Box 1.4: Violence Trends in Africa
Social conflict events in Africa, 1990-2011 400
War Homicide
300
Number of events
There is a dearth of reliable data on the burden of urban violence in Africa. However, some recent data sets suggest a rising trend in the region in this respect. The graph on the left shows a substantial decline in Africa’s war-related deaths over recent years, as well as a moderate
increase in homicide rates in the region. While these data are not specific to urban areas, it is reasonable to assume that they reflect trends in urban areas given that homicide rates tend to be positively correlated with settlement size. The graph on the right draws on recent
10
08
20
06
20
04
20
02
20
20
00 20
98
0
96
2008
19
2004
94
2002
19
2000
100
92
50,000
200
19
100,000
90
Number of deaths
150,000
0
Demonstrations Riots Anti-government violence Extra-government violence
19
200,000
19
War deaths versus homicides in Africa
data from the Social Conflict in Africa Database. It suggests that there has been a steady increase in social conflict events in African cities, including demonstrations, riots, anti-government violence and extragovernmental violence (violence between social groups).
Sources: World Health Organisation; Hendrix and Salehyan (2012)52
the risk of violent conflict.50 Rather, rising urban violence should be understood as a consequence of the failure of cities to fulfil the basic needs, aspirations and expectations of their rapidly growing populations. There is a dearth of robust research on the incidence and determinants of urban violence in Africa, but broader conflict and criminology literature indicates that poverty, inequality, economic shocks, social exclusion and weak political institutions are significant predictors of conflict and violence.51 Many of these risk factors are prevalent, and in some cases worsening, in African cities. South of the Sahara, exceptionally rapid urban population growth has outpaced economic development over the past 30 years, contributing to the “urbanization of poverty” in the region. This, coupled with a generally laissez-faire approach to urban management, has seen the proliferation of unplanned, underserviced settlements, where diseases, associated with poor water and sanitation, are rife; access to adequate health and education facilities is often limited; organized policing is ad hoc at best; and, employment is often informal, insecure and poorly paid. There is a large and growing gap between material conditions and opportunities in slums and those in more affluent neighbourhoods. Even in cities where
THE STATE OF AFRICAN CITIES 2014
assets, undermines social cohesion and erodes trust in public institutions. It generates uncertainties that inhibit the kind of investments that advance development objectives.47 In recent decades, there has been a marked decline in the frequency and intensity of the sovereign and civil wars that have plagued many African countries since independence.48 This trend is good news for Africa and has contributed to improved economic performance in recent years. However, there are indications that the decline in warfare has been accompanied by a rise in urban violence (see Box 1.4). Deadly protests and riots inspired by food and fuel price shocks swept across the continent in 2008 and in 2010. Ethnic and religious violence is on the rise in many cities; the frequency of terrorists attacks has increased in several subregions; organized crime is on the rise; and election-related violence has become commonplace. Less visible, but equally pernicious, are high rates of domestic violence. Boundaries between various forms of violence are often blurred and violence in the home often sets a precedent for that on the streets.49 While high rates of urban violence have accompanied Africa’s urban transition, there is little evidence that urbanization or rapid urban population growth per se increase
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