Non-state Actors Rebel groups target cities because control of these gives significant leverage in negotiation with central governments. Transboundary95 cities, such as Goma on the Congo and Rwanda border, are especially vulnerable to conflict. In 1994, Goma received one million refugees who fled conflict in Rwanda.96 A takeover of Goma by militants known as the Movement of 23 March in November 2012 required the response of regional and global actors. The fragility of the city is in part due to this vulnerability, despite the resilience of its residents in negotiating the duality of border existence. Religious radicalization also plays a key role in generating conflict in African cities and regions alike. The Somali capital, Mogadishu, has endured the ravages of conflict, and the armed Islamic radical group Al-Shabaab occupied territories within the city until it was forced out in August 2011. The northern districts of Mogadishu are run by militias and vigilante groups, with murder and other forms of violence continuing
Financial Capacity Local authority governance in urban Africa often suffers under decentralization of responsibilities without adequate fiscal decentralization.101 However, even when finances are available, mismanagement of funds, lack of service delivery and implementation of projects are commonplace. This is generally due to skills shortages within urban governance institutions. At the same time, the prevalence of informal systems of land settlement, housing acquisition, vast unplanned slums and informal settlements further compound the challenges of municipalities unable to collect adequate taxes. The consequence of municipal financial insecurity is weak institutional capacity to act, adapt and react to circumstances, particularly where service provision is concerned. With 300 million Africans projected to suffer from sanitation shortages and 225 million lacking access to potable water by 2020, service delivery protests are key urban
Institutional Fragility
THE STATE OF AFRICAN CITIES 2014
Key outcomes of institutional fragility in Africa include fragmentation between different spheres and levels of governance; tedious bureaucracy; lack of fiscal decentralization; corruption; political cronyism and nepotism; and private sector coercion, coupled with a severe lack of skills, technologies and organizational cohesion that are typically required to deliver successfully at scale. African institutional fragility can combine in various ways resulting in significant variance in local behaviour and conditions from one city to the next. In Eastern Africa resource scarcity threatens to exacerbate ethnic conflicts, while in Western Africa narcotics and child-trafficking exist in large measure.94 Evictions and segregation are commonplace in Cape Town, Nairobi, Kinshasa and Harare.
to plague the city.97 In response to the Kenyan army moving into Somalia, Al-Shabaab has undertaken further attacks in Kenyan cities such as Mombasa and Nairobi, with the September 2013 attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall receiving global media attention. Boko Haram, a radical Islamist group in northern Nigeria has killed no fewer than 2,800 people. On 20 January 2012, over 180 people died in a series of state building bombings and armed attacks on civilians and government officials in the city of Kano, for which Boko Haram claimed responsibility. Religious conflicts in informal settlements in Lagos and Kano are likely to increase as a result of increased residential segregation, as well as lack of accountable, local governance structures.98 Mali, which recently underwent a coup d’État, has also experienced city invasions from secular and Islamic rebel groups, which are also in conflict with one another. During their brief occupation of Timbuktu, the Islamic rebels, known as Ansar Eddine (“defenders of the faith”), destroyed World Heritage sites and artefacts in this ancient town. State and local institutions are ill-equipped to deal with conflict, whether emerging from forces external or internal to the city. Grenade attacks occurred in Kigali in December 2008 and January 2009, as well as February, March and May of 2010,99 despite the modernization thrust of the state and city governments. These attacks threatened to destabilize the progress that had been made towards reconciliation and reconstruction in Rwanda. Autonomous and “no-go” zones exist within city slums and informal settlements that effectively lie outside local and central government control. These include Bonaberi (Douala), Camp Luka (Kinshasa), Kanu (Abuja), Kibera (Nairobi), Soweto (Johannesburg) and also the “Jesus our Saviour” settlement in Lagos; all fall outside of the control of formal authorities and exercise a high level of self-governance. However, urban fragility is merely a reflection of state fragility and constitutes a security and developmental problem.100
house most industrial activities. Cities provide and fulfil nationwide activities and roles, which are often expressed as solely urban outputs. In general, African countries and cities need to ensure that they are resilient to the impacts of climate change through technologies that are appropriate in economy and scale to suit each city’s specific needs. The relevance of adaptation in African cities is underscored by the number of mayors who committed their local government to implementing the Durban Adaptation Charter which was adopted by the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2011. Lessons learned in pioneering local adaptation planning programmes (e.g. the Sub-Saharan Africa Five City Adaptation Network92) indicate that the integration of adaptation planning and strategies for disaster risk reduction must be geared to achieving development priorities. Initial cost-benefit analyses show that ecosystem-based adaptation strategies and community-based and institutional responses might have advantages in enabling sustainable responses over capital intensive infrastructural solutions.93
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