CATALYSTS FOR CHANGE: AN EFFICACY STUDY OF ONLINE MEDIA AND SOCIAL NETWORKING FOR ORGANISATIONS CONCERNED WITH BUILDING CIVIC PROTEST MOVEMENTS ABSTRACT This critique explores online media in its capacity for community building leading to collective action. Recent events in the Middle East have brought the relationship between new media and popular uprisings into wide discussion. This essay reviews existing theory and attempts to derive insight from a retrospective examination of the work of Maidan, a civil society organisation involved in Ukraine’s 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’. Drawing from the fields of Public Relations, Sociology and Post-‐Soviet Studies this critique aims to contribute to the debate over the role of online media in this context.
INTRODUCTION Whilst the pervasive character of public relations is traditionally aligned with organisational communication as related to corporate function, this work follows in the vain of scholars such as Heath (2006) who regard public relations as “a force to foster community” (p.97). With this relationship-‐centric view, social capital theory has been shown to be an effective conceptual framework for evaluating organisation-‐public relationships (Ihlen, 2005) and for understanding societal impact (Taylor, 2009; Verhoeven, 2008) leading Somerfield and Taylor (2011) to assert that “Fostering social capital in the organization’s environment is public relations’ raison d’être” (p.3). Within this framework public relations practitioners perform a ‘boundary spanning function’ (Daft 1983, cited in Somerfield and Taylor, 2011) enabling information transfer between organisation and environment, thereby creating the relational ties that facilitate the accumulation of social capital. Borrowing much from the sociological platform of network theory this paper shall explore how the extent to which one individual is bonded to another produces differing levels of behavioural influence in the performance of various collective functions. In order to appreciate the impact of social capital upon networks we shall examine evidence of a metric that is concomitant to both theories (Helliwell & Putnam, 2004): interpersonal trust. Although scholarly interest in online media currently surpasses interest in every other media combined (Chadwick & Howard, 2009) and despite growth in participation in social media exceeding overall Internet growth by more than 300% (Nielsen, 2009), Waters (2009) shows that many Civil Society organizations are apprehensive towards new media, whilst other scholars have shown that its relationship building capabilities are largely underutilized (Eyrich, Padman, and Sweetser, 2008; Porter, Sweetser, & Chung, 2009).
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The aim of this critique is to discover if the conceptual frameworks of social capital and network theory can aid our understanding of the potential for new media to catalyse growth in protest and civic resistance movements.
DEBATE BACKGROUND The recent Arab uprisings have drawn interest from experts of many fields generating a diverse body of opinion as to the role of new media in these political events. Some observers have gone so far as to use the term ‘social media revolution’, however critics attest that this is not only incorrect but also demeaning. Below is a summary of the polarised viewpoints intended to offer a conceptual context for the topic and case. DIGITAL UTOPIANISM The Digital Utopian view is presented by Segen (2009): “It seems like democracy is an inevitable result of Internet access” (p.1). Utopians in general perceive a causal link between the proliferation of Internet access and uprisings of a democratic nature and are optimistic about the potential of technology to affect social change. Despite freedom of information being a controversial topic since Wikileaks, US foreign policy now centres on ‘Internet Freedom’ (Clinton, 2010) aligning itself ideologically with those observers that celebrate both Iran (Ambinder, 2009; Rather, 2009) and Egypt (Fraser, 2011; Qualman 2011) with variations of the term ‘social media revolution’. In the practical sense Utopians perceive new media as “giving voice to the voiceless” (Stone, 2010, p.1), circumventing the limitations of official propaganda (Rather, 2009) and mobilizing activists on the ground (Weaver, 2010). Not so much a tool, but as a new platform for the organization of activist movements and a broadcast medium for “resisting those who would censor history in real time” (Rushkoff, 2009, p.1). DIGITAL REALISM By contrast, Digital Realists view the idea of ‘social media for social change’ with deep scepticism; regarding the term ‘social media revolution’ as at best pure hyperbole (Vijayan, 2011), and at worst an offensive product of western media reductionism (Esfandiari, 2010) that distracts from the genuine political struggle (Kaplin, 2011). Some Realists argue that in fact the very nature of new media directly contradicts the requirements of effective activism. Gladwell (2010) contends that high-‐risk activism is a phenomenon requiring the support of strong-‐tie relationships, contrasting new media as “entirely built around weak-‐ties” (p.2). His argument continues that analysis of historic social movements attributes much of their success to the strategic direction provided by centralized leadership, going on to suggest that the structure and character of online networks deny the establishment of hierarchy necessary for this to take place. Another argument affirmed by Realists is that rather than inspiring genuine activism, new media merely lowers the participation threshold, creating a false sense of involvement SN: 46978
