The buses pulled up to a youth hostel where the March was to stay for the San Jose visit. All the marchers were tired from the long drive and still suffering from the three days at the border. There was no sense of anticipation of what was to come in San Jose, only relief that we had arrived In that atmosphere of exhaustion, the marchers were told that there was a large hostile group outside the hostel, armed with tear gas and rocks. It was Movimiento Costa Rica Libre. We were instructed to dampen handkerchiefs, hold. them to the mouth and move rapidly to the centre of the, hostel compound Only seconds after those instructions were given, the first tear gas canister exploded immediately beside the lead bus. The marchers rushed into the compound amidst the shouting from Costa Rica Libre and the chanting and singing from the Costa Ricansup port group assembled inside. It was a surreal scene. There was confusion everywhere, as back packs were UIllOaded
There were over 100 people from Costa Rica Libre. They were young, ranging from 15 to 25 years of age, both men and women They carried placards and wore badges with the Movimiento symbol. They chanted in unison, waving clenched fists, shouting that the marchers had AIDS; “Mother-fucker communists go home”; “Terrorists”; “Out of Costa Rica leftist soldiers disguised as Peacemakers.” They burned a Soviet flag and eventually began throwing more tear gas and rocks and bricks which destroyed all the hostel windows facing the street. As well, eight Costa Rican supporters of the March were injured; one lost an eye. Marchers very quickly retreated into the buildings where they stayed for the entire barrage (about 3 hours). We did not respond to the shouting or rocks but did findfour Costa Ricans who had rocks in their pockets inside the hostel compound, but were able to prevent them from thowing the rocks. Those four turned out to be members of Costa Rica Libre, who had infiltrated the crowd of Costa Rican supporters. While the attacks happened, the San Jose security for ces who were on hand did nothing. They stayed to one side without attempting to even take the names of those with rocks and tear gas, let alone trying to stop them. It
was eventually made known by the chief of security, Colonel Luis Chavez, that the March would have to leave the next day. Shortly after that announcement was made, Benjamin Piza Escalante arrived and was greeted with a hug from the other co-founder of Costa Rica Libre, Bernal Urbina Pinto. Pizathenleftthe mob, crossedthe street andshook hands with Chavez. Ten minutes later the crowd dispersed The situation in the hostel continued in confusion There was talk of resisting a forced eviction from the country. There was further talk of aims and the fundamental nature of the, March. The discussion lasted through the night and would continue for the entire march, but then., when the time came for the security to put the foreigners out of the country, people went voluntarily. Everything that followed in the March for Peace in Central America must be interpreted in light of what happened in Costa Rica. ,In Nicaragua, we were greeted warmly and allowed much freedom to roam in contrast to the cold and restrictive greeting we received in Costa %ica. The march met with many people in small towns and cities. We stayed with campesinos in coffee coops We saw poverty and the enects of revolution and war. Marchers were treated as heroes and shown&e culture of the gast as well as the determinationto press onto the future. Yet, in light of what happened in Costa Rica, this was-a hospitality between coconspirators, not strangers meeting together overcommon concerns. In Honduras and El Salvador, the media were ominous in their reports. The Honduran media reported both what it saw as evidence that the march was communist from what happened in Costa Rica, as well as quoting government sources that the March would not be allowed to enter. In El Salvador, there was simply the statement by the Minister of Immigration, Bene Garcia Aranoea, that the government “would not be able to control the death sqm.”
