The unit is to provide enhanced security measures for personnel and enhanced remuneration for staff. Staff are required to undergo a rigorous screening process conducted by the national security office, and will include members of parliament, government members, chairmen of state administration central bodies, chairman and vice-chairman of the Supreme Audit Office, judges of the constitutional court, judges and prosecutors. A special court shall decide on criminal acts of corruption, while the most serious financial cases are to be verified by a special investigator and tax and financial experts. On the positive side, the state has allocated a relatively large amount of money for its operations, and the first special prosecutor was appointed at a meeting of the Slovak parliament in May 2004 and is widely held in high esteem. On the other hand, there is great concern that the power of the office was substantially weakened as a result of political manoeuvring within the coalition government. As with the new conflicts of interest law, discussed above, one way in which the initiative was weakened was by interest groups within the legislature limiting which public officials are to come under the scope of the institution. The wording of the law was also weakened so that the law only applies to acts directly related to execution
of a public official’s job. In practice, this means that criminal acts committed by a public official before or after his period in office remain under the purview of the general prosecutor. There was significant resistance to the passing of this law from political opposition groups, particularly SMER who rejected the bill wholesale on the grounds of its potential for abuse against those not participating in the coalition government. Concerns had been raised over the office of the general prosecutor and its relation to the office of the special prosecutor. The law provides that the special prosecutor was to be chosen by the National Council of the Slovak Republic from a selection of candidates forwarded by the general prosecutor. The office of general prosecutor was also strengthened by the provision that the prosecution of a member of parliament by the special prosecutor requires the consent of the general prosecutor and the national parliament. In sum, the establishment of the office of special prosecutor and the special court is a positive but not sufficient condition for successfully combating corruption in Slovakia. There seems to be some commitment from the state to create and finance the institutions at this time, but the law has also been weakened by self-interest in the legislature.
Emília Sicáková-Beblavá and Daniela Zemanovicová (TI Slovakia) Further reading E. Sicáková-Beblavá and D. Zemanovicová, Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy in Slovakia (evaluation report) (Bratislava: Transparency International Slovakia, 2003) D. Zemanovicová and E. Beblavá, The Country of Equal and More Equal – Slovakia and Corruption (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2003) V. Pirošík, E. Sicáková-Beblavá and B. Pavlovic, Decentralization and Corruption (Bratislava: Transparency International Slovakia, 2004) TI Slovakia: www.transparency.sk Note 1. Daily Pravda (Slovakia), 10 December 2002.
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