45 minute read
"A Sad and Expensive Experience": Ernest L. Wilkinson's 1964 Bid for the U.S. Senate
Ernest L. Wilkinson. Salt Lake Tribune photograph, USHS collections.
"A Sad and Expensive Experience": Ernest L. Wilkinson's 1964 Bid for the U.S. Senate
BY GARY JAMES BERGERA
AS ERNEST L. WILKINSON, SCRAPPY SIXTY-FOUR-YEAR-OLD president of Brigham Young University, and other Utah politicos sensed, the 1964 U.S Senate race promised the state's electorate a clear choice between an incumbent liberal Democrat and a conservative Republican challenger. Having flirted with the heady give-and-take of American politics as a patriotic circuit rider for free-market capitalism,1 Wilkinson had emerged in the popular Utah mind as an articulate, impassioned, if humorless and overbearing, exponent of hard-core conservative Republican politics.
In his twelve years since leaving a lucrative eastern law practice for BYU, Wilkinson had come to fear deeply for the future of the United States. With his country seemingly on a collision course with socialism, he was convinced he could be of greatest service in Washington, D.C He had also concluded that his mission at BYU—particularly his expansive building program—had been accomplished and that continuing support for his educational agenda would not survive the death of David O McKay, octogenarian president of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and long-time Wilkinson booster. Finally, he knew his own age would soon be an obstacle to political ambition.2
Despite his well known behind-the-scenes involvement in statewide politics,3 Wilkinson's decision to run for the Senate was not an easy one For a brief time he toyed with entering the race for governor but could not shake the allure of national office.4 When he finally resolved in November 1963 that his chances would never be better, he put behind him months of agonizing indecision.5 He and his supporters had sounded out a variety of sympathetic Mormon/non-Mormon business and political interests, securing verbal support and promises of assistance They also knew that in 1962 Utah Republicans had retained their place in the Senate, captured both congressional seats, won control of both houses in the state legislature, and secured a majority of county offices.6 Finally, Wilkinson had received reassurances from President McKay that if he "wanted to run for the Senate in 1964 [McKay] would give [him] a year's leave of absence" from his appointments as BYU president and chancellor of the entire educational system of the LDS church.7
Although he would have preferred to see Wilkinson on the U.S. Supreme Court, McKay agreed in mid-October 1963 that the lawyer turned-educator should run for the Senate An astute partisan observer, McKay knew of Wilkinson's needs and appreciated as well as anyone the value of loyal associates in positions of national prominence and influence According to Wilkinson, McKay voiced his concern that Wilkinson's likely Republican challenger in the primaries, incumbent congressman Sherman P. Lloyd, was becoming too soft on federal aid to education and Medicare and that the BYU president's brand of conservative Republicanism provided a better safeguard against socialist inroads.8 The following month Wilkinson asked members of the church's budget committee, who jointly served on the executive committee of BYU's Board of Trustees, what they thought of his running for the Senate. They unanimously opposed the idea.9 Undissuaded, he notified McKay by letter the next week that
That same day Wilkinson also began sounding out possible campaign managers.
Following a combined meeting of BYU's Board of Trustees and the church's General Board of Education one week later, Wilkinson announced that this would probably be his last meeting with them "You mean the last meeting this year," Hugh B. Brown, McKay's counselor, said. "No," Wilkinson replied, "the last meeting, period." Overcome with emotion, Wilkinson "told them I took credit for only two things. One, that I had not loafed on the job and second, that I had not profited by it. ... " Brown immediately praised Wilkinson's accomplishments and then asked him to meet with N Eldon Tanner, Brown's nephew and co-counselor in the First Presidency, in his office. Alone with Wilkinson and Tanner, Brown asked moments later "what was all this about and if I had cleared it with President McKay." Wilkinson answered that he had. The usually stoical Wilkinson then broke down and wept.11
Wilkinson met the next week with McKay He knew the church president supported his decision but nonetheless emphasized that
He knew he was safe in asking that if McKay wanted him to remain at BYU "all he needed to do was say so and I would stay—in fact," Wilkinson added, "I might be more happy." McKay answered less than a minute later, "I want you in the Senate." He also "reiterated our previous understanding that [a] temporary appointment should be made during the campaign and that if I should be defeated I should return to both of my previous positions" as BYU president and church chancellor of education.12 By this time Wilkinson had concluded that a leave of absence could be a liability and was probably unnecessary given McKay's support.
News of Wilkinson's resignation was officially released to the press on January 9, 1964. "New challenges and responsibilities have developed which call for decisions in the near future," he explained.13 Sensitive to Wilkinson's nuance, the Salt Lake Tribune speculated that "the move was a prelude to his entry in the race for the U.S Senate."14 The same day the Deseret News and Telegram printed the results of its poll of twenty of Utah's twenty-nine Republican county chairmen, finding nine in favor of Wilkinson, nine supporting Sherman P. Lloyd, one for J. Bracken Lee, and one undecided. According to the paper, Wilkinson's supporters had contacted the same group and found fifteen favoring Wilkinson, six Lloyd, and eight neutral.15 The next day the News eulogized Wilkinson, praising the mark he left on BYU as one "such as few men have ever been privileged to leave in their lifetimes."16 When Wilkinson finally announced his candidacy for the U.S. Senate on January ll, 1 7 the news came as no surprise to the state's political savants.
