizations). After data analysis, Bail et. al concluded that counter-attitudinal political information leads to increased ideological political polarization, and that the change is significantly larger for Republicans than Democrats (Bail et. al, 2018). In the existing research, it is clear that there is no consensus regarding the relationship between pro-attitudinal versus counter-attitudinal political information and affective/ideological political polarization, and no apparent explanation for why the evidence has been mixed to this extent. As the evidence is mixed, no scientific conclusion can be drawn yet regarding the impact of pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal information on political polarization. Additionally, no studies were found that studied both affective and ideological polarization, signaling a gap in the research. It is imperative that more research is conducted to fill this gap. Furthermore, with social media becoming the most common news outlet for Americans (Pew, 2018), the lack of research in this field focused specifically on social media is problematic. Design Participants, Recruitment, and Ethics Participants for this study were recruited through government classes at a high school in suburban Connecticut (both standard and AP), since students in both Government and AP Government classes are taught party platforms and given a political alignment test, thus providing them with more opportunities to determine where they stand politically. After participants received information on this study through a brief speech from the researcher, the Government teachers gave students the option to fill out the pre-test (as seen in Appendix C) during class. A total of 221 students chose to fill out the pre-test survey. Similar to Bail et. al (2018), participants who were not self-identified Democrats or Republicans and/or did not check Twitter at least 3 times a week were screened out, which left 173 students. One of the questions on the pre-test asked participants to indicate whether they wanted to participate in the experiment; the 148 students who indicated that they were interested in participating were sent a follow-up email (as seen in Appendix A) with the username of the account they were to follow. The usernames were redacted to keep participants anonymous. As political affiliation can be a sensitive subject, all possible steps were taken to keep participants’ personal information confidential in order to maintain an ethical research design. Though it was necessary to obtain identifying information (namely, participants’ email addresses) to match up the results of the pre-test and post-test in order to measure change in political polarization post-experiment, participants’ privacy was maintained by deleting all identifying information at the end of the research process. Additionally, all participants signed an informed

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consent form (as seen in Appendix B) and were made aware that participation was completely voluntary. Only the researcher had access to identifying information, and participants were made aware that they had the right to request at any time that any information collected through this study be deleted. Method This study’s method was adapted from the experimental setup used by Bail et. al (2018), which was open access. The researcher made several key changes to better align the method with the research question and to ensure feasibility. The changes made to the method were as follows: changing the age range of the participants, removing two questions from the ideological polarization survey, changing the Twitter account from a bot account to a human-run account, adding an experimental group of participants following a Twitter account retweeting those of the same political party, and adding a measure for affective political polarization to the pre-test (which was also the post-test). The experimental control-group pretest-posttest design was appropriate for this study since the pretest-posttest design determines whether a variable (in this case, polarization) changes after the experimental treatment, and the control group can eliminate most confounding variables (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). The age range was changed from those over the age of 18 to high school students ages 1418 as data indicated that younger age groups were most likely to receive political information from social media (Shearer, 2018). Additionally, high school students had not been studied previously in the related literature, indicating a gap in the research. Two questions had to be removed from the Pew Research Center’s original ten questions utilized by Bail et. al (2018), as they contained sensitive topics (concerning race and sexuality) that did not pass the school IRB. Although this was a limitation in the study, the two questions removed asked about participants’ stances on social issues, and there were still questions remaining in the original survey regarding social issues after they were removed. Therefore, the study still measured participants’ ideology as it measured their stances on social and economic political issues, although potentially to a lesser extent; future researchers should utilize the entire range of questions provided to ensure validity of the results. The Twitter account was changed from a bot to a researcher-run account due to feasibility. The two Twitter accounts set up by Bail et. al (2018) were coded bots; while coding the bots required advanced coding knowledge and was not feasible, the bots could be replicated in terms of function. The researcher had an MIT-educated computer science teacher confirm that the method would be a reasonably accurate replication of the bot design. Bail et. al set up two bots, one retweeting Democrat elected officials and opinion leaders and another retweeting Republican elected officials and opinion leaders. The bots retweeted these accounts randomly, 24 times a day, for a one-month period. To replicate the bots, two Twitter accounts were set up, with one account retweeting 1 tweet from each of the 12 most followed Republican senators twice a day and one retweeting 1 tweet from each of the 12 most followed Democratic senators twice a day. Senators were chosen to have their tweets retweeted as senators have a clear, stated party affiliation (unlike news channels and journalists), and are more established as a voice of their party due to their longer terms.

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The experimental group of Republican participants following the Republican Twitter account and the experimental group of Democratic participants following the Democratic Twitter account were added to compare the effect of pro-attitudinal information exposure and counterattitudinal information exposure (Bail et. al had only tested counter-attitudinal information exposure) on political polarization. The measure for affective political polarization was added to the pre-test/post-test as prior research established that it was distinct from ideological political polarization (Iyengar et. al, 2019). The leading researchers in the field have acknowledged that survey self-reports are the most widely used measure of affective political polarization, and the most popular survey instrument was found to be the feeling thermometer from the American National Election Study, in which participants are asked to place Democrats and Republicans on a scale rating from 0 (“cold”, or disapproving) to 100 (“warm”, or approving); affective polarization is then calculated as the difference between the ratings of Democrats and Republicans (Iyengar et. al, 2019). In this study, the feeling thermometer was administered alongside the ideological consistency scale in the pre-test and post-test (as seen in Appendix C). Change in affective political polarization was measured by averaging the mean difference between the rating of Republicans and Democrats among all participants in the Republican group following the Republican Twitter bot, the Republican group following the Democratic Twitter bot, the Democrat group following the Democrat Twitter bot, and the Democrat group following the Republican Twitter bot. Change in ideological political polarization was measured by averaging the mean change in policy position for each of the aforementioned four groups; the change in position on each question was averaged to find a single participant’s change in ideological political polarization. Results The final sample included 97 participants (23 self-identified Republicans and 74 selfidentified Democrats), all of whom were students at a suburban Connecticut high school. As anticipated, change in polarization in both the Democratic and Republican control groups was minor and not statistically significant, limiting the chances of confounding variables changing polarization levels for the experimental groups. For Democrats assigned to the control group, the results for the ideological polarization pretest (M = 12.04, SD = 5.33) and posttest (M = 11.84, SD = 5.04) indicated a small decrease in ideological political polarization, and the results were not statistically significant, t(24) = 2.06, p = .46. The results for the affective polarization pretest (M = 38.60, SD = 20.70) and posttest (M = 39.08, SD = 21.05) indicated a small increase in ideological political polarization, and the results were not statistically significant, t(24) = 2.06, p = .85. For Democrats assigned to the pro-attitudinal group, the results for the ideological polarization pretest (M = 12.83, SD = 5.13) and posttest (M = 13.96, SD = 4.88) indicated that exposure to pro-attitudinal information resulted in a small increase in ideological political polarization, and that the results were statistically significant t(23) = 2.06, p = .001. The results for the affective polarization pretest (M = 39.46, SD = 17.22) and posttest (M = 48.96, SD =

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19.36) indicated that exposure to pro-attitudinal information resulted in an increase in ideological political polarization, and that the results were statistically significant, t(23) = 2.07, p < .001. For Democrats assigned to the counter-attitudinal group, the results for the ideological polarization pretest (M = 11.32, SD = 4.53) and posttest (M = 12.08, SD = 4.58) indicated that exposure to pro-attitudinal information resulted in a small increase in ideological political polarization, and that the results were statistically significant, t(24) = 2.06, p = .01. The results for the affective polarization pretest (M = 37.20, SD = 18.63) and posttest (M = 45.48, SD = 21.63) indicated that exposure to pro-attitudinal information resulted in an increase in ideological political polarization, and that the results were statistically significant, t(24) = 2.06, p <.001 (see Table 1). Table 1. Pre- and post-treatment political polarization for Democrats Control group Pre M

Pro-attitudinal treatment group

Post M

Pre M

Counter-attitudinal treatment group

Post M

Pre M

Post M

Ideological 12.04 polarizatio 5.33 n

11.84 5.04 12.83 5.13

13.96 4.88

11.32 4.53 12.08 4.58

Affective polarizatio n

39.08 21.05

48.96 19.36

37.20 18.63

38.60 20.70

39.46 17.22

45.48 21.63

For Republicans assigned to the control group, the results for the ideological polarization pretest (M = -12.88, SD = 5.99) and posttest (M = -13.25, SD = 6.04) indicated a small increase in ideological political polarization, and that the results were not statistically significant, t(7) = 2.36, p = .59. The results for the affective polarization pretest (M = 31.25, SD = 16.54) and posttest (M = 33.13, SD = 18.78) indicated an increase in ideological political polarization, but the results were not statistically significant, t(23) = 2.07, p = .41. For Republicans assigned to the pro-attitudinal group, the results for the ideological polarization pretest (M = -12.86, SD = 5.34) and posttest (M = -15.14, SD = 5.64) indicated that exposure to pro-attitudinal information resulted in a small increase in ideological political polarization, and that the results were statistically significant, t(6) = 2.45, p = .03. The results for the affective polarization pretest (M = 39.43, SD = 20.65) and posttest (M = 47.29, SD = 26.05) indicated that exposure to pro-attitudinal information resulted in an increase in ideological political polarization, but the results were not statistically significant, t(6) = 2.45, p = .06.

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For Republicans assigned to the counter-attitudinal group, the results for the ideological polarization pretest (M = -12.25, SD = 6.56) and posttest (M = -13.88, SD = 5.84) indicated that exposure to pro-attitudinal information resulted in a small increase in ideological political polarization, and that the results were statistically significant, t(7) = 2.36, p = .01. The results for the affective polarization pretest (M = 30.50, SD = 16.20) and posttest (M = 42.25, SD = 18.27) indicated that exposure to pro-attitudinal information resulted in an increase in ideological political polarization, and that the results were statistically significant t(7) = 2.36, p = .02 (see Table 2).

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Table 2 Pre- and post-treatment political polarization for Republicans Control group Pre M

Pro-attitudinal treatment group

Post M

Pre M

Counter-attitudinal treatment group

Post M

Pre M

Post M

Ideological -12.88 polarizatio 5.99 n

-13.25 6.04

-12.86 5.34

-15.14 5.64

-12.25 6.56

-13.88 5.84

Affective polarizatio n

33.13 18.78

39.43 20.65

47.29 26.05

30.50 16.20

42.25 18.27

31.25 16.54

Discussion The research question of this study was: How does exposure to pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal political information on social media affect political polarization among high school students? The results from the paired t-tests indicated that both exposure to pro-attitudinal political information and exposure to counter-attitudinal political information increased affective and ideological polarization among high school students, supporting a theory advanced by Arceneaux, Johson, & Murphy and Bail et. al, among others. Interestingly, these results indicate that Democrats exposed to pro-attitudinal information will likely become more polarized than Democrats exposed to counter-attitudinal information, both in terms of affective polarization and ideological polarization. This trend was reversed for Republicans; this discrepancy may be a result of the small sample size, and future research should address this. The fact that exposure to counter-attitudinal information in this survey worsened political polarization was a significant finding, leading to the implication that efforts to reduce polarization by exposing Americans to counter-attitudinal information are likely harmful. Many public campaigns to lessen political polarization in the United States have emphasized the importance of exposure to opposing viewpoints; for example, in the best-selling book The Filter Bubble, internet activist and entrepreneur Eli Pariser of MoveOn.org and Upworthy blamed partisan selective exposure, especially on social media, for the rise in political polarization in the last several decades. Pariser suggested more diverse opinion exposure to counter the negative effects of consuming pro-attitudinal political information (Pariser, 2011). While the results of this study suggest that pro-attitudinal information does indeed polarize Americans, they also suggest, similar to Bail et. al, that consuming more counter-attitudinal information (at least on social media) would also polarize Americans and thus have the opposite effect as intended. Therefore, efforts to lower levels of political polarization by inserting counter-attitudinal information into

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one’s media diet likely backfire, implying that those interested in depolarizing the American public should look into new methods of doing so. One key limitation of this study was the small sample size of Republican participants. The researcher attempted to contact the Republicans who had indicated interest in participating in the experiment multiple times; however, only 23 ended up participating, and they had to be randomly assigned to the control group, the pro-attitudinal group, and the counter-attitudinal group. Although the data-driven conclusions were similar for Republicans and Democrats even with the small sample size, this limitation prevented a valid comparison between Republicans and Democrats post-treatment, and lowered the reliability of the conclusion for Republicans. Future studies in the same vein must be conducted to fully validate the conclusion for Republicans. Another limitation of this study was the lack of recent tweets from some senators, which lessened the relevancy of some of the retweets. As the most recent tweet was retweeted from each account, by the end of the month, some of the retweets were from 2019. Future researchers may want to retweet from a larger pool of senators to ensure that the information participants view is topical. A third limitation of the study was its narrow representation of social media platforms. Although the social media platform Twitter was chosen for its prevalence in the related literature since it was unfeasible to study every social media platform, future researchers may want to verify that the results hold for other platforms such as Facebook or Instagram. There is much room for future study regarding the effects of social media information on political polarization. This research is not meant to be generalized to all high school students in the United States, and in fact can only be generalized to Democratic high school students in suburban Connecticut who use the social media site Twitter. This study should be repeated across other regions of the United States, as well as on different social media platforms, with a representative sample of both Democratic and Republican high schoolers. Additionally, although it was outside the scope and time scale of this study, future researchers may want to test the longevity of a change in polarization by re-surveying participants a month after the experiment ends to see if the change in polarization is maintained over time.

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References Arceneaux, K., & Johnson, M. (2015). How does media choice affect hostile media perceptions? Evidence from participant preference experiments. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2(1), 12-25. https://doi.org/10.1017/xps.2014.10 Bail, C. A., Argyle, L. P., Brown, T. W., Bumpus, J. P., Chen, H., Hunzaker, M. B., . . . Volfovsky, A. (2018). Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization. In Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Vol. 115, pp. 9216-9221). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804840115 Bakshy, E., Messing, S., & Adamic, L. A. (2015). Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook. Science, 348(6239), 1130-1132. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa1160 Barberá, P., Jost, J. T., Nagler, J., Tucker, J. A., & Bonneau, R. (2015). Tweeting from left to right: Is online political communication more than an echo chamber? Psychological Science, 112. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615594620 Brendan, N. J., Reifler, J., & Ubel, P. A. (2013). The hazards of correcting myths about health care reform. Medical Care, 51(2), 127-132. https://doi.org/10.1097/MLR.0b013e318279486b. Conover, M. D., Ratkiewicz, J., Francisco, M., Goncalves, B., Flammini, A., & Menczer, F. (2011). Political polarization on Twitter. Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, pp. 89-96. Retrieved from https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM11/paper/viewFile/2847/3275 Dimock, M., Doherty, C., Kiley, J., & Oates, R. (2014, June). Political polarization in the American public. Retrieved from https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/politicalpolarization-in-the-american-public/ Fiorina, M. P., & Abrams, S. J. (2008). Political polarization in the American public. Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 563-588. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.153836 Flaxman, S., Goel, S., & Rao, J. (2016). Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and online news consumption. Public Opinion Quarterly, 80(S1), 298-320. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfw006 Garrett, R. K., Gvirsman, S. D., Johnson, B. K., & Tsfati, Y. (2014). Implications of pro- and counterattitudinal information exposure for affective polarization. Human Communication Research, 40, 309-332. https://doi.org/10.1111/hcre.12028 Guess, A., & Coppock, A. (2018). Does counter-attitudinal information cause backlash? Results from three large survey experiments. British Journal of Political Science, 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000327 Hart, P. S., Nisbet, E. C., & Shanahan, J. E. (2011). Environmental values and the social amplification of risk: An examination of how environmental values and media use influence predispositions for public engagement in wildlife management decision making.

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Society & Natural Resources, 24(3), 276-291. https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920802676464 Hill, S. J., & Tausanovitch, C. (2015). A disconnect in representation? Comparison of trends in congressional and public polarization. The Journal of Politics, 77(4), 1058-1075. https://doi.org/10.1086/682398 Iyengar, S., & Krupenkin, M. (2018). The strengthening of partisan affect. Political Psychology, 39(S1), 201-218. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12487 Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science, 22, 129-146. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034 Kietzmann, J. H., Hermkens, K., McCarthy, I. P., & Silvestre, B. S. (2011). Social media? Get serious! Understanding the functional building blocks of social media. Business Horizons, 54, 241-251. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2011.01.005 Layman, G. C., Carsey, T. M., & Horowitz, J. M. (2006). Party polarization in American politics: Characteristics, causes, and consequences. Annual Review of Political Science, 9, 83-110. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.070204.105138 Leedy, P. D., & Ormrod, J. E. (2010). Practical research: Planning and design (9th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill. Levendusky, M. S. (2013). Why do partisan media polarize viewers? American Journal of Political Science, 57(3), 611-623. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12008 Pariser, E. (2012). The filter bubble: What the Internet is hiding from you. London: Penguin Books. Partisanship and political animosity in 2016. (2016, June). Retrieved from https://www.peoplepress.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/ Shearer, E. (2018, December). Social media outpaces print newspapers in the U.S. as a news source. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/social-mediaoutpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/ Stroud, N. J. (2010). Polarization and partisan selective exposure. Journal of Communication, 60(3), 556-576. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01497.x

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IS IT POSSIBLE TO SPEAK TRUTH IN THE POLITICAL REALM? BY LAILA MOUSSA In Letter from Birmingham Jail, the arrest of Martin Luther King Jr. reflects a particular pattern: he is part of the Black minority in a White majority, and the government stops his protest activities, arresting him for believing in Black-White equality. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates is part of the citizenry, yet the government arrests him for believing in new deities and corrupting the youth with his beliefs. I argue that once you believe in something different from the mainstream, regardless of your connection to the mainstream, the dominant group of people denounces you. You can only speak their truth. For many, truth is perceived as unchanging fact. However, what is perceived by society lies in the hands of those members who dominate it. They determine what is true and what is not. If the dominant people of a society believe in an idea, then that idea is treated as the truth. The idea could be false—a deliberate lie, even—but as long as this group considers it to be true, it remains the truth. For the rest, there is no such phenomenon. If the dominated people believe in a different idea, then this alternative idea becomes a lie. The dominant group is the single entity in society with such an influence. To maintain their influence, the current dominant group must promote their beliefs as the truth, elevating those ideas from their previous status as beliefs. For the truth holds a far stronger connotation than beliefs. The latter appears flimsy and subjective while the former stands unwavering and objective— fitting for a powerful group. I say the truth as opposed to truth because the dominant group considers their truth to be the only truth and, consequently, the truth. Multiple different truths cannot exist. The presence of alternative truth(s) leaves room for questioning the validity and the importance of the dominant-accepted truth, which also constitutes the foundation of society. We use facts when thinking about the world; the dominant attempts to instill in us their own facts by embedding them in our everyday lives. Dominant-accepted truth can be found lodged in our moral code, the same one by which we abide and judges decide. Any challenge to the validity of the dominant-accepted truth could weaken the current dominant group. Thus, the current dominant group sways the government in their favor, ensuring that only their truth stands. The majority of American Whites did not view King as an American citizen: to them, he was just another face to be segregated, another body to be beaten. Their perception of him was significant, for they were and still are the dominant group in American society. They established the norms, and they decided he did not belong to the White majority. He was a Black man, a victim to segregation. Although segregation was based on skin color, it reached past the skin and into the mind. Blacks would be nameless and of least importance yet be constantly singled out by derogatory names. Everywhere they went, “clouds of inferiority” would hang above them (King, 1994, p. 2). The more one experienced being perceived as inferior, the more it infiltrated their thoughts and molded both their perception of themselves and of Whites. This pervasive branding of inferiority indicated to them that their subhuman status was biological, and they absorbed this notion of Black lowliness. At the same time, this inferiority reinforced the notion of Whiteness as necessary yet unattainable for Black people. Black people recognized that in a world inhabited

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and governed by Whites, they would never be viewed as normal. They would never be born with the same worthiness that Whites attribute to themselves. However, Whites still forced their law upon Blacks. Ideologically, White law was not very foreign to Blacks. White law rooted itself in Christianity, and many Blacks were Christians too. White law was characterized by morality, yet in practice, it neglected to have a conscience. When protests for Black and economic freedom occurred, the White clergymen “remained silent behind the anesthetizing security of stained-glass windows” (p. 5). The White church supported the government in its religious justification of laws; in return, the government backed up the “weak, ineffectual voice” of the White church (p. 5). To survive the test of time, the White church dismissed Black believers and their cries for justice as simply “extremist” (p. 4). With inferiority taunting all Blacks and the church abandoning its believers, the white majority twisted and crushed self-image within the Black community. The White majority created a cycle of Black confusion and bitterness, every Black newborn entering this cycle upon its birth. This psychological hold on Black people weakened their community, rendering them incapable of rising against their oppressors. Thus, the White majority secured their power. However, King refutes the permanency of this power imbalance by stating that “oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever” (p. 4). Blacks will realize their abundant natural worth, and their “urge for freedom” will resonate more with them than the malicious words of Whites or the cowardly silence of the White church do (p. 4). King was one of the few who did not succumb to being gaslit by the White majority. He rejected “nobodyness” and expressed himself loudly (p. 2). He made his restlessness known to his oppressors, but this confidence became another obstacle for him. The Whites did not approve of the tension that he sought to build in society (p. 2). Rather than questioning their truth and encountering potential discomfort, they wanted to keep their peace. Releasing their tight grip on society meant losing some of their peace to the undeserving Blacks. Having already entrapped this whole race of people into a negative cycle, acknowledging King and similar figures would undermine their scheme. However, King understood that the White majority felt their power was at risk. To curb their apprehension, he attempted to communicate with them using their own words: through Christianity. In his letter, he reveals his pride in “serving as president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, an organization operating in every Southern state” (p. 1). Here, he uses two rhetorical appeals. He employs ethos, establishing his respectable status as a president of a regional institution. He also employs pathos, explaining how he and affiliate organizations protect Christian values, like our God-given rights. Although he skillfully legitimizes himself as an accomplished, dutiful Christian leader, his subsequent logos about peaceful protest will not go undisputed. Prior to the protest in which he was arrested, King and others implored the White majority to begin “negotiation” for Black rights (p. 2). Degrading enough as it is to negotiate for your own existence, Black interests were either squashed by racist Whites or entertained by moderate Whites. Moderate Whites sympathized with Blacks yet assured them that they could wait longer for justice. This “shallow understanding” of the Black struggle initially bewildered King, but he came to understand the perspective (p. 3). King is in jail for a reason: By being both a powerful Bblack minority member and an individual who voices a

