MODULE 2 MANAGING RISK AND CRISIS
Copyright The course material is and remains the property of the University (and must be immediately returned to the University upon request at any time) and is either the copyright of the University or of third parties who have licensed the University to make use of it. The course material is for the private study of the student to whom it is sent and any unauthorised use, copying or resale is not permitted. Unauthorised use may result in the student’s registration being terminated. This course material was originally created in the academic year 2005/2006 and an updating review was conducted in 2011.
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Table of Contents 1
2
3
2
Unit One: Concepts of risk ................................................................. 7 1.1
Aims and objectives of this Unit ....................................................................... 7
1.2
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 7
1.3
Risk: a question of models and oracles ............................................................ 8
1.4
Risk: a thematic approach .............................................................................. 10
1.5
Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 20
1.6
Guide to further reading ................................................................................. 20
1.7
Study questions .............................................................................................. 21
1.8
Bibliography .................................................................................................... 21
Unit Two: Psychological approaches to risk management ............... 25 2.1
Introduction .................................................................................................... 25
2.2
Aims and objectives of this Unit ..................................................................... 26
2.3
Risk perception ............................................................................................... 26
2.4
Applied psychological perspective ................................................................. 33
2.5
Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 36
2.6
Guide to reading ............................................................................................. 40
2.7
Suggested further reading .............................................................................. 40
2.8
Study questions .............................................................................................. 41
2.9
Bibliography .................................................................................................... 41
Unit Three: Risk communication ...................................................... 45 3.1
Aims and objectives of this Unit ..................................................................... 45
3.2
Introduction .................................................................................................... 46
3.3
The deficit model of risk communication ....................................................... 47
3.4
A critique of ‘scientific rationality’.................................................................. 61
3.5
A critique of the deficit paradigm ................................................................... 69
3.6
Academic and practical conclusions ............................................................... 73
3.7
Guide to reading ............................................................................................. 77
3.8
Suggested further reading .............................................................................. 77
3.9
Study questions .............................................................................................. 77
3.10
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Unit Four: Cultural theory................................................................ 82 4.1
Aims and objectives of this Unit ..................................................................... 82
4.2
Introduction .................................................................................................... 82
4.3
Cultural theory ................................................................................................ 84
4.4
Criticisms of cultural theory............................................................................ 88
4.5
The social construction of risk perception ..................................................... 89
4.6
Cultural theory as organisation theory ........................................................... 91
4.7
Guide to reading ............................................................................................. 98
4.8
Suggested further reading .............................................................................. 99
4.9
Study questions .............................................................................................. 99
4.10
5
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Bibliography ............................................................................................... 78
Bibliography ............................................................................................. 100
Unit Five: Quantifying risks and hazards ........................................ 104 5.1
Aims and objectives of this Unit ................................................................... 104
5.2
Introduction .................................................................................................. 105
5.3
Scales, statistics and quantified assessments .............................................. 106
5.4
Estimating potential severity - how big is the hazard? ................................ 114
5.5
Estimating probability ................................................................................... 116
5.6
The combination of probability and severity - Quantified risk assessment . 118
5.7
Hazard identification and analysis ................................................................ 119
5.8
Quantification of risk .................................................................................... 122
5.9
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7
5.10
Quantification of benefit.......................................................................... 126
5.11
Acceptability of risk .................................................................................. 129
5.12
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 131
5.13
Guide to further reading .......................................................................... 133
5.14
Study questions ........................................................................................ 134
5.15
Bibliography ............................................................................................. 134
Unit Six: Insurance Risk ................................................................. 138 6.1
Aim and objectives of this unit ..................................................................... 138
6.2
Introduction .................................................................................................. 138
6.3
Insurance fraud: case studies ....................................................................... 142
6.4
Risk and insurance ........................................................................................ 145
6.5
What risks are insurable? ............................................................................. 146
6.6
What risks are not insurable? ....................................................................... 147
6.7
Captives......................................................................................................... 153
6.8
Reinsurance/Pool Re..................................................................................... 154
6.9
The Bellwin Scheme ...................................................................................... 159
6.10
Insurance practice .................................................................................... 160
6.11
The insurance policy ................................................................................ 160
6.12
Utmost good faith .................................................................................... 164
6.13
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 164
6.14
Guide to reading ...................................................................................... 165
6.15
Study questions ........................................................................................ 165
6.16
Bibliography ............................................................................................. 166
6.17
References................................................................................................ 168
Unit Seven: Terrorism .................................................................... 171 7.1
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Expressing probability................................................................................... 124
Introduction .................................................................................................. 171
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9
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7.2
Defining terrorism......................................................................................... 176
7.3
A Consideration of the Causes of Terrorism ................................................. 177
7.4
The Management of Terrorism: an Operational Perspective ...................... 187
7.5
The Management of terrorism: a Democratic Perspective .......................... 200
7.6
Conclusion..................................................................................................... 211
7.7
Suggested further reading ............................................................................ 214
7.8
Study questions ............................................................................................ 214
7.9
Bibliography .................................................................................................. 215
Unit Eight: Organisational contingency planning ........................... 226 8.1
Aim and objectives of this Unit ..................................................................... 226
8.2
Introduction .................................................................................................. 226
8.3
Disasters in general....................................................................................... 227
8.4
Risk management ......................................................................................... 230
8.5
Principles of planning.................................................................................... 237
8.6
Emergency and support services .................................................................. 247
8.7
Business continuity management................................................................. 251
8.8
Conclusion..................................................................................................... 257
8.9
Further reading ............................................................................................. 258
8.10
Study questions ........................................................................................ 258
8.11
Bibliography ............................................................................................. 259
Unit Nine: Case study of London bombings ................................... 262 9.1
Aim and objectives of this Unit ..................................................................... 262
9.2
Introduction .................................................................................................. 262
9.3
Case Study 1: The St Mary Axe bomb, 10 April 1992 ................................... 265
9.4
Case Study 2: The Bishopsgate bomb, 24 April 1993 ................................... 269
9.5
Urban terrorism in context ........................................................................... 275
9.6
Lessons learned - response to incidents....................................................... 280
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9.7
Lessons learned - prevention measures ....................................................... 281
9.8
The 7/7 Bombings ......................................................................................... 290
9.9
Conclusion..................................................................................................... 290
9.10
Guide to reading ...................................................................................... 291
9.11
Study questions ........................................................................................ 292
9.12
Bibliography ............................................................................................. 293
1 Unit One: Concepts of risk 1.1 Aims and objectives of this Unit This Module aims to provide a theoretical resource for students and practitioners interested in risk, crisis and disaster management. The Module will present a number of theoretical contemporary debates in this growing area of academic interest. In this Unit, risk concepts are presented in the context of a number of theoretical and practical social science approaches to risk. This Unit aims to briefly summarise the main theoretical human science approaches to risk. It is our objective in this Unit to introduce you to some of the very real questions that might concern contemporary managers of applied risk. The Unit, therefore, introduces some of the themes selected for presentation in this Module.
1.2 Introduction What does it mean to be secure in contemporary society? The absence of risk? This question is perhaps the fundamental dilemma that this Module aims to consider. Many social theorists now argue that we live in a ‘postmodern’ society (cf. Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991), yet the ability to completely remove dangers that individuals feel they are exposed to still appears to many of us as an elusive target. The recent history of human existence is littered with attempts to control nature and context, and some theorists would argue that a failure to manage this process is testimony to our inability to become ‘modern’, let alone ‘postmodern’ (Latour, 1991). Religions, -isms, -ologies and science itself all contribute to the construction and maintenance of a debate which, if history is to act as a guide, will run and run. It has been the promise of religions that a state of ‘heaven’ or ‘nirvana’ can be attained by the few, the righteous in this or another life. For the protagonists of -isms, it is the achievement of political force that will ultimately lead to this state. The arbiters of ologies claim that we have failed to fully understand the human condition in terms of culture, society or even the individual psyche. Those of us who seek this condition of
security must strive, and here the basic problem starts. How to live? Life is about choices (exposures to risk) which have consequences; some apparent, others less so. It is therefore suggested that complete freedom from risk of every kind is for humans still a utopian goal. If we make a choice it is usually on the basis that we have calculated that this will benefit us, but this may frequently involve sustaining risks. Security, it is argued here, is about the management of those risks. It is not our aim to overtly and simplistically define risk as a concept here; it has long been an established concept of academic interest for both pure and social sciences, and is also a subject generating much controversy among contemporary social theorists.
1.3 Risk: a question of models and oracles The Chinese and Greeks were among the many early literate societies to have acknowledged the notion of risk and attempted to address the issue. Many of these early attempts to manage risk produced elaborate and mysterious oracles, some still in popular use today (e.g. astrology). Another approach to the problem has been to contextualise risk as the mysterious workings of a greater being or power. Most British insurance policies until only recently had a clause relating to a lack of cover for ‘Acts of God’. Similarly, a belief in religion among agricultural communities can be more readily understood in the context of a heavy dependency on primitive agricultural tools combined with the unpredictability of the weather and the dire consequences of failure. For many, these beliefs and explanations have been superseded by science, particularly the notion that chance happenings in the world can actually be explained by mathematical probability. For more than a century now, there have been men (and these have been predominantly men) in white coats who claim that the only reason there are still risks that we cannot deal with is that we need to develop more complex mathematical models to manage them. From the middle of the 20th century this view began to look feasible, and one could find a number of scientists throughout the world who appeared to be changing the human condition from a struggle to survive nature to a struggle to control nature.
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Perhaps the most profound example of the human endeavour for control was seen in the power of the tiny and humble atom. Atomic power could be harnessed in such a way as to allow humans themselves to play God: we could choose between inflicting Armageddon through weaponised understanding of nuclear physics and a whole host of positive benefits, including electricity, the clean source of power to replace much dangerous human toil and polluting emissions (e.g. to provide / run coal-fired thermal power generating plant), X-rays and other medical advances such as lasers. These new ways of harnessing nature in turn brought their own risks, but the optimism of the men in white coats brought with it an unfounded confidence that with such enormous strides forward, solutions to new risks (e.g. nuclear waste disposal; proliferation of technologies) could easily be found and implemented. Much of the contemporary theoretical work on risk in the social sciences would appear to suggest some recurring features. First, it would seem that people find unusual or unknown risks particularly terrifying, much more so than familiar ones. Despite this terror factor, it is the familiar risks which claim the most lives. Second, voluntary risk appears to be preferable to imposed risk. The issue of choice is familiar to many of us who regularly choose to engage in risky behaviour, for example, smoking. In contrast, the planned siting of a potentially hazardous installation near our homes may provoke considerable concern. Third, people find it difficult to either comprehend or believe probability. The apparent irrationality of popular risk perception suggests that people have a problem of cognition or trust in official and / or scientific data sources. It might be argued that this is where science begins to turn into science fiction. The reality of the contemporary world is that there are indeed many new improvements to the world in which we live, but always an exponentially greater number of risks. For example, technological advances and new forms of travel enable us to travel more often, more safely and further. However, there is always at least some residual risk involved and it is the increased frequency of travel that must be multiplied by the residual risk. The same can be said for many other aspects of our lives, not least risks relating to security.
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1.4 Risk: a thematic approach The remainder of this Module will introduce you to a number of themes which we feel are representative of approaches to risk management. The themes presented are by no means exclusive; in fact, on the contrary, this Module should be viewed as a starting point from which a whole new subject area can be explored. The individual units are introduced in a little more detail below. 1.4.1
Psychological approaches to risk
The theories on risk presented in this Module can be divided into two methodological and theoretical categories: deductive (quantitative) and inductive (qualitative) models. Psychologists concentrate on various aspects of the human decision-making process and how behaviour may be affected by perception. This is normally investigated by means of a ‘deductive’ or quantified approach. However, the problem with this quantification is that it will frequently lead to context specific results. Sociologists and anthropologists in contrast concentrate on the organisational, communication and cultural aspects of risk. Such -phenomena have usually-been more amenable to - ‘inductive’, or qualitative, methods of enquiry. The theoretical concepts of risk assessment are relatively well elaborated as part of a mostly quantitative and proactive approach to risk avoidance. Much of the earlier work in the social sciences, particularly risk perception in psychology and economic modelling of risk, was also dominated by a quantitative approach. There have more recently, however, been some attempts to consider the human and organisational concerns associated with quantified risk analysis. This trend towards a quantitative approach has been seriously questioned by a number of social theorists in sociology, anthropology and politics who argue that both defining and measuring risk is problematic. These theorists would advocate that the types of data being analysed from disasters is both too complex and interdependent for quantitative analysis. They argue instead for a qualitative approach to understanding risk (Borodzicz, 1996, 1997; Douglas, 1992; Toft and Reynolds, 1994; Turner, 1978). This debate will form much of the first
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module of this course. However, for many social scientists, of fundamental concern is the number of ways in which risk can be both perceived and managed. In Unit 2, some psychological approaches to risk, often called risk perception, suggest some recurring social features. First, that people find unusual or unknown risks particularly terrifying, at least much more so than familiar ones. Second, voluntary risk appears to be preferable to imposed risk. Third, many people find it difficult to either comprehend or believe probability. This apparent irrationality of popular risk perception suggests that people have a problem of cognition or trust with official data sources. In a still influential report from a study group of the Royal Society, it is stated that: [t]here are serious difficulties in attempting to view risk as a one-dimensional objective concept. In particular, risk perception cannot be reduced to a single subjective correlate of a particular mathematical aspect of risk, such as the product of the probabilities and consequences of any event. Risk perception is inherently multi-dimensional and personalistic, with a particular risk or hazard meaning different things to different people and different things in different contexts. Royal Society, 1992: 7
There are a number of examples of quantified risk assessment tools which are commercially available. Most of the work in this area stems from the petro-chemical, energy-related and aviation industries. The aim of many of these quantified tools is to identify risk exposure and provide quantified (objective?) measures of relative safety. The effectiveness of such tools as stand-alone methodologies for managing risk is to some extent controversial. Many social theorists have argued that the efficacy of quantified tools needs to be viewed within the context of a number of social (subjective?) features. 1.4.2
Risk communication
Risk communication, while still in its developmental stage as an academic field, has largely emerged from earlier work in the area of risk perception (Royal Society, 1992). This happened for two reasons. First, there was concern about passing to lay folk quantitative information about risks from expert analysts. Ordinary people would find it increasingly difficult to understand the types of highly technical information which experts are very good at producing. And this is often further complicated by the use of 11
an abstract and difficult to comprehend form of language in which such information is often presented (Covello, 1991; Covello et al., 1986; Slovic and Fischoff, 1983). Not unrelated to the issue of dialogue, risk communication has also evolved in the context of mounting political dilemmas related to the siting of large-scale hazardous installations during the 1960s and 1970s (Krimsky and Plough, 1988). Work in risk perception has indicated that conflicting perceptions of the acceptability of such hazards are dependent on varied public frames of reference; hence much of the initial work in risk communication was designed to improve understanding between these conflicting groups (Borodzicz et al., 1993). Risk communication in this early phase was perceived as a tool for public education. Public questioning of political and expert. assertions was attributed by some risk experts to irrational folk world-views based on a mistrust of expertise and progress (Wynne, 1992). Risk communication represents a quite different sociological approach to the study of risk. Risk communication theorists concern themselves with the dialogue, or rather the lack of it, between expert and lay folk (Irwin, 1989; Wynne, 1989). The crux of Wynne’s work on risk communication is a critique of the distinction which has been drawn between expert and lay decision-makers in much of the psychological and sociological work on risk. Expert approaches, it is argued, are based upon a misconception of ‘science’. The idealised view expressed here is one of an objective scientific community in which subjective factors (social, cultural and psychological ones) either do not, or at least minimally, influence the decision-making process. Risk communication theorists argue that, in contrast to experts, lay people’s perceptions have been tied, at least ideally, to a particular set of social, cultural and psychological factors. Lay perceptions are frequently characterised as being constructed on the basis of irrational and non-objective models of reality which become validated on the basis of folk theories of risk and danger. Sociologists concerned with risk communication concentrate in particular on the transference of information between experts and lay folk. Sociologists argue that this is because experts typically count lost lives while the general public focuses on a number of other factors, in particular fairness and
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controllability (Irwin, 1989; Wynne, 1989). Risk communication theorists suggest that these polarised views of both expert and lay folk have historically been reinforced by human science research into risk management, which itself has largely been carried out within the context of a scientific paradigm which is in turn inherited from the natural sciences. Much of the risk perception work in psychology is also viewed by risk communication theorists in this way. In terms of risk management, the benefits of a risk communication approach must be considered within the context of a general reduction in social conflict which is brought about through an enhanced process of mutual understanding. This will moderate the differing expectations of both lay and expert decision-makers by establishing realistic goals which can hence be achieved through dialogue (Irwin, 1989). However, more recently there has been mounting concern among communication theorists with the pluralistic nature of risk. As a consequence, the approach to the subject has more recently focused on gaining a greater understanding for the variety of ways in which risk can be perceived. This is in contrast to the attempts to calibrate or compare folk and expert models of risk as ‘irrational’ and ‘objective’ models of risk. In other words, while various aspects of risk can be measured, from a risk communication perspective, these measurements will have little or no validity if considered apart from the meaningful interpretations of risk that social actors construct for themselves. The result of this has been to question the validity of any one conception of ‘risk’, instead suggesting that it might be more useful to examine how conceptions of risk are constructed (Wynne, 1992). 1.4.3
Cultural theory
For cultural theorists, risk, like any other phenomenon, is socially constructed, being influenced by people’s involvement in the course of their everyday interactions with family, friends and peers. Hence, any concept of ‘identity’ for the individual has to be seen in the context of the strength of that individual’s relationship to social groups, and the social structure or nature of such groups. Cultural theorists claim that from an anthropological perspective, and with the aid of a 13
highly elaborate theory, there are four universal predispositions which will mediate the nature of any individual perception and response to risk. These categories are: ‘hierarchical’, ‘individualist’, ‘egalitarian’ and ‘fatalist’, and there is a fifth category of ‘autonomists’ or ‘hermits’ (Dake, 1991a, 1991b; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson et al., 1990). It is argued by cultural theorists that these predispositions would be prescribed by the extent to which one is oriented to either ‘group’ or ‘grid’ positions. Where there is a low level of orientation to both group and grid dimensions, the individualist predisposition is likely to be found. Individualists are likely to accept a high level of risk on the understanding that this represents entrepreneurial opportunities. However, when orientation to both dimensions is high then a contrasting hierarchical predisposition is likely to occur. Hierarchists would be less inclined to accept risks, and then only as part of an institutionally sanctioned process. This contrast between individualists and hierarchists can be seen as opposing ends of a traditional social science continuum, analogous to the laissez faire market and the regulated Weberian democracy (Frosdick, 1995: 45). However, where grid influences are weak but group is prominent, then an egalitarian predisposition is likely to occur. For the egalitarian, risk is an omnipresent threat of disaster caused by the actions of significant others. This perpetual threat is also the case for the fatalists, who are in contrast high grid but low group. The difference between these groups is that fatalists accept the risk on the grounds that there is little that they can do about it anyway. The particular disposition adopted will be dictated by the individual’s embeddedness within a ‘social group’, and the extent to which this relates to ‘other individuals through a system of rules’ (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). Central to cultural theory is the understanding that permutations of ‘group’ and ‘grid’ influences can only be reduced to these four categories (Frosdick, 1995: 45-7; Thompson et al., 1990: 84). These categories, argue cultural theorists, will define how any one individual perceives and interacts with their world. Further, cultural theorists
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maintain that these categories represent human universals, and therefore do not respect social, cultural or psychological boundaries. In other words, it is claimed by these theorists that these dispositions appear throughout the human species in every type of human society. 1.4.4
Quantifying risks and hazards
Decision-making is an integral part of all management. For the risk manager, the information upon which decisions have to be based is vast and exists in a variety of types and forms. You have been introduced to qualitative approaches to risk assessment for the most part. Here quantitative approaches to risk assessment are introduced. The aim of the Unit is not to provide in-depth and definitive information on quantitative risk assessment (QRA): this is an immense area of study on its own. Instead, it is hoped to give an overview of some of the uses and limitations of QRA. If presented with numerical assessments of risk, it is important to be as questioning and critical of such data as of any other information. Increasingly, in the world of risk management, overreliance on QRA is being questioned. Some even suggest (Hood and Jones, 1996) that it can be misleading to depend too heavily upon QRA as this can lead to an illusory sense of certainty where no certainty exists. 1.4.5
An introduction to risk insurance
While insurance is now widely regarded as prudent and desirable, many insurers are no longer prepared to take on liability for either certain types of, or even any exposure to risk, unless organisations take certain steps to reduce risks themselves. This has been demonstrated clearly by the blanket adoption, by the insurance industry, of modified policy wordings in respect of certain risks. In the UK, for risks such as terrorism and the ‘millennium bug’ or Y2K, the industry made clear that it was prepared to provide only limited cover in respect of these. Clearly, insurance is a commercial venture, and no company is going to agree to continually pay out large sums of money without some form of control. Contingency plans and good health and safety management are therefore going to be of prime interest to insurers as an indicator of good practice. 15
However, for those responsible for managing risk and security, a working knowledge of insurance and indemnity is important. While insurance may be one of the principal features of a risk management strategy, distinguishing between types of cover, for example, internal versus external insurance and different types of indemnity, are key issues for concern. 1.4.6
Health and safety management
A theoretical approach to health and safety was introduced in Module 1. Here we look at some more practical aspects, particularly related to the management of health and safety in extreme conditions. In contrast to contingency planning, health and safety requirements in much of the industrialised world are now a statutory legal requirement. However, regardless of statutory requirements, a proactive approach to health and safety is now widely accepted as both good management practice and even as a way of improving an organisation’s profitability. Accidents, apart from their immediate localised effects on staff, will usually mean a loss or interruption to production. Good health and safety management is also a way in which the risk of major incidents can be minimised. Planning for an environment in which employees, clients and the public can enjoy acceptable levels of safety, rather than being perceived as a statutory requirement, should, it is argued, be perceived as part of a holistic approach to managing risk and security. The insurance industry has been quick to recognise this. 1.4.7
Organisational contingency planning
In the following Unit, you will be introduced to the concept of organisational contingency planning. This area of security and risk management has taken on a particular significance in the past few years. Of particular relevance is the Civil Contingencies Act, 2004. You will learn more about the Civil Contingencies Act later in the course. At this point, all that is intended is that you get an over-view of this important development.
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1.4.8
Background
Following the fuel crisis and the severe flooding in the autumn and winter of 2000 and the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in 2001, the Deputy Prime Minister announced a review of emergency planning arrangements. The review included a public consultation exercise which reinforced the Government’s conclusion that existing legislation no longer provided an adequate framework for modern civil protection efforts and that new legislation was needed. Following public consultation on a draft Bill from June to September 2003 and prelegislative scrutiny by a Joint Parliamentary Committee, the Civil Contingencies Bill was introduced to Parliament on 7 January 2004. Its development was informed from the start by close consultation with key stakeholders in what was an open and inclusive policymaking process. The Bill received Royal Assent on 18 November 2004 and henceforth became known as the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (the “Act”). 1.4.9
Overview of the Act
The Act, and accompanying regulations and non-legislative measures, delivers a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom planned to be capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. The Act is separated into two substantive parts: Part 1: focuses on local arrangements for civil protection, establishing a statutory framework of roles and responsibilities for local responders. Part 2: focuses on emergency powers, establishing a modern framework for the use of special legislative measures that might be necessary to deal with the effects of the most serious emergencies. Key to modernising existing legislation is updating the definition of what constitutes an “emergency”. The purpose of Part 1 of the Act is to establish a new statutory framework for civil protection at the local level. Local responders are the building block of resilience in the UK, and the Act will enhance existing arrangements by: 17
•
Establishing a clear set of roles and responsibilities for local responders;
•
Giving greater structure and consistency to local civil protection activity; and
•
Establishing a sound basis for performance management at a local level.
The Act divides local responders into two categories depending on the extent of their involvement in civil protection work, and places a proportionate set of duties on each. Category 1 responders are those organisations at the core of emergency response (e.g. emergency services, local authorities). Category 1 responders are subject to the full set of civil protection duties. They are required to: •
Assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform contingency planning;
•
Put in place emergency plans;
•
Put in place Business Continuity Management arrangements;
•
Put in place arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency;
•
Share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination;
•
Co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency; and
•
Provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management (Local Authorities only).
The definition of emergency in the Act defines the sorts of events or situations that Category 1 responders should be preparing for. Section 2 of the Act additionally establishes a threshold that events or situations would need to meet to constitute an emergency, and thus to trigger the duties in Part 1 of the Act. This provides that Category 1 responders’ duties under the Act only apply to events or situations which require the use of assets beyond the scope of normal operations and require a special deployment. Category 2 organisations (e.g. Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies) are “co-operating bodies” who while less likely to be involved in the
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heart of planning work, will be heavily involved in incidents that affect their sector. Category 2 responders have a lesser set of duties – co-operating and sharing relevant information with other Category 1 and 2 responders. Category 1 and 2 responders are also required to come together to form ‘Local Resilience Forums’ (based on police force areas outside London) which will help coordination and co-operation between responders at the local level (Cabinet Office, 2004). The UK government has also published two volumes of guidance to accompany the Act. These are: Emergency Preparedness. Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, its associated Regulations and Non-statutory Arrangements together with Emergency Response and Recovery.
Non-statutory Guidance to Complement
Emergency Preparedness. Emergency Preparedness (Cabinet Office, 2005a) sets out the generic framework for civil protection. It provides statutory guidance and deals with the pre-emergency elements of integrated emergency management – anticipation, assessment, prevention and preparation (pages 5 and 9, paragraphs 1.4 and 1.42). Emergency Response and Recovery (Cabinet Office, 2005b), on the other hand, is nonstatutory and describes the multi-agency framework for responding to and recovering from civil emergencies in the UK (page 5, paragraph 1.5). It is targeted at all personnel who may become involved in emergencies, particularly those at a senior level. It aims to develop a shared understanding of multi-agency response and recovery arrangements across responding agencies (page 6, paragraphs 1.15–1.17). The guidance in Emergency Response and Recovery is not intended to be prescriptive, and can be adapted in the light of local circumstances, experience and priorities (page 6, paragraphs 1.13–1.14). The point to note is that both volumes of guidance are founded on the six activities of integrated
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emergency management
(page
4,
paragraph
1.4 of
Emergency
Preparedness).
Together, both volumes set out the generic framework for civil
protection. The problem, then, is what constitutes an acceptable plan and how do we validate such tools? Who is qualified to produce contingency plans? There are a number of private consultancies all eager for business and offering their services on a competitive basis, but can any plan be trusted? A further question that you may wish to consider is legal negligence. Would a wellpractised contingency plan constitute adequate and/or reasonable defence against a claim of negligence? 1.4.10 A case study approach to risk and security
The final Unit offers you a real case study in risk, crisis and disaster. The Unit considers the commercial management of a crisis caused by terrorist activity. The primary concern here is not the apprehension of perpetrators and prevention of the terrorist act, rather the management of the effects. The case study of the London bombs highlights the importance of contingency plans for the management of events, which may affect our future.
1.5 Conclusions This Unit will have provided you with a brief introduction to risk management. The subject is a large one and much of it is relatively unexplored by academics. Should you choose to produce a dissertation on a subject related to this Module then you will probably find yourself on the frontiers of science contributing to this new area. It is hoped that the Module will help you to consider some of the arguments presented in a new light.
1.6 Guide to further reading You should now read the supplied paper, Security and Risk: A Theoretical Approach to Managing Loss Prevention, by Edward Borodzicz. This paper discusses the case for risk 20
management perspectives in the context of a widening role for contemporary security managers.
1.7 Study questions You should now write approximately 300 words in answer to each of the questions below. We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University. •
If there were to be such a thing as a unified theory of risk, then how should we define this?
•
How might social theories of risk assist in the creation of contingency plans?
•
Should we eliminate the organisational risk manager and rely on insurance?
1.8 Bibliography Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage. Borodzicz, E. P. (1996) ‘Security and risk: A theoretical approach to managing loss prevention’, International Journal of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention 1(2): 131-143. Borodzicz, E. P. (1997) Risky Business: An Examination of Crisis Simulations in the Context of Safety People, PhD Thesis, Birkbeck College, University of London. Borodzicz, E. P., Arangones, J. I. and Pidgeon, N. F. (1993) ‘Risk communication in crisis: Meaning and culture in emergency response organisations’, paper presented at the SRA: Europe Risk Conference, Rome, October 1993. Cabinet Office, (2004), Civil Contingencies Act 2004: a short guide (revised October 2005),
London:
Cabinet
Office;
available
online
at
http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/ccact/index.htm , accessed October 2005. Cabinet Office, (2005a) Emergency Preparedness. Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, its associated Regulations and Non-statutory Arrangements,
London;
available
online
http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/ccact/eppdfs.aspx 21
at
Cabinet Office, (2005b) Emergency Response and Recovery. Non-statutory Guidance to Complement
Emergency
Preparedness,
London;
available
online
at
http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/media/ukresilience/assets/emergresponse.pdf. Civil Contingencies Act 2004, London: HMSO. Committee on Corporate Governance (1998) Final Report (The Hampel Report), London: Gee. Covello, V. T. (1991) ‘Risk comparisons and risk communication: Issues and problems in comparing health and environmental risks’, in R. E. Kasperson and P. J. M. Stallen (eds) Communicating Risks to the Public, Dordrecht: Kluwer. Covello, V. T., von Winterfeld, D. and Slovic, P. (1986) ‘Communicating scientific information about health and environmental risks: Problems and opportunities from a social and behavioural perspective’, In V. T. Covello, A. Moghissis and V. R. R. Uppuluri (eds) Uncertainties in Risk Assessment and Risk Management, New York: Plenum Press. Dake, K. (1991a) Myths of Nature: Culture and the Social Construction of Risk, Surrey Research Centre, University of California: Berkeley. Dake K. (1991 b) ‘Orienting dispositions in the perception of risk: An analysis of worldviews and cultural biases’, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 22(l): 6182. Douglas, M. (1992) ‘Risk and blame’ in Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory, London: Routledge: 3-21. Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A. (1982) Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Danger, Berkeley: California University Press. Frosdick, S. (1995) ‘Organisational structure, culture and attitudes to risk in the British stadia safety industry’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 3(1): 4358. Giddens, A. (1991) Modernity and Self Identity, Cambridge: Polity. Hood, C. and Jones, D. (eds) (1996) Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk Management, London: UCL Press.
22
Internal Control Working Party (1999) Internal Control: Guidance for Directors of Listed Companies Incorporated in the UK, Consultation Draft (The Turnbull Report), London: Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales. Irwin, A. (1989) ‘Deciding about risk: Expert testimony and the regulation of hazard’. In J. Brown (ed) Environmental Threats: Perception, analysis and management, London Belhaven Press. Krimsky, S. and Plough, A. (1988) Environmental Hazards: Communicating Risks as a Social Process, Dover, MA: Auburn. Latour, B. (1991) We Have Never Been Modern, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Royal Society (1992) Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management, Report of a Royal Society Study Group, London: The Royal Society. Slovic, P. and Fischoff, B. (1983) ‘How safe is safe enough? Determinants of perceived and acceptable risk’. In C. A. Gould and L. C. Walker (eds) Too Hot to Handle, New Haven: Yale University Press: 181-216. Thompson, M., Ellis, R. and Wildavsky, A. (1990) Cultural Theory, Boulder, CO: Westview. Toft, B. and Reynolds, S. (1994) Learning from Disasters: A Management Approach, Oxford, Butterworth Heinemann. Turner, B. (1978) Man-made Disasters London: Wykeham. Wynne, B. (1989) ‘Frameworks of rationality in risk management: Towards the testing of naive sociology’. In J. Brown (ed) Environmental Threats: Perception, Analysis and Management, London: Belhaven Press: 33-47. Wynne, B. (1992) ‘Misunderstood misunderstanding: Social identities and public uptake of science’, Public Understand Sci. 1: 281-304.
23
READING ‘Security and Risk: A Theoretical Approach
to
Managing
Loss
Prevention’ Borodzicz, E. P. (1996) International Journal of Risk, Security & Crime Prevention 1(2): 131-143.
Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.
2 Unit
Two:
Psychological
approaches
to
risk
management 2.1 Introduction A philosophical interest in the subject of risk dates back to the time of the ancient Greeks and Egyptians. However, contemporary theoretical approaches are a relatively new concept. Serious academic interest in risk among social scientists can be traced back to as early as the 17th Century, when concepts of risk were being developed concurrently with probability theory in mathematics (Hacking, 1975; Todhunter, 1865). This can be coupled with the context of the general thrust of a growing capitalist philosophy, where the justification for the ownership and creation of wealth could be affirmed in the risk-taking behaviour of the entrepreneur (Douglas, 1985). Contemporary academic work on risk is relatively novel, and can be generally grouped into three broad areas of theoretical research: psychological, social and cultural approaches. Much of the psychological research has focused on the identification and measurement of a variety of features of the decision-making process. Until recently, the majority of research in the area of risk analysis, perception and management has been of a highly quantified nature, usually carried out within the disciplinary strictures of engineering and the pure sciences. This research would typically attempt to understand the decision-making process under a simulated risk environment, carried out in a laboratory. This type of research has, by both its methodological and theoretical nature, been reductionist (e.g. Covello, 1983; Fischoff, 1989). In other words, such research attempts to reduce the complexity of any risk system to its basic elements so that understanding can be gained through the detailed and repeated analysis of simple isolated parts of the system. While such research can be perceived to be reliable in that the results of the research are replicable (if the experiment is repeated), it has increasingly been questioned in
terms of its social validity. Slovic (1987), for example, is critical of the extent to which quantified research can relate to the reality of decision-makers who operate in conditions where data sources are often limited, and where judgements are often mediated by criteria such as ‘trust’ or ‘intuition’. More recent approaches developed in social psychology have attempted to consider the social and cultural contexts within which lay people perceive risk, and how they can be altered when they are at variance with expert conceptions of reality.
2.2 Aims and objectives of this Unit This Unit will focus on the study of risk from the perspective of psychology. Risk has increasingly become of academic interest to psychologists during the past few decades, and this has resulted in the development of a number of approaches. The majority of these, despite displaying substantial methodological differences, can be generally grouped together under the heading of risk perception. This Unit will introduce a number of risk perception approaches including: cognitive, decision-making, psychometric and the more recent ‘mental models’ approach.
2.3 Risk perception 2.3.1
Historical context of risk perception
The study of perception has been a dominant theme in psychology. Psychologists have long been concerned with how the human mind becomes aware of, learns from and deals with the environment. In psychology, risk has largely been studied, at least among the early theorists, within the context of a cognitive research paradigm. Cognition is the mental process or faculty by which knowledge is acquired through perception, reasoning or intuition. The study of risk by psychologists has largely been carried out within this context. For psychological theorists, risk is defined as a real and objective entity, and hence amenable to quantitative analysis (measurement). Psychologists have traditionally tried to understand risks by either isolating some aspect of the phenomenon (a variable), and 26
then simulating this either in a laboratory as an experiment, or through the collection and analysis of data through social surveys. This has been formalised into a research paradigm known as risk perception. The genre for such research has typically been to attempt to measure a ‘perceived risk’ against a calibrated `actual risk’, within a certain population of individuals. In laboratory experiments, a group of subjects are typically required to undertake risky decision-making tasks. The decisions made by subjects can be gauged against known probable outcomes for the decisions in order to give a measure of performance. The tendency among survey theorists has been towards the use of social survey methods. In order to identify and measure the types of risks which concern people, these would typically attempt to measure how strongly a given sample population feel about a particular risk or group of risks. 2.3.2
•
Summary
The study of risk in psychology is carried out in the context of psychological notions of perception.
•
Risk, for psychologists, is a real and objective entity.
•
Risk perception work uses both social survey and laboratory methods.
2.3.3
Cognitive/decision-making strategies
One of the earliest examples of a cognitive approach to decision-making was developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Like many other cognitive theorists at the time, they had begun to question the notion of humans acting as rational beings (this Western philosophic notion of human rationality dates back to the time of Aristotle). Instead, and arguing against an Aristotelian legacy of human rationality which psychologists had inherited from philosophy, Kahneman and Tversky suggested that humans may often make certain types of irrational choices or preferences with a degree of regularity (Gardner, 1987: 360). It is worth noting here that this apparent irrationality is questioned by many sociologists. The classic method for testing such theories was to provide a sample group of subjects 27
with some form of decision-making process. Subjects would be required to choose from a range of options under controlled conditions and these could be recorded and analysed. From this work, it has been established by Kahneman and Tversky that, under certain predefined conditions, people have a statistical likelihood of making certain preferences as opposed to others, and most fundamentally, that these decisions often display a logic which has little to do with rational choice making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Much of this work has been applied to risky decision-making by another psychologist, Lola Lopes. Like Kahneman and Tversky, she also used gambling analogies for her work and a similar laboratory-based methodology for her research. She argued that it was important to make explicit within her work the definition of risk which she was using: Technically, the word risk refers to situations in which a decision is made whose consequences depend on the outcomes of future events having known probabilities. Choices among the different kinds of bets in games like roulette and craps are good examples of choices made under risk. Lopes, 1987
Where her work is of importance is in her attempts to consider the types of motivations influencing choice. In this sense, her approach can be seen to be employing a more realist ontology, in that she attempts to understand the semantic value of the decisions being made by the subjects. Rather than taking a simple head count, Lopes introduces the secondary issue of ‘risky choice’ affecting behaviour, and begins to provide some consideration of the types of contextualising factors which influence decision-making. The advantage of this experimental approach is that it allows the researcher to apply various stimuli to respondents, and observe the response. In other words, a variety of perceived risk scenarios can be contrasted with actual risk. Using such an approach, Lopes theorised that there would be a variance in the ways different people would react to a variety of predetermined risk scenarios, when the probability ratios were already known or could be calculated. Lopes found two dispositional factors which could mediate an actor’s response: the extent to which subjects could be said to be either risk averse ‘pessimists’, or risk seeking `optimists’ (Lopes, 1987). By screening subjects in advance of testing, in order to distinguish between these two groups, a marked statistical difference was found in the level of risk taking in which both groups were 28
prepared to indulge. One problem with this methodology is that when a subject is asked to make a gamble in a laboratory there is no way of comparing this with their naturalistic responses outside the laboratory. We do not know how seriously the subject is treating the task in hand or the level of congruence in ability and motivation to understand between subject and experimenter. A further problem with this approach to the study of risk is that it does not take into account the range of risks and weightings which individuals attach to them. This was investigated by another group of risk perception theorists using a psychometric approach. 2.3.4
Summary
•
Decision-making theorists question the notion of human rationality.
•
Humans make irrational choices on a regular basis, even when future events have a known probability.
•
Dispositional factors can be found to mediate risk taking in experimental settings.
•
It is difficult to measure the difference in people’s behaviour in real and simulated risk situations.
2.3.5
Psychometric approaches to risk
A psychometric study is one where the psychological variables in relation to a phenomenon are collected and measured from individuals in a sample population. The design of such tests would typically involve statistical analysis of data, in order to indicate how that population perceives particular risks. Psychometric approaches to risk have attempted to consider the qualitative characteristics of hazards. Early studies in the psychometric tradition were concerned to measure the extent to which people perceived that particular risks would relate to fatalities. There were increasing social and political pressures to investigate public perceptions of known hazards so the public could be better informed and, where necessary, re-educated when it was found that their perceptions were at a variance 29
with, or conflicted with, expert views. An important study carried out in 1978 involved educated non-experts. They were required to judge the fatality rates from a number of known hazards, ranging from natural disasters to common fatal diseases. These judgements were then plotted against the known actual death rates. The results from this survey found that subjects had a tendency to overestimate the death rates for low frequency hazards such as smallpox vaccinations and floods, while underestimating the death rates for high frequency hazards such as strokes and heart disease (Lichtenstein et al., 1978). This study is perhaps also important in that it enables theorists, for the first time, to measure the extent of human irrationality towards substantive risk issues. It has subsequently been argued by Fischoff that such work demonstrates the public’s confusion in rationalising risk (Fischoff, 1990). Perception of risk was, however, to prove a much more complex issue than simply assessing death rates. As early as 1969, Starr found a distinction between voluntary and involuntary risks. He argued that one’s perception of a risk could be affected by the extent to which that risk was considered to be self-imposed, in contrast to risks exerted. by an outside influence beyond personal control. Involuntary risks were for Starr defined as “imposed by the society in which the individual lives” Starr (1969: 165). There have since been a number of similar attempts to understand what Slovic more recently described as the ‘personality’ of hazards (Slovic, 1992). Many of the early attempts to do so have suffered from having small sample sizes (Pidgeon in Royal Society, 1992). However, two major works worth considering are one carried out by Otway and von Winfeldt (1982) and another by Slovic et al. (1980). Otway and von Winfeldt argued, on the basis of their survey research, that there are a number of ‘negative hazard attributes’ which might influence people’s risk perception. These have been summarised by Pidgeon et al. in the 1992 Royal Society Report: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 30
Involuntary exposure to risk. Lack of personal control over outcomes. Uncertainty about probabilities or consequences of exposure. Lack of personal experience with the risk (fear of the unknown). Difficulty in imagining risk exposure.
6. Effects of exposure delayed in time. 7. Genetic effects of exposure (threatens future generations). 8. Infrequent but catastrophic accidents (‘kill size’). 9. Benefits not highly visible. 10. Benefits go to others (inequity). 11. Accidents caused by human failure rather than natural causes (Royal Society 1992: 101). This study is significant because it highlights the complexity of the social features which might mediate perceptions of risk. Any measurement of risk would, therefore, need to be sensitive to the system of understanding in which that risk is viewed. This also suggests that apparently irrational views may actually constitute logical constructions of a perceived reality. The survey carried out by Slovic et al. in 1980 analysed the types of hazards most feared using factor analysis techniques. Factor analysis is a statistical method for studying the interrelations among various tests. The object is to discover what the tests have in common and whether these commonalities can be ascribed to one or several factors that run through all or some of the tests. This is the diagram of his final analysis:
31
Slovic’s study was important for two reasons. It was comprehensive in that it used a large sample population for data collection and it looked at the perceptions of different hazards in relation to three factors mediating the perceptions of risk. The study locates different hazards on a three-dimensional axis, by plotting ‘dread risks’ (factor 1) on the horizontal axis against ‘unknown risks’ (factor 2) on the vertical axis, against the ‘frequency and extent of exposure’ (factor 3). These psychometric studies began to demonstrate the complexity of factors mediating the understanding of risk among the general population. What was of fundamental importance was that perceptions of risk could be measured and the results were replicable. This is due to the use of statistical analysis techniques; different studies could be compared to produce general conclusions about risk perception in the population. This opened the door to a whole range of studies which attempted to measure specific 32
risks among certain groups in the population. There were, however, methodological problems with this type of psychometric approach. Once questionnaires had been prepared, respondents would be restricted to giving their views only on the basis of hazards mentioned. Other risks which respondents might also consider to be real and tangible hazards would not necessarily be considered. Therefore the relationships between unquestioned risks and the other questioned factors would never be known. It is arguable that, to a certain extent, this criticism can be addressed by good questionnaire design and the use of pilot surveys prior to conducting full surveys. It is, however, also arguable that more axes could be created, for example economic, social or political dimensions of risk. The effects of these additional axes, in terms of realistic research purposes, would also act to make these data sets unmanageable. Two new approaches have been developing in psychology which have attempted to deal with this problem. 2.3.6
•
Summary
Psychometrics are used in risk perception to measure an individual’s view on particular risks.
•
Psychometrics can be used to consider the qualitative characteristics of hazard perception by -sampling groups of individuals.
•
Populations were typically found to overestimate the threat of low frequency events and underestimate the threat of high frequency events.
•
It may be methodologically impossible, or impractical, to measure all risks in all contexts.
2.4 Applied psychological perspective 2.4.1
Mental models approach
Concern with the need to consider the more qualitative dimensions of risk led some theorists recently to adopt a mental models approach. These theorists attempted to study more closely risks as they are individually perceived by certain population groups.
33
The mental models approach could be seen to be based on both the psychometric and decision-making traditions, and also risk communication theories concurrently developing in sociology (Bostrom et al., 1991). To a certain extent the criticisms of the psychometric approach were addressed by a mental models approach. The aim of the mental models approach is to improve the effectiveness of risk communication strategies by helping those who need to make informed choices about specific risks. This was done by producing an analytic framework, which could be used to consider the gaps between both lay and expert conceptions of a particular hazard. Characteristic of the mental models methodology, and in contrast to the psychometric tradition, was a more detailed investigation process of subjects. The investigations would use small population sample sets in order to understand how specific hazards were perceived by both expert and lay population groupings. The initial task would be to select a group of experts and find out what they thought about a particular hazard. This would be done by use of semi-structured and openended interview techniques. Prompted by photographs, the experts would be interviewed at depth about the nature of a particular hazard and the interviewer would collect a series of ‘protocols’ (protocols are an original record of investigation). A pictorial expert influence diagram could then be constructed). This would be used to illustrate the known risks from the phenomenon, and the expert’s conceptions of how they viewed the hazard:
34
The lay perceptions of the risk would be analysed in the same way. These could then be mapped on to the expert conceptions, in order to identify any gaps and misconceptions in the lay people’s beliefs. Lay people would then be shown the expert influence diagrams and photographs in order to prompt them to discover for themselves where their beliefs about the hazard are incomplete or misinformed. Bostrom et al., using the effects of radon gas (a ‘naturally’ occurring radioactive gas affecting homes built on predominantly granite subsoils) as an example, argue that this technique is useful in providing personal psychological portrayals of representations of particular risks for analysis. Bostrom argued that this technique could be useful in improving lay people’s conceptions about radon, by concentrating risk communication work on those aspects of radon where lay perceptions most need informing. In many cases, however, what people need to know most is not summary estimates, but substantive knowledge of what a hazard is and how it works. Such knowledge is essential for following public discussions about a hazard, for assessing one’s competence to deal with
35
it, and indeed, for formulating the options that might serve as the focus for decision making [...] . Determining what people know and need to know - about these substantive processes requires quite different research strategies than studying their summary estimates. [...] Risk communication could then focus on those first facts that people do not know already. Bostrom et al 1992
This influence diagram can be shown to lay subjects in order to show them where their own conceptions of the radon risk correspond or not to that of the expert model. Mental models represent an attempt to depart from the classic risk perception paradigm. There are, however, a number of criticisms of this methodology. It is questionable whether the interview techniques used would be sensitive enough to elicit the whole context within which subjects view a particular hazard. No account appears to be taken of the political and economic ramifications surrounding the example used, conceptions of radon gas. People may naturally confuse this relatively new and unknown risk with other radioactive hazards. Similarly, the method of obtaining informants (paying them to assist with a ‘study of a risk’) is likely to suggest to subjects that they are being questioned about a dangerous phenomenon, perhaps something akin to nuclear power. They may previously have had little or no concern about risks from radon. This is indicated by the absence of radon gas as a recorded hazard, or concern in earlier studies, even in such comprehensive studies as Slovic et al., 1980. 2.4.2
•
Summary
A mental models approach aims to facilitate risk communication between expert and lay groups.
•
By identifying substantive areas of expert knowledge about a hazard, an expert influence diagram can be constructed.
•
Lay perceptions of risk can be most effectively improved by focusing on erroneous or incomplete assumptions.
2.5 Conclusions While much of the risk perception work can be perceived to be reliable in that its results are replicable, this has increasingly been questioned in terms of the validity of this 36
approach to day-to-day risk management. Slovic, for example, is critical of the extent to which this type of empirical research can relate to the reality of decision-makers who operate in conditions where data sources are often limited, and judgement strategies may be mediated by criteria such as ‘trust’ or `intuition’ (Slovic, 1987). Can choices made in gambling analogies really tell us about decision-making under risk? We need to consider the applicability of gambling analogies for the study of risk situations where there are no predefined probabilities. Gambling as a phenomenon needs to be considered within its own context as a risk-taking behaviour. Gambling situations may well invoke certain risk-taking features, but these are not necessarily synonymous with risks in other contexts, particularly outside the laboratory. A laboratory itself constitutes a social setting and hence any attempt to measure risk must necessarily rely on socially derived constructions of reality. Therefore, the very process of taking any cultural phenomenon out of reality and into the laboratory may not be valid (other than to prescribe the researcher’s perceptions of risk). In addition to the issue of validity in experimental studies generally, there is an array of social and cultural features to be considered in the use of gambling analogies, as representative of other types of decision-making in risk scenarios. For example, gambling is not simply a case of winning and losing, but must be viewed within the context of its meaning within a ‘gambling culture’, where rationality may not be the most significant (or only) factor affecting choice. Pessimists (the risk averse) and optimists (the risk seeking) need to be viewed in terms of their need to take a chance, or gamble, as a way of seeking personal satisfaction. Loss-making to the gambler may well have very different meanings and repercussions to the expert decision-maker operating within a crisis situation. The losing of large sums of money may actually spur the gambler to try harder, by increasing the optimism about an eventual win on the grounds of probability, or the personal need to make a spectacular win. It can also be argued that gambling is a social problem. It is reasonable to assume that the gamblers’ sense of identity to the unit being put at risk will relate closely to the nature of their relationship to it. It is therefore questionable whether a
37
bad decision costing say, twenty lives, could be viewed in a similar context to losing twenty or thirty pounds. The move to psychometric techniques did not signify a major departure from a reductionist paradigm, and the basic pattern remained the same. Perceived risk was measured against actual risk, and it was assumed that by using representative samples, aspects of risks could be considered as constants and accurate measurements could be made of how people view hazards. The psychometric approach has come under increasing attack both within and outside psychology. In particular, a risk perception approach has been questioned by ‘risk communication’ theorists in sociology, who question the social context within which communication takes place between ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ groups. They argue that it is this social context (in particular the social structure and power relations between the groups concerned) which will mediate the nature of perceptions gained. Another reason for this bias towards empirical methods within psychology and the human sciences more generally is the desire to produce work which can be evaluated in the same terms as the pure sciences. Until recently, most work in the area of risk analysis, perception and management has been of a highly quantified nature, usually carried out within the disciplinary strictures of engineering and the pure sciences. In simplistic terms, technical answers were sought to what were perceived to be technical problems. Only ten years ago, the Royal Society produced a highly influential study group report in which there was no reference to the relevance of human factors in risk management and perception. The human dimensions to risk perception were not considered to be significant beyond the parameters of human error (Royal Society, 1983). A different approach has since been acknowledged by a more recent Royal Society report (1992). For the first time this includes sections on the management and perceptions of risk, and considers the social and cultural context in which risk occurs. Clearly, approaches which appear to provide clear-cut answers and recommendations in the empirical style are more likely to appeal to an expert community who have been predominantly trained in the disciplines of the natural sciences. Yet this scientific
38
approach appears to create its own dilemma. The more one attempts to isolate and measure mental processes or models, the more they are treated as a ‘black box’. In order to isolate these processes, one needs to decide on an a priori basis which set of stimuli are producing which set of responses; this is hypothesis-led research which in turn leads to reductionism. Lola Lopes puts this quite succinctly herself: Experimental theories, whether they are behavioural or cognitive, tend to revolve around the transformation of the stimulus into the response. If this can be done without invoking individual differences or higher-level cognition, all the better. Hence the appeal of the psycho physical metaphor for explaining risky choice (or more properly, for explaining the most common choice pattern while ignoring entirely the patterns of a substantial minority of subjects) (Lopes 1987).
There are many problems associated with predicting causal relationships. Can we ever know what influences were affecting the actors at the crucial time prior to a major disaster? As Jim Reason has pointed out in his book Human Error (1990), one cannot study large-scale human disasters in the laboratory, and it is impractical and may be unethical to study them as they happen. Short of inventing a new methodology we are left with a dilemma as to how research of this kind can be better conducted and validated. The use of a mental models approach provides an example of applied risk perception by psychologists. It is perhaps unfortunate that the application of this method has been restricted to a relatively recent and unknown hazard, radon gas. Lay perceptions about particular hazards would be unlikely to have developed sufficiently for a comparison of unknown or recently discovered hazards. It is therefore not surprising that expert and lay conceptions of the risks involved would be divergent. In contrast, for wellestablished hazards, the lay population may well prove to be well informed. A further and perhaps more pertinent criticism is whether or not a unified expert conception can be constructed at all. Experts frequently disagree among themselves about the nature and treatments of a variety of risks. If ‘misinformed’ lay people are to have the gaps in their personal beliefs filled by this or any other technique, then which expert conceptions should be used to do this? This criticism is relevant to all the risk perception approaches which treat the anomalies of lay perceptions of risk as being in
39
need of redressing by scientific knowledge. In this respect, the mental models approach is perhaps more useful in telling us about misconceptions of risk phenomena among risk perception researchers themselves, rather than those they attempt to research. There is a presumption in a risk perception paradigm that the world could function if only we could eradicate the anomalies, or folk views, of what is a natural and unnatural risk. The groupings presented in this Unit do not, in reality, represent an exclusive system of categorisation. Many of the approaches to risk discussed here have been influenced by social, cultural, economic and political theories. It is also pertinent that much of the work presented here has an interdisciplinary nature, which may not yet be self-evident. It is hoped that as you go through the next few Units of this Module, the interdisciplinary nature of modern risk management theories will become apparent to you. 2.5.1
Summary
•
Risk perception work is methodologically reliable. Results can be replicated in further surveys/experiments.
•
The validity of current risk perception work is questionable.
•
Risk perception provides some factual answers to risk issues. Risk perception work does not question the notion of pluralistic expert conceptions of risk.
•
Risk perception theories can be used in conjunction with other methodological approaches to the study of risk.
2.6 Guide to reading You should now read the supplied article ‘The Psychology of Risk’ by N. Pidgeon. This provides a sound introduction to the early approaches to risk in psychology.