In his farewell address to BYU's student body, Wilkinson proved unusually self-revealing "The intervening thirteen years [1951-64] have been the happiest years of our lives," he said, "not that there have not been problems. Sometimes I know that some members of my Board of Trustees have felt that I thought that too much of the income of the Church should be spent for the B.Y.U. And there may have been times when I pressed my viewpoints a little too hard," he confessed. "I told one of them one day that if what I was doing was treason he should make the most of it." He admitted that he may have been "unduly brusk, and for this I apologize." But he had found students "the easiest of all to control, because, based on my boyhood days, I understand you students better than I sometimes understood the Board and the faculty."18
Two days later, addressing faculty, he conceded: "Our decision to resign in order to run for political office was the most difficult decision we have had to make in our lives."19 He had decided to run now because the government was spiritually bankrupt, men and women were too reliant on federal aid, government spending was steadily increasing, the national debt was burgeoning, the Monroe Doctrine had been abandoned, and the threat of communism was growing worldwide. "If the Constitution is to hang by a thread in this country," he vowed, alluding to popular Mormon tradition, "I want to be the one to save it."20
Early on Wilkinson found that staffing his campaign machine was more difficult than he had imagined. Salt Lake City businessman Joseph P. Rosenblatt had initially offered to help raise funds for the race. In mid-1963 he had publicly declared:
In fact, Wilkinson had concluded to run, in part, because of Rosenblatt's support However, Rosenblatt subsequently changed his mind, preferring to remain on the sidelines. Angry over this turn of events, Wilkinson never forgave him. As a result, the former BYU president went for several months without a fund raiser;22 and then, tragically, the next man who agreed to help died within the month, leaving a seriously handicapped Wilkinson to rely on part-time volunteers.
Securing a full-time campaign manager proved less difficult, though in some ways more problematic. Wilkinson's selection, John T. Bernhard, was a logical choice. He was trained as a political scientist, had loyally served Wilkinson for more than three years as administrative assistant, had cultivated strong ties to Utah's Republican party as a state legislator, and shared Wilkinson's conservative political views. With typical alacrity Wilkinson obtained David O. McKay's permission for Bernhard to take a "special [sabbatical] leave of absence" "at full compensation" to serve as his campaign director.23 However, BYU's comptroller objected to the arrangement, arguing that he would only comply with it on the express order of the university's acting president or Board of Trustees.24 The comptroller and others knew that Bernhard did not qualify under university policy for a paid sabbatical and probably feared as well the accusations of church support for Wilkinson that would erupt should the arrangement be made public.
Despite these concerns, the chair of BYU's Board of Trustees and president of the Quorum of Twelve Apostles notified BYU's acting president that in view of the "special circumstances"—that Wilkinson had served for thirteen years without compensation and that Bernhard's "services in his new assignment will redound to the benefit of B.Y.U."—"we believe it is proper to grant him a special sabbatical leave with full pay from February 1, 1964, to November 15, 1964. This would be in accord with President McKay's desires, and this letter is your authority to grant the same, which we would appreciate your doing."25 Still BYU administrators balked at the idea. Wilkinson then suggested that Bernhard be given an unpaid leave and that the church simply deduct his monthly salary from the school's operating budget and pay him from an account outside the university.26 School officials found this alternative more acceptable,27 and Bernhard, who had gone more than four months without pay, was able to concentrate entirely on the campaign.
With these and similar problems in mind, Wilkinson lamented less than six weeks after announcing his candidacy, "Frankly, were it possible to undo what has been done in the last two months and not resign at all, I would make that decision, but decisions once made and relied on by other people (hundreds are supporting me) cannot be undone and I must go forward."28 "I, frankly, often regret that I am not still at the B.Y.U.," he later added. 2 9
In his primary bid against Sherman P. Lloyd, the erstwhile educator found himself facing a man with considerable public service experience. A native of eastern Idaho and former general counsel for the Utah Retail Grocers Association, the forty-nine-year-old Lloyd had spent eighteen years in the Utah State Senate. Most recently he had served on the Utah Legislative Council, acted as Utah's representative on the board of managers of the Council of State Governments (CSG), and chaired the CSG Committee on State Taxation of Interstate Income. He had been a delegate to the State Republican Convention and the Republican National Convention. He had run unsuccessfully for Congress in 1960 and successfully in 1962. In fact, Wilkinson had earlier lauded Lloyd as one who "will help to restore sanity to the Congress of the United States,"30 even crediting himself as "one responsible for getting Sherman Lloyd in the congressional Republican primary race and [who] intended to continue to support him."31 Times had changed, however, and Wilkinson clearly felt that Lloyd, a political moderate, had become ineffectual in corralling a runaway federal bureaucracy. Ironically, Lloyd had initially encouraged Wilkinson to run "because I mistakenly felt that I could defeat him and that it would be better if he ran for the Senate instead of governor because I thought if he ran for governor he would not help the ticket."32
Wilkinson tried to portray himself as a hard-working, frugal, common man of the people, with strong ties to Utah and an even stronger commitment to its economy, who by sheer force of his will and managerial abilities would bring a recalcitrant federal government to its knees in service to the citizens of the United States. He was resolutely opposed to federal intervention in any but the narrowest aspect of daily life and liked to think of himself as conservative presidential candidate Barry Goldwater's ideological twin. "True dynamic progress," Wilkinson believed, "can only be achieved when individual citizens are left free to develop their own creative powers unfettered by government." 3 3 "I pledge a militant fight for the preservation of our inspired Constitution, and our Republican form of government," he promised at the Utah Republican Nominating Convention on June 13. "Each generation of free men has its rendezvous with destiny," he proclaimed, "and our rendezvous is to see that our Government remains our servant, and does not become our master."34