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truth different from the mainstream, he threatens the stability of the governing White majority. The White majority enjoys their orderly “negative peace” at the expense of Blacks (p. 3). Socrates fit the profile of a citizen in Athens. To be counted as a citizen, one had to check several boxes. First, they must be born to Athenian parents; thus, mixed or completely foreign people were not citizens. Secondly, they must be a man; thus, women and male children were not citizens. Lastly, he must be free, for being another man’s slave, or property, meant that one’s rights belonged to his owner; thus, men seen as possessions were not citizens. Socrates was an Athenian-born, free man; thus, Socrates was a citizen. Unlike King’s America, the citizenry was not the majority here. With more requirements for citizenship, Athens excluded the majority of community members. Nevertheless, the Athenian-free-man minority ruled as the governing group. During Socrates’s time, race had yet to be so carefully constructed. While White Athenians ranked above non-Whites and foreigners in societal status, the real determinant of power was property. Like King’s America, White men had successfully acquired all of the possible property to distribute amongst their small group. Their property translated into power, allowing them to expand their assets and influence across Athens. The citizenry created their own government, and Socrates’s trial provides insight into how this government functioned. By directly controlling society through legislation and judiciary, the citizenry became the only group whose opinion mattered. At his trial, Socrates attempted to appeal to the citizenry. One of the charges against him was not believing in the gods. Throughout his defense he insisted “by Zeus,” the head of gods, and “by Hera,” the wife of Zeus (Plato, 2009). He inserted them smoothly, demonstrating how familiar these figures were to him, and how he believed in them enough to throw them in his speech. When explaining the prophecy that he had received from the oracle, he incorporated another god, Delphi, to assure his truthfulness. Socrates portrayed himself as properly religious by believing in the mainstream gods (p. 24). He faced another charge of corrupting the youth. Earlier in his defense, he appeared meek and mature, apologizing for his coarse language due to it being his “first appearance in a court, at the age of seventy” (p. 21). His seniority denoted wisdom, but his apology alleviated the jury of observing age stratification; he manipulated this hierarchical system to his advantage. Later, he used his old age again. He listed 18 men who are present in court, including the scribe of his defense, Plato (p. 36). Some were related to each other, either father and son or brothers. Socrates was well-acquainted with these different generations of citizen families; therefore, he must have been a respectable man. Although he relied on his ties to the citizenry, the jury did not respond to his familiarity. The appeals Socrates attempted were flawed since he was removed from the jury. He opened his defense with a short address to the jury, the “men of Athens.” In the footnote, it stated that Socrates snubbed legal etiquette by not calling them “gentlemen,” reserving the term for those who supported him (pp. 20-21). Rather than referring to them broadly as citizens or as the jury, he emphasized their masculinity to the point where it became savagery. He did not stress that he too was a man, like the 501 men of the large yet homogeneous jury. Then, when he apologized for his coarse language, he asked that the jury treat him kindly like he is a “stranger”

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(p. 21). He had already transformed into a stranger before the citizenry, and this plea to “the majority” of the jury only further separated him from their circle (p. 23). Once Socrates diverged from the normal behavior of his fellow citizens, he lost his status as a citizen. The duty of the citizen is to involve himself in the political realm; for this, he must be an active member. Socrates left the political realm because he strongly disagreed with the decisions the citizenry made. He was guided by a voice that “turns [him] away from something… [that] never encourages [him] to do anything”; this voice inspired him to withdraw from the political realm quietly (p. 34). It was not a real choice though. Socrates feared the inevitable tension that would accompany him voicing his disapproval. Having some sort of impact on people was a priority for him, and he had to “survive for even a short time” to carry out his agenda (p. 34). His right to pick was curtailed. The intolerance of the citizenry forced Socrates into becoming inactive in the political realm and not fulfilling his duty as a citizen. Therefore, the goal of the dominant group is the same in every society: to maintain the status quo that it has fabricated for itself. The makeup of the dominant group varies; both the Athenian citizenry and the American majority grounded their normalcy in race. The Athenian citizenry surpassed the American majority in its requirements for membership by requiring a citizen not only belong to the white race, but also be a wealthy man. In societies where race cannot legally affect citizenship status, the dominant group follows the example of Athenian citizenry. Alexei Navalny is not part of the dominant group in Russia. Although innately patriarchal, the nation is similar to Athens with respect to the system of the dominant group. An oligarchy controls society, as did one in Athens. However, while Athenian oligarchy aligned itself to timocracy, meaning that property owners held the power, Russian oligarchy leans towards plutocracy, in which the wealthy hold power. The current state of the oligarchy remains indefinite––among the chaos Russia has previously assumed a kratocracy when the Communist Party staged a brutal coup and won by means of force. Afterwards, the Communist Party quickly established a meritocracy, endorsing the proletariat and their work ethic. In comparison, the U.S. has not undergone such fluctuations, so the White majority relies heavily on the tradition behind its long-running supremacy. In Russia, the unstable balance of power only adds pressure on the current dominant group; it often has to start somewhat from scratch to build a new reality from its beliefs. Any other opinions or truths would threaten its plan. In the case of Navalny, he is part of the majority as an ethnic Russian. However, the wealthy minority leads the nation as the dominant group. To secure their position, the plutocracy engages in acts of corruption. For example, Navalny, head of the Anti-Corruption Foundation, reported that former president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev accepted an estimated $70 billion rubles ($1.19 billion USD) worth of bribes from oligarchs (Navalny, 2017). Navalny continuously exposed other dishonorable activity, releasing compiled evidence in the form of Youtube videos or social media posts (Glazunova, 2020). These revelations dismantled the artificial reality that the oligarchs had been using to hide their greed. Navalny voiced the doubt and distrust harbored by the progressives, another minority in Putinist Russia. The dominant group of wealthy individuals, fearful of losing their power, did what they do best: they stopped

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him from speaking up. Like King, he was arrested several times for protesting against the government. These days, diffusing information is much easier than what it used to be. With social media, the voice of a single person can reach the minds of countless people; these people can then organize themselves into groups, and these groups can unite as a movement. The dominant group has always manipulated the media, but the ever-changing, unpredictable nature of online media leaves room for more hands. Hundreds of sites and platforms appear constantly, reopening under new names if shut down by the government. Hackers maneuver around loopholes and individual users install VPNs. The cyber community is developing at a speed ahead of what the government can fully control. The imprisonment of Navalny offers a juxtaposition. His work is modern and innovative in the political realm. He relates to the younger generation not by forming their beliefs, which the government does through institutions like public schools, but by revealing the truth that their fabricated beliefs oppose. Imprisonment, on the other hand, is an ancient tactic to silence dissidents. The government physically confines people who try to speak about their reality. While it also performs censorship in the online world, its favored imprisonment method results in retrogration. Furthermore, the security the government achieves with imprisonment is only temporary. New dissidents will continue to emerge, to organize, and to fight—opposition cannot be tamed. As the online world advances, the government will continue its struggle to erase different truths. Imprisoning more people and censoring content is not enough to catch up. The impact that King and Socrates each had on their respective societies demonstrates that despite the actions of the dominant group, truth will be spoken and heard.

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References Glazunova, S. (2020). ‘Four Populisms’ of Alexey Navalny: An Analysis of Russian NonSystemic Opposition Discourse on YouTube. Media and Communication, 8(4), 121–132. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v8i4.3169 Kazun, A. (2019). To cover or not to cover: Alexei Navalny in Russian media. International Area Studies Review, 22(4), 312–326. https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865919846727 King, M. L., Jr. (1994). Letter from the Birmingham Jail. Harper. Navalny, A. (2017, March 2). Don’t call him “Dimon” [Video]. https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=qrwlk7_GF9g Plato. (2009). Apology (J. J. Helm, Ed.). Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers.

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THE FUTURE OF ABORTION: JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION V. DOBBS BY EMILY WILLIAMS In 2019, the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit heard Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Dobbs. The plaintiff in this case is Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the only facility that provides abortions in Mississippi. They took action on behalf of themselves and their patients against the defendant Thomas Dobbs, the State Health Officer of the Mississippi Department of Health. The Women’s Health Organization Clinic was challenging the constitutionality of Mississippi’s Gestational Age Act, which prohibits abortions after 15 weeks unless for a medical emergency or severe fetal abnormality. This case came from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, where the judge granted the Clinic’s motion to limit discovery to the issue of viability and granted them summary judgement. The defendant appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The appeal is set to be heard by the Supreme Court in December of 2021 (Hassan, 2021). The question in this case is whether the Mississippi law is an unconstitutional ban on pre-viability abortions, especially in reference to the precedent set in landmark abortion cases. The Fifth Circuit decision relied heavily on the district court’s decision. In March of 2018, Mississippi enacted House Bill 1510, the Gestational Age Act. The legislature’s argument for banning abortions after 15 weeks’ gestation was that the procedure would most likely be an evacuation method, about which it stated that “the intentional commitment of such acts ... is a barbaric practice, dangerous for the maternal patient, and demeaning to the medical profession” (Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Dobbs, 2019). They also argued that scientific developments show that the ability to sense outside stimulation and to open and close fingers begins at 12 weeks’ gestation. Finally, they argued that abortion carries an increased risk for the mother as her gestational age increases, and that the state of Mississippi has a legitimate interest in protecting women’s health. The Clinic argued that such a law is unconstitutional and violates the established right of a woman to pre-viability abortion. Immediately after the Act was passed, Jackson Women’s Health Organization not only filed suit challenging the act, but also requested and was granted an emergency temporary restraining order. Given the Supreme Court’s viability framework, the Act’s lawfulness was dependent on whether or not the 15-week mark was before or after viability. Because of this, Mississippi’s state interests would be irrelevant, and the State’s discovery was, in fact, aimed at rejecting the Supreme Court’s viability framework rather than trying to make the Act work within that framework. The Women’s Health Organization submitted evidence that a fetus is not viable at 15 weeks. The State conceded that point and said they had no evidence of viability but were more interested in whether their state interests could justify the Act. The district court ruled that the Act was unconstitutional since it was clear that states cannot ban abortions prior to viability (Jackson v. Dobbs, 2019). On appeal, the State made several arguments, including that the Supreme Court's decision

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in Gonzales v. Carhart preserves the possibility that a “state's interest in protecting unborn life can justify a pre-viability restriction on abortion,” and that the Act imposes no undue burden since it only reduces the window in which women can elect to have abortions by one week. Additionally, they argued that the district court overreached in granting a permanent injunctive relief to the Clinic, and that the Clinic lacked standing to bring a facial challenge since they do not perform abortions after 16 weeks in the first place. The Fifth Circuit Court again found, as had been decided by the district court, that the Act was unconstitutional. First, there was no denying—not even on behalf of the State itself—that at 15 weeks the fetus would not be viable. Second, the State argued that their Act was a regulation on abortions since it stipulated exceptions (e.g. medically dangerous situations), and the only clinic in the state would not perform an abortion after 16 weeks, so it made only a week difference. Although a regulation that does not pose an undue burden may be constitutional when weighing the state’s interest against the women’s right to an elective abortion, a prohibition is unconstitutional. Regardless of the State's interests, the ban would be unconstitutional since “a State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability” (Jackson v. Dobbs, 2019). The Act limits the availability of abortions to a specific gestational age that undisputedly prevents the abortions of some non-viable fetuses. The Appeal Court wrote that Roe v. Wade has continuously been reaffirmed and established a woman's right to choose an abortion before viability. The Circuit Judge wrote, “States may regulate abortion procedures prior to viability so long as they do not impose an undue burden on the woman's right, but they may not ban abortions. The law at issue is a ban.” The Court reiterated that Casey and Gonzales did not tolerate bans on pre-viability abortions in situations such as the one in question, and that this Act directly conflicts with Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Finally, the Court held that the district court did not overreach in granting a permanent injunctive relief, and that this law would pose a substantial obstacle in a large fraction of cases. Therefore, the law violated the long-established right of a woman to an abortion prior to viability (Jackson v. Dobbs, 2019). In recent years, Republican controlled states have attempted to pass anti-abortion legislation, which were all struck down in appeals courts because of Supreme Court precedent. If this law were to pass, it would be devastating for thousands of women. It would endanger those who cannot travel to another state and choose to take matters into their own hands. The state of Mississippi has announced that it hopes to overturn Roe v. Wade, and there is now a 6-3 conservative majority on the Court with Justice Barrett. Between this case and the new abortion law in Texas, there is fear surrounding even the slightest possibility that more rights could slowly be taken away from women. If Roe were to be overturned, about 11 states that currently have “trigger bans” would ban abortion completely (Totenberg, 2021). The instability caused by overturning this landmark decision would not be in the best interest of the country.

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References Hassan, A. (2021, December 1). What to Know About the Mississippi Abortion Law Challenging Roe v. Wade. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/article/mississippi-abortionlaw.html Jackson Women’s Health Org. V. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019). Totenberg, N. (2021, May 17). In Challenge To Roe, Supreme Court To Review Mississippi Abortion Law. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2021/05/17/997478374/supreme-court-to-reviewmississippi-abortion-ban

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THE ILLEGALITY OF THE MIGRANT PROTECTION PROTOCOLS AND THE ARGUMENT TO ELIMINATE THEM BY ROSEMARIE GOLDSTEIN The Trump Administration enacted many controversial and often racist immigration policies throughout its four years, and one piece of legislation that stands out as incredibly harmful is the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), which forced hopeful asylum seekers from Central America to stay in Mexico while they waited for their immigration court hearings. Because of the high number of asylum seekers showing up at the southern border of the United States, the Trump Administration created various policies with the purpose of stopping migrants and asylum seekers from coming to the border and from applying for asylum. One such policy is the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), also known as the Remain in Mexico program, enacted in December 2018 as a way to deter migrants from arriving at the border and to prevent asylum seekers from not showing up to their court hearings while they wait in the United States (Department of Homeland Security, 2018). To justify this inhumane policy, the Department of Homeland Security claimed that migrants would declare they had a credible fear of persecution in their home countries just because they knew that while they waited for their court hearings, they could stay in the United States — and, the DHS reasoned, “disappear” in this time between arriving and their court hearing (2018). As the name “Remain in Mexico” suggests, they were forced to stay in camps in Mexico near the border, but left to provide for themselves. O’Toole, a reporter for the Los Angeles Times, suggests that these asylum seekers had to live “in cities that the U.S. State Department considers some of the most dangerous in the world”, and many of these asylum seekers have been “attacked, sexually assaulted, and extorted” while waiting in Mexico (2019). This is incredibly damaging to the mental and physical health of the asylum seekers and hurts their chances of gaining this protection granted by asylum; they stay in Mexico but their hearings are in the United States, so they must often go through a long process of traveling to the border, crossing the border, and then arriving to the court in time for their hearing. The Department of Homeland Security released new guidelines after President Biden’s inauguration and “suspended new enrollment” into the Remain in Mexico policy in order to work towards replacing it with a better program (2021). There are still asylum seekers waiting in Mexico for their cases to be processed as the Biden Administration has not yet established a better program that will help to process these asylum seekers and that will find a place for them to stay within the United States while they wait. The Migrant Protection Protocols are detrimental because they hurt the asylum seekers’ chances of gaining asylum and often harm the migrants themselves, so this program must be completely terminated and replaced with an economical and humane solution. By establishing a “credible fear” of past or future persecution, migrants at a country’s border can apply for asylum so that they do not have to return to their home country; this allows them to eventually follow the process for citizenship in the country they seek asylum in and protects them from future persecution (American Immigration Council, 2014). Asylum seekers

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can either apply for asylum affirmatively, if they are not in removal proceedings, or defensively, if they are in removal proceedings from the United States (American Immigration Council, 2014). The process for gaining asylum is often a lengthy one and can be burdensome to migrants because they must prove to officers and immigration judges that their fear of persecution is a valid fear. Because of increasingly unsafe conditions in many Central American countries, the number of migrants arriving at the southern border of the United States continues to increase, even during the global COVID-19 pandemic (Ellicott, 2021). Many are seeking asylum, but far too often they are turned away from the border because their fear of persecution is not seen as justified or because they must wait for their asylum application to be processed. Because there are so many asylum seekers at the border, many Republican lawmakers are in favor of stronger border control. Republican Senator Marco Rubio’s news release after the Biden Administration suspended the MPP shows how Republican lawmakers view this policy as helpful to the United States’ border control because they believe that ending it will lead to “‘more chaos at the border, more lives exploited by evil human traffickers, and more illegal immigration’” (2021). People who agree with this argument believe that border security is more important than taking in refugees who desperately need asylum and often believe the policies in place, especially the Migrant Protection Protocols, help the migrants’ applications to be processed in a timely manner while they wait in a safe environment. This could not be further from the truth: their applications pile up while they live in dangerous conditions. The MPP create more chaos on the border and hurt more migrants as they live in areas thick with kidnapping, sexual assault, and other crimes that they fled from (O’Toole, 2019). These migrants left their countries in most cases to leave violence behind and create a safer life for themselves and for their families, just like each person has the right to do. United States residents move within the country constantly for jobs or to leave a dangerous situation; these migrants are doing the exact same thing, just on a larger scale since they are not safe anywhere within their home countries. Sending these migrants back over the border to wait in Mexico hurts them and they would be safer within the United States — it is possible to house them in the United States where it is safe and where they can be under strict supervision while waiting for their court hearings. People who agree with the Migrant Protection Protocols do not take basic human rights into consideration and do not think about how the MPP led to various human rights violations. Holding people in an unsafe place is not more moral than allowing them to enter the U.S. border and to live in the country under observation while they wait for their asylum applications to be processed. There are other policies that can be explored that take national security into consideration while prioritizing the needs of migrants before their immigration court hearings. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stated that they had the authority to create and “implement” the Migrant Protection Protocols under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically under INA § 235(b)(2)(C). According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), this section of the act states that any migrant at the border under removal proceedings, which includes asylees, may be returned to the country they arrived from — for these asylum seekers, their country of arrival would be Mexico — if there is not substantial belief that the migrant would be tortured or persecuted in the country of arrival (2019). However, there

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are exceptions to INA § 235(b)(2)(C), with one being that DHS cannot return any migrants if they are “subject to expedited removal”; under this process of expedited removal, migrants are removed from the United States without a court hearing (Harrington & Smith, 2019). Harrington and Smith, two legislative attorneys, reasoned that most asylum seekers are “generally subject to expedited removal,” and thus the DHS violates the law when they claim to return these migrants under the authority of INA § 235(b)(2)(C) as these asylum seekers do not fall under their “return authority” (2019). The Migrant Protection Protocols do not protect any migrants, and the Department of Homeland Security cannot remove these migrants from the United States to their country of arrival — Mexico — under expedited removal proceedings because the INA § 235(b) (2)(C) explicitly states that the DHS does not have the return authority to do so. In addition, the policy also calls for USCIS officers to interview the asylum seekers in order to determine whether or not the asylum seeker is “more likely than not to be persecuted in Mexico” (Department of Homeland Security, 2019). Many are fleeing gang violence from their home countries, and it is often hard to escape these gangs no matter where they end up (Silverstein et al., 2021). While a USCIS officer can assume that an asylum seeker will be safe in Mexico, this may not entirely be the case, especially since the regions of Mexico that the Department of Homeland Security forces them to wait in are known to be extremely dangerous; this harms the asylum seekers’ chances of making it to their immigration court hearing and their chances of even staying safe at all while waiting in Mexico (O’Toole, 2019). This violates the law because the Migrant Protection Protocols do not properly assess the danger that the migrants are likely to be in and can knowingly put them in harm’s way in order to deter them and others from seeking asylum in the United States. The Biden Administration must completely abolish the Remain in Mexico policy and create a new policy that is legal and will allow for migrants to live in a safe area while they wait for their court hearings. Besides the legal aspect of the Remain in Mexico policy, the program is incredibly traumatizing to the asylum seekers. One study conducted by Silverstein et al. found that the MPP led to increased and continued trauma for the asylum seekers, and “may have been harmful to the physical and psychological health of enrolled asylum seekers” (2021). The organization Doctors Without Borders also noted, based on observations by teams in Mexico, that the asylum seekers lived in areas with unsafe conditions and that the Mexican government did not provide “adequate humanitarian assistance” to these asylum seekers. The United States cannot, within reason and within the law, allow this humanitarian crisis to continue along its southern border. One asylum seeker in the MPP, Daniela, left her home country of El Salvador at the age of nineteen in order to escape gang violence, as reported by Molly O’Toole of the Los Angeles Times. After registering for asylum at the border, waiting, and finally crossing the border to meet with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, she was sent back to wait in Mexico until her court hearing. She did not feel safe going back there and told them this, but the CBP officials did not do anything with that information and forced her to wait again in Tijuana, one of the many dangerous regions along that border where migrants are living while they wait for their applications to be processed. Daniela, along with so many others just like her, are kept in harm’s way and therefore are often prevented from going forward with this process for gaining asylum