2.7 Suggested further reading Bostrum, A., Fischoff, B. and Morgan, M. (1992) ‘Characterizing mental models of hazardous processes: A methodology and application to radon’, Journal of Social Issues, 48(4): 85-100. 40
Lopes, L. L. (1987) ‘Between hope and fear: The psychology of risk’, Advances in Experimental and Social Psychology, 20. Slovic, P., Fischoff, B. and Lichtenstein, S. (1980) ‘Facts and fears: Understanding perceived risks’. In R. C. Schwing and W. A. Albers (eds) Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe is Safe Enough, New York: Plenum Press. There is a useful collection of articles about the psychology of risk in Pidgeon, N., Kasperson, R. E. and Slovic, P. (2003) The Social Amplification of Risk, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2.8 Study questions You should now write approximately 300 words in answer to each of the questions below. We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University. •
Discuss the theoretical problems with quantitative approaches to risk.
•
Explain risk perception.
•
What is the aim of a mental models approach?
2.9 Bibliography Bostrom, A., Atman, C., Fischoff, B. and Morgan, M. (1991) Assessing Risk Communication Documents: Completing and Correcting Mental Models of Hazardous Processes, draft paper, Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University. Bostrom, A., Fischoff, B. and Morgan, M. (1992) ‘Characterizing mental models of hazardous processes: A methodology and application to radon’, Journal of Social Issues, 48(4):-85-100. Covello, V. T. (1983) ‘The perception of technological risks: A literature review’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 23: 285-7. Douglas, M. (1985) Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences, New York: Russell
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Sage Foundation. Fischhoff, B. (1989) ‘Risk: A guide to controversy’. In National Research Council, Committee on Risk Perception and Communication, Improving Risk Communication: 211-319, Washington DC: National Academy Press. Fischoff, B. (1990) ‘Psychology and public policy: Tool or toolmaker?’, American Psychologist, 45: 647-53. Gardner, H. (1987) The Mind’s New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution, New York: Basic Books. Hacking, I. (1975) The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979) ‘Prospect theory: An analysis of decision making under risk’, Econometrica, 47: 263-291. Lichtenstein, S., Slovic, P., Fischoff, B., Layman, M. and Combs, B. (1978) ‘Judged frequency of lethal events’, Journal of Experimental Psychology (Human Learning and Memory), 4: 551-78. Lopes, L.L. (1987) ‘Between hope and fear: The psychology of risk’, Advances in Experimental and Social Psychology, 20: 255-295. Otway, H.J. and von Winfeldt, D. (1982) ‘Beyond accpetable risk: On the social acceptability of technologies’, Policy Sciences, 14: 247-56. Reason, J. (1990) Human Error, New York: Cambridge University Press. The Royal Society (1983) Risk Assessment A Study Group Report, London, The Royal Society. The Royal Society (1992) Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management, London: The Royal Society. Slovic, P. (1987) ‘Perceptions of risk’, Science, 236: 280-5. Slovic, P. (1992) ‘Perceptions of Risk: Reflections on the Psychometric Paradigm’. In S. Kimsky and D. Golding (eds) Theories of Risk, New York: Praeger Publishers: 117152.
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Slovic, P., Fischoff, B. and Lichtenstein, S. (1980) ‘Facts and fears: Understanding perceived risks’. In R. C. Schwing and W. A. Albers (eds) Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe is Safe Enough, New York: Plenum Press: 181-216. Starr, C. (1969) ‘Social benefit versus technological risk’, Science 165: 1232-1238. Todhunter, I. (1865) A History of the Mathematical Theory of Probability from the Time of Pascal to that of LaPlace, New York: Chelsea Press.
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READING ‘The Psychology of Risk’ Pidgeon, N. (1992) In D. I. Blockley, Engineering Safety, McGraw-Hill: 167-185.
Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.
3 Unit Three: Risk communication 3.1 Aims and objectives of this Unit This Unit will introduce you to two models of risk communication. Risk communication may be defined as the techniques (‘protocols’) used by risk managers to inform the general public of the risks pertaining to products and/or activities, with a view to influencing behaviour. Poor risk communication prevents effective risk management. The outcome-may-be injury-and/or-loss of life. Litigation may follow. The ‘deficit’ model is examined in detail. This is the model most often used by risk communicators today. A number of examples of risk communication using the deficit model are given. These examples are intended to act as heuristics, helping the reader both to understand the theory of risk communication and to relate theory with practice. Current risk management efforts are based on two assumptions; first, that ‘dispassionate’ science offers the best explanation of the world about us; and secondly, that science offers the best chance of managing the multiplying risks and hazards of the modern world - many of which ironically are generated by science itself. As Irwin (1995) puts it, science is ‘Janus-faced’. That is, science is a double-edged sword, simultaneously dispensing both hazard and panacea. For example, science gave us both ozonedestroying chloro-fluorocarbons (CFCs) (used as a heat exchanging gas in refrigerators), and the satellites and sensors that detected the resulting ozone hole over Antarctica. Given the above, it might well be asked whether science is quite as rational and objective as its devotees would have us believe. Science is, after all, just as much a human artefact as any other form of knowledge, and as such is just as fallible. With this in mind, the unit offers a critical evaluation (‘critique’) of the underlying principles, practice and consequent ‘world-view’ of science. Please note, however, that this critique of ‘scientific rationality’ is no New Age rant against ‘malevolent, faceless science’. It is merely an attempt to develop a more mature understanding of science: an antidote to the kind of breathless, ‘gee-whiz’
representations served up by such programmes as ‘Tomorrow’s World’ and such institutions as the Royal Society in its ‘Christmas lectures for young people’, broadcast annually by the BBC. Having discussed the strengths and weaknesses of scientific rationality, the unit offers a critique of the deficit model itself. As with the examination of ‘scientific rationality’, the intention is not to debunk, but to develop a more effective model of risk communication. As the examples demonstrate, within the deficit model, risk communicators and members of the public have a tendency to ‘talk past’ each other. The message, and the feedback, often disappear into the ether. This renders risk communication ineffective. Next, the unit describes and evaluates the second model of risk communication - the ‘sociological’ model. We begin with an exploration of the philosophical aspects of the sociological approach to risk communication. The major insight is that in the ‘Risk Society’ (Beck, 1992a) the public may hold a potentially infinite number of opinions on both the nature and management of scientific and technological hazards. Consequently, the privileging of a single view may alienate a major part of the risk communicator’s audience. This may render risk communication largely ineffective. Scarce risk management resources - of both time and money - may be wasted. Having explored the issue of ‘multiple world-views’ (or ‘multiple social realities’), the section concludes with a step-by-step guide as to how this understanding may be applied to practical risk communication.
3.2 Introduction If the German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992a) is correct, we live in a ‘Risk Society’. The Risk Society has two chief characteristics. First, it is a society in which a ‘post-materialist’ public is becoming more and more aware of the risks and hazards of modern life. Secondly, it is a society in which scientific and technological hazards are both multiplying and spreading. Modern hazards are global hazards. Greenhouse gases are no respecters of national borders. Acid rain in Scandinavia is attributed to sulphur dioxide (S02)
46
emissions in the UK. Deforestation in Germany is blamed on noxious emissions from `backward’ Eastern European industries. Ozone depletion is a global phenomenon. Every human being on earth, new-born or octogenarian, has traces of the insecticide DDT in her/his body. Even the wealthy have no protection against such ubiquitous hazards. For a corroboration of Beck’s thesis, see, for example, Steward, (1989). The multiplication of risk in concert with a developing risk consciousness places a premium on open and effective risk management and communication. The public want to know more about the increasingly hazardous world in which they live. And more than this, the public want more of a say in how science and technology are applied and managed. Facilitating ‘technological citizenship’ (Irwin, 1995) is a major new challenge for risk managers and communicators. The stakes are high. Success may reduce opposition to new scientific and technological developments. Failure may deal a fatal blow to science, technology and the enterprises in which they are employed. According to those sociologists (like Wynne and Irwin) who study scientific and technological risk and hazard, securing ‘technological citizenship’ requires a new, balanced approach to risk management and communication - one that treats ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ accounts of science and technology as equally valid. It is believed that such a balanced or ‘symmetrical’ model has one great advantage: namely that it provides the conditions under which realistic risk management goals can be set between parties with different expectations and agendas. The result of such negotiation may be a reduction of social conflict, and a more efficient use of risk management resources. That, at least, is the utopia promised by those who promote the ‘sociological approach’. Before discussing this approach in detail, a firm understanding of its well-established and widely employed intellectual antecedent, the deficit model, is required.
3.3 The deficit model of risk communication The deficit (or public dissemination) model is the one most frequently used by risk communicators. It exhibits the following characteristics: 1.
47
It assumes formal scientific research to be the only legitimate form of
knowledge. This ‘science centredness’ automatically de-legitimises lay understandings. 2.
It uses ‘unreflexive’ science. That is, a form of scientific discourse in which assumptions, pre-commitments and uncertainties are systematically filtered out (see Wynne, 1992). This gives the impression of a coherent, homogeneous body of knowledge of unassailable integrity - even in the midst of scientific uncertainty.
3.
Official science is portrayed as objective and ‘uninterested’. ‘Unofficial’ science and other forms of knowledge are alleged to be tainted by vested interests.
4.
The deficit model of risk communication uses discourses of expertise and specialism. That is, risk assessments and arguments are expressed in technical terms using a technical argot (language). Thus, risk managers employ ‘quantitative risk assessments’ and ‘cost-benefit analyses’. The evaluations they produce may be loaded with ‘comparative risk tables’ where different kinds of risks are expressed as numerical values decimalised for complete accuracy. Such abstractions are clearly the domain of those with expert knowledge. When they are discussed, there is a presumption of technical competence and expertise. A capacity for abstract thought may be required.
5.
Given the exclusivity of such technical discourses - the language and rules of expert debate are unfamiliar to the average citizen - the public is effectively barred from the discussion.
6.
The deficit model conceives of the public as a tabula rasa. That is, each citizen is thought of as a blank sheet of paper, waiting to be inscribed with ‘knowledge’. Even where citizens have a basic familiarity with, or knowledge of the science or technology in question (as with residents who either work at, have relatives and/or friends who work at, or live close to major industrial sites) they are assumed to be mere ‘empty
48
vessels’. In short, they are passive receptors waiting to be filled with knowledge. 7.
Risk communicators conceive of the public as an undifferentiated, homogeneous mass. Outdated social models - for example of the patriarchal extended family group with the ‘housewife mother’ and liveat-home grandparents - may be employed. But this ignores the advent of what Beck calls ‘individualisation’, where people may engage in more than one family relationship during a lifetime. As he puts it, ‘Biographical pluralism of forms of life i.e. the alternation between families, mixed with and interrupted by other forms of living together or alone, is becoming the [...] ‘norm” (Beck, 1992a: 115). With the demise of prescriptive social traditions, people are now free to ‘write their own biographies’, i.e. to ‘do their own thing’ without fear of (overt) chastisement. This means, for example, that there are more cohabitees (according to the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, in 1989 26 per cent of single women were cohabiting); more single parent families (according to the JRF, in Britain in 1991, 30 per cent of births were outside marriage); more families where the grandparents are accommodated by the state; more families where different children have different fathers or mothers; and more families where the young leave home as soon as it is economically feasible.
8.
Social behaviour is stereotyped. For example, in the majority of risk communication exercises conducted under the Control Of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations (which require that major industrial sites inform proximate communities of the actions they should take in the event of an accident), it is assumed that, at the time of an alert, those likely to be affected will be at home with the family. No allowance is made, for example, for those in transit (either by bicycle, car, bus or train), or for those with children at school or grandparents at a local old people’s home whose instinctual response might be to collect their
49
charges. 9.
In the deficit model, communication is unidirectional (i.e. asymmetrical or, to use a computing metaphor, uniplex). An ‘ignorant’ public is given information or instruction on the assumption that it cannot possibly have anything to contribute to risk assessment or management processes. The assumption of ignorant passivity precludes any consideration of ‘feedback loops’ - procedural or institutional means by which the public can engage in a personal dialogue with risk managers.
10.
Most risk communication exercises are ‘one-offs’. The dissemination of information is done just once, and the success of the exercise (in terms of a positive assessment of how much instruction has been absorbed) is rarely evaluated. If there is any official evaluation, it is usually no more than an assessment of the content of any letters or calls received (sometimes the communications are just counted). Evaluation, therefore, is usually passive. Often, a single medium only is employed.
3.3.1
Examples of risk communication using the deficit model
The following examples are taken from Alan Irwin’s book, Citizen Science (1995). Most of the examples are covered in detail in Chapter 4 of the book: ‘Witnesses, Participants and Major Accident Hazards’. The chapter is reproduced at the end of this Unit. Explosive issues Under the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) regulations, 1984, industrial complexes storing large volumes of hazardous materials were obliged to inform the public of that fact, and to give advice on what people living close to a complex should do in an emergency. To this end, a leaflet (or more durable card) may be sent to all those living within a Public Information Zone (PIZ). The PIZ usually corresponds to the Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE’s) Consultation Distance - an area around a plant within which certain planning controls operate. In Citizen Science, Irwin evaluates a major CIMAH risk communication exercise (at the Carrington petrochemical complex in Greater Manchester). During the exercise, a leaflet 50
was sent to all those within the PIZ, under the rubric of the local authority. The communication, which assumed a public ignorant of industrial practice, gave minimal information on the nature of the hazard, and very simple advice on what people should do in the event of an emergency. It assumed that at the time of an emergency, residents would be at home. On this assumption, people were advised to stay indoors and await further instructions. The risk communication exercise was a ‘one-off’. It was not repeated. Only one version of the leaflet was issued. The degree of success of the exercise was not evaluated. There were no supporting campaigns in, for example, the local press or on the radio. The public had no right to question the disseminators ‘live’, although they were told they could address any queries to the relevant site in writing. No telephone number was given. The public was at no time asked what it thought about the advice given in the communication. In his evaluation of the success of the Carrington risk communication exercise, Irwin concluded that it enjoyed ‘Only partial success in improving the level of local awareness and emergency response’ (Irwin, 1995: 90). There is a clear match between the Carrington risk communication exercise and the deficit model of risk communication described. For example: 1.
The tone of the leaflet was authoritative and unequivocal. Scientific uncertainties - for example, in relation to the behaviour of gases under different atmospheric conditions (a notoriously difficult scientific question) were not discussed. In consequence of such rationalisation, a large number of disaster scenarios were aggregated together to produce a couple of lines of instruction.
2.
The leaflet assumed the.public to be unfamiliar with the Carrington complex, even though a proportion of those in receipt of the leaflet would almost certainly have possessed some knowledge of either the companies involved, their financial status, their respective industrial processes or (perhaps most pertinently) their safety records. In such a context, the leaflet’s ‘presumption of ignorance’ would seem naive.
3.
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It is not difficult for the public to obtain information on local hazardous
industries. Such things as lay-offs, bad smells and bangs are the ‘bread and butter’ of local newspapers and radio stations. Perhaps more ominously for the companies concerned, local and/or national environmental groups will always be willing to provide curious citizens with their version of events at a particular site or complex. 4.
Only a single version of the leaflet was issued. Clearly there was an assumption of a homogeneous, undifferentiated public.
5.
No allowance was made in the leaflet for variations in social circumstance at the time of an emergency. Instructions were given on the assumption that people would be at, or very near, their own home.
6.
The public were unable to engage in open dialogue with the risk communicators. Site telephone numbers were not given. The only permissible mode of communication was letter-writing. Letter-writing is impersonal and time consuming. (It should be noted that in some spheres of government activity, the telephone ‘Help Line’ is de rigueur. Until late 1996, for example, the Benefits Agency ran a 24-hour Help Line for claimants. Such services may generate expectations of openness and responsiveness among the public.)
The leafleting exercise was a ‘one-off’. There were no supporting campaigns in newspapers, on local radio or on television. There were no exhibitions in schools, libraries, health centres, sports centres or shopping malls. Apart from Irwin’s evaluation of the Carrington risk communication exercise, the public authorities (for example, the Metropolitan Borough of Trafford, Fire Service and Police) and companies concerned carried out no proactive evaluation of its success. 3.3.2
Mad cows
During the late 1980s, news of a particularly cruel and always-fatal cattle disease, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), began to appear in the media. When TV news channels started broadcasting pictures of superficially healthy cows staggering and stumbling across farmyards, the public began to take notice. Then, when the possibility of BSE transmission across the species barrier was raised, public concern reached a 52
crescendo. ‘Could it happen to me?’ was the question on every beef consumer’s lips. While there were suspicions that BSE could cause Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) (a degenerative brain disease similar to BSE) in humans, the government insisted that there was no scientific evidence to support this view - despite a lack of consensus within the scientific community. Despite repeated assurances, however, public concern continued to mount, with groups like Parents for Safe Food and the Consumers’ Association accusing the government of complacency. In the midst of a maelstrom of bad publicity, John Gummer, the government minister responsible, went on the offensive. References were made to ‘public hysteria’, `media hype’ and the use of `false experts’ by the ‘opposing’ side. He even labelled vegetarians ‘wholly unnatural’(!). Thankfully, however, public insult was not the only form of risk communication employed by the authorities. Thus the Meat and Livestock Commission put the case for eating British beef (in newspaper advertisements) without once mentioning the ‘opposition’. Similarly, the Royal Society and the Association of British Science Writers called a press conference to try to clear up the ‘confusion’ over BSE. It was hoped that the five experts on the panel would be able to give those who were reporting the subject clear guidance. And they did, the most pessimistic assessment being that the disease posed a ‘very low’ risk to humans. There were rather more gimmicky responses, too, with John Gummer inviting the press to witness him feeding a beefburger to his daughter. Significantly, this exercise could be construed to symbolise the government’s reaction to public concern. Generally, the public was treated with disdain. Gummer hid behind the (sometimes uncertain) science produced by his ministry, and refused to be drawn into open debate on alternative views, such as those held by Professor Richard Lacey. Lacey, a microbiologist from Leeds University warned that, in the worst case scenario, ‘a whole generation would be lost’. Furthermore, the public had no means of officially engaging the responsible ministry: there was no system for handling public enquiries. Meanwhile, BSE had reached epidemic proportions in the nation’s beef herds. By 1990, almost 300 cases were being notified each week.
53
As with the Carrington risk communication exercise, there are clear parallels between the government’s handling of the BSE scare and the deficit model of risk communication. For example: 1.
The government based its advice firmly on ‘formal’ and ‘legitimate’ (i.e. government-sponsored)
scientific
research.
Any
science
not
directly
commissioned by government, such as the ‘inconvenient’ analysis produced by Professor Lacey, was publicly discredited. Lay understandings, such as those underpinning the campaigns of the Consumers’ Association and Parents for Safe Food, were given no credence at all. 2.
‘Official’ government science was portrayed as objective and detached, i.e. ‘uninterested’. Critics, however, asserted that the analyses produced by government scientists were unduly influenced by farming interests, and that, in general, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) placed producer interests before those of the consumer. In response, the government reasserted the neutrality of its science, and insisted that Parents for Safe Food and the Consumers’ Association were giving undue weight to consumer interests.
3.
Both sides in the debate produced ‘unreflexive’ science. That is, neither side would admit to any precommitment or bias in its scientific discourse.
4.
Risk communication was unidirectional. The public had no means of interactively engaging risk communicators in dialogue (this could only be done by proxy through special interest groups like the Consumers’ Association).
3.3.3
Farm labourers
In the 1980s a bitter dispute erupted between the National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers (NUAAW) and the government’s Advisory Committee on Pesticides (ACP). The NUAAW, on the basis of its own research into the use of the pesticide 2,4,5-T (a powerful defoliant with potential long-term adverse health effects), argued that it should be banned (see Irwin, 1995). The pesticide had already been proscribed in countries like Canada, the United States and the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, in Britain, it had been abandoned by British Rail and the National Coal Board. The ACP, 54
however, on the basis of its own scientific research and laboratory modelling of work practices, insisted that the pesticide was safe if it was used ‘in the recommended way and for the recommended purposes’. The crux of the farmworkers’ case was that in the real world, the pesticide was used in less than ideal conditions. Time pressures meant that training was often inadequate. Sometimes protective clothing was not available and even when it was, using it in hot and humid conditions proved difficult. Diluting the chemical accurately under rough and ready field conditions was problematic. Time pressures and logistical difficulties meant that clothes doused in chemicals were not always changed (meaning that the clothes might be worn home) and equipment was not always thoroughly cleaned. And finally, the socio-economic environment of farmworking, where workers and their families were often dependent on the good will of the farmer for employment/promotion opportunities and for housing, mitigated against ‘playing it by the book’. Given such concerns, the farmworkers gathered evidence of work practices and possible health effects via a questionnaire in the NUAAW’s newspaper. The survey produced a number of accounts of ill health among workers and their families. Out of this ‘popular epidemiology’ the NUAAW synthesised 14 case studies for submission to the ACP. In one case, the wife of a sprayer had suffered a miscarriage. She later gave birth to a daughter with a cleft palate and hare lip. The 14 case studies were, however, dismissed by the ACP as mere ‘anecdotal’ evidence. The ACP demanded scientifically based proof, rather than the testimonies of a ‘suggestible’ constituency. And it reiterated that 2,4,5-T was safe if used as directed. It seemed to the farmworkers and their families that they had been prescribed the status of ‘living laboratories’ with little hope of escape. The manner in which the government communicated with the farming industry over the alleged risks of 2,4,5-T conformed to the deficit model in a number of ways: 1.
The government, through the ACP, leant heavily on ‘objective, rational science’. The ‘science centredness’ of the government’s risk management and
55
communication
strategy,
expressed
automatically
de-legitimised
the
through
‘discourses
farmworkers’
of
expertise’,
questionnaire-based
epidemiologic research. The ACP’s science was portrayed as authoritative and coherent - the only legitimate source of data on the health effects of 2,4,5-T while the lay knowledges of the farmworkers were devalued and ignored. 2.
The ACP insisted that its science was conspicuously ‘uninterested’. The Committee existed to serve only the public interest. The NUAAW, however, believed the ACP to be looking after the interests of the UK’s agro-chemical industry - an important source of income for the Exchequer (and perhaps also for the party of government). For its part, the government saw the NUAAW’s stand as evidence of a hostile attitude towards the chemicals industry, the government and agricultural employers. (Of course, neither side made any attempt to reflexively articulate any pre-commitments or vested interests they might have held.)
3.
The ACP believed its science to represent the universal ‘truth’ about 2,4,5-T. Other countries, however, drew a different conclusion and banned 2,4,5-T. Evidently, the science of 2,4,5-T produced by the Canadian, American and Soviet authorities differed from that produced by the UK. (This disparity is indicative of the ‘contingent’ and ‘socially mediated’ character of science, which is discussed in detail below.)
4.
The ACP applied a de-contextualised, ‘laboratory’ model of social organisation to the farming environment. No attempt was made to ascertain whether, in the ‘real world’, the chemical could, in fact, be ‘used as directed’. It was assumed that farmworkers and their employers would work together to ensure that 2,4,5T would be used safely. Both groups were assumed to have safety - and not profits, girl/boyfriends or knocking-off times - uppermost in their minds. Such distractive intrusions are not recognised in laboratory models.
3.3.4
Safe sex
In the 1980s, the British government, like other national authorities, mounted a major campaign to warn of the dangers of a new and virulent sexually transmitted disease, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). As there appeared to be no cure for the 56
condition, the Department of Health’s risk communication effort centred on the theme of ‘safe sex’. The risk communication campaign was more imaginative than most. Leaflets were distributed to every household. Campaigns were run in the national press and on television, and a telephone Help Line was established. There were even billboard posters. Additionally, responsible authorities, like the Inner London Education Authority, ran supplementary campaigns. The Department of Health’s message was a simple one: prevention is the only cure. To this end, the public were instructed to use condoms despite rumblings that those of the latex variety may not provide complete protection. (They were found to be only 98 per cent effective. As one stand-up comic put it, ‘Would you go into a room and turn the light on if two times out of a hundred you got electrocuted?’) While the HIV/AIDS campaign was (and is) more imaginative than most risk communication exercises, two criticisms can be made. First, as in other risk communication campaigns, officialdom assumed the public to exist in a state of blissful ignorance. The campaign slogan ‘Don’t die of ignorance’ reflected this. Second, officials promoted a method of prevention that took no account whatsoever of the possibility (or likelihood) of unequal power relations within sexual relationships. Thus it was assumed that should the male refuse to wear a contraceptive, the female would be in a sufficiently strong negotiating position to refuse sex. Such an assumption, however, was a gross over-simplification of the politics and circumstances of sex, where unequal power relations may reduce the woman’s influence in decision-making, and where the issue of contraception can be a source of great unease. As one young woman put it, ‘Don’t die of ignorance? I nearly died of embarrassment!’ (Scott, 1991). As in the case of 2,4,5-T, a model of usage had been developed that failed to take into account the exigencies and compromises of life as it is lived in the real world. Although the government’s ‘safe sex’ campaign departed from the deficit model of risk communication in a number of important respects (for example, in its imaginative ‘multi-media’ approach to risk communication and use of interactive enquiry modes), there are a number of similarities with the model. For example:
57
Health experts applied a de-contextualised model of social behaviour to the ‘real world’ situation of sexual relations. No allowance was made for the political inequalities of sex, where one partner may have more power than another. Such inequalities may proscribe .reasoned discussion.. In addition, the campaign employed a discourse of scientific certainty, despite the highly uncertain status of our knowledge about HIV and AIDS. While well intentioned, discourses of certainty may produce a false - and possibly dangerous - sense of security. (Research, for example, has shown latex condoms to be less than 100 per cent safe. At some point in the future it may be revealed that the HIV virus can spread by means other than the exchange of body fluids.) 3.3.5
Summary
The four activities described above all approximate to the deficit model of risk communication: •
they all employ a ‘science centred’ model of risk communication: that is, one that privileges scientific discourse over other forms of knowledge, such as ‘popular epidemiology’ (the gathering of evidence on health questions by members of the general public, as in the case of 2,4,5-T) or craft skills;
•
scientific uncertainties and organisational pre-commitments are never discussed in public. They are filtered out to project a single, authoritative analysis of unimpeachable integrity. The analysis is articulated through discourses of expertise and specialism, often in formal settings by the men in suits’. This subtle ‘massaging’ and careful presentation ensures the preservation of the mystique and epistemological (knowledge) status of science;
•
they deny the public any effective role in risk management and risk communication. There is no commitment to ‘technological citizenship’. The public, uncomfortable with discourses of expertise and specialism, is effectively barred from participating in debate
•
they employ de-contextualised, ‘universal’ models of human behaviour, sometimes based on inaccurate social models
58
•
they assume a public deficient in knowledge.
Assuming the above exercises to be representative of contemporary risk communication, it can be seen that, in Britain at least, the deficit model of risk communication is still in widespread use. As evidence of this, you might like to consider the recent publication of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. The report considered the safety of pesticides on crops and offers some good examples of the risk assessment process (see Unit 5 of this Module) and risk communication (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution: Special Report, [2005] and Smith, [2005]). The background to the report, as set out by the Minister, was to improve public access to information about pesticides used and specifically, to carry out a special study to examine the scientific evidence on which DEFRA has based its decisions on the risks to people from pesticide exposure. (The Minister) requested the study following a detailed evaluation of the responses made to the two public consultations launched on 21 July 2003, which sought views on the introduction of buffer zones around residential properties near farms and how residents can best be informed of the pesticides that are being sprayed. the responses to the consultations demonstrate that there is a perception that the current arrangements, and in particular the assessment of risks, are inadequate.
The report commented that: We are concerned that the toxicological testing currently undertaken within the pesticides approval and assessment process, [...] does not encompass the full range of conditions that have been described to us by members of the public and attributed by them to exposure to pesticides (para. 6.5). Residents and bystanders have told us that their experiences of the current reporting arrangements [...] are unsatisfactory. Some have also reported difficulty in having their concerns taken seriously and accessing the most appropriate medical experts (para. 6.8). In the light of the lack of rigour in the underlying science, we have been surprised at the level of confidence expressed in advice to Ministers and the level of assurance given to the public about the safety of residents and bystanders potentially exposed to agricultural pesticides. We have concluded that the level of these assurances is not robustly founded in scientific evidence. Limitations in the data and alternative views of the science, as well as political and ethical judgements implicit in this advice, all need to be clearly acknowledged (para. 6.14). It is clear to us that there is a demand from those concerned about pesticides for better access to information. DEFRA proposed that information on what had been sprayed should
59
be made available through a third party only. We rejected this approach as untenable over 20 years ago in our Tenth Report, Tackling Pollution Experience and Prospects, and were disappointed to find it still being used to justify policy today (para. 6.16). We recommend that the advice to Ministers from technical and scientific advisory committees, such as that of the Advisory Committee on Pesticides on the approval of pesticides, should take account of the criteria employed regarding risk and precaution, the choices available, and the likely impacts on those affected by the decisions being recommended. This information needs to be reflected explicitly when communicating risk management decisions to the public. The meaning of such terms as ‘adequate protection’ should be clearly defined and communicated. Areas of scientific uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy need to be recognised and their nature described explicitly. It should be clear how uncertainty has been managed within the assessment, for example, through the use of probabilistic analysis (3.53), uncertainty factors etc. The effect of uncertainty on the estimate of risk should be clear (5.37) (para. 6.44).
In the light of the recommendations in the report referred to above, the student might like to consult and consider a Cabinet office report into risk (Cabinet Office, 2002). This report considered how the government could improve its capability to handle risk and uncertainty. Amongst other things, it recommended that there was a need for: •
Building public confidence in the basis of decisions made by government about risks;
•
More transparency about decisions so that they demonstrate a clear grounding in evidence;
•
Decisions that better reflect public values and concerns; and providing enough information to allow individuals to make balanced judgements (cabinet Office, 2002: 74).
The point being made is that whilst the Cabinet Office report was dated 2002 and the recommendations were to be taken forward as a two-year programme, it can be argued from the findings of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, that little has changed. As stated in the ‘Aims and Objectives’, the deficit model is informed by ‘scientific rationality’. Science is assumed to be the most rational and objective means of identifying, evaluating and managing risks and hazards. But is this ‘way of knowing’ as infallible as its devotees would have us believe? A critical understanding of scientific rationality is an essential prerequisite to any attempt to devise a better model of risk management and communication. The 60
following is therefore a measured critique of the scientific foundations of the deficit model.
3.4 A critique of ‘scientific rationality’ Scientific rationality is the bedrock of the science-centred deficit model of risk communication. It is believed that the model’s scientific foundation lends it authority, legitimacy and credibility. The scientific method’s grounding in fallibilism (the requirement that theories-be continually questioned and tested), reproducibility (the requirement that theories produce the same result when used by different people at different times) and universalism (the requirement that theories produce the same result wherever they are applied) would appear to make it almost unassailable: the best ‘way of knowing’ we have. To its devotees and practitioners it is the apotheosis (pinnacle) of modernist rationality and objectivity. But to others, it is little more than politics in a white coat. The following critique is no debunking of science. It is merely an attempt to gently ‘lift the lid’ on science; to put an important and extensive body of knowledge into some sort of social, economic and political context. (Note that the critique is based on a conception of science as a ‘cultural’ activity, using the popular definition of culture as ‘a system of ideas, values and behaviours associated with one or more social groups’.) First, science may either be, or be seen to be, ‘interested’. That is, science will reflect the mores of the experts who give it life, the paradigms and agendas of the institutional settings in which it is created (Thomas Kuhn, 1962), and the social, economic and political values of the day. As Irwin puts it, ‘Science is constituted within particular social contexts, and these will shape what eventually counts as certified knowledge’ (Irwin, 1995: 58). Put simply, science is as much a human artefact as any other product of mankind’s intellectual exuberance. The ‘interestedness’ of science may be seen, for example, in the choice of one set of assumptions over another, and in the nature and rigour of any subsequent tests. The permeability of science to the social, economic and political climate in which it is
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created is reflected in the different attitudes of various governments towards certain well-known scientific proofs. This is the case with animal tests for carcinogenicity. Thus, in some countries, if a chemical is proved carcinogenic in animals, it is assumed carcinogenic in humans. In other countries, this assumption is rejected. Returning to the examples given at the beginning of this Unit, it should be noted that the science produced by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) was seen by some to reflect certain vested interests. That is, the science was seen to reflect (and legitimise) the farmers’ and feed producers’ interests in the BSE debate. Similarly, in the arguments over 2,4,5-T, the science produced under the auspices of the ACP was thought by some to reflect the financial interests of Britain’s agro-chemical industry, a major employer and contributor to Exchequer coffers. Of course, government scientists do not have a monopoly on ‘interestedness’. Environmental groups like Greenpeace are today turning more and more to science as a means of giving campaigns authority and legitimacy. Balance requires that the same questions be asked of ‘green science’: Who is paying the Piper? What assumptions and forms of evidence are accepted and rejected, and why? Why is one proof acceptable, and another not? And finally, is it mere coincidence that the Piper’s final tune is one the paymaster can dance to? (That is, why do the recommendations of scientists exhibit a tendency to reflect the views of those who commission the research in the first place?) The sensitivity of science to the values of those who commission and practice it may be termed its ‘institutional shaping’. The permeability of science to social, economic and political influences reflects its status as a culture: all cultures, however well-defined their boundaries, are osmotic. They affect, and are affected by, their environment. The second major weakness of scientific rationality, and one alluded to above, is that of the contingency of science. Thus, the product of scientific reasoning is to a large degree determined by the assumptions made at the beginning of a research project. Different assumptions may produce different scientific conclusions. The inherent contingency of science is illustrated in the bitter 1980s debate between the British government and other European countries over acid rain. The arguments
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were fuelled by the inherent uncertainty of the science of acid deposition. The first problem lay in the lack of a single, coherent scientific paradigm of acid deposition. This difficulty is quite common in ‘problem-oriented’ fields of scientific enquiry,
where
investigations
span
a
number
of
unique
and
sometimes
incommensurable disciplines. In the case of acid rain these included geology, physics, biology, chemistry and meteorology. Obviously, each discipline focuses on different aspects of the problem. The scientist is then faced with the task of deciding what weight to give each particular perspective. Different formulations of the five or so disciplines involved will produce different conclusions. The scientist ends up with not a single, coherent science of acid deposition, but with a potentially infinite number of sciences, at which point a preference will have to be expressed. (Bearing in mind the potential ‘interestedness’ of science, the choice may, to some degree, reflect a --political rather than a scientific agenda.) The second problem lies in the inherent uncertainty of the mechanisms of acid deposition. Linking cause and effect is far from simple. (Indeed, there is even disagreement over the precise cause and effects of deposition.) There are many intermediate factors. Other pollutants or naturally occurring chemicals, for example, may exacerbate or diminish the problem, as will geological and soil conditions, weather patterns (short and long term) and even the waste products of biological organisms. The profusion of naturally occurring intermediate factors presents the scientist with two major headaches. First, the scientist is dealing with a very complex ‘open system’ where variables may interact in highly unpredictable ways. (Contrast this with the ‘closed system’ of the laboratory bench, where the complexity of a system is decided by the scientist, and where variables are amenable to calculation and control.) And secondly, as Steve Yearley (1991) has pointed out, environmental scientists are often working at the ‘margins of observability’. So the scientist, besides being uncertain as to how much weight to give each variable, may be unable to accurately measure the variables in the first place! Of course, it is also possible that certain key variables are still unknown to science.
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Given
such
uncertainties,
variabilities,
indeterminacies
and
intra-disciplinary
incommensurabilities, the science of acid deposition inevitably draws on the judgements and methodological preferences of its scientists. Inevitably, different groups of scientists will make different judgements and choices. Each set of judgements and choices may produce a different science of acid deposition. The question then is which one is ‘correct’? (Given that science is an inherently cultural artefact (see above), the answer may lie in the political agenda of the authority, interest group or government that commissioned the science in the first place, e.g. the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), Department of the Environment, Government of Sweden, Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth.) The implications for ‘risk management of the contingency of science should not be underestimated. Risk managers spend a great deal of time modelling such things as toxic releases. Such models draw heavily on scientific assumptions; for example, how a gas might behave during an accidental release. Emergency plans rest on such assumptions. But what if there is more than one way of looking at the problem. What do risk managers do if different assumptions produce different conclusions? (In practice, risk managers, under pressure to impose ‘order’ on potentially chaotic situations, may choose what they are advised is the ‘most likely’ scenario. This choice is then concretised in a ‘discourse of certainty’. That is, the public is told that this or that is exactly what will happen. Contingencies and uncertainties are edited out of whatever risk management script may be seen by the public.) The way in which initial assumptions can influence scientific conclusions was illustrated very publicly a few years ago when the CEGB tested the durability of a rail-going nuclear waste flask. In the presence of the press and TV, the CEGB ran a diesel locomotive and train at 70 mph into a flask lying on its side across the tracks. The flask remained intact. The CEGB asserted that this test proved the safety of its flask technology. That is, the CEGB made a general claim about flask safety on the basis of this one successful test. But, as with all tests, certain assumptions and choices were made prior to the event. Thus the test locomotive had a ‘snub’ nose. The rail-going flask had no wheels. The track
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expired at the point of impact, there being no sleepers or track beyond the flask. Greenpeace said that such unique conditions mitigated against the generalisability of the test results. Had the CEGB scientists used a different set of starting assumptions, the flask might have been breached. Thus, the use of a locomotive with a different frontal configuration, or the retention of the wheels on the flask, or a frontal impact on the flask may have caused it to rupture. Furthermore, in the `open system’ situation of a real life railway accident with an almost infinite number of scenarios, it is quite possible that other factors might intervene. What if there had been a prolonged fire? What if the flask had been hit again by a locomotive coming in the opposite direction? What if the locomotive had hit a line of flasks? And so on. Obviously, given time and budget constraints, it is never possible for risk managers to evaluate every scenario (see above). But, as Wynne (1984) points out, it is feasible for scientists to make public the assumptions that presage such tests. Such reflexive ‘social learning’, by putting science in perspective, might serve to build greater confidence in scientific discourse. Third, elaborating on the theme of contingency, the scientific method is often grounded in laboratory models of social practice. Such ‘closed systems’, however, may fail to pick up all the nuances and complexities of an often `messy’ reality. In the case of 2,4,5-T, for example, the scientists made a number of assumptions about the way in which the chemical would be used in the field. Thus the ACP scientists’ social model assumed, for example, that users would be trained, that protective clothing would be available and would be worn, that instructions would be legible and would be followed, that the chemical would be properly diluted, that spraying equipment would be thoroughly cleaned after use and that in the event of a breach of safety procedure on the part of the employer (where an employee might be asked to work without adequate protection or in high winds) the former would have the confidence and support to challenge unsafe management decisions. As mentioned above, such assumptions reflected the scientists’ highly rational ‘closed system’ modelling of the world at large. Unfortunately, however, the world can be a highly irrational and unpredictable place, where the exigencies of ‘having to do a day’s work’ may mitigate against safe practice. As one sprayer told the
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NUAAW: They [the ‘experts’] may know the risks of 2,4,5-T. They may handle the stuff properly. They tell us we’ll be alright if we use the spray normally. But have they any idea what ‘normally’ means in the fields? Irwin (1995:112)
For agricultural workers, ‘normally’ often meant working with imperfect knowledge in less than ideal conditions to a very tight timescale. As Cook and Kaufman (1982) explain in Portrait of a Poison - the 2,4,5-T Story: Users [...] are often simply unaware of the directions for use or, if they are aware of them, find that they are working under so much pressure that it is easier to ignore them. This is all a long way from the laboratory conditions in which tests may be conducted. Kaufman (1982: 53).
As a consequence of such research and of the testimony of its members, the NUAAW alleged that ‘the conditions envisaged by members of the [advisory committee] (presumably used to the controlled conditions of the laboratory) are impossible to reproduce in the field.’ The NUAAW went on to conclude: ‘This single fact must be sufficient to demolish the supposition that the herbicide is safe to use’ (Irwin, 1995: 18). In other words, as far as the Union was concerned, the ACP’s presumption of an ordered, rational world in which technologies were applied ‘as directed’ was not only inaccurate, but, because of the chemical properties of 2,4,5-T, potentially dangerous. A final point - and one not made by the NUAAW - is the desirability of transferring such context-sensitive technologies as 2,4,5-T to environments where there are even fewer safeguards. Third World countries, for example, often have even less protection for agricultural workers than First World countries. Workers may be under greater economic pressure. In certain countries, where either a caste system or raw, unregulated capitalism may operate, workers may be under socio-cultural-:pressure to do as they are told. Protective clothing may be completely absent. Where clothing is available, meteorological conditions may mitigate against its use. There may be no equivalent of our (albeit diminished) Health and Safety Executive, and trades unions may have even less influence than in First World countries - or may be completely absent. Given such cultural disparities between the chemical’s potential spheres of application,
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it would seem foolhardy to apply the same de-contextualised laboratory model of application in all cultural milieux. The possible inapplicability of First World technologies to Third World contexts has been noted by, among others, David Weir in his book The Bhopal Syndrome. Thus Weir quotes one UN official as saying ‘There is a lack of awareness generally about how dangerous pesticides are. There’s a lack of skilled regulatory personnel and controls. There is, in sum, a whole syndrome of problems’ (Weir, 1987: 63). In conclusion, much of the appeal of scientific rationality lies in its ‘universalism’. That is, a scientific `fact’, once established, is presumed to be universally applicable. The same reasoning is applied to any resulting technology. But, as shown above, the success and safety with which science is applied will depend upon the accurate modelling of notoriously complex real world situations. This may be beyond the capacity of benchbound scientists familiar only with tightly controlled, highly rational ‘closed systems’. (Note that the tendency of scientists to produce `naive sociology’ is neither a sign of intellectual weakness nor of indifference to the human condition; merely a function of his/her training, the `unreal’ laboratory environment in which they have to work, and the peer judged, paradigmatic organisation of science.) A further limitation of the scientific method is its fallibilism. Fallibilism (or as Beck would have it, ‘systematic nest-fouling’) is the rock on which all science is built. Only by trying to disprove a theory can scientists assess its robustness - and ultimately its ‘veracity’. The more arduous the testing, the more credible the theory. Beck, typically, describes such methodical scepticism as an ‘ultimately blasphemous process of ‘conjectures and refutations” (1992a: 165). And herein lies the weakness; for eventually, such ‘blasphemous’ refutation may overturn a key scientific theory or paradigm, leaving a dependent user group with nowhere to turn. Given that methodical scepticism may overturn not just a scientific theory, but possibly an entire dependent socio-technical system, the loss of face to both scientists and technologists is potentially very great. But worse, such ‘fallibilised’ science might have had an adverse effect on health, as in the case of, for example, Thalidomide (withdrawn) or the incineration of toxic waste at sea
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(banned). But as there is no alternative to the ‘insurance policy’ of methodical scepticism, what can be done to give the scientist some latitude and credit with the public? Beck thinks he sees an answer in ‘reflexive scientisation’, that is, in a form of scientific discourse that admits publicly its inherent fallibility. Thus, where ‘unreflexive’ science (although ‘subject to challenging questions and internal scepticism’) is ‘dogmatised externally’, ‘reflexive’ science makes explicit its assumptions and pre-commitments. While even the new ‘reflexive’ science may be - like its ‘unreflexive’ antecedent little more than a collection of ‘errors subject to recall’ (Beck, 1992a:164), at least the public is aware of its fallibility and indeterminacy. There is a bias within the science of risk assessment in favour of quantitative methods. This reflects the modernist preoccupation with ‘organised knowledge’: there is nothing quite as organised and rational as a mathematical formula, bar chart or pie graph. By contrast, personal testimonies, such as those obtained by the NUAAW on 2,4,5-T, are decidedly ‘messy’. In the context of formal scientific rationality, such qualitative risk assessments are considered inferior to their mathematical cousins. This, however, presents a problem for the scientific method: the public may understand personal testimony (perhaps because they can relate more closely to autobiography) better than numbers. The heuristic quality of autobiography (or biography) may hold important lessons for risk communicators. Lastly, formal scientific rationality privileges expert over lay accounts. As Brian Wynne (in Irwin and Wynne, 1996) noted in his study of post-Chernobyl Cumbrian hill farmers, MAFF scientists would not listen to the farmers’ discourse on the most appropriate response to radioactive fallout. Rather, the scientists applied a de-contextualised ‘textbook’ model of soil conditions, grazing and meteorological patterns, and gave instructions accordingly. This ‘naive’ science and sociology resulted in mistakes. For example, the scientists’ assumptions about grazing were inaccurate, as were their assumptions about upland soil types and substitute feeds. One scientist, for example, promised the farmers that as soon as they fed their sheep on imported straw,
68
contamination levels would fall. The farmers were incredulous. As one put it, ‘I’ve never heard of a sheep that would even look at straw as fodder. When you hear things like that it makes your hair stand on end’ (Irwin and Wynne, 1996: 36). Thus the farmers were alienated by the scientists’ ‘arrogant’ (Wynne) indifference to their craft knowledges. But more than this, the scientists’ determined indifference to the hill farmers’ history and traditional skills undermined their very identity. Whereas in ‘late-modernity’, people often define themselves through consumption patterns (ranging from the Knightsbridge-shopping, Range Rover-driving Barbour wearer to the bean-eating, natural fibre-wearing, Solstice-attending New Ager), in traditional societies, people often define themselves in terms of their work. To undermine that association is to risk destroying a person’s self-identity. He or she becomes a nobody useless, unrecognised, disappeared. (To avoid such annihilation, a sociological approach to risk should treat all accounts as equally valid - if not equally relevant.)
3.5 A critique of the deficit paradigm The following comments are intended to point the way to a more effective model of risk communication. They are made on the assumption that the current model is less than wholly effective (Wynne, Irwin). (Given that the deficit paradigm is informed by formal scientific rationality, much of the critique is implicit in the preceding section. Consequently, what follows is a summary of the major points.) The privileging of formal scientific accounts de-legitimises lay (‘folk’) knowledges. As Wynne noted in the case of the hill farmers, scientists ignore such knowledges at their peril. The projection of formal scientific argumentation as the only `legitimate’ and `authoritative’ discourse is intimidatory. Few people would feel confident enough to speak up in such an oppressive ideological environment. Both the rules and argot (language) of debate are unfamiliar. The educational (and social) gulf between ‘experts’ and the majority of the public can be intimidatory. Popular metaphors and heurisms (unconnected phenomena that, nonetheless, aid understanding) may be jettisoned by
69
the audience for fear of appearing ‘childish’, ‘coarse’ or ‘uneducated’. Indeed, the atmosphere may be so oppressive that a form of ‘self-censorship’ may obtain, with debating points ‘predefined as illegitimate’ by their sponsors (Irwin, 1995: 98). This results in a silence that is often misconstrued as acquiescence. The projected idea of a single, stable, homogeneous science is puzzling to a public increasingly familiar with scientific disagreements, such as those over BSE. Ironically, those who project the image of a calm, ordered body of knowledge the scientists themselves - are very aware of the inherent uncertainties of, and turmoil within their profession: [Science] is subject to challenging questions and internal skepticism [...] [I]nternal success is based on the demolition of the ‘demigods in labcoats’ Beck (1992a: 164)
While the public needs ‘science for doing’ (i.e. science that is of some practical value), it often gets information that is at best irrelevant, at worst incomprehensible. (The Manchester CIMAH communication, for example, contained data on chemical hazards which was superfluous in light of the leaflet’s very basic objective: to get the public to stay indoors.) Furthermore, ‘science for doing’ must accommodate the understandings and rationalities deployed by the public. That is, it must recognise and be sensitive to social practice, i.e. the way people actually live their lives. For example, in a recent energy efficiency campaign, scientists were puzzled by the public’s indifference to their advice to ‘keep the heat in’. It was later discovered that the public’s incomprehension lay in their conceptualisation of the problem not in terms of ‘keeping the heat in’, but in terms of ‘keeping the cold out’ (Layton, 1993). The adoption of an inappropriate model of social practice had led to the development of an incomprehensible scientific discourse. Thus the public were advised to use short curtains above radiators to allow heat to circulate in the room. But some people used long curtains to direct heat over windows to keep the cold out. (And others used long curtains simply because they liked them!) In this case, the development of an inaccurate behaviour and attitudinal model meant that well-intentioned scientific advice failed completely to engage with the public. Thus, if risk communication is to work, the public must be able to relate the advice it is 70
given to its own experience and practice, and must be able to employ that advice to meet some practical objective. Even if ‘bare’ scientific facts are understood and are seen to be of some relevance to ‘life as it is lived’, the deficit model’s absence of an interactive ‘feedback loop’ proscribes any deeper understanding of the issue at hand. It also denies scientists, technologists and risk communicators access to any bright (and, perhaps, commercially valuable) ideas the public may have. Denied any mode of enquiry or engagement, the public may simply ‘turn off’. Such alienation may have serious consequences for any subsequent emergency.—Also, -the-one-sidedness s of the deficit model means that any science used in the risk communication may simply ‘disappear’ into a void. This can lead to the erroneous conclusion that the public either does not understand, or is indifferent. The deficit model assumes an undifferentiated, homogeneous public. A frequently used social model is that of the patriarchal nuclear family (of the type that might have visited the Festival of Britain; Dad, Mum, two children and Gran). But such outdated models miss important new social groups, like single parent families and the independent-living elderly. Today, risk communicators must deal with publics. (To gauge how far we have travelled from the ‘Festival of Britain’ extended, patriarchal family, see Young and Willmott, 1957. This study is a masterpiece of sociological research into family life before the liberations of the 1960s and 1970s.) The deficit model assumes a standard behavioural reaction to risk. In CIMAH communications, for example, it is assumed that people who are told to go indoors and shut windows will do just that. Research has shown, however, that in actual emergencies, other, potentially dangerous forms of behaviour are equally likely (Irwin, 1995): for example, on hearing the alarm, people may seek out children or friends, thereby exposing themselves (and those they locate) to danger. Furthermore, the model’s decontextualised character fails to recognise the social, economic and political dynamics of risky or hazardous situations. Power relations, for example, are hugely important in the area of safe sex. If the male enjoys more power than the female, unprotected sex may result. Yet the early HIV/AIDS campaign failed to recognise such
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factors (or was it that such unequal power relations were thought not to exist in ‘modern’ relationships?). Thus, unless risk communicators accept that risks and hazards exist in a social, economic and political context (including a personal political context), risk communications will miss the mark. The deficit model assumes a passive, ignorant public. But the public is no tabula rasa no ‘empty vessel’ waiting to be filled with ‘knowledge’. Rather, an ‘active’ public already holds opinions on a range of matters, and is far from deficient in knowledge. Such knowledge, however, will be held in a form unfamiliar to scientists. It will be unstructured. It will not be subject to ‘methodical scepticism’, fallibilism or peer review. It may not be amenable to universal application. And it may be retained through the use of ‘folksy’ heuristics and metaphors. As one of Irwin’s interviewees said of a local plant, ‘There’s a cornflakes smell and a blue- haze’—(Irwin, 1995: 94).-Irwin also found-that,despite-the-possibility of a-gas leak, many locals understood chemical hazard only in terms of explosions or ‘bangs’. While the equation accident = explosion met with their expectations, the equation accident = invisible gas cloud did not. The homely, craft, culturally-mediated nature of ‘active’ knowledge - such as the hill farmers’ awareness that sheep would never eat straw - is no reason to downgrade or ignore it. Indeed, such contextualised knowledges can tell risk communicators how the public understands the world about it. Such insights can only improve risk communication. The success of a risk communication exercise is very dependent on the reputations of those institutions responsible for its formulation and administration. If they are perceived by the public as untrustworthy, the impact of the message is reduced (Irwin, 1995). But more seriously, social conflict may result. As Wynne explains: [T]he heart of risk perceptions and risk conflicts [is] not the issue of technical risk magnitudes, but rather trust in institutions [...] trust [is an] essential dimension of social life and institutional viability. Wynne (1992: 278)
In the case of MAFF’s handling of the Chernobyl accident, the indifference of ‘arrogant’ scientists to the hill farmers’ knowledge of animal husbandry caused the Ministry to lose the trust of the farming community. This impeded MAFF’s efforts to handle the crisis.
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Had MAFF scientists attempted to win the trust of the farmers by adopting a more symmetrical model of risk management, their chances of handling the crisis successfully would have improved. Lastly, the deficit model - as implemented by most risk communicators - employs only a single medium, is not repeated and is rarely subjected to assimilation research. In short, most exercises smack of ‘minimal compliance’. Such tokenism and dearth of imagination will not go unnoticed by an ‘active’ public. The problem for communicators, however, is that the absence of `feedback loops’ may mean that public discontent goes unregistered. This is where problems can start, for a ‘silenced’ public is not necessarily a happy, acquiescent or cooperative one. Indeed, an ‘active’ public may seek to express its discontent through, for example, tenants’ representatives, amenity groups, councillors, sympathetic universities, local and/or national media, MPs and MEPs. Only by ‘listening for the echo’ can risk communicators develop an appropriate message.
