EWS
MV WAKASHIO: THE FALLOUT AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED. As a spill and pollution response trade association it has been fascinating to follow the MV Wakashio grounding and subsequent loss though social media and in the 4 webinars we have so far run. The media coverage has been reasonably balanced with the exception of one journalist at Forbes who seems never to have seen a spill pad in his life or been to sea in anything other than the Manhattan ferry. We have benefitted hugely from firsthand reports from those in Mauritius which have been honest and insightful. Whilst tinged with some frustration, all have commended the fortitude of the affected population and praised the way they have rallied together to do their bit to ‘save their island’ and the energy with which they approached the remedial works. We hope we have delivered our webinars and coverage in a balanced manner. It is certainly not our position to judge. We would appreciate feedback on that point. There is no doubt that this was one of the most significant incidents in shipping in 2020 as it was so surprising that a 300m bulk carrier should choose to be where she ended up, running aground on a reef with visible surf, in daylight.
So why did it happen? I am not sure we will ever truly know what was happening on the bridge at the time of the grounding. It is down to the inquiry to find this out. To date it has failed to do so. However we have had confirmed some of what the media have reported. The Captain agreed to change the approved route to pass the Cape of Good Hope to allow the vessel to close the island so that the crew could connect to family and friends using their phones. From the inquiry we have had confirmed that there was a birthday party on board and the Captain left the bridge to join that, leaving the First Officer in charge. When he came back to the bridge the First Officer was in charge of navigation and then, with the Chief Engineer also on the bridge, the vessel first struck the reef. The Captain has stated that
the Chief Officer was in charge of maintaining safe navigation and the error was his. Not surprisingly the First Officer says otherwise. The Court of Inquiry has again refused the Captain and First Officer bail as it would appear to believe that both have responsibility for the errors. Ultimately the Captain is the man in charge so should have ensured, knowing that they were entering shallow waters, that the vessel was safely navigated. There is no confirmation that the mapping software in use was inappropriate for the area they were navigating. However, the initial investigation by the Panama authorities indicated that it was not set at the right scale to show the hazards around the vessel and that the charts were not the current version. We have also heard that the Mauritius Coastguard were slow in reacting to the MV Wakashio being off her filed course. Having entered territorial waters one would have expected the vessel to be challenged by the Coastguard, particularly as she was heading straight toward the coast and not tracking south west as would be expected if she was routed to pass south of Cape of Good Hope. Due to a lack of attention to the radar plot by the duty watchkeeper no contact was made until after much delay the deviation was noticed and the Mauritius radar station endeavoured to contact the vessel as it approached the shore but no calls to the vessel were answered. We also know that two helicopters should have been available that could have intercepted the vessel. However, neither were actually available as one was under maintenance and spare parts for the other had not been delivered. We also know that following the grounding the ballast pumps, used to move fuel and liquids around the vessel, were not working. This would have meant that there was no way the vessel could alter the trim of the vessel to lift the bow to enable it to go astern
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