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and eventually citizenship. The trauma that these migrants experience is heightened through this Remain in Mexico policy and minimized by the CBP officials as they ignore the experiences of asylum seekers and force them back into these dangerous living conditions. Migrants risk everything they have to come to the United States to escape various forms of violence, and the United States government has a duty to not put them back in harm’s way in order to deter them from seeking asylum here. Because of the United States’ position on the world stage and because of a long history of interfering with the region, the U.S. government has an obligation to help asylum seekers from Central America. In the twentieth century, the United States created multiple policies that caused most countries in Latin America to become dependent on the United States in many ways, especially through their economies (Bitar, 1984). This led to the inequality and poverty that persists today and pushes many migrants out of their home countries in Central America, so the United States has a duty to help asylum seekers that leave because of issues caused by these inequalities. Those who wish to decrease the number of immigrants the United States accepts or those who want stricter immigration laws argue that these migrants do not have a real reason to seek asylum. They believe that most asylum seekers make up stories and do not have real reasons for needing asylum in the United States. The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board claims that “asylum claimants may avoid immediate deportation simply by convincing an immigration officer that they have a ‘credible fear’ that they will be persecuted if they return to their home country” (2019). By using the term “simply by convincing”, the Editorial Board leads the audience to believe that asylum seekers are making up their stories about why they need asylum. This article only considers the pull factors for migrants to the United States, such as a safer place to live and often better quality of life, and does not at all think about the push factors that force many migrants to leave their homes, such as gang violence in their communities, domestic violence, torture, or other ongoing persecution. Community organizer Julio Ruiz has personal experience working with undocumented workers and other migrants who come to the United States from Central America, and notes that nobody is ever extremely excited to leave their homes: choosing to immigrate to the United States is always a last resort. The article completely ignores the human rights violations occurring at the border and in these detention centers within the United States and in Mexico as a part of the MPP; they did not fully explain the situation at the border and only looked at it through the lens of the politically-conservative ideology. One possible alternative to the Migrant Protection Protocols is to house migrants with family members within the United States while they wait for their court cases to proceed. The American Immigration Lawyers Association, as reported by the news organization CQ Roll Call, has “called for Biden to grant humanitarian parole to MPP asylum seekers'' (2020), which will allow them to stay in the United States, and the other main option right now is to allow asylum seekers to live in the United States with family members through the “government’s ‘alternatives to detention’ program” (DeChalus, 2020) with many restrictions such as home check-ins. This is a humane alternative to forcing migrants to stay in Mexico while they wait for their applications to be processed, and is also noted by DeChalus in her article in CQ Roll Call to be “viewed as a more cost-effective option to placing migrants in federal detention centers.” Allowing migrants to

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live with relatives in the United States will benefit them because it will decrease the amount of trauma they experience and will benefit U.S. taxpayers because it will allow taxpayers’ money to go to a better program. I call for the United States government to completely eliminate the Migrant Protection Protocols from its immigration policy and to establish a new program that will help the migrants’ overall health. In the past and in the present day, we have always felt the urge to fight against inhumane conditions and policies, and this situation is no different. Research shows how much pain the Remain in Mexico program causes. We must replace the MPP with a program that is safer and better not only because this will help migrants, but also because of our commitment to protect the rights of others here and around the world.

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References American Immigration Council. (2014, August 27). Asylum in the United States. American Immigration Council. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-unitedstates Bitar, S. (1984). United States-Latin American relations: Shifts in economic power and implications for the future. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 26(1), 3–31. https://doi.org/10.2307/165505 DeChalus, C. (2020, December 11). Biden’s immigration problem: How to end ‘Remain in Mexico.’ Roll Call. https://www.rollcall.com/2020/12/11/bidens-immigration-problem-howto-end-remain-in-mexico/ Department of Homeland Security. (2018, December 20). Secretary Nielsen announces historic action to confront illegal immigration. Department of Homeland Security. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/12/20/secretary-nielsen-announces-historic-action-confrontillegal-immigration Department of Homeland Security. (2021, February 17). Migrant protection protocols. Department of Homeland Security. https://www.dhs.gov/migrant-protection-protocols Doctors Without Borders. (2019, September 5). US ‘Remain in Mexico’ policy endangers lives of asylum seekers in Tamaulipas state. Doctors Without Borders - USA. https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/us-remain-mexicopolicy-endangers-lives-asylum-seekers-tamaulipas Editorial Board. (2019, March 31). The Border Asylum Crisis. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-border-asylum-crisis-11554062066 Ellicott, V. (2021). Immigration overhaul. CQ Researcher, 31(11), 1–24. Harrington, B., & Smith, H. R. (2019). “Migrant Protection Protocols”: Legal Issues Related to DHS’s Plan to Require Arriving Asylum Seekers to Wait in Mexico. Congressional Research Service. O’Toole, M. (2019, August 28). Trump immigration policy appears to violate U.S. law, officials warn. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-08-28/trumpadministration-pushes-thousands-to-mexico-to-await-asylum-cases Policy memorandum, (2019). Rubio, M. (2021, February 19). Rubio on Biden Ending “Remain in Mexico” Policy. Congressional Documents and Publications; Federal Information & News Dispatch. https://www.proquest.com/docview/2491622134/fulltext/C88A74967D844214PQ/1? accountid=14953 Ruiz, J. (2021, May 14). Undocumented Workers Rights [Zoom Event]. Silverstein, M. C., Long, R. F. P., Burner, E., Parmar, P., & Schneberk, T. W. (2021). Continued trauma: A thematic analysis of the asylum-seeking experience under the migrant protection protocols. Health Equity, 5(1), 277–287. https://doi.org/10.1089/heq.2020.0144

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PETTY PUNISHMENT: HOW U.S. IMMIGRATION LAWS CRIMINALIZE MISDEMEANORS WITH DETENTION CAMPS BY EMMA LEE

Introduction On January 24, 1995, former President Bill Clinton addressed the American public about the criminal activity of immigrants “plaguing” the nation. In his State of the Union Speech, Clinton said, “All Americans … are rightly disturbed.” He later also said, “We are a nation of immigrants. But we are also a nation of law” (Clinton, 1995). Indeed, Clinton would push America closer to a “nation of law” the following year by introducing immigration laws that altered the course of border control and punishment. According to journalist Dana Lind of Vox, these laws established the current nature of immigration today, “where deportation is a constant and plausible threat” (Lind, 2016). Now, it is not uncommon to hear horror stories of families being separated through deportation or children kept in cages at the border. The U.S., a nation whose heritage is embedded within immigrants, has become the one to oppress them. To understand this development, an examination at the history of immigration law will reveal the established patterns of mass incarceration and deportation of immigrants, thus revealing opportunities to reform and change an infamously broken system. History of Immigration Laws and Punishment To fully understand how the U.S. came to mass incarcerate its immigrants and systematically deprive them of human rights, it is imperative to first examine the history of U.S. immigration patterns and the ensuing laws. Starting in the early 20th century, the grounds for deportation remained relatively consistent. According to Melissa Cook, the U.S. government has always grounded the qualifications of deportation in “commission of felonies and crimes involving moral turpitude” (Cook, 2003). However, in 1988, this all changed with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act during the War on Drugs, which was a movement to reduce illegal drug trade in the United States (Cook, 2003). Cook points out that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was primarily aimed at immigrants due to “debates in the House of Representatives suggest[ing] a concern over the growing number of drugs and weapons crimes committed by immigrants, as well as a belief that felonious immigrants were evading deportation” (Cook, 2003). Fueled by these fears, Congress introduced the concept of aggravated felony within the Act, a new provision of deportable offenses limited to “serious crimes,” such as murder, drug trafficking, and firearm trafficking (Cook, 2003). If a non-citizen immigrant—legal or not—were to be convicted of an aggravated felony, then they would not only be deported through an accelerated process, but also “barred … from seeking readmission into the United States for ten years” (Cook, 2003). Clearly, some of the harshest punishments outlined in the Act specifically targeted immigrants, in effect branding them as the enemy in the War on Drugs.

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Unfortunately, this would not be the only problem stemming from the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. According to Cook, the aggravated felony provision was unprecedented within immigration laws: for the first time, it gave the government grounds to establish specific crimes punishable by deportation outside the traditional “commission of felonies and … involving moral turpitude” (Cook, 2003). While at a first glance, the aggravated felony provision was little more than a means to protect American citizens from criminal immigrants, the danger lies in how an aggravated felony was defined. The federal government now had the power to incarcerate and deport non-citizens for almost any crime they wanted—as long as a law defined it as an aggravated felony. Ultimately, the new provision significantly leveraged the U.S.’ own interests over the interests of the immigrants, and anti-immigration advocates continued to push for the intolerance of criminal non-citizens. The Immigration Act of 1990 was the first subsequent immigration law to capitalize on the flexibility of aggravated felony. It changed the definition of aggravated felony to include more “serious crimes”; however, as Cook points out, said additional “serious crimes” were actually just minor drug charges and violent misdemeanors (Cook, 2003). However, in 1990, minor drug charges and violent misdemeanors could now cause legal and illegal non-citizens alike to be detained and deported. Cook reports that the Act caused “the number of undocumented noncitizens in prison [to be] six times greater than ten years before,” and that “80% of the undocumented individuals who were imprisoned had been convicted of narcotics violations, compared with approximately 50% of all federal prisoners” (Cook, 2003). This statistic only fueled anti-immigration sentiments as more Americans grew concerned about the number of criminals amongst immigrants. The 1996 Immigration Laws Two watershed immigration laws were enacted in 1996, partly because of rising pressure from the public for stricter immigration control. Other statistics were released displaying the increasing incarceration rates of non-citizens, augmenting the proportion of criminals amongst immigrant communities. Bill Clinton subsequently signed the Antiterroism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibilty Act (IIRIRA), stating that they would “crack down on illegal immigration” without “punishing those living in the states legally” (Shahani, 2019). However, as deportation reports rolled out, Clinton’s statement turned out to be a lie. It did not simply “crack down” on immigration at the border, it devastated the livelihoods of immigrants already living in the United States. The AEDPA would too expand the list of crimes under the aggravated felony provision to include “bribery, counterfeiting or mutilating a passport, obstruction of justice, gambling offenses, and transportation for the purposes of prostitution” (Cook, 2003). Moreover, the AEDPA “explicitly bars any aggravated felon from applying for discretionary relief,” thus disallowing a judge to take into account factors such as “family ties, length of residence, rehabilitation, service in the armed forces, history of employment, community service, and hardship to family members” when considering if deportation were to be an inequitable punishment (Cook, 2003). In other words, judges must adjudicate solely based on the crime, and not contextualize the felon

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with other circumstances. As Cook remarks, this was especially problematic for lawful permanent residents because they likely had families, important jobs, and established lives in the United States: “[D]eportation was effectively banishment from one’s home” (Cook, 2003). The implications of the AEDPA would be exacerbated by the IIRIRA, perhaps the most controversial and damning law for non-citizens. The IIRIRA instituted an “expedited removal” of convicted aggravated felons that allows them to be deported before they even see an immigration judge—a blatant violation of due process and, therefore, a disrespect of the courts’ discretion. Worse, the IIRIRA applied the aggravated felony provision and all its newly included crimes retroactively (an ex post facto law), meaning that one could get deported for a crime they committed years before it even became a deportable offense. Normally, the ex post facto clause in Article I of the Constitution would prohibit the retroactive application of the IIRIRA; however, the Supreme Court upheld this ability of Congress due to the fact that deportation is a civil and not criminal proceeding (Cook, 2003). This ruling drew sharp criticism from pro-immigration advocates, pointing out the hypocrisy in how immigrants were supposedly declared as not belonging in criminal proceedings, yet they were deemed as criminals by politicians, arrested as criminals by I.C.E, and treated as criminals in detention camps. Pro-immigration lawyers dubbed the IIRIRA “the mother of all ex post facto laws forbidden by the Constitution” (Cook, 2003). As for the ones directly targeted by the IIRIRA, immigrants braced for the worst. Punishment through Detention Camps Detention centers are the result of funneling immigrants through unjust immigration laws, and it is no secret as to why this is extremely unhealthy for immigrants. In June 2020, The Human Rights Journal of Harvard Public School of Health declared that the federal government had no excuse to ignore the mounds of evidence pointing directly to the human rights violations and public health misconduct in detention centers. Photos, public health reports, and testimonies from detainees and immigration officers have revealed horrific living conditions: cold, unsanitary, and overcrowded cells of centers; lack of privacy; sleep deprivation; severely inadequate medical care; negligence; physical and mental abuse; sexual assault of children; and inadequate meals (Saadi, De Trinidad Young, Patler, Estrada, & Venters, 2020). Moreover, The Human Rights Journal states that immigrants can stay in detention camps indefinitely when awaiting deportation, as determined by the IIRIRA. With immigrants “serving a sentence” in waiting for their deportation, coupled with the horrific abuses happening within, detention centers are very close to a prison experience (the detainees even have to wear gray uniforms) (Saadi, De Trinidad Young, Patler, Estrada, & Venters, 2020). These circumstances not only make it even more unreasonable to not consider deportation as a criminal proceeding, but they also embody how overly harsh the immigration laws are. The AEDPA and IIRIRA enables the human rights of immigrants to be violated by automatically incarcerating them to the deplorable detention centers, no matter what “felony” they committed (as insinuated earlier, a large proportion of crimes considered an aggravated felony are, under normal, non-immigration laws, simply a misdemeanor). There is no range of criminal punishment for these non-citizens, so the two automatic punishments available—detention and deportation—are hardly appropriate for

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every crime. This is ultimately demonstrative of how U.S. immigration laws treat immigrants like a monolithic group—everyone who commits a crime is a felon and therefore deserved the worst punishment within the criminal justice system. Detention centers are just another one of the instances in which immigrants are excluded from many privileges afforded to normal citizens such as legal assistance, a proper judge hearing, and due process procedure. Aftermath of 1996 As mentioned before, the implications of the AEDPA and IIRIRA devastated non-citizens. Cook was one of the critics who slammed the Clinton administration for these new immigration laws, emphasizing that many of the new crimes considered an aggravated felony were neither aggravated/violent nor severe enough to be a felony. In fact, many of them would normally be considered a simple misdemeanor, or a “lesser” crime (“Misdemeanor,” n.d.). Reports of immigrants being detained and deported for “felonies” like shoplifting, trespassing, disturbing the peace, writing a bad check, fabricating a passport, and basic traffic violation spread like wildfire (Cook, 2003). In 1997, the New York Times published the story of Xuam Wilson, a lawful permanent resident who had not stepped foot in her home country, Vietnam, since she was four years old. Yet, she was being faced with deportation and separation from her three children because she forged a $19.83 check at a grocery store nine years prior (Dugger, 1997). In another story: Nigerian mother and lawful permanent resident Olufolake Olaleye was under deportation proceedings for shoplifting a dress in 1994(Solis, 2019). The National Immigration Project details how Emma Mendez de Hay was sent to a detention camp for helping her cousin translate something from Spanish to English on the phone, unaware that she was communicating with a potential drug buyer (Jorjani, 2013). These stories are not unique. The immigration laws producing these stories are, at its very core, unjust and oppressive. The extreme punishments inflicted upon non-citizens for usually misdemeanors essentially criminalizes their very existence, as they are devoid of human rights in detention camps. According to The Atlantic journalist Aarti Shahani, the AEDPA and IIRIRA have built a “robust pipeline for mass deportation” that leads to human-rights abuses in the detention camps at the border (Clinton, 1995). Existing immigration laws, fueled by xenophobic intentions, have created a framework within which the government works to systematically mass incarcerate immigrants and violate their human rights, all while justifying this to be under the law. Immigrants are having their livelihood uprooted and being effectively banished from the United States for misdemeanors, which would otherwise only be punished with fines and community service for U.S. citizens (Essex, 2019). This vast disparity between the punishment administered to immigrants and citizens illustrates how immigrants are held at a higher standard of lawfulness that is enforced using unjust and oppressive laws. Healing a Broken System Pro and anti-immigration advocates alike believe that the immigration system is broken. The ongoing debate largely concerns itself with how the immigration system ought to be changed. This research has made clear why the American immigration system is at a critical point

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and in desperate need of reform. However, anti-immigration advocates express anxiety toward loosening immigration laws, mainly due to fears of potential terrorist threats. According to Dan Cadman, a researcher of the Center for Immigration Studies, the main point of immigration control is to protect the citizens. Immigration laws prevent potential terrorists from wreaking havoc upon American society, and administer swift punishment to immigrants who inflict violence upon communities (Karaim, 2015). Cadman points out that between 1975 and 2017, 86% of the murders caused by terrorists in the U.S. were from foreign-born immigrants; if the U.S. did not have the strict immigration laws that it does now, then that would only allow even more unnecessary deaths (Karaim, 2015). To an extent, it is necessary to account for potential terrorists within immigrant groups—immigration legislation will always address that. However, a closer look at Cadman’s statistic will reveal that out of the 192 foreign-born terrorists, 183 of them were actually legal immigrants. The Cato Institute reports that “nine were illegal immigrants, 57 were lawful permanent residents (LPRs), 21 were students, 1 entered on a K-1 fiancé(e) visa, 25 were refugees, 11 were asylum seekers, 41 were tourists on various visas, and 11 were from Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries” (Nowrasteh, 2020). Since nearly all of the foreign-born terrorists were legal immigrants, it becomes painfully clear that the terrorist threat cannot be pinned on illegal immigrants. If anything, illegal immigrants are even more likely to not commit such felonies because it will mean a certain deportation for them. The argument that loosening immigration laws will allow a potential increase in domestic terrorist attacks is old and unfounded, existing mostly in hypotheticals. On the other hand, immigrants are currently facing inhuman crises caused by unjust and oppressive immigration laws, an issue that has been ignored by the nation for far too long. The most necessary changes will come threefold—strictly defining aggravated felony, revoking the retroactive application of the IIRIRA, and implementing laws upholding human rights and public health safety in detention centers. As previously explained, the definition of “aggravated felony” has been abused to incriminate more immigrants for crimes that are not considered felonies. Enforcement of this provision is the driving reason behind increasing numbers of immigrants being sent to detention centers. While it is agreed that there ought to be some flexibility in defining this provision, it does not need to be to such an extreme. A single piece of legislation passed under the Clinton Administration has essentially banished thousands of legal immigrants for crimes that are not qualified to be felonies. The definition of aggravated felony should specify a list of applicable crimes that are indeed egregious and severe. While this may seem redundant, it would serve as precedent and a buffer should a politician try to include anything less than a severe, violent crime under aggravated felony. Second, the ex post facto aspect of the IIRIRA must be revoked as such laws are deemed unconstitutional. The Founding Fathers understood that this is the epitome of unjust and inhumane, for it does not recognize everyone equal under the law: it punishes people for crimes they already committed, therefore limiting their opportunities to better themselves, and has the potential to carry out prejudice against certain groups by criminalizing things that were not previously punishable. It is ironic that the U.S. institutes stricter immigration laws to shut

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loopholes yet creates its own loophole by classifying deportation as a civil not criminal proceeding, thus giving itself the foundations for systematically incarcerating non-citizens. The retroactive application of the IIRIRA is too harsh, and as demonstrated through the aforementioned examples, it devastates the established livelihoods of immigrants. If the U.S. were to continue enforcing an oppressive, ex post facto law to exile immigrants, then it has no right to continue calling itself as “nation of immigrants.” Lastly, if there should be stricter regulations anywhere, they should be enforced upon detention centers. For too long, ICE has gotten away with abusing its detainees and allowing more than 150 immigrants to die while in its custody. Detention centers need to collaborate with public health officials to create new rules that do not endanger women and children detainees, that do not deplete immigrants of medical services, serve inadequate meals, or keep people in unsanitary conditions. Moreover, detention centers need to allow detainees to have legal assistance and ensure that they receive a hearing with a judge before deportation. As mentioned, a lack of hearing with a judge is a disregard of due process procedures and a judge’s role—for such practices to happen in detention centers sets a dangerous precedent that it can happen elsewhere. Immigrants are people with their own stories, and they deserve to voice them in court. To deprive them of that opportunity is to consider them as less than human and to oppressively alienate them from American society. The immigration system is not just broken: it is prejudiced, xenophobic, and oppressive. Some of our own presidents, like Bill Clinton, ran election campaigns that emphasized taking pride in immigrants, dubbing the U.S. as a true “nation of immigrants,” and yet enacted some of the most devastating immigration laws. Immigrants are expected to assimilate into society, yet the U.S. government works within a legal framework that systematically alienates them by holding them to different standards and administering unjust, inhumane punishments. Thus, this research has presented a larger dichotomy about immigrants—throughout history, they are used as a symbol of hope, courage, and freedom, yet in the eyes of the current politics, they are nothing more than criminals, terrorists, and animals. The stories immigrants carry across borders is more complex than black-and-white laws, but a “nation of immigrants” and a “nation of laws” continue to be pitted against each other. This research has shown that these two identities can very well coexist and strengthen history and culture. Until legislators realize this, America will continue to undermine the immigrants that made this country great.