3.6 Academic and practical conclusions First, the sociological view of risk communication will be placed in some sort of hopefully accessible - philosophical framework. The crux of the risk communication approach is that people see the world differently. Consequently, issues, whether they be political, economic or scientific, are ‘framed’ differently by different people. Sociologists call this subjective framing of the world ‘social construction’. Potentially, each citizen has a unique view or ‘construction’ of the world about him/her. Practically, of course, different constructions may be summarised under a number of broad headings. In the case of nuclear by-products, for example, there are two basic views. As Wynne (1984) explains: Spent nuclear fuel is widely and unambiguously treated as ‘nuclear waste’ in popular perception, yet it is seen as a valuable resource [by] [...] the industry. Wynne (1984: 246)
Such conflicts are a reflection of ‘The dislocation between meanings which different social groups give to [an] issue’ (Wynne, 1984). That is, the same phenomenon may mean different things to different people. Of course, in the real world, the unequal distribution of political resources means that different social constructions are rarely 73
given equal weight. Thus in the case of nuclear by-products, local authority attempts to classify them as undesirable ‘waste products’ (and consequently ban them from their territory) were overruled by the government. Instead, the nuclear science perspective of by-products as ‘resources’ prevailed. But why do different people or groups hold such widely differing views on scientific and technological risks? Wynne thinks he sees the answer in the ‘different social worldviews’ and `tacit dimensions of institutional belief and commitment’ that characterise risk debates (Wynne, 1992: 278). That is, differential constructions of risk are the product of unexpressed (and incommensurate) belief systems, which themselves may reflect incommensurate political philosophies. But social conflict is far from inevitable. As Wynne explains, if the social foundations of such incommensurate risk framings were to be made explicit, different groups might begin to understand the reasons for disagreement, and might even come to an accommodation (by, for example, setting up truly independent, democratically informed intermediary bodies). Wynne terms this revelational process ‘social learning’: [Social learning] tries to articulate what are usually unarticulated belief systems about social relations and institutions. It focuses on the social identities underlying explicit risk definitions, which people are continually struggling to develop and defend. Wynne (1992: 278)
Thus, reflexivity - the enlargement and articulation of self-knowledge - may provide a means of reducing social conflict between groups with different world-views and agendas, first, by helping risk communicators to a better understanding of the public’s ‘irrational’ reaction to risks, and secondly, by allowing risk communicators to restore their own credibility and legitimacy by explaining their own pre-commitments and interests: More sense could be made of public responses to ‘risks’ by treating them as responses to the more grounded experience of technologies as both hardware and historically rooted social-organisational relationships [...] It allows the opportunity to place scientific knowledge on a more legitimate, properly conditional, and ultimately more effective footing. Wynne (1992: 279)
(Of course, being reflexive is not easy. Developing an awareness of all the prejudices, pre-commitments and external pressures to which one is subject may be a painful
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process. And making such discoveries public may be just too much - especially for those working within organisations with tightly defined political and/or economic agendas.) As discussed above, the core of the sociological approach to risk communication is the recognition that, as people see (‘construct’) the world differently, no single world-view should be privileged over any other. Rather, the subjective rationality and legitimacy of each world-view should be recognised and respected. This, from the point of view of the risk communicator, is an eminently rational and practical standpoint. For unless all subjective rationalities are recognised (and, if possible, accommodated in some way), ‘experts’ and public will continue to ‘talk past’ each other. (This is what happened in the heating efficiency campaign, where the same problem was framed by the experts as one of ‘keeping the heat in’, and by the public as one of ‘keeping the cold out’. In this context, expert advice made little sense to a public working to a different set of assumptions.) If risk communicators and public can find some common ground, underpinned by a common argot, a mutually satisfactory and meaningful orientation to risk may be obtained. Effective risk communication requires research, dialogue, aggregation, negotiation and a measure of humility. Didactic monologue - within the context of an increasingly sceptical Risk Society - does not work. But ‘getting inside the mind’ of the public is no easy task when each individual citizen may be working to a different agenda within a world familiar only to her/himself. This is the Kafka-esque world of ‘multiple realities’: To try to understand the experience of another it is necessary to dismantle the world as seen from one’s own place within it, and to re-assemble it as seen from his [...] [but] the subjectivity of another does not simply constitute a different interior attitude to the same exterior facts. The constellation of facts of which he is the centre is different. Berger and Mohr, in Irwin (1995: 81)
In short, a truly symmetrical and reflexive treatment of risk communication requires that a potentially infinite number of rationalities be accommodated. For risk communicators, under all sorts of pressures, complete symmetry and reflexivity may be unfeasible, although a sensitive and negotiated aggregation of the main orientations to risk may offer a way forward. But enough of philosophy. As Goethe once said: 75
All theory dear friend is grey, but the golden tree of actual life springs ever green. Goethe: Faust
So what practical lessons can risk communicators learn from the preceding discourse? There are ten major points: 1.
Understand that what appears ‘logical’ to you may not appear so to someone else. Because we live in a world of ‘multiple social realities’ it is important for risk managers to listen.
2.
Recognise that the scientific method is but one way of looking at the world (‘constructing’ the world), and that scientists, and to a lesser degree technologists, do not automatically command public trust (House of Commons Agriculture Select Committee, in Irwin, 1995, and Giddens, 1994).
3.
To avoid alienating audiences, do not privilege one form of knowledge over any other. Give informal ‘folk’ knowledges the respect they deserve. Stripping a subject of his/her identity - as happened to the Cumbrian sheep farmers - is a sure-fire way of making an enemy!
4.
Spell out your pre-commitments, agendas and uncertainties - even scientific uncertainties. Such ‘reflexivity’ requires humility. Encourage the public to do the same.
5.
Provide a range of mechanisms for the expression of ‘multiple social realities’ (different ‘world-views’). Make them easy to use. Remember, people can be intimidated by technical language and abstraction, and may feel uncomfortable in the presence of ‘experts’.
6.
Aggregate the different rationalities (‘world-views’), being careful not to obscure the fine grain of each argument, and negotiate a mutually satisfactory orientation to the risk in question. (At the very least, do not dismiss what the public says out of hand. You may just learn something to your advantage.)
7.
Adopt a symmetrical, non-didactic model of risk communication. Don’t be superior. Be humble. (Remember the farmers’ reaction to MAFF’s supercilious scientists.)
8. 76
Use a multi-media approach to communication. Be imaginative. Repeat as
necessary. 9.
‘Listen for the echo’, and adjust the message and/or the media as necessary.
10.
Actively evaluate the success of the exercise. You may be pleasantly surprised!
3.7 Guide to reading You should now read the supplied article, ‘Witnesses, Participants and Major Accident Hazards’ by Alan Irwin. You should now also read the article at the end of this unit, ‘Incidents and accidents on the ramp: does ‘risk communication’ provide a solution’, by Simon A. Bennett and Andrew P. Shaw.
3.8 Suggested further reading Irwin, A. (1995) Citizen Science, London: Routledge. There is a useful collection of articles about risk communication (see part 1 of the volume) in Kasperson, J. X. and Kasperson, R. E. (2005) The Social Contours of Risk, Vol. I: Publics, Risk Communication and the Social Amplification of Risk, London: Earthscan. (This volume has also useful material on ‘Cultural Theory’ [see Unit 4 of this module] as well as ‘Quantifying risks and hazards’ [see Unit 5 of this module]). Slovic, P. (2000) The Perception of Risk, London: Earthscan has a useful collection of previously published articles including, amongst other things, articles on risk communication (Chapter 13). The student might also find it useful to consult the Centre for Risk Communication website at http://www.centerforriskcommunication.org/publications.htm. The Centre, however, publishes only a sample of the papers available.
3.9 Study questions You should now write approximately 300 words in answer to each of the questions below. We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University. 77
•
What is risk communication and how can it be used?
•
How would a risk communication approach enable us to understand risk differently from psychological theories?
•
What are the benefits of risk communication?
3.10 Bibliography Beck, U. (1992a) Risk Society, London: Sage. Beck, U. (1992b) ‘From industrial society to the risk society’. In M. Featherstone (ed.) Cultural Theory and Cultural Change, London: Sage: 97-123. Bennett, S. (1996) ‘Getting the public on board’. In Chemistry in Britain, London: The Royal Society of Chemistry (RSC): 32(4) April: 39-41. Cabinet Office (2002) Risk: Improving Government’s Capability to Handle Risk and Uncertainty, London: Cabinet Office; available online at: www.strategy.gov.uk. Cook, J. and Kaufman, C. (1982) Portrait of a Poison - The 2,4,5-T Story, London: Pluto. Giddens, A. (1994) Beyond Left and Right, London: Polity Press. Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (eds) (1989) New Times, London: Lawrence and Wishart. Irwin, A. (1995) Citizen Science, London: Routledge. Irwin, A. and Wynne, B. (eds) (1996) Misunderstanding Science? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krimsky, S. and Golding, D. (eds) (1992) Social Theories of Risk, New York, Praeger. Kuhn, T. S. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press. Layton, D. (1993) Inarticulate Science, Studies in Education Ltd. Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution: Special Report, (2005) Crop Spraying and the Health of Residents and Bystanders, September, London: Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution; available online at: http://www.rcep.org.uk/cropspraying.htm, accessed 23 September, 2005. Rustin, M. (1994) ‘Incomplete Modernity: Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society’, Radical Philosophy 67, Summer. Scott, S. J. (1991) Pressure, Resistance, Empowerment. Young Women and the
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Negotiation of Safer Sex, Women Risk and Aids Project (WRAP) Paper 6, Tufnell Press. Smith, L. (2005) ‘Public misled over danger of crop spraying’, The Times, September 23: 33;
available
at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,81221793084,00.html,
accessed 23 September, 2005. Steward, F. (1989) ‘Green times’, in S. Hall and M. Jacques (eds) New Times, London: Lawrence and Wishart. Weir, D. (1987) The Bhopal Syndrome, London: Earthscan. Wynne, B. (1984) ‘Public perceptions of risk’. In J. Surrey (ed.) The Urban Transportation of Irradiated Fuel, Basingstoke: Macmillan: 246-259. Wynne, B. (1992) ‘Risk and social learning’. In S. Krimsky and D. Golding (eds) Social Theories of Risk, New York: Praeger: 275-297. Yearley, S. (1991) ‘Greens and science, a doomed affair?’, New Scientist, 131, No 1777, July: 37-40. Yearley, S. (1991) in Irwin, Citizen Science, London: Routledge. Young, M. and Willmott, P. (1957) Family and Kinship in East London, London: Routledge.
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READING ‘Witnesses,
Participants
and
Major Accident Hazards’ Irwin, A. (1995) In A. Irwin, Citizen science, Routledge: 83-103.
Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.
READING ‘Incidents and accidents on the ramp: does ‘risk communication’ provide a solution?’ Bennett, S. & Shaw, A. (2003) Human Factors and Aerospace Safety 3(4), 333-352.
Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.
4 Unit Four: Cultural theory 4.1 Aims and objectives of this Unit The aim of this Unit is to introduce you to ‘cultural theory’. Cultural theory is a method of disaggregated analysis which can be used for evaluating the influence of organisational structure on behaviour and attitudes, including the perception of risk. Having outlined ‘the concepts underpinning the theory, the Unit will then go on to illustrate how the theory can be applied as a practical analytical tool.
4.2 Introduction 4.2.1
Culture
The term ‘culture’ has been used in a variety of ways. There are perhaps two common ways of understanding the term. The first views culture as a way of describing a particular autonomous group or population. This has often proved problematic due to the difficulty in defining the boundaries of such populations. The second common understanding of culture views it as a system of ideas, values and behaviours associated with one or more social groups. These are also sometimes considered as ‘subcultures’, for example black American culture. Culture has proved a particularly difficult and elusive concept to understand. One reason for this is because culture will reveal different features of itself, depending on who is looking and how. Over the past one and a half centuries many definitions of culture have been posited. Consider the earliest and most famous of a long line of definitions of culture which was made by the anthropologist Edwin B. Tylor in 1871: Culture or civilisation, taken in its widest ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. Tylor (1871)
This rather static conception of human culture can be contrasted with a more recent and politically oriented version by Edward Said, whose area of study was Oriental cultures and their historic relationship with our own:
Cultures are permeable and, on the whole, defensive boundaries between polities. Said (1989)
Much of the controversy surrounding the nature of culture has focused on the features which should be included in that complex whole, and the parameters which identify it as a society or group. In other words, if culture were a box full of things, then how big is that box, and what are its contents? Tylor’s use of the term acquired is also important because it indicated that one’s attributes as a cultural actor are derived from social membership rather than biological birthright. Therefore, culture must also have some means of re-creating itself through common practices. Culture, then, is not a static entity, but as Waring agues: [...] a complex and dynamic property of human activity systems. Waring (1992: 42)
Many subsequent theorists have considered culture as a system of beliefs or symbols. Included among these theorists are those working in the area of ‘cultural theory’ and ‘safety culture’. 4.2.2
Theory
During the course of any study or research, we may well carry out observations on our chosen research setting and take detailed notes which describe what we have observed. But description on its own does not take us very far. Given that we have been able to observe and describe a particular social phenomenon (let’s call it ‘Y’), we will often want to be able to explain why it happens (let’s call the explanation ‘X’). We can then go on to predict that, if ‘X’ happens, ‘Y’ will probably happen too. This ability to predict then gives us an opportunity to try and control the effects of ‘Y’ by tackling its cause ‘X’. In developing our explanation of ‘X’, we are developing theory. A theory is an explanation - something that presents a particular view of the world. Without theory there can be no proper understanding. The development of theory, then, is an essential and integral part of understanding the social world. Thus if we want to understand more about-the world of risk, crisis and disaster management, we will need to draw on a variety of theoretical explanations about, for example, how risk is perceived, why crises develop and what causes disasters. 83
Theory can range between a student’s minor working hypothesis and the master conceptual schemes of ‘grand theory’, for example Marx on the development of capitalism. Much of the body of theory is constructed between these two extremes and is referred to as ‘middle-range theory’ (Merton, 1957). Cultural theory offers one such source of ‘middle-range’ explanation. Cultural theory has demonstrated effectiveness and potential applicability over a wide variety of contexts at both macro and micro levels. As Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky have argued: [...] the test of any theory is its effectiveness: does it explain better than alternatives? A glance at the bibliography we have appended to this book will confirm that many practitioners(ourselves included) are convinced that it does. Thompson et al (1990): 14
For the practitioner, the attraction of cultural theory is increased by the practical applications to which it has been put, for example in the work of Frosdick (1995a, 1995b) and Mars (1983, 1994).
4.3 Cultural theory 4.3.1
Ways of life
Rather than getting drawn into the debate about the definitions of culture, the cultural theorists Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky have sought to clarify matters by distinguishing between three terms - cultural bias, social relations and way of life. They offer the following definitions: Cultural bias refers to shared values and beliefs. Social relations are defined as patterns of interpersonal relations. When we wish to designate a viable combination of social relations and cultural bias we speak of a way of life. Thompson et al (1990): 1
Their seminal book seeks to identify the viable ways of life and explain how these maintain themselves. Their theory of sociocultural viability (which they call ‘cultural theory’) is derived from social anthropology and founded on the work of Professor Mary Douglas. This cultural theory has its origins in her argument (Douglas, 1978) that there are two dimensions by which all cultures can be classified. The first is the ‘grid’ dimension, which has been defined as: [...] the’ total body of rules and constraints which a culture imposes on its people in a
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particular context. Mars and Nicod (1993: 124)
and as: [...] the degree to which an individual’s life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions. Thompson et al. (1990: 5)
The Hindu caste system is an example of a high grid context, whereas the free and easy lifestyle of the American West Coast represents an instance of low grid. The second dimension is one of ‘group’, which: [...] emphasises collectiveness among people who meet face to face. Mars (1994: 24)
The group dimension also: [...] refers to the extent to which an individual is morally coerced by others, through being a member of a bounded face-to-face unit. Mars and Nicod, (1983: 125)
and describes: [...] the experience of a bounded social unit. Douglas (1978: viii)
Living in a total institution such as an army barracks represents high group, whereas being housebound alone in a tower block is an example of low group. Considering the two dimensions together produces a fourfold typology of ways of life, each reflecting a cohesive and coherent cluster of attitudes, beliefs and styles of relationships. Thus each way of life is the product of a value system (the cultural bias) and a pattern of social relations, classified by reference to the relative strength of the ‘grid’ and the ‘group’. These ways of life inform the perceptions of the participants, determine their behaviour and are used by them to justify the validity of their social situations. Where both dimensions are weak, we find an individualist way of life. Where both are strong we have a hierarchical one. These two types lie at either end of a continuum which represents the conventional economic duality extending between the free entrepreneurial market and the highly regulated Weberian bureaucracy. Cultural theory introduces a more disaggregated view of the world since there are two further ways of life to consider; egalitarianism (weak grid/strong group) and the more passive fatalism (strong grid/weak group). These categories can be brought to life through examples which illustrate features of 85
each of the ways of life. Mars, for example, uses grid/group to set out a classification of occupations and their associated fiddles (Mars, 1994), white Thompson et al. give outline vignettes of a Hindu villager, a communard, a self-made manufacturer and a ununionised weaver: A high caste Hindu villager and a member of a self-sufficient Western commune both have strongly positive group contexts. At the other end of the scale, a self-made Victorian manufacturer and a ununionised weaver employed at his mill both have strongly negative group contexts. What separates the Hindu villager from the Western communard, and the mill owner from his hired hand, is the extent of prescriptions: the grid dimension. The highcaste Hindu villager and the ununionised mill worker both have strongly positive grid contexts in that their freedom is everywhere constrained by a socially imposed gridiron of things they cannot do and moves they cannot make. At the other extreme, the self-made Victorian manufacturer and the self-sufficient communard both have strongly negative grid contexts in that each rejects coercion; they both consider themselves free to act as they please - the one to hire and fire as he sees fit, the other to act as the equal in all respects of his fellow communards. Thompson et al. (1990: 7)
Thompson et al. introduce the possibility of a fifth very passive way of life, that of the hermit, who withdraws altogether from social life. The hermit avoids both the grid dimension - he refuses to be controlled by others - and the group dimension - he refuses to engage in any relationship with others. Since this introduction to cultural theory is aimed at demonstrating its practical application to the social world (from which the hermit has withdrawn), the possible existence of the hermit may be properly regarded as a theoretical distraction. Having acknowledged his existence we will move on. 4.3.2
The impossibility theorem - viable ways of life
We have seen how the grid/group typology gives rise to four ways of life, each the product of a distinct combination of cultural bias and social relations. It is possible to conceive of other alternative ways of life. However, according to cultural theory, these four (ignoring the hermit) are the only viable ways of life. That is, it is only these four ways of life that are able to sustain themselves so that they endure over time. This idea that there are only four viable ways of life is what cultural theorists refer to as the ‘impossibility theorem’. Thompson et al. set out to substantiate this theorem in a number of ways. The argument is complex but Part One of their book is well worth reading in full.
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Summarising very briefly, the assertion is first grounded in the fact that the grid/group framework meets the logical requirements of classification, namely that the four types produced are both mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. The argument is then developed through a complex analysis of the social construction of nature, that is, what models do different people use to explain both physical nature and human nature. The argument then builds by examining the ways in which people manage their needs and resources in order to make ends meet, and the way in which adherents derive their preferences from their chosen way of life. Later on in this Unit, we shall be drawing on the analysis of both nature and preferences, including ideas about why different people worry about different risks, when we look in more detail at the social construction of risk perception. 4.3.3
The requisite variety condition - all must be present for each to survive
While there are only four viable ways of life, according to cultural theory they cannot exist independently of each other. The idea that each depends upon the survival of the others for its own continued existence is what cultural theorists call the requisite variety condition. Implicit in this is the recognition that ways of life are inherently political (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Douglas, 1992), that is they are concerned to control resources, manipulate rhetoric and influence events. They are mutually competitive and define themselves not only by the distinctiveness of their coherent value structures (what we are) but also by their opposition to other ways of life (what we are not) (Mars and Mars, 1993). As Thompson et al. put it: It is only the presence in the world of people who are different from them that enables adherents of each way of life to be the way they are. Thompson et al (1990: 96)
This conclusion is argued through Thompson et al.’s analysis of surprises, that is, the way in which adherents look for an alternative way of life when they find a lack of satisfying fit between the world as they perceive it and the world as they actually findit. While the world as a whole is stable and coherent, its constituent parts are unstable, evolving and changing in response to surprises. 87
4.3.4
•
Summary
Cultural theory defines culture as ways of life, each of which is the product of a distinct set of values and attitudes (cultural bias) and a distinct pattern of relationships (social relations).
•
There are four different ways of life: individualism, fatalism, hierarchy and egalitarianism.
•
These are the only four viable ways of life, and each depends on the others for its own continued existence.
4.4 Criticisms of cultural theory The cultural theory approach may be criticised for being too reductionist. Limiting the viable cultural permutations to four, it may be argued, oversimplifies the complexity found in the real world. But the four types are archetypes. In practice, in any one context, all four types are present - indeed they must be there, as we have seen - but one of the four types is dominant. For example, Frosdick (1995a) has shown how the British safety at sports grounds industry is dominated by regulatory hierarchies, although the three other types are present, represented by the individualist clubs, long-suffering fatalist spectators and their more egalitarian colleagues in supporter and local residents pressure groups. Furthermore, a fourfold typology is twice as complex as the dualities offered in many other social science contexts, and explicitly avoids to choose or assign priorities. As Thompson et al. point out: Too often social scientists create needless controversies by seizing upon one side of a dualism and proclaiming it the more important. Cultural theory shows that there is no need to choose between, for instance, collectivism and individualism, values and social relations, or change and stability. Indeed we argue, there is a need not to. [...] Asking which comes first or which should be given causal priority is a non-starter. Thompson et al. (1990: 21)
The value of the cultural theory approach may also appear questionable to the management practitioner. How can such a theory be used to reduce or manage risk, to understand more about crises or to learn more about the prevention of disasters? Let us therefore investigate two areas in which an understanding informed by cultural 88
theory can be seen to have practical implications for risk, crisis and disaster management; first, the perception of risk, and secondly the cultural analysis of organisations.
4.5 The social construction of risk perception 4.5.1
The risk perception debate
Scientists and engineers working in risk analysis and management are mainly concerned with putting numbers of risk through the calculation of probabilities and the use of data bank information on failures and reliability. These ideas of risk are not shared by social scientists or whom: There are serious difficulties in attempting to view risk as a one-dimensional concept [...] (when) [...] a particular risk or hazard means different things to different people in different contexts [...] (and) [...] risk is socially constructed. Royal Society (1992: 7)
However, within the behavioural sciences themselves there are disagreements. Some psychologists argue that the layman views risk not as the product of scientific rationality, but simply as a matter of popular social construction. These arguments are set out in more detail in the unit on Risk and Psychology. But psychological views have been criticised by anthropologists as failing to take account of the cultural dimensions of risk perception. Douglas argues that: [...] the profession of psychologists which has grown up to study risk perception takes the culturally innocent approach by treating political dissension as intellectual disagreement. Douglas (1990: 9)
Psychologists seek to emulate the engineers by the use of supposedly objective methods such as questionnaires to determine perceptions of risk. This can lead psychologists to support the view that the science of risk analysis should be separated from the political process of risk management. However, according to Douglas: [...] the effort is skewed by the culturally innocent assumption that cultural bias is irrelevant for us at home, that culture is something that starts with the Wogs, abroad. Douglas (1990: 10)
The Royal Society Study Group lend credibility to these criticisms in their acknowledgement that:
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[...] one of the major challenges to orthodox psychological approaches to risk perception over the past ten years has come from the grid-group ‘cultural theory’ proposed by the anthropologist Mary Douglas and her colleagues. Royal Society (1992: 112)
What, then, is the cultural theory approach to risk perception? 4.5.2
Cultural theory and attitudes to risk
In their review of rival theories of risk perception, cultural theorists Wildavsky and Dake conclude that: [...] cultural biases best predict risk perception findings Wildavsky and Dake (1990: 48)
and: [...] individuals choose what to fear (and how to fear it), in order to support their way of life. Wildavsky and Dake (1990: 43)
4.5.3
The implications for risk assessment
The Royal Society Study Group consider that cultural theory has revolutionary implications for risk assessment and perception. Following Douglas: [...] it implies that people select certain risks for attention to defend their preferred lifestyles and as a forensic resource to place blame on other groups. Royal Society (1992: 112)
Acceptance of this approach results in a scenario where no one measure of risk can represent the perceptions of the disaggregated cultural types. What this means in practice is that the risk analyst needs to recognise that different people perceive risk in entirely different ways. There are, therefore, no right or wrong answers and nobody is wrong to perceive a particular issue as a risk. It is important to ensure that a broad range of perspectives is adequately represented in the risk assessment exercise. This is best accomplished by identifying representatives of each of the four constituencies, all of which we know will be present somewhere, and inviting them to participate in the exercise. Most significantly, this means inviting those who oppose you to join in the exercise - they won’t hesitate to articulate the risks you would prefer not to hear. A practical example can be provided by the National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS), a major Home Office programme to develop standard software
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applications for the British police service. Managing risk is an integral part of the management of the programme and its constituent projects, and makes an important contribution to the overall objective of delivering the products as quickly as possible, to the required quality; with the minimum of work, and at the least cost. The NSPIS programme’s strategic risk assessment was carried out by a mixed team made up of: •
police information technology suppliers
•
recipient police forces
•
the Home Office and
•
other police forces vociferously opposed to the whole national strategy.
The four constituencies were specifically chosen to map as closely as possible on to the four types within cultural theory. The approach was fully justified by the richness and diversity of the analysis and debate within the team. 4.5.4
Summary
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There is widespread disagreement about the way risk is perceived.
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Cultural theorists argue that people choose what to fear and how to fear it in order to support their chosen way of life.
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Comprehensive risk assessment should take account of the perspectives of all four cultural categories.
4.6 Cultural theory as organisation theory Since all organisations, by definition, must have some degree of both grid and group, references, for example, to low grid and low group mean that both grid and group are relatively weak when compared with the classic Weberian bureaucracy. The use of cultural theory as organisation theory therefore takes place within an overall cultural context of organisational hierarchy. 4.6.1
Cultural analysis as a risk and crisis management tool
Many of the management philosophies developed in recent years have represented a 91
return to the classical approach to organisation theory. The acronyms for these new management theories abound. MBO (Management by Objectives), SBUs (Strategic Business Units), JIT (Just-in-Time Manufacturing), TOM (Total Quality Management), PRP (Performance Related Pay) and, most recently, BPR (Business Process Redesign); each advocates a new universal management solution. But, as Fons Trompenaars has argued: [...] the fallacy of the ‘one best way is a management fallacy which is dying a slow death. Trompenaars (1993: 5)
Strategies and ideas that work well in one organisation or country may lose effectiveness when introduced in another. Why should this be? Johnson and Scholes have referred to the cultural and political systems of an organisation and acknowledged the: [...] growing awareness of the central importance of these issues in understanding strategy formulation and implementation. Johnson and Scholes (1988: 113)
Cultural analysis has an important role to play in the study of management in general, whether strategic management, risk management, crisis or disaster management. Several writers have proposed models as frameworks for such cultural analysis. Partly due to the popularity of their work as a set text for MBA students, the most familiar and enduring tool is probably Johnson and Scholes: [...] cultural web of factors within an organisation which preserve and sustain commonly held core beliefs - the recipe. Johnson and Scholes (1988: 41)
Elliott and Smith (1993) have shown the importance of understanding the cultural interaction of organisations in order to learn more about disaster prevention and crisis management. Referring to Johnson and Scholes, they highlight the need: [...] to look closely at the cultural web of the various organisations concerned and assess how this interacts with the crisis recipe that is in place. Elliott and Smith (1993: 210)
The recipe, or paradigm, is the set of subconscious basic assumptions and beliefs, shared by everyone in the organisation, which define ‘the way we do things around here’. The paradigm is difficult to change because it is surrounded by a protective web of cultural artefacts. The six factors in this ‘cultural web’ are: rituals and myths, symbols, power structures, organisational structures, control systems and routines. 92
In workshops and seminars, the web is used as a heuristic device to enable managers to confront, perhaps for the first time, the culture of their own organisation. As Johnson points out: It is an exercise which is used frequently by the author to allow managers to ‘discover’ the nature of their organisation in cultural terms, the way it impacts on the strategy they are following, and the difficulty of changing it. Johnson (1992: 208)
During the course of such an exercise, managers may be asked to draw a cultural web for their own organisation, perhaps using different sizes of circle to depict their perspective of the relative importance of each of the six factors. For the would-be objective analyst there is a problem here. The cultural web accepts a definition of organisational culture which is ethnocentric both because it is top-heavy only managers have participated in the definition - and because it looks on the organisation as a bounded entity rather than considering the social context in which it is set. Furthermore, because the web surrounds the core values - the paradigm - it cannot actually nail those values in to concrete forms of organisational structure. While use of the web allows members of an organisation to consider aspects of culture and assign value to them, perhaps through the relative sizes of the circles, it does not allow them to relate those aspects of culture to the structure of the organisation. The web is descriptive rather than analytical. What is needed, then, is a model to disaggregate the different types of (crisis) paradigm to be found within the web. Mars (1996) has highlighted the contribution which cultural theory can make to cultural analysis of human factor failure in learning more about the circumstances giving rise to crises and disasters. Thus a marriage can be proposed between the cultural web, as a well-established device for describing the factors which influence organisational culture, and cultural theory as a model for disaggregated paradigm analysis. The key to such an analysis will be an examination of each of the six headings within the cultural web to determine those factors which suggest the relative strength of grid and group. At first sight, the headings of power structures, organisational structures, control
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systems and symbols, have very clear dimensions of grid, while routines has a clear group dimension. Rituals and myths would seem to be signposts for deference to history and tradition indicating a cultural bias towards hierarchy. But on more detailed consideration, it is possible to argue that five of the six headings have both grid and group dimensions. In drawing out the analysis, account will need to be taken of the existing grid/group frameworks set out under the headings of space, time, objects, resources and labour (Douglas, 1996; Mars and Mars, 1996); autonomy, reciprocity, insulation and competition; and frequency, mutuality, scope and boundary (Mars, 1994). 4.6.2
Power structures
The grid dimension describes the locus of power. If grid is extremely high, power is inherent in the system and no level of management has autonomy. This is only viable if the economic environment is static. More commonly, high grid means that control is held by senior management. Top management autonomy is high while middle management autonomy is low. Low grid means that middle managers are the locus of power. Top management autonomy is low, in that they must bring about changes by influencing middle managers, whose autonomy is high. Very low grid means that decision-making is vested at the level of the first line supervisor. The group dimension describes the importance of co-ordination versus individual autonomy. If group is high, individual action is discouraged, power is centralised and coordination is required either vertically (in high grid organisations) or horizontally (where grid is low). If group is low, power is decentralised and individual action is encouraged. With low grid, this encourages individual middle managers to think of themselves as entrepreneurs running a ‘business within a business’. Where grid is high, middle managers are free to individually follow their goals within boundaries set by those above them. 4.6.3
Organisational structures
The most generally recognised structural types range from the basic simple and 94
functional structures through to the more complex multidivisional, holding company and matrix structures. Whatever the type, an examination of the organisation chart will give a feel for the relative strength of grid and group at the macro organisational level. Irrespective of the size and complexity of the organisation, the number of layers of management will give a good indication of grid in this context. Long chains and narrow spans of command suggest that grid is high, while wide spans and short chains imply lower grid. Thus a small organisation with a basic functional structure but multiple layers of management within each function may be higher grid than a large divisional organisation with a very flattened management pyramid or matrix structure. Nomenclature (naming conventions), corporate identity and intra-organisational boundaries provide evidence of the extent of group. Asking the staff who they work for is key. Thus the multidivisional company operating under one brand name is relatively high group, while the holding company with subsidiaries retaining their own identities is relatively low group. The structures for meetings within the organisation provide a further indication of group. Regular inter-divisional and cross-functional meetings suggest that group is high, while purely departmental meetings imply lower group. 4.6.4
Control systems
Key considerations under this heading will include the systems for formal control of space, time, resources and labour. High grid is suggested by rank-related prescriptions in the use of space. Executive canteens and washrooms, designated parking spaces and bigger offices for more senior staff are common indicators here. The most senior personnel will frequently have access to their offices guarded by an ante room and secretary. Emphasising function over rank involves a very different approach to spatial use. With low grid, we find open access to all areas, an absence of symbolic load and a tendency to open plan and low level screening, for greatest visibility and access. Where group is also low, sectional competition may be expected to lead to the emergence of privately captured space. 95
With low group, there will be no perceived requirement for public areas. On the other hand, the presence of communal space, for example meeting rooms, reception areas and an atrium or foyer with coffee facilities, provides a good indication of high group. Formal time controls such as clocking-on, factory hooters, set tea breaks, lunch hours and even holidays, all indicate high grid, whereas flexi-time and control of diaries by individuals themselves suggest grid is low. Gaskell and Hampton (1982) have demonstrated how different aspects of accounting procedures can be used to illustrate the relative strengths of grid and group in the context of resource management. High grid is indicated where capital expenditure proposals originate only from the top, where there is central control and compulsory use of resources and no accountability in respect of such use and where uncertainty in accounts is concealed. Low grid is the reverse. Blame absorption, belief in the accounts and lack of penalties for exceeding budgets all suggest the organisational group dimension is high. Again, low group is the reverse. Thus the existence of diverse cost/profit centres within an organisation is an indication of both low grid and low group. As Mars (1994: 24-8) has shown, the extent of control of labour depends on how the particular jobs within the organisation are organised ‘on the ground’. Where grid is low, people have autonomy, can transact with a wide range of others and can carry out tasks in ways which they can define for themselves. Where grid is high, people may be tied to a defined place, time and mode of work where they are socially insulated from others and have no scope for competition. High group is derived from frequent and repeated face to face contacts with others in a mutually interconnecting network, across a range of activities. Low group is implied by isolated subordination (where grid is high) or individual entrepreneuriality (where grid is low). Human resource management policies within the organisation will be further indicators. For example, Performance Related Pay and Bonuses suggest competition between individuals and thus low group. Similarly, the strength of group may be deduced from
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whether appraisals and objective setting are conducted on an individual or team basis. Routines Informal controls of space and time may be considered under this heading. New members of the organisation may unwittingly break unwritten high grid rules about who sits where in the canteen or who parks where in the car park. The strength of a group is further increased as the scope of its activities becomes wider, perhaps through communal residence or habitual association outside work. Where grid is also high, individuals may be powerless to resist, for example, a three line whip to go drinking after work on Fridays. Looking at how coffee is taken gives a helpful indication of group. The tea trolley coming round to individual offices suggests lower group than a ritual daily canteen or foyer meeting at a predetermined time. 4.6.5
Symbols
The symbolic and rank related size and quality of objects such as desks, furnishings and carpets, etc., all suggest high grid. Where, on the other hand, such objects are functional rather than symbolic, We find that grid is low. Where grid and group are high, the public space will include large entrances, elaborate doorways and expansive reception areas and thus symbolically distinguish the inside from the outside. Communal use of objects may be evidence either of high grid, where such use is prescribed, or high group, where the communal use takes place by consensus. 4.6.6
Rituals and myths
An emphasis on myths and stories, told repeatedly over coffee or at social functions, provides a strong suggestion of hierarchy, in which grid and group are both high. 4.6.7
The implications for risk, crisis and disaster management
Thus we can see how, taking the particular case to be analysed, each of the headings within the cultural web may be taken in turn and the relevant issues considered. A
97
judgement may then be made about the relative strengths of grid and group within the heading, and the cultural web circle drawn in the appropriate place on the cultural theory matrix. Once the analysis is complete and all the circles have been mapped on the matrix, the outcome should provide an immediate pictorial representation of the cultural bias of the organisation. Cultural theory thus offers a tool-kit for disaggregated analysis. Such disaggregation is useful for exploring cultural differences and explaining why apparently good (risk, crisis and disaster management) ideas sometimes fail to transfer effectively across cultural borders. Furthermore, as Frosdick concludes, such cultural analysis of the organisation structures involved in risk, crisis and disaster management: [...] seems to offer the opportunity for all parties to confront the existing culture and be aware of its implications for overall attitudes to risk. Such awareness should encourage an appreciation of the validity of alternative points of view and thus enable each party to manage the interactions between themselves and other agencies in a more constructive and enlightened way. Frosdick (1995a: 55)
The reading supplied with this Unit further demonstrates how such cultural analysis can be used to inform understanding of the cross-organisational collaboration required between the different agencies involved in managing public safety in British sports grounds. 4.6.8
Summary
•
Cultural analysis of organisations has an important place in learning more about how to prevent disasters.
•
Cultural theory offers a framework for disaggregated analysis of organisational (safety) culture.
•
Such an analysis can help support improvements in inter-organisational risk management relationships.
4.7 Guide to reading You should now read the supplied article, ‘Safety Cultures in British Stadia and Sporting Venues’, by Steve Frosdick. The article uses cultural theory to show that there are four viable alternative ways of 98
organising for public safety. Some implications of the findings for public policy are also discussed.
4.8 Suggested further reading Adams, J. (1995) Risk, London: Routledge is useful in relation to cultural theory. He notes that Cultural theory explains risk-taking behaviour by the operation of cultural filters. It postulates that behaviour is governed by the probable costs and benefits of alternative courses of action which are perceived through filters formed from all the previous incidents and associations in the risk-taker’s life. Elliott, D. and Smith, D. (1993) ‘Football stadia disasters in the United Kingdom: Learning from tragedy?’, Industrial and Environmental Crisis Quarterly, 7(3): 205-29. Frosdick, S. (1995) ‘Organisational structure, culture and attitudes to risk in the British stadia safety industry’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 3(1): 43-57. Lupton, D. (1999) Risk, London: Routledge is also useful in relation to cultural theory (Chapter 3). Mars, G. (1994) Cheats at Work: An Anthropology of Workplace Crime, Second Edition, Aldershot: Dartmouth. Slovic, P. (2000) The Perception of Risk, London: Earthscan has a useful collection of previously published articles including, amongst other things, articles on the perception of risk (Chapter 13) and the social amplification of risk (Chapter 14). Thompson, M., Ellis, R. and Wildavsky, A (1990) Cultural Theory (Part One), Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
4.9 Study questions You should now write approximately 300 words in answer to each of the questions below. We believe this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University. •
What is cultural theory?
•
Discuss the meaning of ‘culture’ in an organisation.
99
•
What use can be made of cultural theory?
4.10 Bibliography Douglas, M. (1978) ‘Cultural Bias’, Royal Anthropological Institute, Occasional Paper No. 35. Reprinted in Douglas, M. (1982) /n the Active Voice, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 183-254. Douglas, M. (ed.) (1982) Essays in the Sociology of Perception, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Douglas, M. (1985) Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Douglas, M. (1990) ‘Risk as a Forensic Resource’, Daedalus, 119(4): 1-16. Douglas, M. (1992) ‘Risk and Blame’, in Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory, London: Routledge: 3-21. Douglas, M. (1996) ‘On Not Being Seen Dead: Shopping as Protest’. In Thought Styles, London: Sage: 77-105. Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A. (1982) Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Danger, Berkeley: CA: University of California Press. Elliott, D. and Smith, D. (1993) ‘Football Stadia Disasters in the United Kingdom: Learning From Tragedy?’, Industrial and Environmental Crisis Quarterly, 7(3): 205-29. Frosdick, S. (1 995a) ‘Organisational Structure, Culture and Attitudes to Risk in the British Stadia Safety Industry’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 3(1): 43-57. Frosdick, S. (1 995b) “Safety Cultures’ in British Stadia and Sporting Venues: Understanding Cross-Organizational Collaboration for Managing Public Safety in British Sports Grounds’, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, 4(4): 13-21. Gaskell, G. and Hampton, J. (1982) ‘A Note on Styles in Accounting’. In M. Douglas (ed.) Essays in the Sociology of Perception, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 103-11. Johnson, G. (1992) ‘Managing Strategic Change: Strategy Culture and Action’. In
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D. Faulkner and G. Johnson (eds) The Challenge of Strategic Management, London: Kogan Page: 202-19. Johnson, G. and Scholes, K. (1988) Exploring Corporate Strategy, Second Edition, London: Prentice-Hall. Mars, G. (1994) Cheats at Work: An Anthropology of Workplace Crime, Second Edition, Aldershot: Dartmouth. Mars, G. (1996) ‘Human Factor Failure and the Comparative Structure of Jobs: the Implications for Risk Management’, Journal of Management Psychology, 11(3). Mars, G. and Mars, V. (1993) ‘Two Studies of Dining’, in G. Mars and V. Mars (eds) Food Culture and History, London: London Food Seminar. Mars, G. and Nicod, M. (1983) The World of Waiters, London: Allen and Unwin. Mars, G. and Mars, V. (1996) Household Worlds: The Creation of Domestic Cultures (derived from research carried out by the authors on behalf of Unilever). Merton, R. (1957) Social Theory and Social Structure, New York: Free Press. Pidgeon, N. F., Hood, C., Jones, D., Turner, B. and Gibson, R. (1992) ‘Risk Perception’, In Royal Society, Risk: Analysis, Perception, Management, The Royal Society, London: 89134. Royal Society (1992) Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management, Report of a Royal Society Study Group, London: The Royal Society. Said, E. (1989) Orientalism, London: Routledge. Slovic, P. (1991) ‘Beyond Numbers: A Broader Perspective on Risk Perception and Risk Communication’. In D. Mayo and R. Hollander (eds) Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 48-65. Thompson, M., Ellis, R. and Wildavsky, A. (1990) Cultural Theory, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Thompson, M. and Wildavsky, A. (1986) ‘A Cultural Theory of Information Bias in Organizations’, Journal of Management Studies, 23(3): 273-86. Trompenaars, F. (1993) Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Cultural Diversity in Business, London: The Economist Books.
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Tylor, E. (1871) Primitive Culture, London: John Murray. Waring, A. (1992) ‘Developing a Safety Culture’, Safety and Health Practitioner, 10(4): 42-4. Wildavsky, A. and Dake, K. (1990) Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why’, Daedalus, 119(4): 41-60.
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READING ‘Safety Cultures in British Stadia and Sporting Venues’ Frosdick, S. (1995) Disaster prevention and management 4(4): 13-21. Following (announced
the on
Interim 13th
Decision December
of 2001),
the
Copyright
permission
copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.
to
Tribunal make
this
5 Unit Five: Quantifying risks and hazards 5.1 Aims and objectives of this Unit There have been several attempts to introduce rationality into the management of risks and hazards by devising scales and quantification procedures which, instead of simply recognising the existence of a problem, try to indicate the size and/or frequency of it. The attempt has also been made to develop this into an administrative decision-making tool by adding acceptability and action criteria. The intention of this Unit is to examine the development of a representative selection of these quantification procedures and scales, and to discuss the implications of their application. By the end of this Unit and associated reading you should: •
be aware of the general approaches which have been applied to the quantification of risk and hazard
•
be able to discuss their strengths and weaknesses
•
be able to decide if a particular technique is appropriate in a given set of circumstances
•
be able to discuss the use of quantified risk and hazard assessments in the management of risks and hazards.
It is not intended to produce a definitive list of all the techniques available, nor is it intended that studying this Unit will make the reader proficient in the application of any particular technique. The focus here is on concepts, rather than the mathematical aspects of quantification. Although the terms ‘risk’ and ‘hazard’ have acquired specific and separate meanings, in this Unit they are used in their general sense, and may be regarded as synonymous (unless the context indicates otherwise). 5.1.1
Acronyms
The following acronyms have been used in this Unit: ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable
BATNEC
Best Available Techniques Not involving Excessive Cost
CBA
Cost Benefit Analysis
FMEA
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
HAZOP
Hazard and Operability Analysis
HSE
Health and Safety Executive
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
INES
International Nuclear Event Scale
PSA
Probabilistic Safety Analysis
QRA
Quantified Risk Assessment
SEEBOARD
South Eastern Electricity Board
UK
United Kingdom
5.2 Introduction Looking a long way back into pre-history, our early hunter/gatherer ancestors had a very simplistic way of dealing with hazards. Once a hazard was recognised, the primitive ‘Fight or Flight’ instinct was invoked. If the hazard was a physical threat from a predator (or another human) they could fight it. If it was from something like a bush fire they could run away from it. If they did not need to take either action, the situation was `safe’ and the potential threat could be ignored. Once people abandoned the nomadic hunter/gatherer lifestyle, became farmers, and established fixed communities, hazards could not be avoided quite so simply. Instead, they had to be evaluated. Early settlers in the Nile Valley, for example, had to weigh the risks of living on the flood plain of a major river, against the benefits of having a regular water supply and replenished fertile soil for their crops. Decisions now had to be based on some form of risk assessment, rather than a subjective feeling. This duality in the origins of the acceptability of risk has a number of implications. The ‘Fight or Flight’ instinct is still very strong in most humans. It determines the subjective perception of risk, which is often at odds with objective Quantified Risk Assessments
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(QRAs). It also influences the way that the true level of risk can be communicated effectively, although it has been shown previously that this is a separate topic in its own right.
5.3 Scales, statistics and quantified assessments The term ‘to quantify’ simply means ‘measure or express as a quantity’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1995). In emergency management terms, a broad (although not absolutely rigid) division can be made between event scales which quantify observed physical effects, and risk assessments which tend to quantify human and/or financial consequences. 5.3.1
How big is ‘big’?
Adjectives such as ‘small’, ‘moderate’, ‘big’ and ‘major’ can be very subjective. In the United Kingdom (UK) experience, the Towyn Flood of February 1990 was a very big flood. Although there were no direct fatalities, it covered an area of several square miles, and affected 2,800 properties, causing ‘one of the biggest evacuations in post-war Britain’. Some buildings were flooded to a depth of 5 feet (1.5m) (Home Office Emergency Planning College, 1994: 46) In the UK, it would certainly be regarded as a ‘big’ flood. By comparison, in Bangladesh, it is normal for between 25,000 and 40,000 square kilometres (roughly one-quarter of the country) to flood every year. This would be regarded as ‘normal’ flooding. During the period 1971-1988, ‘abnormal’ floods occurred in 1971, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1984, 1987 and 1988. In the 1988 flood, 66,360 square kilometres (46% of the country) was inundated, 2,397 people lost their lives, 172,000 head of livestock and 2,922,000 tonnes of rice production were lost, and 7,179,000 homes were destroyed or damaged. (Haque and Zaman, 1994: 65, 68). Thus, in international terms, the UK’s `very big flood’ would be insignificant. 5.3.2
Hazard scales
As terms such as ‘big’ and ‘major’ are both subjective and potentially ambiguous, in
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order to objectively compare events, some form of scale is needed. In some cases, such as floods, a simple measurement (of area, or depth) may suffice. In others a specific scale is needed. •
The Beaufort scale
One example of a scale in general use is the Beaufort Wind Scale, devised in 1805 by Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort. The scale ranges from 0 (calm) to 12 (hurricane). Each point on the scale is defined in terms of physical wind speed, and visible effects. Interestingly, although this is an objective scale, as Francis Beaufort was an admiral, the descriptions are in nautical terms. Originally, wind speed would only have been quoted in knots. Also, being Anglocentric, the effects of a hurricane on land are not considered. Although objective, it is still affected by personal experience. Although the scale has been in accepted use for only a little short of two centuries, it can still be applied incorrectly. The severe weather which affected the South of England in October 1987 was widely described as a ‘Hurricane’. The SEEBOARD (South Eastern Electricity Board) subsequently published a ‘Report on the Emergency Following the Hurricane on 16 October 1987’ (Squair, undated). This was despite the fact that ‘the Meteorological Office insisted that the gusts had not lasted long enough to be classed as such’ (Dennett, 1988: 1). Table 1: The Beaufort Wind Scale Beaufort Wind speed
Wind speed
Description
of
conditions
number (Knots) (Km/hr) 0
less than 1
Calm - smoke rises vertically, sea like a mirror.
1
1-3
1-6
Light air - smoke drifts, ripples on sea.
2
4-6
7-12
Light
breeze
-
wind
felt
on
vanes moved by wind, small wavelets on sea. 3
7-10
13-19
Gentle breeze leaves and small twigs in constant motion, light flags extend, wave crests begin to break.
4
11-16
20-30
Moderate breeze - dust and loose paper raised, small branches move, fairly frequent white
107
face,
leaves
rustle,
horses at sea. 5
17-21
31-39
Fresh breeze - small trees sway, crested waves on inland waters, moderate waves at sea.
6
22-27
40-50
Strong
breeze
telegraph
wires
-
large
whistle,
branches
foaming
crests
move, and
some spray at sea. 7
28-33
51-62
Near gale - whole trees in motion, inconvenience
felt
in
walking
against
wind,
foam at sea begins to be blown into streaks. 8
34-40
63-74
Gale - twigs broken off trees, walking upright difficult, wave crests break into spindrift.
9
41-47
75-87
Strong gale - chimney pots and slates removed, high waves at sea with rolling crests and dense spray.
10
48-55
88-102
Storm - trees uprooted, considerable structural damage, sea appears white with high overhanging waves and streaks of dense foam.
11
56-63
103-117 Violent storm - very rare on land, causing widespread damage, sea covered in foam patches, with waves high enough to hide medium-sized vessels and with crests blown into froth, visibility affected.
12
over 64 over 118 Hurricane - sea completely white, with driving_ spray, the air filled with foam and spray, visibility seriously impaired.
5.3.3
The power of earthquakes - the Richter, Mercalli and China scales
Earthquakes are common natural disasters, and a number of methods have been devised to quantify them. Two of the most widely used are the Richter scale, which measures power, and the Mercalli scale which describes the effect. The Richter scale was devised in 1935 by an American seismologist, Charles Francis Richter. It measures the total energy released at the focus of the earthquake, on a logarithmic scale, in which an increase of one full scale point indicates an earthquake
108
ten times more powerful. A magnitude 5 earthquake is 10 times more powerful than a magnitude 4 earthquake, 100 times more powerful than a magnitude 3 earthquake, 1,000 times more powerful than a magnitude 2 earthquake, and so on. Theoretically, the Richter scale is open-ended, but until 1979 an earthquake of magnitude 8.5 was thought to be the most powerful possible. Since then, however, improvements in seismic measuring techniques have enabled seismologists to refine the scale, and a score of 9.5 is now considered to be the practical limit. In disaster management terms, the energy released may not be the most important aspect. The actual effect of an earthquake at any given location (which may be well away from the actual epicentre) can be measured on what is known as the Modified Mercalli scale. This is a twelve-point scale, first proposed in 1902 by the Italian seismologist Giuseppe Mercalli, and is based on visual observations, rather than measurement. Table 2: The Modified Mercalli Scale Intensity Description 0
Registered only by seismographs.
1
Not felt, except under ‘ideal’ conditions.
2
Felt by a few at rest. Delicately suspended objects swing.
3
Felt noticeably indoors. Standing cars may rock.
4
Felt generally indoors. People awakened. Windows rattled.
5
Felt generally. Some falling plaster. Dishes, windows broken.
6
Felt by all. Chimneys damaged. Furniture moved. Difficult to walk.
7
Everyone runs outdoors. Felt in moving cars. Moderate damage.
8
General alarm. Damage to weak structures. Monuments and walls fall down.
9
Panic. Total destruction of weak structures. Ground fissured.
10
Panic. Only strongest buildings survive. Ground badly cracked. Rails bent.
11
Panic. Few buildings survive. Broad fissures. Underground pipes broken.
12
Total destruction. Ground waves seen. Uncontrollable panic.
Based on Magnusson (1987): 386 Both the Richter and Mercalli scales have their limitations. Because they are based on different concepts, there is no direct correlation between points on the two scales. The focus of the earthquake as used by the Richter scale may be very deep underground, and some distance away from any ‘at risk’ community. The Mercalli scale utilises 109
observed effects on buildings, and reactions of members of the public. It may be difficult to categorise an earthquake in a sparsely populated area with few buildings. In emergency management terms, the practical implications of an earthquake of the same magnitude may vary considerably. A third approach, which combines both objective measurement and the ability to predict potential surface damage, was described by Chen Yong et al. (1988: 5). This is the Chinese twelve-point seismic intensity scale. It is based on instrumental measurement, but correlates to the horizontal ground acceleration at the point of observation. This in turn can be correlated to the likely damage any particular type of structure may experience. The main advantage of this approach is that given adequate data, and geological information, it may be possible to plot different zones of seismic intensity. This in turn would be extremely valuable in planning rescue and recovery operations. The fundamental differences between these approaches highlight an important point to be remembered. If reports originate from different parts of the world, and simply refer to a magnitude ‘x’ or a scale ‘x’ earthquake, without saying on what scale, care is needed in evaluating the potential consequences. More broadly, this illustrates a potential problem in the application of quantified risk assessments, and the interpretation of such information. Care must be taken in the communication of quantified risk data, that all parties are `speaking the same language’. Too often, incorrect assumptions are made regarding this issue, with potentially disastrous implications. 5.3.4
The size of a disaster - the Bradford Disaster scale
Most of the scales mentioned so far are used to compare events of a similar nature. In the 1980s, in the UK, there was a spate of disasters such as aircraft and rail crashes, crowd disasters and industrial accidents. This triggered speculation that the world (or the UK at least) was becoming a more dangerous place. An attempt was made to statistically evaluate this, and in order to do so, the Bradford Disaster Scale was devised (Keller, 1990). Disasters were classified under 17 headings, according to the primary 110
cause, such as ‘Avalanche/Rockfall’, `Air Transport’, ‘Fire’, `Volcanic Activity’ and so on. The size of each disaster was then estimated from the number of recorded casualties. A simple logarithmic scale was used, as shown in Table 3, with intermediate values given by the common logarithm (base 10) of the number of fatalities. Table 3: The Bradford Disaster Scale No. of fatalities
Magnitude
10
1
100
2
1,000
3
10,000
4
100,000
5
1,000,000
6 Keller (1990): 15
The scale did allow some calculations to be made of the comparative frequency of different events, but it had a number of limitations (Horlick-Jones and Peters, 1991; Horlick-Jones et al., 1991). The conclusion was that: Disasters are subjective phenomena. They arise from the behaviour of complex systems [...] The Bradford fatality scale does not adequately measure the totality of harm created by disasters and, if used as a basis for planning, could seriously underestimate the resources needed to respond to disasters. Horlick-Jones and Peters (1991: 147)
Consequently, although it would be desirable to have an objective disaster measurement scale, this attempt was limited by the fact that it was a fatality scale, rather than a disaster scale. 5.3.5
The International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)
The main advantage of an event or hazard scale is that, if it becomes accepted, then it can put the severity of different events in context. The public perception of the nuclear industry is such that any accident tends to attract major publicity. An attempt to overcome this was made in 1990 when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development jointly published the
111
International Nuclear Event Scale (IAEA, 1990). The declared intent was that the scale was to be: [...] a means for promptly communicating to the public in consistent terms the safety significance of events reported at nuclear power plants. The hope was that: by putting events into proper perspective, the Scale can facilitate a common understanding between the nuclear community, the media and the public. IAEA (1990: 2)
The scale classified events at seven levels. The psychology of the scale was interesting in that there was also a level zero - events with no safety significance, which were termed ‘Out of Scale’- in effect an event which was not an ‘Event’. An outline of the scale is given in Table 4. Table 4: The International Nuclear Event Scale
Based on IAEA (1990) By this scale, the 1986 Chernobyl incident would rate as scale 7, with the 1957 Windscale incident and the 1979 Three Mile Island incident rating scale 5. At the time of
112
updating, the incident at the Japanese Fukushima nuclear complex was judged by that country’s nuclear safety agency as weighing-in at 4 on the INES scale:
. Putting the event into further context:
Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1366308/Japan-earthquake-tsunami-
113
Meltdown-3rd-reactor-blast-hits-nuclear-plant.html When the scale was first introduced, it did get some limited use. A local newspaper serving the area which included the UK’s Hartlepool Nuclear Power Station noted: The nuclear industry hopes that the INES scale will increase awareness and become as familiar as the Richter and Beaufort scales. Evening Gazette (18 December 1990)
A later incident was actually reported as being ‘below scale on the International Nuclear Event Scale’ (The Mail, 11 February 1991). A second incident was reported as ‘scale one on the International Nuclear Event Scale, or an ‘anomaly” (The Mail, 11 February 1992). This article carried the potentially emotive headline ‘Fault sparks alert at nuclear power station’ but coupled it to a secondary headline ‘No radiological danger to public from gas leak’. It appears that the scale could potentially achieve its desired intent, even though it has not yet achieved widespread use by the general public or the news media.