Initially, Wilkinson focused on differences between the Republican and Democratic parties, but his platform left little doubt as to those areas in which he felt Congressman Lloyd was weakest. Specifically, Wilkinson called for "curbing run-away government expenditures, and making a substantial payment on the federal debt"; selling to private enterprise all "government businesses, except those absolutely indispensable for national defense"; eliminating federal subsidy programs; encouraging "American private industries to invest in foreign countries"; defeating the federal Medicare bill; repealing the Civil Rights Act; fighting "for a strong and resolute foreign policy, based on formidable military strength"; adopting "a Constitutional Amendment permitting state legislatures to be based both on geographical as well as popular representation"; reopening investigations into government corruption; supporting legislation to benefit Utah such as "irrigation projects," "protect[ing] the cattle industry from threatened bankruptcy," and "full utilization of our missile industry"; and "us[ing] all my influence to persuade permanent peacetime industries to locate in Utah."35
Representative Lloyd adopted a more gentle approach, announcing ten "broad principles" at the nominating convention "on which you may judge whether I am the kind of man you would hire to send to Washington to secure results for you of lasting worth." He vowed not to "appeal to your prejudices," but to "your sense of justice"; not to "inflame you," but to "inform you"; not to "close your minds," but to "open them"; not to be "influenced by distribution of scabrous literature or by the vices of bigotry"; not to "arouse your hates," but to "reason with you"; to "continue to give voice to the dignity of the individual by working to suppress excessive government"; to "work for unity" and to "oppose the forces which divide us"; to continue to "labor against waste and unwise public debt"; to be "positive and constructive"; to "respect the rights and opinions of others"; and not to be "one of your leaders," but "one of your servants."36
Lloyd enjoyed the advantages of incumbency—experience in elected office, public exposure, existing campaign staff, fund-raising resources—and Wilkinson knew that the congressman's supporters were confident their man would easily garner the nomination. After a lackluster start, the former BYU president campaigned with singleminded vigor and determination—or with acrimony and demagoguery, his opponents would charge.37 In March he dramatically confronted head-on rumors that he was too old or in poor health by performing forty-eight push-ups before 10,000 enthusiastic fans during a BYU basketball game and then challenging Lloyd to a similar feat.38 He subsequently charged the freshman congressman with missing nearly 40 percent of roll-call votes, including sessions when the House cut $2 million from an appropriation bill for Hill Air Force Base or voted on state reclamation projects. More damaging, he began picturing Lloyd as politically and economically liberal, alleging that he had voted conservatively "only 64% of the time" and condemning his support of the Civil Rights Act. "Is Lloyd Becoming a Liberal?" Wilkinson's ads asked This aggressive strategy began to pay off when it became apparent that Lloyd's popularity was not as widespread as assumed. In fact, polls conducted after less than four months of campaigning showed Wilkinson capturing slightly more than 48 percent of delegates to the State Republican Convention.39
Lloyd was clearly not accustomed to such attacks, including innuendos that he drank to excess, 40 and angrily denied the charges, protesting that he was actually the most conservatively voting member of Utah's four-man congressional team. He also circulated photographs of himself with presidential contender Barry Goldwater Wilkinson countered by securing Goldwater's endorsement (as well as that of Michigan governor George Romney, Illinois senator Everett M. Dirksen, Massachusetts senator Leverett Saltonstall, Kansas senator Frank Carlson, Maine senator Margaret Chase Smith, and former U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower), and proclaiming that he, not Lloyd, had Goldwater's real support.41 From Lloyd's point of view the debate should have been between Democrat and Republican but Wilkinson turned against his own party. "Wilkinson campaigned against me," Lloyd complained. "I also say—and I think I could sustain it in court—that he distorted my votes, accused me of absenteeism, for which I was not guilty, and many other things."42 Reportedly, the head of the firm handling Wilkinson's campaign advertising later apologized to Lloyd.43
Interest in the controversial campaign so intensified that by the time of the state Republican primary on August 11, a record number of 120,567 voters turned out "Most attention, and most heat, centered in the Republican senatorial primary," the Salt Lake Tribune reported.44 After spending more than $80,000 Wilkinson managed to carry nineteen counties—Lloyd ten—to barely edge past Lloyd 61,113 votes to 59,454.45 "The students of BYU take pride in the accomplishment of their former leader," the school's student newspaper editorialized two days later, "and realize that if the same boundless energy and devotion to a cause for which he is famous, is incorporated in further campaigning Pres Wilkinson will be a tough competitor in November."46 With voters in the Republican primary exceeding those in the Democratic primary by more than 20,000, Wilkinson's "scant" 1.3 percent margin of victory heralded to some outsiders: "The way things stand now, Wilkinson can start packing to move back to Washington."47
Lloyd credited his support of civil rights legislation, and Wilkinson's calculated criticisms of it, as the major cause of his defeat. "I had a hard time trying to reason with people in 1964 on the Civil Rights issue," he noted, "which was the big issue and in Utah had a tremendous undercurrent of ugliness to it."48 Following the bitter contest Lloyd resigned himself to endorsing Wilkinson's continuing bid, "even though I thought many Wilkinson views were extreme," and discouraged supporters from running a write-in campaign in his behalf. However, when Lloyd declined an offer to appear with Wilkinson in a large heart-shaped advertisement after the primary and later when his mother's funeral prevented him from attending a Wilkinson fundraising dinner, Wilkinson condemned the former congressman's support as half-hearted at best Years afterwards a resentful Wilkinson would repeatedly insist that Lloyd was a poor loser and had refused to support his candidacy.49
Wilkinson's Democratic opponent, fifty-two-year-old incumbent senator Frank E. Moss, had earlier worked as an attorney for the Securities and Exchange Commission, been appointed judge advocate in Europe during World War II, and served for ten years as a Salt Lake City judge and another ten years as Salt Lake County attorney In 1958 Moss had barely been elected to the U.S. Senate when a third candidate (J. Bracken Lee) split the Republican vote. Convinced a preemptive strike was now needed, the Salt Lake City native launched his first volley against Wilkinson almost immediately.