*Lne nondumn position was accurately reported The March spent almost a week, from about the 27th of December to past New Year, at the Nicareguan/Honduran border. We were met each day with a line of about 80 soldiers - the Honduran “Cobra” force, reportedly responsible for over a 100 disappearances in Honduras in December 1985. All the presentations of visas, pleas for entry, singing of songs, vigils and silent meditation at the Honduran border were to no avail. Honduras was impenetrable. And so it was with the diplomatic visits to El Salvador. Only a few of the leaders saw the country of El Salvador, the March was not allowed entry. What Costa Rica had started, Honduras and El Salvador furthered. InGuatemala, the March was not allowed to conduct any of its planned agenda. People entered Guatemala in smaller groups, split up to meet with some of the Guatemala support committees. But only in Mexico couldthe March for Peace in Central America conduct its business as it had, somewhat, inpanama and Nicaragua, but then Mexico is not considered to be a part of Central America by many-Central Americans. Still there was a large recep tion in Mexico City with many thousands turning out. The point is though, that at places where a confrontation could have happened, where the March could have made a stand, it didnot - not inCosta Rica, Honduras or El Salvador. It could not make such a stand mostly because it did not have the American media behind it. There was very little international pressure applied on governments antagonistic toward the March. American pressure would certainly have had an influence, but that would have been going against stated American policy. Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala could simply wash their hands of the situation - the threat of having their people exposed to other perspectives and being given the occasion to express themselves ‘in such an international context. There was no reason to let the March pass and thus, in most respects, the March failed in those countries. Still, not being allowed into Honduras and El Salvador, or being allowed in the waywe were in Guatemala, had some positive effects too. People saw the fear of their own government toward ideas, and they saw the force that would be used against those ideas. That knowledge can be a powerful thing; it can strengthen people’s resolve. Besolve can lead-to action and action to change. Some people now know the ways ideas can be squashed before they can come in from the outside. They may have known already, about how ideas are squashed as they rise spontaneously in their country. Because of the March, though, another side of their governments’ faces were exposed
The problem with the kind of resolve that knowledge brings to people in Central America, however, is that they become resolved to fight an animal that is equally resolved to fight back Further to the presence of the “Cobra” force at the Honduren/Nicaraguanborder, those in Honduras who went to greet and support the March were detained, 40 were arrested, and the rest were sent
back No word has been heard from them since. In El Salvador, the March committee decided to stage anationwide march, despite the fact that our international group was not allowed into the country. During that march, at least one man, Brigidio Sanchez, a father of eight, was arrested and tortured He is still in custodyand.his family has no access to him. The rest of Salvadoranmarchers were forced to sleep on the highweybefore being turned back and dispersed in the city of San Salvador. In countries where death lists and death squads decide thousands of fates, a March for Peace can be more a trap than that of a liberating force - symbol of hope or not. A risk is taken when being associated with “communists.” It is a long term risk lasting far past the time when the “Internationals” leave. For the 40 Hondurans and Brigidie Sanchez, the risk was evident evenbefore the march entered those countries. In Panama, Costa Rica, and maybe Guatemala, the process may tab longer, but those countries are certajn.lynotbeyondkeepingsuchlistsand using activities like peace marching as evidence of treasonous activity.
It was a difficult issue for the March to decide the responsibility that it bore for the arrest and the future of the people who helpedwith or supported the March. The stakes were very high, but it was felt that ultimately, the decision lay with those whose lives were affected Their decisions would be made with a fuller knowledge than those on the March. After all, the lives were of Central Americans who lived in Central America and who were familiar with their own countries. Despite that, there was still an unshakeable feeling that the March shared in the came of those arrests. So, people both in and out of the March are left wonder ing whether the March was too successful. Indeed, there were many fundamental questions asked: should “Inter nationals” stage their political protests at the scene of the crime, so to speak? Are they an imposition and a drain on the people whose cause they champion? The consequences of the March are still indeterminable. Certainly it was a good pioneering effort to be learned from for future marches. It brought together those who participated and those Central Americans who watched It let Europeans, through their media, see things that would not have otherwise been seen But then Europe does nothave much influence on what goes on in Central America. The March did little for Americens. It was an historical event linking many people in a region which contains just about every type of conflict known to man North/South, East/West, racial, between the sexes, and religious. But the March was also an example of how fragmented even peace makers cenbe. The long meetings - the perpetual meeting - about what the posture of the March ought to be, was never resolved except by the pressures of the circumstance. That was the case at the Costa F&an border, in San Jose, at the Honduran border and in Guatamala. There was never a time when the March stood on its own feet. It was timid to the point of powerlessness. It lost all control of its destiny andcouldchellenge nothing on its own To get to the end somehow seemed to be a satisfactory goal. There was no question about non-violent resistance. The marchers were not prepared for it. Further, there was little direction about specific political agendas proposed by the March. This was mirrored in the ambiguities of the slogans it carried As well, there was much unresolved debate over pragmatic questions such as: how much walking versus busing should be done; how self-sufficient with food and lodging the March out ought to be; or whether cities or the countryside should be favoured
The participants were diverse; there were Buddhist monks and Australian solidarity-workers, French Canadians, Spaniards, Americans and Central Americans. Opinion on things reflected the breadth of the perspectives. Though the problems encountered couldultimately be blamed for a lack of preparation, it would seem that no amount of preparation could resolve some of the fundamental differences of opinion within the March Was it there to challenge Central American governments or the U.S. government? Or was it there simply to meet people and as a,witness to their suffering. There are now at least 350 westerners who have important stories to tell. And there are many more Central Americans who have seen a little bit of hope and who have gained knowledge. They, both marchers and Central Americans, have witnessed firsthand both the forces that exist to resist change and, by that, the starkness of the need for change. The cards were, in a way, laid on the table in a struggle that is by no means over. Eventhough the deck is being restacked, the nature of the game is, more known and the next hand will be easier to play.