5.4 Estimating potential severity - how big is the hazard? Scales can obviously be applied to events which have actually happened, by direct observation or measurement. For planning purposes, it may be desirable to estimate the size of a potential hazard, and a number of techniques have been developed to do this. 5.4.1
Industrial hazards - the Dow and Mond indices
The Dow and Mond Hazard Indices were devised by the chemical industry to provide: [...] a direct and easy method for quickly estimating the risks in a process plant. When applied: The methods assign penalties and credits based on plant features. Penalties are assigned to process materials and conditions that can contribute to an accident. Credits are assigned to plant safety features that can mitigate the effects of an accident. These penalties and credits are combined to derive an index that is a relative ranking of plant risk. AIChE (1985: 4-15)
The two indices are very closely related. The Dow Index came first, and is basically a fire and explosion index. The Mond Index was a later development, which included toxicity of process materials. Hazard classification guides have been published giving tables and graphs indicating the 114
penalties and credits to be assigned for each of these features. The overall result is a number indicating the overall hazard. The degree of hazard this represents is indicated below. Table 5: The Dow Hazard Index Dow Fire & Explosion
Degree of hazard
Index range 1-60
Light
61-96
Moderate
97-127
Intermediate
128-158
Heavy
159 - Up
Severe American Institute of Chemical Engineers (1985): 4-18
Although the index values given in column 1 of Table 5 are objective, the descriptions in column 2 are of course, subjective. A person living in close proximity to the plant may well disagree over what constitutes a ‘light’ or a ‘severe’ hazard. What these indices do is provide a method of ranking hazard. They can say that plant ‘A’ is more hazardous than plant ‘B’, but cannot really say how hazardous each is in absolute terms. They do, however, have many similarities with a full QRA. 5.4.2
Estimating effects - Monte Carlo modelling
One method of estimating or quantifying potential outcome is known as ‘Monte Carlo’ modelling. The methodology involves the application of random number values to design variables, and then estimating consequences, usually by computer modelling. This incorporates elements of chance, or gambling, and the name alludes to the famous casino at Monte Carlo, Monaco. Hay (1991) describes how the technique can be used to quantify fire risks. Starting with a computer model of a building which visualises it as a collection of interconnected compartments, random numbers are generated to represent such things as fire load in each compartment, which doors are open or closed, how long the fire remains 115
undetected, etc. One compartment is chosen as the source of ignition, and the rate of fire generation and spread are estimated. By performing the same process a number of times, with different (random) values for each variable, and different locations for the ignition source, it is possible to determine a range of potential values. These include potential values for such things as the time it would take for a fire to develop, and the probability of fire spreading to any given room.
5.5 Estimating probability If it is accepted that it is possible to quantify the effects of a hazard, the logical next question is, ‘How likely is it to happen?’ This involves the estimation of probability. 5.5.1
The use of statistics - actuarial tables and return periods
One of the basic assumptions in risk quantification is that the frequency with which events occurred in the past may be used to predict or measure the probability of their occurring in the future. On the basis of mortality statistics, for example, insurers can draw up actuarial tables which give an estimate of the average number of people in each age, occupation and gender group to die each year. According to McConway (1994: 88), in 1989, the average UK male life expectancy was 72.2 years. This figure would allow for a number of people who died very young, from accidents and the like. If, however, a person had survived to, say, age 45, the statistics indicated that on average they would live another 29.6 years. The person’s total life expectancy was not now 72.2 years, but (45 + 29.6) = 74.6 years. This is because the calculation of the average excludes those people who died before their 45th birthday. This knowledge would allow an actuary to estimate the number of claims which are likely to arise from a given group of customers, and hence the premiums which must be collected to cover liabilities, and allow a reasonable profit margin. The same concept can be applied to many other risks. In the 17th Century, fitting out a ship for a foreign trading voyage was a costly procedure, with a fair chance that the ship might be lost on the voyage. Based on past experience, knowing the time of year, destination, and the quality of the ship and fittings, the financiers could estimate the 116
likelihood of the ship being lost, and might offer cover for the risk for an agreed premium. Shipowners, merchants and financiers, meeting at Edward Lloyd’s coffee house in London, would discuss transactions such as this. This informal system became institutionalised, and developed into Lloyds of London, incorporated by Act of Parliament in 1871. As an aid to risk assessment, the organisation went on to develop a ship inspection classification and certification system. Statistical data are also widely used in assessing the potential frequency of events such as storms and floods. This is usually termed the ‘Return Period’. An earthquake can be expressed as a ‘once in a thousand year’ event. The severity of a flood may be described as being a ‘once in a hundred year, a ‘once in ten year’, or even an annual (once a year) event. The alternative way of saying this is that these events have a ‘return period’ of 1,000, 100, 10, or 1 year respectively. This is linked to the concept of probability, and the number of times a situation should recur, given a large enough sampling period. The conceptual fallacy with this method of expressing probability is that it leads to the incorrect perception that if an event only occurs ‘once in a hundred years’ then there will be a hundred years between successive events. Subjectively, if a person has experienced such an event, there is a perception that it will never happen again in their lifetime. This is not so. In the case of an earthquake, with a 1,000 year return period, the necessary sampling period may be the whole of recorded history. The fact that it might have happened yesterday does not mean that it cannot happen again, tomorrow for instance. Indeed, the theory of plate tectonics tells us that earthquakes occur when the pressure between continental plates builds up to the point where they suddenly slide against each other. This may have to occur several times in succession before all the tension is released. There may then be a very long period before it happens again, but ‘on average’ it occurs once in one thousand years. Using statistical data in this way has a number of limitations. The basic assumption (that the frequency with which events occurred in the past may be used to predict or measure the probability of their occurring in the future) is only valid if nothing else
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changes. Global warming, for example, if the effects are as some people predict, will mean that future estimates of things like storms and floods cannot be based on past experience. Statistical data are also a sample of reality and, as with any sample, they may be subject to error, particularly if what is being studied is a rare event such as a disaster. Statistical validity is really a subject in its own right, and too large a topic to cover here, but one example may illustrate the need for caution. In the Christian calendar, Easter is a ‘movable feast’. It is not celebrated on the same date each year. There is a complicated formula to decide on the date, but the dates are: 1998-12 April; 1999- 4 April; and 200023 April. The UK ‘financial (tax accounting) year’ runs from 6 April one year, to 5 April the next. If a researcher, looking at UK public holidays, relied purely on statistics and used the financial year as the sample period, taking the financial year 1998-1999, it might appear that Easter occurred twice a year. If the financial year 1999-2000 was selected, it might seem that Easter was no longer celebrated. Neither conclusion is correct. With some other events, the error may not be so obvious, leading to a false estimate of the frequency. In particular, for some uncommon events, the human lifetime is far too short a sampling period to permit the true ‘average’ return period to be statistically demonstrated.
5.6 The combination of probability and severity - Quantified risk assessment As with many topics related to the assessment of risk, terminology can be confusing. The term ‘Quantified Risk Assessment’ is sometimes used as though it is a single, specific, clearly defined process, but a number of different methodologies have been devised. Any process which assigns a numerical value to probability, or severity, is strictly speaking a form of QRA. Even the name can vary. The HSE notes that in the nuclear industry the same process is generally known as Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) (HSE, 1992: 22). QRA should be regarded as a generic, rather than a specific term. An event scale can only measure the size of an individual risk. If a holistic assessment of 118
risk is to be made, it may be necessary to estimate the combined risk from totally dissimilar hazards. If someone lived in a location which was prone to both earthquakes and hurricanes, it would be nonsense to add the probability of an event, such as a Richter 3 earthquake, to that of a Beaufort 10 storm, and claim that was the combined risk for that location. The consequences of each event are not directly comparable. One approach is not to compare the risks directly, but to find some common factor (usually the risk to life, or the potential financial loss). Quantification of risk is being developed as a science, which is becoming more and more important, both in the development of public policy and decision-making, and in day-today management. Workplace Health and Safety risk assessments are required by legislation in many countries, including the UK and the rest of the European Community. Given that the hazard has been recognised, there are three basic requirements for a quantified risk assessment. The first two are objective measures: •
an estimate of the severity of the problem
•
an estimate of the probability of the problem occurring.
These combine to form the quantification process. The third requirement is subjective: •
some criterion of acceptability of the risk as quantified.
5.7 Hazard identification and analysis According to the HSE, the first stage in QRA is essentially technical and would involve: Quantification of likely risk with an understanding of the inherent uncertainties. HSE (1989: 2)
A number of techniques have been developed to do this. 5.7.1
Fault and event trees
Fault and event trees are two similar processes which look at industrial accidents from different directions. Their use is described in several sources (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1985; Parry, 1986). They are called ‘trees’ because they are usually portrayed as diagrams with branching arms representing different fault or event paths. The names can be confusing, because the fault tree starts with an event and looks at the
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faults which can contribute to it. The event tree starts with a fault and looks at the events which could follow from it. As a fault tree starts with the top event (the accident) and looks for causes, it applies backwards (analytical or deductive) logic. This is sometimes termed the ‘top-down’ approach, where the event is broken down into its components. Fault tree diagrams look very similar to computer algorithm diagrams with standard symbols for such things as faults and logic gates. For example, if there was a gas explosion, there must have been both an ‘Explosive Concentration’ and an ‘Ignition Source’. These become the first two branches of the tree. Because both must be present for the explosion to occur, they would be linked to the ‘Explosion’ event by an ‘AND’ logic gate. Conditions which might cause an explosive concentration could be a leak in a tank, a pipe fracture, a valve leak or a storage vessel being overfilled (there may be several more). These become the second layer of branches on the ‘Explosive Concentration’ line. They would be linked to the ‘Explosive Concentration’ condition by an ‘OR’ logic gate, because any one could give rise to it. Similarly, ignition can be instigated by a high temperature source or an energy source. The high temperature source could be a naked flame, or a hot surface such as an overheated bearing. An energy source could be an electrostatic discharge, or a spark from switchgear, and so on. An event tree does essentially the same thing, but from the opposite direction. It is a ‘bottom-up’ approach which starts with a fault condition, and looks at possible consequences. It is forward looking or predictive. It looks at safe, as well as hazardous, outcomes. Assume, for example, that there is a flammable liquid tank, and the risk of a major fire is being considered. The starting point might be a fault such as a valve leak on the tank. The situation is then analysed by a series of ‘either/or’ situations. Either the tank is empty, or filled. If the tank is empty there is no danger. If the tank is filled, it may have secondary containment, in which case there is no danger. If there is no secondary containment, there may be a vapour detector. The detector may function, in which case there is no danger, or it may fail. If it fails, there may or may not be a source of ignition.
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If there is a source of ignition there may or there may not be an automatic fire extinguisher, and so on. Following either system, pathways along the trees can be identified which can link defects and/or deficiencies with unwanted outcomes. These can be used in two ways. If the probability of each branch in the path is known (such as the chance of a detector failing, or a pipe fracturing, or the proportion of time a naked flame is present) then an overall probability of all the conditions leading to the unwanted event can be estimated. Alternatively, as a managerial tool, potentially hazardous combinations of circumstances can be identified, and measures taken to eliminate them. 5.7.2
Hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies: Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)
Just as fault and event trees represent lop-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ variants of event analysis, so HAZOP and FMEA are two different ways of evaluating industrial processes, and are described in the same sources (AIChE, 1985; Parry, 1986). Some variations do exist. So, for example, in addition to the conventional FMEA, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers also describes an extended version ‘Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis’ (AIChE, 1985: 2-16). HAZOP is the lop-down’ variant. The basic assumption is that in a correctly designed plant, a hazard only occurs if it does not operate as intended, that is, that some ‘deviation’ has occurred. To carry out a HAZOP study, a manageable section of the process is selected, and in what amounts to a brainstorming process, experts try to identify and predict the consequences of deviations. This is done by a process of asking a series of ‘What if?’ questions, which are linked to ‘guide words’. Examples of guide words are ‘no’ (or not), `more’, ‘less’, ‘as well as’, ‘part of’, `reverse’ and ‘other than’. Not all guide words apply in all circumstances, but for example if the process being considered was a section of a plant feeding a chemical from storage tank ‘A’ into a reactor: What would happen if: • •
there was NO flow from tank ‘A’ to the reactor? there was MORE flow than intended from tank ‘A’ to the reactor?
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• there was LESS flow than intended from tank ‘A’ to the reactor? • substances were fed from tank ‘B’ AS WELL AS tank ‘A’, to the reactor? • through poor mixing, only PART OF the contents of tank ‘A’ were fed to the reactor? • there was a REVERSE flow from the reactor into tank ‘A’? • substances OTHER THAN intended were put into tank ‘A’ and fed to the reactor? For every identified Failure Mode, a further set of questions can be asked: • Could it happen? • What would cause it? • What would the consequences be? • Would they be hazardous? • What would the effects be? • How would the failure mode be detected? • How could it be prevented? • Based on possible consequences, would the cost of prevention measures be justified? The results of this analysis are quantified by assigning probabilities, and the results fed into the managerial process. If HAZOP looks at the operation as a whole and then attempts to identify potential deviations, FMEA looks at every component in the system; it identifies the potential ways in which it could fail, and assesses the consequences. It is the ‘bottom-up’ variant of the process. In effect, each component is listed, and the consequences of every conceivable failure mode considered. A valve, for example, may fail - ‘closed’ (which might prevent the flow of emergency cooling water), it may fail -’open’ (so that the flow into a tank cannot be stopped when it is full), or it may rupture (causing a leakage). A tank gauge may fail -’low’ indicating that a full tank is empty, or fail - `high’ indicating that an empty tank is full. The consequences of each failure mode may be vastly different.
5.8 Quantification of risk The descriptions given so far all demonstrate how the various techniques would identify risk or hazard. In each case, the outcome would be at least one path, or set of conditions, which could lead to the hazard being realised. In any practical analysis of anything but the simplest of systems, it would be more usual to identify several paths or sets. What then has to be done is to evaluate the probability of each item. This may be
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done by manufacturers’ reliability testing data, by an estimate based on known operating conditions, or a combination of both. The individual probabilities are then combined in stages, until the overall probability can be estimated. The following theoretical example might explain how this would be done. It is stressed that this is a simplified example, not a real situation, so the attempt should not be made to analyse the scenario too deeply. Assume a tank which contains a substance which gives off a flammable vapour has been fitted with a pressure relief valve to allow air in a tank to vent when the tank is filled. The valve has been tested by the manufacturer and is estimated to randomly fail ‘closed’ once in 10,000 operations. If this happens, instead of venting safely, flammable vapour can enter a nearby workshop, where it might be ignited by a gas cutting torch, causing an explosion. If the tank is filled twice a week, then it is expected to operate (2 x 52) = 104 times a year, so the probability of failure in a given year is 104 in 10,000 = 1 in 96. If the filling operation takes one hour, and can take place at any time, then as there are 8,760 hours in a year, the chance of the tank being filled at any particular moment in time is (2 x 52) in 8,760 = 1 in 84 (approximately). If the gas cutting torch is used, on average, six hours a day, then the probability of a naked flame source being present is 6 in 24 = 1 in 4. If an individual worker works on average 8 hours per day, the chance of being in the workshop at any one instant is 8in24=1 in3. The combined probability of the relief valve failing closed, during filling, causing flammable vapour to enter the workshop, whilst the gas torch was in use, causing an explosion when a particular worker was present would be: 1 in 96x 1 in 84x 1 in 4 x 1 in 3- 1 in 100,000 According to the HSE, 1 in 100,000 is about the general risk of death in an accident at work in a ‘safe’ industry (HSE, 1992: 4). As this would not be the only hazard in the workplace the contribution it makes to the overall risk might well be considered unacceptable.
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5.9 Expressing probability When reading technical literature, the chance of something occurring can be expressed in several ways. Take as an example, that above, of the worker employed 8 hours a day. This can be expressed as the chance - 8 hours in 24 hours = 1 hour in 3 hours or, simply, 1 in 3. What can sometimes be confusing is that it can also be expressed as an odds ratio. There are three 8-hour periods in the day, the worker will be present for one of them and absent for the other two. Therefore the odds of being present are 1 to 2 (or as it is usually written 1:2): a chance of 1 in 3 is an odds ratio of 1 to 2 Chance can also be expressed as a percentage: 8/24 = 33.3%. It may also be expressed as a decimal fraction, usually termed the ‘Probability’ (symbol P). Something which is absolutely certain has a probability of P = 1. Something which is absolutely impossible has a probability of P = 0. Working 8 hours a day, the probability of being present is P = 0.333. Expressing a probability in this way makes calculation of combined probabilities easier. Taking the example above, but this time working in probabilities, the probability of valve failure becomes (2 x 52) / 10,000, or P =.0.010. The probability of the tank being filled becomes (2 x 52 ) / 8760 or P= 0.012. The probability of a naked flame source becomes 6 / 24 or P = 0.250. The probability of the worker being there becomes 8 / 24 or P = 0.333. The combined probability of all conditions existing together becomes: P = 0.010 x 0.012 x 0.250 x 0.333 = 0.00000999 This would round to P = 0.00001, or 1 in 100,000. When estimating overall risk, as a general rule, if several things must all happen together for something to occur, the individual probabilities are multiplied together to determine the combined probability. As P is equal to, or less than one, this makes the overall, or combined, probability less than any of the individual ones. 124
In some situations, the risks might be independent of each other. Take, for example an international journey. The traveller may drive a car to an airport, fly to another country, take a taxi to a railway station, go by train to another city, then walk to the hotel. It would be possible to calculate the probability of being injured on each stage of the journey. Because the traveller would become a casualty if they were injured at any stage, the individual probabilities are added together to determine the combined probability. This makes the overall probability larger than any of the individual ones. This combined probability must, however, still be less than one, or the traveller would be certain to be injured. 5.9.1
The accuracy of predictions
One feature which should be noted is the apparent accuracy with which probabilities can be calculated and quoted. The fact that they are only an estimate of risk can easily be overlooked, when they are presented in a way which suggests that they are hard scientific fact (such as quoting a probability to seven decimal places in the example above). They are also only as good as the initial hazard identification exercise. The calculation above contains several ‘average’ values. Many QRAs contain significant assumptions, such as ‘average’ exposure times, ‘normal’ site inventories or ‘average’ health on the part of the population. In theory, an objective evaluation should be repeatable, and different assessors working with the same data should come up with similar results. In practice, this may not happen. Any QRA contains a host of assumptions, and Otway (1992: 221) cites one study by Mandl and Lathrop (1983) where estimates of the risk to the public from facilities which were technically similar, varied by a factor of 100 million (eight orders of magnitude). He claims that: The differences were due mostly to the assumptions made by the analysts and the methods they chose to use in making their quantitative assessments.
He also cites what he calls a ‘large benchmark exercise’ (Amendola, 1986) where teams from ten countries independently estimated the failure probability of the same subsystem piece of plant (the auxiliary feedwater system for a particular nuclear power 125
plant). In the exercise: Each team carried out its own analysis, using its own problem structures, fault and event trees, models and data. The estimated mean failure probabilities ranged over a factor of forty-five. In the second phase of the study, the teams met to discuss their analyses and, once again working separately, had the opportunity to revise them, but without a requirement to converge. After a discussion of results and an exchange of ideas, the estimates still differed by a factor of thirty-six. Otway (1992: 221)
One obvious point is the differences in the size of the risk as estimated by the individual QRAs. One outcome which Otway finds significant was that although they knew that other experts had come up with vastly different results, and having reviewed their own assessment, each group still thought that their QRA was the correct one. It could be expected that the maths would have been checked very thoroughly by the various teams, so as with the Mandl and Lathrop study, these differences would stem from the assumptions and models. As Otway concludes: In practice, there are no ‘true’ measures of the industrial risks that concern us most. The risk numbers we see floating about are based on expert judgement, as expressed through models, theoretical predictions, extrapolations and so on. The most valuable product of risk analysis is not the risk estimates generated, but what is learned about the system from the analytic process. Otway (1992: 221-2)
5.10 Quantification of benefit So far, what has been discussed is the quantification of risks and hazards, which are unwanted outcomes. From an administrative point of view, it would be very attractive if wanted outcomes could be quantified similarly. In the introduction, it was noted that Early settlers in the Nile Valley, [...] had to weigh the risks of living on the flood plain of a major river, against the benefits of having a regular water supply and replenished fertile soil for their crops.’ This would have been done subjectively, but if both risks and benefits could be quantified, decision-making could be made into an objective process. As when attempting to determine the combined risk of two dissimilar hazards the problem is in identifying a common unit. Some attempts at this have been made. 5.10.1 Cost-benefit analysis
According to the dictionary Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is: [...] a process that assesses the relation between the cost of an operation and the value of
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the resulting benefits. Concise Oxford Dictionary (1995)
In this rather bland form, the process can appear to have many advantages. The HSE (1992: 48) gives a slightly fuller definition: [...] the identification and quantification, in common (and hence usually monetary) units, of all the desirable and undesirable consequences of a particular measure to society as a whole.
This HSE definition reveals one of the main weaknesses. Both the desirable and undesirable consequences must be measured in the same units. As the HSE go on to say, the use of CBA involves attaching monetary values to human life and health. Cross (1982: 73) claims that CBA ‘offers a means of evaluating in economic terms projects which are not subject to the usual economic criteria of `the market It also offers the opportunity to include ‘externalities’ which do not normally appear on a company balance sheet. The example given is of a firm which may be able to sell products cheaply because it spends little or nothing on pollution control, so pollution costs are borne by society at large. He does go on to say: ‘it does seem that factors that are regarded as intangible, or immeasurable today, may not be so tomorrow’ (Cross, 1982: 74). Given the current application of the `Polluter Pays’ principle by regulatory bodies in many countries, this may seem prophetic. The argument is fairly neatly summed up as follows: It is also argued against CBA that its use of money as the unit of measurement is, in some cases, crass philistinism. The cost-benefit analyst who calmly calculates the ‘price’ of a life lost by accident - apportioning so much for loss of earning power, so much for the relatives’ grief, etc. - seems inhuman. But the analyst’s reply is that simply abandoning oneself to emotionalism is a poor substitute for rational decision-making, and that people do put economic values on seemingly ‘intangible’ factors such as life and safety: for example, when they are prepared to pay more for a motor car with more safety features than another. Cross (1982: 74)
If (and it is by no means certain) all desirable and undesirable consequences can be satisfactorily converted into monetary terms, there is still one further social dilemma. This is the problem of equity, where one group pays the costs, but another group receives the benefits. As the HSE (1992: 48) notes, ‘CBA is not concerned with the distribution effects of a project (i.e. with who gains and who loses)’. It goes on to observe that the French power utility tries to balance this out by providing reduced
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price electricity and subsidised local amenities in the vicinity of their nuclear power stations. The next section looks at one attempt to develop this concept further. 5.10.2 The quantification of perceived risk - multi-attribute utility theory
Using cash values, or potential risk of death, as a ‘common unit’ in CBAs and QRAs can be quite emotive. One possible alternative described by the HSE is Multi-Attribute Analysis (HSE, 1992: 51). The essence of the technique is to have a group of informed people apply a numerical scoring scheme to factors such as aversion to low probability accidents, socio-political issues and the local environment. In concept, this is very similar to the approach employed in the determination of the Dow and Mond Hazard indices. The factors being scored need not be restricted to unwelcome aspects. Syme and Nancarrow (1991) describe the application of Mufti-Attribute Utility Theory in assessing the public perception of cumulative risks and benefits of living near the Kwinana Industrial Strip, south of Perth, Western Australia. By asking residents to assign a numerical value to each aspect (negative values for risks, positive values for benefits) an overall ‘Mean MAU value’ (Multi-Attribute Utility value) can be determined. It is claimed that a positive number would indicate ‘that the benefits of living in the (Kwinana) area outweigh the risks’ (Syme and Nancarrow, 1991: 88). Risks considered and given a numerical value include levels of air pollution, transportation of fuel and toxic substances, estuarine pollution, the presence of a maximum security prison, and the docking of foreign military ships. As a decision-making tool, in theory, it would be possible to ask residents to complete a Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis for a particular locality as they think it would be with, and without, a proposed development. This would indicate if in perceptive terms, the overall effect was beneficial or detrimental. The possible drawback to this is the fact that individual perception can change very rapidly. A news report of an accident or a local publicity campaign could very easily result in two different analyses conducted in the same locality, by the same researchers, with the same respondents, only a short time apart, giving entirely different results. As a decision-making tool this would prove extremely problematical. 128
5.11 Acceptability of risk Again, looking to the difficulties with terminology which beset emergency management, one definition of ‘acceptable’ is ‘tolerable (an acceptable risk)’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1995). The HSE, however, states: ‘Tolerability does not mean ‘Acceptability [...]. To tolerate a risk means that we do not regard it as negligible or something we might ignore, but rather as something we need to keep under review and reduce still further if and as we can. For a risk to be ‘acceptable’ on, the other hand means that for purposes of life or work, we are prepared to take it pretty well as it is. Health and Safety Executive (1992: 2)
The outcome of a QRA is, as the name implies, a quantified estimate of risk. Even assuming it is accurate, this can give no indication as to whether or not that risk is acceptable. If the same objective procedures which underlie QRA were to be applied, statistical data would be sought on the general ‘riskyness’ of society, and an acceptable risk value chosen which equates to some everyday activity. An example of the estimated risk of some common activities is given in Table 6. Table 6: Levels of Fatal Risk (in the UK) Approximate level of risk
Activity (chance of fatal injury - (in the United Kingdom) per annum)
1 in 100
Risk of death from five hours of solo rock climbing every weekend
1 in 1,000
Risk of death due to working in high risk groups within relatively risky industries such as mining
1 in 10,000
General risk of death in a traffic accident
1 in 100,000
Risk of death in an accident at work in the very safest parts of industry
1 in 1,000,000
General risk of death in a fire or explosion from gas at home
1 in 10,000,000
Risk of death by lightning
Health and Safety Executive (1992: 4) As a solution to the question of what standard to apply, in the UK the HSE have come up with a three-stage system. A higher level of risk (the just tolerable level) which if exceeded would be regarded as unacceptable. A lower level of risk (the acceptable level) below which no further precautions are necessary. Between these two boundaries a cost-benefit analysis would be needed, with risks reduced to levels which are ‘As Low as Reasonably Practicable’ (the ALARP principle) (HSE, 1992: 4-5). Another acronym which may be encountered in this context is BATNEEC (Best Available Techniques Not involving Excessive Cost). 129
Current UK guidance (HSE, 1992: 30-31) is that as seen from Table 7, the maximum tolerable risk for any worker is around 1 in 1,000 per annum. It is argued that the maximum tolerable risk to any member of the public, from any hazardous industry, should be in the region of 10,000 per annum - that is, at least ten times lower. It is also considered that such is the public dread of nuclear power, that the maximum risk from a new nuclear power station should be ten times lower again 1 in 100,000. At the other end of the spectrum, the ‘broadly acceptable’ level is considered to be ten times lower again - 1 in 1,000,000. There is no scientific justification for these `factors of 10' - it is simply down to political opinion. The point has, however, already been made that ‘the Perception of Risk [...] is often at odds with objective QRAs’. The public may well not accept these administrative guidelines as representing acceptable or tolerable risks. A recent Health and Safety course makes the point that: [...] it must be remembered that the final test is whether the community in question will accept the risk as being acceptable. Only under these conditions can we say that something with low risk levels is also safe. Open University (1997: 32)
A number of factors have been suggested which might cause the results of a QRA to be rejected or modified by the public. These are given in Table 7. Table 7: Considerations for Risk Acceptability of a potentially hazardous substance or pollutant) Conditions leading to Conditions leading to greater acceptability lesser acceptability
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Risk assumed voluntarily
Risk borne involuntarily
Effect immediate
Effect delayed
No alternatives available
Many alternatives available
Risk known with certainty
Risk not known
Exposure essential
Exposure a luxury
Risk encountered occupationally
Risk encountered non-occupationally
Common hazard
‘Dread’ hazard
Affects average people
Affects sensitive people
Will be used as intended
Likely to be misused
Consequences reversible
Consequences irreversible Open University (1997: 33)
This table applies to a hazardous substance such as a potentially harmful chemical, or to pollution, but the same concepts can be applied (in some cases, with slight modification) to physical and environmental risks.
5.12 Conclusion Evaluations are used for all sorts of purposes. Any graded response system incorporates an element of risk quantification. For example, in 1990, the UK National Rivers Authority (now part of the Environment Agency) devised a flood warning service with three warning phases: a Yellow Warning (flooding possible), an Amber Warning (flooding likely) and a Red Warning (serious flooding likely). Each of these warnings was linked to a description of the likely effects and resultant risk, and in combination, becomes a flood effect scale (NRA, 1990). In activating the system the operator must evaluate the risk in order to issue the appropriate warning. The most obvious theoretical advantage of quantified risk assessments -and objective decision-making protocols is that, in theory, they take the subjective human element out of the process. This might be true of the process (calculation) stage, but that is only one small part of the process. The most fundamental aspects of the process are still conceptual. Cross (1982) notes that one of the key stages in the use of CBA is the correct definition of the alternatives. He uses the classic example of the 1971 Roskill Commission’s cost-benefit analysis of potential sites for the third London airport. It did a cost-benefit comparison of the four possible sites, but failed to include the possibility that not having a third airport might have been the most beneficial option. As Cross says: The relevance of this ‘no project’ alternative has since been demonstrated by the fact that that is indeed the alternative which has been exercised. Cross (1982: 75)
Even though when thinking rationally, an individual may well accept that a certain degree of risk must be tolerated, the instinct for risk avoidance is a very powerful one. In modern society, it is no longer possible for the individual to move away from the 131
hazard. Although rationality dictates that decisions must be based on some form of quantified assessment, the subjective desire for risk avoidance means that even a favourable quantified risk assessment will not necessarily convince the general public. Instead, the most likely response is the establishment of a protest group calling for it to be banned or relocated. This has been termed the ‘NIMBY Syndrome’ (‘not in my back yard’). QRA is not an end product in its own right, it is simply a tool. The HSE recognise this, when they say that a decision process involving QRA ‘ [...]is a process which is essentially economic and political though informed technically’ (HSE, 1989: 2). As evidence of some of the current debate going on within ‘Risk Assessment’, you might like to consider the recent publication of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. The report considered the safety of pesticides on crops and offers some good examples of the risk assessment process and risk communication Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution: Special Report, [2005] and Smith, [2005]). (This report and comment was previously referred to in Unit 3 of this Module but is useful in the risk assessment context also). The background to the report, as set out by the Minister, was to improve public access to information about pesticides used and specifically, to carry out a special study to examine the scientific evidence on which DEFRA has based its decisions on the risks to people from pesticide exposure. (The Minister) requested the study following a detailed evaluation of the responses made to the two public consultations launched on 21 July 2003, which sought views on the introduction of buffer zones around residential properties near farms and how residents can best be informed of the pesticides that are being sprayed. [...]. the responses to the consultations demonstrate that there is a perception that the current arrangements, and in particular the assessment of risks, are inadequate.
The report commented that: We are concerned that the toxicological testing currently undertaken within the pesticides approval and assessment process, [...] does not encompass the full range of conditions that have been described to us by members of the public and attributed by them to exposure to pesticides. This situation is unsatisfactory; in effect we lack input data on ‘no effect levels’ for the ill health conditions not covered by the testing. In the absence of this data no scientific model of exposure can address those particular health concerns (para. 6.5).
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We have significant concerns about the assessment of resident and bystander exposure. Although the assessment is conservative in terms of the way in which toxicological data are reflected in exposure limits, it has been drawn up to represent a single situation and looks at one exposure route which it assumes to be the main route. It is deterministic, not taking account of a range of possible outcomes. More sophisticated probabilistic models are needed to allow risk managers to assess the likelihood that serious situations could arise and to manage exposure risks accordingly (para. 6.10). The risk assessment depends crucially on both the exposure assessment and toxicological testing. Although uncertainty factors are built in, they are there to cover issues related to the toxicology testing and cannot compensate for the weakness of the exposure assessment. [...] the only option is to reduce overall levels of exposure through the package of risk management measures recommended at (6.33-6.43) and through the spraying notification measures in 6.51 and 6.53 (paras. 6.12 - 6.13). In the light of the lack of rigour in the underlying science, we have been surprised at the level of confidence expressed in advice to Ministers and the level of assurance given to the public about the safety of residents and bystanders potentially exposed to agricultural pesticides. We have concluded that the level of these assurances is not robustly founded in scientific evidence. Limitations in the data and alternative views of the science, as well as political and ethical judgements implicit in this advice, all need to be clearly acknowledged (para. 6.14). We have recommended a more precautionary approach pending more research. This will deliver a significant strengthening of risk management procedures until a more rigorous evaluation of the risk and necessary accompanying measures can be made. The interim measures need to be introduced in the UK and drawn to the attention of the authorities in the EU who, we are told, do not currently regard bystander exposure to pesticides as a priority (para. 6.19). We recommend that the advice to Ministers from technical and scientific advisory committees, such as that of the Advisory Committee on Pesticides on the approval of pesticides, should take account of the criteria employed regarding risk and precaution, the choices available, and the likely impacts on those affected by the decisions being recommended. This information needs to be reflected explicitly when communicating risk management decisions to the public. ‌ It should be clear how uncertainty has been managed within the assessment, for example, through the use of probabilistic analysis (3.53), uncertainty factors etc. The effect of uncertainty on the estimate of risk should be clear (5.37) (para. 6.44).
See also: Smith, L. (2005) ‘Public misled over danger of crop spraying’, The Times, September
23:
33;
available
at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,8122-
1793084,00.html, accessed 23 September, 2005.
5.13 Guide to further reading You should now read the attached extract from the Health and Safety Executive report, Quantified Risk Assessment: Its Input to Decision Making, published in 1989 and then
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reprinted in 1993.
5.14 Study questions You should now write approximately 300 words in answer to each of the questions below. We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University. •
Which types of quantified risk assessment could be used in your workplace and for what tasks?
•
What are the strengths and weaknesses of utilising quantified risk assessment tools and techniques?
•
Why might those managing risk feel more comfortable utilising quantified risk assessment approaches rather than qualitative approaches to risk management?
5.15 Bibliography American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) (1985) Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, New York: AIChE. Amendola, A. (1986) ‘Uncertainties in systems reliability modelling: Insights gained through European benchmark exercises’ Nuclear Engineering and Design 93:215-25 cited in Otway (1992). Anon (1990) ‘Scale is yet to be tested’, Evening Gazette, Middlesbrough, 18 December 1990, p.13. Anon (1991) ‘A-plant contamination’, The Mail (Hartlepool), 11 February 1991: 5. Anon (1992) ‘Fault sparks alert at nuclear power station’ The Mail (Hartlepool), 11 February 1992: 2. Chen Yong, Kam-ling Tsoi, Chen Feibi, Gao Zhenhuan, Zou Qijia and Chen Zhangli (1988) The Great Tangshan Earthquake of 1976, Oxford: Pergamon Press. Concise Oxford Dictionary (1995): 9th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cross, N. (1982) Control of Technology: Unit 8 - Methods Guide, 2nd edition, Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 134
Dennett, P. (1988) The Great Gale, Burgess Hill: Phillip Dennett. Home Office Emergency Planning College (1994) A Digest of Some Well-Known Disasters, Easingwold: Easingwold Papers No. 8. Haque, E. and Zaman, M. (1994) ‘Vulnerability and responses to riverine hazards in Bangladesh: A critique of flood control and mitigation approaches’. In A. Varley (ed.) Disasters, Development and Environment, Chichester: John Wiley: 65-79. Hay, A. (1991) ‘A different approach to quantifying fire risks when decision making’ Fire, July: 32-4. Horlick-Jones, T. and Peters, G. (1991) ‘Measuring disaster trends part one: Some observations on the Bradford Fatality Scale’, Disaster Management, (3)3: 144-8. Horlick-Jones, T. Fortune, J. and Peters, G. (1991) ‘Measuring disaster trends part two: Statistics and underlying processes’, Disaster Management, (4)1 41-5. HSE (Health and Safety Executive) (1989) Quantified Risk Assessment: Its Input to Decision Making (reprinted 1993), London: HMSO. HSE (1992) The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations (2nd revised edition), London: HMSO. International Atomic Energy Authority / Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1990) ‘The International Nuclear Event Scale’, International Atomic Energy Authority Bulletin 32(2) Supplement. Keller, A. Z. (1990) ‘The Bradford Disaster Scale’. In A. Z. Keller and H. C. Wilson (eds) Disaster Prevention Planning and Limitation: Proceedings of the First Conference, University of Bradford, 12-13 September 1989, London: British Library), 3-39. McConway, K. (1994) Studying Health and Disease, Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Magnusson, M. (ed.) (1987) The Reader’s Digest Book of Facts, 2nd edition, London: Reader’s Digest Association. Mandl, L. and Lathrop, J. (1983) ‘LEG risk assessments: Experts disagree’. In H. Kunreuther, (ed.), Risk Analysis and Decision Processes: The Siting of Liquefied Energy Gas Facilities in Four Countries’, Berlin: Springer-Verlag (cited in Otway, 1992).
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NRA (National Rivers Authority) (1990) Emergency Procedures, Factsheet 1, ‘Flood Warning Service’. Open University (1997) Integrated Safety Health and Environmental Management, 2nd edition, (Course Text, Block III, Part 1 - Epidemiology), Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Otway, H. (1992) ‘Public wisdom, expert fallibility: Toward a contextual theory of risk’. In S. Krimsky, and D. Golding, Social Theories of Risk, Westport, Con: Praeger Publishing, 215-28. Parry, S. T. (1986) A Review of Hazard Identification Techniques and their Application to Major Accident Hazards, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, Safety and Reliability Directorate/Health and Safety Executive. Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution: Special Report, (2005) Crop Spraying and the Health of Residents and Bystanders, September, London: Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution; available online at: http://www.rcep.org.uk/cropspraying.htm, accessed 23 September, 2005. Smith, L. (2005) ‘Public misled over danger of crop spraying’, The Times, September 23: 33;
available
at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,81221793084,00.html,
accessed 23 September, 2005. Squair, G. A. (undated) Report on the Emergency Following the Hurricane on 16 October 1987, Hove: South Eastern Electricity Board. Syme, G. and Nancarrow, B. (1991) ‘Risk perception and procedural justice’. In, J. Handmer, B. Dutton, B. Guerin, and M. Smithson (eds) New Perspectives on Uncertainty and Risk, Canberra: Australian National University and Mt Macedon: Australian Counter Disasters Organisation.
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READING ‘Quantified
Risk
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Its Input to Decision Making’ Extract: HSE (1993) Health and Safety Executive report: 1-18, 29-30. Following (announced
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of 2001),
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6 Unit Six: Insurance Risk 6.1 Aim and objectives of this unit Insurance represents one of the principal options open to an organisation formulating a risk strategy. By taking out insurance, companies, organisations and public bodies can offset some of the risks they face by transferring them to external agents. Insurance can increase the degree of confidence for organizations in their ability to calculate and manage risk. The aim of this Unit is to provide an insight into the basic principles of insurance and the ways in which insurance plays an important role in trade and commerce. In addition, it will provide an overview of current insurance practice and the important interaction between insurance and security management. This unit will also explore some of the latest challenges facing the insurance industry. By the conclusion you should have a better understanding of how the insurance industry functions and its links with security and risk management industry.
6.2 Introduction Insurance, very simply, can be defined as: 1.a an arrangement with a company in which you pay them regular amounts of money and they agree to pay the costs, for example, if you die or are ill/sick, or if you suffer lose or damage. Oxford University Press, 2005. 1.b the act, system, or business of providing financial protection for property, life and health, against specified contingencies such as death, loss, or damage, and involving payment of regular premiums in return for a policy guaranteeing such protection. Collins English Dictionary (1992): 802)
The purpose of insurance is to allow people to carry on their private or business lives with the reassurance that if they suffer a personal loss or damage to property or become liable to pay damages to third parties, their insurance company will provide an indemnity for them. Insurance, then, is the means by which those unfortunate enough to be the victim of some loss can gain compensation. At the macro level, insurance is now recognised as an essential aid for managers to cope with new risks such as terrorism and climate change.
But how can insurers provide this compensation - especially when they know there are so many fires, accidents, thefts, injuries and other losses each day? The answer lies in that very fact. Insurers can predict with some certainty how many incidents there will be. They do not know exactly but, based on their long experience of dealing with risk, they have a very good idea. More important, they know it is not everyone who is going to suffer. In fact, only a few people actually suffer as a result of some risk. Think for a moment of the street where you live. How many fires can you remember recently in the houses around you? It is really not all that likely that your house will catch fire, that your car will be in an accident, that you will be injured at work. Nevertheless, if it did happen, it could be a disaster for you. The insurance company is able to offer you the protection it does by grouping together a large number of people who all feel exposed to the same form of risk. This could be fire, theft, accident or any other risk we have either mentioned or will look at later. The company or organisation, gathers these people together knowing that in any one year very few in the group will actually suffer any loss. By collecting an amount of money from each person in the group, it can then accumulate a fund - an amount of money, out of which the losses suffered by the few who become victims can be paid. This seems fine but why not just put the money in the bank instead of paying it to an insurance company, and wait for the day the loss might happen? If you own a £100,000 house, a £15,000 car, a £30 million ship, how much will you put in the bank? You just do not know when the risk will happen, and it is unlikely you could put away enough money for such an occurrence. The money paid to an insurance company is a very small amount in relation to the value of a house, car or ship. The only reason the insurance company requires such a relatively low premium is because they have gathered premiums from a large number of people, most of whom will not suffer a loss - at least not in the same year as you. The premiums paid by all the people who seek protection go towards paying for the losses of the few who actually suffer. This does not mean that if you did not suffer at the hands of some risk, you have paid your money for nothing. You had the security, you had the peace of mind all through the year and, if anything had happened, you would have been financially protected. The Chartered Insurance Institute (2007)
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6.2.1
Indemnity
All policies of insurance are fundamentally policies of indemnity. The principle of indemnity as discussed at length in the case of Castellain v Preston (1883) was defined as follows: The very foundation in my opinion of every rule which has been applied to insurance law is this, namely, that the contract of insurance contained in a manner of [...] policy is a contract of indemnity and of indemnity only, and that this contract means that the Insured in the case of a loss [...], shall be fully indemnified. This is the fundamental principle of insurance and if ever a proposition is brought forward which is at variance with it, that is to say, which either will prevent the Insured from obtaining a full indemnity, or which will give the Insured more than a full indemnity, that proposition must surely be wrong. Castellain v Preston (1883)
The principal problem with indemnity arises as a result of the need to assess the measure of indemnity in relation to the variety of circumstances that arise. It is a matter of fact that the intention is to restore the policyholder to the position they enjoyed immediately before the loss, which is substantially the same purpose as the award of damages in a civil law case (this is where a knowledge of insurance would be of assistance to all security managers who find themselves in the position of resolving claims arising in the workplace). 6.2.2
Indemnity and fraud
Expressed in all policy wordings is the provision that insurers will indemnify the policyholder either by the payment of cash, or, at the insurer’s option, reinstate or replace the subject property. Increasingly over recent years insurers have elected to indemnify the insured through the replacement of the goods lost or destroyed. This has arisen predominantly in domestic insurance contracts. A major reason has been the increasing trend in fraudulent or exaggerated claims. Requiring the Insured to have replacement items means that the fraudster does not receive the large cash sums which in many cases has been the sole purpose of the venture. Insurers have also in many cases established their own lists of approved building contractors, professional cleaners/restorers, computer equipment repairers/suppliers and glazing contractors.
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6.2.3
Implications for the policyholder
Insurance, then, provides indemnity, and with it an increased sense of financial security through the transfer of risk to an insurer. This transfer is not without a number of important implications for the policyholder: •
in return for the payment of the premium, the consumer is able to transfer some, but not all, of their uncertainty to the insurer (the consumer will retain those risks not insured against, and in most cases will have agreed to retain a percentage of the cost of this loss, this sum being referred to as the ‘excess’)
•
the unknown cost of risk (represented by the possible losses incurred and the loss of utility caused by the existence of risk) is substituted for a known cost - the premium payment made at a known time
•
The policyholder is left to bear all those risks that cannot be insured, plus those insurable risks that have been retained for one reason or another.
Both from an individual and corporate view insurance is important as it mitigates risk by guaranteeing recompense in the face of loss. Companies in particular regard the insurance of some risks as essential to their business survival. The reasons for this are twofold: first, it serves to protect against financial loss which is generally harmful and, depending on the severity and timing of that loss, may be sufficient to put them out of business. Second, it changes the unpredictability of the risk, changing it from a loss of unknown severity occurring at an unknown time, to a premium of agreed cost and agreed timing. For the manager the area of insurance is of direct relevance, because insurance against loss through crime is one of the principal options open when formulating a security risk strategy. Additionally, the manager needs to be aware that crime and insurance are linked, not only in the positive sense, i.e. as a means of mitigating against the risk of crime, but also in the negative sense that some forms of crime are generated by the very fact that insurance has been taken out, as Litton puts it: Insurance and crime interact. At a trivial level it is obvious that, without crime, there would be no crime insurance. However, because insurance is, at least in part, criminogenic, without insurance there would be less crime - some arson and all insurance frauds only exist because insurance is there. Litton (1990): 1
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6.2.4
Types of fraud
Examples may include the ‘staging’ of a loss that never actually occurred; the deliberate destruction of the property; or the intentional inflating of the amount claimed for a genuine loss. A useful summary is provided in Home Office (1988): Broadly there are three types of offender involved with insurance fraud. There is the individual in financial difficulties who sees the possibility of a quick insurance pay-off as an answer. There is also the person who dishonestly insures his property or stock for a sum greater than the real value. Thirdly there is the owner of the property in need of repair where he hopes a claim for a partial fire loss will cover the cost of improvements.
It is generally accepted within the insurance industry (Blunt, 1907; Carter, 1974; Hansel, 1979; Holton, 1973) that the only prudent course of action where a record of fraud exists is for the underwriter to decline insurance. See also: Home Office (1999) & OPDM (2002). Fraudulent and dishonest claims are a major problem for the insurance industry and fraud is alleged in a number of cases. These can be difficult to assess. To establish that fraud has taken place, some concrete evidence of lies, inconsistent statements or acts of deception must be present. The fact that members of a firm’s staff are personally satisfied of the claimant’s bad faith is not sufficient proof of dishonesty. The essential components of fraud are intent to deceive and desire to induce the firm to pay more than it otherwise would. Establishing these points can require an analysis of the claimant’s motives. Inevitably this is a largely subjective exercise. An exaggeration is not always fraud. And the firm should not repudiate the entire claim simply because the customer has mistaken the cost of replacing the item claimed for - or has an inaccurate recollection of its purchase price. To repudiate the claim, the firm must be able to show that the customer was trying to obtain more than he or she was entitled to. For example, many people consider their car is worth more than the value placed on it by the firm’s engineer. But since they will not normally receive more than the ‘market value’ when their claim is settled, their exaggerated view of the car’s worth will not render their claim void. Financial Ombudsman Service (2002)
6.3 Insurance fraud: case studies The following case studies have been supplied by the Financial Ombudsman Service as examples of various ‘real life’ claims presented to insurance companies. 142
42/3 A policyholder forges documents in the course of making a valid claim - insurers wrongly attempt to ‘avoid’ entire policy Mr H was a self-employed plumber. In January, his home was burgled and he made a claim under his home insurance policy, which the firm duly paid. In May, his van was broken into and a number of personal possessions were stolen, including the tools he used for his work. He made another claim to the firm under the personal possessions section of his home contents policy. During the course of its enquiries, the firm’s loss adjusters insisted that Mr H substantiate all his losses with original purchase receipts. Mr H was unable to find all the receipts, so he asked a friend to fake one for him. When the firm discovered the forged receipt, it ‘avoided’ the policy - in other words, cancelled it from the start. The firm not only refused to pay for the items stolen from the van, it also tried to recover the money it had previously paid out to Mr H for his earlier burglary claim. After complaining unsuccessfully to the firm, Mr H came to us.
complaint upheld
The firm accepted that the theft from the van was genuine. Mr H had been foolish to obtain a forged receipt but he was not dishonestly trying to obtain something to which he was not entitled. The loss adjusters had, in fact, been rather overzealous in insisting on strict proof of purchase for all the items stolen. We applied the rationale of ‘The Mercandian Continent’ case (reported in [2001] Volume 2 of the Lloyd’s Law reports at page 563) which concerned the principle of ‘utmost good faith’. Ultimately, the case held that insurers should only be able to ‘avoid’ a policy for fraud where the insurer’s ultimate liability was affected, or when the fraud was so serious it enabled the insurer to repudiate the policy for fundamental breach of contract. Following this rationale, we concluded that the fair and reasonable solution was for the insurer to reinstate the policy and pay the claim. In any event, it was unlikely that the firm’s ultimate liability would be affected by the fraud, as Mr H’s work tools were specifically excluded from the home policy. Home policies often exclude cover for contents or possessions that are for business rather than personal use. We also pointed out to the firm that even if Mr H had been guilty of fraud, it would only have been entitled to ‘forfeit’ the policy from the date of the current claim, leaving the earlier burglary claim intact. It was not entitled to recover previous payments for valid claims. 42/4 policyholder supplies misleading and fraudulent documents in the course of making a valid claim - insurers able to ‘forfeit’ policy from the date of the claim Miss J made a claim under her general household policy for ‘escape of water’ damage. As the damage was reasonably limited, the firm simply asked her to send in repair estimates. She provided three. The firm discovered that all three estimates - purporting to come from different contractors - were fraudulently produced by one contractor who had carried out extensive works for Miss J in the past. The firm considered Miss J to be guilty of fraud. It cancelled her policy and refused to deal with the claim. Miss J then bought her complaint to
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us.
complaint rejected
Miss J had already admitted supplying false information to the firm, and in an attempt to resolve the matter, had produced further - genuine - estimates from independent contractors. However, these merely served to show the extent to which the prices quoted in the fraudulent estimates had been exaggerated. Once again, we applied the principles of ‘The Mercandian Continent’ case (see case 42/3). If the fraud had not been discovered, the firm would have ended up paying more in compensation than was properly required of it, and more than Miss J was legally entitled to. To this end, the fraud affected the firm’s ultimate liability and was a fundamental breach of contract. Having applied that rationale, we decided that the firm had been entitled to ‘forfeit’ the policy from the date of the claim. 42/5 policyholder purposefully gives wrong details of stolen items - insurers able to forfeit’ policy from the date of the claim Mr G made a claim for goods stolen from his home during a burglary. Among the many items he claimed for were some Star Wars DVDs. This alerted the firm’s loss adjusters to the possibility of fraud, since at the time of the burglary the films in question had not been released on DVD. The firm rejected the claim and ‘forfeited’ Mr G’s policy from the date of his claim. Mr G complained to us, arguing that he must have mistakenly claimed for pirated copies of the DVDs, and that this mistake did not warrant ‘forfeiture’ of the policy
complaint rejected
We were satisfied that this was a clear attempt to defraud the firm. There was evidence that showed ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ - more than the usual civil requirement of ‘balance of probabilities’ - that Mr G was claiming for something that he could never have owned. This higher standard of proof indicated that Mr G would still be guilty of fraud, even if the pirated DVDs did exist, since he had attempted to claim for legitimate copies. The value of the DVD’s was relatively small compared with the overall size of the claim, but we did not feel this was a case of `innocent and minimal exaggeration’. Mr G had dishonestly claimed for something he was not entitled to. This went to the very root of the insurance contract, and was a breach of the policyholder’s duty to act in ‘utmost good faith’ when submitting a claim. We also felt that this fraud, and Mr G’s subsequent attempt to cover it up, cast doubt on the validity of the entire claim. The firm’s decision to ‘forfeit’ was therefore fair and reasonable. Financial Ombudsman Service (2005)
The manager, therefore, must view insurance as a double edged sword dependent upon the type of organisation they are employed by. On the one hand it is a means of transferring risk, on the other it may bring with it risks that are peculiarly its own.
