67 Onyango, Hixson and McNally 2013. 68 Haughton and Khandker 2012. 69 Data on public social expenditures
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
84 85 86
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
are derived from OECD (n.d.). The main social policy areas are old age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labour market programmes, unemployment, housing and other social policy areas. Those areas can be further divided by type of expenditure (cash benefits, benefits in-kind), type of programme (active labour market programme, incapacity-related) and source (voluntary private, public). Furceri 2009. OECD 2013b. Assimaidou, Kiendrebeogo and Tall 2013. Von Wachter 2014. World Bank 2012. Fischer 2013. Posel, Fairburn and Lund 2006. ILO 2009. ILO 2010c, 2011b. ILO 2011a. Gassmann and Behrendt 2006. ILO 2010c. ILO 2006b. Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Senegal, the United Republic of Tanzania, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Viet Nam. ILO 2008. Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock 2006. The classification of less- and morecohesive societies is the same as in Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock (2006) and is based on measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalization and income share of the middle class (defined as the middle 60 percent of the income distribution). Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock (2006) define more cohesive societies as those in the lower half of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and in the upper half of income share of the middle class and less cohesive societies as the reverse. Since 1980 more-cohesive societies have progressed faster than less cohesive societies, but the difference became much more pronounced after the recession in less cohesive societies in the 1980s and after the global crisis in 2008. The Economist 2013a. Telles 2004. Carneiro 2013. Naidoo and Kongolo 2004. Maisonnave, Decaluwé and Chitiga 2009. Burger and Jafta 2010. Sander and Taylor 2012. World Bank 2011. To foster desired behaviours, economists emphasize material incentives provided through contracts, markets or policy. While these often work very effectively, there also many puzzling cases where incentives fail
to have the desired effects (crowding out) or where minor incentives have a disproportionately large impact (crowding in, shift in norms). Societies also sometimes persist with what seem like inefficiently costly forms of incentives (prison rather than fines or reparations) or renounce others that might be quite cheap or effective (public shaming). For a more detailed discussion, see Benabou and Tirole (2011). 96 Young 2007. 97 Kinzig and others 2013. 98 Benabou and Tirole 2011. 99 UNDP 2009a. 100 UNDP 2009a. 101 Rodrik 2000, p. 3. 102 Easterly and others 2006. 103 Evans and Heller forthcoming. 104 Stewart 2013. 105 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth 2009. 106 UNDP 2003. 107 Sobhan 2014. 108 UNISDR 2012b. 109 Haque and others 2012. 110 UNISDR n.d. 111 UN System Task Team on the Post2015 UN Development Agenda 2012a. 112 UNDP 2013d. 113 Lund and Myers 2007. 114 Marc and others 2012. 115 World Bank 2012.
19 Stiglitz 2013. 20 See Kaul (2013, 2014) and Kaul and
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
33 34 35
Chapter 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12
13 14 15 16 17 18
World Bank 2014b. United Nations Population Division 2013. Hale 2014. Bank for International Settlements 2013. Wadhams 2010. Canis 2011. UNHCR 2012. Kaul 2014. Kaul 2014. Kaul and others 2003; Kaul and Conceição 2006. Universal social goods are goods and services that society decides should be guaranteed to all people, independent of their capacity to pay, and the rules that citizens should respect in their interaction with each other (such as nondiscrimination and protection of weaker members of society). See Ocampo (2013). See Musgrave (1959) for the original theorization of merit goods. For an explanation of merit goods in the global context, see Sandler, Arce and Daniel (2002). Fenner and others 1988. WHO 2013a. Médecins Sans Frontières 2013. Held and Young 2013. Stiglitz and Kaldor 2013b. Held and Young 2011.
36 37
38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
others (2003) for more on global public goods. See Musgrave (1959) for original theorization of merit goods. For explanation of merit goods in the global context, see Sandler, Arce and Daniel (2002). See Ocampo (2013) for a discussion of universal social goods (goods that aim to promote common social norms and standards and promote equality among individuals). Ortiz and others 2013. Crouch 2011. Evans and Sewell 2013. ILO 2010c. UN 2000. UN 1948. UN 1966. EU 2007. UN 2009. UN 1989. ILO 1952. See UNCSD (2012) for details of the proposal to develop an inclusive and transparent intergovernmental process on the sustainable development goals that is open to all stakeholders with a view to developing global sustainable development goals to be agreed by the UN General Assembly. Naudé, Santos-Paulino and McGillivray 2011. UNDP 2012c. International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2011. The G7+ members are Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Togo. Sierra Leone 2013. Targets 8.B and 8.C of the Millennium Development Goals encourage increasing official development assistance for developed countries but do not list specific targets. However, at the 2005 Group of Eight Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, donor countries pledged to provide official development assistance at the level of 0.7 percent of gross national income by 2015. In 2012 official development assistance was less than half this goal, at only 0.29 percent of (UN 2013c). UNDP 2013a. Hamdani 2014. OECD 2013a. OECD 2013a. UNDP 2011b. Hollingshead 2010. Africa Progress Panel 2013. G20 2013. OECD 2011c. UNDP 2013a. Ocampo 2010. Stiglitz and Kaldor 2013b. Cattaneo, Gereffi and Staritz 2010.
UN Global Pulse 2010. Cho and Newhouse 2013. Jansen and von Uexkull 2010. Jansen and von Uexkull 2010. Dureya and Morales 2011. Gavrilovic and others 2009. Bluedorn and others 2013. Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz 1999. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has introduced stringent regulatory standards, including increasing capital buffers to draw on during periods of financial stress, measures to improve the quality of bank capital and a global minimum debt to equity ratio. Promising though it is, the 2010 Basel III Accord is based on voluntary commitments and has yet to be fully implemented (see Held and Young 2011). 60 UNDP 2013a. 61 Ratha and others 2013. 62 Ratha and others 2013. 63 This cost was for transfers from Ghana to Nigeria (World Bank 2013a). 64 IMF 2012. 65 G20 2011. 66 Kynge 2014. 67 Ocampo 2006; Machinea and Titelman 2007. 68 Ocampo and Griffith-Jones 2007. 69 Grabel 2012. 70 The leaders of Brazil, China, India, the Russian Federation and South Africa agreed to pool their resources to establish a BRICS Bank during the March 2013 BRICS Summit in South Africa. 71 Park 2006. 72 Culpeper 2006. 73 UNDP 2013a. 74 Hamdani 2014. 75 Jansen and von Uexkull 2010. 76 Hamdani 2014. 77 Thrasher and Gallagher 2008. 78 Gallagher, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2012. 79 WTO 2001 p. 1. 80 WTO 2013. 81 Von Braun and Tadesse 2012; Hoekman and Martin 2012. 82 Khor and Ocampo 2011. 83 Ghaenm 2011. 84 Khor and Ocampo 2011. 85 Kennedy and Stiglitz 2013. 86 Odagir and others 2012; Pollock 2006. 87 Abdel-Latif 2012. 88 Hogerzeil and others 2013. 89 Khor and Ocampo 2011. 90 IPCC 2013. 91 World Bank 2014b. 92 IPCC 2013. 93 UNDP 2012a. 94 Hirsch 2012. 95 Polk 2013. 96 Polk 2013. 97 UN General Assembly 2013c. 98 Hale 2014. 99 UN-Habitat 2011. 100 Lutsey and Sperling 2008. 101 WWF 2007. 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59
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