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References Clinton, W. J. (1995, January 24). Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union (G. Peters & J. T. Woolley, Trans.). The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/221902 Cook, M. (2003). Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation. Boston College Third World Law Journal, 23(2), 293. Dugger, C. W. (1997, August 11). After Crime, She Made a New Life, but Now Faces Deportation. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/11/world/after-crimeshe-made-a-new-life-but-now-faces-deportation.html Essex, A. (2019). Misdemeanor Sentencing Trends. National Conference of State Legislatures. https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/misdemeanor-sentencing-trends.aspx Jorjani, R. (2013). The All-In-One Guide to Defeating ICE Hold Requests. National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild. Karaim, R. (2015). Immigrant Detention. CQ Researcher, 25(38), 889–912. Lind, D. (2016, April 28). The disastrous, forgotten 1996 law that created today’s immigration problem. Vox. https://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11515132/iirira-clinton-immigration Misdemeanor. (n.d.). Legal Information Institute. Retrieved December 20, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/misdemeanor Nowrasteh, A. (2019, May 7). Terrorists by Immigration Status and Nationality: A Risk Analysis, 1975–2017. Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/terroristsimmigration-status-nationality-risk-analysis-1975-2017 Saadi, A., De Trinidad Young, M.-E., Patler, C., Estrada, J. L., & Venters, H. (2020). Understanding US Immigration Detention. Health and Human Rights, 22(1), 187–197. Shahani, A. (2019, November 11). Bill Clinton Owes My Father an Apology. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/time-bill-clinton-apologizeimmigrants/601579/ Solis, J. A. (2016). Detained Without Relief. Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review, 10(2), 357–392.

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PAVING A PATH TO CITIZENSHIP: UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION POLICY REFORM IN REQUEST BY CINDY PENG On the night of the final 2016 presidential debate, I was in front of the television with my first host family, watching Secretary Clinton expressing her view on undocumented immigration: “I don't want to rip families apart. I don't want to be sending families away from children” (Clinton and Trump, 2016). My host sitting next to me--a Georgian Trump-supporting woman-frowned. “This is ridiculous,” she complained. “Those kids can stay. But illegals must get out of my country.” It was my first glimpse of the unauthorized immigration debate, which its controversy intrigued my curiosity. Particularly, I was haunted by three questions raised in my mind: What are the present issues with the undocumented immigration policy? Why would a policy reform be beneficial to both the undocumented community and the United States at large? And revealing the reality behind the illegal immigration myths, why do unauthorized migrants deserve a legal status? Tackling the first topic, the U.S. immigration policy currently demonstrates two problems: firstly, the ineffective immigration system with various limitations has discouraged people from applying for legal status, and instead it has pushed migrants to cross the border without documentation. Secondly, complete deportation has been proven unfeasible, which renders integrating the unauthorized group into the society legally to become the only viable solution. On the second question, adopting an inclusive unauthorized immigration policy is beneficial to not only migrants, but also the United States. Particularly, delving into the positive effect of President Reagan’s immigration bill in 1986 and examining the potential of President Biden’s new proposal in 2021, evidence indicates that such policies qualify the humanitarian purpose and would spark socioeconomic development. And finally, debunking the public misconceptions, the unauthorized population are mostly ordinary yet oppressed people contributing significantly to America; they are legitimate to acquire a lawful position. Granting them an access to citizenship is both a protection to prevent them from encountering further mistreatments and a recognition of their positive impact on the nation. To begin with, the current U.S. immigration system is in a stalemate that not only the inefficient procedure has urged migrants to enter the country undocumented, but also, undocumented people and American society’s interaction has rendered massive deportation impractical. While anti-immigration opponents have argued, “Why can’t the illegals just get in line?” The reality is, under a system with high barriers and lengthy processes, there is no line for many people to immigrate to the U.S. or adjust their status legally. Among the only three lawful channels to enter the states--the family based, work based, and asylum-seeking immigration-according to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) enacted in 1952, each method contains restrictions preventing a large portion of applicants from being admitted. On family-based immigration, the legislature requires the applicants to be immediate relatives or siblings of their

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American sponsors. Besides, while these potential migrants need to fulfill all immigration requirements, sponsors are also expected to exemplify a capable financial status to sustain the applicants (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2019). Moreover, based on INA §202(a) (2)--”No country can receive more than seven percent of the visas available for the year”--in addition to an annual numerical limit on potential immigrants’ family categories, there is another quota on their nations of origin (1952). Such conditions lead to backlogs in visa admission. The June 2021 Visa Bulletin indicates that the bureau is proceeding immigration cases of Mexico as early as in 1996 for the F3 family category of married children of the U.S. citizens, and in 1998 for the F4 category of US citizens’ siblings (U.S. Department of State -- Bureau of Consular Affairs). As research by the American Immigration Council shows (2019), the confinement of close family relationships and amount of proceedable cases has excluded many migrants’ opportunities to apply for status legally. On employment-based visas, in addition to the legislature’s quota on both nationality and annual numerical limit, as well as the request on employee’s petition, a major obstacle for applicants is that the government prioritizes workers with high levels of education and professional experience, favoring occupations such as professors and scientists (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2020). As a consequence, work-based immigration becomes extremely competitive, causing workers with relatively lower backgrounds and skills to be rejected, which pushes those with special financial or social conditions to consider other options such as illegal crossing. Besides, the standards for refuge-seeking have disqualified migrants in need of protection and resettlement. The policy, based on INA §207(a) restricts the amount of admittees for humanitarian reasons (Bruno, 2018). Following, item §208(b)(1)(B) defines the requirement for granting asylum that “the applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant” with credible proofs (1952). However, not only the approval mechanism and judgement on witnesses and testimonies are ambiguous and subjective; moreover, the description does not include poverty and economic hardship (American Immigration Council, 2019), which such problems could be detrimental to people. Furthermore, transferring their status to authorized, undocumented people would still encounter obstructions from the system, leading to negative effects. On one hand, being eligible to obtain permanent residency or citizenship within the U.S., migrants are required to return to their countries of origin if applying for legal immigration. Yet, with their previous conditions, these unauthorized immigrants would be banned from entering America for three years if their legal status has expired for more than six months, and for ten years if it has overdue for over a year (American Immigration Council, 2016). On the other hand, filing a refugee status--without considering the following application--is unviable to many undocumented since INA §208(a)(2) (B) rules that asylum requests are to be submitted within one year arriving in the US (1952). Thus, it is the ineffective system that encourages illegal entrances since the policy has restrained people from immigrating lawfully, especially for those from popular home countries such as Mexico, China, India and the Philippines (Budiman, 2020). The structure needs

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immediate reform as a chance for unofficial immigrants to access a lawful position, and for the legislature to remedy the problems they have created. After understanding the deficiencies in immigration structure, it is crucial for the institute to address the illegal migration matter. Two techniques are commonly proposed: deportation and integration, by granting legal status to the group. Combining nowadays context, nonetheless, the former seems unrealistic; since the undocumented interact closely with American public, uprooting the community would intrigue human rights controversy and potential instability. The number of undocumented immigrants is large, “range from 10.5 million to 12 million, or approximately 3.2–3.6% of the population” (Kamarck & Stenglein, 2019); around 60% of them have lived in the States for over a decade (Migration Policy Institute, 2018). Their lives have cooperated deeply with American society, where they “rent or own homes...raise families and buy groceries...work hard...pay taxes, and do their fair share...in thousands of cities and towns all across this country” (Trumka, 2013). As Senator Sanders stated: “We cannot and we should not even be talking about sweeping up millions of men, women, and children—many of whom have been here for years—and throwing them out of the country. That's wrong and that type of discussion has got to end” (2015). Ideologically, each person--regardless of his, her or their status--owns the freedom to love, contribute to and sustain a life in the country. As scholar Kieran Oberman concludes, immigration is a human right protected by “freedom of movement, expression and association” (2016). Uprooting, arresting and expelling millions of people is inhumane and against the founding principle of individual liberty, as well as America’s nature as a nation of immigrants. Institutionally, complete deportation requires massive law enforcement and involves a large variety of interest groups from the federal government and local legislatures to organizations and individuals, which could potentially become a challenge to the system and lead to social upheavals. If every unauthorized personnel is subjected to deportation, as Secretary Clinton illustrates, “law enforcement officers would be going school to school, home to home, business to business, rounding up people who are undocumented” (2016). Such a situation could become a test for the institute’s duration if inefficiency and failure of collaboration appears, such as certain states and organizations refusing to comply with central orders. Meanwhile, law execution could result in panic, violence and resistance among communities--deportees and family members being violated and traumatized, immigration supporters protesting, and radical conservatives conducting hate speeches and crimes toward migrants. Either upheaval could bring detrimental consequences to the country. Therefore, since deportation is--quoting President George W. Bush, “unrealistic” and “not going to work” (2006)--there is no harm to explore the other approach by naturalizing undocumented people. Contemplating the benefits of providing a pathway to legal status for unauthorized immigrants through the success of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) under President Ronald Reagan and the potential of the U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021 proposed by President Joe Biden, such a policy can elicit socioeconomic improvement to both the non-citizens and America.

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As one of the few enacted immigration overhauls in history, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 granted amnesty to undocumented immigrants arrived in the United States prior to 1982. The immediate positive feedback is that over 2.7 million unauthorized migrants passed the investigation and received permanent residency, allowing them to step out of the shadows and attain proper identifications and social benefits. Simultaneously, the government profited over 100 million dollars from undocumented immigrants’ application fees (Matthews, 2018), creating additional financial revenue to the US. Moreover, the future returns reinforce the influence of IRCA in economic and social growth. According to Economic Progress via Legalization (Paral & Associates, 2009), a study focusing on the legalized population under IRCA, these naturalized immigrants enhanced their socioeconomic status significantly by becoming more educated, entering higher-skilled occupations, earning better wages, and increasing consumption power without being dependent on governmental welfares and other public assistance. Additionally, these effects of undocumented immigrant legalization have benefited the States by prompting economic advancement and reducing socioeconomic differentiations both from the natrualized directly and their descendants in the future. Since the predecessor has demonstrated promising outcomes in adopting an open citizenship policy to unauthorized immigrants, the public should consider examining and embracing similar present-day proposals. Aiming to create an eight-year pathway to citizenship for non-citizen residents, the U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021, under President Biden’s supervision, suggests that undocumented immigrants are eligible to obtain green cards after staying in the US for 5 years and passing background checks; and after additional three years, they will be able to apply for citizenship. While still being debated and proceeded by the legislature, the bill is reasonable and crucial to the U.S. as a humanitarian solution and an approach stimulating social progress. To immigrants, the proposal would prevent family separation and secure equal treatment to both native and newly legalized citizens, expressing America’s respectful attitude toward human rights and determination to “be aggressive in pursuing policies that are humane and sensible and that keep families together,” as Senator Sanders proclaims (2015). And to the United States, legalizing unauthorized migrants would boost the economy by creating work opportunities, enhancing federal tax revenues and increasing financial outputs. Based on a prediction on a 10-year economic impact of immigration reform (Lynch & Oakford, 2013), under a scenario which unauthorized residents are granted both legal status and citizenship, over 10 years, the U.S. GDP would increase by $1.4 trillion additionally; Americans would gain an additional $791 billion in income; the government would receive $184 billion extra tax revenue; and immigrants would help create 203,000 more jobs each year. The data reflects that the undocumented people are “earning far less than their potential, paying much less in taxes, and contributing significantly less to the U.S. economy than they potentially could”. The analysis was projected in 2013, which the U.S. economy and society have developed over the past eight years; if the 2021 Citizenship Act is approved, current profits the legislation shall bring would only be more prolific than the estimation. And the sooner the policy is reformed, the better economic return would the U.S. obtains from undocumented community legalization; a stagnant would only result in increasing financial losses. To conclude, Biden’s proposal satisfies the

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human rights and economic aspects of nowadays immigration policy debate, which is feasible to practice. The past case and current plan both not only represent America’s liberal value and its nature as a nation of immigrants conceptually, but also realistically, elicit greater social mobility to both the country and the unauthorized group. Despite displaying the effectiveness of policies paving a pathway to legal status for the undocumented group, destructionists may still concern the “features of illegal migrants”, criminalizing and diminishing the community while blaming them for resource redistribution, which if scrutinized carefully, are stereotypes shaped by the unofficial immigration myths. By depuzzling the two major misconceptions depicting unauthorized migrants as “criminals, terrorists and low lifes” and “job and resource stealers,” the reality explains that they are ordinary yet discriminated humans who have played a significant role in socioeconomic development, legitimizing their channel to citizenship application is firstly a protective mechanism preventing immigrants from encountering oppressions, and secondly, an acknowledgement rewarding to their contribution to the U.S.. Undocumented immigrants have been criminalized and diminished by anti-immigration factions. Using political propaganda to obtain support, Trump overtly slandered Mexican migrants as “drug dealers, criminals, and rapists” repeatedly during his election campaign (BBC News, 2016) and presidency (Wolf, 2018), as well as bashing all undocumented immigrants that “These aren't people. These are animals” (Korte & Gomez, 2018), which affected public views on migrants, associating them to felons, and as a threat to national security. The biased statement seems ironic with researchers concluding that immigrants are two to five times less likely to commit a crime than the native-born population, based on the data of Census and American Community Survey (Ewing et al., 2015). Particularly, in 2010, less-educated young Mexican, Guatemalan and Salvadoran male immigrants, which consist of a large number of those entering the U.S. unlawfully, have incarceration rates of 2.8% of Mexican migrants and 1.7% of Guatemalan and Salvadoran migrants, compared to 10.7% of native-born men aged 18-39 without a high school degree (Ewing et al., 2015). And to narrow down the marginal error caused by census, follow-up studies discovered that an increase in immigration does not raise criminal cases, and in certain contexts, would even lower crime rates (Nowrasteh, 2015). Undoubtedly, the vast majority of unauthorized immigrants are merely normal people entering the U.S. “with dreams of a better life for themselves and their families,” as the former Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez remarks (2017). Furthermore, they have encountered continuous systematic suppression. Labor being exploited, they are paid with wages below the minimum rule and placed under dangerous working conditions (Garcia Quijano, 2020). Civic engagement being hindered, not only being treated as the second-class without voting rights, they are also prohibited from attain driver’s license in 34 out of 50 states (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2021) since regional institutes possess authority to self-interpret and design requirements for license applicants’ lawful status evidence under the Real ID Act of 2005, Title II. Individual rights facing violation, they live under the fear of being taken into custody and separated from families, as multiple narratives illustrate (Fernandez, 2019). Not to mention the interrogation and detention process has been surrounded by controversies on poor living

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conditions with children being “caged” in “jail-like border facility,” testified Human rights watch associate director Clara Long (2019); women experiencing hysterectomies, reported by a whistleblowing nurse at the private Irwin County Detention Center in Georgia (BBC, 2020); managers in southern states constantly neglecting detainees’ medical and living needs with physical abuses involved (National Immigration Project, 2016). Leaving their status suspended would only incite further mistreatments; in contrast, a legal position for non-citizen immigrants can lessen the injustice existing currently by providing them a safe environment and options to defend themselves. Another common prejudice accuses the undocumented for taking away American works and resources and considers them as an economic burden to the nation. This xenophobic perspective is proved to be misleading as various sources indicate that the group, even being unauthorized, contributes the economy and productivity positively. Puncturing the myth, while immigrants are hardly job stealers that the “displacement” is rarely observed or has minimal effect when being detected (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine et al., 2017), most of the unauthorized people partake in fields citizens do not involve that are physically demanding, such as fishing and farming. As Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda FelbabBrown presents, “undocumented workers often work the unpleasant, back-breaking jobs that native-born workers are not willing to do,” which she also argues that the key of remedying immigration structure is to create legal access for jobs Americans do not want instead of cutting off workers’ options (2017). While the so-called resource competition between citizens and the undocumented barely exists, unauthorized workers’ entrance fulfill the emptiness of the original unwanted fields and generate additional financial profits for the United States. Following, under crucial circumstances such as the pandemic, the unauthorized community became the facilitator of social needs during COVID-19. Tom Jawetz, the vice president for Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress testified before the U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship, that “nearly 3 in 4 [undocumented immigrants]—an estimated 5 million people—are doing jobs deemed essential to the nation’s critical infrastructure according to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and International Security Agency’s latest guidance” (2020). Around 389,000 are farmworkers and food processors “securing the nation’s food supply, even as food processing plants became epicenters of the virus and agricultural areas are right now experiencing some of the nation’s highest concentrations of coronavirus outbreaks”. An estimated 225,000 are healthcare workers like doctors and nurses and home health aides risking their lives while an additional 190,000 workers have administrative roles to ensure the safety and openness of health care settings. And millions of other undocumented are working to sanitize, pack and serve businesses (Jawetz, 2020). Without their efforts and sacrifices in remaining in the frontline, the nation would function much less durably and the public order would become much less manageable. Building upon that, the undocumented labor force is indispensable to the U.S., and rejections of unauthorized workers can result in adversity to economy, referring to Georgia’s recession caused by its state legislature’s Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act, or House Bill 87 of 2011. Prohibiting employment of workers without proper documentation and

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authorizing police to inspect suspected personnel’s’ legal status, the bill was passed by a 37 to 19 vote (Redmon, 2013). As Republican governors expected, the harsh law enforcement decreased the number of undocumented workers significantly, especially in the farmlands. But incidents happened. Farm owners were unable to find substitutes of expelled workers after realizing the locals were lacking necessary skills for the job. With agriculture as Georgia’s largest industry, millions of pounds of crops and fruits rotted in the field “as many of the most dependable and experienced farmworkers steered clear of Georgia and headed north for friendlier states” (Asbed & Sellers, 2011). The labor shortage of nearly 50% rendered “$300 million in lost crops and potential losses of $1 billion for the season for the state's agricultural sector” (Asbed & Sellers, 2011), and another study by the University of Georgia estimates a $400-million shrink in Georgia's economy in 2011 (Joyner, 2012), which Democratic Senator Jason Carter called the situation an “economic disaster” that harms Georgia's reputation profoundly (Bluestein, 2014). The negative outcomes of HB 87 not only demonstrate the nation’s dependency on unofficial workers, but also implies the non-negligible beneficence they have to the country, supporting their legitimacy to pursue a lawful social position. In conclusion, under an ineffective immigration system, illegal crossings are largely urged by the legislation’s high barriers and time-consuming process. Meanwhile, while mass deportation is impersonal ideologically and unlikely in practice by igniting potential public upheavals, an open policy on unauthorized immigration legalization becomes approachable. Given the success of Reagan’s immigration bill in 1986 and the viability of Biden’s proposal in 2021, it is beneficial to the humanitarian and socioeconomic aspects to both the undocumented immigrants and the United States. Moreover, by explaining the misunderstandings on undocumented immigrants, the community’s underprivileged status and economic contribution render the immigration reform to minimize ongoing discriminations toward migrants and reward their influence to the society. The government should provide a path for undocumented immigrants to apply for citizenship; it is closely related to the notion, images and development of the United States. An immediate immigration reform is needed.

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References American Immigration Council. (2016, October 28). The three- and ten-year bars. American Immigration Council. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/three-and-tenyear-bars American Immigration Council. (2019, November 25). Why Don’t Immigrants Apply for Citizenship? American Immigration Council. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/why-don%E2%80%99t-they-just-getline Asbed, G., & Sellers, S. (2011, October 17). The nation: The high cost of anti-immigrant laws. The Nation. https://www.npr.org/2011/10/17/141413786/the-nation-the-high-cost-of-antiimmigrant-laws BBC News. (2016, August 31). “Drug dealers, criminals, rapists”: What Trump thinks of Mexicans. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-37230916 BBC News. (2020, September 15). ICE whistleblower: Nurse alleges “hysterectomies on immigrant women in US.” BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada54160638 Bluestein, G. (2014, August 25). Carter, Deal clash over immigration. The Atlanta JournalConstitution. https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/carter-deal-clash-overimmigration/FKjj9iW9OHOzjRce4vXzCK/ Bruno, A. (2018, December 18). Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy. CRS Report No. RL31269; Congressional Research Service. Budiman, A. (2020, August 20). Key findings about U.S. immigrants. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/ Bush, G. W. (2006, August 3). President Bush discusses comprehensive immigration reform in Texas. George W. Bush White House Archives. https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060803-8.html Clinton, H., & Trump, D. (2016, October 19). The third 2016 Presidential Debate. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/full-transcript-third-2016-presidential-debate-230063 Ewing, W. A., Martinez, D., & Rumbaut, R. G. (2015). The criminalization of immigration in the United States. In SSRN. American Immigration Council Special Report. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2631704 Felbab-Brown, V. (2017, August 22). The Wall: The real costs of a barrier between the United States and Mexico. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-wall-the-real-costs-of-abarrier-between-the-united-states-and-mexico/ Fernandez, M. E. (2019, October 2). The heartbreaking immigration stories behind living undocumented. Vulture. https://www.vulture.com/2019/10/living-undocumented-netflix.html Garcia Quijano, J. A. (2020). Workplace discrimination and undocumented first-generation latinx immigrants. Advocates’ Forum, 2020, 27–35. The University of Chicago.