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6.4 Risk and insurance For most security managers it will be the concept of insurance as a risk management strategy that will be uppermost. The manager, in dealing with risk, aims to further organisational objectives such as survival, profitability and public image. Risk management can help to achieve these objectives by preventing or reducing losses that would otherwise delay the achievement of some of these goals. The design of risk financing techniques to secure sufficient cash flow after a loss has occurred, and ensuring that the costs of pure risks are included in the capital budget, is all part of the risk management function. Correctly managing risk promotes profitability by allowing managers to concentrate on the entrepreneurial aspects of the business, knowing that ‘pure risks’ have been protected against. This encourages confidence in financial forecasting and avoids ‘pound swapping’ with insurers. 6.4.1
Pound swapping
All insurers seek to make a profit from their contracts. For every £100 of claims paid by an insurer they need £120 worth of premium to cover such claims. Current thinking within the commercial sector is to avoid pound swapping with insurers. Pound swapping occurs when the cost of claims is balanced by the cost of the insurance, less the insurer’s profit. In such cases the organisation gains nothing from the arrangement. The only advantage is that payments may be predictable whereas the loss may fall at any time. In order to avoid ‘pound swapping’, organisations should seek to identify those losses which are predictable and retain them (this is not to say that organisations simply accept these losses, but that they must seek to reduce them by means other than insurance). 6.4.2
Perfect compensation?
Insurance will rarely provide a perfect compensation for loss because of the practical implications of the principle of indemnity or because through under-insurance the
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policyholder may not attain the same post-loss financial position that they were in prior to the loss. In practice, premiums may not be certain in timing or amount. If premiums are retrospectively calculated, the policyholder will not know exactly what they have to pay until the end of the contract. Similarly, generally rising premium rates (attributed to inflation) induce another element of uncertainty into the level of future insurance charges. The net result of these qualifications is that insurance cannot be used by policyholders to completely remove their uncertainty. Additionally, not all risks are insurable.
6.5 What risks are insurable? Risks may be classified as ‘pure risks’ which offer the prospect of loss but not gain (such as burglary or the risk of fire) or they can be classified as ‘speculative’ which offer the prospect of both loss and gain (such as investing in the stock market or starting a new business venture). Only pure risks are insurable. Insurers do not gamble; they analyse and consider the risks that they are prepared to take very carefully - or at least they should do. Insurable risks generally exhibit certain features. They must, for example, be pure risks, they must be capable of financial calculation and the risk must be fortuitous (a fortuitous risk is one which is not certain to occur). In addition, the event being insured against must not be contrary to the public interest and the premium must be reasonable in relation to the likely loss. Insurance premiums vary according to the perceived likelihood of loss (claims frequency) and the potential loss involved (claims costs). Insurers use a variety of statistical techniques to analyse past losses and predict future patterns. One example of high frequency and low average claims is breakage of office equipment, whilst an example of a low frequency high claims cost would be terrorist bomb damage. Insurers use statistics to ascertain what has happened in the past and by analysing such data can predict or, more accurately, infer what is likely to happen in the future. A key
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element of this approach to measuring risk is the application of probability theory, including exact probabilities and ‘best guess’ approaches based on all available data.
6.6 What risks are not insurable? It is important, too, at this point to note that not all risks are insurable. To benefit from the advantage of insurance protection, a risk has to have certain characteristics. It must involve a loss which can be measured in actual money rather than, for example, sentimental value. This is clear in the case of damage to buildings, loss of profits, or awards of compensation made by the courts. There must be a large number of similar risks. We have said that the insurance company is able to offer the protection it does because it operates a common pool in which only a few will suffer loss in any one year. In the absence of a large number of people being exposed to the same risk, this kind of operation would not be practical as there would be so few in the pool that each would require contributing so much. A further characteristic of the insurable risk is that it does not involve any prospect of gain or profit. Just think what it would mean if it was possible to insure against not making a profit from selling goods in a shop. There would be very little incentive to try to sell the goods if the owner knew the insurance company would step in and pay up anyway. Similar to this in some ways is the fact that the loss must be entirely fortuitous, accidental, as far as the person insuring is concerned. This rules out, for example, any advantage people might hope to gain from burning down their own factory or shop. The fortuitous character of most risks is quite apparent, but in life insurance it could be argued there is no uncertainty about death. It is one of the few certainties we have. Life insurance is however still involved with fortuity as it is the timing of death which is uncertain. This is not so with suicide and, to take account of this, most policies will exclude death from suicide for, say, the first 12 months of a new policy’s existence. So only those planning suicide far ahead would have this possibility of exploiting an insurer in this way.
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To be insurable, it must not be against public policy to have that insurance protection. In most cases, it is in the interest of society to have insurance, but in a few cases this is not so. It would not be, for example, in the public good to allow insurance protection against a fine imposed by the Court. A fine is a penalty to be met by the offender and it would contravene what society considers right and proper if a person could take out a policy of insurance to pay the fine. The premium charged by the insurance company must be reasonable, and this imposes certain restrictions on the risks which are insurable. Who would be willing to pay £5 or £10 to insure against the risk of losing a 25 pence ball-point pen? The premium would not be reasonable. Similarly, there could be some cases where the risk occurs so often that the premium would be far too high. Finally, it is essential that the person insuring must be the one who will suffer should the loss occur. In other words, you can insure your camera against loss or damage, as you are the one who will suffer if it is lost or damaged, but you cannot insure your friend’s camera. The Chartered Insurance Institute (2007)
Beck’s influential book Risikogesellschaft was first published in 1985, but has only been available in English as Risk Society since 1992 (recommended reading this and other units). It identified risk as the defining characteristic of contemporary society. The Politics of Risk Society consists of an editorial introduction by Jane Franklin and essays by 13 prominent social commentators elaborating this theme and exploring its implications. In Risk Society Beck argued that modern science and technology have created a society in which the creation of wealth has been overtaken by the production of risk; the primary concerns of “industrial” or “class” societies – the production and equitable distribution of wealth – have been replaced, he said, by the quest for safety. “In advanced modernity the social production of wealth is systematically accompanied by the social production of risks. Ecological and high-tech risks … endanger all forms of life on this planet … by risks I mean above all radioactivities, which completely evades human perceptive abilities…. Risk society is a catastrophic society … The dream of the class society is that everyone wants and ought to have a share of the pie. The utopia of the risk society is that everyone should be spared from poisoning” (Beck 1992: p23)
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Chapter 1 of The Politics of Risk Society is by Beck himself. He continues with the gloomy message of his earlier book; “Society”, he insists “has become a laboratory where there is absolutely nobody in charge.” (Beck1992: p9). The risks being created in this laboratory, he insists, are different from the risks that earlier generations encountered: “There was once a time when a risk was something that you indulged in for a bit of excitement. A bet on the Grand National, a spin of the wheel – it was all meant to add a bit of spice to an otherwise orderly and predictable life. Now manufactured uncertainty means that risk has become an inescapable part of our lives and everybody is facing unknown and barely calculable risks. Risk becomes another word for ‘nobody knows’. We no longer choose to take risks, we have them thrust upon us. We are living on a ledge – in a random risk society, from which nobody can escape. Our society has become riddled with random risks. Calculating and managing risks which nobody really knows has become one of our main preoccupations. That used to be a specialist job for actuaries, insurers and scientists. Now we all engage in it, with whatever rusty tools we can lay out hands on – sometimes the calculator, sometimes the astrology column. The basic question here is: how can we make decisions about a risk we know nothing about?” “risks that were calculable under industrial society become incalculable and unpredictable in the risk society.” (Beck 1992: p25)
Chapter 2, “Risk Society: the Context of British Politics”, is by Anthony Giddens; he is often bracketed with Beck in discussions of risk, but is less apocalyptic – “The idea of the ‘risk society’ might suggest a world which has become more hazardous, but this is not necessarily so. Rather, it is a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk.” (Giddens 1999: p3) What, if anything, should we do about it? In her introduction Franklin (1998) explains that “to understand risk society… we have to begin to think in a new way about the world we live in, to find a new language to describe what is happening to us,” that we must “resist the comfort of reconstructing old certainties, ”and that “we need policy initiatives which give space to a new politics, still emerging, generated by uncertainty, which insists that decisions which affect us are taken in the context of democratic debate.” She urges the application of the ”precautionary principle, so that we can all engage creatively with risk”. (Franklin 1998: p8)
The contributors worry about how to label the society they are studying and how to distinguish it from an earlier era when risks were different. They resist the label “postmodern” and the cultural inchoateness with which it is associated, in favour of modernity mark II, what might be termed neo-modern: “The first phase [of modernity] is characterized by industrialization and the drive to conquer
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the natural world … Risk society marks the end of the first phase … The second phase of modernity is taking shape but we cannot understand it or describe it with our existing vocabulary … although things still look the same … they are not working in the way we have come to expect.” (Franklin 1998: p2)
Franklin argues that there are two possible responses to our current state of incomprehension. The first she introduces in order to wave it aside: “If we see it as a consequence of a breakdown of traditional order, we may seek to preserve and strengthen those institutions and relationships that once worked … This politics appears to be a resistance to change. It builds on an idealized notion of community and encourages efforts to bring back the traditional family, reconstruct strong neighbourhoods, and reassert a kind of commonsense morality to hold it all together … It endeavours to build the idea of trust and responsibility in to institutions that are themselves rapidly changing and are incapable of responding as we imagine they used to.”
The second is ineffable: “In contrast, the politics of risk society takes the reality of everyday life as its starting point, recognizing that we need a new language to describe what is happening to us. This language is not yet formulated, but it has to be a language that resonates with our experience and can take us forward into the unknown, opening up the possibility of living creatively with risk and uncertainty. It offers an alternative strategy to the politics of nostalgic community.” (Beck 1992: p 2-3)
The last three chapters by Orbach, Pahl and Coote (1998) all focus on relationships. Coote insists in the concluding chapter that “a high trust democracy [is] the only way to face a risky future” (Coote 1998: p131). But how the requisite trust is to be engendered is not made clear. Pahl argues for the importance of friendship in “a society in which there is considerable mistrust in most institutional sphere;” but presents evidence that contacts with friends and relations are growing weaker (Pahl 1998: p116). Orbach warns against placing our trust in the nostalgic rhetoric of “family” values” and stresses the importance of “trying to build quality relations – [enabling relationships] – in a risk society.” But how this is to be done in a world that she describes as beset by “Economic pressures, shifts in general relations, the collapse of the health and educational services, worries about work … consumer culture … the hurts of racialism and class” does not emerge (Orbach 1998: 91-94). What are the risks with which this book is concerned? These might be termed 150
manufactured virtual risks, i.e. risks, not from nature, but produced by human activity, and about which science has nothing conclusive to say: BSE and its possible link to new variant CJD, which was much in the news at the time the book was written, is the example most commonly referred to. Food additives, pesticide residues, low-level radiation, electro-magnetic fields, and global warming are additional examples of manmade risks characteristic of phase-two modernity. The last of these in particular, global warming, highlights a further aspect. The idea of The Risk Society rests upon the assumption that science and technology are now creating not only more, but bigger risks than they are mitigating, and making them less rather than more comprehensible. Science and technology do create new risks – the invisible radiation risks associated with the nuclear industry are one of Beck’s favourite examples. Alternatively, perhaps the most convincing proof of the historic triumph of science over risks to life in the global population explosion – widely held to be the ultimate threat to life on earth. Have we merely deferred some risks at the cost of much larger ones? Common to the filters of most of the contributors to this book is a mistrust of “hubristic” science and technology. The past, viewed through their perceptual filters, was safer and more “calculable” than the world today; once upon a time risk was “spice” voluntarily consumed. But was it? Others can be found who have very different filters, who look back upon a history in which life was nasty, brutish and short, who sees a present that is healthier, wealthier and longer-lived than ever before, thanks to science and technology; and who look forward optimistically to a future in which the best hedge again uncertainty is investment in more science and technology. We do not respond blankly to uncertainty, we impose meaning(s) upon it. In the presence of virtual risk people are liberated to argue from belief, prejudice and superstition. Virtual risks are mental constructs that float free of scientific evidence. This book argues that, in Risk Society, they also float free of words with which to discuss them – it repeatedly reminds us of the inadequacy of our existing vocabulary for making sense of latter-day risks. Psychiatrists deal routinely with people who construe reality idiosyncratically, people 151
who perceive threats that “normal” people cannot see. But the concept of normality can embrace a range of perceptual filters. Even where risks are clearly perceptible, either directly or with the help of science, it can be difficult for “normal” people to reach a consensus about what is normal and what is not. Agreement about virtual risks is much more elusive. Participants in debates about such risks frequently question their opponents’ grip on reality and denounce those who disagree with them as “mad”. With such risks filters are all; the perception of virtual risk comes uncomfortably close to hallucination – defined as “perception in the absence of external stimuli”. This is territory worthy of exploration by psychiatrists. For those inclined to accept the challenge, this book can be recommended as a good introduction to the intellectual foundations of a syndrome that Furedi has dubbed “the culture of fear”. Furedi (1997) 6.6.1
Self-insurance
Self-insurance occurs where an organisation consciously accepts and retains a risk and deals with it by establishment of an internal fund. Usually such a decision will only be taken by large organisations who may already have qualified insurance personnel capable of administering such a fund. The advantages of self-insurance are that premiums of funding levels should be lower since there are no insurer’s costs, profits or commissions to pay. The insured receives the benefit of investment income from the fund and keeps any profit accrued by it. Another consideration is that if the insured, through good risk management, is a better than average risk for that particular trade, the premium payable to an insurer might not necessarily reflect that. The insured, therefore, would be paying over the odds. This situation is easily avoided by self-insurance and has the additional benefit of encouraging the organisation to reduce loss. This is particularly important to the security manager, as a self-insured company is much more likely to identify directly with any loss it incurs. There are, however, disadvantages (or risks) to the self-insurance option. A self-insured
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company will normally create its insurance fund based upon ‘normal’ loss estimates; as such, there may be insufficient funds to cope with catastrophic loss, or a series of smaller losses occurring in the early years of the fund. Such losses might be sufficient to destroy a company. Another consideration is that a self-insured fund must be more ‘liquid’ than an insurance company’s fund, and therefore the investment income will not be as high. Additional staff will be required by a company to manage its self-insured fund, and the wide range of expertise, especially of surveyors, may not be available. Other limitations include the fact that statistics, where maintained, will not be broadly based, that shareholders may criticise the move on grounds of their return, that the company may be tempted to borrow from the fund, therefore weakening it, and that the Inland Revenue will probably disallow contributions into the fund for Corporation Tax purposes. In an attempt to militate against these limitations, some companies have opted to set up ‘captive’ companies.
6.7 Captives A captive company is a wholly owned subsidiary company formed to underwrite selected insurance risks for its parent company. The effect of the decision to create such a company, which will accept the premium from the parent, and settle claims from its fund, is to reduce the overall cost of insurance in the medium to long term. Additionally, an organisation will benefit from having the opportunity, through owning a captive insurance company, to participate in underwriting profits. The captive company provides direct access to wholesale and reinsurance markets which would not otherwise be accessible. There is also access to investment income generated by the captive, and to higher discounts given for deductibles or self-insured retentions. Other advantages are that the parent’s policy cover and conditions will be more flexible through a captive, that price stability can be given - which is far less likely in the uncertain insurance market place and that there are possible tax advantages, especially if the captive is
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based off-shore. All direct insurers usually retain only a proportion of many risks, and reinsure the proportion which is above their financial ability to retain to professional reinsurers. As the direct or commercial market insurer has all the procuration and survey costs to bear, the net cost of reinsurance is substantially less than the cost of direct insurance. Normally the premiums paid to a captive company are allowable against Corporation Tax, although in the USA the Inland Revenue System (IRS) has disallowed such premiums where the captive transacts its business from risks created outside the parent company.
6.8 Reinsurance/Pool Re Insurance companies seek to protect their business by laying off some of the risks that they accept by means of reinsurance. Reinsurance business is placed in the London market for insurance companies all over the world. Reinsurance can be arranged either on a facultative (single) case basis, or under a treaty or reinsurance contract which accepts blanket cover for all individual policies written by a certain insurance company in a 12-month period. The original underwriter can either take the first proportion of any claim on the business they have reinsured, or share in the business from the ground up, thus spreading the risk either above certain parameters (monetary limits) or proportionately (share of) according to their requirements. Reinsurance can therefore be used to spread risk amongst other insurance companies, and there are specialist reinsurers who only accept such classes of business and do not deal with the public directly. Having identified risks and decided on the option of insurance to transfer a proportion of them, a company enters into the contractual world of insurance. Commercial insurance normally conforms to a set procedure. This conformity was, however changed by acts of terrorism in the early 1990’s. 6.8.1
The Pool Re Scheme
The Pool Re Scheme is in effect another form of reinsurance. It was introduced at a time when there was an upsurge of terrorist activity in the early 90’s. It has proved to be a 154
useful mechanism to spread risk. Pool Reinsurance Company Limited was formed in 1993. Its formation was brought about by conditions in the insurance market following a series of terrorism incidents in the early 1990’s in London and elsewhere in England, related to the situation in Northern Ireland at that time. The cost of losses arising from these incidents caused insurers and reinsurers to focus on the difficulties of providing terrorism cover for commercial properties, in particular the high potential cost of losses and the lack of any reliable method of estimating what the future loss experience might be. Insurers were dependent upon reinsurers for financial protection should very large claims occur and, accordingly, both insurers and reinsurers decided they could no longer provide terrorism cover using methods traditionally employed in the market. It became necessary to devise a mechanism through which to continue to make terrorism cover available to buyers of commercial property and business interruption insurance, without leaving insurers or reinsurers open to substantial losses for which there was no reliable method of calculating accurate premiums. Following September 11, (Twin Towers terrorist attack, New York 11 th September 2001) terrorism reinsurance and insurance cover was withdrawn across significant areas of the insurance industry. This was a particularly acute problem for commercial property insurance. The Pool Re Scheme was extended (in and for the UK) to rectify this situation. Pool Re was provided for reinsurance cover for commercial property damage and business interruption costs resulting from an act of terrorism which causes fire or explosion, but it did at the time, provide cover against other forms of terrorist attack. 1. Extension to Pool Re’s cover Pool Re currently covers commercial property damage and business interruption costs arising from an act of terrorism which results in fire or explosion. This means that an act of terrorism resulting in other causes of damage (e.g. a major flood or contamination) but which did not involve fire or explosion would not be covered by the original Pool Re scheme. September 11 demonstrated that terrorists could find methods of attack which go beyond “normal” scenarios and the uncertainty which surrounds the method
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chosen by a terrorist is a source of great concern for insurers and buyers of insurance. Cover provided by Pool Re would therefore be extended to cover terrorist attacks which cause commercial property damage and consequent business interruption by “all risks”. There would be no change to the existing exclusion for war risks, nor to the type of property covered by Pool Re. There would however be an exclusion in respect of hacking and virus damage to electronic components due to the likely inability to prove a virus was a terrorist attack. It is intended that the present exclusion which exists under the scheme for damage caused by nuclear devices will be deleted as soon as practicable. The extension in cover to all risks will be reflected in a doubling of the existing rating charged for Pool Re cover under existing Heads of Cover arrangements until the end of the year. (The rating is currently discounted at 85%, and this proposal does not affect that discount). 2. Retention Pool Re operates a “retention” under which insurers bear the first amount of any claims for an event covered by Pool Re, for each “head of cover”, i.e. section of policies they issue. This retention is generally £100,000 per head of cover (though different retentions apply in certain circumstances). This means that the total cost borne by an individual insurer depends on the number of heads of cover affected. The Terms of Reference emphasised the objective of encouraging competition within the market, given the fact that Pool Re is the dominant provider of terrorism reinsurance in this sector. In the current market, the scope for commercial capacity to re-enter the market is clearly limited. The most practical way of encouraging commercial capacity back into the market will be to raise the retention, opening the possibility for insurers to seek commercial reinsurance to cover these retentions. The group believed a big increase in the retention would be difficult for insurers (particularly small insurers) to bear, particularly given the proposal that cover provided should be extended to “all risks”, since the current basis for the retention could lead to a very high overall loss for an individual insurer. The group therefore considered alternative models for the retention, and concluded that it should move to a per event retention, combined with 156
an annual aggregate limit for each insurer, based on the overall terrorism market share of each insurer. The intention is that the retention will be set for each insurer annually as a proportion of an “industry wide” figure. This will make a larger retention easier to bear for insurers, because they will have certainty about their maximum exposure in any one year, leaving Pool Re and if necessary, the Government to bear the cost of a major incident or a terrorist campaign involving a sustained series of incidents. In contrast to the old basis, each insurer will have its losses capped under the new basis, both per event and per annum. Insurers will know in advance the maximum amount they could be called to pay out in any one year. From 1 January 2003 the maximum industry retention was set at £30 million per event, with individual insurers’ retentions being based on market share. Extensive modelling work done on behalf of the group suggested this represents a moderate increase on retentions under the old basis (£100,000 per head of cover per policy). In practice, the actual amount of retention borne by the industry following an event would probably be considerably less than this, depending on the distribution of claims between insurers. 3. Reinsurance and Insurance Premiums The way in which Pool Re charges for its reinsurance will be reviewed constantly to take account of the change in the basis and size of the retention for insurers. Under the new arrangements from 1 January 2003, insurers were free to set the premiums for underlying policies according to normal commercial arrangements. From that date the following arrangements were discontinued: - arrangements under which Pool Re could call additional premium from members in respect of years which result in loss to Pool Re - payment of premium rebates in respect of years which resulted in a surplus - payment of reinsurance commission to members. 4. Governance Pool Re and HM Treasury have agreed that as part of the overall package of changes to Pool Re they will re-examine the detailed involvement of Treasury in day-to-day decisions. Under the new arrangements the Public Interest Director will provide a formal annual report to the Treasury on how Pool Re has performed against its set
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objectives. He may report more often than once a year in exceptional circumstances, and will bring to Treasury’s attention any issues which arise which have a particular bearing on the objectives or some other aspect of the public interest. The Government recognises there are circumstances in which it has a role as reinsurer of last resort to prevent or mitigate market failure: where there is a substantial public policy interest in pooling risk, and where the market is currently unable to provide insurance. It will not step in wherever the market does not offer cover. In this case, there are issues for the insurance of commercial property for material damage and business interruption in the event of terrorist attack, for perils other than fire and explosion. In order to find a mutually acceptable way forward the Government will discuss with the industry changes to the Pool Re scheme to reflect the situation post September 11 and changes in the market since Pool Re was set up in 1993. HM Treasury (2002) Pool
reinsurance
arrangements:
technical
notice
to
industry
(13 December 2004) Following consultation with the insurance and commercial property industries, the Treasury published a set of general principles of interpretation that it would expect to be guided by in its application of the definition of an ‘act of terrorism’ under the Retrocession Agreement between HM Treasury and Pool Re, made in accordance with the Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993. The principles are aimed at professionals working in the insurance industry as a clarification of the existing cover provided through the Pool Re arrangements. HM Treasury and Pool Re have also agreed to review the technical detail of the Retrocession Agreement to ensure that it is delivering the intended outcomes and that it is up-to-date where circumstances have changed since 1993. The government and insurance industry continue to work in partnership through the Pool Re scheme to ensure that terrorism cover remains available for commercial property and business interruption in Great Britain. Notes
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1.
Under the Retrocession Agreement between HM Treasury and Pool Re, made
under the Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993, the Treasury has a role in certifying whether a particular incident falls within the definition of an ‘act of terrorism’ and hence whether covered by the Pool Re arrangements. These general principles of interpretation would guide HMT in its application of the definition. 2.
The principles issued today do not change the scope of cover provided through
Pool Re but clarify the existing situation. 3.
The review of the Retrocession Agreement is a technical exercise aimed at
ensuring that the Agreement, which was made in 1993, is up-to-date. 4.
Pool Re was set up in 1993 to ensure that terrorism insurance for commercial
property would continue to be available in Great Britain, following the withdrawal of reinsurers from the market. HM Treasury is the reinsurer of last resort for Pool Re, protecting it in the event that it exhausts all its financial resources following claim payments. 5.
Following 11 September 2001, a package of measures was agreed in July 2002 to
extend the coverage of the Pool Re scheme from terrorist incidents involving fire and explosion to an “all risks” basis. HM Treasury (2004)
6.9 The Bellwin Scheme 6.9.1
Background and General Information
The Bellwin Scheme was introduced by the government in 1983. The scheme does not provide insurance cover, but was established to provide financial help to local authorities in the aftermath of large-scale emergencies. The Government has the powers needed to make emergency financial assistance available to local authorities (as defined in section 155(4) of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989) in England. A Bellwin scheme may be activated in any case where an emergency or disaster involving destruction of or danger to life or property occurs and, as a result, one or more local authorities incur expenditure on, or in connection with, the taking of immediate action to safeguard life or property, or to prevent suffering or severe inconvenience, in 159
their area or among its inhabitants. There is no automatic entitlement to financial assistance: Ministers are empowered by Section 155 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 to decide whether or not to activate a scheme after considering the circumstances of each individual case. Qualifying Emergencies Bellwin has traditionally been seen as a response to incidents in which bad weather caused threats to life and property beyond all previous local experience. Although the law does not rule out other types of incident, the Department expects that the scheme will continue to apply predominantly as a response to bad weather incidents that occur within the area that the scheme covers. It is unlikely to set up a scheme in response to events in areas where the government makes specific provision. In these cases, authorities are expected to deal with some rise and fall in expenditure demands within the money allocated to the spending programme concerned. The extensive flooding in the UK during the summer of 2007 is an example of this kind of emergency. The Department Communities and Local Government (2007)
6.10 Insurance practice A company which requires insurance cover against burglary, for example, would approach an insurance broker or, if they wish, an insurance company direct. In the case of a direct approach, only that insurer would provide a premium quotation. However, if a company approaches an insurance broker, that broker will contact several insurers to obtain alternative and competitive quotations. The broker and/or insurer would direct the insured to complete a proposal form giving full details of the buildings in question. In certain cases the insurer or broker would arrange a survey to provide fullest details to insurers. The broker would then canvass various insurers to obtain the best possible terms and premium. Where an insurance company has been contacted directly, they will underwrite the risk and provide a quotation to the insured.
6.11 The insurance policy Once the insured has obtained a quotation and reviewed the policy wordings they will then decide on an insurer. Cover is put in place, the premium is paid by the insured to their insurers and policy documents are issued.
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6.11.1 The policy
By persuading their organisation to take out insurance against certain risks, the security or risk manager transfers those risks to insurers who accept them in return for the payment of a premium. The contract is evidenced by the insurance policy, which sets out clearly and unequivocally what is and what is not covered by the insurance policy. Although the Association of British Insurers (ABI) currently publish standard recommended policy wordings/forms, there is no true barrier to any individual policy document taking a unique form. However, there would still be basic insurance definitions arising from the law which would apply to the interpretation of any such individual document in the event of a dispute. One such aspect, which is continually the subject of legal consideration, is the principle of uberimma fides (utmost good faith) (in contrast to that of caveat emptor - let the buyer beware). English law recognised over 200 years ago that caveat emptor had no place in negotiations for a contract of insurance. Arguably, it is and always has been essential that each party has full knowledge of the intents of the other. Thus the doctrine of full disclosure or utmost good faith rests with both insurer and insured and applies prior to and during the period of the policy. In the period between 1923 and 1985, the majority of the major insurance companies were members of the Fire Officers Committee (FOC) and as such it was mandatory for each subscribing company to use the standard policy wordings which were issued by the FOC. Throughout this period ‘Accident Policies’ were issued through the Accident Offices Committee which was an organisation of similar standing to the Fire Officers’ Committee. In 1985 the FOC was incorporated into the Association of British Insurers (ABI), with the standard policy wordings issued by the ABI being termed ‘Recommended’ as opposed to mandatory. 6.11.2 Policy conditions
These conditions constitute the ‘small print’ by which insurers protect themselves from 161
their less scrupulous policyholders Whilst fraud may be very strongly suspected, the onerous burden of proof necessary to prove fraud may be insurmountable and therefore insurers would resort to establishing a breach of policy condition as their only available device to defeat the claim. Of particular interest is Claims Conditions 1 a (iii) and 2. Claims Condition 1 a (iii) states: [...] the Insured shall deliver to the Insurer [...] all such proofs and information relating to the claim as may reasonably be required.
This statement basically reiterates the common law requirement that he who asserts must prove. Hence, in the event that insurers are presented with a loss that they regard as suspect, they are entitled to require the insured to strictly prove both the quantum of the claim and, indeed, the cause of the loss. In this case insurers are not required to express opinions on the subject of policy cover, etc. and to remain silent is often a very strong position to adopt. The use of the ‘strict proof’ tactic has resulted in many legal cases over the years, and the court report on the 1993 case of Sagir v Barnes makes for interesting reading. In this case a Birmingham jeweller alleged that he was attacked in a multi-storey car-park where his alleged assailants overpowered him and stole three cases of jewellery from his car boot containing jewellery valued at £212,564. An insurance policy was in force with a limit of liability of £200,000 and the claim was set at this amount. The defendant underwriter refused to indemnify the jeweller and the judge said that a defendant was entitled to say by way of defence that the claim should be strictly proved and admit nothing, in which case the onus remained with the plaintiff to establish the case he was alleging. In the final outcome the jeweller failed to satisfy the court that a robbery had occurred and his claim failed - yet fraud was not a factor that was considered. Once again, it is important to be aware that the use of the requirement for claimants to be put to ‘strict proof’ is not solely a tactic available in insurance matters and can be employed by security managers in many similar instances. Claims Condition 2 is entitled ‘Fraud’ and confirms that if the claim is fraudulent or fraudulent means are used by the insured or anyone acting on his behalf, then all benefit under the policy is forfeit. 162
At first glance this would seem to offer a very effective tool to defeat fraudulent claimants. However, in practice it is suggested that only in relatively rare instances is there a sufficient body of evidence to make use of the condition and risk a legal battle, which may not be sustainable. This is borne out in the 1994 case of Diggens v Sun Alliance and London Insurance. The matter related to structural repairs to Diggens’ property which were alleged to have been necessary due to the operation of the insured peril of subsidence. The value of the claim put forward totalled some £157,000 and indeed the insurers had paid Diggens in excess of £102,000. There was then a dispute over additional works that the insurer alleged were carried out because of an uninsured defect. In a legal report published in the Post Magazine, 22 September 1994, the trial judge said: The mere fact of instructing the builder to carry out extra works which were not in respect of an insured peril was not in itself a breach of any term of the policy or of the Insured’s duties owed to the Insurers. The breach, if there was one; lay in the making of a false claim. Post Magazine, 22 September (1994)
In the event, the insurers failed in the bid to prove fraud and the judgment went in favour of the insured. Additionally, during the case of Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services (1994), it was doubted whether every claim which is knowingly exaggerated in some degree should as a matter of law disqualify the insured from any recovery. However, the final decision in the Orakpo case supported the insurer in their contention that the claim was fraudulently exaggerated. In conclusion, insurance fraud is no different to any other category of fraudulent act but the problem arises in attempting to draw a line between wilful deception and mere exaggeration. As indicated by these instances of fraud, the very fact that insurance exists opens the door to insurance-related crimes. For this reason, and to protect both the insurer and the insured from abuses (both parties, insurer and insured, are heavily reliant on the honesty and reliability of the other), certain legally binding principles have grown up to ensure the ‘fairness’ of insurance contracts to both parties. Foremost amongst these principles is the concept of ‘utmost good faith’. 163
6.12 Utmost good faith This doctrine, which is embodied in statute, has also been subsequently underpinned by the decisions of legal cases and can be defined as follows: Uberimmae fidea. (Of the fullest confidence.) A contract is said to be uberrimae fidea when the promisee is bound to communicate to the promisor every fact and circumstances which may influence him in deciding to enter into the contract or not. Contracts of insurance of every kind are of this class. Bird (1990): 332
Most reported cases on the principle of utmost good faith have arisen because the insurer maintains that the proposer/insured has not shown good faith in negotiations at the proposal stage. This is typified by an extract from the following judgement: In policies of insurance there is an understanding that the contract is Uberimma Fides, that, if you know any circumstances at all that may influence the Underwriter’s opinion at the risk he is incurring and consequently as to whether he takes the risk and what premium he will charge you will state what you know. The concealment of any material facts known to you, whether you thought it material or not, voids the policy. Brownie v Cambell (1880)
In essence, the only option open to an individual or organisation applying for insurance is to answer all questions fully and to declare any relevant information they may have; failure to do so will lead to the failure of any subsequent claim. The concept of good faith can be quite far-reaching, as demonstrated in the case of Woolcott v Sun Alliance and London Assurance (1978), where the court accepted that failure to disclose a criminal conviction was material and that the insurer would not have accepted the risk due to the increased moral hazard. The criminal conviction in question related to armed robbery and the insured had served a 12-year prison sentence ending the year before the policy was taken out. Mr Woolcott had failed to disclose it, which ultimately led to his substantial claim for fire damage being defeated. As regards the insurer’s part of the bargain, major insurers instruct their loss adjusters that all claims should be dealt with ‘fairly and firmly’ within the terms of their policies, which reinforces the intention to act with good faith.
6.13 Conclusion This Unit has provided the student with an insight into the basic principles and practice of insurance and the link between insurance, risk management and security 164
management. The unit has also explored current challenges to the insurance industry in the light of terrorist activity and climate change. In the current business environment it is imperative that risk, and losses, be minimised. The economic situation is such that the problem of risk can no longer be simply insured against or transferred to underwriters. Nor is insurance alone sufficient there will be risks which have not been identified, or correctly evaluated, and there will also be occasions when insurance is prohibitively expensive or the risk uninsurable. Against the current background of massive insurance losses, the underwriter expects the utmost security measures to be in place and risk management to be an integral part of their client’s business strategy. Currently, there is a growing demand for risk management services in the commercial world and that demand is coming from insurance buyers. At board level, business plans are being put in place, with the more alert companies incorporating risk management provisions which go far beyond simply buying insurance. Risk management is also a serious business amongst insurance companies, with many employing their own risk management departments. As technology and the spread of information is made more readily available, insurers will come to expect, if not demand, higher and higher levels of security with the risks they insure. The role of the security manager therefore must be increasingly risk targeted, proactive and insurance aware only in this way can the security manager hope to align the interests of the organisation with the financial implications of security.
6.14 Guide to reading You should now read the supplied reading matter: The paper ‘From Industrial Society to Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and Ecological Enlightenment’ by Ulrich Beck.
6.15 Study questions You should now undertake the following exercise which has been designed to increase your understanding of the decision-making process of risk assessment and its 165
relationship to insurance. We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of the material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University. With reference to your own organisation, or a company you are familiar with, examine the following categories of risk and consider what type of insurance cover, if any, would best suit each one: •
theft and material damage
•
employer’s liability
•
public liability
•
vehicular (accidental damage and third party)
•
uninsured risks.
With reference to each risk you should first, write a short paragraph stating which risks you would retain and which you would allocate to outside insurers (together with your reasons why). Second, with regard to the risks you have decided should be retained, please state whether you would recommend that they should be: •
paid from cash flow?
•
paid from an internal fund?
•
paid from a captive insurance fund?
•
financially reinsured?
•
dealt with through a combination of the above?
6.16 Bibliography Adams, J. (1999) Review for The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry UCL, 8.9.98, published in vol.10, no.1. Osborn, P. (2005) Osbom’s Concise Law Dictionary, London: Sweet and Maxwell. Curwin, J. and Slater, R. (2001) Quantitative Methods for Business Decisions, London: Thompson. Dickson, G. & Stein, B. (2003) Insurance a brief guide, London: The Chartered Insurance 166
Institute. Financial Ombudsman Service (2005) Ombudsman News, December 2004/January 2005. London: Financial Ombudsman Service Limited. Š Financial Ombudsman Service (2002) Ombudsman News, October 2002 issue 21. London: Financial Ombudsman Service Limited. Š Franklin, J. (1998) (ed) The Politics of Risk Society. London, Polity. Furedi, F. (1997) The Culture of Fear . London, Cassell. http://www.local.communities.qov.uk/finance/bellwin/beII078.pdf http://www.lancs.ac.uk/biopoliticsofsecurityindex.php?page=research&project_id= pr10002 Home Office (1988) Report of the Working Group on the Prevention of Arson, London: Home Office. Home Office (1999) Safer Communities: Towards Effective Arson Control. The Report of the Arson Scoping Study, London: Home Office. HM Treasury (2004) Pool reinsurance arrangements: technical notice to industry, London: HM Treasury. Litton, R. A. (1990) Crime and Crime Prevention for Insurance Practice, Hants: Gower. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2002) The Burning Issue: Research and Strategies for Reducing Arson. London: OPDM. The Chartered Insurance Institute (2007) What is Insurance? London: The Chartered Insurance Institute. The Communities and Local Government (2007) Bellwin Scheme of Emergency Financial Assistance to Local Authorities, London: The Communities and Local Government. Walker, C & Broderick, J. (2006) The Civil Contingencies Act 2004: Risk, Resilience, and the Law in the United Kingdom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Adams, J (1999) Review for The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry. UCL, 8.9.98, published in vol. 10, no 1.
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6.17 References ABI.2005.
The
Economic
Value
of
General
Insurance,
available
at:
http://www.abi.org.uk/Bookshop/default.asp#General_Insurance_Social_and _Economic_Value: Association of British Insurers. Adams, John. 1998. Review for The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry. UCK 8.9.98, published in vol. 10, no 1. Alderman, David Brewer, 2006. Speech given at The Insurance Dinner, Mansion House, 7 June 2006, available at:http://213.86.34.248/NR/rdonlyres/D1B14763-2AD6-40A59851-825D2AB4C534/0/MC_SP_insurance06.pdf Bougen, Philip, 2003. Catastrophe Risk. Economy and Society 32 (2):253-274. Dillon, Michael, 1996. Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought. London: Routledge. Dillon, Michael, 2003. Virtual Security: A Life Science of (Dis)order. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 32 (3):531-558. Dillon, Michael, 2004. The Security of Governance. In Global Governmentality, edited by W. Larner and W. Walters. London: Routledge. Dillon, Michael, 2005. Global Security in the 21st Century: Circulation, Complexity and Contingency. Chatham House ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 05(02):2-3. Dillon, Michael, 2006. Governing Through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance Political Geography doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.08.003. Dixon, Lloyd, Noreen Clancy Clancy, Seath Seabury, and Adrian Overton. 2006. The National Flood Insurance Program’s Market Penetration Rate. Santa Monica, Ca: RAND Corporation. Elden, Stuart. 2001. Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the project of a spatial history, London: Continuum. Elden, Stuart. 2004. Understanding Henri Lefebvre: Theory and the Possible. London: Continuum. Ericson, Richard, and Aaron Doyle. 2004. Catastrophe risk, insurance and terrorism. Economy and Society 33 (2): 135-173. 168
Foucault, Michel. 1994. Space, Knowledge and Power. In Michael Foucault:
The
Essential Works, Vol 3: Power, edited by J. D. Faubion. London: Allen Lane-The Penguin Press. Luck, Peter H. 2005. Special risks and contingency cover insurance. Zurich: Swiss Reinsurance Company.
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READING ‘From
Industrial
Society
to
Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and Ecological Enlightenment’ Beck, U. (1992) In Theory, Culture and Society: Vol. 9: 97-123. Following (announced
the on
Interim 13th
Decision December
of 2001),
the
Copyright
permission
copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.
to
Tribunal make
this
7 Unit Seven: Terrorism 7.1 Introduction This Unit considers terrorism in greater detail, offering a consideration of the causes and management of terrorism and how terrorism might be managed in a democracy. The history of terrorism can be traced back to the Sicarii of first century Palestine and early forms of terrorism included assassination of political leaders and/or attempts to bring about popular revolution (House of Commons, 2001). In more recent times, terrorist groups have tried to promulgate a cause or ideology by intimidation particularly for political ends. Terrorists including the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Bader Meinhoff, ETA craved media attention for their cause but often avoiding mass fatalities by providing warnings of bombs to allow evacuation to take place, producing property damage and publicity but avoiding loosing popular appeal by killing innocent people (House of Commons, 2001). This type of terrorism could be referred to as the ‘Old Terrorism’. Since September 11, 2001, however, terrorism has developed into a far more sinister form – what could be referred to as the ‘New Terrorism’, with the apparent promotion of religious fanaticism pitching one form of culture or civilisation (Islam) against another form of culture or civilisation (the “imperialist capitalist” countries of the West). According to the House of Commons (House of Commons, 2001), this development (a “new dimension”) has been carried out by a minority of extremist religious zealots who promote the view of the Western form of culture and civilisation as being antiIslamic, particularly with the assistance given to Israel by the United States of America and the “interference” in Arab affairs. (This is where the ‘New Dimension’ programme to equip the Emergency services to deal with potentially catastrophic situations got its name from). A useful introduction to the idea of a clash of civilisations is contained in Huntington (1998) who argued that future conflict would not be amongst nations but rather would be concerned with civilisations, ideas and cultures. (For criticism of Huntingdon’s
argument see Rubio [2002: 67] although other authors comment that ‘Even if we maintain that this struggle is not a ‘clash of civilisations’, our enemies regularly define precisely as that … al Qaeda describes its fundamental raison d’etre in terms of the ‘clash of civilisations’ …[Hoffman, 2005: 19]). Terrorism may be classified a number of ways but for the purposes of this Unit, the following typology will be used: 1.
Domestic
2.
International or transnational terrorism
3.
State sponsored – this is when a government uses terrorism against its own citizens or in support of international terrorism.
This Unit will primarily be concerned with the first two typologies although aspects of the third will be referred to on occasions. Domestic terrorism originates within a particular country and stays within those national boundaries. Consequently, such terrorism is an ‘internal’ problem for the country concerned and whilst other countries may express concern or support for what is happening, they do not (or should not) interfere and in fact, are usually requested not to. (It is an ‘internal’ matter). With domestic terrorism, there are no obvious ‘spillovers’ of benefits or costs to other countries. Thus, there is no apparent need for international co-operation in the case of domestic terrorism (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2005: 172). International or transnational terrorism, on the other hand, has implications for two or more countries. If an incident starts in one country but terminates in another (e.g., 9/11), then the incident can be said to be an international or transnational terrorist event. The kidnapping of foreign workers in Iraq during 2004 to pressure governments to remove their citizens from the U.S.-backed reconstruction efforts would represent transnational terrorist attacks (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2005: 172). The difference between domestic terrorism and international terrorism is the concept of ‘spillover’. Spillover refers to actions or deeds in one country having an effect in another. This would apply to both terrorist deeds and action by ‘legitimate’ forces of the
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state in trying to deal with the terrorism. The student will already have read how domestic terrorism does not have any ‘spillover’ per se. International terrorism, on the other hand, does have spillover. For example, when, political grievances in the Middle East motivate terrorists to stage attacks in European cities (e.g., Madrid, 2004). Rosendorff and Sandler, (2005: 172) comment that such terrorists use these European venues to gain a wider media exposure and greater global awareness for their political agenda. Additionally, international terrorism may also have a spillover effect if it causes the terrorists to move to countries where the counter-terrorist effort is perceived to be not so strict. This may also foster recruitment to the terrorist group, which can then augment risks to potential target countries (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2005). This latter point highlights how terrorism differs from conventional warfare. Because the enemy is not a nation-state, victory cannot be achieved by defeating/removing an opposing government, even when it may be deemed, by some, to be necessary - as in the case of Afghanistan or Iraq. Grayling (2004) comments in this regard ‘…(the) enemy is not a nation, a state, an army, or anything with a habitation local enough to aim a missile at. It is a philosophy’. Before getting into the Unit properly, it is useful to remember the following points concerning terrorism: 1. Luck: After the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bombed the Grand Hotel in Brighton in 1984 in an attempt to murder the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet, the terrorist organisation issued the following statement: ‘Today we were unlucky, but remember: we only have to be lucky once’ (Bardon: 2001: 754; O’Doherty: 1998: 97) 2. The global paradox: The bigger the world economy, the more powerful its smallest players (Naisbitt, 1994: 12). 3. War on the cheap: Terrorism has become relatively common throughout the world because it is a low-cost, low-risk, potentially high-yield method of struggle for all kinds of groups and regimes (Buchanan, 2006; Roth et al., 2004; Wilkinson,
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2002: 78). 4. The media: Over-riding all of the various issues that will be discussed below, the student should never under-estimate the importance of the media. Perception is a key element of study in this course (risk perception) and ‘perception’ is no less important in the management of terrorism. References to the media will be made throughout this Unit but a specific study of the media and terrorism is not included. 5. Understand the concept: When seeking to manage terrorism, it is important to try and understand it. How can something be managed if it is not understood? Consider the following poem by the Irish poet, Yeats about a person on hunger strike. He has chosen death: Refusing to eat or drink, that he may bring Disgrace upon me; for there is a custom, An old and foolish custom, that if a man Be wronged, or think that he is wronged, and starve Upon another’s threshold till he die, The common people, for all time to come, Will
raise
a
heavy
cry
against
that
threshold,
Even though it be the King’s. The King’s Threshold, by W. B. Yeats The student is asked to reflect on this removing, whilst doing so, ‘the cloak of his/her own worldview’. (According to Dake [1992], worldviews are general attitudes towards the world and its social organisation and as such, are ‘orienting dispositions’ which serve to guide people’s responses in complex situations). This is in order to try and understand the motivation behind terrorism. (It is acknowledged that this will be quite difficult for students as their values and beliefs will reflect their own society and their experiences in that society. Just how difficult this is was shown by the RAND organisation who carried out a ‘table-top’ exercise in 2004 to try and understand the Jihadist perspective and determine how well the US National
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Strategy for Combating Terrorism was working. They found, amongst other things, that it was very difficult to get into the mind-set of the Jihadist. [Parachini, 2005: 12-13]). Did the student feel moved by the words of the poem? Did the student feel some sympathy, some admiration for the ‘hunger striker’? The student is now asked to consider the same poem only this time with a worldview supportive of the ‘hunger striker’. The student would be living in the same area or town or city as the hunger striker. What is the feeling now? Perhaps the student felt good; that it was justified; that someone had the courage to kill themselves by deliberately starving themselves to death; that ‘the struggle’ will be worth it in time; that ‘I knew that person. I knew his family’. Keep these thoughts in mind and now consider how a particular ‘terrorist’ action might be understood. Calhoun et al. (2002: 22) comment that: The way that we recount (or see) events – even such seemingly unassailable tragedies as September 11 – depends deeply on the world we inhabit as we witness them. What September 11 was to a New Yorker is not exactly what it was to a poor Muslim on the streets of Jakarta (material in brackets added).
In essence, the point being made is that when considering terrorism and how to manage it, it is important to view it through a cultural and social lens that is appropriate for the state or situation in which it is being played out. The Unit is not seeking to excuse terrorism; it is seeking to understand it and thereby manage it better. Following this brief introduction to the concept of terrorism, the Unit will develop this further by a consideration of: •
How terrorism is defined.
•
The causes of terrorism.
•
How terrorism might be managed.
•
How democracies might address the issue of terrorism.
There is an interesting set of articles on terrorism from the Club de Madrid series on Democracy and Terrorism. These have helped to inform and illustrate this Unit and grateful acknowledgement is made to the Club de Madrid for permission to follow the structure of their conference in March, 2005 when preparing this Unit.
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The articles resulted from the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in Madrid between 8 - 11 March 2005. The three volumes resulting address the Causes of Terrorism, Confronting Terrorism’ and Towards a Democratic Response. They can be found at http://english.safe-democracy.org/.
7.2 Defining terrorism Defining what terrorism is (and what it is not) is crucial to the effective management of terrorism. The rationale for this is straightforward: how can you manage a situation if you do not know what you are dealing with or when there is no common agreement of what that situation is? Defining terrorism, however, has proven to be very difficult. The difficulty is that the old adage of ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ seems to be very true. This is because everybody has different perspectives (worldviews) of the world they live in, their country and how they see things. Consequently, they naturally see issues differently. Even the United Nations Security Council has been unable to define the term. Keohane (2002: 77) notes that ‘each party seeks to define its enemy’s acts, but not its own, as terrorist’. The issue continues to perplex the United Nations as is evidenced by the difficulties over defining terrorism that occurred at the 60th Anniversary Summit held in New York in September, 2005. For example, Mac Askill (2005) reported: A meeting of the UN security council unanimously passed a UK-sponsored resolution outlawing incitement to terrorism at home or abroad. But that has been undermined by the failure to agree a definition of terrorism. Middle East countries, in particular, insist some groups, such as the Palestinians, are engaged in legitimate resistance and are not terrorists.
Hoffman (1998: 26) notes that when Yassir Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly in 1974, he stated that: The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called a terrorist ….
All of the commentary above illustrates how difficult it is to get individuals,
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organisations, states and countries to agree on a common definition. Jahangir and Azzam (2005: 28) observe in this context that: The difference of opinion regarding the definition of terrorism is not incidental. It reflects varied experiences of terrorism and a lack of unanimity amongst decision makers in their level of commitment and approach in combating terrorism. At the same time, there appears to be a wider consensus in bending the rules to counter what each of them perceives to be, or wishes to call, ‘terrorism’.
The whole issue over the language used in a terrorism context is crucial. The student will recall Module 1, Unit 2 and the material dealing with Dombrowsky. Dombrowsky’s statement that ‘Disasters do not cause effects. The effects are what we call disaster’ illustrate a similar point to that of attempting to define terrorism. That is, the argument behind Dombrowsky’s quote expresses his concern as to ‘how language is structuring our perception of the world’ through our ‘tenacity of lingual haziness’ (Dombrowsky, 1995: cited in Quarantelli, 1998: 21). The same point could be made with regard to defining terrorism. Having introduced the concept and considered definitional issues relating to it, the Unit now examines some of the main causes of terrorism.
7.3 A Consideration of the Causes of Terrorism A consideration of the causes of terrorism is important because without some understanding of the causes, then how can these be addressed? It would be like a retail organisation in the High Street bringing out a product to sell without carrying out any market research into the potential of the product. There are various causes of terrorism and these may be grouped under the following headings: 7.3.1
Psychology
Under this heading, the intention is to try and understand what it is that makes people commit acts such as 9/11 in the United States or 7/7 in London, 2005. There are two main schools of thought on why someone should become a terrorist (Steven, 2005: 296). 1. 177
Rational Choice Theory: it is a rational or strategic choice as a reaction to
their environment. 2.
Psychopathology Theory: this suggests that individuals are drawn to terrorism as a result of some psychopathological disorder.
Rational choice theory explains terrorism by proposing that it is a rational or strategic choice as a reaction to the environment of the person. Rubio (2002: 62) argues that whilst the terrorist may be difficult to understand per se (worldviews – see above), the ‘terrorist is a profoundly rational individual’. Harrison (in Arnot, 2003) states that ‘I see it as a contract between the young person and the terrorist faction to exchange life for identity’. He adds: Community pressures are very strong, and you have to remember that families collude. I’ve seen many TV clips of parents sending off a son. They know that his name will be immortalised, and a substantial cheque from a government that sponsors terrorism will, in some cases, go some way to ease the pain of his passing (See also Harrison, 2003).
Consequently, it could be argued, for example, that a person committing suicide is rational in the sense that it gives that individual identity and respect as well as reflecting positively upon his/her family. (A potential difficulty with this is that ‘each new martyr must compete for distinction with all existing martyrs who are currently remembered. Thus the distinction attached to a martyr’s identity may diminish with the number of recent martyrs’ [Harrison, 2003: 13]). Silke (2003: 7) comments in this regard that the suicide: … bombers are not psychopaths. Instead, they are usually stable and unremarkable individuals … They are so normal for their communities and societies’. He also notes that there is a strong awareness of the needs of the surviving family stating that most of the terrorist groups provide pensions for the families (Hamas pays $300 per month).
Turning to psychopathology theory, Post (2005: 7) succinctly sums this up, stating: ‘… terrorist groups and organisations regularly screen out emotionally unstable individuals. They represent, after all, a security risk’. Silke (1998: cited in Silke, 2001: 580) goes so far as to say ‘It is very rare to find a terrorist who suffers from a clinically defined ‘personality disorder’ or who could in any way be regarded as mentally ill or psychologically deviant’. Steven (2005: 296) acknowledges that whilst there may be some validity to rational
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choice theory, ‘To try and suggest that one theory in particular is dominant is simply naïve’. The key then to the psychology of the terrorist would appear to be not with the individual terrorist but with a number of influencing factors including his (or her) religion, culture, politics, economics as well as organisational and social psychologies. (Munthe, 2005: 8; Steven, 2005: 296). Post (2005: 7-8) confirms this stating: Given how different the causes and perspectives of right-wing, nationalist-separatist, social revolutionary and religious fundamentalist terrorists, it should come as no surprise that the psychologies of these types of terrorism differ as much as their motivations. … And while psychology plays a crucial role in understanding terrorism, to comprehend this complex phenomenon fully requires an inter-disciplinary approach, incorporating knowledge from political, historical, cultural, economic, ideological and religious scholarship.