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without any actual contribution (Mozarov, 2011). This school of thought positions new media as “more like a stress reliever than a mechanism for political change” (Khouri, 2010, p.1), and has spawned the derogatory term ‘Slacktivism’ (Feder, 2002). THE UTILITARIAN PERSPECTIVE The term Utilitarian is here used to refer to those authors that make up the middle-‐ground, seeking neither to glorify, nor disregard, the impact of social media on activism; positioning it instead as a supplementary utility to traditional advocacy and resistance. Whilst Utilitarians directly refute the assumption of a causal link between the Internet and social activation (Gharbia, 2010), they also demonstrate a greater degree of optimism than that espoused by Digital Realists. York (2010) and Littau (2011) highlight the technology’s ability to widely distribute messages as well as to establish a permanent information portal for activists. Rutledge (2010) regards the lowering of the participation threshold observed by Realists as the “thin end of the wedge towards social action” (p.1) suggesting that any form of participation that receives positive feedback will encourage further contribution. In response to the Realist argument that the Internet is a weak-‐relationship only medium, Utilitarians make three points: 1) Beacher and Smith (2010) observe that strong-‐ties may develop inside weak-‐tie networks; 2) Livingstone (2011) claims that weak online networks can contact and galvanise existing strong-‐tie groups; 3) Simons (2010) asserts that when there exists a shared ideological goal strong relationships develop regardless of the medium of communication. With these three viewpoints defined, this paper will now, after briefly clarifying a few conceptual elements, attempt to develop a contribution to this vibrant discussion by analysing an early case of Internet use by a civic protest movement.
CLARIFING CONCEPTS Aiming to clarify this paper’s theoretical approach, the following section defines some of the theories behind the conceptual framework through which the topic and case will be analysed. First by explaining Granovetter’s (1973) much-‐cited network theory ‘the strength of weak ties’, before detailing the various types of social capital to be used in the analytical section of this paper. THE STRENGTH OF WEAK TIES When Granovetter (1973) refers to the strength of weak ties he is observing a deceptively simple social factor with profound implications: First, that individuals within strong-‐tie networks (e.g. Family and close friends) are very likely to possess much of the same information, which creates sympathetic attitudes but restricts exposure to new ideas. His hypothesis follows that acquaintances, with whom an individual has looser ties, move in different circles and are thus privy to alternative information. These ‘weaker’ relationships
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act as information bridges across which new ideas diffuse amongst a population. The ‘strength’ of weak ties then refers to the ability of weak-‐tie bridges to bring together contrasting ideas, which through inter-‐group dialogue form the broader cultural trends that underpin society. TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL CAPITAL: A sociological theory that accounts for the value of relationships among a social group. High levels of social capital are represented by strong societal trust and are a primary indicator of social cohesion (Putnam, 1993). BRIDGING CAPITAL: A social capital sub-‐type that represents the amount of weak-‐tie bridges in a given network (Ellison, Steinfield & Lampe, 2007). Following Granovetter (1973) bridging capital can also be said to be representative of the diversity of a network’s information sources. BONDING CAPITAL: Another social capital sub-‐type that refers to the quantity and intensity of strong-‐tie relationships within a network. Whereas bridging capital facilitates information exchange between distinct groups, bonding capital deals with the provision of direct support within an exclusive network (Putnam, 2000). Wellman (2001) offers three other sociological terms, which are useful for understanding the progressive stages through which loose networks consolidate into bonded communities. 1) NETWORK CAPITAL: A term that refers to the total weak-‐tie network connections of an individual or organisation and evaluates the capacity for information exchange with all individual agents. 2) PARTICIPATORY CAPITAL: A term that represents the potential for loosely connected agents to transition into a strong bonded group. This accounts for the internal trust that is forged through participation in collective action, which in turn fosters a sense of collective identity and shared responsibility. 3) COMMUNITY COMMITMENT: This is the ultimate stage for community building in which all bonds between network members are consolidated into true ideological harmony. This is represented by community-‐centric attitudes, collective direction and motivation.
