and written evidence made by a number of organisations, including Transparency International, the SFO, the OECD Expert Group on Bribery and the attorney general. The evidence presented by these and other witnesses was highly critical of the bill, which led the committee to suggest a number of fundamental changes to the proposed legislation. The committee argued that the bill would not be ‘readily understood by the police, by prosecutors, by jurors and by the public, including – especially – the business and public sector communities, and their advisors, both here and abroad’.1 The report also criticised the definitions of ‘corruption’ and ‘corruptly’ contained within the bill as ‘opaque’, and argued that they fail ‘to cover some corrupt conduct such as when the head of one firm bribes the head of another or when an employer consents to the bribery of his agent’.2 The report made further suggestions regarding corruption in the private sector and parliamentary privilege. In December 2003, the government published its official response to the report, which accepted several recommendations, but defended the bill against criticisms over its definition of corruption. 3 The government argued that the proposed legislation remained consistent from 1998 to 2003, in which time it underwent three periods of consultation, a fact attested to by the committee’s report.4 W h y, t h e n , h a d t h e s e p r e v i o u s consultations not provided more substantive criticisms that could have been addressed in either the 2000 White Paper, or the 2003 bill itself? One possible reason is simply the complexity of the area, in which few can agree on a definition of corruption. A second reason could be that there is a lack of political will within the government, and that legislative reform is simply not high enough on the government’s agenda. Defenders of the government may point to its signing of the UN Convention against Corruption in December 2003. In order
to ratify the convention, however, the government admitted that it needs to put in place primary and secondary legislation and there is no timetable for this process as yet. Indeed, it seems the government more heavily favours legislation on the fight against fraud and organised crime rather than corruption per se, as evidenced for example by its recent white paper One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime (see next section). The apparent lack of will may have resulted in public indifference. As things stand, the future of reform is uncertain – although the redrafting process is ongoing, there is now no definite date for its completion. Reform of existing legislation, therefore, still appears to be some distance off.
A fragmented fight? Although anti-corruption organisations appear to be successful in Britain, the relationship between them is complex and somewhat confusing. Any coordination that does occur takes place in three major ways: joint investigations; information sharing; and developing common standards. In February 2004 David Blunkett, the home secretary, announced the creation of a new joint investigation body, accountable directly to him. The role of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) was fleshed out in the White Paper, One Step Ahead. It is proposed that SOCA will be charged with combating drug trafficking and organised immigration crime, as well as the recovery of criminal assets. It was hoped that the creation of the new agency would ‘reduce the number of organisations with which the police and others have to deal, improving efficiency and reducing bureaucracy’.5 The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) contains another example of a joint investigation agency. To promote cooperation between the various units within the DWP, other government departments and local authorities, a joint working unit
Country reports BRITAIN
GC2005 02 chap06 113
113
13/1/05 4:34:00 pm