7.3.2
Political Explanations
To put political explanations of terrorism into perspective, the student may find it helpful to consider how the world has changed over the last twenty years. Gone is the old boundary of the Cold War. This boundary shaped the ‘conventional’ war potential in the latter part of the twentieth century. There was symmetry between the two main factions, the West and the East (America and the USSR). Now, however, there is no symmetry between nations. America is the world’s only super-power. As Tucker (1999) comments: (The US) is the only country to maintain a global naval presence, a panoply of overseas bases and the ability to deploy military forces to distant regions. The US defence budget, at over $280 billion for fiscal year 2000, is several times larger than the combined spending of the countries generally perceived as the most likely future US opponents: China, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, Syria and Yugoslavia. (Note that Tucker was writing in 1999).
How then could a terrorist, poorly armed/dressed/fed/housed etc. influence, in a political sense, the world’s only superpower? The answer is by using innovative yet affordable weapons and tactics that minimise the effectiveness of that superpower and bring political and other rewards out of all proportion to the expenditure, effort and numbers of operatives involved. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland became very adept at improvising explosive devices (IEDs) and adopting tactics to make the job of the security 179
forces (or, as the terrorist might see it, the invader or occupying force) so much harder. (The military in Northern Ireland quickly found out that if they used the same patrol route on too many occasions or in a regular pattern, they would suffer loses in the form of deaths or injuries because the terrorist attacked them). In response to these attacks, the terrorist attempts to make the ‘State’ adopt measures which are expensive, hard/severe on the local population, ineffective and ideally illustrating, both operationally and politically, how ineffective the state is to a wider audience. All of this is intended to have a political effect. (The student may recall the US attempt to strike at the al Qaeda leadership in 1998 when cruise missiles were fired from ships in the Arabian Sea. Clarke [2004: 189] records the reaction to this attack: ‘(it seemed that) Clinton had launched a military strike to divert attention from the Monica [Lewinsky] scandal; the Defence Department had wasted valuable cruise missiles attacking huts and tents’). Wilkinson (2002: 221) gives an example of the political consequences of terrorism. … the handling of the seizure of the entire United States diplomatic mission in Tehran in 1979 became a colossal burden on the Carter administration, crippling other activities and weakening US morale and prestige internationally, particularly in the Middle East. In the early 1980s, the tragic bombings of US marines in Lebanon not only took large numbers of lives, but also severely curtailed President Reagan’s military options in the Middle East and made it impossible for him to maintain a US presence in Lebanon, either through the multinational force or independently. The suicide bombers’ atrocity reached US opinion, Congress and the media, as it was clearly designed to do.
In essence, political explanations for terrorism relate to the fact that a small group of people can have a political effect out of all proportion to their size or the percentage of a population they (allegedly) represent. Freedman (2005: 21) puts it bluntly: ‘As a strategy, terrorism is designed to use actual or threatened violence to cause psychological effects which can be turned into political gains’. An example was the Madrid Bombings of March 2004. This particular atrocity highlights the point that a well-timed terrorist incident can have significant political ramifications. (An obvious example was the newly elected Spanish government withdrawing Spanish troops from the American-led coalition in Iraq [Rosendorff and Sandler, 2005: 171]). In addition to the ‘war of the flea’ (Taber, 2002 and Taber [undated]) methodology
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outlined above, political explanations of terrorism at the macro level could be argued to centre around two dimensions: The freedoms associated with the West (free movement and the media are the obvious examples) and Globalisation. With regard to the first, Wilkinson (2002: 220) comments that western liberal democracies are vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of the openness of their societies (giving terrorists freedom of speech and association) and the ease of movement across and within borders. This enables the terrorist ‘to move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea’ (Mao Tse-Tung). In a democratic society, the media are unregulated – at least to some degree. (The student will note that there are varying degrees of democracy). In any terrorist campaign involving a democracy, it is likely that the media will be one of the ‘spillover’ (see above) effects of terrorism. For example, Rosendorff and Sandler (2005: 179) comment in this regard that: Due process and the preservation of individual rights protect not only the ordinary citizen but also the terrorists. Such freedoms and rights may facilitate spillover terrorism as grievances from abroad give rise to terrorist events staged in democracies. Press freedoms may exacerbate this spillover because deadly terrorist attacks will likely receive widespread coverage that can make a terrorist cause known far and wide. Through this news coverage, liberal democracies may unwittingly bolster the ability of transnational terrorists to create anxiety in a targeted audience.
This ‘double-edged’ aspect of the media presents challenges for decision-makers in order to, on the one hand, inform the public but on the other, not to ‘over-play’ the threat – which might have political consequences (Manningham-Buller, 2003). The importance of this issue is such that specific attention has been given to media management in the Civil Contingencies Act, 2004 (CCA, 2004). More specifically, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations, 2005, provide ‘In performing its duty under section 2 (1) (f) (duty to arrange for the publication of assessments and plans), a general Category 1 responder must have regard to the importance of not alarming the public unnecessarily’. Emergency Preparedness (HM Government, 2005), the guidance to part 1 of the CCA 2004, states ‘ At every stage of the process, the key to effective communication with the public is getting the message right for the right audience’ (para. 7.82, page 106). 181
Nonetheless, the influence of the media should not be overplayed. For example, Petts et al. (2001: v) carried out research, which questioned the validity of the perception that the media were the main culprit for the perceived amplification of risk. They found that ‘a large body of media research would refute this interpretation’. What this shows is that although the media undoubted have an influence – and it would seem that this is most likely to be strongly felt in the short term – there is no definitive evidence as to the extent of this. The second dimension, the concept of ‘globalisation’, considers the political impact of the interdependencies of the modern world. There are various definitions of globalisation but essentially, ‘all these converge on the notion that human activities across regions and continents are increasingly linked together as a result of both technological and social change’ (Keohane, 2002: 78). Globalisation is very much linked with global economics, which will be considered in the next section, but it is useful at this point to consider the concept in terms of political impact. Whilst globalisation has many benefits (Greenspan, 2004), there is little doubt that, for some countries, particularly those that are less well developed, globalisation has had a substantial negative impact (Sassen, 2002: 109). From a political perspective, Guehenno, (2001: 88) comments that: The evolution of terrorism may become a strategic threat characterising the age of globalisation. … Such an evolution raises fundamental questions for democracies, which have always made a distinction between what they allow themselves to do ‘abroad’ and what they are permitted to do domestically. If there is no ‘abroad’, if each citizen is a potential enemy, the balance between the requirements imposed to safeguard the collective security of a group and the requirements of individual freedom may be upset at the expense of the latter.
A final point when considering globalisation and terrorism is that it is worth recalling the words of Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman AI Zawahiri. He argues that it is better for the youth of Islam to pick up arms than to submit to the humiliation of globalization and Western hegemony (Stern, 2002: 37).
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7.3.3
Economic Factors
Perhaps the best indication of the importance of these factors to the modern terrorist is to quote from Bin Laden himself. In a videotape broadcast by Bin Laden in October 2004, he stated: ‘So we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy. Allah willing, and nothing is too great for Allah’ (Bin Laden, 2004). In considering economic factors that give some explanation of terrorism, there are arguably three issues to consider. The first is perhaps the most obvious. That is, terrorism from an economic standpoint can be explained by a consideration of issues concerning poverty, injustice and inequality. (These factors can be either real or perceived, it does not really matter. It is the perception that counts). The argument is that due to these factors, people are minded to favour the terrorist (passive support) if not actually join the terrorists (active support). Stern (2005: 36) cites the then British diplomat Paul Schulte who warned that: (The) casbah (the slum in Algiers where resentment of French colonialism finally boiled over) is spreading worldwide. Every first world city now has a third world one within it … where residents are ‘emotionally very far withdrawn from the surrounding national public space’, … extremist groups are likely to prey on individuals with ‘various statuses of official citizenship and subjective identity, identification and loyalty’.
Having stated this, it is important to note that: Poverty per se is not a direct cause of terrorism. Macro-studies show that terrorism can occur anywhere, but is more common in developing societies, rather than in poor or rich countries, and is most likely to emerge in societies characterized by rapid modernization (Gurr, 2005: 19).
The second issue, the impact of globalization (referred to above) would seem to be an obvious element in this perception. The impact is not, however, clear-cut. Stern (2005: 37) comments that: [...] (some authors) do not believe that globalisation is a motivating factor for terrorists: while globalisation increases the flow of trade and ideas, thereby increasing terrorists’ capacity to do us harm, their interest in doing so is not a result of that process. The counterargument [...] is that globalisation and the need to compete for jobs and ideas on a global scale feels humiliating, even if global productivity rises and although, on average, most people benefit. Terrorists find a way to augment and strengthen this feeling of humiliation among potential recruits. (Emphasis added)
Kuran (2002: 73) challenges this notion, stating:
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Globalisation itself, particularly the growth of international trade, is justified through hallowed Islamic institutions. Until modern times Islam encouraged long-distance trade through one of its five basic requirements, the duty, incumbent on all Muslims of means, to make at least one pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj). … the annual pilgrimage, which can be performed only during three specified days of the year, served as an occasion for intercontinental commerce on a grand scale.
He also cites Goitein (Goitein, 1966: in Kuran, 2002: 73 and 391) who states that commerce was so integral to the Islamic pilgrimage that a pilgrim would often be blessed through the formula “May God accept your pilgrimage, condone your sins and let you find a good market for your wares”’. Perhaps the point for the student to consider is the ‘feeling’ or perception of humiliation referred to in Stern (2005: 37) above. The third economic issue is that the cost of terrorism to the state becomes so much due to the actions of the terrorist (bombings and shootings) that it is encouraged to negotiate with the terrorists in order to avoid any more cost or harm to its economic interests and reputation. That is, terrorism is relatively inexpensive but the cost of that terrorism can be huge. Terrorism is war on the cheap; the war of the poor and disaffected. The situation in Northern Ireland, during what was euphemistically called ‘the troubles’, illustrates this strategy. O’Doherty (1998: 97) comments that ‘The massive inner-city bombs of the 1990s were … clearly part of an effort to urge the British to negotiate with the IRA, and they appeared to be successful in this’. It could be argued that the St Mary Axe bomb in 1992 and the Canary Warf bomb in 1996, both in London, were prime examples of this effort. As O’Doherty (1998: 98) comments about the Canary Wharf bomb: There have been occasions on which the degree of damage done to the City of London and threatened against Heathrow airport has been of a scale that was highly damaging and expensive. Many republicans felt it was this damage that prompted the British government to engage in the peace process in 1993. Two years later they were confronted with the refusal of the British government to respond as they had expected … The Canary Wharf bomb … is credited … with forcing the (British) government to 184
name a date for talks … Many believe that the Anglo-Irish Agreement (November 1985) was signed by Margaret Thatcher as a direct result of the … Brighton bomb. More recently, of course, the London bombings cost only ‘a few hundreds of pounds’ (Buchanan, 2006) yet the economic knock-on effect could be argued to have been substantial in terms of damage to London’s reputation and confidence as an international finance centre. It could be argued therefore that as with psychological factors, the evidence is conflicting. That is, economic factors do not cause terrorism per se although they do have some effect. Additionally, economic factors can be used by the terrorist as a methodology for a political gain. 7.3.4
Religion
Religion always seems to have been a part of wars and terrorism. An obvious example is the Crusades. Reader comments that ‘Religion can be a cause of terrorism due to its tendency to be often centred on themes that can be inherently polarizing – concepts of truth, notions of good, of absolutes and ultimate realities’ (Reader: undated comment cited in Juergensmeyer, 2005: 27). It can also be argued that so much of the perception of religion is built around myths. Steven (2005: 295) writing about, amongst other things, suicide bombers and religion, comments: A common myth is that suicide missions are only undertaken by religious fanatics, but there are others such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, who effect suicide missions based not on religion and the belief of automatic access to heaven but on indoctrination with the belief of becoming a martyr, legend or hero, by doing something to be remembered by and by making others proud. This latter point corroborates Harrison (2003) in which he comments that ‘I see it (suicide) as a contract between the young person and the terrorist faction to exchange life for identity’. Silke (2003) supports the non-effect of religion stating that Professor Ariel Merari, one
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of the few psychologists to have actually interviewed suicide bombers, says that ‘religion is relatively unimportant’. Nonetheless, as with so many other possible factors, the new terrorism could be argued to have at least some of its foundations in religion. The benefit of religion for the terrorist is that ‘… there is no need to compromise one’s goals. There is no need … to contend with society’s laws when one is obeying a higher authority’ (Juergensmeyer, 2002: 29). Again, however, as with the other factors, it needs to be remembered that ‘… while religion has been a major factor in recent acts of terrorism, it is seldom the only one. Religious ideologies … are often interwoven with those that are economic, social and political’ (Juergensmeyer, 2005: 27). The important thing for the student to understand when examining religion is that in spiritualising violence, religion gives that violence legitimacy and power. Juergensmeyer (2002: 29) observes that it can also give the leaders of that religion, or those associated with it, power out of all proportion to the actual number of adherents to that religion. 7.3.5
Culture
Cultural explanations of terrorism focus on the notion that terrorism is caused by different values and beliefs being held by different parts of the society and/or by different states. These come into conflict and result in violence. (This, broadly, is the idea of a clash of civilisations is contained in Huntington [1998] referred to earlier). Stern (2005: 35) emphasises the complicated nature of modern terrorism stating ‘Cultural factors (including ethnic and religious grievances) are likely to be interwoven with individual incentives, political ideologies and economic goals. Stern (2005: 36) considers culture in a post-modern perspective. Previously, and with reference to the non-indigenous community, culture has been thought of as establishing the appropriate values and beliefs of the society into which they have arrived or sought to be assimilated into. Now, however, in an era of globalisation, aided by the Internet and 24/7 news, the modern young are more likely to ‘find their identity in a new, radical
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jihadi culture’ which is very far removed from its cultural underpinnings. (See also Post, 2005: 10). Consequently, when considering culture, the student should look to post-modern values and beliefs and particularly globalisation when seeking cultural factors to explain the ‘new terrorism’. From the discussion above, the student should be able to recognize the complicated nature of terrorism and the fact that in seeking an explanation for it, no one particular cause is predominant. Rather, it is necessary to consider multiple and inter-related factors together with the environment and history of the situation.
7.4 The Management of Terrorism: an Operational Perspective This section examines how terrorism might be managed from the operational perspective. The discourse will consider perspectives from the police, intelligence, military and science and technology as well as taking into account how terrorist finances can be used in the management of terrorism. Before commencing the discussion, it is useful to make a general comment. The difficulty in trying to manage terrorism from an operational perspective is succinctly put by Bigo (2002: 80) who comments: The most acute problem encountered by protection agencies in a risk society is being able to differentiate between an accident and the malevolent or strategic intentions of an adversary. Identifying adversaries who refuse to claim responsibility for or comment on their acts because they are not looking to develop ‘propaganda by the deed’ is technically and politically difficult. From a technical point of view, this problem highlights the importance of human intelligence, … Politically, it complicates the situation because popular opinion demands the quick identification of a recognisable enemy, while the genuine enemy might hide behind silence or ‘false colours’. … contingency must be managed while at the same time symbolic overreaction combined with tactical impotence is avoided.
7.4.1
Policing
The student might readily recognise that in any liberal democratic state, the framework for tackling terrorism is the criminal justice system of that state. Given an existing framework of criminal justice, it is natural that the civil police are the prime agency for preventing and detecting terrorist crimes as well as tracking down suspects and bringing 187
them to trail (Wilkinson, 2002: 125). The difficulty for the police when trying to manage terrorism, however, is that they can be perceived to be, or are, an instrument of the state. This means that they are naturally apart from society even though they come from within it. This causes difficulty in the operational management of terrorism because the personnel who make up the police may have some natural sympathy with the terrorist (consider the situation in Iraq with the US trying to train a new Iraqi police force but the chief of the police stating openly that some of his police officers may side with the insurgents [Guardian Unlimited, 2005]) or else be overzealous in their application of the law, thereby potentially alienating some of the population who may previously have been inclined to support the state. A further difficulty is in identifying the terrorist. Although the police should ideally come from the community they serve, inevitably, they will not know everything that goes on in the community and must therefore rely on patrolling and gaining intelligence in order to try and identify the terrorist ‘fish’ in the sea of the population. This is undoubtedly difficult. Calhoun et al. (2002: 14) observe that: Fundamentalists, puritans and extremists of various sorts dominate our concerns for security, but as in lower Manhattan, so too in other parts of the world are religious convictions deployed for peace and care for the needy.
Hoffman (2005: 7) agrees with this pointing out that: As far back as 2001, the Netherlands’ intelligence and security service had detected increased terrorist recruitment efforts among Muslim youth … whom it was previously assumed had been completely assimilated into Dutch society and culture.
The London 7/7 bombing illustrated the difficulty for the police in trying to identify the terrorist. In his report on the Terrorism Bill, Lord Carlile (Carlile, 2005) commented: The 7th July events clearly involved British nationals, born and/or resident in the UK, … Its effect is to render the finding of terrorist cells far more difficult, … it is a well-known pattern of experienced terrorist organisations to use “clean skins”, i.e. terrorists who have not committed serious crimes before and are therefore less likely to attract the attention of the authorities. Nobody should be in any doubt of the difficulty this causes in detecting likely terrorists.
Lack of co-operation between the various law enforcement agencies, both nationally and locally can be an additional problem. Storbeck (2005: 7) notes in this regard that
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whilst information and intelligence are the raw material of all police work ‘ [...] the exchange of data between national and international law enforcement agencies continues to be reactive rather than pro-active . [...] in most cases, terrorism-related information is transmitted only following a specific request’. Storbeck’s rather depressing comment is corroborated when considering co-operation between various law enforcement agencies – even within countries. For example, Condoleeza Rice, the then US National Security Adviser, in her evidence to the panel investigating the September 11 atrocity, confirmed this (lack of co-operation) stating that the single greatest failure before the attacks was caused by ‘structural and legal impediments’ that prevented the sharing of intelligence between the FBI and CIA. She stated that there was ‘an inability to connect the dots’ (Reid, 2003). 7.4.2
Intelligence
From an operational perspective, intelligence could perhaps be argued to be the most important dimension. This is because intelligence defines how the operational response will be carried out. Making the natural (and reasonable) assumption that the state concerned does not wish to unnecessarily alienate the population, intelligence is vital in order to, and again paraphrasing Mao Tse-Tung, identify the terrorist fish swimming in the sea of the population. Intelligence needs to be accurate and up-to-date. If it is not, the consequences can be disastrous. As Bardon (2001: 682) comments about the introduction of internment in Northern Ireland in 1971: Internment was a major blunder if only because it failed to bring about the seizure of the leading members of the Provisional IRA. The army … simply lacked the necessary information … Police intelligence was … out of date.
The student should not underestimate, however, how difficult the intelligence dimension can be. Davis et al., (2005: 25) state the matter clearly: … we still face the issues that we have had all these number of years: how to provide policymakers with analysis that is not biased by the individual perspectives of the departments and agencies, and how to ensure that competing views are introduced into the formulation of intelligence estimates, so as to avoid ‘the failure of imagination’ in the words of the 9/11 Commission, or the ‘groupthink’, in the words of those who looked at our
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intelligence on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
Additionally, it is very difficult to get the balance between the resourcing of intelligence and operational activity, correct. (As Miles [2005: 19] comments: ‘… too much intelligence is as worthless as too little, for the police cannot follow up all of it’). The testimony into the 9/11 atrocity (Hill, 2002) gave an example of this. Hill gave evidence that an FBI agent had expressed concerns, based on first-hand knowledge, of a coordinated effort by Bin Laden to send students to the United States for civil aviationrelated training. The agent made a number of recommendations but due to the lack of resources, ‘his communication did fall to the bottom of the pile’. (The report became known as the ‘Phoenix Electronic Communication’). Apart from trying to get this balance, there are a number of difficulties that the ‘product’ of intelligence can be subject to. Firstly, is the ‘pressure’ that ‘experts’ can come under when there is a need to justify action. Reid (2003) reported that: Patrick Lang, a former head of Middle Eastern affairs in the Pentagon’s Defence Intelligence agency, stated that when experts wrote reports sceptical about the existence of weapons of mass destruction “they were encouraged to think it over again”.
Secondly, there is the ‘self-fulfilling’ nature of intelligence. Jenkins (2005a: 6) comments in this regard: Jihadists’ … take note of concerns voiced by the public in target communities. For example, public statements that the population is vulnerable to biological or chemical attack are picked up by the Jihadists’ and possibly incorporated into operational planning. These steps are often then confirmed by Western intelligence. Our concerns become self-fulfilling prophecies.
Thirdly, and as seems increasingly common, is the apparent political manipulation of intelligence. For example, Buncombe et al. (2004) reported that a security alert in 2004 had been based on intelligence that was at least three to four years old. They reported that Tom Ridge, the US Homeland Security Secretary stated: We don’t do politics in the Department of Homeland Security. This is not about politics. It’s about confidence in government. …Despite Mr Ridge’s assertion, a transcript of a background briefing provided to the US media on Sunday night by intelligence agencies reveals the extent to which officials were determined to imply the information was
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current. … During the briefing one official, described only as a “senior intelligence official”, said: “The new information is chilling in its scope, in its detail, in its breadth. It also gives a sense, the same feeling one would have if one found that somebody broke into your house and over the past several months was taking a lot of details about your place of residence and looking for ways to attack.” (In this regard, the student might recall the furore over the ‘45 minutes to launch’ claim by the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair in the run-up to the Iraq war and the subsequent Hutton Inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly [House of Commons, 2004]). A further report by Rufford (2003) illustrates a related issue to the point made immediately above. That is, there seemed to be almost a public relations campaign being operated by the UK Secret Intelligence Service in the run up to the Iraq war in 2003. Rufford comments that: The government yesterday confirmed that MI6 had organised Operation Mass Appeal, a campaign to plant stories in the media about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. … but denied that it had planted misinformation. “There were things about Saddam’s regime and his weapons that the public needed to know,” … “The aim was to convince the public that Iraq was a far greater threat than it actually was,” …
Fourthly is the natural reticence between intelligence agencies to share information and intelligence. Storbeck (2005: 7) notes in this regard that: Information and intelligence are the raw material of all police work. … however, the exchange of data between national and international law enforcement agencies continues to be reactive rather than pro-active. … in most cases, terrorism-related information is transmitted only following a specific request.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that after the decision by the United Kingdom Home Secretary not to hold a public inquiry into the London bombings of 7 July, but to issue a narrative instead, McGrory et al. (2005) noted that the “narrative” that the Home secretary wants published will not say why they (the bombers) went there (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia). One reason is that the co-operation that friendly governments promised in the days after the attack (has) largely dried up. Some of the countries suspect that Britain might try to blame foreign extremist groups for providing the inspiration, expertise and 191
finance for what they (would) argue was a homegrown operation. All of the discourse above illustrates just how important the intelligence dimension is but also how difficult it is to get right the balance between resources, political pressures and co-operation between intelligence agencies, not only in a local or national sense, but also internationally. 7.4.3
Military Responses
Governments consider military responses to terrorism when the situation has got beyond the capabilities of the normal police force and the particular skills of the military in terms of personnel, equipment, intelligence gathering and special forces capability is considered necessary to deal with the situation. (Smith, [2005:311] relates what the former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright said when a general was arguing against deploying US forces into some conflict: ‘What is the point of having all this army if we don’t use it?’) Bringing the military in to deal with a terrorist situation will be, most likely, a last option by a civilian government. This is because the military will bring their own form of rule and will be less accountable and transparent than the local police force. This must mean, by definition, a weakening of the democratic process. As Freedman (2005: 21) observes: ‘Resort to military means poses in the starkest form the problem of the compatibility of liberal democratic principles with a counter-terrorist campaign’. Having decided to initiate a military response, the issue of definition comes up again. That is, ‘What are we dealing with and what do you want me to do?’ (An interesting and hypothetical [?] transcript of a discussion between a Foreign and Commonwealth Official [FCO] and the Ministry of Defence [MOD] about possible involvement in Rwanda is given in Smith [2005: 311-312]). This difficulty is put succinctly by Freedman (2005: 21). … the issue (of military response) touches on the most fundamental questions of how the phenomenon of terrorism is best understood and how the challenge it poses is best addressed. … The challenge is to find forms of response … that are both efficient and conform to liberal democratic principles.
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Smith (2005: 273-274) realistically comments about the practical difficulties of this: … a condition of democracy is militarily difficult to achieve when occupation is involved, as Israel has discovered in the occupied territories and as the imperial powers discovered after the Second World War … The reason is simple: upon occupation the military force loses the strategic initiative. Once all the tangible objectives have been taken or destroyed, and the land is held, what is there left for force to achieve strategically, or even operationally? The initiative moves to the occupied, who can choose to co-operate with the occupiers or not. And if they have popular support, those that choose not to co-operate … (can) … drain and exhaust the stronger military occupier.
This emphasises the point above about the military being used as a last option. They are simply not best suited to humanitarian and policing purposes. Smith (2005: 10) quotes the Iraq situation as an example. He comments: … it is necessary to understand that in many of the circumstances into which (the military) deploy, (the) forces as a military force will not be effective. The coalition forces in Iraq were a classic example of this situation: their effectiveness as a military force ended once the fighting between military forces was completed in May 2003. … they had a greatly diminished – if any – effect as an occupation and reconstruction force, which had become their main mandate. They were neither trained nor equipped for the task, and therefore could not fulfil it. (emphasis in original)
Williams (2006), writing from the perspective of the ‘soldier on the ground’, confirms this highlighting the military paradox of training people to go to war and kill the enemy one day and then switching over the next day to peace-keeping duties – building rather than destroying. Apart from this, military power is obviously negated (to some extent, at least) by the need to consider the local population and western, liberal democratic principles. Not all of the population will be ‘terrorist fish’ so the military must use their power carefully and selectively.
Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) conclude in this regard that if a
government responds too harshly, its actions can empower the terrorists by providing a larger constituency. As Bresser-Pereira (2002: 127) observes: ‘In contrast to governments … terrorist leaders do not fear widespread retaliation. They may even look forward to it, since it will only breed more hatred’. This is the classic problem for democratic governments when dealing with terrorism. A government that does not respond enough (in the eyes of its people) runs the risk of
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being unable to protect its citizens and lose popular support yet if it overreacts, it risks encouraging people to the terrorist cause (think of Internment in Northern Ireland in 1972) and alienating local and world opinion. The military position therefore when responding to terrorism is to try and ‘… create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure and other measures to create desired political outcome of stability, and if possible democracy’ (Smith, 2005: 270). Having outlined some of the general issues that will come to the fore when a government is considering a military response, it is appropriate at this point to examine the strategies that may be used when the military are actually deployed. There are two broad strategies that the military employ to defeat terrorism – ‘Search and Destroy’ (the Americans in Vietnam and Iraq) and ‘Hearts and Minds’ (the British in Northern Ireland and in Iraq). Search and destroy, as a strategy, has a number of advantages: firstly, it uses the facilities with which the military has much of – personnel and equipment. Secondly, it has relatively quick results and this is advantageous for the government that wants to be seen to be ‘doing something’. The difficulty with the strategy, however, is neatly summed up by Clark (2003) who comments: Terrorism makes armies treat civilians as potential enemies and makes winning their support all the more difficult – And this is exactly the intent. By distancing the military forces from civilians, terrorism inhibits the collection of intelligence, disrupts humanitarian efforts and frustrates the emergence of the close relationship essential in post-conflict transitions to new forms of government. This is why terrorism is being used by the weaker side when rifles, tanks and artillery do not enable them to win a conventional fight.
Additionally, a search and destroy strategy may be weakened by the demand for quick results and because casualties are mounting. This is because the military may not have accurate intelligence to be effective (this will take time to gain). (Bardon’s [2001: 682] comment above about the introduction of internment in Northern Ireland in 1971 is an example of the consequences of acting on poor intelligence). A further difficulty with this strategy is that whilst ‘flooding’ the area with troops can quickly guarantee security, the problem arises when the military withdraw, thereby 194
leaving a vacuum for the terrorist to fill. In contrast, the Hearts and Minds strategy, as the name suggests, deals, or attempts to deal, with the motivation behind the terrorist and to deprive the terrorist of support from the local population. From the military point of view, Smith (2005: 277) comments that ‘Capturing the will of the people is a very clear and basic concept yet one that is either misunderstood or ignored by political and military establishments around the world’. Smith (2005: 277-278) explains this stating: The politician keeps applying force to attain a condition, assuming the military will both create and maintain it. … for many years the military has understood the need to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population … (but) … this is still seen as a supporting activity to the defeat of the insurgents rather than the overall objective, and it is often under-resourced and restricted to low-level acts to ameliorate local conditions and the lot of the people.
A further difficulty with the hearts and minds concept is that ‘the military fight amongst the people’ (Smith, 2005: 278). Consequently, the battleground moves into cities, towns and villages; into homes and workplaces; and civilians become caught up in the military battle. This latter point is important to both sides – the military and the terrorist. This is because the military wants to capture the civilian ‘hearts and minds’ yet they also have to remember that those civilians whom they search and arrest may be terrorists. From the terrorist perspective, the civilian is important because a direct attack on a section of a community may have benefits for the terrorist since it reinforces their image as ‘protectors’ of their own community and may also bring a response as vicious as the act itself (Juergensmeyer, 2002: 40; Smith, 2005: 278). An important point for the student to realise about the hearts and mind concept, is that in none of the situations where the strategy has been used (the British Army in Northern Ireland is the obvious example), has it provided a means of defeating an enemy: what it has done is help contain a potentially dangerous situation and create the conditions for more focused political measures to be applied’ (Freedman, 2005: 23). (This emphasises the importance of Smith’s comments above as to just what the military are capable of doing – that is, creating a conceptual space for diplomacy and other incentives [Smith, 195
2005: 270]). A final point also needs to be considered when using the military in response to terrorism. This is in relation to the number of troops that are likely to be required. Research by the RAND organisation (RAND, 2003; Maddox, 2006) indicated that, based on research examining American occupations of Japan, Germany, the Balkans, Somalia and Afghanistan, the number of troops needed for stability in Iraq would be in the region of one soldier for every 50 residents or 20 troops for every 1,000 of the population. (This equates to 500,000 – more than three times the number in 2005). 7.4.4
Terrorist Finance
Details of terrorist finances are important because, like everybody else, terrorists need money to operate. Money is needed to buy arms and explosives, mount operations, help prisoners and the families of the injured and dead as well as promoting the particular terrorist cause. To raise money, terrorists will use a number of strategies. These would include: •
Fundraising.
•
Racketeering and criminal enterprises.
•
Legitimate enterprises.
In addition, the terrorist organisation may receive funding from various backers including private individuals, organisations and other nation states (Napoleoni and Carisch, 2005: 27). Some examples of terrorist financing give an indication of both the cost of terrorist operations and how much one terrorist organisation actually ‘took in’ in a particular year. •
Roth et al. (2004: 3) note that the 9/11 plot cost approximately $400,000 – 500,000.
•
The London bombings reportedly cost only ‘a few hundreds of pounds’ (Buchanan, 2006).
•
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Hamill (1995: cited in Bardon, 2001: 736-737) noted that in 1979, ‘… the
Provisional IRA had an income each year about £550,000 from armed robbery, £250,000 from racketeering, and £120,000 from overseas donations …’. Robinson (2006) comments that ‘The clearest example of what terrorist operations actually costs came in 1997, when the IRA issued a bomb threat to stop the Grand national at Aintree. The damage was measured in millions. The price was a 2p phone call’.
Although it might be assumed with the increase in computerisation, that tracking terrorist funding would be relatively easy, this is far from the case. In fact, the financial aspects of terrorism are often shrouded in mystery (Napoleoni and Carisch, 2005). This is because so few people have the expertise to enable them to understand the flow of money around the world. Indeed, in researching for this Unit, there was little material that dealt with this issue more than on a superficial level. Roth et al (2004: 13) commented that ‘The nature and extent of al Qaeda fund-raising and money movement make intelligence collection exceedingly difficult, and gaps appear to remain in the intelligence community’s understanding of the issue’. This comment was confirmed by Napoleoni and Carisch (2005: 27) who stated: The existing studies of terrorist financing provide no coherent or comprehensive understanding of the origins of the Jihadist funding networks. … there has been no effort yet to go beyond the analysis of isolated factors.
Nevertheless, even before 9/11, noteworthy efforts to track terrorist finances had been made. The United Nations 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (UN, 1999) is an example. Unfortunately, as Napoleoni and Carisch (2005: 28) acknowledge, ‘The patchwork of multilateral agreements … has failed to generate a coherent strategy that would be capable of countering the informal nature of the Jihadist funding mechanisms’. Efforts continue to be made, however. For example, a report on UK action into combating the financing of terrorism (Home Office, 2002) states that on an international level, countering terrorist funding has been broadened: •
by the United Nation’s development of extended sanctions regimes against o terrorism in general and Al Qaeda in particular,
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•
by the setting of international standards and the adoption of the Financial Action Task Force’s 8 Special Recommendations and
•
by the provision of technical assistance to countries.
On a domestic (UK) level, measures to combat terrorist financing have included: •
The Terrorism Act 2000
•
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and
•
Orders in Council implementing UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1390
In the US, meanwhile Roth et al. (2004: 14) comment that the intelligence community (including the FBI) has devoted much more resources to the financial issue. The student should note, however, that notwithstanding all of these measures, Roth et al. (2004: 16) comment that the total elimination of money flowing to the terrorist is unlikely, ever, to be stopped. Lehmkuhler (2003) agrees stating: The greatest weakness in (countering) terrorist financing lies in the inability to develop effective tracking measures for trade-based money … Technical assistance and legal harmonisation are necessary, but without an effective means of tracking all the money, they will be limited in their effectiveness …
7.4.5
Science and Technology
Science and technology is one of the areas where the student might have thought that the state would possess an over-whelming advantage. To an extent, this is true. Consider the power of computers and how so much of the infrastructure of modern life is controlled by computers. (Perhaps the student has been delayed due to problems at air traffic control (computers?); perhaps a signalling failure on the railways (computers?). From a counter-terrorist perspective, consider how detectors have been placed at airports, train stations and seaports to identify hidden items on people or to detect people trying to illegally enter the country. Tendler (2003) reported that in the UK, police now have ‘Secret high-tech equipment capable of spotting suicide bombers on Britain’s high streets’. Recognition might also be made of the recent growth in identity fraud (caused by, amongst other things, the computerisation of credit card details). The student is asked 198
to contemplate this last point in the context of the state trying to identify the terrorist fish from all the other fish in the population - it will certainly not make it any easier. (Carlile [2005] referred to above, is also evidence of this difficulty). It can be argued that advanced nations (essentially the Western nations but increasingly countries like China) have an increasing dependency on science and technology. They need this in order to feed themselves, clean the water they drink, move about the country and generally, live a ‘modern’ life. Consequently, advanced nations are very dependent (and inter-dependent) upon science and technology and it is this weakness that the terrorist seeks to exploit. In fact, the more advanced the state, the more vulnerable they are simply because a relatively small terrorist operation, such as disrupting the telephone or water network, can have an effect out of all proportion to the effort or expenditure incurred by the terrorist. (The 9/11 atrocity is a prime example of this). Keohane (2002: 82-83) comments in this regard that: Power comes not simply out of the barrel of a gun, but from asymmetries in vulnerability inter-dependence – some of which, it turns out, to favour some non-state actors more than most observers anticipated. The networks of inter-dependence along which power can travel are multiple, and they do not cancel one and other out. Even a state that is overwhelmingly powerful on many dimensions can be highly vulnerable on others. …this (was the) lesson in the 1970s with respect to oil power; we are relearning it now with respect to terrorism.
Science and technology can be used by the terrorist to gain knowledge about critical materials (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) and how to use them. This knowledge can then be easily spread to similar minded people by means of the Internet. Calhoun et al.(2002: 6) sum up the science and technology issue stating ‘Few (people) seemed to appreciate that one of the prime ironies of 9/11 had been the way in which advanced technology had been turned against its makers’. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001: 363) put the technology issue bluntly when they state that ‘The same technology that aids social activists and those desiring the good of all is also available to those with the darkest intentions, bent on destruction and driven by a rage reminiscent of the Middle Ages’.
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The overall conclusion concerning science and technology is that whilst it clearly benefits the advanced nations, those nations are very much dependent and interdependent upon it. This will be the vulnerability that the terrorist will seek to exploit. Considering the management of terrorism from an operational perspective therefore, it is clear from the above discussion that there are a number of strategies or options that can be employed. All of these have advantages and disadvantages. No one strategy is dominant and like the causes of terrorism, no one strategy should be dominant. Rather, a multi-strategy should be adopted as the most effective in managing any terrorist campaign.
7.5 The Management of terrorism: a Democratic Perspective This section will examine the management of terrorism from a democratic perspective. It will analyse this management using a number of dimensions, namely: •
International Institutions
•
Legal Responses
•
Democracy Promotion
•
Human Rights and
•
Civil Society
The student should recognize from the outset (from the discourse already presented) how interlinked these dimensions are likely to be and that any effective counterinsurgency strategy will be likely to use a combination of all the above. The whole issue of managing terrorism from a democratic perspective was succinctly put in a recent UK government paper dealing with counter-terrorism powers (Home Office, 2004: 1). This stated: There is no greater challenge for a democracy than the response it makes to terrorism. The economic, social and political dislocation which sophisticated terrorist action can bring, threatens the very democracy which protects our liberty. But that liberty may be exploited by those supporting, aiding, or engaging in terrorism to avoid pre-emptive intervention by the forces of law and order. The challenge, therefore, is how to retain long held and hard won freedoms and protections from the arbitrary use of power or wrongful conviction, whilst ensuring that democracy and the rule of law itself are not used as a cover by those who seek its overthrow.
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It can be argued, therefore, that one of the key issues for any democratic government will be to win the support of the people for whatever action the state considers necessary in order to deal with the terrorist. The state, however, has to be mindful of the actual strategy it uses because it will be in direct competition with the terrorist for the hearts and minds of the people (referred to earlier). As Mackinlay (2005: vi) observes ‘… winning their support is a key objective for the military, the insurgents and the humanitarian actors’. This is what makes managing a counter-terrorist campaign in a democracy so difficult. Before commencing the examination, there are a number of issues that the student should consider. These relate to the very notion of democracy itself and are as follows: 1. Who are the democracies? The discussion in this Unit is about how democracies might respond to the ‘new terrorism’. Those democracies are considered to be the ‘western nations’. That is, those nations that support and hold western values and cultures. These would be the United States of America, Western Europe (led by France, Germany and the United Kingdom) and the others (Japan and Australia, for example). 2. A democratic Response? The assumption is made that a democratic response to terrorism is best since, by definition, it will have legitimacy in the eyes of most of the population and they will support the actions of that democracy in dealing with terrorism. Wilkinson (2002: 78 and 92) also makes this assumption but seems to hint that he might have some doubts about this as he calls for an up-to-date and in-depth study on the relationship between public opinion and terrorism in democratic societies. Wilkinson’s hint would seem to be quite accurate. For example, the revelation of how lobbyists in the United States (US) allegedly influence members of the US Congress and others highlights the weakness of the democratic system. Baker (2006) writes that: For a decade Mr Abramoff (the lobbyist) took in tens of millions of dollars from eager clients who had some important legislative matter that they wanted pursuing in the world’s most powerful city. He would then push the money on to lawmakers and
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administration officials to ensure that those interests were looked after; a convenient clause in a Bill would be added here; a pesky regulatory committee would be persuaded to back off there. The members of Congress would then find funds flowing smoothly into their political campaigns. … As Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House, put it this week, US politics works as something like an incumbency protection racket. The democratic situation in the UK cannot be assumed either (The Times, 2006). The revelation that the United States (aided by the United Kingdom) has instigated what is reported to be an assignation programme (Smith, 2006), further highlights the difficulties for democracies when dealing with terrorists. Smith (2006) writes that ‘Amnesty International and a United Nations Special Rapporteur have denounced these attacks as “extrajudicial execution”’. 3. The World’s Superpower It can be reasonably argued (at the time of writing), that America is the world’s only superpower and is effectively, the world’s policeman. No other country has the might, in military, economic and diplomatic terms, to match America. (For an interesting argument of how this position might change in the future, see Kennedy [1989]). It could also be argued, broadly, that because of this position, Europe and the rest of the western nations fall in behind America on most occasions. The student may recognize that this is not always the case. For example, Rosendorff and Sandler (2004: 659), in discussing the responses to terrorism, contrast the US approach following 9/11 with that of the European Union. They comment that ‘… the US approach following 9/11 was to eliminate the terrorist risk through a ‘war on terror’ whereas that of the European Union (sought to) manage the risk with greater reliance on defensive actions’. Wallace (2002: 103) makes an interesting comment in this context with regard to the second Gulf war in 2003. He states that whilst Tony Blair gained considerable popularity within the US for his support for that invasion ‘… it remains unclear to what extent he gained any significant influence over aspects of American policy’. Wallace (2002: 105) adds that ‘American rhetoric about transatlantic partnership was
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always a little disingenuous, offering junior partnership within an American-led community rather than an effective partnership of equals’. 4. The threat This is the threat/perspective as perceived at the time. Jenkins (2005b: 14) comments in this regard that: (The) threat is dynamic and diverse. While it is the jihadists who currently command our attention, and are likely to do so for years, ten years ago, an odd religious sect in Japan, not considered a terrorist organization, carried out the first large-scale chemical attack on a civilian population in Tokyo. We cannot confidently forecast what the terrorist threat will be ten years from now, where its centre will lie, or how it will manifest itself. An example of how the ‘threat’ and perspective has changed is the television image from 1985 of President Reagan introducing mujahideen leaders on the White House lawn to the media. Ahmad (2001: cited in Mamdani, 2002: 48) records Reagan as saying ‘These gentlemen are the moral equivalents of America’s Founding Fathers’. (This was in the context of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the mujahideen resistance to that invasion and subsequent occupation. [Note that Bin Laden was a member of the same mujahideen and subsequently established al Qaeda [variously translated as the ‘base of operation’ or ‘foundation’ or ‘the precept’ or ‘method’] in 1989). 5. Terrorism can be ‘blurred’ The dilemma for any democratic response is that the act of terrorism can be ‘blurred’ (in the sense that there might be no obvious perpetrator or reason for the act). Consequently, the state does not know how best to respond. Benhabib (2002: 246-247) declares that: The presence of an enemy who is neither a military adversary nor a representative agent of a known state creates confusion as to whether it is the police …or the military who should take the lead in the investigation … - the lines between acts of crime and acts of war get blurred. The category of the terrorist as an ‘internal enemy’, as one who is among us, even if not one of us, strains the democratic community by revealing that the rule of law is not all-inclusive and that violence lurks at the edges of everyday normalcy.
Consequently, the question for the student to consider is this. When examining democratic responses to terrorism and given the points outlined above, is it correct for 203
the other democratic nations follow the American lead or should they try and implement their own democratic response? This question is important because who is to say that the American response to the new terrorism is correct? Since some authors argue that al Qaeda should be regarded as the first truly global insurgency (Brennan et al., 2005: cited in Mackinlay, 2005: 23), perhaps a more truly democratic response should be via the United Nations? (The observation by Baker [2006] above highlights the importance of this). The difficulty is, as the student will recognize, getting the various countries of the United Nations [with all their worldviews] to act together). Nonetheless and in essence, what is being suggested is that it is important for the student keep an open mind when considering democratic responses (as opposed to any other form of response) to terrorism and remember the ‘cloak of his or her own worldview’ and the global environment then pertaining. 7.5.1
International Institutions
The student will have read above about the concept of ‘globalisation’ and how the ‘new terrorism’ is a worldwide phenomenon and can have a worldwide impact (9/11, the Madrid bombing in 2004 and 7/7 in London 2005 are the most obvious examples). Consequently, when considering how to manage terrorism from a democratic perspective, it is important that international institutions cooperate and move forward together. (The UK Extradition Act (2003) making it quicker and easier to extradite terrorist suspects is one example of this co-operation). As Hampson (2005: 7) states: No state alone can assure the security of its citizens; co-operative action is indispensable. Given the transnational nature of contemporary terrorism, the struggle to suppress it must be carried on through effective, international co-operation.
Nonetheless, this co-operation can, for a variety of reasons, be difficult. For example, Baker (2005) reports with regard to the NATO operation in Afghanistan that the German contingent operates under: … rules called “caveats”, decided by each nation, … (these) impose tight restrictions on what they may and may not do. … caveats are infuriating for the NATO commanders but are imposed by political leaders terrified that the slender public support for the operation in
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Afghanistan might be shattered completely by serious military reverses … (the caveat is) that German military planes (are) not to fly at night …a country whose government expresses full commitment to the War on Terror, says that it can take part only in daylight hours.
Mackinlay (2005: 2) argues that this international co-operation is nevertheless essential to any counter-insurgency strategy. The advantage is that it confers ‘… greater legitimacy on the political leaders of the coalition but also, unfortunately, it imposes grave tactical disadvantages on its military commanders’. This ‘political reality’ is not to deny the strong efforts that have been made to try and improve co-operation between nations and organisations even though this has been difficult. Even so, it would seem that progress has been slower than might have been expected. The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, held in Madrid 2005, recommended that ‘The international community needs to bolster the UN’s capacity and performance in counter-terrorism’ (Hampson, 2005: 8). Rosendorff and Sandler (2004: 670) support Hampson’s comment and highlight an additional dimension, stating that in adopting strategies to deal with terrorism: … the targeted states fail to adjust for the externalities that they impose on one another, which then allows the terrorists to exploit vulnerabilities from states’ uncoordinated actions. If resources are to be allocated efficiently to counter-terrorism, nations must act in unison. The international community is far from accepting this basic insight.
7.5.2
Legal Responses
Legal responses are concerned with making an effective framework to deal with terrorism (Corell, 2005: 13). It is argued that such responses should be at the heart of a democratic response. Again, the issue of defining terrorism is at the core of this framework and the student will be aware from the discourse of the difficulties surrounding this. Similarly to the need for international institutions to co-operate, a further key factor in any legal framework is the need for laws to be fully international in nature and agreed between all parties. This would mean, for example, that there are effective counterterrorist prosecution and extradition procedures (the UK Extradition Act 2003 [mentioned above] is an example) together with appropriate legal provisions for 205
freezing of any assets used to finance terrorism (Corell: 2005: 15). The student should recognise, from the discourse already, that whilst the above legal responses may be desirable, getting them in place and working effectively would be a major undertaking requiring agreement on a number of difficult issues from a variety of countries, all with differing perspectives and interests. There is also one other difficulty from the legal perspective. Comment was made above about how the act of terrorism can be ‘blurred’. This ‘blurring’ creates a difficulty in that ‘Democracies are, even in the most testing conditions, supposed to set themselves higher standards than those of terrorist organisations’ (The Times, 2003). Yet there appears to be some evidence that there can also be a blurring concerning the legal responses by some democracies. For example, the American practice of ‘extraordinary rendition’ of terrorist suspects ‘to countries where they may face torture during interrogation’ (Gadher, 2005). Additionally, Jahangir and Azzam (2005: 27) comment that ‘From a human rights perspective, recent counter-terrorism legislation or draft laws are seriously flawed’. They acknowledge that whilst democratic governments are under exceptional strain: … the counterproductive aspect of such policies has to be brought out with more clarity than hitherto. The legal sanctioning of human rights violations undermines the rule of law and creates enabling environments for vicious and militant networks that prosper in oppressive systems of governance.
The United Kingdom’s (UK) response in countering terrorism might be used as an example of how a democracy frames its legal response. In this case, the UK developed a coordinated long-term counter-terrorism strategy known as CONTEST. The overall aim of the strategy is described as being to: Reduce the risk from international terrorism in order that UK citizens are able to go about their business freely and with confidence [...] CONTEST’s focus over the next five years must be reducing the risk. That means reducing the threat and our vulnerability (Blears, 2005).
The strategy to achieve this comprises four key elements or risk management principles: •
Preventing terrorism through action to tackle factors which encourage and facilitate recruitment;
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Pursuing terrorists and those that sponsor them by better understanding
terrorist networks in order to track, disrupt and bring to justice; •
Protecting British interests at home and abroad, and
•
Preparing thoroughly to respond to any attack in order to minimise its consequences.
The student should note that the first two strands are concerned with reducing the likelihood of terrorism; in other words, trying to prevent terrorism through the factors which encourage and facilitate recruitment but also, pursuing terrorists and those who sponsor them by better understanding their networks in order to track, disrupt and bring them to justice. The third and fourth strands are concerned with mitigating the consequences by protecting British people and British interests at home and abroad and also by preparing to respond to any attack and its consequences (The New Dimensions programme). These four elements are supported by the following specific aims (Blears, 2005): •
Effective legislative framework comprising the Terrorism Act 2000, the AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.
•
Strengthened border controls comprising the policing of points of entry by the police, immigration and customs services.
•
A science and technology programme to provide an evidence base for policy and planning decisions and to enhance response capability.
•
Targeting terrorist funds - disrupting terrorist activity through tracking and freezing their funding streams.
•
Infrastructure Protection - enhancing the security and reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure.
•
Resilience and contingency planning - the continued development and exercising of plans for preventing and responding to a terrorist attack.
7.5.3
Democracy Promotion
This section considers how best democracy can be promoted so that it is an effective weapon in the fight against terrorism. The student will be aware from the discourse above that this is not a clear cut issue but for the purposes of this particular dimension, 207
the assumption is made that democracy, as a form of government, is better than any other form (such as an autocratic type, for example). A number of points need to be considered when contemplating how democratic promotion might be used as a weapon against terrorism: 1. Democracy and time Nodia (2005: 22) draws a distinction between countries which have a strong, established system of democracy (in which case it could be argued that the promotion of democracy will be or is likely to be effective) and those countries which have not such a strong foundation in democracy (in which case ‘the process of democratisation may turn out to be destabilising, thus creating opportunities for terrorists to make political gains’). With regard to those countries in which democracy is not firmly established, Nodia (2005: 22) perceptively comments that such cases are likely to generate a number of political dilemmas and that such scenarios may potentially influence political attitudes in America and the European democracies. Nodia (2005: 22) comments in this regard that: “In the case of Pakistan … a delicate balance need[ed] to be struck between undermining the autocratic rule of President Musharaf and paving the way for Islamist extremists to assume control of a nuclear state.” 2. The Historical Record The historical record of democratic countries and terrorism indicates that consolidated / established democracies are not immune to internal terrorism. (Nodia [2005] cites examples of left wing terrorism in Germany, Italy and Japan in the 1970s and ethnic and sectarian terrorism in Spain and Northern Ireland). 3. Advantages and disadvantages It can be argued that strongly repressive or totalitarian regime possess clear advantages in fighting terrorist groups (freedom of action, a controlled/repressed media, lack of accountability etc.). 4. Freedom of Speech In a democracy, one of the key human rights is freedom of speech. The difficulty when fighting terrorism is that by allowing the terrorists or their representatives the same
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freedom, there is a danger or encouraging terrorism rather than weakening it. On the other hand, by preventing the terrorists or their representatives to speak out, then as Nodia (2005: 22) argues regarding the Middle East, the exclusion of Islamist political parties from genuine political competition may push these actors to adopt more extreme agendas and methods. This is undoubtedly a difficult balance to get right. Arthur (2000: 149) notes that when Mrs Thatcher introduced a media ban in 1988 so that no interviews between supporters and members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or loyalist paramilitaries could be broadcast (to deny them the ‘oxygen of publicity’), a Newsday editorial stated that ‘Britain hasn’t yet torn up the Magna Carta but it’s sending some of the country’s most revered civil liberties to the shredder’. 5. Using military Force Nodia (2005: 23) argues that it is neither right to use foreign military force in order to create the conditions for local democratic development (as in the 2003 war in Iraq), since doing so ‘undermines the international political order and may serve as a pretext for intervention motivated by selfish interests’. She further argues that it is not practical either because democracy emerges as a result of internal societal and political developments. It is about choice and freedom of that choice – which cannot be imposed. These comments corroborate Smith (2005: 270) referred to earlier. That is, the military: ‘do not intervene to take or hold territory … (they) seek to create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure … to create a desired political outcome of stability and if possible, democracy’.
From a consideration of the points above, the student should realise that democratic promotion, as a weapon against terrorism is a difficult one to use with effect. Wilkinson (2002: 89) concludes that ‘There are severe limits to what a democratic government can achieve by purely political means in countering terrorism’. 7.5.4
Human Rights
Jahangir and Azzam (2005: 27) observe that ‘Human rights are an assertion that human
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beings, individually and collectively, are inherently endowed with certain minimum standards of dignity and rights that must be respected and protected in law’. Within a democracy, it would seem self–evident that the state should respond along those universal principles. Indeed, the preamble to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that human rights are necessary so that people do not need to in order to resort to ‘rebellion against tyranny’ (UN, 1948). Nonetheless, as Jahangir and Azzam (2005: 27) also comment: The significant progress made in the promotion of human rights standards, however, has not been accompanied by sufficient political will for their protection and enforcement. Consequently, inequality, exclusion and the use of violence in settling political disputes have not abated.
Consequently, it appears to be difficult in a ‘realpolitic’ sense, for a democracy to effectively respond to terrorism – in terms of human rights. Jahangir and Azzam (2005: 27) observe in this regard that: The resort to a ‘war on terrorism’ without UN sanction, degrading and inhuman treatment of prisoners, attacks on and detention of non-combatants and the excessive use of force have severely tested human rights principles, especially that of proportionality. 7.5.5
Civil Society
This dimension of the democratic response focuses on the fact that ‘the citizen’ in a democracy, has or should have a voice in how terrorism should be responded to. This is because ‘Citizens are the bedrock of democracy, and they cannot therefore be absent from the discussion about how to deal with the problem’ (Kaldor and Darcy, 2005: 33). Consequently, the response to terrorism should involve not just government(s) but also the citizens of that/those societies. Kaldor and Darcy (2005: 34) explain this by stating that ‘Civil society is the method through which we can identify the unique character of every violent situation’ and that ‘It is civil society that gives a voice to different social groups and causes, that provides a channel of expression for the minorities and the dissenters, that promotes by its very diversity a culture of tolerance and pluralism’. 210
The student may recognize, however, just how difficult this might be. How would a government ever get a consensus from the citizens regarding how to react? The answer is surely, through the political representation system in a democracy. The reply to that may be to question how representative ‘a political elite’ is of the common citizen. It is inappropriate to develop this argument further. It is sufficient that the student recognize that the civil society dimension is just one of the multi-faceted aspects that need to be considered when attempting to manage terrorism. Considering the management of terrorism from a democratic perspective therefore, the student should be able to see that like the other perspectives with terrorism, this management is, to say the least, difficult. This is because of issues relating to co-operation and co-ordination between institutions as well as establishing an appropriate legal framework – all within a national and international context. In addition, this perspective highlights the need to balance the management of terrorism from a human rights and civil society perspective, all the while acknowledging that the rights in a democracy can and often do, favour the terrorist.