Moss promised to travel the moral and ethical high road and "keep on the real issues of the day": employment, education, industry, poverty, natural resources, tourism, recreation, civil rights, personal freedom, roads and highways, small business, Social Security, national defense, conservation, and world peace "I invite Mr Wilkinson," he announced, "to rise above personal abuse, accusation, and innuendo to talk sense to the people of Utah."51
Wilkinson responded by attacking Moss's votes for increased federal spending and by repeatedly telling voters:
In a point-by-point rebuttal Moss charged that his opponent intentionally preyed "on the fears of our elder and retired citizens for political purposes"; that his position on foreign aid was "that of . . . the John Birch Society"; that he ignored important provisions of the Civil Rights bill that addressed his criticisms; that he deliberately manipulated federal budget figures; that he insincerely objected to federal aid to public education without offering a "constructive solution to our school financing problem"; and that his criticisms of foreign travel at federal expense was hypocritical: "Mr. Wilkinson . . . believes that travel broadens Republicans, but is a waste of money for Democrats." Finally, Moss, gave voice to rumors that Wilkinson had misrepresented his personal wealth and out-of-state financial interests:
In subsequent advertisements Moss forces revealed that Wilkinson owned a multimillion-dollar luxury apartment building called Inwood Manor in a wealthy Houston neighborhood despite Wilkinson's public protests that "No—I don't have millions invested in Texas."54 After quoting from the sales brochure, which extolled Wilkinson's development as "that mauve moment in history when the world had become gloriously rich but not yet grown unimaginatively equal," the ads asked: "Does this demonstrate any interest in the problems, dreams and hopes of the average Utah family . . . [A]ren't you more likely to protect your investment by working for the economy of Texas instead of Utah? .. . Is it your belief that to the strong belong the spoils that the problems of the old, the poor and the ill can be disregarded?" "Lest we be misunderstood," the ads closed, "Mr Wilkinson certainly has the right to invest his money in Texas instead of Utah— But the citizens of Utah also have a right, the right to know."55
In their own full-page response Wilkinson backers blasted the allegations as "low blows." They insisted that Wilkinson's investment in Texas totalled less than a million dollars; that some Inwood Manor apartments rented for $250 per month, not $1,000; that Wilkinson had not approved the sales brochure; that he was not as wealthy as opponents suggested; that he had investments in Utah as well; and that he intended to donate the major share of his wealth, including Inwood Manor, to BYU at his death. "Mr. Moss," Wilkinson's supporters retorted, "we ask you, does Mr. Wilkinson's years of unselfish service at the BYU and his generous dedication to the students of Utah justify insinuations, as contained in the ad—that he has sought or is seeking to do anything but devote himself to public service?"56
The candidate's critics countered:
His opponents convincingly demonstrated that despite having publicly denied he had invested "millions in Texas," Wilkinson's Inwood Manor project was worth more than $6 million. With a Houston bank holding a $3.5 million mortgage on the upscale apartment building, the ad asked, "Could Mr Wilkinson fairly represent the citizens of Utah with this huge personal liability owing to a Texas financial institution? . . . Why won't Mr. Wilkinson disclose? What is he hiding?"57
These and other accusations sallied back and forth, including charges that Wilkinson had a decade earlier backed a proposal to transfer Weber Junior College in Ogden to the LDS church and had tried to prevent Utah State University in Logan from entering the Western Athletic Conference.58 Soon pro-Moss groups began emerging among disenchanted Republicans. In a barrage of newspaper, radio, and television assaults during the closing weeks of the campaign Wilkinson supporters charged that Moss was soft on communism, favored selling American wheat to Russians, called for officially recognizing mainland China, received an excessive amount of financing from out of state, had toured the world with his wife at government expense, and had blocked congressional ethics probes. Moss backers alleged that Wilkinson had used foreign steel in BYU construction projects, was more interested in promoting a right-wing political agenda than Utah interests, favored the "tactical" use of nuclear weapons, and was conducting a campaign of "distortion, fear-and-smear."59
As humiliating as the attacks on his character were, Wilkinson also scrambled to minimize the impact of President Lyndon Johnson's two providentially timed visits to David O McKay prior to his November 3 face-off with Moss Ostensibly seeking the Mormon leader's "strength and understanding,"60 Johnson explained, "I always feel better after I have been in his presence."61 For his part, McKay, a Republican, responded by wishing the Democratic president "continued success," which some saw as an implicit endorsement. Of course, cynics accused Johnson of manipulating the aged and frail McKay for political purposes, but newspaper photographs of their carefully managed meetings, which almost always included Moss, made it difficult for the majority of Mormons to believe their prophet had been so crassly used.62
Alarmed at McKay's apparent friendship with Johnson, Wilkinson subsequently attempted to secure McKay's endorsement of the Republican party and presumably his candidacy McKay chose not to respond to Wilkinson's awkward public pleas directly. But when Barry Goldwater paid him a visit, McKay moved to even the score, commenting to reporters, "I wish him success and advise him to stand true to his principles."63 McKay later offered, "I think you can put me down as favoring the success of the Republican party." Still, Wilkinson's determined, and occasionally inept, pressure for McKay's support may have backfired: while 50 percent of Utah voters disapproved of Moss's attempts to align himself with McKay, 74 percent took exception to Wilkinson's strong-arming of the church president.64