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Gutierrez, C. (2017). Immigrants put America first: In coming here, they affirm our values. The Catalyst: A Journal of Ideas from the Bush Institute, Fall 2017(08). George W. Bush Institute. https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/democracy/gutierrez-immigrants-validate-values.html Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (House Bill 87), The General Assembly of Georgia (2011). https://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/37943 Jawetz, T. (2020, September 28). Immigrants as Essential Workers During COVID-19: Testimony Before the U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship. Center for American Progress. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2020/09/28/490919/immigrants -essential-workers-covid-19/ Joyner, C. (2012, May 11). PolitiFact - Immigration bill cost Georgia farmers ‘close to’ $400 million, labor leader says. @politifact. https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2012/may/11/charlie-flemming/immigration-bill-costgeorgia-farmers-close-400-mi/ Kamarck, E., & Stenglein, C. (2019, November 12). How many undocumented immigrants are in the United States and who are they? Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/how-many-undocumented-immigrants-arein-the-united-states-and-who-are-they/ Korte, G., & Gomez, A. (2018, May 16). Trump ramps up rhetoric on undocumented immigrants: “These aren’t people. These are animals.” USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/05/16/trump-immigrants-animalsmexico-democrats-sanctuary-cities/617252002/ Long, C. (2019, July 11). Written testimony: “Kids in cages: Inhumane treatment at the border.” Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/11/written-testimony-kids-cagesinhumane-treatment-border# Lynch, R., & Oakford, P. (2013, March 20). The Economic Effects of Granting Legal Status and Citizenship to Undocumented Immigrants. Center for American Progress. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2013/03/20/57351/theeconomic-effects-of-granting-legal-status-and-citizenship-to-undocumented-immigrants/ Mathews, J. (2018, October). Ronald Reagan was right on amnesty for immigrants. Here’s why. The Sacramento Bee. https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/article220609805.html Migration Policy Institute. (2018). Profile of the unauthorized population - US. Migrationpolicy.Org. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrantpopulation/state/US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, (2017). The economic and fiscal consequences of immigration. National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/23550 National Conference of State Legislatures. (2021, February 8). States offering driver’s licenses to immigrants. NCSL. https://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/states-offering-driver-slicenses-to-immigrants.aspx

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National Immigration Project. (2016, November 21). Report: Abuse, neglect common at immigrant detention centers in south. National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild. https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/pr/2016_21Nov_pr-shad-rpt.html Nowrasteh, A. (2015, July 14). Immigration and Crime – What the Research Says. CATO. https://www.cato.org/blog/immigration-crime-what-research-says Oberman, K. (2016). Immigration as a human right. Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership, Eds. Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2164939 Paral, R., & Associates. (2009, November). Economic progress via legalization: Lessons from the last legalization program. Immigration Research Library; American Immigration Council. https://www.immigrationresearch.org/report/immigration-policy-center/economic-progresslegalization-lessons-last-legalization-program Real ID Act, Article II (2005). https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/real-id-act-text.pdf Redmon, J. (2013, June 11). Georgia lawmakers pass illegal immigration crackdown. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. https://www.ajc.com/news/local/georgia-lawmakers-pass-illegalimmigration-crackdown/dvEcDeIuAOvpGvoHzCVodN/ Sanders, B. (2015, June 19). Remarks at the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Conference in Las Vegas, Nevada. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-national-association-latino-electedand-appointed-officials-conference-las Immigration Reform and Control Act, (1986). https://www.congress.gov/bill/99thcongress/senate-bill/1200 The U.S. Citizenship Act, (2021). https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-president-biden-sends-immigration-bill-to-congress-as-part-ofhis-commitment-to-modernize-our-immigration-system/ Trumka, R. (2013, March 7). Remarks by AFL-CIO President Richard L. Trumka 2013 Immigration Campaign Launch Event, Chicago, Illinois [The American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)]. https://aflcio.org/ Immigration and Nationality Act, (1952). https://www.uscis.gov/laws-andpolicy/legislation/immigration-and-nationality-act U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2019, July 10). Immigration and Nationality Act. USCIS. https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/legislation/immigration-and-nationality-act U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2020, January 9). Permanent workers. USCIS. https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/permanent-workers U.S. Department of State -- Bureau of Consular Affairs. (2021, May 7). Visa bulletin for june 2021. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-bulletin/2021/visa-bulletin-forjune-2021.html Wolf, Z. B. (2018, April 6). Trump basically called Mexicans rapists again. CNN Politics. https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/06/politics/trump-mexico-rapists/index.html

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SOME OPTIONS ARE BETTER: RELEASING UNACCOMPANIED MINORS AT THE BORDER BY EMMA WINE In February 2021, 9,500 children crossed the border into the United States—alone (Williams, 2021). February was not special: thousands of unaccompanied minors cross the border every month and are placed into the custody of the U.S. government until they are united with a sponsor. For many children, this process can take months. The question remains: How can the U.S. expedite the release of unaccompanied minors to family members in the U.S.? The ideal is to reunite unaccompanied minors with their loving families quickly, but can the solution be as simple as just speeding up the process? It is indeed important to consider the possibility of illintentioned sponsors, and to be cautious of overextending departments that are already overwhelmed. When it comes to this balance of releasing children to their families as quickly as possible while ensuring the safety of these children, the Biden Administration frequently states that “all the options are bad” (Blitzer, 2021). This pessimistic position can lead to an attitude of complacency. Why even bother trying to improve the system if nothing will actually help? In this paper, I suggest that there are in fact several steps that the U.S. can take that would not only reunite families more quickly but also improve the health and safety of the child in the process. Suggestion 1 A prominent counterargument to expediting the release of children from detention facilities draws from a 2016 report that found several children were victims of neglect and abuse by their sponsors upon expedited release (Burke, 2016). In 2013, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) responded to a surge of unaccompanied minors entering the United States by relaxing their process of vetting potential sponsors. They hoped expediting the process would get children out of government custody and with sponsors as quickly as possible. First, they stopped fingerprinting potential sponsors, and in the months that followed, they also stopped checking birth certificates, requiring identification forms, and checking criminal history (Burke). In 2016, an investigation conducted by the Associated Press (AP) found that more than two dozen children were subjected to “sexual abuse, labor trafficking, or severe abuse and neglect” by their sponsor after being released to their care (Burke). They reported having difficulty in getting a full count because many of the children were unable to be found again for follow-up checks by a social worker. In a report about this investigation, Representative Blake Farenthold (R-TX) blamed this on then-president Obama’s “lax policies” and “political open borders agenda” (Federal Information & News Dispatch, 2016). There is a humanitarian argument to be made against speeding up the process of reuniting children with their families. There are clearly steps that need to be taken to prevent more children from being sent home with abusive sponsors. Unfortunately, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) custody is not always safer than abusive sponsor homes. In 2014, an administrative complaint was filed with the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) on behalf of 116 children, citing neglect in

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care at these facilities as well as “verbal, sexual, and physical abuses by immigration officials” (Ataiants et al., 2017). Further, after seven children died during or after their detention in a CBP facility, the administration argued in court that they were not responsible for providing necessities such as soap and beds to children in CBP custody (Chishti et al., 2019). The children who are eventually transferred from CBP custody to the Office of Refugee and Resettlement (ORR) are placed in shelters until they can be united with a sponsor. However even these shelters are considered to be “not aligned with child welfare best practices” because the large number of children confined in one setting often prevents each child access to the care they need (Hasson et at., 2019). That both the government custody of children and potential sponsor homes run the risk of being dangerous and unhealthy environments for children appears to reinforce the Biden administration’s claim that “all the options are bad.” However, it is important to understand another aspect of this situation: relaxing some of these vetting procedures likely allowed more sponsors to come forward. The AP report of the initial investigation suggested that “federal immigration agents’ recent controversial efforts to round up Central American families for possible deportation have further complicated the situation, creating a climate of fear and instability in communities that are welcoming children'' (Burke). Before the suspension of fingerprinting sponsors, the information was sent directly to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Furthermore, this information sharing resulted in the arrests of 170 potential sponsors who were unauthorized immigrants, including 109 with no criminal record (Chishti et al.). Any fracture in trust may lead to situations such as sponsors not showing up to claim children, or not showing up to follow-up checks with social workers that would provide additional resources. Adopting measures such as not sharing the results of background checks with ICE would not only speed up the process of these checks by eliminating a third party, but it would also improve the trust between the U.S. government and potential sponsors, which contributes to a more successful transition for the children. It is also worth examining the relationships of abusive sponsors to the children. The AP report references a “distant relative” the child had never met, an aunt, a “friend’s brother,” and a “family friend” as examples of abusive sponsors (Burke). None of the sponsors mentioned were direct or close relatives. The ORR categorizes sponsors as either parent/guardian, immediate relative, distant relative, or no identified sponsor, with releases prioritized for parents and guardians (Hasson et al.). To further expedite the process of reuniting families, the U.S. should consider loosening the screening requirements for closer categories of sponsors, reserving extensive background checks for more distant relatives. This way, children are able to reunite with their immediate families more quickly while high-risk sponsors face more thorough screening processes, and there will be fewer children at any given time waiting in U.S. custody. Suggestion 2 The United States has instituted a number of policies and agreements that protect unaccompanied minors, from when they arrive in the U.S. until they are reunited with their families. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 “requires that children in government custody are placed in the least restrictive and most humane settings possible”

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(Ataiants et al.). U.S. Welfare standards state that the “best interests of the child” should be at the forefront of their custody and care. At an international level, the U.S. has signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which emphasizes the importance of paying special attention to children and “implies children should not be detained except for a measure of last resort, and for the shortest time possible” (Ataiants et al.). Indeed, the United States has laws that prohibit holding children from contiguous and non-contiguous countries in a detention facility for over 48 and 72 hours, respectively (Ataiants et al.). Despite all this legislation, these policies are frequently disregarded. Given the blatant disregard of existing policies, the problem cannot be solved with simply another rule or agreement. At the root of the issue, many of the departments that handle these children do not operate with a purpose that aligns with the best interests of the child. Hasson et al. assert that Customs and Border Control, an agency of the Department of Homeland and Security (DHS), as well as the Office of Refugee Resettlement, a program of DHHS, have conflicting interests of “security-focused policy versus child-centered policy” (Hasson et al.). Currently, all unaccompanied minors apprehended at the border interact with Customs and Border Control as a first stop. For minors from contiguous countries, these agents determine if they are eligible for refugee status. As Ataiants et al. point out, “CBP uniformed officers are not properly trained to detect signs of abuse, trauma, or fearing persecution,” which means they may end up sending back home children who have viable claims to refugee status but are unable to articulate it or do not adequately understand their options (2017). Hasson et al. state, “the dramatic shift from threat-focused assessment to child-focused assessment does not occur until the [unaccompanied minor] transitions from DHS custody to ORR custody.” They distill the problem with putting CBP in charge of any aspect of the process of handling unaccompanied minors: “CBP agents are trained to view unlawful entrance as a potential threat to the United States” (Hasson et al.). A department that views these children first as threats is not going to consistently have their best interest in mind. Conversely, Hasson et al. point out that “social work, as a profession, is uniquely positioned to highlight [the] absence of social justice.” If, from the moment they arrive at the border, all unaccompanied minors work exclusively with social workers and other employees of the DHHS rather than border control officers from the (DHS) as is now the case, the wellbeing of these children would be prioritized throughout the entire process. Further, the process would be much more streamlined with only one, well-equipped department involved, leading to a quicker release of the children to their parents. Releasing children to their families becomes more urgent when an increase in children at the border overwhelms the systems. An important question to consider is what is responsible for surges in immigration in the first place. Republicans view years with unusually high numbers of unaccompanied minors as the product of relaxing policies and opening borders. Just as Rep. Farenthold blamed the influx of refugees in 2013 on Obama’s failure to crackdown on border security, Republicans are once again attributing another surge during the Biden administration to a similarly hyper-relaxed stance on border security (Williams). However, these are not the only instances of an unprecedented flow of immigrants. During his time in office, President Trump took a very tough-on-immigration stance, attempting to scare away potential immigrants and

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refugees with threats of deportation (Chishti et al.). Despite a multitude of policies meant to discourage immigrants, 2019 saw an unprecedented number of children cross the border (Chishti et al.). This overwhelmed border security and forced the government to request emergency funding, search for temporary holding facilities, and suspend resources they could no longer fund such as educational and recreational programming (Chishti et al.). The Biden administration is similarly looking to open temporary holding facilities as they deal with the current influx of children (Williams). However, the Migration Policy Institute suggests that the issue with the approach taken by all of these administrations is that they are treating these surges as temporary emergencies rather than natural and inevitable. They argue that it is important to be proactive in setting up a system that can accommodate these surges rather than responding with crisis resources, which often cost more money in the long run (Chishti et al.). Blitzer argues that these are the kinds of systems that the Trump administration destroyed. The shifts proposed so far to expedite the reunion of families are long-term solutions that would rely on a consistent adequate flow of resources up front. This would likely mean shifting resources from the DHS to the DHHS who would be taking over the responsibilities of the DHS. The shift would be an essential proactive step to prevent crises upfront. Conclusion Ultimately, I can confidently suggest two changes to expedite, and in turn, improve the process of reuniting unaccompanied minors with their families in the United States: 1. Reduce the screening of immediate family in order to concentrate on background checks of other categories of sponsors. 2. Switch the majority of processing (for both contiguous and non-contiguous refugees) over to DHHS, starting immediately after a child is apprehended. The first change would also involve permanently ending any communication with ICE for all categories of potential sponsors. The second change would require shifting in funding as part of proactively viewing the surges as natural. While these policies are a solid starting point, there are further questions to consider about their implementation. For example, how can we improve the climate of ORR shelter settings when they are still not ideal? Additionally, how do we prevent shifting the responsibilities of border patrol over to social workers from turning the social workers dealing with children to a policing unit with merely a different name? These are just some of the crucial nuances that must be considered in the implementation and expansion of these changes to expedite the process of reuniting families. Nonetheless, most important is to understand that expediting does not equal increasing harm or even risk for the child. In fact, the system can be simultaneously expedited and improved. Sure, there are many details to consider in the process of reuniting families. After all, these are children, so we ought to be especially careful about their care. Even so, that there are many components to consider in these proposals does not automatically rule them out as better options than what currently exists. The Biden administration may say “all options are bad;” to that, I say all options may be complicated, but there is certainly a way forward.

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References Ataiants, J., Cohen, C., Riley, A. H., Tellez Lieberman, J., Reidy, M. C., & Chilton, M. (2018). Unaccompanied Children at the United States Border, a Human Rights Crisis that can be Addressed with Policy Change. Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health, 20(4), 1000– 1010. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10903-017-0577-5 Federal Information & News Dispatch. (2016, January 26). AP: Unaccompanied Minors Became Victims of Child Sex Abuse After Feds Lowered Safety Standards. ProQuest. https://www.proquest.com/docview/1760537199/F94CB2AA5B584D5EPQ/ Garance Burke. (2016, January 25). AP INVESTIGATION: Feds’ failures imperil migrant children. Associated Press News. https://apnews.com/article/cc07b82ec58145cca37d6ff952f334c1 Jonathan Blitzer. (2021, March 9). Biden Has Few Good Options for the Unaccompanied Children at the Border. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/why-biden-has-few-good-options-at-the-border Chishti, M., Pierce, S., & Telus, H. (2019, June 27). Spike in Unaccompanied Child Arrivals at U.S.-Mexico Border Proves Enduring Challenge; Citizenship Question on 2020 Census in Doubt. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/spikeunaccompanied-child-arrivals-proves-enduring-challenge Hasson III, R. G., Crea, T. M., McRoy, R. G., & Lê, Â. H. (2019). Patchwork of promises: A critical analysis of immigration policies for unaccompanied undocumented children in the United States. Child & Family Social Work, 24(2), 275–282. ProQuest. https://doi.org/10.1111/cfs.12612 Williams, A. (2021, March 17). Surge of minors poses border test for Biden: US immigration. Political crisis Republicans blame wave of unaccompanied children on removal of Trump-era curbs. Financial Times. ProQuest. http://www.proquest.com/docview/2512970710/CB7426D8A7A84FE2PQ/1?accountid=149 53

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GROWTH AND GLOBALIZATION: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT IN PARAGUAY BY MARIELA DURAN

Introduction As a landlocked developing country bordered by two giants, Argentina and Brazil, Paraguay faces particular challenges regarding globalization. Paraguay shares two important common natural resources with these countries, the Paraná River and the Gran Chaco region. The Paraná River runs through all three countries and is home to the Itaipú Dam, co-owned by Paraguay and Brazil. The Itaipú Dam is an important resource for Paraguay, generating hydroelectric energy that meets 90% of the country’s demand and producing a surplus that could represent important gains in international trade (Elder, 2019). Although Paraguay has access to such an important resource, the Itaipú Binational Treaty with Brazil has left it in a disadvantaged position. The Gran Chaco region in the northwest of the country is shared primarily with Argentina, although small parts of it also extend into Bolivia and Brazil. This region contains 60% of Paraguay’s uninhabited land and is extremely ecologically diverse. However, it is increasingly dominated by Paraguay’s soybean and charcoal production and cattle ranching, largely by foreign companies and farmers, resulting in an extreme rate of deforestation. The deforestation of the Chaco region has not only contributed to climate change but also driven out indigenous communities. Aside from the problems that arise from sharing common resources with its larger neighbors, Paraguay is also in a uniquely challenging position due to its location in the heart of the South American continent. Landlocked countries often face additional barriers to trade than countries with access to an ocean, but Paraguay’s central location among non-landlocked countries presents an important opportunity to offset these challenges. Out of the fourteen countries in South America, only Bolivia and Paraguay, two of the least developed countries in the continent, are landlocked. Due to Paraguay’s central location between Brazil and Argentina, who are large trading partners with each other, it is inevitably in a position to be a geographic facilitator of their trade, connecting important points in major trade routes. However, Paraguay remains cut off from Brazil’s Port Murtinho and Argentina’s Port Pozo Hondo due to lack of infrastructure. These two ports connect trade routes to two important ports in South America, Brazil’s Port Santos and Chile’s Port Antofagasta, respectively. Although the Paraguayan government has begun construction of the Corredor Bioceanico, a road to connect Paraguayan ports to those in Brazil and Argentina, issues in financing and corruption have stalled the project. Additionally, the project has received little attention from neighboring countries despite representing an important potential resource for the continent. Paraguay’s location in the South American continent has created individual difficulties for the country. Sharing common natural resources with Argentina and Brazil and being landlocked among larger neighbors inherently exposes Paraguay to the effects of globalization. Because of its

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status as a small developing country with little bargaining power, it inevitably bears many of the negative costs associated with globalization and is limited in its ability to capitalize upon the growth opportunities globalization offers. Because of this imbalanced relationship with Argentina and Brazil, many of Paraguay’s problems require inherently global solutions. Although Paraguay shares a border to the north with Bolivia, it is another landlocked developing country that has little bargaining power or regional political influence. For these reasons, Paraguay would benefit from recognizing the political and economic implications of its geographic situation and taking a more proactive approach to reap the benefits of globalization. This approach would include implementing three policies aimed at improving Paraguay’s position with respect to trade, environment, and development. The first policy would be a renegotiation of the Itaipú Dam treaty with short- and long-term growth objectives. The second policy would involve creating a regional environmental intergovernmental organization with Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia to implement anti-deforestation laws and regulate licensing in the Gran Chaco region. The third policy would require securing a loan from the World Bank to finance the completion of the Corredor Bioceanico and implementing an anti-corruption initiative to increase Paraguay’s access to trade routes. Renegotiation of the Itaipú Dam Treaty The first area for policy reform, a renegotiation of the Itaipú Dam Treaty, would have a significant positive impact on trade and development in Paraguay. The Itaipú Binational Treaty was signed by Paraguay and Brazil in 1973 to develop the hydroelectric resources of the Paraná River, which lies on their shared border. Itaipú Binacional, the hydroelectric company that administers the plant, is jointly owned by both countries. The binational treaty was signed during military dictatorships in both countries as a fifty-year treaty, stipulating that each country owns half of the energy produced and any surplus to either country must be resold to the other. The price of these sales, considered “compensation payments',” are based on the cost of production and not the market price of energy (Elder). The current agreement puts Paraguay in an extremely unfavorable position, as it consumes only 10-15% of its share to meet 90% of its demand for energy. Brazil, on the other hand, does not meet its demand for energy with just its share. Even its half of the energy plus Paraguay’s surplus only accounts for 15% percent of its demand for energy. Because of the difference in scale between the two countries’ energy consumption and the treaty signed under non-democratic leadership, Paraguay is locked into an unfavorable economic position until 2022, when the treaty expires. The stipulation that any surplus must be resold to the other country significantly disadvantages Paraguay, as it is the only country small enough to which this clause could apply. Since the energy is sold at a price based on the cost of production rather than the regional market price of energy, Paraguay loses important revenue that it could have gained had it been allowed to sell globally. According to economist Miguel Carter, between 1984 and 2018, Brazil underpaid Paraguay by about $75.4 billion; if Paraguay had been allowed to sell at the regional market price of energy, it would have been able to earn about twice its current GDP from Itaipú sales alone (Elder). Aside from the loss in revenue, Paraguay has been