7.6 Conclusion This Unit has considered how terrorism is defined. The examination highlighted the difficulties in getting a common definition and that these difficulties were the result of perception and worldviews. The Unit also examined various causes of terrorism ranging from psychological, and political factors through to economic, religious and cultural factors. The examination showed that there was no one identifying cause. Rather, the cause of terrorism would appear to be a combination of all of these factors, with no one single factor predominating. The Unit further considered how terrorism might be managed. This aspect was researched using the dimensions of policing, intelligence and military responses as well as considering how terrorists financed their operations and how science and technology
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could work both against and for the terrorist. Positive and negative issues of these dimensions where examined and analysed. Finally, the Unit analysed the management of terrorism from a democratic perspective, highlighting the many difficulties that terrorism causes for a democracy. From the discourse above, the student should be able to recognise how the concept of terrorism is complicated and the management of it consequently so difficult. In summary, the Unit highlighted a number of reasons for this difficulty: Defining terrorism: There is a clear and obvious difficulty with this due to various ‘worldviews’. This clearly hinders effective management of terrorism. A Philosophy: The new terrorism can be argued to be a ‘philosophy’ and as Grayling (2004) comments: This is a battle of ideas and sentiments, and the kind of power required to win it is not ‘hard power’ in the form of military might, but ‘soft power’. Power is what gets things done; hard power does it by coercion, soft power does it by persuasion, attraction and inducement.
There is no definable end: The release of a letter between two senior al Qaeda leaders, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi illustrates the strategic nature of modern terrorism (ODNI, 2005). One of the points made in the letter acknowledged that ‘the war does not end with an American departure’ from Iraq. Mackinlay (2005: 41) states that a counter insurgency strategy would ‘… take at least a decade to deliver and is beyond the resources of a single actor, no matter how rich or powerful’. Hoffman (2005: 10) agrees, commenting that many observers admit that winning the global war on terror will take decades. (The student might feel that that this timescale is overly pessimistic. If this is the case, the student should note that the British army were introduced into Northern Ireland in August 1969 and it was only in 2006 [37 years afterwards] that they have contemplated any significant reduction in troop levels [Sharrock, 2006]). Globalisation: The student will be aware from the Unit how interlinked and interdependent the modern world is. This has both positive and negative aspects when considering terrorism and seems likely to be a major factor in future terrorism. Coker (2002: 9) comments in this regard:
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In future, three dialectics of globalisation may make it increasingly difficult for nations to work together. The tensions between universal and local or regional forces; between transnational and national structures or states; and between pro-American and antiAmerican sentiments are all to be found within the Western world. Culture: Nations, organisations and individuals need to be more globally minded and culturally aware of whom they are dealing with. Unfortunately, this is likely to be difficult – as evidenced from the discourse above. Legal Response: It is difficult to get the balance between human rights and action against the terrorist. Additionally, and as Mamdani (2002: 59) observes: ‘Unlike the criminal, the political terrorist is not easily deterred by punishment’. Military Response: The discourse has highlighted how, on the one hand, the military can seem to an obvious solution, but on the other hand, the evidence of military involvement indicates that they can only try and ‘… create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure and other measures to create desired political outcome of stability, and if possible democracy’ (Smith, 2005: 270). Mamdani (2002: 59) agrees, commenting that ‘… one needs to recognise that terrorism has no military solution’. Overall, however, the major difficulty in managing the new terrorism, however, is that it can be argued to be, and paraphrasing Smith (2005: 278) ‘war amongst the people’. All the resources of the state, from the police, the military, the intelligence services, the media, the legal framework, national and international co-operation, are all limited to some extent, by the need to consider this factor. This is because the ‘will of the people’ is an essential foundation of the state and without their support, no government can manage terrorism. Ultimately, therefore, whilst ‘…prolonged and intensive terrorism can be very damaging to the democratic governments and societies that experience it’, there is ‘… no universally applicable counter-terrorism policy for democracies. Every conflict … has its own unique characteristics’ (Wilkinson, 2002: 220 and 229). Nonetheless, from the discussion outlined in the Unit and not minimizing the difficulties 213
in managing terrorism, a possible prescription for doing just that might include the following: Treat the insurgency as unique; Do not assume that any previous methodology will work; Gain as wide a consensus as possible amongst all parties involved; Be prepared to spend a significant amount of money in addressing the cause(s) of the insurgency; Realise that the actions to defeat the insurgency are likely to take a significant amount of time – certainly in a democracy. Above all, weld these dimensions and efforts into a co-ordinated strategy. This will be difficult as the student will recognize from the discourse above but as Hoffman (2005: 16) puts it: Organizations will … have to do - or be compelled to do - what they have been reluctant to do in the past: reaching across bureaucratic territorial divides and sharing resources in order to defeat terrorists, insurgencies, and other emerging threats. …
7.7 Suggested further reading Calhoun, C., Price, P and Timmer, A. (2002) (eds.) Understanding September 11, New York, The New Press. Confronting Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, Vols I – III: International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-11 March, Madrid: 2126; available online at http://english.safe-democracy.org. Hershberg, E. and Moore, K. W. (eds) Critical Views of September 11, New York, The New Press. Smith, R. (2005) The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World, London: Allen Lane.
7.8 Study questions •
The events of September 11 indicate that terrorism is a form of risk, which cannot be managed. Discuss.
•
If terrorism is so difficult to define, can it ever be successfully managed and if so, how?
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•
An understanding of the causes of terrorism is an essential requirement for the modern risk manager. Discuss.
•
Discuss the difficulties in managing terrorism from an operational perspective and suggest ways as to how they might be overcome.
•
A democracy, by definition, is unable to effectively manage the risk from terrorism. Discuss.
•
The difficulty with managing terrorism is that it is ‘war amongst the people’ (Smith, 2005). What implications does this have for the risk manager and how might they be overcome?
7.9 Bibliography Arnot, C. (2003) ‘What makes a martyr?’, Guardian Education, April 29: 14. Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. (2001) ‘Afterword (September 2001): The sharpening fight for the future’, In J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (eds.), Networks and Netwars, Rand, Santa Monica, CA: 363-369. Arthur, P. (2000) Special Relationships. Britain, Ireland and the Northern Ireland Problem, Belfast: Blackstaff Press. Baker, G. (2005) ‘NATO facing a critical test of its resolve from resurgent Taleban’, The Times, (London), December 29: 36; http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,256891961736,00.html; accessed 4 January, 2006. Baker, G. (2006) ‘Why US politicians are giving away money’, The Times, (London), January
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Bin Laden (2004) Osama Bin laden Video Speech 2004, Transcript, available online at: http://www.warriorsfortruth.com/news-bin-laden-video.html; accessed 12 January, 2006. Bresser-Pereira, L. C. (2002) ‘After balance-of-powers diplomacy, globalisation’s politics’, In E. Hershberg and K. W. Moore (eds) Critical Views of September 11, New York, The New Press: 131-150. Blears,
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Oxford, OUP. Corell, H. (2005) ‘Legal responses’, The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, Towards a Democratic Response, Vol. III, International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-11 March, Madrid; available online at: http://english.safedemocracy.org, accessed 12 September, 2005: 13-20, Dake, K. (1992) ‘Myths of nature:Culture and the social construction of risk’, Journal of Social Issues, 48: 21-27. Davis, L., Wermuth, M., O’Connell, K. and Treverton, G. (2005) ‘Terrorism and intelligence reform’: In Three Years After. Next Steps in the War on Terror, D. Aaron (ed.),
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Globalisation Before the Bundesbank Lecture 2004, Berlin, Germany, January 13, 2004; available online at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2004/20040113/default.htm; accessed 20 December, 2005. Guardian Unlimited (2005) ‘Reid defends UK troops’ role in Iraq’, Guardian Unlimited, September 21: http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1575080,00.html; accessed 6 January, 2006. Guehenno, J. M. (2001) ‘The impact of globalisation on strategy’, In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (eds) Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, Washington, United States Institute of Peace: 83-96. Gurr, T. R. (2005) ‘Economic factors’, The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, Addressing The Causes of Terrorism, Vol. I, International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-11 March, Madrid: 19-26; available online at: http://english.safe-democracy.org, accessed 12 September, 2005. Hampson, F. (2005) ‘International institutions’, The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, Towards a Democratic Response, Vol. III: International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-11 March, Madrid: 7-12; available online at: http://english.safe-democracy.org; accessed 3 January, 2006. Harrison, M. (2003) ‘The logic of Suicide terrorism’, Royal United Services Institute Security
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READING ‘Weak
States,
State
Failure,
and Terrorism’ Newman, E. (2007)
Terrorism
and
Political
Violence,
19:
463-488.
Taylor & Francis Group. Following (announced
the on
Interim 13th
Decision December
of 2001),
the
Copyright
permission
copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.
to
Tribunal make
this
8 Unit Eight: Organisational contingency planning 8.1 Aim and objectives of this Unit In this Unit, we will be looking at some current practical aspects of risk and disaster management. The aim is to consider organisational contingency planning and specific objectives are to: •
examine the interrelationship of risk management, business continuity planning and civil protection
•
examine the stages of the disaster management cycle
•
discuss the principles and priorities of risk management
•
look at key topics and structures of contingency planning
•
examine the roles of support agencies in the response phase
•
identify differences in the planning process between the private and public sectors
•
consider the application of these considerations in business continuity planning.
8.2 Introduction As practically perceived, there are three major aspects in terms of minimising the risks and effects of major untoward incidents. These may be classified as: •
minimisation of risk protecting people and the environment
•
ensuring the survival of the organisation.
Each aspect has (or traditionally has had) its own practitioners. Engineers and other risk analysts work to ensure that, so far as is practicable, risks from industrial and commercial operations are reduced to an acceptable level. Within governmental and emergency response agencies, attention is paid to what is variously called public or civil protection or emergency or contingency planning. Particularly within commercial companies, the last few years have seen increased emphasis on business continuity planning - that is, ensuring that the organisation can, so far as is possible, not only continue to survive but also continue, so far as is possible, with normal operations in the
event of a disaster. In a British government publication on handling national disasters (Home Office 1994), it was suggested that: Nearly every day there are many unpublicised disasters, man-made and natural, which devastate both private and public sector business units. Statistics indicate that 80% of companies which experience a computer disaster, do not have appropriate plans and go bankrupt within 18 months.
Organisational survival depends on planning. In contingency terms, that planning must include the designing-out of as many dangers as possible, the preparation of schemes for continuing when the unimaginable occurs and dependence on external agencies for what might be termed the ‘clean-up’. At this point, you are asked to refresh your memory about the impact of the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004 (see Unit 1 of this Module). The two volumes of guidance which accompany the CCA are important guides in dealing with the management of all types of incident. See: •
Cabinet Office, (2005a) Emergency Preparedness. Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, its associated Regulations and Non-statutory Arrangements, London.
•
Cabinet Office, (2005b) Emergency Response and Recovery.
Non-statutory
Guidance to Complement Emergency Preparedness, London. This Unit starts by looking at disasters in general, including the disaster management cycle; it then considers separately - though the overlaps must be borne in mind - the topics of risk management, general emergency management and specific applications of civil protection and business continuity.
8.3 Disasters in general Disasters can occur without warning, at any time, often with profound and sometimes catastrophic effects on the business community. The ability to handle a disaster successfully is an important management skill, and as the number of serious incidents continues to increase, disaster management becomes ever more significant. Preparedness is integral to disaster management, as is contingency funding and 227
property insurance, yet it is neither as well understood, nor as widely practised. Planning can save lives, property and resources, can relieve suffering, prevent escalation and collateral damage, safeguard jobs, businesses and financial assets, speed subsequent inquiries and the return to normality, and protect the environment. Even when disaster planning is not a statutory requirement, prudence demands it. It must be seen as an integral part of a well-considered organisational risk management strategy. 8.3.1
The threat
There is no single definition of a disaster. It is usually seen in terms of its implications for the particular organisation concerned, and the emergency services themselves differ in their interpretations. Comment has already been made in Module 1 (Unit 2) of the difficulties in dealing with the terminology so often used in discussions about risk and risk management. For the purposes of this Unit, however, a general definition of disaster which has been adapted from the definition of a major emergency is suitable: A disaster is any event (happening with or without warning) causing or threatening death or injury, damage to property or the environment or disruption to the community, which because of the scale of its effects cannot be dealt with by the emergency services and local authorities as part of their day-to-day activities. Home Office (1997: 1.5)
A disaster is not the same as a serious incident, or an emergency. A serious incident such as a major traffic accident may put considerable pressure on the emergency services, but it will not have the national impact or wide-ranging effects on the community that a severe storm or flood might have. Similarly, although an emergency will be declared at an airport if an inbound airliner reports a fire on board, should it land safely and the passengers and crew suffer no injuries, it will not be a disaster. On the other hand, if the airliner crashes in a built-up area and scores of people are killed, it will assuredly be a serious incident and almost certainly a disaster. In business terms (for both the private and public sectors) a suitably simple definition of a disaster is ‘any untoward event that requires specific arrangements to be made, or special actions to be taken’. Such could include both physical events, which form the main consideration of this Unit, but also applies to sudden and severe financial loss such as may be encountered as a result of stock market or currency fluctuations, or 228
malpractice - as in the Barings Bank case study (Module 1). 8.3.2
Types of disaster
Disasters are sometimes categorised as natural or ‘man-made’ - more correctly sociotechnical both having several sub-categories reflecting their nature and cause. While businesses in the UK can be affected both directly and indirectly by many different disasters, the most pertinent are severe storms and floods, fires and explosions, hostile acts, pollution, epidemics and insect infestations, and a wide variety of technological disasters. Technological, perhaps more correctly socio-technical, disasters may be due to structural and equipment failures, industrial incidents such as explosions and toxic and radioactive releases, and transport accidents. 8.3.3
Management cycle
Disaster management is a logical, integrated and progressive discipline, a cycle of preparedness measures and related actions. It has four stages: mitigation, readiness, response and recovery. Mitigation Mitigation is primarily about managing and reducing risks, whatever their source. The hazards, business vulnerabilities and probable severity of all likely incidents have first to be identified. As the Emergency Preparedness guidance states: Category 1 responders should aim to be aware of new hazards and threats which might affect their locality and be ready to revise their risk assessments and plans accordingly (Cabinet Office, 2005a, page 8, para 1.44).
The worst possible effects, particularly on people, must then be assessed and appropriate actions taken to eliminate, reduce or control them. Further provision is needed to offset residual risks. Readiness Readiness is the ‘in-house insurance policy’ and covers all preparedness measures, most notably planning. This would include amongst other things, warning systems, communications, control teams, equipment and resources, 229
casualty procedures, essential services, media policy, critical records and welfare arrangements. Readiness must be underpinned by the selection and training of staff and validation of the business continuity plan. Resources to support the plan have also to be considered, as has its distribution and updating. Response The core of the external response to a life-threatening disaster is generally provided by the emergency services, assisted by the local authority. Support services and other agencies may be involved. Business response is given in the continuity plan, and although it may vary according to the incident any response must always be speedy, effective and appropriate. While the purpose is primarily to save life and relieve suffering, there are other priorities such as protecting property and resources, preventing secondary damage, assisting criminal investigations and safeguarding the environment. Recovery Recovery starts with business survival and then embraces the range of activities needed for a rapid return to normality. The local authority may have a significant part to play. Recovery has to cover all operational, logistical, human and environmental needs, many of which are predetermined during planning and begin at the response stage. Among the priorities are restoration of essential services, alternative accommodation, equipment and resource inventories, site reconstruction and reoccupation, and funding and insurance. In addition, there may be statutory requirements such as inquiries, and long-term medical aid and staff counselling to consider. Also important are the lessons to be learnt and amendments to be made to any existing continuity plan.
8.4 Risk management In immediate practical terms, risk may be regarded as the product of a hazard (a situation that can lead to harm) and vulnerability to that hazard. It has been defined as ‘the probability that an adverse event occurs during a stated period of time, or results
230
from a particular challenge’ (Royal Society Study Group, 1992). Risk Management canbe defined as ‘the action taken to deal with potential for injury, loss or damage’. It should be seen as the first stage of contingency planning, not separate from it. (The Emergency Preparedness guidance defines Risk Management as ‘The culture, processes and structures that are directed towards the effective management of Risks’ [Cabinet Office, 2005a: 223]). The importance of risk assessment and management was underlined in the ‘Turnbull Report’: Responsibilities
231
16.
The board of directors is responsible for the company’s system of internal control. It should set appropriate policies on internal control and seek regular assurance that will enable it to satisfy itself that the system is functioning effectively. The board must further ensure that the system of internal control is effective in managing risks in the manner which it has approved.
17.
In determining its policies with regard to internal control, and thereby assessing what constitutes a sound system of internal control in the particular circumstances of the company, the board’s deliberations should include consideration of the following factors: •
the nature and extent of the risks facing the company
•
the extent and categories of risk which it regards as acceptable for the company to bear
•
the likelihood of the risks concerned materialising
•
the company’s ability to reduce the incidence and impact on the business of risks that do materialise; and
•
the costs of operating particular controls relative to the benefit thereby obtained in managing the related risks.
18.
It is the role of management to implement board policies on risk and control. In fulfilling its responsibilities, management should identify and evaluate the risks faced by the company for consideration by the board and design, operate and monitor a suitable system of internal control which implements the policies adopted by the board.
19.
All employees have some responsibility for internal control as part of their accountability for achieving objectives. They, collectively, should have the necessary knowledge, skills, information and authority to establish, operate and monitor the system of internal control. This will require an understanding of the company, its objectives, the industries and markets in which it operates, and the
risks it faces.
Managing risks begins with a review of significant hazards and an impact analysis centred on the vulnerabilities of the core elements of the business. This leads to the setting of post-disaster recovery targets and the mitigation stage of disaster management. The process is dynamic, with existing risks being constantly monitored and updated and new ones considered. 8.4.1
Significant hazards
The starting point then is hazards, a number of which have special significance. Such hazards may be internally or externally generated - that is, their source may lie either within or outside an organisation. This distinction is important from aspects of both forecasting and control. It might seem easier to deal with those which may arise internally; but it is equally necessary to foresee and limit the effects of those which have an external origin. Internal hazards are brought into existence through an organisation’s own activity. They may range from machinery failure via production control failures (loss of chemicals for example) through employee misdemeanour to ‘straightforward’ accident. Because they are, largely, under the control of the organisation, they tend - as we will see later - to receive the most attention. However, comparison may indicate that such an approach is rather limited. External hazards can be regarded as those which exist (or might exist) regardless of the organisation’s existence, but which have the propensity to impinge on its activities. These could include a wide range of events: •
Weather-related - Even in the UK storms and floods, including flash floods, are the most usual natural disasters that affect businesses. This may be through onsite injuries to staff and damage to property and facilities on the one hand, or disruption to road and rail communications preventing attendance at work on the other. The ‘Great Storm’ in southern England in October 1987 is one example of this, as are the floods in the Chichester area in January 1995.
• 232
Supply problems - For a number of years major industries in the UK provided a
litany of instances in which component manufacturers were unable to meet their contracted arrangements, causing severe disruption in primary assembly lines. Where products are complex and all or many of the components are produced out-of-house, an organisation will be particularly vulnerable. •
Marketplace changes - These include currency and share price fluctuations, alterations in taxation and government subsidy arrangements, product obsolescence, hostile takeover and targeted competition.
•
Epidemics and infestations The greatest asset of any business is its workforce, particularly the most highly skilled workers. If a significant number of such employees are unable to work for a protracted period the effects on a business can be profound, and at times calamitous. An epidemic disease, perhaps one as common as influenza, may result in disastrous absenteeism. Infestations of insects or rodents may especially affect food-based organisations.
•
Hostile acts - Events in recent years have shown that any business in the private or public sectors is subject to the possibility of terrorist and protest action. Examples range from threats to (particularly) executives through to intentional adulteration of products. Of everyday concern too is the threat of theft and vandalism involving property, equipment, facilities, records and information. Professional gangs targeting cash and electronic equipment are an obvious danger, but so are casual thieves and vandals.
•
Information technology failures - Information technology is fundamental to modern business practice, and an electronic failure can bring a business to a standstill. ‘In-house’ threats, though they must be taken very seriously, are probably minor in comparison with the increasing number of electronic viruses and hostile hackers. In 1999, the Melissa virus caused havoc across the globe, whilst concerted hacking disrupted the operations of the service provider America Online (AOL).
•
Transport accidents - Transport accidents involving key staff can have a major impact on a business. They may involve rail, road or air. Consider a train disaster,
233
as happened near Clapham Junction in 1989, and imagine the effect on a business if three of its directors are killed or injured. Road accidents are more common. Some international companies have a policy whereby senior members of staff travel separately. •
Other incidents - There is a wide diversity of other possible incidents, many of them more probable than the apocalyptic scenarios. They range from power failures through collateral damage from a disaster stricken neighbour to a departmental syndicate winning the National Lottery - making a nine-to-five job in a mundane business seem very unappealing!
8.4.2
Risk identification and assessment
In organisational terms, risk can be taken as the interaction of a hazard with any vulnerable business activity, resource or facility. Many identification techniques are used, depending on the business. They are wide ranging. •
Statutory compliance
•
Operating, storage, transit and waste disposal systems
•
Job safety analyses
•
Permit to work clearances
•
Supervisory arrangements
•
Inspections and maintenance procedures
•
Testing and defect reporting
•
Modification controls
•
Equipment and resource allocation
•
Hazard and operability studies.
Following identification, the next stage is assessment, i.e. the measurement of risk in some form or other. Although every business faces risks, most only have finite resources to deal with them. To allocate those resources effectively, the risks must be given an order of priority: some employees may be at greater risk, some property more vulnerable. Health, safety and environmental legislation must be considered, as must the image of the business and the cost benefits of any remedial action. 234
The likelihood of a risk becoming reality and how serious the effects might be should be considered. This should take account of secondary dangers, e.g. the structural failure of a building following a fire. Each risk has to be separately assessed before remedial action can be taken or the need for it dismissed. Where there is doubt about the result of an assessment, safety is paramount, with severity having precedence over likelihood. There are a number of different formulas for assessing risk. The simplest is to develop a risk index and criteria in-house, using a broad categorisation into high, medium and low probability and high, medium and low severity. Alternatively, a more precise risk/impact rating may be used. 8.4.3
Risk reduction and control
Once assessment is complete, safety procedures can be introduced to eliminate, or at least - reduce and control risks. Risk reduction and control involves a mixture of physical and procedural measures designed to prevent or limit loss. Apart from strict compliance with health and safety, fire, building, environmental and other legislation, safety procedures can be reinforced by the use of a variety of in-house codes of practice and operating systems. Some of these have been listed below: Reduction and control o Substitute hazardous substances and materials o Revise working practices o Health screening and staff welfare o Personal protection and first aid o Safety discipline and supervision o Security and fire precautions o Safety and other audits o Alerting, call-out and response systems o Hazard and emergency point diagrams o Education and training. As an example, we might consider the identification and minimisation of a possible terrorist threat. Having identified the risk, various procedures might be put in place. To 235
combat the threat of terrorism, a security plan should ideally offer some important practical guidelines: •
Vehicle entry and parking - Unauthorised vehicles must not be allowed to enter business premises and large vehicles have to be excluded from car parks. Cars in staff car parks must be identifiable and visitor car parks observed either directly or by remote surveillance equipment.
•
Access and monitoring There has to be close control of visitors. Reception areas must only display essential information, and equipment and keys have to be hidden from view. Briefcases and handbags must be searched, and if this is refused entry forbidden. Outside business hours security guards can be employed, or the premises secured and local police given a list of key holders.
•
Incoming post and deliveries - Incoming post and deliveries must be examined. Staff, especially postal staff, have to be briefed about the tell-tale signs of letter bombs and action to be taken concerning suspect packages. Particular care is needed if a package is hand delivered from an unknown source.
•
Telephone threats and warnings - Staff must be advised on how to respond to threatening telephone calls, such as bomb warnings. A readily available checklist is helpful.
•
Search and evacuation - Response to a threatening telephone call must be predetermined. It may be disregarded as a hoax, and the majority of calls are hoaxes, or a search conducted. If a suspicious vehicle or object is found, a decision has to be taken about evacuation. The aim is to move people away from the possible bomb rather than move the possible bomb away from people. A clearly understood and well-rehearsed evacuation plan is therefore essential.
•
Surveillance and sweeps - Surveillance and security sweeps of business premises are important. They have to be. routinely carried out before and after normal business hours by those familiar with the premises.
•
Good housekeeping - Many security measures consist simply of common sense and good housekeeping. Keeping out the terrorist also stops the thief, shoplifter
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and burglar; a video camera on the street dissuades car thieves; and fire precautions such as clearing waste, discarded paraphernalia and overgrown shrubbery remove not only cover for a bomb, but a potential source of arson and accidental fires. 8.4.4
Risk funding and transfer
Some residual risks will always remain. Dealing with residual risks is the fourth stage of risk management. Known as risk funding and transfer, it includes contingency funds, personal and property insurance and continuity planning. Risk funding and transfer o Contingency funds o Legal safeguards o Insurance cover o Employment contracts (e.g. mobility clauses) o Site leasing commitments o Continuity planning o Emergency procedures. Many risk managers use a concept called ‘total cost of risk’. This covers the costs involved in each of the four stages - identification, assessment, reduction and control, and funding and transfer - and includes monitoring and administration. These cost elements are inter-linked, higher expenditure in one area leading to lower costs in another, e.g. higher retained risk means lower insurance premiums. As insurance cannot by itself ensure continuity, some businesses have planning as the main mode of cover, with only a small proportion of the estimated cost of any loss being by insurance. The management of residual risks is usually supported by cost-benefit analyses, i.e. the total cost of the requisite protective measures set against the safety benefits they provide.
8.5 Principles of planning Following mitigation comes readiness, and readiness requires pre-planning. If any of the residual risks determined during risk management materialise as disaster, it is such 237
planning that enables fast, effective and appropriate response. This and the following sections cover principles that are mostly common to both civil protection and business continuity planning. Here, the umbrella term ‘contingency’ plan or planning is used to cover both areas. 8.5.1
Purpose of planning
There are a number of sound business reasons for planning. It is suggested here that preplanning: •
is good management practice
•
reduces thinking time when a crisis occurs
•
facilitates a systematic and effective response
•
helps contain an incident and limit damage.
Disasters do happen, and preparedness is essential. Nonetheless,. whatever preparations are made, a disaster by definition will cause major upheaval. In an increasingly competitive and litigious market place, management must do more than just respond. A contingency plan should help organisations - and that includes communities survive and recover; it must therefore enable commercial organisations to continue to trade with minimum disruption throughout an incident. The success of Commercial Union in implementing its own maxim ‘Business as Usual’ after the St Mary Axe bomb in 1992 is a good illustration. Similarly, a public sector organisation must still meet its statutory requirements whatever disaster occurs. A fundamental aim of contingency planning is to keep an organisation functioning as normally as possible throughout any crisis or disaster situation. 8.5.2
Business objectives
A disaster impacts on all management areas and puts people, property, equipment, resources, facilities, jobs, information and credibility in jeopardy - witness the loss of public confidence and esteem in Yorkshire Water in 1995 as a result of prolonged water shortages. For any business, whether in the private or public sectors, an imperative in contingency planning is to avert such threats, or at least to ameliorate the situation. 238
A contingency plan has three objectives: •
to control the initial and developing situation while continuing to meet normal imperatives with minimum disruption, and to return to normality as quickly as possible;
•
to ensure as necessary health, safety, security and welfare of those directly affected, and their relatives and friends, with care and consideration; and
•
to liaise with other agencies with proper understanding and efficiency, and to mutual advantage.
8.5.3
Private and public sectors
Although their activities remain subject to statute, many public sector organisations are now self-funding units operating on commercial lines. The principles of contingency planning advocated here are the same for both the private and public sectors, but the planning sequences are different. Private sector businesses determine the aim of their continuity plan on commercial grounds at corporate level, e.g. ‘To return business operations to 75 per cent of normal within 24 hours of any disaster’. When the outline plan has been drafted to meet that aim, the key departments within the business draw up their own departmental plans within the corporate criteria. In other words business continuity planning is a ‘top-down process’. Although public sector organisations may have as a common purpose the provision of the highest possible level of public service, the units within those organisations can have very disparate statutory criteria. This can be because the service provided is peculiar to the business unit by function or timing, such as collecting monthly rents or dispensing weekly benefits, or because the unit provides a support function for other units, like accommodation or information technology. If a major and perhaps protracted disruption is to be avoided when a disaster strikes, each business unit must have an aim specific to the service it provides. Separate unit contingency plans, therefore, need to be initiated. When written, those plans have to be consolidated centrally, and a corporate plan and co-ordinating instructions added. Contingency planning in this case is a 239
‘bottom-up process’. In both cases, however, it is vital that the participants (or proposed participants) are involved in the planning process. 8.5.4
Planning guidelines
A plan has to be adaptable, and to be so it must follow certain guidelines, which remain constant whatever the overall function. •
Top management support - For planning to be meaningful, regardless of whether it is ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’, it must have chief executive support. He or she must be committed to the need for planning, and must prescribe policy and determine responsibility for the process. No plan must become just another chore to be forgotten when done.
•
‘In-house ownership’ - Equally important is ‘in-house ownership’ of the plan. Key staff must be included in the planning process, and departmental advice and external expertise sought where necessary. A contingency plan has to be developed from research and case studies, and centred on established structures and routines.
•
Purpose and priorities - Where there is danger of human casualties, the primary purpose of planning is to save life, prevent injuries and alleviate suffering. Other priorities in this case are less urgent. In contingency planning the aim is not simply to ensure business survival and early recovery, but to enable normal work to continue with minimum disruption.
•
Effects not causes - When the identification, assessment, and reduction and control of risks are complete, action has to be taken on residual risks. This includes the need for planning. Any contingency plan therefore must be tailored to the impact of the residual risks concerned, i.e. to the effects of disasters not their causes.
•
Basic framework - It would be very rare for a contingency plan precisely to match the disaster that occurs. Accordingly it must not include too many predetermined actions. When complete, the plan has to provide a simple, flexible framework that can be adapted to respond quickly and effectively to any
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situation. •
Executive document - While it should be flexible, a business continuity plan is still an executive document; it is not a review of ‘ifs, buts and maybes’ when an incident occurs. Once adapted to meet the situation it has to be implemented with promptness and common sense. Specialist advice must be available, but ultimately there needs to be an accountable and identifiable person with overall responsibility.
•
Aim and strategy - Every contingency plan must have a clear, positive and attainable aim which is directly pertinent to the risks for which the plan is intended, and any caveats that apply - if it doesn’t, the plan is irrelevant. The aim may also include the strategy for continuing normality, or if disrupted, the time frame in which normality has to resume.
•
Requirements and considerations - A key requirement in any contingency plan is assured communication for the constant passage of reliable information on which measured decisions can be made, and a control structure to direct and manage the immediate and developing situation. In addition, there is a wide range of other considerations covering response, survival and recovery, not all of which apply to every situation.
•
Associated plans - A contingency plan may incorporate or have dependent from it a number of associated plans relating to specific requirements, e.g. evacuation, communications, information technology, media, etc. They are activated depending on the disaster that occurs. These associated plans must be compatible with the central plan.
•
Testing and training - Once prepared, a contingency plan must be resourced before it can be implemented. It has also to be tested and rehearsed, and all staff must be trained in their individual and collective tasks. The plan must be understood by all involved in its execution - if there is a lack of familiarity, confidence or training, it is likely to fail.
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8.5.5
Communications and control
Every disaster is different, and its initial effect and how the situation develops depend on the nature and scale of the incident. Nonetheless, there is a common sequence of events in the response of any well-prepared business. Sequence of events •
Identify the disaster and raise the alarm
•
Call the emergency services
•
Save lives and treat casualties
•
Confirm communications are working
•
Activate the business continuity and associated plans
•
Establish control
•
Manage the developing situation
The ability of a business to handle this sequence of events quickly and effectively depends on two key requirements: assured communications for the rapid and constant passage of reliable information on which to make measured judgements and decisions, and a planned and tested control structure to direct and manage the immediate and developing situation. For disasters that occur outside normal working hours, a call-in procedure is needed for key staff. A cascade system is commonly used. 8.5.6
Communications
Whatever the nature of activity, successful businesses by definition have excellent communications. However, many make no preparations to guarantee the efficacy of those communications when a disaster strikes. When communications fail, so too will the business. A communications plan covering in-house as well as external needs is crucial in passing information, making decisions and ensuring continuity of trading. If a business is to assure its communications in a disaster situation, the requirement for communications must be identified and suitable provision made before an incident occurs. Too much reliance should not be placed on the possibility of external assistance. Although in the UK some telecommunications providers offer a service that includes 242
self-contained mobile exchanges and mobile payphones that have been used at such diverse disasters as Lockerbie, Hillsborough, Deal, Zeebrugge and Clapham, availability and timescales may not be sufficient. In-house mobile phones, radios and pagers may need to be relied on - though networks may become overloaded in the case of a major disaster. 8.5.7
Control structure
The business needs to be able to implement a complementary control and management structure to make and implement judgements and decisions. This structure will run in parallel to normal management, which remains responsible for everyday trading. Typically a business disaster control structure is three-tiered, reflecting strategic direction, hands-on management and specialist expertise. What the tiers are called is a matter of choice, these are often labelled as: Crisis Action Committee, Disaster Management Group and Support Teams. Given that telephone exchanges and mobile phone networks may become overloaded at the point of a disaster, consideration needs to be given to remote location and to alternative communication systems. Crisis action committee The Chief Executive and directors, or their equivalent make up this ‘top’ decision making group. When a disaster occurs the group meets as and when required to determine corporate strategy. If the Committee does not gather formally, it is nonetheless prudent for at least one member to be on call to take corporate decisions, provide senior direction and guidance, front high profile commitments such as VIP liaison and media interviews, and ensure that the caring image of the business is maintained and clearly evident. Disaster management group The Disaster Management Group consists of senior managers from key areas of the business. If the disaster is such that the Group is already assembled, and has delegated authority from the Crisis Action Committee, it will be this Group that activates the business continuity plan. Thereafter it will implement that plan by adapting it to the disaster and controlling and managing the situation as it 243
develops. The leader of the Group is the principal decision-maker in the moment-by-moment handling of the incident. Support teams The Support Teams cover five requirements: incident response, evacuation, specialist interests, media affairs and casualties. o Incident Response Team - An Incident Response Team is site-specific. The Team is responsible for administering immediate first aid (in the sense of both people and processes), isolating the incident, carrying out on-thespot damage assessment, and any necessary liaison with the emergency services. The Team must have a good knowledge of the site and be entirely familiar with business operations and any hazardous substances in use or sensitive work in progress. It is important that the Team be aware of the business priorities with regard to on-site facilities and resources. o Assembly Point Team An Assembly Point Team is needed at all the business sites. It must have a detailed knowledge of evacuation procedures. When a disaster occurs, the leader has to be informed by reception of all on-site customers, visitors and contractors, and of those members of staff who are not at work for whatever reason. If evacuation is ordered, the Team must activate the Site Assembly Point and check staff and others against the business nominal roll and visitors’ book. The Assembly Point has to be clearly marked and known to all staff. o Specialist Advisory Teams - Specialist Advisory Teams provide expert advice on specific business aspects. Depending on the nature of the event and the business, these teams could include: security, safety engineering, fire, health and safety, communications, operations, logistics, information technology, international affairs, quality control, personnel and training, space planning and estates, facilities and resources, building and maintenance,
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production,
marketing
and
sales,
transport
and
distribution, legal, finance and insurance, catering, etc. o Media Affairs Team - The Media Affairs Team issues media statements, holds regular briefings and arranges suitable media exposure for senior staff. It must be aware of media needs and establish pre-disaster personal contacts with local media representatives. Handled with skill and understanding, a disaster can be a media success, as British Midland Airways demonstrated after Kegworth in 1989. o Casualty Support Team - The responsibilities of the Casualty Support Team include accounting for all members of staff, determining names of casualties and missing staff, liaison with the Casualty Bureau and receiving hospitals, and handling relatives and friends. The Team must have immediate access to all relevant staff records, understand the emergency services’ casualty procedures, have knowledge of ethnic and religious attitudes to casualties, and be trained in sympathetic telephone techniques. Emergency controller Many disasters are immediate and occur before the disaster control structure can be activated. It is imperative, therefore, that someone of suitable seniority and standing be nominated to advise the Chief Executive, with authority to act on his/her behalf until the control structure is operating effectively. Sometimes called the Emergency Controller, he/she could have vital decisions to make. The first is about evacuation. The decision to evacuate a building depends on the disaster or the threat of it. A fire will almost certainly cause the building to be evacuated. However, if there is a bomb alert it may be more sensible to start by searching the building. Thereafter, and depending on the result of the search, staff should be concentrated in a previously determined safe area within the building evacuation in such a case could put people into even greater danger. Another vital decision is to determine when an incident is sufficiently serious, or likely to become sufficiently serious, from the business standpoint, for it to be declared a
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disaster. This decision is particularly significant when the incident occurs outside normal business hours. If the situation continues to deteriorate, the decision must be taken to activate the business continuity plan. This is a judgement with far-reaching ramifications, and if it has to be taken before the disaster control structure is operating, and the Chief Executive is unavailable, it is the responsibility of the Emergency Controller. No matter who takes it, the decision must be made in sufficient time for the business to have the optimum chance of attaining the aim of its continuity plan. Once the disaster control structure is operating effectively it is usual for the Emergency Controller to join the Disaster Management Group. 8.5.8
Disaster management centres
Disaster Management Centres must be predetermined in at least two major sites of the business, or at the major site and an alternative location if the business has only one site. Each Centre needs communicating but separate rooms of suitable size for the Disaster Management Group and Support Teams. The Crisis Action Committee can meet as and when required in any chosen location. A purpose-built Disaster Management Centre may not be needed, providing suitable rooms have been identified pre-disaster and can be made readily available when it occurs. Similarly, much of the equipment and facilities required do not have to be exclusively disaster orientated. Nonetheless, it is pragmatic to draw up an inventory including communications, boards and charts, stationery, and a television set. 8.5.9
Training and validation
An important feature of any contingency plan is training and validation. Few major events are performed without preparation or rehearsal, and the management of a major crisis or disaster should not be an exception. It is pertinent to argue here that there are three progressive steps. The first is to select the most suitable staff for the key disaster management appointments. The second is to ensure the nominated staff understand their roles and acquire the confidence and expertise to undertake their requisite tasks successfully. The third is to validate, develop and resource the business 246
continuity plan. These objectives are achieved by a combination of perceptive management, briefings and training, and rehearsals and exercises.
8.6 Emergency and support services As part of continuity planning it makes good sense for business continuity managers to understand the role of disaster response and support agencies. Where appropriate, points of liaison with external agencies should be established prior to the implementation of the plan. The description which follows derives directly from United Kingdom practice, but the principles are more widely applicable. 8.6.1
Disaster response
The core of the initial external response to any life-threatening disaster is generally provided by the emergency services, assisted by the local authority. Other agencies like the voluntary and utility services may be involved in a supportive role, and on occasions so too might the armed forces and central government. All agencies have to maintain plans and procedures, which must be up-to-date, validated and rehearsed. A Senior Coordinating Group co-ordinates inter-service planning and training. While these services and agencies have their own specialist roles and functions, they have certain common responsibilities and objectives in serving and protecting people and property in any disaster situation. It is therefore important that those responsible for business continuity be familiar with the operations of these organisations. Common objectives in a life-threatening disaster •
Saving life and relieving suffering
•
Protecting property and resources
•
Preventing escalation of the incident
•
Assisting friends and relatives of casualties
•
Responding appropriately to the media
•
Preserving the scene for inquiries and investigations
•
Safeguarding the environment
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8.6.2
The emergency services
Police. In the UK, the police are normally in overall control at a disaster scene and coordinate the activities of all agencies attending. They employ a three-tier structure of command, known as gold (strategic), silver (tactical) and bronze (operational). Among the police tasks are: control and co-ordination, including cordoning the scene and restricting access to the outer cordons; identification of casualties and support for their friends and relatives (this involves collation and dissemination of casualty information through a Casualty Bureau and arrangements for the dead in conjunction with the coroner). Further police issues are the protection and preservation of the scene for subsequent inquiries and investigations that may follow, liaison with the media and coordination of VIP visits. Fire service tasks cover search and rescue operations for those trapped or injured, containment of the incident by fire-fighting and the control of hazardous substances and materials, and co-ordination of the safety of all those working within the inner cordon (sometimes called the ‘fire zone’). Business staff are unlikely to have direct contact with fire-fighters except when being rescued or advised on escape. However, there are two officers with whom interaction is probable. First, the Fire Incident Commander, who has close liaison with the Incident Response Team. There may be questions about staff nominal rolls, on-site customers, visitors and contractors, hazardous products and building plans. It is the Fire Incident Commander who may inform about casualties, both injured and dead (bodies are not removed until the police give permission), who can advise when the fire is under control and, depending on police investigations, indicate when buildings can safely be reoccupied. Second, the Fire Investigation Officer, who is responsible for determining the cause of any fire. The cause may be arson or accidental - if arson, the investigation is carried out in close liaison with the police; if accidental, the Fire Investigation Officer examines the premises with appointed business staff as soon as possible, and reports on fire safety measures such as extinguishers, sprinklers, fire doors, etc. Ambulance Service. The ambulance service is unlikely to be directly involved in the
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management of business continuity, except in cases of extreme disaster or in major training exercises. In the event that an incident is serious enough to involve casualties, the ambulance service will render emergency medical aid at the scene of a disaster and determine the priority of evacuation for casualties. The ambulance service will also alert receiving hospitals and transport casualties to them. The most probable interaction between a business and the ambulance and medical services is to establish the whereabouts and condition of an organisation’s employees after an incident. The ambulance service should maintain documentation on casualties which is similar to that held by the police. 8.6.3
Other disaster response agencies
Local Authorities - Assistance from local authorities is both immediate and longer term. In the immediate term the local authority will support the role of the emergency services. This is done by providing support and care for the local and wider community (housing, food, works, transport, communications, information services, welfare et al.) and the co-ordination of any response agencies other than the emergency services. As the disaster moves into the recovery stage, the local authority takes a leading role in rehabilitating the community, re-establishing routines and restoring the environment. One key feature of local authority involvement for business continuity purposes, is the structural safety of buildings. Local authority civil engineers may need to inspect buildings damaged by fire, explosions, etc. before staff are allowed back in. National Government - Although there is an increasing tendency for what might be seen as political presence at the scene of disasters, particularly those involving loss of life, national government is not typically and directly involved in disaster response. This may, however, change in the case of what has been termed the ‘massive disaster’. In the UK, the projected system to be used is that of the ‘lead government agency’, where the most directly-applicable civil service organisation would head central response. Other, specialist, national agencies, may however be called upon to assist. Notably in the UK, the Environment Agency has specialists in, for example, preventing and coping with chemical releases which threaten the aquatic environment. 249
Voluntary Agencies - The voluntary services contribute a wide range of expertise in support of the emergency services and local authority. They may operate or be organised internationally (e.g. Red Cross / Red Crescent, Medecins sans Frontieres) or be country-specific. They may offer specialist practical skills (in the UK for example the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, Mountain Rescue and the Mines Rescue Service), emotional support (e.g. the Samaritans) or more general assistance (the Women’s Royal Voluntary Service, the Salvation Army). However, it must be stressed that while these organisations offer a valuable and often highly specialised service, their involvement is voluntary and should therefore not be relied on in contingency plans. ‘Utility Services’ - The utility services - telecommunications, electricity, gas, oil, water often play an important part in disaster response. It is important that any continuity plan should contain some contingency strategy for utilities. Many of the utilities themselves now offer contingencies for crisis situations as part of their business contract. It is therefore important that these be established as sufficient for likely needs prior to any implementation of the business continuity plan. Commercial Disaster Response Agencies - There are a variety of commercial agencies that offer specialist support in a disaster, e.g. in respect of office space, furniture, transport, computer back-up, environmental clean-up, document recovery. Many of these organisations offer an excellent service and some regularly assist the emergency services. It should be borne in mind, however, that they have a commercial interest in selling their assistance. The middle of a major crisis is not the ideal time to discover shortcomings in their service expertise or ability. Mutuality - Immediate neighbours can be immensely helpful in providing, for example, shelter and food for evacuated staff, and in the City of London disaster related liaison between businesses, even between competitors, is becoming commonplace. This need not necessarily be on a local basis. Oil companies have, for example, co-operative arrangements which can be brought into effect in the event of major oil spills. 8.6.4
Pre-disaster liaison
When approached, the emergency services will usually give briefings to businesses 250
about their specialist roles and functions, and local authorities may provide advice and training. Other pre-disaster actions include drawing up contracts with commercial disaster agencies and liaison with neighbours about mutual aid. The onset of crisis or disaster is no time to be searching for assistance.
8.7 Business continuity management Arguably there is no longer any choice for any business over whether or not business continuity management and planning (BCM) is necessary. As Waterer (1999) points out: Firstly, and most simply, it has to be accepted that if it fails to plan for interruption, and then goes on to suffer a ‘disaster’, the likely outcome will be huge loss of profit (Eurotunnel suffered £400 million in lost revenue after their 1996 fire). The probable eventuality is often the end of trading altogether (8 out of 10 companies if you read the independent statistics). We live in an economic environment that is so hugely competitive that consumers, whether they are of a product or service, do not give you a second chance. In a disaster scenario they will quite happily switch their allegiance to a competitor, rather than face the prospect of sharing the struggle of the unprepared supplier who is attempting to survive.
A useful place to start when considering business continuity planning and management is the website of the Business Continuity Institute (BCI). This is at www.thebci.org. John Sharpe, former CEO of the BCI, has stated that: ‘Business Continuity Management (BCM) is not just about disaster recovery, crisis management, risk management control or technology recovery. It is a business-owned and driven issue that unifies a broad spectrum of business and management disciplines. In particular, it enables the strategic and operational framework to review the way an organisation provides its products and services while increasing its resilience to disruption or loss’ (Sharpe, 2003:16).
Sharp adds that ‘… good BCM fully recognises that an organisation’s resilience depends equally on its management and operational staff as well as technology’ (Sharpe, 2003: 16). The BCI defines Business Continuity Management as: Business Continuity Management is defined as an holistic management process that identifies potential impacts that threaten an organisation and provides a framework for building resilience with the capability for an effective response that safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation and value creating activities.
Its primary objective is to allow the Executive to continue to manage their business under adverse conditions, by the introduction of appropriate resilience strategies, recovery objectives, business continuity and crisis management plans in collaboration 251
with, or as a key component of, an integrated risk management initiative. See: www.thebci.org/certificationstandards.htm (accessed December, 2005). Sharpe comments that: ‘In managing any event, it is critical to recognize that a successful outcome is judged by both the technical response and the perceived competence and capability of the management in delivering the business response. The stakeholder perception should be seen as the critical success factor with an equal if not more urgent priority over the technical solution. Consequently, the “acid test” is to convincingly demonstrate an effective BCM competence and capability to continue business as usual, rather than adopt an outmoded business resumption management approach’ (Sharpe, 2003: 16).
The BCI has developed a set of six BCM principles or stages in order to provide a generic framework for successful BCM. These guidelines are at www.thebci.org/gpg.htm. They are as follows: 1. Understanding your business 2. BCM Strategies 3. Developing a BCM Response 4. Developing a BCM Culture 5. Exercising, Maintenance and Audit These then come together to form an overall sixth stage which is ‘Management of the BCM Programme’. The BCI has also developed 10 standards of professional competence to guide managers in developing BCM plans. The competencies required by a professional practitioner in order to deliver effective Business Continuity Management. They are not presented in any particular order of importance or sequence. 1. Initiation and Management Establish the need for a Business Continuity Management (BCM) Process or Function, including resilience strategies, recovery objectives, business continuity and crisis management plans and including obtaining management support and organizing and managing the formulation of the function or process either in collaboration with, or as a key component of, an integrated risk management initiative. 2. Business Impact Analysis Identify the impacts resulting from disruptions and disaster scenarios that can affect the 252
organization and techniques that can be used to quantify and qualify such impacts. Identify time-critical functions, their recovery priorities, and inter-dependencies so that recovery time objectives can be set. 3. Risk Evaluation and Control Determine the events and external surroundings that can adversely affect the organization and its resources (facilities, technologies, etc.) with disruption as well as disaster, the damage such events can cause, and the controls needed to prevent or minimize the effects of potential loss. Provide cost-benefit analysis to justify investment in controls to mitigate risks. 4. Developing Business Continuity Management Strategies Determine and guide the selection of possible business operating strategies for continuation of business within the recovery point objective and recovery time objective, while maintaining the organization’s critical functions. 5. Emergency Response and Operations Develop and implement procedures for response and stabilizing the situation following an incident or event, including establishing and managing an Emergency Operations Centre to be used as a command centre during the emergency. 6. Developing and Implementing Business Continuity and Crisis Management Plans Design, develop, and implement Business Continuity and Crisis Management Plans that provide continuity within the recovery time and recovery point objectives. 7. Awareness and Training Programmes Prepare a programme to create and maintain corporate awareness and enhance the skills required to develop and implement the Business Continuity Management Programme or process and its supporting activities. 8. Maintaining and Exercising Business Continuity and Crisis Management Plans Pre-plan and coordinate plan exercises, and evaluate and document plan exercise results. Develop processes to maintain the currency of continuity capabilities and the plan document in accordance with the organization’s strategic direction. Verify that the Plan will prove effective by comparison with a suitable standard, and report results in a
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clear and concise manner. 9. Crisis Communications Develop, coordinate, evaluate, and exercise plans to communicate with internal stakeholders (employees, corporate management, etc.), external stakeholders (customers, shareholders, vendors, suppliers, etc.) and the media (print, radio, television, internet, etc.). 10. Coordination with External Agencies Establish applicable procedures and policies for coordinating continuity and restoration activities with external agencies (local, state, national, emergency responders, defence, etc.) while ensuring compliance with applicable statutes or regulations. The student might also find it useful to consult Chaper 6, ‘Business Continuity Management’ of Emergency Preparedness. Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Note here that BCM is not ‘a plan’ but an ongoing process, that it is not an attempt to continue all operations in all circumstances but rather aims to ensure continuance of critical processes and that it is based on prior evaluation of company operations and status. Neither is the management cycle fixed. Strohl Systems (2000) introduce a phase of resumption, which ‘refers to the process of planning for and/or implementing the resumption of only the most time-sensitive business operations immediately following an interruption or disaster’, so that the cycle previously described mitigation response - recovery - restoration becomes prevention - response - resumption - recovery - restoration. Business continuity planning is not an exact and defined process. In common with all good management skills, it needs knowledge, reflection, insight and aptitude. 8.7.1
The plan
It would be a mistake of the first order to draw up a continuity plan which was based on pre-judgement of the likelihoods it should address, what it should contain or how it should be structured. Nevertheless, a typical plan has a number of sections, of which 254
training and validation are particularly important. The plan should be written in a simple and concise manner. A suggested order might be: •
Information - This section sets the scene for the plan. It designates the core elements and trading imperatives of the business
•
Impact analysis and targets - An impact analysis is the evaluation of the effects of a significant hazard on a business, related especially to the core elements of that business. The impact is determined in respect of criteria such as loss of customers or product launches, contractual penalties and fines, additional costs of working and recovery, bad publicity and tarnished reputation, and possible long-term failure of the business. From the analysis, recovery targets can be set. The targets must be fully attainable.
•
Aim - The aim is crucial to the success of any plan. Aims should be clear, positive and attainable. The aim could also include strategic targets and timings for achievement.
•
Execution - The execution section is the substance of the business continuity plan. The section must provide the essential framework and directions for the plan to be readily adapted to whatever situation pertains.
•
Communications and control - The communications and control section gives the Disaster Management Structure. It should specify the locations of Disaster Management Centres and the resources needed on activation. The section may provide information about co-ordination and liaison with the emergency services, and perhaps the outline of an initial media statement.
•
Welfare and administration - The welfare and administration section covers the major aspects of welfare especially as this affects casualties and next-of-kin but also on-site staff and visitors. The casualty support team needs up-to-date nextof-kin details. This section might also deal with essential services and emergency supplies such as generators and heaters.
•
Supporting documentation - Supporting documentation is enclosed as required, e.g. associated plans, site drawings, diagrams and photographs, and additional
255
papers. •
Training and validation - The training and validation section is traditionally seen as supplementary. However, some theorists acknowledge it as being as important as the plan itself. This section can give directions on the selection, briefing and training of key staff, including reliefs and reserves, detail plan validation, rehearsal and update, and refer to development, resourcing and distribution of the plan.
