considered the benefits of an agreement to alternate the presidency of the supreme court between the main political parties on an annual basis.
Challenges in establishing a judicial career law The Consultative Group for Nicaragua, made up of 12 governments, bilateral donors, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, met in September 2003 in Managua to reiterate what national and international organisations had long been saying: institutional reform, particularly in the judiciary, is crucial to the country’s development. The current judicial system is criticised for its sluggishness and excessive politicisation. The supreme court submitted a draft judicial career law to the national assembly at the end of 2003.3 In its June evaluation of corruption in Nicaragua, the G8 cited the bill as an important component of the administration’s anti-corruption agenda, but described its chances of passing in the current political climate as ‘moderate’. Several versions of the bill were discussed by the national assembly, but no law had been approved at the time of writing. The reasons for this failure reflect the lack of political will from parties with an interest in blocking the bill’s two main reforms: the ‘professionalisation’ of the judiciary through transparent and competitive appointments; and the fostering of its external and internal independence, which would require the supreme court to relinquish its current responsibility for administering appointments and salaries. The supreme court’s proposal addressed the lack of merit-based mechanisms for hiring and promotion, but continued to give itself control over the administration of judicial careers. Experts criticised it for failing to separate the administrative and judicial functions of the judiciary and, therefore, not addressing the issue of internal independence. There are three main views of the proposed legislation in the national assembly. The PLC – which does not have a sufficiently large
majority to pass laws on its own – argues that the judiciary sympathises with the Frente Sandinista, Nicaragua’s second largest party, since the majority of its members were appointed in the Sandinista revolutionary period. Because of this, and the fact that the current judiciary imprisoned former president Alemán on corruption charges, the PLC wants to use the new law to replace judicial officials. The Frente Sandinista rejects the bill, citing the constitution which grants the supreme court authority over the ‘administration of justice’. They argue that this guarantee cannot be altered by any law adopted under normal procedures, but would need a qualified majority of parliamentarians to amend the constitution. In the past few years they have found allies in a number of judges, nervous about the loss of power and political relevance that the proposed judicial career law might entail. A third faction is headed by President Enrique Bolaños, whose aim is to depoliticise the judicial system. This was a campaign promise and it is widely seen as key to Nicaragua’s economic development. Given that the majority required for constitutional reform is impossible without the support of the Frente Sandinista, it will be difficult to win approval for the proposed law. This political logjam highlights the barriers confronting any attempt to instigate institutional reform in Nicaragua.
Accusations of corruption against the president highlight the need for electoral reform When President Bolaños announced in 2002 that charges had been filed against Alemán for corruption that had cost the state at least US $100 million, he could scarcely have imagined his action would lead to further charges related to his own use of funds, allegedly embezzled by Alemán.
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