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overpaying for electricity as consumers bear the cost of the construction debt through electricity bills. Additionally, selling only to Brazil has limited Paraguay’s access to the global market and prevented it from establishing trade partnerships with other countries. A potential policy solution would involve raising the price of the “compensation payments” to match the market price of energy. Alternatively, a better policy would aim to eliminate the requirement that surpluses be sold only to the other country—selling at the market price would open up sales to third-party countries, increasing Paraguay’s access to global markets for hydroelectric power, and increasing revenue from the sales already made to Brazil. However, although Paraguay currently still has a surplus of hydroelectric power, domestic demand is increasing. It is projected that Paraguay will use most of its share by 2035. Therefore, it is important for the Paraguayan government to develop alternative energy sources that it can use in the future so that it does not become dependent on any revenue gained from selling its current surplus at the market price. An extension of this policy with long-term growth objectives would greatly increase development and ensure that the country does not become too dependent on the revenue from the sales. It should aim to invest the revenue gained into developing other sectors of the Paraguayan economy, specifically other sources of energy. In addition, if Paraguay’s demand for energy continues to increase after 2035, it would have other industries it could rely on to satisfy domestic demand, minimizing the importance of the Itaipú Dam. According to Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, special advisor to the Paraguayan government on energy, the generation of wind energy and solar energy are extremely promising fields for Paraguay given its conditions (“Director of ITAIPU Reconnects,” 2021). Currently, car companies have started manufacturing cables in Paraguay to export to Brazil due to low taxes and cheap electricity in the country (“Secret Hydropower Deal,” 2019). Using the excess power to industrialize would capitalize on its current conditions and increase development in the future. Although using the excess power to industrialize would be a domestic extension to the policy, allowing Paraguay to sell its surplus at the market price would require a global solution, namely, renegotiating the Itaipú Treaty. As the payments for debt construction will end in 2022, the Treaty is set to be renegotiated in 2023. However, these negotiations would be difficult and likely contribute to the existing political tensions between the two countries. According to Christine Folch, a Duke University researcher, “Public sentiment in Paraguay is particularly sensitive to the asymmetry with its neighbor because of memory of the devastating the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-70) which Paraguay lost to the combined forces of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay” (2019). Further, both governments’ connections to the previous right-wing military governments under which the treaty was signed have caused concern in Paraguay: Bolsonaro openly admires the Brazilian dictatorship of the 1960s to 1980s, and Abdo is the son of Paraguayan General and Dictator Alfredo Stroessner’s (1954-1989) private secretary (Folch). In recent years, political tensions have increased and Itaipú has become an issue of sovereignty to many Paraguayan political groups, who claim that Paraguay has been effectively subsidizing industrial growth in Brazil. Previously, several deals made between Paraguay and Brazil heightened tensions, such as a deal made in 2009 that saw Brazil triple its yearly payments

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to $360 million from the previous $120 million. Although this deal was favorable to Paraguay, it was still being “dramatically undercompensated for its electricity exports to Brazil” since it had been selling at a fixed price (Folch). Additionally, the Itaipú Dam almost led to the impeachment of the current Paraguayan president, Mario Abdo Benitez, in 2019, when he attempted to strike a “secret hydropower deal” that would grant a private energy contract to Leros, a Brazilian company with alleged ties to the Bolsonaro family (Folch). The difference in size and resources between the two countries has also created a political disadvantage for Paraguay in any potential negotiations. After the 2009 deal was reached, former Brazilian director of Itaipú, Joaquim Silva e Luna, argued that a reduction in the sale price of energy would benefit Brazil’s industries more. Brazilian researcher Claudio Salles at Instituto Acende Brasil stated that it was “Brazilian economic clout” that secured the debt to finance Itaipú in the first place. Brazilian negotiators have argued that a change in price of surplus energy would result in extra costs for the facility, which already suffers due to poor infrastructure. Although the dam is co-owned, Paraguay is not seen as having equal ownership in the eyes of Brazilian directors and policymakers. Worse, Paraguay does not have a full-fledged energy ministry to address this situation, which makes negotiations more difficult. The aggregation technology in this issue would be weighted-sum, since Brazil and Paraguay receive disproportionate benefits from their common resource and have different incentives to cooperate. Renegotiating the Itaipú Dam treaty to either increase Brazil’s yearly payments to Paraguay for the excess energy it sells to Brazil or allow Paraguay to sell freely to Brazil and other countries at market prices would present a viable solution to Brazil’s underpayment of surplus energy. However, a long-term policy should aim to invest revenues on national development, such as industrializing or exploring alternative energy sources, such as solar and wind energy, given Paraguay’s current conditions. Although the negotiations themselves may prove difficult, the benefits from a restructured deal would exceed the costs. According to the Paraguayan engineer Ricardo Canese, “Electrical income should be a tool for development, not ‘profiteering’” (Elder). Given the country’s current conditions and that its surplus is set to run out in 2035, a policy to allow Paraguay to sell freely and invest this revenue in domestic growth would be the best solution for Paraguay to capitalize on a shared natural resource and on globalization. An Environmental IGO to Protect the Gran Chaco Region The second area for policy reform is environmental, involving the protection of the Gran Chaco region distributed between Paraguay, Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil. Paraguay’s Chaco region is divided into eastern and western strips, with the eastern containing wetlands and the western containing dryer forest. This region began facing deforestation in the 1990s, as the country sought to fulfill the growing demand for soybeans (IUCN, 2019). Large migration of Brazilian farmers, known as brasiguayos, and agribusinesses into Paraguay since the 1970s transformed the domestic agricultural economy: Paraguay is currently the world’s fourth largest exporter of soybeans, with approximately 95% of its exports produced by brasiguayos (Nickson, 2019). Then, Paraguay began experiencing more deforestation in this region to meet the demand

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for charcoal, particularly from European countries. Most of the deforestation for charcoal is motivated by investments of Brazilian and Uruguayan investors. In recent years, cattle ranching has increased as much of the region is uninhabited: only 5% of the population lives in the Chaco, the majority being indigenous groups or farmers. The rate of deforestation in the Chaco is the highest in the world at nearly 2000 hectares deforested every ten days. This deforestation has occurred due to the large migration of foreign farmers and the exploitation of land by foreign companies to meet increasing global demand for certain commodities. In 2004, the Paraguayan government implemented the “Zero Deforestation Law”, but this regulation only applied to the Oriental region of Paraguay, which does not include the Chaco region. A policy to extend this law would reduce the rate at which the land is being depleted. Additionally, limiting environmental licenses would ensure that companies operating in the Chaco are willing to comply with environmental regulations and would decrease interest in the Chaco from foreign investors and companies. However, stricter environmental regulations would likely result in a decrease in soybean, charcoal, and cattle exports, which represent a large part of Paraguay’s GDP. The Chaco region is an important environmental resource for Paraguay due to its biodiversity and the fact that it is home to many indigenous communities. Although agricultural and production activities taking place in the region are beneficial to Paraguay’s economy, the rapid rate of deforestation could devastate the region. According to the International Union for Conservation of Nature, “The Paraguayan Chaco lost native vegetation at an average rate of more than 540 hectares per day or more than 200.000 hectares per year. The Paraguayan Chaco region is in the top five of highest rates of deforestation in the world” (IUCN). Due to its status as a developing country, Paraguay has faced a trade-off between environmental protection and economic growth. Globalization has pushed states to maximize resources for revenue and economic growth, which is significant to developing countries such as Paraguay and brings with it the “normalized destruction of the source of livelihood” (Prayogi, 2020). Although globalization may have pushed Paraguay to exploit the Chaco region for economic gain, a global partnership could be a solution. The Gran Chaco is split between four countries: Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil. 60% percent of the region belongs to Argentina, 23% to Paraguay, 13% to Bolivia, and 4% to Brazil. Though most of the region is located in Argentina, Paraguay’s share is a large portion of its total land area, making Argentina and Paraguay the largest stakeholders in the deforestation of the Chaco region. Domestic initiatives have not yielded many results: the World Wildlife Fund Paraguay, along with other NGOs, has attempted to foster dialogue between key stakeholders such as government authorities, farmers, and representatives from indigenous communities but no policy changes have taken place (IUCN). A regional environmental IGO with Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia would help reduce deforestation in the region as an international coordination effort is needed. Although little of the Chaco region lies in Brazil, it has successfully taken measures to reduce deforestation in other regions. Research shows that Brazil’s environmental registry, Cadastro Ambiental Rural (CAR), has contributed to reducing deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon (USAID, 2017). Similar

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strategies could be implemented to tackle deforestation in the Chaco. Additionally, an environmental IGO among these four countries would bring much needed attention to this problem and would provide a coordinated effort to increase research and make policy recommendations as these countries are all clearly affected by this crisis. According to Sandler, subsidiarity places the problem on the most appropriate participants, which would also help to reduce transaction costs (Sandler, 2001). Similar to the Itaipú Dam, the aggregation technology needed to achieve international cooperation in this issue would be weighted-sum; each country’s contribution to preserve and restore this land would have a different effect since they each possess very different amounts of the region. Additionally, the effects of deforestation also have significantly different impacts on each country’s incentives to cooperate. For example, since the Chaco region is such a large part of Paraguay’s total land area, preserving it would be more crucial, and Paraguay might have a larger incentive to contribute. According to Sandler, with weighted sum, some countries have larger incentives to contribute because they will receive disproportionately larger benefits from the IPG, so “efforts should be channeled to where provision has the greatest marginal impact” (Sandler). Although the primary aggregation technology in question is weighted-sum, there are also elements of “threshold” aggregation technology in terms of biodiversity. According to the Argentine Wildlife Foundation, “birds tolerate up to a certain level of forest volume decline but when a certain threshold is exceeded and the loss reaches 30 or 40 percent, the collapse in the wealth of species is resounding” (Chisleanchi, 2019). Since most plants and animal species require a certain threshold to survive, the regional IGO would have to work to meet these levels. Forming a regional environmental IGO with Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil to extend Paraguay’s “Zero Deforestation Law” to include the Gran Chaco region and implement stricter environmental licensing requirements would help to reduce deforestation caused by the production of soybeans, charcoal and cattle ranching by both domestic and foreign firms in the region. The Chaco region is being deforested at an extremely rapid rate, but being a shared resource among four countries, domestic research and policies have little effect on the preservation of the environment. Drawbacks to increasing environmental protection efforts, such as pushback from companies, would also be better addressed internationally by countries in the region rather than domestically. The Corredor Bioceanico And Trade The third area for policy reform involves trade and development of public infrastructure to accommodate Paraguay’s unique geographic position. According to the UNECE, globalization has impacted landlocked countries significantly, as they face higher transport and trade costs due to a lack of access to seaports and complex administrative transit and border procedures. On average, landlocked countries are 20% less developed then they would have been had they not been landlocked, although this can range from 10-30% individually (UN, 2013). In Paraguay’s case, it is situated between two giants, Argentina and Brazil, so trade occurring between nearby countries often involves transportation through Paraguay.

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Reducing transit costs and gaining easier access to more trade partners requires investments in infrastructure to offset Paraguay’s landlockedness. Between 2015-2018, the Paraguayan government designed and constructed the “Corredor Bioceanico,” a road to connect the Chilean sea ports of Antofagasta, Iquique, and Arica to a major Brazilian port, the port of Santos. This would benefit importers and exporters from all countries and strengthen Paraguay’s access to global markets by reducing costs and transaction times. This project is currently 70% complete. Additionally, the Paraguayan government has ratified the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement and implemented 50% of the 36 measures. If the government implemented the TFA at its infrastructure projects currently under construction, routes such as the Corredor Bioceanico would be more efficient and would not require additional restructuring once finished. According to the Paraguayan government, applying the remaining measures would either require a transition period or additional capacity-building support. Although they issued a bond in collaboration with UBS to finance the project, they have still not reached the necessary funding to finish the project, and could potentially issue another bond in the near future (“Paraguay Rejects Guarantee Request,” 2020). Although this could potentially provide sufficient funding for the project, Paraguay has historically experienced high-levels of corruption, especially when it comes to infrastructure projects. For example, they had previously attempted to implement a rapid transport project called the “Metrobus” across the capital, Asuncion, but stopped work on the project in 2018, claiming that the construction company had breached its contract. However, the Portuguese company filed a claim against the state, stating that they had not acquired the necessary land for the project (“Paraguay Rejects Guarantee Request”). For these reasons, seeking a loan from the World Bank would be a better alternative that provides not only financing but also access to anti-corruption programs, as they subject all potential projects to certain scrutiny and conditions. Investing in the improvement of existing infrastructure such as roads and bridges to increase trade facilitation by reducing transit times and transaction costs of goods and services would help offset the barriers created by being landlocked. The Corredor Bioceanico is the perfect example of an infrastructure project that would represent an important resource for Paraguay. Requesting a loan from the World Bank would not only provide sufficient funding but also increase transparency and accountability in this project. Considering Paraguay’s central location in the continent, the Corredor Bioceanico would be a valuable resource for several countries if not the entire continent, which would provide incentives for other South American countries as well as the World Bank to take interest in this project. Conclusion Paraguay’s status as a small, landlocked, developing country presents increased barriers to certain aspects of globalization such as trade, and exposes it to negative externalities resulting from globalization such as environmental depletion. Its central location in the South American continent—being bordered by two “giants”—has also put Paraguay on the receiving end of power imbalances and negative effects due to the difference in scale in the countries’ economic and political resources. However, Paraguay’s location has also presented it with opportunities to

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capitalize on the benefits that globalization can provide. For example, the Corredor Bioceanico would provide easier access to important trade routes, and a regional environmental IGO with Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia would allow for greater resources to preserve the Chaco region. Through the three policies outlined above, Paraguay can reap the benefits of globalization to increase its development and offset the negative effects of being a landlocked country. Because of its location, Paraguay is inevitably exposed to globalization and its effects. Sharing common resources with nearby countries and being dependent on them to access ports present problems with an inherently global nature. Global problems require global solutions, even if these solutions are simply regional. Due to its lack of transparent governance and passive approach to negotiations and deals with its neighbors, Paraguay has only been receiving the negative effects of globalization thus far. If Paraguay is inevitably exposed to globalization, it should capitalize on it as a source of growth.

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References A secret hydropower deal with Brazil causes a political crisis in Paraguay. (2019, August 22). The Economist. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/08/22/a-secret-hydropower-dealwith-brazil-causes-a-political-crisis-in-paraguay Carmignani, F. (2013). The Development Economics of Landlockedness: Understanding the Development Costs of Being Landlocked. United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States. Director of ITAIPU reconnects with Jeffrey Sachs to explore alternative energy generation. (2021, February 11). BNamericas. https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/director-of-itaipureconnects-with-jeffrey-sachs-to-explore-alternative-energy-generation Elder, A. (2019, August 13). The Dam that (Almost) Brought Down Paraguay’s President. North American Congress in Latin America. https://nacla.org/news/2019/08/13/dam-almostbrought-down-paraguays-president Folch, C. (2019, August 19). The ITAIPU energy uproar continues on both sides of the Paraná. Global Americans. https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/08/itaipu-energy-uproar-that-almostled-to-the-impeachment-of-paraguayan-president-mario-abdo-continues-on-both-sides-of-theparana/ Nickson, A. (2019, March 18). Reassessment of the Itaipú Treaty and “brasiguayo” political power could reshape Paraguay’s relationship with Brazil. LSE Latin America and Caribbean. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2019/03/18/reassessment-of-the-itaipu-treaty-andbrasiguayo-political-power-could-reshape-paraguays-relationship-with-brazil/ Paraguay rejects guarantee request over scrapped US$54mn Metrobus project. (2020, May 15). BNamericas. https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/paraguay-rejects-guarantee-request-overscrapped-us54mn-metrobus-project Prayogi, A. W., Cangara, A. R., Badu, M. N., Baharuddin, A., & Marifat, I. D. N. (2020). The impacts of Paraguayan charcoal export to European markets upon deforestation of Paraguay’s Chaco forest. IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, 575(1), 012243. https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/575/1/012243 Sandler, T. (2001). On Financing Global and International Public Goods (Policy Research Working Paper No. 2638). World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2638 Tackling uncontrolled deforestation in Paraguay by improving landscape planning. (2019, June 1). International Union for Conservation of Nature Netherlands. https://www.iucn.nl/en/story/tackling-uncontrolled-deforestation-in-paraguay/ Veit, P., & Sarsfield, R. (2017). Land Rights, Beef Commodity Chains, and Deforestation Dynamics in the Paraguayan Chaco. USAID Tenure and Global Climate Change Program.

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FROM SWORDS TO FAKE NEWS: EVALUATING CONTEMPORARY WARFARE THROUGH AN ISLAMIC LENS BY NUZAINA FAISAL KHAN Death outside the natural confines of illness and old age is, in many cases, the consequence of choices made by individuals, communities, or states. These choices, which are at the heart of many contemporary issues (such as abortion, suicide and euthanasia), dominate political discourse and are at the forefront of judicial interpretation. For Muslims, the answer to such questions, and the basis for such choices, are governed by traditional sources that form the core of Islamic falsafa, kalam and fiqh, namely the Quran and the Prophetic tradition. Questions on the ethical justification for choosing death for oneself or others have always existed. However, with changes in society and the advent of technology, new dimensions have been added to these loaded questions. For example, in a shortage, how should doctors decide who gets access to life-saving medication? There is a necessity to constantly revisit and reinterpret traditional sources for a contemporary context. This theological and moral exercise is perhaps best encapsulated by Mona Siddiqui in her book The Good Muslim, where she states that these are “conversations that were never meant to end” (2012). The need to revisit ethical concerns becomes important when looking at conduct in war. 1400 years ago, the idea that swords and sticks would be replaced by biological weapons and nuclear armaments was unimaginable. The idea that a military would consciously, deliberately, and repeatedly use ‘fake news’ as their weapon of choice would be even more far-fetched (Harkins, 2020). In this paper, I will explore traditional sources and extend frameworks to better understand the ethical dilemmas that play out on modern battlefields. Allah repeatedly warns mankind to “not transgress limits” in the Quran (The Qu’ran, 1985, 2:190). This paper will attempt to discern what the “limits” are in two types of warfare: physical (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons) and the digital (cybersecurity and information warfare) using four main points of reference: the Quran, Prophetic traditions (Sunnah and Hadiths), the example set by the three blessed generations (Sahabahs, Tabi’in, and Tabi’ al Tabi’in), and the view-point of modern scholars. I hypothesize that the development of warfare in the two domains mentioned above is not permissible within the Islamic faith due to the indiscriminate use of force that inevitably accompanies modern weapons. We will explore the first domain—physical warfare—by honing in on the concept of indiscriminate killing. Modern methods of warfare such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are inextricably tied to disproportionate use of force killing (Walker, 2017). In fact, the inherent purpose of nuclear armaments is to cause mass destruction. As seen in the case of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the effects of nuclear weapons are not limited to military personnel or a particular region in a particular time, but to the detriment of civilians for generations to come (Yamamura, 2013). The majority of faqih and qadis strongly condemn such actions and firmly believe that killing indiscriminately during war is forbidden in Islam (Mowatt-Larssen, 2011). These scholars

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refer to Quran scripture to highlight specific categories of people who must be protected and methods of warfare which are forbidden to use. For example, Surah al-Baqarah verse 190, for example, is commonly cited as evidence for protecting non-combatants. Allah states, “And fight in the way of God those who fight against you and do not transgress. Indeed God does not like transgressors” (The Qu’ran, 1991, 2:190). Scholars believe that individuals who do not fall under “those who fight against you” are protected groups, such as children, the elderly, the sick, individuals who are differently abled, those who are in monastic practice, and women who are not fighting (Al-Dawoody, 2017). In modern conflicts, such as the civil war in Syria, we witness these very groups, innocent civilians, most directly affected by Bashar al Asad’s use of chemical warfare (Timeline, 2021). Individuals known as al-usafa are also considered a protected group. In his book The Islamic Law of War, Ahmed Al-Dawoody translates al-usafa to mean “hired man” or “employee” (2011). This group includes individuals who are under contract to provide services but are not actively engaging in warfare. In a modern context, this would include medical personnel or war journalists —many who we once again see getting injured in present-day conflicts (i.e. the war in Yemen) (McKernan, 2020). As mentioned above, many faqih state that certain methods of warfare are also prohibited. This stems from the belief that these means of warfare may lead to indiscriminate killing. Shooting at al-tataruss (human shields) is, of course, forbidden; so is al-bayat (attacking at night), if one is unable to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants (Al-Dawoody, 2011). The underlying principle in the case of al-bayat is that the element of surprise that may give one actor an edge over the other should not be used if it comes at the risk of innocent lives. This claim undermines the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as a means to catch one’s opponent off-guard and give one an unfair advantage. Islamic scholar and intellectual Abu Hamid al-Ghazali stated that the concept of maslaha (public interest) was integral to the Shariah and based on the preservation of five principles: din (religion), nafs (life), nasl (progeny), aql (intellect) and mal (property) (Griffel, 2020). Two of these principles—nafs (life) and nasl (progeny)—are directly harmed by the use of modern weapons. Al-Ghazali claimed that societies must act towards tashil (securing) and iqba (preserving) maslaha through madarra (avoiding harm) and manfa’a (acquisition of benefit). Asma Afsaruddin explored maslaha in a political context and explains this idea of maximizing benefit is also echoed through more well-known teleological frameworks, like utilitarianism, which aims to provide the greatest good for the greatest number of people (Afsaruddin, 2013). Notions of prioritizing welfare and protecting non-combatants are also enshrined in modern rule of war, such as the principle outlined in jus in bello’s (law that governs the way warfare is fought) and malum in se (restricting weapons that are considered ‘evil’ or cannot be controlled) (Dige, 2013). According to Griffel, another principle of maslaha is protecting the haqq (right) of mal (property). It is due to this integral pillar that many muftis state that modern methods of warfare that use excessive force are haram. In addition to loss of human life, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons’ harm to nature and destruction of property makes them forbidden. The Quran