This outline is neither determinate nor invariable. A copy of the University of Leicester Flu Pandemic Contingency Plan is included as an annex to this Unit. In studying it, you will note that some priorities and the order vary from the list above. Plans need to be tailored to the institution to which they relate and to take into account the events which appear, on analysis, most likely. A plan must be predicated on the most likely scenarios, but planners must ensure that it will be functional and useful in other circumstances. 8.7.2
Summary - business continuity management
Business continuity management is now acknowledged as an essential feature of risk management in both commercial and government organisations. Although still not compulsory in law, (but the student should note the effect of the CCA, 2004 on various categories of organisation and local authorities and responders) continuity planning and the factual evidence displayed in the plan itself - may be the only defence against unreasonable negligence claims following a major crisis. The expectations of the Turnbull Report, referred to earlier in this Unit, emphasise the significance. The exercise of writing a continuity plan, if well researched, will highlight shortcomings in an organisational risk assessment. This exercise should not, however, be seen as the endpoint or the major activity of the planner or of planning. By way of instant audit, it is argued that five questions could be asked about any business continuity plan. These are: •
Have all possible steps been taken to reduce the chance of a serious incident occurring? (Risk management)
• 256
Have all core activities and facilities been considered and key staff, equipment
and resources protected? (Prioritisation) •
Will the business survive and continue to trade/operate effectively if a serious incident occurs? (Planning)
•
Are response and recovery measures up-to-date, have they been validated or rehearsed and have all staff been trained? (Training)
•
Is the planning process ongoing and proactive?
Continuity planning is a circular process If there are doubts about any of the answers, the business may be at risk. If there are not, then it is certain that new processes, new systems and external events will act to circumvent the planning process. Disasters are real, they can’t be re-run and if a business is to be assured of its future, it must be fully prepared - and preparedness is the purpose of business continuity planning.
8.8 Conclusion This Unit has covered a wide area of current practice. Perhaps the major comment to bear in mind is the interdependence of risk management with continuity planning and civil protection. Risk assessment and reduction is limited unless there are procedures in place to deal with the unforeseen event, and dealing with the unforeseen event involves not just the organisation itself but the community in a much wider sense, represented immediately by governmental agencies and the emergency services. A holistic view will insist on close collaboration of all those management facilities involved. The question then arises as to the practicability and the costs involved in achieving those ends. Although costs have not been directly touched upon in this Unit, it is clear that, in the final analysis, they play an important part. There is, first, the cost that an organisation will bear if it is unprotected in the event of disaster. But this must be balanced by the second consideration - the proportion of its budget that can and should reasonably be devoted to that protection. Strictly speaking, that calculation is also one that is in the realms of risk management; but it is one that, in the end, must be taken by the organisation’s executives.
257
8.9 Further reading You should now study the material provided at the end of this Unit. Note that sensitive information has been removed from the document. It has also been reformatted.
8.10 Study questions To reinforce your practical understanding of risk assessment and continuity planning, you should complete the two exercises below. These are important and will assist your comprehension and aid your progress. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University. The University of Leicester Flu Pandemic Contingency Plan Having studied the Plan, list. •
five non-information-technology disasters that might affect the University
•
five additions to the plan that might make it more comprehensive
•
five simplifications that would make it easier to use.
(Note that the Plan has been reformatted and index page numbers removed from the original: changes to layout are therefore not an option for the last of these questions). Response Exercise Background •
You are the newly appointed Support Services Manager with the retail company Dino Hyperstores Ltd. The head office is in two buildings, one larger than the other, about 30 metres apart on an industrial estate. In the few days since starting the job, you have discovered: first, that in addition to catering, cleaning and other administrative duties, you are also responsible for safety and security; and second, that extant company safety and security arrangements are less than satisfactory - you are particularly perturbed to find there is no business continuity plan. You are preparing to submit a proposal to the directors suggesting that a consultant be called in to prepare such a plan, when one of the very incidents you fear occurs.
258
Setting •
You are the most senior person present on site towards the end of your first Friday afternoon. While discussing fire precautions with one of the two company fire marshals the building you’re in, the larger of the two, is rocked by an explosion. Before you can fully regain your wits, two employees burst into your office screaming that there are bodies everywhere. A junior manager says she has seen a number of staff who appear seriously injured and others with lesser injuries quickly follows them; she also tells you that some inner walls have collapsed and there is a lot of glass and debris about. The telephone rings - it is reception asking what has happened and saying that the smaller building is shaken but undamaged. As you put down the phone you can hear sounds of panic outside. There is also a strong smell of gas and someone is shouting ‘Fire! Fire! Fire!’ Your brain is whirling. While you inwardly curse the lack of a continuity plan, you desperately try to remember a disaster course you attended last year.
Requirement •
What action should you take, and with what priority? Whom must you contact and whom should you co-opt? What outside assistance can you expect, and from what sources? What about self—help? Who is likely to want answers, and what answers? What can you do to prevent what is clearly an emergency becoming a crisis, and perhaps degenerating into chaos? Where do you start and how?
8.11 Bibliography Cabinet Office, (2005) Emergency Preparedness. Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, its associated Regulations and Non-statutory Arrangements, London. Cabinet Office, (2005) Emergency Response and Recovery. Non-statutory Guidance to Complement Emergency Preparedness, London. Home Office (1994) Dealing with Disaster, 2"d Edition, London: HMSO. 259
Home Office (1997) Dealing with Disaster, 3d edition, Liverpool: Brodie. Home Office (1999) Standards for Civil Protection in England and Wales, London, Home Office
Communication
Directorate.
Also
available
at
http://www.homeoffice.govuk/epd/sfcpew.pdf. Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (1999) Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code, London: ICAEW. Royal Society Study Group (1992) Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management, London: The Royal Society. Sharp, J. (2003) ‘Practical standards’, Continuity Insurance and Risk, January: 16. Strohl Systems (2000) Business Continuity Planning Guide, Strohl Systems online, http://www.strohl-systems.com/Products/Bcp/bcp_inside.asp. Waterer, R (1999) ‘Business Continuity Explained’ in Facilities Management Guide (23), May.
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READING University of Leicester Flu Pandemic Contingency Plan
9 Unit Nine: Case study of London bombings 9.1 Aim and objectives of this Unit This Unit looks at terrorist incidents as disasters calling for a public protection response, and aims to demonstrate the complexity of dealing with something which has been perpetrated with the deliberate intent of causing disruption. A more in-depth examination of terrorism is considered in the following Unit of this Module. Using real incidents as case studies, this Unit will: •
consider the differences between deliberate and accidental disasters
•
identify the various perspectives and priorities of different organisations affected
•
provide an overview of measures needed to ensure an integrated response to a complex situation
•
demonstrate the need for arrangements covering pre-incident planning and post-incident recovery, as well as the response phase.
Social and political causes of terrorism (and aspects of incident management which involve dealing with the terrorist, whether by way of detection and/or negotiation) are beyond the scope of this Unit. It would seem appropriate, however, to offer a definition of ‘terrorism’. The following definition is taken from an article in the New Statesman: Terrorism is a special form of political violence, not a political philosophy or a movement. It is premeditated and aims to create a climate of extreme fear. It is directed at a wider audience or target than the immediate victims of the violence. And it inherently involves attacks on random and symbolic targets, including civilians Wilkinson (1996)
9.2 Introduction History records many acts of urban terrorism, from the Guy Fawkes’ 1605 Gunpowder Plot, to the assassination at Sarajevo in June 1914 of the Archduke Ferdinand, leading to the First World War, to the planting of bombs by the Suffragettes. Despite this, urban terrorism is sometimes portrayed as a product of the late 20th Century. Brian Cartheart (1993), for example, reporting on the Bishopsgate bomb, claimed ‘It was a very modern emergency’.
What has changed in recent years is the technology available to the terrorist. This includes the development of explosives many times more powerful than gunpowder (and of many of the older, so-called ‘high explosives’), remote-controlled detonators and electronic timers which have extended the time between planting and detonation to days or even weeks. Modern devices can be very compact and easily hidden, or can be very large, on the scale of -a-commercial vehicle payload. Other changes affecting vulnerability include: •
reliance on telecommunications, and computerised records render commercial organisations more susceptible to disruption
•
the style of construction of modern buildings, particularly the extensive use of large glazed panels making buildings more susceptible to damage
•
modern transport systems, notably aircraft, provide targets where a comparatively small device can have major results.
Perhaps the biggest change has been in the growth of mass communication. This has given the terrorist an immediate and potentially world-wide audience. There is no doubt whatsoever that many terrorist attacks are perpetrated solely for the publicity which follows. These case studies are of the St Mary Axe Bomb on 10 April 1992 and the Bishopsgate Bomb on 24 April 1993, both in the City of London. In terrorist terms, both were very large incidents, both aimed at disrupting the commercial community, and both (it is generally accepted) carried out by the same organisation. There have been other attacks, both before and since, but these two have been selected to demonstrate the main learning points and features of such incidents. Each case study highlights different aspects, but this does not necessarily mean that they were unique to that incident. For example, many organisations were involved in both incidents, although their role is only referred to in one study. Similarly, there are many organisations (such as various voluntary groups) who made a major contribution to the response, but space does not permit a full description. The studies therefore outline a typical response from a representative set of organisations.
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9.2.1
The values and limitations of case studies
The strength of a case study is that it is a real incident, studied with the gift of hindsight. People can say what they actually did, and organisational response can be assessed on what actually happened, rather than what planners and managers hoped or intended. The main weakness is that it is based on one incident, and people assuming that other incidents will be the same, may use it as a model instead of a learning experience. A case study reveals the way a specific set of organisations, with a set staffing structure, resources, personnel, communications and level of preparedness responded to an incident. The incident itself was in a specific location, at a set time of day on a specific date, in one set of weather conditions, and was perpetrated by one organisation with one set of objectives. Change any one of these factors and the outcome could be significantly different. Even the same people put back into the same situation may handle it differently as a result of lessons learned. Each incident is different. A set of planning arrangements based on one case study may only work if that incident is repeated, and can run the risk of being too ‘brittle’ to cope with another, marginally different incident. 9.2.2
Accuracy of case study reports
The case studies were chosen because they represent well-documented cases, which illustrate important aspects of potential vulnerability, incident management and postincident recovery. A major source of information was contemporary newspaper reports, which (particularly in the early stages of an incident) may contain substantial inaccuracies. In the initial aftermath these (inaccurate) reports can carry more weight in determining public (and hence political) perception than the accurate, factual, official reports prepared in the following weeks and months. Given that a common terrorist aim is publicity, there may even be attempts by the terrorists to manipulate these reports, as exaggerated claims may enhance their status. Certainly, in the immediate aftermath, organisations involved must respond to and address issues raised by the media. The effect of this is twofold. First, the case studies use facts (and consequences) ‘as reported’ (although, where possible, inaccuracies have been pointed out). Second, they 264
emphasise the need for good press liaison and media relations to prevent, as far as possible, inaccuracies and exaggerated claims being published in the first place.
9.3 Case Study 1: The St Mary Axe bomb, 10 April 1992 9.3.1
Background
The City of London covers an area of about one square mile. With space at a premium, it is very heavily developed, with tall buildings and narrow streets. The architecture is a mixture of old buildings dating to the restoration after the Great Fire of 1666, and modern glass and concrete. During the day it is normally occupied by about a third of a million workers, but the resident population is only about 4,000. Following the UK general election on Thursday 9 April 1992, by the early hours of Friday morning it was clear that the Conservative Party under John Major would form the next government. At the time this was well received in the City, and that night some workers stayed back celebrating, making the population slightly higher than normal. 9.3.2
The incident
Shortly before 9.00 pm, British Rail staff at Waterloo Station received a coded telephone message saying that a bomb had been planted in a white transit van outside the Stock Exchange, and was due to explode in 20 minutes. It is commonly accepted that this came from the (Provisional) Irish Republican Army (who later claimed responsibility for the incident). Although no such vehicle was parked outside the Stock Exchange, the police began an evacuation. At 9.20 pm there was a tremendous explosion. The bomb was in a white transit van, not parked near the Stock Exchange, but about 400 metres away, near the Baltic Exchange, in St Mary Axe, a side street off Leadenhall Street. Initial estimates vary, but the bomb was described as containing somewhere in the region of 45-50 kg of explosive. Much later, news reports alleged that it contained about 1,000 lb. (about 450 kg, or approaching half a tonne) of explosive. This confusion over the size of the bomb can be quite a common feature of press reports, as some use actual weight of explosive, and
265
others use ‘TNT-equivalent’. (Some modern explosives can be ten times more powerful than TNT.) At about 20 times the power of the average terrorist bomb, it was reputed to be the largest explosion on mainland Britain since the Second World War. 9.3.3
Secondary attack
At about 1.05 am on Saturday morning (11 April 1992) a second device was detonated at Staples Comer, the junction of Edgware Road and the North Circular Road (adjacent to the Brent Cross shopping centre and part of the interchange at the southern end of the M1 motorway). Although no one was injured, this added to the problems for emergency services, and caused major disruption. Although not on the scale of the St Mary Axe bomb, the blast damaged a flyover, blew a 5-metre hole in the road and ‘almost demolished’ a do-it-yourself warehouse 20 metres away (O’Neill and Rayner, 1992). 9.3.4
Effects of the St Mary Axe bomb
The blast was contained and channelled by the large buildings, producing a storm of glass shards travelling at speeds estimated as being up to 500 kph. Three people were killed - a 15-year-old girl and a 29-year-old office worker, on the pavement about 50 metres from the blast, and a 49-year-old employee in the Baltic Exchange building. Some 130+ people were injured, most by flying glass and debris, and a number required extensive surgery. A number of Japanese tourists were injured, and although they could speak English as a second language, in shock they reverted to Japanese, making communication difficult. The noise of the blast was heard over an estimated radius of about 4.5 - 5 km, and noise at this level can itself cause injury. The bomb left a crater about 4.3 metres deep by 4.5 metres diameter (about 22-23 cubic metres). One 2-metre piece of debris was blasted over 600 metres, and part of a vehicle was found on the 7th floor of the Nat West Tower. The ground shock was felt about 13 km away in west London. Gas and water mains, telecommunication cables and sewers were damaged to a radius of about 400 metres. Electricity supplies were cut, extinguishing street lighting. 266
Although there was no extensive fire, dust clouds causing a ‘smoke effect’ described as a ‘thick fog’ were reported over a radius of 450 metres or so. 9.3.5
Building damage
In an explosion, buildings are subject to an initial ground shock, and a blast overpressure or shock wave. After this passes a partial vacuum is formed, and the contents of buildings are sucked outwards. This vacuum effect can be more damaging than the initial blast, and can result in the widespread scattering of documents, etc. Fourteen buildings in the immediate vicinity suffered serious structural damage, windows were broken at up to 800 metres, and buildings 10 km away suffered structural vibration. Major buildings damaged included: •
the Baltic Exchange itself, and the adjacent Chamber of Shipping
•
the Commercial Union Tower (the St Helens Building)
•
the Nat West building
•
the Church of St Helens, Bishopsgate (a rare survivor of the Great Fire of 1666).
There were some noticeable variations. Older solid buildings of traditional masonry construction tended to absorb the full force of the blast. Modern steel-framed buildings tended to let the blast pass through. The glazing was lost, but the frame structure remained intact. The 23-storey (118 metre) Commercial Union Tower, a modern glass-covered structure, lost every one of its windows. The Nat West building, a 42-storey structure of 183 metres, situated 200 metres from the blast, lost 187 windows, with damage on all floors. Interestingly, the Lloyds Bank building, which features curved, rather than flat glass, suffered comparatively little damage. Broken glazing was a major problem, with an estimated 500 tonnes of glass shards forming a carpet about 50 mm deep. This presented a health and safety hazard to both rescue and salvage workers. 9.3.6
Emergency service response
As is usual with such incidents, there was some initial confusion as first reports were 267
sorted out and a major incident response mounted. The noise of the bomb was so loud that people outside the City believed that the bomb was located near to them, and echoes led many to believe that there had been more than one bomb. There was a strong subjective feeling among a number of officers that the error in the warning message, giving the Stock Exchange rather than the Baltic Exchange for the location of the bomb, was deliberate (perhaps to include emergency services among the casualties). Whatever the intent, it hampered evacuation of the area at risk. Given the size of the device and nature of the area, the length of warning was also clearly insufficient. The bomb effectively cut the scene in two. Separate teams had to approach from either side, creating logistical problems for emergency vehicles and, in some instances, confusion over who was taking the lead managerial role. Resolving these difficulties was a primary co-ordination task. Priorities for the police at this stage would include: •
evacuation of the area
•
co-ordination of activities at the scene
•
facilitating search and rescue
•
establishing control cordons round the affected area
•
preservation of evidence at the scene of crime
•
diversion of City traffic
•
establishment of a casualty bureau to deal with enquiries
•
media liaison.
They would also have to set in motion a major criminal investigation, involving coordination on a national and international level. The fire service responded initially with 30 appliances and 135 firefighters, backed up with specialist vehicles. There was only one fire reported, but a large number of extensively damaged buildings (some in dangerous condition) had to be searched for casualties. Search and rescue was reportedly made more dangerous by glass and other debris
268
dislodged by the downwash of helicopters, some in use by the news media, finally resulting in the establishment of an air exclusion zone. The London Ambulance Service initially despatched 20 ambulances to the scene. Receiving hospitals were put on an emergency footing, and medical teams attended the scene. Of the 130+ injured, serious casualties were distributed as follows: •
St Bartholomew’s Hospital
37 cases
•
Guy’s Hospital
17 cases
•
Royal London Hospital
24 cases
The most seriously injured casualties were taken to St Bartholomew’s and Guy’s.
9.4 Case Study 2: The Bishopsgate bomb, 24 April 1993 9.4.1
Background
Although a series of overt and covert measures to minimise the risk of terrorist action were implemented following the St Mary Axe bomb, the daily number of commuters and vehicles entering the City left it still vulnerable to terrorist activity. About a year later the City of London was again subject to a terrorist attack involving a bomb of similar magnitude. Responsibility for the incident was claimed by the Irish Republican Army, and there was press speculation that the attack was timed to coincide with a visit by about 1,000 international politicians, officials and businessmen attending the ‘ annual meeting at the headquarters of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EBRD escaped serious damage. 9.4.2
The incident
The attack took place at 10.25 am on Saturday 24 April 1993, when a bomb, variously alleged by initial press reports to be ‘1001b (45.5 kg) of Semtex’ (Sunday Telegraph) over 1000 lb. (450 kg) (Sunday Times) and ‘one ton’ (2,240 I, 1,016 kg) (Mail on Sunday and Sunday People), was delivered by a lorry parked about 50 metres from the Nat West Tower. One eye-witness described the lorry as a blue articulated unit, with a 40-foot
269
(12.3 metre) high-sided-open-top trailer, but most other reports, including the police report, described it as a blue Iveco/Ford tipper truck. It had been under police surveillance since 9.00 am and when a series of eight coded warnings were received (starting with one at 9.17 am, to Sky Television), evacuation procedures were commenced. This was still ongoing when the bomb exploded, killing one person and injuring 42. 9.4.3
Effects of the bomb
Initial effects would be very similar to the St Mary Axe bomb. The blast caused a crater of about 12 square metres in area, the engine of the lorry used to carry the bomb was blown about 50 metres, and part of the cab was found 100 metres away. The blast shook flats in the three Barbican tower blocks about 0.8 kilometres away, and at a distance of nearly 2.5 kilometres some windows were broken. According to some, the area affected was even greater than with the St Mary Axe bomb the previous year. Unlike the St Mary Axe bomb, which went off late in the evening, this bomb went off during the day while office buildings were occupied. According to press reports, about 100 workers were trapped in the Nat West Tower for about four hours, and about 100 in the Bank of England for roughly five hours because falling glass made it unsafe to come outside. Principal buildings damaged included: •
the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank
•
the Nat West Building (for the second time)
•
55 Bishopsgate (housing the Long Term Bank of Japan)
•
55 Old Broad Street (a nine-storey office block)
•
120 Old Broad Street (an office block being redeveloped)
•
Dashwood House (an 18-storey office block)
•
the 600-year-old St Ethelburga’s Church, Bishopsgate.
Several buildings were affected by fire and by water damage from burst mains. Initial estimates claimed that damage costs would exceed £1,000 million, but the Association of British Insurers later revised this to about £350 million (Daily Telegraph, 1 May 1993: 5). 270
9.4.4
Secondary attacks
In a follow-up attack, armed terrorists hijacked two minicabs, loaded them with explosives, and ordered the drivers to drive to selected targets. The drivers defied the gunmen and fled. The bombs exploded near St Pancras station, and at Finsbury Park in North London, fortunately without serious casualties. 9.4.5
Local authority response
The response by the staff of the City of London was outlined in a series of press releases. The first gave details of a press conference called for 5.00 pm on the day of the attack. Speaking at the press conference were Sir Francis McWilliams, the Lord Mayor, Michael Cassidy, Chairman of the Corporation of the City of London’s Policy Committee, Owen Kelly, Commissioner of the City of London Police, and Hugh Harris, Associate Director of the Bank of England. This high-powered group of officials stressed the intention of the City to be ready for business by the following Monday. As well as clearing an estimated 500 tonnes of debris, work to make buildings safe and arrangements for traffic diversions, key services provided included: •
acting as a clearing house for temporary accommodation for firms affected setting up a public information office
•
setting up an information point for incoming office workers providing an advisory service for companies without contingency plans of their own
•
arranging access to premises within the cordon if it was safe to do so
•
providing temporary communication and refreshment facilities for workers unable to enter the cordon area.
Care was also needed for residents of the Corporation’s Middlesex Street housing estate, where about 35 windows and doors were damaged. The staff resource requirement was significant, including: •
30 staff on information desks
•
20 surveyors advising on relocation issues
•
30 engineers seeing to buildings, services and infrastructure
•
12 Environmental Health Officers, advising on food, water and health and safety.
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Other staff included housing managers, social workers, and ‘dozens and dozens of glaziers too many to count’. The day after the bomb, the queue of people wanting access to premises -within the cordon was six deep, right round the Guildhall. Over the weekend more than 3,500 people visited, access arrangements were made for over 1,000 and 7,676 telephone calls were logged. As well as the major commercial organisations, special help was given to the estimated 150 small businesses - sandwich bars, dry cleaners, heel bars, stationers and the like who provided essential support services for office workers. A temporary roof was provided (at a cost of ^20,000) to allow salvage work to take place at St Ethelburga’s Church. This building, described as a landmark church, contained priceless art treasures and relics. It had survived the Great Fire. of 1666 and the Second World War, but was now very severely damaged. 9.4.6
Satisfaction with the official response
Following the attack, a Financial Times/MORI poll surveyed 103 senior directors and partners of City companies (Jack, 1993). This poll found that: •
74% of companies had formal contingency plans before the Bishopsgate bomb
•
45% of those with plans had formalised them after the St Mary Axe bomb
•
26% of those with plans used them to respond to the Bishopsgate bomb.
Respondents were asked how satisfied they were with the government in dealing with the problems caused by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The results were as set out in Table 1:
272
Table
1:
Satisfaction
with
Government
handling
of
problems
caused by PIRA
Response
Per cent
Very satisfied
2
Fairly satisfied
31
Neither / Nor
19
Fairly dissatisfied
26
Very dissatisfied
8
No opinion
14 Based on FT/MORI survey, Jack (1993), n = 103
The information in Table 1 was used to justify a headline ‘City critical of government after bomb’ (Jack, 1993). The way that the news media can put their own interpretation on factual data is clearly shown in the article’s claim that: [...] only one third said that they were either ‘fairly satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with the performance of the government.
The implication is that two-thirds were not satisfied. In fact, as the figures show, 33% expressed a degree of satisfaction, 34% expressed a degree of dissatisfaction, and 33% had no views either way. The ‘neither / nor’ and ‘no opinion’ groups have been selectively included to arrive at the reported conclusion. From the data given, it would be equally valid to claim ‘two-thirds said they were not dissatisfied [...] ’ or ‘only onethird were unhappy’. Alternatively, but less sensationally for a newspaper headline, if the ratio of those expressing satisfaction to those expressing dissatisfaction is taken, the claim should probably be ‘City evenly divided ...’. The respondents’ views on the performance of other organisations was as given in Table 1, which again can be presented in various ways. Jack commented, on the basis of the straight percentages, that, ‘Fifty-nine per cent were positive about the role of the press’, and `Less than a third had positive comments on the performance of the government’. On that basis, it would be correct (although not fair) to say both that ‘Less than half
thought the fire service did a good job’ and that ‘No one had a bad word to say about the fire service’. There are three main lessons which can be learned from these two tables. The first is that the answer to a poll very much depends on the way a question is framed. This can be seen from the difference between the government rating of ‘34% dissatisfied’ in Table 1, and ‘17% poor’ in Table 2. The differences possibly arise because Table 1 asks for degree of satisfaction, whereas Table 2 asks if they did a good job. It is quite possible to agree that someone did a good job, but feel that it did not meet your exact needs, and hence not be satisfied.
Table 2: Rating of organisational performance after the Bishopsgate bomb
Organisation
Good (%)
Poor (%)
Neither / Don’t know (%)
City Corporation
74
1
25
Fire Service
48
0
52
Police
60
10
30
Government
32
17
51
Media
59
7
34 Based on FT/MORI survey, Jack (1993), n = 103
The second lesson comes from the very high percentage of ‘Neither/Don’t knows’ in Table 2. The most plausible explanation is that the respondents did not know what the organisation did, and were therefore unable to come to a view. This suggests that perhaps the organisations became so wrapped up in ‘doing the job’ that they did not keep the public informed about what was being done. The third and most crucial point is that it is possible to put quite different interpretations on the same set of data. Once this is done; particularly where the interpretations are then presented by the news media as the ‘facts’ of the situation, political and public perception can be heavily influenced. This can have significant effects on the perception of the competence of the organisation, and on the morale of 274
individual staff members, who may be upset at what they see as unjust criticism. It can be very difficult to retrieve the situation once a negative image of the response to an incident has been portrayed by the media. Good media relations from the earliest stages of an incident can pay dividends in the short and long term.
9.5 Urban terrorism in context A survey of over 6,500 bombing incidents in the United States between 1989 and 1993 showed that the motives were as set out in Table 3. These incidents resulted in 258 deaths and 3,419 injuries, and damage to property estimated at $641.3 million (US Treasury, 1993: 13). Although there are substantial social and political differences between the UK and the United States, statistics demonstrate the wide variety of potential causes of urban terrorism. These can probably be summarised into the following categories: •
publicity (for an organisation or cause)
•
demonstration of ability (to give strength to a negotiating position) financial gain (insurance fraud, intimidation)
•
deliberate harm (revenge, homicide, retribution or retaliation).
Although these categories are a little bit fuzzy, they show definite objectives which are recognisable, even if considered reprehensible by the majority. A disturbing aspect of the US data is the number of incidents ascribed to vandalism, or categorised as unreported or undetermined. That such incidents will be of limited effect cannot be taken for granted, as even a small, unsophisticated device, if placed in a vulnerable location, can create major damage or disruption. Table 3: Bombing incidents in the US (1989-93*) - cause of attack by motive Motive
Explosive
Incendiary
Total
Vandalism
3,612
239
3,851
Revenge
1,119
974
2,093
Protest
91
103
194
275
Extortion
134
18
152
Labour related
89
26
115
Insurance fraud
11
20
31
Homicide/ Suicide
115
23
138
undetermined
3,304
1,185
4,489
Total
8,475
2,588
11,063
Motive unreported/
US Treasury (1993: 20) (*1993 statistics include attempted bombings.) Incidents which have the most impact do, however, tend to be perpetrated by groups with a well-developed organisation, and technical and financial backing. These tend to be organisations with political objectives which both dictate and limit the nature of attacks, targets and weapons. It is a common assumption, for example, that an organisation with logical aims would not use certain types of weapons because they would cause public revulsion, and damage the organisation’s credibility. A very worrying development took place in Japan, where a series of apparently motiveless attacks took place over a period of about two years. Although most did not achieve major international publicity, a quick scan of UK newspapers revealed reports of at least 18 incidents. The first major incident was in Matsumo, on 21 June 1994, when seven people died, and 200 were ill after what is believed to be a nerve agent, Sarin, was released. The next (and the one, which did achieve international publicity) was an attack on the Tokyo underground system on 20 March 1995. This again involved the nerve agent Sarin in a simultaneous attack on several locations. (There is some uncertainty over exactly how many, as some incidents occurred on trains travelling between stations.) There were eleven fatalities, and an estimated 5,000 injuries. Over the next few months further attacks occurred, some using cyanide-based devices. None of the reports suggest that any warning had been received by either the news media or the authorities.
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The attacks were linked to the Aum Shinri Kyo (Supreme Truth) sect. Formed in 1980, according to some newspaper reports it has (or had) 10,000 followers, and assets of £29 million. This was a ‘doomsday’ sect, which had no logical objectives. It simply intended to cause the maximum harm to the maximum number of people for no purpose, and had the resources and organisation to do so. Thorne (1995), talking about the then approaching Millennium, notes in passing that American research has found over 350 cults and sects which had identified the year 2000 as Armageddon. There was always the danger that one of the sects might attempt to make the prophecy come true. The Japanese experience indicates that an organisation without logical objectives has no logical inhibitions. This strongly suggests that. a much more flexible approach, covering all the potential objectives of terrorism, is called for. Plans based on an assumption of ‘logical’ terrorism may not be adequate to cope. 9.5.1
Consequences of terrorism
Leaving aside the major social and political issues, at a practical level, organisations must address four issues: •
changes in operational security and/or trading practices
•
preparation of contingency plans coping with an incident post-incident recovery.
The first two are consequences of the threat of terrorism. Fortunately, most organisations will never have to go beyond this stage. The second two are consequences of an actual terrorist attack. Although listed as four separate issues, it should be stressed that each is interdependent and the boundaries are not clear-cut. Operational security and trading practices should always be considered as integral with contingency plans. These in turn should be framed with an objective of minimising vulnerability, and the restoration of operational or trading ability. 9.5.2
Relationship to other major incidents
Other major incidents, such as the industrial explosion at the Nypro Works, Flixborough, Humberside, in June 1972, or the crash of the Boeing 747 cargo aircraft into an 277
apartment block in Amsterdam, in October 1992, have resulted in damage on a similar scale to the two case studies. Major fuel gas leaks (on the scale of a major pipeline fracture) or incidents involving highly flammable liquids in transit (such as petroleum spirit) can, and have, also on occasion caused problems on a similar scale. This may lead people to consider that bomb incidents are simply another class of technologically initiated’ major incident. There are in fact many similarities. Many of the lessons are transferable, and the concept of Generic or Functional Emergency Planning stresses that plans should be concerned only with meeting needs and consequences, not dealing with causes. There are, however, some significant differences, which must be noted. Location Urban planning controls aim to minimise the risk and/or consequences of disasters. by avoiding co-location of high-risk and sensitive developments, and by designing the urban infrastructure to aid response arrangements. Most industrial and commercial hazards, such as airports and fuel refineries are identified, and controlled, by legislation (although as the Amsterdam air crash shows, this cannot be guaranteed). Terrorist devices may well be sited in locations which, from an ‘accidental’ disaster viewpoint, are extremely low-risk, and which may have been specially selected to cause maximum disruption. They may also be aimed at targets with a social or political significance, which can rapidly change, making it more difficult to identify potential hazards, and prepare contingency plans. Being ‘low risk’, the security arrangements which would normally be justifiable, and the attitudes of the workforce to those arrangements, may also make them particularly vulnerable. Nature of hazard There may be a deliberate attempt to cause casualties among relief workers, either by giving false information, too little time for a full evacuation or by setting a secondary device. This places severe constraints on rescue workers. It also significantly affects site or building safety management. With an ‘accidental’ emergency such as a fire, conventional health and safety measures would include immediate evacuation of buildings. If the cause of the alarm, however, is a terrorist device, evacuation could put
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people at risk from a blast or flying glass - especially ‘if the terrorists who planted the bomb have not allowed sufficient time for the evacuation. The risk of secondary devices could also significantly delay the implementation of emergency management and recovery measures. The length of time allowed by terrorists for evacuation is far from consistent. While the time allowed for evacuation at the Bishopsgate incident was over an hour (during which time no fewer than eight warnings were given), that allowed at St Mary Axe was only 20 minutes. Of course, a terrorist might seek to justify such inconsistency on the grounds that the St Mary Axe device exploded at 9.20 pm on a Friday night, when the occupancy levels of the targeted buildings would have been quite low. But even in such circumstances, 20 minutes is far too short a time to secure a full evacuation and withdrawal from a labyrinthine City of London location. Stress Terrorist organisations commonly give some kind of warning to the news media. Such warnings, and the high-profile nature of the incident, usually ensure intense media coverage, and detailed scrutiny of the management of the incident. There is commonly an attempt by the terrorist organisation to transfer blame for personal injury away from the perpetrators and on to the emergency services, e.g. for not clearing the target area in time, or for getting the attack location ‘wrong’. Victims also know that their injuries were not accidental, but deliberately caused, and may feel that they have no control over the hazard. It could occur again anytime, anywhere, and being hidden, cannot be detected and so avoided. These factors combine to significantly increase the stress induced by the incident both for victims and relief workers, and may in turn increase the need for support services. This was recognised by the City of London social services department,- who established a stress counselling service following the Bishopsgate bomb.
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9.6 Lessons learned - response to incidents 9.6.1
Area at risk
Given sufficient information, it is possible to calculate the likely effects of an explosion. The Health and Safety Executive have issued guidance on ‘Simplified Calculations of Blast Induced Injuries and Damage’ (Merrifield, 1993). Following the St Mary Axe bomb, one newspaper article (Partridge, 1992) reviewed three computerised risk assessment packages available commercially. It is unlikely, however, that accurate details of the bomb will be known, and assumptions have to be made. Before St Mary Axe and Bishopsgate, a rule of thumb was that the area at risk was within a 200-metre radius of the device. In an unconfined area, this would probably equate to the distance at which windows would be broken by a 500 kg (TNT-equivalent, 1100 Ib.) bomb. Given the uncertainties, the London experience suggests that in the absence of accurate information on the nature of the device, it may be more prudent to set the potential danger radius at something nearer 500 metres. 9.6.2
Site control
The crater of the St Mary Axe bomb blocked the highway, and could not be crossed. In effect this produced two incidents as different teams had to approach the scene from different directions. Although in a city centre, the response had many similarities with incidents on bridges or in tunnels. In dense urban areas it is essential to have marshalling areas for vehicles and equipment, otherwise remaining access routes quickly become choked. It may not be easy to identify suitable areas, and may be even harder to ensure their proper use in an incident. The venerable City of London, with its many narrow, winding streets, is an especially difficult area in which to marshal numerous emergency vehicles and organise dispersal points for others.
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9.6.3
Emergency procedures for buildings
With high-rise buildings, large explosive devices and short warning periods it may not be possible to complete an effective evacuation. This results in a significant risk of having people exposed to flying glass. Evacuation may not, therefore, be the most appropriate course of action, and it may be better to direct people to safe areas within the building during an alert. This has the advantage of minimising risk from secondary devices, but does necessitate some form of selective warning system to differentiate bomb alerts from fire alarms. It also implies a high degree of staff training and discipline, which may be difficult to maintain over a prolonged period. On a more general note, emergency procedures for buildings should: •
ensure that outstations can still function if the main building is affected
•
provide standby communication equipment wherever possible
•
identify a secondary operational base
•
have a ‘clear desk’ policy (to avoid confidential documents being scattered about)
•
introduce security checks for people entering (also allows a roll-call to be taken)
•
have an established and practised search routine
•
establish a list of repair contractors (and give them building service plans).
9.7 Lessons learned - prevention measures Perhaps the first lesson is that a determined terrorist will stand a very high chance of achieving their objective in the end. Security measures must work every time to prevent a bomb being planted, whereas a terrorist only has to get lucky once to succeed. Security measures to guarantee denial of access to a terrorist would be so restrictive to the ordinary public that they would make it impossible for a commercial centre such as the City of London to function. Following the Bishopsgate bomb, a Financial Times/MORI poll put certain proposals to the senior directors and partners of City firms concerning potential security measures
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(Jack, 1993). The respondents’ views on the proposals are given in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 4: Acceptability of specific actions to combat terrorism (in per cent) Measure
Support
Oppose
Don’t know)
Greater police presence on streets
84
6
10
Exclude private cars from high-risk areas
40
49
11
Give police powers to establish road blocks 79
14
7
Extra insurance for terrorism risks in
31
51
18
Formal co-ordination of company security 74
16
10
‘high-risk’ areas
arrangements Based on FT/MORI survey, Jack (1993), n = 103) Following the St Mary Axe bomb, security measures included: •
the introduction of spot checks on vehicles entering the City
•
a series of one-way traffic systems and diversions established to facilitate vehicle searches during security alerts
•
co-ordination of private-sector precautions (e.g. arranging for security cameras to cover overlapping sectors)
•
improved plan co-ordination and training.
Other suggested measures included a ‘Ring of Steel’ sealing off all minor roads, and restricting access to the City to eight or ten major routes, with barriers staffed by security guards, as has happened in Belfast in the past. This did not find much favour in official circles as it implied the necessity to turn the City into a fortress, and that the terrorists had achieved their objective of disrupting normal life:
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Table 5: Company security measures considered (in per cent) Measure
Have
Will consider
Control over building entry
78
7
External security cameras
50
24
Install toughened glass
48
13
Redesign office accommodation
44
15
Secure the area round the building
39
8
locations
21
19
None of the above
9
46
Move key functions to less vulnerable
Based on FT/MORI survey, Jack (1993), N= 103 Security measures are expensive, and one of the more excitable newspapers - The Sun (Kay and Lewthwaite, 1993) - claimed the cost could be as follows: •
Bomb-proofing measures
£500 million
•
Lorry ban in the City
£1.5 million
•
The ‘Ring of Steel’ security scheme
£100 million
•
‘Ring of Steel’ running costs
£25 million per year
•
National identity cards
£350 million per year
•
National anti-terrorist squad
£50 million per year
•
Extra policing
£5 million per year
Some of these costs seem a little speculative (for example, a national identity card scheme costing over £6 per person per year). Nevertheless, complete security would be expensive. 9.7.1
UK Home Office guidance
In the wake of the extensive terrorist activity, two guidance documents were issued by the Home Office. The first was Dealing with Disaster (Home Office, 1994a), a general guidance on emergency planning, putting terrorist incidents in the context of other disasters, and advocating the concept of Integrated Emergency Management. It set out
in general terms suggested arrangements for emergency planning at the local level. As the document states: No single organisational arrangement will be appropriate to each and every disaster, nor will a single organisational blueprint for planning meet every need. The key to an effective response is to apply sound basic principles to the problem in hand. Home Office (1994a: 1.4)
The general principle was set down (Home Office, 1994a: 1.8) that there was no intention for a ‘National Disaster Squad’ or anything similar, and that Prime responsibility for handling disasters should remain at the local level where the resources and expertise are found. The CCA 2004 continued with this ethos stating that: Local responders are the building block of resilience in the UK, and the Act will enhance existing arrangements by: •
Establishing a clear set of roles and responsibilities for local responders;
•
Giving greater structure and consistency to local civil protection activity; and
•
Establishing a sound basis for performance management at a local level.
The Act divides local responders into two categories depending on the extent of their involvement in civil protection work, and places a proportionate set of duties on each. The Emergency Preparedness guide (Cabinet Office, 2005) confirms this stating: The LRF itself is a strategic co-ordinating group. … It also reflects the key principle of UK civil protection arrangements that the initial response to most emergencies is delivered at the local level (page 17, para 2.46).
The initial response should be co-ordinated by the police, but there is a strong probability that at some stage during the recovery and clean-up phase the local authority would take over the lead responsibility (Home Office, 1994a: 2.6). In this context, it is usually stressed that the co-ordinating role of the police does not give them overall command. Each organisation remains autonomous, and has complete control of its own resources and personnel. In this context, the United Kingdom system is different from that in many parts of the world (including many parts of Europe), where one person (usually in the form of a regional governor) can step in and take overall control, with the power to direct the activities of all organisations.
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The second guidance document is Bombs - Protecting People and Property (Home Office, 1994b). Described as ‘A Handbook for Managers and Security Officers’ and covering: •
the nature of the terrorist threat
•
anti-terrorist precautions the response to incidents
•
administrative and physical security measures
•
preparation of plans
•
how to respond if a warning is received from a terrorist (including a checklist for the person receiving the call)
•
searching premises
•
evacuation, and evacuation plans.
9.7.2
Post-incident recovery
A priority for most commercial organisations is maintaining cash flow. While a company is unable to trade, income ceases but out goings actually increase as the cost of replacement stationery, office equipment and repairs (and possibly temporary accommodation) suddenly comes at once. There is also a danger that customers, anxious to maintain their own business, may obtain goods and services elsewhere, and the switch of supplier may be a permanent one. Case study - the Commercial Union (CU) response Most organisations insure key aspects of their business, and would look to the insurers for assistance. In the incidents being considered, some of the organisations affected were insurance companies who found themselves in the same situation as their customers. Business recovery is, therefore, an even higher priority for a major insurance company, and provides a good example of the measures which may be needed to effectively respond to the situation. Of course, the CU case study represents an ‘ideal type’ response (one would expect nothing less). Other companies affected by the St Mary Axe bomb might not have been so prepared. The Commercial Union Insurance Company was badly affected by the St Mary Axe 285
bomb. Thankfully, however, they had previously drawn up contingency plans with the aim of providing: [...] a service as near to normal as possible by the start of the first working day after the incident. CURM (1992: 4)
The way this was achieved, and the lessons learned have been set down in a series of papers (CURM, 1992; Kemp, 1992a, 1992b; Anderson, 1992; Athawes, 1992). The timetable for achieving restoration of trading capability was as follows (CURM, 1992): Friday 10 April 1992 (Day 1) 21:20
Bomb detonated.
21:40
Television news flash (with pictures).
22:00
Crisis meeting held at the UK managing director’s home.
22:30
Company assessors on site enquiring about injuries and damage.
24:00
Disaster recovery plan activated.
As well as normal trading difficulties caused by the loss of the building, the company’s Annual General Meeting was due to be held, and failure to hold the meeting could have caused legal complications. Saturday 11 April (Day 2) A crisis meeting of directors and senior managers was called at another company building near Croydon. It was ascertained that the extent of the damage was as follows: o building itself, and the contents, extensively damaged; o all communications links (including the entire London area switchboard) lost o office equipment, including 500+ computer terminals and 650+ telephones lost; o building estimated to be out of commission for at least a year. The four prime considerations were: o how to reinstate the company 3,600 extension telephone system for the region o where to accommodate 650 staff 286
o how to provide them with computers, communications and furniture o how to inform customers of the new arrangements. The switchboard was reconstituted at the company’s computer centre, temporary arrangements were made for relocation of staff in other Commercial Union buildings and orders were issued for computer and office equipment. By mid-afternoon managers were contacting staff with details of where they should report on Monday morning, advertising space had been booked in the Monday editions of the national press, and an alternative venue found for the Annual General Meeting. A press release was issued covering the arrangements. Sunday 12 April (Day 3) The arrangements agreed the previous day were finalised, office equipment was delivered to the locations taking extra staff, and the switchboard was reconstituted. The Loss Adjusters commenced a survey of the damaged office building. Monday 13 April (Day 4 - the first trading day) Advertisements appeared in the national press, confirming ‘business as usual’, with staff working from various locations, but able to access company information and electronic information systems. Meetings held to update senior staff about the situation. Tuesday 14 April (Day 5 - second trading day) Of the 650 staff previously based in the damaged building, 631 (97%) were working as usual. The remaining 19 were either working from home, or on holiday. At the ‘time appointed’ a quorum of shareholders went to the site, passed a formal resolution to reconvene, and the company’s Annual General Meeting was held, in the company’s words, ‘as though nothing had happened’. Friday 17 April (Day 8) With initial structural assessment completed, staff were allowed into the building to recover files and personal possessions.
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Thursday 23 April (Day 14) The company announced that a short-term lease had been agreed for a new office block at Cutler’s Exchange, about 200 metres from the damaged- offices. The target date for relocation to the new building was 31 May - just over seven weeks from the incident. Roy Kemp, the UK Divisional Director of Commercial Union, claimed that one of the factors leading to successful management of the incident was the establishment of a small (seven-person) emergency team, able to step back and consider the wider issues. The diversity of problems which can occur in the first few hours was demonstrated by the list of priorities and tasks identified in an initial’ brainstorming session (Kemp, 1992a: 3): o identify names and telephone numbers of key personnel o liaise with emergency services and utilities o organise emergency repairs o assess floor space requirements of each company unit; o identify unoccupied company floor space in the region o allocate available space, and notify managers concerned o cascade details of arrangements via line managers o provide managers with staff home telephone numbers from company database o secure a supply of office equipment and computers o obtain a new switchboard o create a new internal telephone directory o issue a statement to staff o advertise ‘business as usual’ o manage press enquiries o determine contractual obligations to company tenants o liaise with tenants o consider removal of valuable/sensitive documents
288
o secure the building. Some of the logistical problems (Kemp, 1992b) may not have been immediately obvious: •
10-feet (3-metre) long shards of half-inch (12.5mm) glass, hanging 200 feet (61 metres) above the ground to be removed
•
200 tonnes of broken glass to be cleared from the inside of the building
•
safety supervision needed for 150 contractors working on site
•
20 contractors working for five days gathering scattered documents for subsequent sorting.
Something which can be done by a commercial organisation, but which a public body may have procedural difficulty with, is crisis decision-making. In Roy Kemp’s words (1992b: 8): The immediate solutions by necessity allow little attention to be paid to cost. Such actions need to be taken immediately and there is little time for research and analysis [...] you do not have time to check out 20 alternatives.
Obviously, for a commercial organisation, good customer and media relations were essential, and it was felt necessary to put out a message confirming ‘business as usual’. Bob Anderson, Commercial Union’s General Business Manager (Anderson, 1992: 2) posed the question ‘Who are the audiences (for the message)?’ The list he came up with was: •
customers
•
the public
•
brokers
•
staff
•
shareholders.
The customers, and potential customers (the public) are obvious, but the other internal customers, such as, staff often get overlooked. As Anderson points out, however, the ‘wrong’ reaction by any of those groups could have damaged the company severely. He highlighted five key lessons (Anderson, 1992: 7): 1. be prodigal with information to all the appropriate audiences 2. assign responsibility (and sufficient resources) for communication at a senior
289
level 3. know, listen to, and work closely with professional advisers 4. ride the spontaneous goodwill a disaster generates 5. believe your staff can move mountains - and they will. The question of how to develop an effective contingency plan was addressed by John Athawes (1992). He suggested a four-stage process: 1. establish commitment to, and ownership of the plan 2. identify all critical areas and potential problems (within the organisation, with suppliers, and clients) 3. prepare and test the plan by simulating a range of events which could occur 4. review and revise the plan at regular intervals. Perhaps the final point to come out of Commercial Union’s experience (Athawes, 1992: 1) is: One thing is certain, disasters will continue to occur [...] but a major fire, explosion or other disaster can have substantially different consequences for similar organisations, depending on the success or otherwise of their advance planning and the defence systems they have put in place.
9.8 The 7/7 Bombings Even though the 7/7 Bombings in London occurred in 2005, it is only with the publication of the Coroner’s Inquest report and other analyses that a fuller picture of the backdrop to, events on and responses to the day – by the emergency, security and other services is becoming clearer. As we go to press, the best advice that we can give is to begin by reading the Coroner’s report – available at: http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/docs/orders/rule43-report.pdf and thereafter use web and other searches.
9.9 Conclusion Although most terrorist attacks involve small explosive or incendiary type devices, the City of London bombs in St Mary Axe, in April 1992, and Bishopsgate, in April 1993 (and subsequently in South Quay, Canary Wharf, on 9 February 1996, and the Arndale
290
Shopping Centre, Manchester, on 15 June 1996) show that terrorists can both manufacture, and are prepared to use, very large devices. Publicity is often a prime objective of terrorist attacks, and the media are heavily involved. News reports have a strong influence on public and political perceptions, and to retain public confidence, organisations may well find themselves responding to an agenda set as much by the media as by their own technical or operational assessments. Although different organisations involved in dealing with terrorist threats will have different priorities, it is essential that all plans be compatible. This involves a high degree of integration, both of emergency services, local authorities, public utilities, public agencies and commercial organisations. This integration can often be difficult to achieve. If it is achieved, however, the implicit analysis of an organisation’s own operation, and the necessary development of inter-organisational working relationships can have significant benefits in day-to-day operations. Terrorist incidents are different to ‘accidents’ in that they are caused deliberately, and attempts may be made to maximise the severity of damage or injury (for example, by planting secondary, ‘boobytrap’ explosive devices). They do, however, have many similarities with other major incidents. Planning to cope with the unexpected is an extension of good management.
9.10 Guide to reading As different organisations have different priorities, it would be useful to examine a variety of sources. Examples include: Beck, A. and Willis, A. (1993) The Terrorist Threat to Safe Shopping,_ Leicester Scarman Centre for the Study of Public Order. Haworth, D. (1995) Terrorism and the Role of the Local Authority, Manchester: Manchester City Council, Emergency Planning Unit. Home Office (1994) Dealing With Disaster, London: HMSO. Home Office (1994) Bombs - Protecting People and Property, London: HM Communications Directorate. Latter, R. (1992) The Terrorist Threat to Business, Wilton Park Paper No. 62,
291
London: HMSO. Most emergency services also have specific emergency planning guidance documents drawn up either by the services themselves, or by professional bodies. A list is included in Dealing with Disaster (Home Office, 1994a, Annex B: 39-40). Although the specialist nature of the documents means that they are of limited general interest, and are not therefore on general distribution, they should be available within the organisations concerned. Updated versions of Dealing with Disaster and other UK advisory literature can
be
accessed
through
the
UK
Cabinet
Office
website
at:
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/emergency-planning
9.11 Study questions You should now write approximately 300 words in answer to the questions below. We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of the material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University. 1.
Consider your own organisation, and prepare a list of ways in which it could be involved in the response to a bomb on the scale of those in the case studies.
List these under two headings •
if the bomb was at a remote location, and you were responding as an emergency service, service provider or contractor (depending on your organisation)
•
if your normal workplace or operational base was in the area affected.
Consider what actions your organisation may need to take, which of those may be regarded as non-routine, and list the topics an effective contingency plan for these nonroutine tasks may cover. 2.
Consider how a ‘man-made’ disaster like a terrorist bombing might differ from an ‘accidental’ disaster, like a railway accident or air crash. Outline measures which may be necessary to cope with these differences.
3.
Consider the Financial Times/MORI poll noted earlier and the way the results
were interpreted by the news media. Given that most news reports contain an element
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of fact, what measures could an organisation responding to a major incident put in hand to: •
ensure that the initial facts are correctly reported
•
get the organisation’s view on those facts fairly represented
•
support staff who may find the actions they took in the heat of the moment being subject to intense (and perhaps, ill-informed) scrutiny.
Consider the advantages and disadvantages of attempting to get an unfavourable and/or misleading report corrected after it has been published.
9.12 Bibliography Anon (1993) ‘Bishopsgate bill tumbling down’, Daily Telegraph, 1 May: 5. Anderson, B. (1992) (General Business Manager, Commercial Union, Europe) ‘Managing the crisis’, Customer and Media Relations Conference proceedings, Commercial Union, Belgium (December). Athawes, J. (1992) (Marketing Development Manager, Commercial Union Risk Management) ‘What if it happened to you?’ in ‘Managing the Crisis; Conference proceedings, Commercial Union, Belgium (December). Cabinet Office, (2005) Emergency Preparedness. Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, its associated Regulations and Non-statutory Arrangements, London. Catheart, B. (1993) ‘Running the mile’, Independent on Sunday, 1 May:19. Civil Contingencies Act 2004, London: HMSO. CURM (1992) Crisis - A Timetable for Recovery, Commercial Union Risk Management Ltd, Lathham House, 16 Minories, London EC3N 1 DQ. Haworth, D. (1995) Terrorism and the Role of the Local Authority, Manchester City Council, Emergency Planning Unit. Home Office (1994a) Dealing with Disaster, 2nd edition, London: HMSO. Home Office (1 994b) Bombs - Protecting People and Property, London: Home Office Public Relations Branch.
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Jack, A. (1993) ‘City Critical of Government after Bomb’, Financial Times, 1 May: 5. Kay, J. and Lewthwaite, J. (1993) ‘The costs of anti-terrorism precautions’, The Sun, 26 April: 4. Kemp, R. (1992a) (UK Divisional Director, Commercial Union) ‘Managing the first few hours’. In ‘Managing the Crisis’ conference, Commercial Union, Belgium (December). Kemp, R. (1992b) (UK Divisional Director, Commercial Union) ‘Damage assessment, limitation and action planning’. In ‘Managing the Crisis’ conference, Commercial Union, Belgium (December). Latter, R. (1992) ‘The Terrorist Threat to Business’, Wilton Park Paper No. 62, Conference report on the seminar on Terrorism and Business in the 1990s: Threats and Responses, Wilton Park (July), London: HMSO. Merrifield, R. (1993) Simplified Calculations of Blast Induced Injuries and Damage, Health and Safety Executive, Specialist Inspector Reports No. 37, London: HMSO. O’Neill, S. and Rayner, J. (1992) ‘City of shattered glass sealed off’, Independent on Sunday, 12 April. Partridge, C. (1992) ‘Calculating the risk of bombs’, The Sunday Times, 22 November. Thorne, T. (1995) ‘2000 - Heading for the millennium’, Livewire, Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996: 22-6, East Coast Inter-City Railways. US Treasury (1993) Explosives Incidents Report, US Government, Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Explosives Division, Report ATF P 3320.4 (7/94). Wilkinson, P. (1996) ‘How to combat the reign of terror’, New Statesman, 2 August.
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