With only days left in an increasingly acrimonious campaign, an anonymous letter surfaced on college campuses throughout the state. The most vitriolic of any attack, the letter was evidently written by a disgruntled BYU employee and read in part:
Angered by the anonymous attack, McKay, at Wilkinson's urging, released a public statement one day before the November finals. He condemned in no uncertain terms the "vituperative attack" as "an error-filled anonymous letter now being examined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation." While remaining neutral, McKay praised Wilkinson's integrity, insisting that in administering the affairs of BYU he had merely "followed the instructions and directions of the Board of Trustees." McKay closed by affirming that Wilkinson had always been considered "a man of honor, integrity and sound principle."66
If Wilkinson knew that his $240,00067 battle with Moss—the majority of which he financed personally—would be uphill, he rarely expressed it. Still he must have greeted with considerable disappointment the results of a last-minute poll. Labeling the Senate race "probably Utah's most heated contest," the Salt Lake Tribune reported 55 percent of the state's voters favored Moss, while 45 percent said they would vote for Wilkinson.68 When the final results in "the most torrid state contest by long odds"69 were tabulated two days later, not only was Wilkinson's margin of loss greater than that predicted (14.8 percent or 169,491 to 228,210),70 he lost by more votes than Goldwater and even failed to carry his own home county.71 In a stunning sweep, Democrats won the U.S. presidency, the governorship, the Senate, one of two congressional seats, and control of both houses in the Utah legislature.72 "Senator Moss has an impressive mandate with a total that led the entire ticket," the Deseret News reported. The newspaper concluded that "Clearly, the people of Utah appreciate his leadership in issues important to the state, and were not persuaded by the hard-hitting campaign waged against him."73 While conceding Moss's victory, Wilkinson announced: "I stand behind every statement I made during the campaign, and still believe in them."74
Wilkinson had hoped the grueling race would bring his family closer together,75 but for several of his children the defeat was difficult. His wife Alice remembered:
As for herself, Alice Wilkinson was relieved:
Wilkinson tried to be upbeat about the loss, but his disappointment was obvious. "I don't want you to think I am bitter about it," he shortly afterwards wrote to Ezra Taft Benson, a member of the Quorum of Twelve Apostles and a longtime friend, "because I am not I sensed ahead of time that this might happen and I was much more prepared for defeat than most of my supporters. Nevertheless, it was a very sad and expensive experience."77 He then enumerated five reasons for his defeat: (1) having been blamed for master-minding the failed 1954 referendum transferring three Utah junior colleges back to the LDS church; (2) having been charged with preventing Utah State University from entering the Western Athletic Conference; (3) having reportedly fired the director of the church's Institute of Religion adjacent to the University of Utah for differences over LDS doctrine; (4) University of Utah and Utah State University alumni being "natural [ly] jealous over the growth of BYU"; and (5) Lyndon Johnson's having created "the impression that President McKay was an old time friend and [was] for him in the campaign."78
Later Wilkinson also cited the church's unwillingness to "do its duty in supporting the right candidates."79 "If the Church and the forces of good are going to have political influence in this State," he complained to McKay the following year, "the leaders of the Church must use their individual influence in having proper men selected as leaders of our political parties."80 Too, Wilkinson may have felt that his age, lack of a full-time fund raiser, and having to face an incumbent all contributed to the embarrassing defeat.81 Finally, Wilkinson's politics may simply have been too conservative for the majority of Utah's electorate, many of whom voted straight-ticket Democrat.82 In the end, a deeply disillusioned Wilkinson would chalk the tumultuous experience up as one of the greatest disappointments of his life.83
Wilkinson's ten months on the campaign trail crystallized his intense political views. Returning to BYU in early 1965, he regretted that in his absence "so-called 'liberal elements' [had taken] charge of the economic and political things of the university,"84 and he determined to mold the school into a showcase of conservative politics. "We are facing a great crisis in this country," he would explain to McKay, "and many of our political science and economics teachers are teaching false doctrine."85 In his diary he confided, "The problems that I will face are much larger than those I faced when I first came in as president of the B.Y.U. Whether I will have the energy and the fortitude and patience to solve some of them remains to be seen." But, he promised, "I am going to do what I can to reverse [this] trend."86 As would become apparent in the ensuing years, one of the legacies of Ernest Wilkinson's 1964 bid for the U.S. Senate would be a university president overly politicized by his foray into partisan politics, increasingly fearful of dissent, and preoccupied to the point of distraction with rumors of faculty disloyalty.87
NOTES
Mr Bergera is director of publishing, Signature Books, Salt Lake City He wishes to acknowledge the helpful advice of John T. Bernhard, Harvard S. Heath, Frank E. Moss, F. Ross Peterson, and John Sillito.
1 For Wilkinson's political career before 1964, see Gary James Bergera, "A Strange Phenomena: Ernest L Wilkinson, the LDS Church, and Utah Politics," Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought 26 (Summer 1993): 89-115. During these years Wilkinson publicly addressed a variety of conservative subjects Unquestionably his favorite was "The Founding, Fruition, and Future of Free Enterprise" (also known as "Free Enterprise for Everyone"), which he delivered to eager audiences at least twenty-one times from 1961 to 1963 Copies of this and other speeches can be found in Wilkinson's Biographical File, Brigham Young University Archives, Harold B Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Provo (hereinafter BYU Archives).