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refers to such actions as causing fasād fī al-ard, which literally translates to the ‘destruction in the land’ (The Qu’ran, 2014, 2:190). Abd al-Rahman Al-Awazi, eponym of Awazi school of Islamic jurisprudence, interpreted the phrase fasād fī al-ard to imply that “it is prohibited for Muslims to commit any sort of takhrīb, wanton destruction, [during the course of hostilities] in enemy territories” (Al-Dawoody, 2017). Censure of unnecessary harm and destruction in Islamic thought is also supported by a well-known list of rules Abu Bakr laid out for his army. He ordered, “[D]o not cut down fruitbearing trees or destroy buildings [...]” (Saritoprak, 2014). Unfortunately, in many modern wars, such as the U.S. intervention in Iraq, we witnessed the destruction of cultural sites, artifacts, and monuments, including the Ziggurat in the city of Ur and the National Library (Destruction of Cultural Heritage, n.d.). With these narrations in mind, it is not difficult to understand why warfare that leads to unnecessary and avoidable damage is considered haram. Perhaps the best way to understand how traditional frameworks can be applied to modern contexts is through an analogy. Many scholars, especially those ascribing to the Hanafi and Maliki schools of thought, believe that it was impermissible to poison wells and use poisoned arrows during the time of the Prophet ‫( ﷺ‬Fadel, 1996). This opinion is seconded by modern scholars including Muhammad Hamidullah, who explores this impermissibility in his book The Muslim Conduct of State (2012). Poisoned arrows are the most primitive form of chemical warfare, so contemporary scholars can extend this impossibility of indiscriminate harm to modern weapons. In this way, present day Muslims can partake in qiyas (reasoning by analogy) and ijma (consensus) to make judgments on weapons used and methods employed in modern warfare. Moreover, jurists can use sabiqa (precedence) and apply rational reasoning for the public’s collective interest. Ebrahim Moosa, in his essay “Quran Ethics,” emphasizes the need to conceptualize the Quran as an “elaborate programme” rather than a checklist. Such an approach allows for fundamental lessons and values to be applied to shifting contexts (Moosa, 2020). The second domain—digital warfare—is more difficult to contextualize and compare through direct analogies. One reason is because concepts like ‘fake news’ and ‘alternative facts’ were coined only relatively recently. Additionally, political scientists have yet to form a consensus on the definition and parameters of cyberwarfare, so it is difficult to determine whether it fits the template of traditional Islamic warfare if we are unaware of its boundaries (Theohary & Rollins, 2015). However, if one observes the basic ethical dilemmas of cyber warfare and information warfare—lying, deception, and misinformation—there is a wealth of sources that can provide valuable insights. One particularly ominous verse in the Quran seems to be foreshadow global politics of recent years. In Surah Al-Hujurat verse 6, Allah says, “Believers, if a troublemaker brings you news, check it first, in case you wrong others unwittingly and later regret what you have done” (The Qu’ran, 1998, 49:6). Here, there is a clear emphasis on being a critical receipt of information rather than a passive consumer. There are also narrations in Islamic history where false information almost lead to conflict. One example concerned the tribe of Bani al-Mustaliq, who embraced Islam during the time of the Prophet ‫ﷺ‬. The Prophet ‫ ﷺ‬sent Walid bin Uqbah to collect zakat from them; however, when he arrived in their territory he felt frightened

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and returned, saying they refused to pay zakat. A contingent was going to be employed against Bani al-Mustaliq until their chief, Harith bin Dirar, came and stated that they never saw Walid bin Uqbah (Payeur, 2013). This narration highlights the very real political and military consequences of misinformation. Some Islamic scholars attempt to make the distinction between treachery and deception (Hayward, 2012). The former is considered haram, but the latter is permissible. In a narration, Abu Muslimah said, “Umar ibn al-Khattaab said: ‘By the One in Whose hand is my soul, if any one of you were to point to the sky [i.e., a gesture to imply that he will not harm him] to make a mushrik come down to him and then kill him, I would kill him for that’” (2012). Breaking a pledge, in the case above, killing someone after pleading not to, is defined as treachery. Extending this concept to treaties and agreements between countries, it can be seen as deceitful for Muslim countries to spy on countries they have pacts with. With concepts that are relatively newer and unexplored, like information warfare, scholars must use aql (reasoning faculty), have sidq (integrity) and act in a way that is sulh (conducive to peace). This could lead to ijtihad, which Abou El Fadl refers to as independent reasoning informed by religious knowledge and considers the basis of democratic governance (Abou El Fadl, 1999). Gudrun Kramer’s argument about focusing on the “spirit of the Shariah” in The Contest of Values becomes particularly important in cases such as those described above where explicit verses are unavailable (Krämer, 2008). In An Introduction to Islamic Law, Wael Hallaq furthers this sentiment with his discussion on the need for rational thinking. He poses the question, “Does rational thinking, on its own, accomplish the job?” (Hallaq, 2009). This highlights the need to strike a balance between using the facilities God has blessed us with while relying on God’s revelation as is. It is important to acknowledge that despite the widespread sectarian violence and divide that is rife in the Muslim world, there is in fact considerable agreement that the excessive use of force and unjust killing accompanying many modern weapons of warfare make their use haram. For example, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a Sunni chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, stated, “Islam, the religion of tolerance, holds the human soul in high esteem, and considers the attack against innocent human beings a grave sin, this is backed by the Qur’an” (Mowatt-Larssen, p. 14). Similarly, Grand Ayatollah Yusef Saanei, Grand Marja of Shia Islam and an Iranian Scholar, reaffirmed, “There is complete consensus on this issue. It is self-evident in Islam that it is prohibited to have nuclear bombs. It is eternal law, because the basic function of these weapons is to kill innocent people. This cannot be reversed” (Mowatt-Larssen, p. 51). However, just like other faiths, Islam is not a homogenous block and there are dissenting opinions. Some scholars believe that the use of cyberwarfare and nuclear and chemical weapons is, in fact, permissible. Proponents cite darurat (necessity) as a concept commonly applied in legal decision making where necessity trumps regular law (Mowatt-Larssen). Many would argue that the context of war allows for such necessities. This idea is echoed in some consequentialist frameworks where ‘the ends justify the means’ and moral choices are judged by the outcome and effect (Sinnott-Armstrong & Zalta, 2019). In Islam, human acts are classified on a range from wajib (obligatory) to haram (forbidden) with mandub (recommended), makruh (disapproved) and

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mubah (permitted) in between. Those who argue for the permissibility of modern weapons believe that they fall into the four non-haram categories, thus making them halal. The concept of istishan (jurustic preference) allows necessity to triumph over textual inferences if it is in the public’s best interest these interests may be interpreted to mean long-term political goals (Hallaq, p.12). Scholars vary in the importance they give Hadith in the overall calculus of determining moral judgements. Scott Lucas, for example, states that there are four approaches to Hadith. These perspectives range from concentrating exclusively on the Quran as the only authentic source of judgment to pushing for the compilation of new critical Hadith collections (Lucas, 2011). The way scholars interpret sources like the Hadith, and the individual importance they place on them, will determine whether lessons from Hadiths will form the basis of Islamic falsafa. As El Fadl put it, we need to take a “conscientious pause” and “ask: to what extent did the Prophet ‫ ﷺ‬really play a role in the authorial enterprise that produced the tradition?” and how much was it a by-product of time and culture? (Abou El Fadl, 2003). The spectrum of opinion on the use of modern weapons ranges from never permissible to permissible due to necessity. Perhaps, this is best summarized in a quote from Gharavian, an Iranian cleric. He considers it “only natural” to have nuclear weapons and states, “When the entire world is armed with nuclear weapons, it is permissible to use these weapons as a countermeasure” (Mowatt-Larssen). There are important similarities between traditional Islamic sources and modern agreements, like the Geneva Conventions and UN charters (Kayaoglu, 2020). For example, when referring to the treatment of prisoners, the Prophet ‫ ﷺ‬states, “Prisoners are your brothers and companions. It is because of God’s compassion that they are in your hands. They are at your mercy, therefore treat them well as if you were treating yourself” (Iwansyah, 2018). This is echoed in the Geneva Article 13, which states, “Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated” (Wills, 2017). Furthermore, the Quran states, “But if they incline towards peace, you [Prophet] must also incline towards it,” dictating the etiquette on how to treat those who surrender (The Qu’ran, 1998, 8:61). Similarly, the Geneva protocol expresses that “opposing forces cannot directly target surrendered persons” (Wills). The reason behind these similarities may be linked to the taqwā (consciousness and awareness), which may involve mankind's ability to differentiate between right and wrong without being explicitly told (Rahman, 1989). When exploring ethical justifications for choosing death for oneself or others, Islamic scholars and military jurists are tasked with the difficult job of striking a balance between humanitarian laws inherent to Islam and political and military pressures in an ever-changing world. Due to the excessive use of force and avoidable harm that is caused by modern physical and digital warfare, I would pose the conclusion that their use is not permissible in the Islamic faith. However, due to constant technological innovation and what Siddiqui refers to as the error of “human approximation,” these questions will have to be reposed and revisited with the belief that these conversations are “never meant to end.”

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References Abou El Fadl, K. (1999). The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry Into Classical Sources. The Muslim World, 89(2), 144–157. Abou El Fadl, K. (2003). The Ugly Modern and the Modern Ugly: Reclaiming the Beautiful in Islam. In O. Safi, Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism (pp. 33–77). Oneworld. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.30837 Afsaruddin, A. (2013). Maslahah as a Political Concept. In M. Boroujerdi (Ed.), Mirror For the Muslim Prince (pp. 16–44). Syracuse University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1j1w04g.7 Al-Dawoody, A. (2011). Islamic International Humanitarian Law. In The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (pp. 107–146). Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230118089_5 Al-Dawoody, A. (2017, March 14). IHL and Islam: An overview. Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog. https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2017/03/14/ihl-islam-overview/ Destruction of Cultural Heritage. (n.d.). Retrieved December 14, 2021, from https://archive.globalpolicy.org/humanitarian-issues-in-iraq/consequences-of-the-war-andoccupation-of-iraq/35721.html Dige, M. (2013). Explaining the Principle of Mala in Se. Journal of Military Ethics, 11(4), 318– 332. https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2012.758404 Fadel, M. (1996). The Social Logic of Taqlīd and the Rise of the Mukhataṣar. Islamic Law and Society, 3(2), 193–233. Griffel, F. (2020). Al-Ghazali. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/al-ghazali/ Hallaq, W. (2009). An Introduction to Islamic Law. Review of Middle East Studies, 44(1), 86–88. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2151348100001208 Hamidullah, M. (2012). The Muslim Conduct of State. Islamic Book Trust. Harkins, G. (2020, August 16). Fake News Is Wreaking Havoc on the Battlefield. Here’s What the Military’s Doing About It. Military.Com. https://www.military.com/dailynews/2020/08/16/fake-news-wreaking-havoc-battlefield-heres-what-militarys-doing-aboutit.html Hayward, J. (2012). Warfare in the Qur’an. Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Center. Iwansyah, H. (2018). Islam and the Provisions of War. Al-’Adalah, 15(2), 325–343. https://doi.org/10.24042/adalah.v15i2.3549 Kayaoglu, T. (2020, September 28). The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s declaration on human rights: Promises and pitfalls. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/research/theorganization-of-islamic-cooperations-declaration-on-human-rights-promises-and-pitfalls/ Krämer, G. (2008). The Contest of Values: Notes on Contemporary Islamic Discourse. In The Cultural Values of Europe (pp. 338–356). Liverpool University Press. https://doi.org/10.5949/liverpool/9781846311383.003.0015

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Lucas, S. C. (2011). “Perhaps You Only Kissed Her?”: A Contrapuntal Reading of the Penalties for Illicit Sex in the Sunni Hadith Literature. The Journal of Religious Ethics, 39(3), 399–415. Blackwell Publishing. McKernan, B. (2020, March 18). Health workers targeted at least 120 times in Yemen conflict. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/18/health-workers-targeted-atleast-120-times-yemen-conflict Moosa, E. (2020). Qur’anic Ethics. In M. Shah & M. Abdel Haleem (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Qur’anic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199698646.013.10 Mowatt-Larssen, R. (2011, January). Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification for and against Nuclear Weapons. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/islam-and-bomb Payeur, B. (2013). From Merchant to Messenger. Rahman, F. (1989). Major Themes of the Quran. Bibliotheca Islamica. Saritoprak, Z. (2014, July 30). Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq. Oxford Bibliographies. https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780195390155-0221 Siddiqui, M. (2012). The Good Muslim: Reflections on Classical Islamic Law and Theology. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511980015 Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & Zalta, E. N. (2019). Consequentialism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2019 Edition. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/consequentialism/ The Qur’an (M. Al-Maraghi, Trans.). (2014). The Qur’an (A. Haleem, Trans.). (1998). The Qur’an (U. Muhammad, Trans.). (1991). Sahih International. The Qur’an (A. Yusuf Ali, Trans.; Saudi Rev.). (1985). Theohary, C. A., & Rollins, J. W. (2015). Cyberwarfare and Cyberterrorism: In Brief (p. 15). Congressional Research Service. Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2021. (2021, May). Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-WeaponsActivity Walker, P. F. (2017). A Century of Chemical Warfare: Building a World Free of Chemical Weapons. In B. Friedrich, D. Hoffmann, J. Renn, F. Schmaltz, & M. Wolf (Eds.), One Hundred Years of Chemical Warfare: Research, Deployment, Consequences (pp. 379–400). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51664-6_20 Wills, S. (2017). The Geneva Conventions: Do They Matter in the Context of Peacekeeping Missions? In Do the Geneva Conventions Matter? Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199379774.003.0012 Yamamura, E. (2013). Atomic bombs and the long-run effect on trust: Experiences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 46, 17–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2013.06.001

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MONTREAL PROTOCOL BY ROXIE MILES The action plans the Montreal Protocol has compelled its member states to adopt have been highly effective in reducing the anthropogenic degradation of the ozone layer (Bodansky, 2010; World Meteorological Organization (WMO), 2018, p. 16). A single state alone could not protect the health of the ozone layer because continued degradation from any other nation could deplete it entirely and render the preservation efforts futile. Absent a treaty that guaranteed collective global action, there was no incentive for any one state to incur the costs associated with decreasing the harm they caused to the ozone layer. The Montreal Protocol has exhibited three major strengths in overcoming this individual incentive not to act; the treaty has been effective in getting countries to ratify it, encouraging their compliance, and ultimately reducing their degradation of the ozone layer (“All Ratifications,” 2020; “Consumption,” n.d.; “Production,” n.d.; WMO, p. 16). The mere existence of the Montreal Protocol is not a guarantee of ozone health, though, as the treaty is reliant on the good-faith participation and compliance of every state at all times. Thus far, it has been able to persuade such good-faith compliance, and the observable improvements in the health of the ozone layer are unquestionably attributable to the Montreal Protocol and the obligations it imposes on its member states. The Montreal Protocol was created to preserve the health of the ozone layer by limiting the emissions of ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) globally (Montreal Protocol, 1989, Preamble; Salawitch et al., 2019). The ozone layer is measured by the concentration of ozone within the stratosphere (Salawitch et al., p. 7). The higher this concentration, or the thicker the ozone layer, the healthier it is. Ozone health is measured in Dobson Units, which are a standardized measure of how thick the ozone layer is at 0 degrees Celsius and under atmospheric pressure (“NASA Ozone Watch,” 2021). Humans contribute to the degradation of the ozone layer through the emissions of ODSs, a term that refers to all substances that have been discovered to be harmful to the ozone layer (Salawitch et al., p. 7). Once they reach the stratosphere, ODSs continue to harm the ozone layer until they break down, and most ODSs have long atmospheric lifespans (Salawitch et al., pp. 22-25). For this reason, reductions in ODS emissions are not immediately mirrored in a corresponding improvement in ozone thickness; instead, the rate of thinning slows because there are fewer numbers of ODSs entering the stratosphere to continue its degradation. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the ozone layer is not as thick now as it was in the 1980s, but the rate at which it was changing flipped in the mid-1990s, and ozone thickness has been generally increasing since then (WMO, p. 16). The atmospheric concentrations of nearly all ODSs have drastically decreased since 1998, indicating that the existing ODSs in the atmosphere are breaking down and are not being replaced by continued emissions of those substances (“Current State of the Ozone Layer”). If the current decreases in ODS emissions continue, by approximately 2050 there will no longer be ODS in the stratosphere, and the ozone layer will have surpassed 1980-level thickness (“Current State of the Ozone Layer”; WMO, p. 16).

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Figure 1. Ozone Thickness Globally

Note: Adapted from “Executive Summary,” in Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion: 2018, World Meteorological Organization, 2018, Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project – Report No. 58, p. 16) The Montreal Protocol’s capacity to preserve the ozone layer is reliant on current knowledge of the health of the ozone layer, the rate of emissions of each regulated substance, and the capacity of different substances to harm the ozone layer, which are all measured by the Scientific Assessment Panel assembled through the treaty (Montreal Protocol, Article 6; Salawitch et al., pp. 13-17). As the treaty was being negotiated, it had not yet been proven that human emissions of substances known to be harmful to ozone molecules were reaching the stratosphere and depleting the ozone layer. Because of this scientific uncertainty, states were reluctant to decrease their use of ODSs (Benedick, 1998, pp. 68-70). This made it politically impossible to create a stand-alone treaty that would require countries to make ODS emissions reductions. Instead, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone layer was first negotiated as a statement of collective intent to act to preserve the ozone layer, before negotiations began for the Montreal Protocol, which would determine which actions were necessary to do so (Montreal Protocol, Preamble, Article 2). The Montreal Protocol was made to be updated as scientific understanding regarding ODSs developed over time. To make major changes to the treaty, such as proposing the regulation of newly-identified ODSs, member countries can propose and negotiate treaty amendments (Desombre, 2017, pp. 119-22). In order to make smaller changes more quickly, such as changing the required reductions timeline for an ODS already regulated under the treaty, “adjustments” can be made. These adjustments do not require a formal negotiation process, and can be approved to enter into force without unanimous agreement from all the member countries (DeSombre, 2001, pp. 54-55). States that ratify the treaty cannot choose to make objections or reservations to specific rules, including those made by amendments and adjustments (Montreal Protocol, Article 18). Importantly, this means that member countries can be bound to observe changes made to the treaty even if they did not agree to them (Montreal Protocol, Article II. 9. (d)). Although the original structure of the Montreal

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Protocol was extremely influential in getting powerful countries to coalesce with the goal of combatting ozone depletion, due to the limitations in scientific knowledge during the initial treaty negotiations, the impact the Montreal Protocol has had on the health of the ozone layer would not have been possible without the treaty’s amendments and adjustments (Benedick, pp. 68-70; Bodansky, p. 261)). In its requirement of ODS emissions reductions, the Montreal Protocol distinguishes between ‘developing’ and ‘non-developing’ countries, because the two groups were not equally financially capable of reducing their ODS reliance. Article 5 of the treaty outlines the requirements to meet the ‘developing’ country classification and delay treaty obligations (Montreal Protocol). From this point onward, this paper will refer to the countries that meet these requirements as Article 5 states and those that do not as non-Article 5 states. In the negotiations for the original text of the treaty, only CFCs and halons were restricted (Montreal Protocol, Annex A Groups I and II). For both of these substances, the required reductions for Article 5 states were set 10 years after the reductions for non-Article 5 states (Montreal Protocol, Article 5). The time lag for these ODSs between non-Article 5 states and Article 5 states is shown in Figure 2 (Parson, 2003, p. 235). The dramatic decrease in CFC and halon use in non-Article 5 states occurs because the treaty required that their CFC use halt in 1989 and cease in 1996, and their halon use halt in 1992 cease in 1994. For both substances, the required elimination date was set with allowances for specific states, and it is shown in Figure 2 that non-Article 5 states’ emissions continued past the elimination deadline. Article 5 states were not required to halt their CFC use until 1999 and their halon use until 2002, and did not face emissions reductions requirements before 2000 (Montreal Protocol, Annex A Group I and II). CFC and halon use and creation by both Article 5 and non-Article 5 countries was fully eliminated in 2010, meeting the deadline set for Article 5 countries (“Consumption”). Figure 2. Article 5 and non-Article 5 Reductions in CFCs and Halons, 1986-2000

