closed block list system. Their inclusion or not in the lists depends on their party loyalty. In theory, once elected, Deputies and Senators can be independent as regards their judgement and votes, but in practice they are subject to firm discipline from the parliamentary groups to which they belong. In summary, although the legal framework guarantees the independence of the legislative bodies, in practice many of the issues contemplated by the law are difficult to comply with because: 1. the parliamentary system of government provides for the Prime Minister to dissolve Parliament if he does not have its support; 2. Spain’s electoral law stipulates closed block lists for elections to Congress; 3. the parliamentary groups exercise strict internal discipline; and 4. in order to ensure governability it is necessary to ensure that the votes of the deputies supporting the government in the Chambers are foreseeable. All parliamentary dissolutions so far (six plus the first constituent term) have been decreed by the Prime Minister. The relevant decrees have made reference to article 115 of the Spanish Constitution and state 81 that the dissolution has been proposed by the Prime Minister after consideration by the Cabinet. Similarly, on every occasion dissolution has affected both Congress and Senate simultaneously, with no recourse being made to the possibility of separate dissolutions. On being interviewed, deputies 82 recognise that discipline is the key to their inclusion or not in candidate lists in the future. It is quite exceptional for a bill proposed by the government not to be approved, as it is rare for a bill presented by the opposition to be accepted (see chart below).
Table 14: Bills presented and approved in Spain (1979-2011), with percentages Term: I Leg. II Leg. III Leg. IV Leg. V Leg. VI Leg. VII Leg. Bills: Presented 216 128 160 180 162 328 369 Approved 68 17 13 24 35 35 18 % 31,5 13,2 8,1 13,3 21,6 10,6 4,8 Source: the authors from data provided by the Congress of Deputies’ database.
VIII Leg.
IX Leg.
295 21 7,1
291 10 3,4
A deputy or senator might not accept parliamentary group discipline but in that case, if it should occur again, he would be expelled from the group, although this would not lead to the loss of his seat. Throughout the various terms over the democratic period these incidents have been exceptional, with maintenance of group discipline being the norm. There are pacts between the major parties to prevent deputies or senators from defecting from one group and being accepted into another. Discipline is not as strict in either the regional parliaments or in local government, and anti-defection pacts are usually not strictly applied. Groups and deputies depend on their own technical and administrative teams. As the support is insufficient, the deputies of the majority frequently have to resort to the ministerial teams, with the consequent risk to the effective separation of powers. Worse still, sometimes they need to resort to the technical assistance of lobbies. According to the deputies interviewed, ‘many deputies of the group supporting the government, whatever its orientation, find it more difficult to bear their dependence on ministerial staff, which frequently comprises individuals with no specific ideological or party allegiance, and even with no personal commitment to the political project in question, than to accept their dependence on the party’. On many occasions, the final decision about a parliamentary initiative or an 81
See Royal Decrees 3073/1978, of 24 December, 2057/1982, of 27 August, 794/1986, of 22 April, 1047/1989, of 1 September, 534/1993, of 12 April, 1/1996, of 8 January and 64/2000, of 17 January. 82 Interview with two PSOE deputies, one a member during five parliamentary terms, the other during two terms. 46