2 Wilkinson's bid was not the first such attempt by a BYU president. Both Karl G. Maeser and Franklin S Harris had earlier campaigned unsuccessfully for public office: Maeser in 1895 for state superintendent of public instruction and Harris in 1938 for U.S senator (see Maeser to George Reynolds, October 12, 1895, Maeser Presidential Papers, BYU Archives; Harris Journal, August 2, 9, 10, September 12-14, November 4-8, 1938, Harris Papers, BYU Archives). Other BYU administrators had also tested partisan waters, relying on their affiliation with the school and network of university contacts to improve their chances of winning For example, the representative of one candidate reminded BYU's official fund raiser in the early 1960s: "You are going to contact the Dean's Council and the Administrative Council to obtain donations for the John Bernhard campaign fund" (Edwin Kimball to Noble Waite, September 12, 1962, Bernhard Biographical File, BYU Archives).
During the 1950s BYU's board of trustees, composed almost entirely of high-ranking LDS officials, had ruled simply that faculty involvement in politics required administrative clearance (BYU Board of Trustees, Minutes, July 22, 1954, November 4, 1959, BYU Archives) By early 1962, and at Wilkinson's urging, the board had settled on allowing the university president "to judge each case on its merits and make such decisions as he thought proper with these guide lines": (1) "faculty members [should] not be unduly partisan"; (2) "staff members running for political office or staff members occupying positions with political parties should not permit their duties to interfere with their regular work at the University"; and (3) "if the political campaign or office is of such a nature that they cannot give full attention to their regular work at the University, they should either be given a leave of absence without pay or resign" (Executive Committee, BYU Board of Trustees, Minutes, March 22, 1962).
3 See Bergera, "A Strange Phenomena."
4 Wilkinson, Memorandum for File, November 1, 1963, Wilkinson Papers, BYU Archives Copies of virtually all documents from the Wilkinson Papers cited in this essay are also in private possession, which is my source for them Additionally, many are referenced in Ernest L Wilkinson, ed., Brigham Young University: The First One Hundred Years, vol 2 (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1975), pp 497-723; Wilkinson and Leonard J Arrington, eds., Brigham Young University: The First One Hundred Years, vol 3 (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1976), pp 3-789; Wilkinson and W Cleon Skousen, Brigham Young University: A School ofDestiny (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1976), pp 429-759; and Woodruff J Deem and Glenn V Bird, Ernest L. Wilkinson: Indian Advocate and University President (Salt Lake City: Alice L Wilkinson, 1978).
5 For Wilkinson's vacillation, see Wilkinson diary, March 1, 2, 13, October 11, November 27, 1963, photocopy in David J Buerger Papers, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City; original in Wilkinson Papers.
6 See Stewart Grow, "The 1962 Election in Utah," Western Political QuaHerly 16 (1963): 460.
7 See Wilkinson, Memorandum of a Conference with McKay, March 7, 1962, Wilkinson Papers; see also Wilkinson Diary, March 2, 1963; Wilkinson, Memorandum of a Conference with McKay, October 17, 1963, Wilkinson Papers; compare Wilkinson Diary, April 9, 1958 In fact, McKay felt at first that "President Wilkinson should remain as president of the Brigham Young University while he is seeking the nomination, and if he gets the nomination then we can consider rinding a successor If he is not elected, then he should continue at the school" (McKay Diary, November 21, 1963, McKay Papers, LDS Church Archives, Salt Lake City).
8 See Wilkinson, Memorandum of a Conference with McKay, October 17, 1963.
9 McKay Diary, November 21, 1963.
10 Wilkinson Diary, November 27, 1963.
11 Ibid., December 4, 1963.
12 Ibid., December 10, 1963.
13 Daily Universe, January 9, 1964.
14 Salt Lake Tribune, January 9, 1964.
15 Deseret News and Telegram, January 9, 1964.
16 Ibid., January 10, 1964.
17 Daily Universe, January 13, 1964.
18 Wilkinson, 'Valedictory Address," February 18, 1964, p 6, Wilkinson Biographical File.
19 Wilkinson, 'Valedictory to Faculty," February 20, 1964, p. 7, Wilkinson Biographical File. In fact, Alice Ludlow Wilkinson, Wilkinson's wife of forty years, was even more apprehensive "I was not very enthusiastic in the beginning," she later recalled "I didn't want to see him get into politics because I had seen so many things happen in political life that I didn't like, but I knew that he loved politics When President McKay asked him if he would run, of course he wanted to, and I said that I would support him" (Oral History, September 28, 1979, p 11, BYU Archives).
20 Wilkinson, 'Valedictory to Faculty," February 20, 1964, pp 8-9 The minutes of this meeting record Wilkinson's closing promise a little differently: "if the constitution [were] to hang by a thread he wanted to be one to help save it" (BYU Faculty Meeting, Minutes, February 20, 1964, BYU Archives) "We have not yet determined when we will move from the campus," Wilkinson closed 'Th e Board of Trustees has said that in exchange for my 13 non-salaried years of service [to the university] we may remain in the [president's] hom e until we decide where to move permanently for the convenience of our son who is now enrolled in school We may, however, open another home in Salt Lake also for I am there 6 out of every 7 days But we hope to see all of you frequently If I should become unemployed we may have the glorious privilege of seeing you more in social gatherings" ('Valedictory to Faculty," p 11; on Wilkinson retaining occupancy of the president's home, see McKay Diary, February 4, 1964).
21 "Introductory Remarks of Joseph Rosenblatt at Testimonial Dinner for Doctor Ernest L Wilkinson, May 2, 1963," pp 3-4, Wilkinson Biographical File.
22 See Wilkinson, Memorandum of a Conference with McKay, November 13, 1966, Wilkinson Papers BYU subsequently awarded Rosenblatt an honorary doctorate less than two weeks after Wilkinson died in April 1978.
