disaster
riskcrisis MANAGE RISK
1. Although modern buildings had generally effective earthquake protection, Kobe is an old city and contained many structures that were, for earthquake situations, structurally unsound. Private dwellings in poorer districts were particularly vulnerable. 2. The affected area was a narrow strip of land bordered on one side by the sea and on the other by mountains. The major transportation routes (the railway and bullet train, and the Hanshin highway) were put out of action through collapse of elevated sections, rendering rapid access extremely difficult. 3. Other main roads were not immediately closed to traffic. Access for emergency vehicles was severely hindered by congestion as people attempted to leave the scene by car.
5. There was poor communication between the Municipality and the Prefecture, showing that neither was sufficiently aware of the other’s role and responsibilities and suggesting a lack of the coordinated planning that is established practice at the local level in the UK (Bawtree, 1995). There was a report that the Prefectural Governor delayed for four hours before calling for military aid. Tierney et al. (2001:68) noted that compared to disaster relief efforts in many other situations, the military were an under-used resource in Kobe. This was apparently due to the public in Japan having a negative attitude to military involvement in civil matters (which may reflect post-Second World War efforts to de-militarise public life). 6. Lacking accurate field information, the Prime Minister’s office reacted slowly. When Directives from the Prime Minister and Cabinet were issued they were often not acted on because functionaries were unused to this sort of top–down, urgent executive action. If Directives were not countersigned by the right people, then those below them felt unable to act. In the words of Heath (1995: 13-14): ... Japanese bureaucrats are likely to wait until consensus is achieved, display bondloyalty to their specific employer, and seek means to avert and avoid loss of face. Such behaviour is likely to slow down response management and create consequent time lags. 7. Despite annual awareness exercises, public education was less than adequate in that the threat in this particular region was not seen to be immediate. A degree of unconcern, fostered perhaps by the Japanese attitude of acceptance of natural disaster, had been allowed to grow. The people were unprepared for the catastrophe and the authorities could not respond to address their needs.
CRISIS
MSC IN RISK, CRISIS AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT
4. Although official response plans were in place, there were considerable delays in mobilisation. The Kobe city authority was unable to assess the situation because of staff not getting to work; the city’s emergency radio system failed and telephones and many roads were unusable.
D SASTER
DISASTER
8. A remarkable aspect of the Kobe aftermath is the scale of the community self-help with residents helping to run their temporary accommodation, which was often in schools. Volunteers came from afar, including Japanese students from courses in the USA, and the unprecedented scale of this spontaneous volunteer effort became a study topic for Japanese researchers (Tierney et al. 2001: 214).
6-17