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Note: From Protecting the Ozone Layer: Science and Strategy, by E. A. Parson, 2003, Oxford University Press, p. 235. For the treaty to effectively combat ozone depletion, it had to be universally ratified; just one state’s decision to continue emitting ODSs without restrictions could completely decimate the ozone layer. Article 5 states had no incentive to ratify the original form of the treaty, though, because eliminating their CFC use would have been very costly. Just one year after the treaty entered into force, Article 5 states were able to leverage the treaty’s need for their ratification to negotiate the creation of the Multilateral Fund. This funding mechanism pooled the resources of the non-Article 5 member states, to offset the costs incurred by Article 5 states when transitioning away from ODS reliance (DeSombre, 2017, p. 122). Once the Multilateral Fund was established, both India and China were convinced to join the treaty (“All Ratifications”). Their membership was important for the treaty’s effectiveness because they were prominent CFC-emitting Article 5 states (DeSombre, 2017, p. 122). Strengthened by the Multilateral Fund, the Montreal Protocol has been highly effective in incentivizing states to agree to its obligations, and has since been ratified by every UN member state (“All Ratifications”). High rates of ratification alone have not been responsible for the treaty’s effect on the health of the ozone layer; states must also comply with the rules they signed on to uphold and take action to reduce their degradation of the ozone layer. The treaty’s noncompliance procedure was added after the treaty entered into force, and has since been used to determine the necessary response to each instance of member state noncompliance that has arisen (Usuki, 2000, p. 29). The noncompliance procedure adopts a managerial approach to its response; it operates from an assumption that states’ continued membership in the treaty indicates their individual willingness to pursue its goals. Whenever states are noncompliant with their obligations, the treaty would respond as if those states are prevented in some capacity from doing so, and not as if they are indifferent to the health of the ozone layer (Bodansky, 2010, pp. 235-37. In practice, the treaty’s capacity to make allowances and new reduction timelines for noncompliant states has encouraged states to remain members to the treaty and continue working toward the goal of ozone preservation rather than withdrawing from the treaty altogether (DeSombre, 2017, p. 125). Since the initial negotiation of the treaty, regulations have been added for seven other substances: CTC, TCA, HCFCs, HBFCs, MB, BCM, and HFCs. The use and creation of CFCs, halons, TCA, HBFCs, and BCM have been reported to have been eliminated by all countries in compliance with the requirements of the treaty (“Consumption”; “Production”, Montreal Protocol, Annex B Group III, Annex C Groups I and II). Non-Article 5 use and creation of CTC has been eliminated, and some Article 5 states are still permitted to emit very small amounts of CTC (“Consumption”; “Critical or Essential,” n.d.; “Production”). MB use and creation for all countries has decreased significantly since the beginning of its regulation, and non-Article 5 states have eliminated their creation of MB. The Executive Committee overseeing country compliance has created exemptions from the required MB elimination deadline for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 countries (“Consumption”; “Critical or Essential”; “Production”; DeSombre, 2017, p. 123). Non-Article 5 states currently use 0.8% of the MB they were using when

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regulations began, and Article 5 states use 0.6%. Article 5 states have also reduced their MB creation by 93% (“Consumption”; Montreal Protocol, Annex E Group I; “Production”). Eliminations in HCFC use are not required by the treaty until 2030 for non-Article 5 states and 2040 for Article 5 states, and although both groups have reduced their HCFC creation and use, they have not ceased entirely (“Consumption of Controlled Substances”; Montreal Protocol, Annex C Group I; “Production of Controlled Substances”). HFCs were only regulated by the treaty beginning in 2016, and the only reduction deadline that has passed was a 10% reduction in both use and creation for non-Article 5 countries in 2019 (Kigali Amendment, Article 1; Montreal Protocol, Annex F). Non-Article 5 countries surpassed this requirement, with over a 45% reduction in both use and creation (“Consumption of Controlled Substances”; Montreal Protocol, Annex F, Annex C Group I, Annex A Group I; “Production of Controlled Substances”). Member states have been able to take such significant steps in transitioning away from their use of the regulated substances because of the treaty’s support for the development and identification of technology that uses alternative non-ODS substances. The treaty’s technological support has been twofold: a technology research panel was established in the original treaty, and the Multilateral Fund can be used by Article 5 states to acquire technology to facilitate their elimination of ODSs (DeSombre, 2017, pp. 123-24; Montreal Protocol, Article 6). The most common ODS-reliant technology used CFCs and HCFCs in spray canisters, foaming products, and air cooling technology, as well as halons in fire extinguishers, methyl bromide in fumigation procedures, and CFCs, HCFCs, TCA and CTC in cleaning products, medical products, and as a protective exterior for other products (Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook, 1998, p. 251). The technology research panel formed under the treaty is currently called the Technology and Economic Effects Panel (TEAP), and exists to find alternative technologies that serve these needed functions without damaging the ozone layer (“Technology and Economic Assessment Panel,” 2020). The TEAP subcommittees were structured to involve perspectives from ODSreliant industries and governments alike, to ensure that their proposals would be supported and implemented (Canan et al., 2015). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), as a designated agency working under the Multilateral Fund, is responsible for allocating funding so that Article 5 states can afford to transition to new ozone-friendly technologies as they become available (DeSombre, 2017, pp. 123-24). Additionally, National Ozone Units were created in Article 5 states as domestic infrastructure to coordinate the operations within the country with both the Multilateral Fund and the obligations set by the Montreal Protocol (Canan et al.; DeSombre, 2017, pp. 123-24). The identification of alternative technology does not offer a perfect environmental solution. HFCs were identified and used as an effective alternative to CFCs, before it was discovered that they are a greenhouse gas and contribute to climate change (DeSombre, 2017, p. 120). In response, the treaty added HFCs to the list of its regulated substances under the Kigali Amendment in 2016 (Article 1). The treaty has been overwhelmingly effective in promoting the development and implementation of non-ODS technology, as demonstrated by its capacity to promote the use of HFCs and then later have its member states agree to make HFC emissions reductions.

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Since the Montreal Protocol entered into force and began to regulate ODS emissions, the greatest threat to the preservation of the ozone layer has been posed by the emergence of a black market for CFCs. This happened during the time period shown in Figure 1, when the treaty restricted non-Article 5 states’ use, but CFCs were still widely legally available in Article 5 states. The domestic implementation of the required CFC reductions led to increased expenses for consumers, as they were being asked to pay increased taxes on CFCs or take on the financial burden of transitioning their personal technology away from CFC dependence. CFCs were widely available for much cheaper consumption if bought through the black market, and many people were financially driven to illegal action. Any legal availability and production of CFCs made the black market difficult to regulate. For regions where CFCs were restricted, it was difficult to prove that someone was using CFCs that had been acquired on the black market. Even in places where CFCs were banned altogether, if individuals were using CFCs, it was difficult to prove that they had not been purchased at a time when it was legal to do so. The market for illegal CFCs could not last forever, because illegally acquired CFCs were less reliable and as a result less demanded by industries that had previously used CFCs in high quantities. Additionally, technology that used CFCs tended to be older and more prone to breaking, which led to reduced demand from consumers and higher numbers of people buying ozone-safe technology (DeSombre, 2001, pp. 62-69). Without the existence of the Montreal Protocol, states would not have taken action to reduce their ODS emissions, and would have continued perpetuating the depletion of the ozone layer. Even when non-ODS alternative technology was available, substate actors had strong financial motivations to continue to use and create the much less expensive ODSs, even if doing so meant violating international law. Ultimately, this illegal trading ended because of a reduction in CFC demand and in the amount of CFCs supplied through the black market that could be passed off as legal, both of which would not have occurred without the treaty making the use and creation of CFCs illegal. Because ODSs, and CFCs in particular, were so widely used and inexpensive, there was a high cost associated with the transition to ozone-safe technology (DeSombre, 2001, pp. 62-69). The only way to offset this cost was through collective action under the Montreal Protocol in pursuit of the benefits associated with a healthy ozone layer. The fewer ODSs are emitted into the atmosphere to degrade the ozone layer, the faster the ozone layer can recover from the harm associated with previous ODS emissions (Salawitch et al., pp. 22-25). When there are higher concentrations of ozone in the stratosphere, it is more difficult for ultraviolet-B (UVB) rays to pass through the ozone layer and cause skin cancer in humans (“NASA Ozone Watch”). Without the existence of the Montreal Protocol in its current form, states would not have reduced their ODS emissions, and the current recovery in the ozone layer would not have happened (Bodansky, p. 261). For this reason, the treaty is credited with preventing over 2 million cases of skin cancer (DeSombre, 2017, p. 126). It is made clear in Figure 3 that had the pre-treaty rates of ODS emissions continued, the effective stratospheric chlorine, which is indicative of the presence of ODS in the ozone layer, would have been much higher. Additionally, with the increased rates of Article 5 state ratification after the passage of the London Amendment, and the added regulations of newly-identified ODSs through the London,

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Copenhagen, and Beijing Amendments, the amount of effective stratospheric chlorine decreases (Bodansky, p.261; DeSombre, 2017, p. 119-122). These reductions in effective stratospheric chlorine correspond to decreased rates of skin cancer, providing supporting evidence that the ODS emissions reductions states have made as a result of the Montreal Protocol have not only reduced the effective stratospheric chlorine, but also reduced the thinning of the ozone layer, and the amount of UVB rays able to pass through as a result (Bodansky, p.261; “NASA Ozone Watch”). Figure 3 makes clear that the obligations set by the treaty and its amendments have been effective in reducing the degradation of the ozone layer, and that states’ continued compliance with their obligations is critical to both ozone and human health (Bodansky, p. 261). Figure 3. The Projected Impact of the Montreal Protocol and its Amendments After 2006.

Note: From The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, by D. Bodansky, 2010, Harvard University Press, p. 261.

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In 2019, it was discovered that China had resumed its CFC emissions, which posed a grave risk to ozone health. External scientific reporting traced an annual rate of 7,000 tons of CFC emissions back to the specific provinces they were coming from, unquestionably indicating Chinese noncompliance. The country’s government had reported its noncompliance, but had only identified 114 total tons of illegal CFCs (Cyranoski, 2019). The managerial model of the Multilateral Fund necessitates that the governing body of the treaty make the assumption that China was not producing CFCs with the intent of harming the ozone layer, and should not be sanctioned for its actions (Bodansky, pp. 235-37). Instead, funding from the Multilateral Fund can be used to reduce any financial advantages associated with ODS production that might be motivating China’s noncompliance (DeSombre, 2017, p.122). It is possible that the actors within China that decided to resume CFC emissions were pursuing an advantage over business competitors by reducing their production costs through the inexpensive creation of CFCs (DeSombre, 2001, pp. 62-69). Affordability is not an excuse for CFC production, though, because China is an Article 5 state and qualifies for financial support from the Multilateral Fund to use non-ODS alternatives (DeSombre, 2017, p.121). The Multilateral Fund responded to this noncompliance by leveraging its financial assistance and threatening to revoke existing financial support if China did not once again eliminate its CFC emissions (Cyranoski). Despite the long atmospheric lifetimes of ODSs, it is clear that the ODS emissions undertaken by both Article 5 and non-Article states have resulted in a decrease in effective stratospheric chlorine and an increase in the global thickness of the ozone layer (Bodansky, pp. 22-25; Salawitch et al., p. 261; WMO, p. 16). Because states and industries had such strong financial motivations not to reduce their ODS emissions, demonstrated by the existence of the CFC black market and China’s recent noncompliance, states would not have decided to reduce their emissions without the support structures created by the Montreal Protocol (Cyranoski; DeSombre, 2001, pp. 62-69). The Montreal Protocol was able to receive such widespread ratification and high rates of member state compliance because it was capable of being adapted over time, so elements like the Multilateral Fund, its support for the development of ODS alternatives, and the managerial noncompliance procedure could be added as needed (DeSombre, 2017, pp. 122-24; Usuki, p. 29). Its adaptability was also a crucial component in its capacity to address ozone depletion, because it was created at a time before the full number of ODSs had been discovered and needed to add emissions reduction obligations over time (Benedick, pp. 6870). The effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol would not have been possible without its ability to be continually adapted, and the incentives it created to encourage universal ratification and compliance. The Montreal Protocol is particularly praiseworthy for not having gone too far with these strengths, either, and not becoming adaptable to the point of acquiescing to member states’ financial desires, or requiring so great a contribution to the Multilateral Fund that a non-Article 5 state decided to withdraw (“All Ratifications”; Montreal Protocol, Article 11. 3. (h)). For another international environmental law to have a similar effect on the environmental issue it seeks to remedy, the treaty must be capable of changing as much and as quickly as is scientifically necessary, and must have an active funding mechanism to ensure that the costs of compliance are equitably balanced across its member states (DeSombre, 2001; 2017, p. 122).

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References All ratifications. (2020). Ozone Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme. Retrieved March 23, 2021, from https://ozone.unep.org/all-ratifications Benedick, R. E. (1998). Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (pp. 68– 70). Harvard University Press. Bodansky, D. (2010). The Article and Craft of International Environmental Law. Harvard University Press. Canan, P., Andersen, S. O., Reichman, N., & Gareau, B. (2015). Introduction to the special issue on ozone layer protection and climate change: The extraordinary experience of building the Montreal Protocol, lessons learned, and hopes for future climate change efforts. Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, 5(2), 111–121. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-0150224-1 Consumption of controlled substances. (n.d.). Ozone Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme. Retrieved March 23, 2021, from https://ozone.unep.org/countries/data? report_type=0&period_start=1986&period_end=2020&output_type=odp-CO2e-tonnes Current State of the Ozone Layer. (2015, July 17). United States Environmental Protection Agency. Retrieved March 23, 2021, from https://www.epa.gov/ozone-layerprotection/current-state-ozone-layer Cyranoski, D. (2019). China Feels the Heat Over Rogue CFC Emissions. Nature 571, 309–310. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-019-02109-2 DeSombre, E. R. (2001). The Experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly Remarkable, and Remarkably Particular. UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, 19(1), 49–81. DeSombre, E. R. (2017). Global Environmental Institutions (2nd ed.). Routledge. Kigali Amendment. (2016). Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. (1989). NASA Ozone Watch. (2021). National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Retrieved March 23, 2021, from https://ozonewatch.gsfc.nasa.gov/ Parson, E. A. (2003). Protecting the Ozone Layer: Science and Strategy. Oxford University Press. Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook. (1998). World Bank. Production of Controlled Substances. (n.d.). Ozone Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme. Retrieved March 23, 2021, from https://ozone.unep.org/countries/data? report_type=1&period_start=1986&period_end=2020&output_type=odp-CO2e-tonnes Salawitch, R. J., Fahey, D. W., Hegglin, M. I., McBride, L. A., Tribett, W. R., & Doherty, S. J. (2019). Twenty questions and answers about the ozone layer, 2018 update. In Scientific assessment of ozone depletion, 2018. World Meteorological Organization. Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP). (2020). Ozone Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme. Retrieved April 1, 2021, from https://ozone.unep.org/science/assessment/teap Usuki, T. (2000). Measures to Ensure Compliance with the Montreal Ozone Protocol—New Institutionalized Reaction to Non-Compliance. Japanese Annual of International Law, 43.

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World Meteorological Organization. (2018). Executive Summary. In Scientific assessment of ozone depletion: 2018. Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project–Report No. 58.

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THE COCA LEAF AND THE MAS: CREATING A NEW PATH FORWARD FOR BOLIVIA’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLE BY ITZELT REYES CHAPARRO Víctor Paz Estenssoro instituted Bolivia’s first rounds of neoliberalist reforms during his 1985 to 1989 presidential term. The Bolivian economic and dynamic social changes led to protests spearheaded by indigenous people. After various ignored requests, they formed coca unions, which were recognized, but not respected by the country’s oligarchs. Eventually, indigenous leadership addressed a negligent government by creating the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party in 1998 (Grisaffi, 2019, p. 45) The party was a network of coca union alliances that continued responding to the deepening of neoliberalist reforms. The privatization of various industries left more than 20,000 people without a job; many resorted to growing the coca leaf and establishing a dependent relationship with the coca leaf’s revenue (Padilla, 2021). As the most indigenous country in South America, with around 70% of its population identifying as native, its rising inequalities mostly affected its autochthonous population (Grisaffi, p. 27). In response, the MAS party utilized the coca leaf’s cultural and symbolic importance to raise indigenous political representation, mobilize society to acknowledge the indigenous community’s needs, and denounce U.S. coca-eradication efforts. MAS leadership highlighted how U.S. intervention in coca production policies caused violent clashes against indigenous communities without even achieving the desired outcome of decreasing coca leaf production. In the implementation of the Triennial Plan in 1986, the United States sent military personnel and numerous Blackhawk helicopters to destroy crops and promote coca plant interdiction. Less than a decade later, President Hugo Banzer Suarez’s Dignity Plan instituted a ‘“systematic terror policy”’ by increasing the number of police and military members in El Chapare, Bolivia’s leading coca plant production zones (Grisaffi, p. 130). After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. equated the war on drugs to the war on terror; the U.S. Embassy established training programs that urged its attendants to possess U.S. values and interests and rewarded them with a “‘gringo”” monthly bonus of $400. It is noteworthy that the U.S. Embassy threatened to halt aid if the Bolivian government did not adopt U.S.-led coca eradication programs. Consequently, the MAS party declared itself anti-imperialist to address the pattern of modern U.S. government violation of indigenous human rights. During Evo Morales’s presidential campaigns, local songs declared “this [Evo’s potential election] yes, Yankees no. Out with imperialism (Landes, 2007).” Newspapers and party literature condemned U.S. coca eradication efforts and killing strategies by printing on their front pages: “they [U.S. diplomats,] do not want to eradicate the coca plant, they instead want to get rid of the [indigenous] peasants (Landes, 2007).” The MAS party used U.S. intervention to show the deleterious effects of imperialism on the indigenous community. The party’s anti-U.S. rallying cry and collective organizing empowered indigenous people to protect their heritage and their lives. The MAS party used the policy goal to legalize the coca leaf as a centripetal force to increase indigenous political representation and establish political legitimacy. Before the MAS

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party assumed presidential power in 2005, Bolivia’s government was a “disjunctive democracy.” Endemic corruption and police violence promoted the interests of a small group of white creoles. Their endeavors disregarded the country’s indigenous communities and suppressed their civic representation, resulting in minimal indigenous electoral participation. However, after establishing the MAS party, confederations of coca unions turned the coca leaf into a symbol of collective identification to increase political engagement (Landes). According to Thomas Grisaffi, the author of Coca Yes, Cocaine No, many prolific coca chewers identify as “truckers, peasants, laborers, miners, and small-scale merchants, who value its qualities as a moderate stimulant to suppress hunger and fatigue” (p. 19). Hence, the MAS’s political symbol of the coca leaf unified Bolivia’s working-class and created solidarity among indigenous rights advocates. The MAS party’s anti-colonialist stance put indigenous voices at the forefront. Their project leaped forward with the election of ex-President Evo Morales in 2005, the first indigenous president in Bolivia’s history. He previously was a coca leaf grower who still had his farm during his presidency. The feat highlighted the power of the coca leaf in moving masses and placing individuals in power who understand the indigenous plight and marginalized experience in Bolivia. With the coca leaf at the center of the MAS project, the party provided a social platform for coca planters to voice their grievances and enact long-awaited transformation. As one indigenous member stated, “We live from coca. Without coca, there is nothing (Landes). Up until that point in Bolivian history, revenue from the coca plant had served as the financial backing for Bolivia’s absence of social safety nets for indigenous communities. Morales alleviated dependence on the crop when he stepped into the presidency in January 2006. From the onset, he “prioritized development assistance to coca-growing areas, improving educational, health, and road infrastructure, … developing alternative uses for coca, using it to manufacture everything from cakes to toothpaste” (Grisaffi, p. 2). Morales diverged from U.S. affiliated drug programs and adopted a new policy called “Coca Yes, Cocaine No.” The new program established a cato system that implemented a one-cato farming limit for each household (Landes). The initiative did not cut the indigenous peasants off from their primary source of revenue. As a result of all the initiatives during his presidency, the country’s extreme poverty fell, and the country’s inequality gap decreased (Padilla). No previous politician had heeded indigenous needs, nor cared to shift the power dynamics that held the indigenous people hostage to incoming revenue from the coca plant as much as Morales. The MAS party’s momentum continued when Morales was elected twice and continued pushing for transformation. After the Bolivian government ignored the indigenous community's call for change for several decades, the MAS party used the coca leaf to symbolize their cause and participate in their country's political system. The MAS’s project empowered indigenous communities by condemning U.S.-led coca extermination strategies and carrying out crucial reform in indigenous communities. Additionally, by protecting the coca plant's existing production, MAS’s indigenous members increased their political presence in a country where they are the majority but have always been pushed out of the political sphere. The plant encapsulated the indigenous community’s heritage, economic potential, and vulnerability, and MAS used it to transform Bolivia’s social fabric and political landscape in their favor.

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Grisaffi, Thomas (2019). Coca Yes, Cocaine No: How Bolivia’s Coca Growers Reshaped Democracy. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Landes, Alejandro. Cocalero. Documentary, 2007. Padilla, Tanalís. Unit III: Coca Leaf - Labor Resistance and Indigenous Identity, Case Study Bolivia; Week 8, October 25, 2021.

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