23 Bernhard to Joseph T Bentley, January 8, 1964, BYU Archives According to the terms of this special leave, Bernhard's pay totaled nearly $12,000.
24 Joseph T Bentley to Earl C Crockett, acting BYU president, January 13, 1964, BYU Archives.
25 Joseph Fielding Smith to Crockett, May 20, 1964, BYU Archives.
26 Bentley to Crockett, Jun e 25, 1964, BYU Archives.
27 Lyman J Durfee to Bentley, December 11, 1964, BYU Archives; Bentley to Bernhard, January 4, 1964 [1965], BYU Archives.
28 Wilkinson Diary, February 17, 1964.
29 Wilkinson to Ben E Lewis, May 21, 1964, BYU Archives.
30 "Television Address of Ernest L Wilkinson on Channel 5 KSL TV," October 29, 1962, p 23, Wilkinson Biographical File.
31 Wilkinson Diary, August 4, 1962.
32 Sherman P. Lloyd, Oral History, November 21, 1974, pp. 2-3, Utah State Historical Society, Salt Lake City.
33 "Statement of Political Convictions of Dr Ernest L Wilkinson, former President of Brigham Young University, Republican Candidate for United States Senate from the State of Utah," July 10, 1964, p 1, Wilkinson Biographical File.
34 Quote d in The Wilkinson Story (Provo, Ut.: Volunteers for Wilkinson, 1964), p 1, Wilkinson Biographical File.
36 Excerpted from ibid., pp 1-8; "Television Address of Ernest L Wilkinson, Candidate for the Republican Nomination as United States Senator, over K.S.L.-T.V on July 24, 1964," pp 2-9, Wilkinson Biographical File; "Speech of Ernest L. Wilkinson, Wilkinson Family Program, August 10, 1964," pp. 2-3, Wilkinson Biographical File.
36 Lloyd, "Speech Given before the Republican State Convention,"June 13, 1964, in Lloyd, Oral History, November 21, 1974, p 4.
37 See Calvin L. Rampton, As I Recall, ed. Floyd A. O'Neil and Gregory C. Thompson (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1989), p 124; Lloyd, Oral History, November 5, 1974, pp 2-3.
38 See "Wilkinson Keeps in Top Physical Condition," The Wilkinson Story, p 3 Wilkinson's feat was later restaged for campaign photographs to document the candidate's "can-do spirit."
39 See "Utah: How It Is Out There," Time, August 21, 1964, p. 18; "Wilkinson Beats Lloyd in Lloyd's Own District," in The Wilkinson Story, p 3.
40 See Rampton, As I Recall, p 124.
41 See "Utah: How It Is Out There."
42 Lloyd, Oral History, November 21, 1974, p 5.
43 Ibid., p 8.
44 Salt Lake Tribune, August 13, 1964.
45 Richard R Wilkins to Wilkinson, February 3, 1965, Wilkinson Papers; Deseret News, August 12, 1964.
46 Daily Universe, August 13, 1964.
47 Ibid.; "Utah: How It Is Out There."
48 Lloyd, Oral History, November 5, 1974, p 11.
49 Ibid., pp 3, 8, 9; November 21, 1974, pp 7-8 Following his defeat Lloyd became vice-president of Prudential Federal Savings, in charge of public relations He also lectured on politics at the University of Utah and was subsequently elected to the U.S Congress in 1966, where he remained for six years In 1973 he was appointed assistant director of the U.S Information Agency and taught political science at Utah State University H e was then name d trade specialist in charge of the Utah office of the Department of Commerce He ran again for the Senate in 1976 After losing he retired to Salt Lake City, where he died in late 1979.
50 Wilkinson's only sister, Elva Wilkinson Bell, was a Democrat and worked for Moss When her older brother announce d his candidacy, she "tearfully tendered her resignation." Moss quickly explained that "he had full confidence in her loyalty and integrity and that she need not resign." Bell 'joyfully continued her services and," according to Moss, "was probably the most exultant Utah resident with the Moss re-election." In fact, Moss reported that he "can still hear her muttering, "That damned Ernest'" (Moss to Gary J Bergera, March 13, 1992).
51 Untitled papers in Moss Papers, Special Collections, Marriott Library See also "Senator Moss Position Papers" in ibid.
52 "Speech over KSL Television by Dr. Ernest L. Wilkinson, Fiscal Integrity vs Fiscal Insanity, October 7, 1964," p. 9, Moss Papers.
53 "Senator Moss Position Papers."
54 Salt Lake Tribune, October 11,1964.
55 Ibid.; see also Daily Herald, October 18, 1964.
56 Daily Herald, October 19, 1964.
57 Ibid., October 18, 1964 Shortly before his death in 1978 Wilkinson donated 42 percent of his interest in Inwood Manor as a tithing contribution earmarked for the LDS church's educational system This contribution was estimated at the time to be worth $4 million See Executive Committees, Church Board of Education and Boards of Trustees of Brigham Young University, Brigham Young University—Hawaii Campus, Ricks College, and LDS Business College, Minutes, May 4, 1977.
58 Although he had not publicly endorsed the proposed transfer of Weber Junior College, as well as two other state colleges, to the LDS church, Wilkinson had carefully orchestrated the unsuccessful move from behind the scenes. See Gary J. Bergera and Ronald L. Priddis, Brigham Young University: A House of Faith (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1985), pp 30-31, 385 n 63.
59 See advertisements in DeseretNews, October 24, 1964; Daily Herald, October 16, 21, 26, 1964 In 1992 Moss recalled, with evident pleasure, a debate with Wilkinson on the BYU campus: "A speaker's stand and microphones were installed, reminding me of a ring for exhibition boxing." The two candidates spoke and fielded questions for nearly an hour. "Ernest was fair and advised the students that I was to be treated with respect," Moss said "They heeded this request by bestowing on me applause in excess of that given to Ernest as we each made our points on most all of the issues in that election campaign My paralyzed staff members were breathing easy and smiling at the end That debate was one highlight of that campaign" (Moss to Bergera).
60 Salt Lake Tribune, September 17, 1964.
61 DeseretNews, September 18, 1964.
62 See also Frank H.Jonas, "President Lyndon Johnson, the Mormon Church and the 1964 Political Campaign," Proceedings, Utah Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters 44 (1967), Part 1: 67-90.
63 Salt Lake Tribune, October 11, 1964.
64 See Jonas, "President Lyndon Johnson," pp 87-88.
65 Photocopy of original letter, entitled "Dear Friend of Good Government," in my possession. This letter reportedly reached 115 BYU faculty members, 75 percent of Utah State University faculty members, 25 to 30 Weber College faculty members, and a similar but unspecified number of University of Utah faculty members See Earl C Crockett to Wilkinson, February 11, 1965; L Mark Neuberger to Wilkinson, February 5, 1965; Wilkinson to L. Ralph Mecham, February 18, 1965; all in BYU Archives.
66 See Deseret News, November 2, 1964; Salt Lake Tribune, November 3, 1964; Daily Universe, November 3, 1964 Much to Wilkinson's dismay the FBI failed to unmask the letter's author and closed its investigation after four months (see Herbert J Miller to Wallace F Bennett, undated but ca March 3, 1965; Bennett to Wilkinson, March 5, 1965; all in BYU Archives) Wilkinson entertained the idea of having McKay intercede personally with Lyndon B Johnson but changed his mind (see draft of letter to Johnson written by Wilkinson for McKay, February 13, 1965, BYU Archives).
67 Wilkins to Wilkinson.
68 Salt Lake Tribune, November 1, 1964.
69 Ibid., November 3, 1964.
70 DeseretNews, November 4, 1964.
71 Ibid.; Daily Herald, November 4, 1964.
72 Daily Universe, November 5, 1964.
73 Deseret News, November 4, 1964.
74 Ibid., November 5, 1964. Moss ran again in 1970 and won, but lost six years later. While in the Senate he chaired the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, was secretary to the Democratic Conference, and served on the National Democratic Steering and Policy committees After his loss in 1976 he resumed his law practice in Washington, D.C, and later in Salt Lake City, where he currently resides.
75 See Wilkinson to Alice Ann Mangum, August 17, 1964, Wilkinson Papers.
76 Wilkinson, Oral History, p 12.
77 Wilkinson to Benson, February 2, 1965, Wilkinson Papers.
78 Ibid In a second list Wilkinson added that because of its deficit spending policy, the Democratic party had succeeded in promoting a feeling of peace and prosperity nationally; Moss had run a better-financed, better-organized campaign; Lloyd had refused to endorse his candidacy; the state's school teachers had condemned him for opposing federal aid to education; and his own outspokenness and unwillingness to compromise had made him an easy target for "mud-slinging" tactics (Wilkinson, "Memorandum on Reasons for Election Defeat on November 3, 1964," undated, Wilkinson Papers).
79 See Wilkinson diary, October 5, 1966.
80 Wilkinson to McKay, April 26, 1965, Wilkinson Papers His pleas fell on sympathetic but ultimately deaf ears, as more powerful voices in the LDS hierarchy determined not to mire the church in partisan intrigues See Wilkinson Diary, October 14, 1970, when he was criticized for endorsing a congressional candidate Wilkinson later noted: "I have been active [in giving political speeches] off-campus, which met with the enthusiastic approval of President McKay, but that's quite different than speaking on campus" which was "the policy I pursued when I was President, of not giving any political speeches on campus" (Wilkinson to Dallin H. Oaks, August 26, 1978, photocopy in private possession).
81 See Wilkinson Diary, March 13, 1968.
82 See Frank H.Jonas, "The 1964 Election in Utah," Western Political Quarterly 18 (June 1965), No 2, Part 2: 509-13. For Lloyd the reason was simple: "I say this firmly, honestly, and without any reservations in my own mind—that the principal reason for his very poor showing in the November election was the low quality, the low grade of the campaign which he ran aerainst me " (Oral History, November 21, 1974, pp 7-8).
Wilkinson's campaign manager, Joh n T Bernhard, identified his own reasons for the loss: Goldwater's candidacy proved more harmful than helpful; Moss's organization did an excellent job; Wilkinson's "campaign war chest was chronically inadequate"; Lloyd "and many of his followers sat on their hands instead of helping their party's chosen candidate"; and finally "I was still a greenhorn campaign manager! With more know-how, particularly in state-wide campaigning, an experienced manager might have made a difference." "My biggest challenge during the campaign," Bernhard reported, "was trying to 'soften' Wilkinson's negative impact on the electorate He was so combative! Time and time again, he came across as irascible and dogmatic. I wasn't very successful in my efforts to moderate him" (Bernhard to Gary J Bergera, March 24, 1992).
83 Wilkinson, "Personal Disappointments in Life," in Deem and Bird, Ernest L. Wilkinson, p 631.
84 Wilkinson Diary, November 30, 1970.
85 Wilkinson to McKay, July 1, 1965, Wilkinson Papers.
86 Wilkinson Diary, January 2, April 7, 1965.
87 For Wilkinson's political agenda at BYU after 1965, see Bergera and Priddis, Brigham Young University, pp 198-219.