CASE STUDY: MAIDAN In order to develop a contribution to this discussion the paper will now examine the case of Maidan, a Ukrainian civil society organisation who built a pro-‐democracy social movement between 2000 and 2004, in the run-‐up to the 2004 Presidential election. The organisation had two goals: 1) to change the public perception that there was no alternative to the entrenched regime of President Kuchma; 2) to build a protest community capable of lobbying for a freer and more democratic Ukraine. Community building and organising were conducted online and experienced strong success despite an unfavourable context. SN: 46978
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TIMELINE 2000: Maidan is formed by a group of journalists and activists close to the political commentator Georghiy Gongadze; an outspoken critic of the incumbent regime, who was kidnaped and beheaded in September 2000. Due to censorship and insufficient finance, traditional media channels are not accessible and so the group uses the Internet to broadcast notification of a protest action on the Ukrainian capital’s central square, Maidan Nesalezhnosti, which lasts from December until March the following year. 2001: Following the end of their initial protest action, Maidan re-‐launch their site incorporating forum functionality. Inspired by early interest, Maidan began to realise the organisational capabilities of the Internet and structure their efforts towards building an online community. Autumn 2001: average ≥490 visitors per day (v/d). 2002: Internal trust within the community reaches its first tipping point as the organisation begins to receive donations and new members hold their first private meetings offline. The website’s server is moved abroad for security. Autumn 2002: average ≥1220 v/d. 2003: Maidan holds regular protests and pickets, publicly supports other activist actions and distributes literature on non-‐violent protest including case studies of other successful campaigns. Autumn 2003: average ≥1400 v/d. 2004: Maidan’s community is active and geographically disperse, which enables them to react to political events faster than traditional media. This fast reactive ability and their freedom from censorship position Maidan as a potent alternative media force. Defecting members of the ruling regime choose Maidan.org as a channel through which to leak political information, sparking several nationwide scandals. A controversial video acquired by Maidan is downloaded from their site over 100,000 times. The Maidan community are also instrumental in monitoring the elections, collecting between 5000-‐10,000 applications from local would-‐be observers, bringing in over 100 International observers and setting-‐up two 24hr call-‐centres to facilitate whistleblowing. During the second round of elections the call-‐centres collect enough tip-‐offs for Maidan to be able to post a new report of election fraud or voter intimidation on their website every minute throughout the election. On December 22nd a third round is held invalidating the previous in reaction to endemic election fraud. The final round finds in favour of opposition candidate Victor Yuschenko and is hailed internationally as a triumph for democracy. Autumn 2004: average ≥6800 v/d. December 2004: average ≥21,100 v/d.
ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION POST SOVIET TRUST ISSUES In order to appreciate the efforts and successes of Maidan it is important to account for three contextual limitations working against them: 1) In 2004 Ukrainian Internet penetrated to only 2-‐4% of the population of 48 million (Kyj, 2006); 2) As the Gongadze case affirms, there was potential for violent repercussion from the authorities (Bondarenko, 2011: author
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interview, see appendix A); 3) The population’s trust in organisational efforts was very low, as this paper will now explore. Sztompka (1999) describes post-‐soviet society as undergoing a near total breakdown of trust in institutions and society at large; a trend that Lomnitz and Sheinbaum (2004) attribute to the failure of the state to provide the minimal services necessary for survival. This results in what network theory terms social fragmentation, where society fractures into small isolated clusters with equally high levels of internal trust and external distrust (Aberg & Sandberg, 2003; Sapsford & Abbot, 2006). Ledeneva (1998, 2009) identifies two serious issues with this societal make-‐up: 1) Closed networks substitute common morality for that of the group; 2) Closed networks become islands resisting progressive social development. Addressing this issue, Granovetter (1973, 1982), illustrates that closed networks lack the weak-‐tie bridges with other clusters that normally enable culture to diffuse widely across society and are thus locked-‐in to their existing perspectives, he concludes suggesting: “This may be one reason why poverty is self-‐ perpetuating” (p.213) This description of a closed and distrustful population juxtaposes Maidan’s success in building such a large, bonded and active community. In pursuit of an explanation this paper will examine the medium of online communication in its capacity to expand weak-‐networks and transition weak-‐tie affiliations into strong bonds of trust. MAIDAN: A MODEL COMMUNITY “Trust is the central component of social solidarity” (Simmel, 1964, p.318). Maidan’s community was bonded by deep interpersonal trust, collective identity and shared ideology (Bondarenko 2009, 2011). If, as Realists assert, activism is a strong-‐tie-‐only phenomenon then Maidan’s success lies in the development of trust building and transition of bridging capital gained through the Internet into the bonding capital that united their community. The first interesting point was Maidan’s decision to launch a forum in 2001. A forum carries many of the features of modern social networking sites, in that users have individual identities and can hold on-‐going conversations that are archived and remain accessible. This facility for dialogue is recognised as instrumental in building trust (Heath, 2001), whilst Yang and Kang (2009) cite interactivity as the primary facilitator of positive attitude and word-‐of-‐ mouth support for online campaigns. Aside from interactivity, trust among Maidan’s community benefited from opportunities for real-‐world participation, this potentially had a duel effect: 1) Real world stakeholder engagement is proven to strengthen organisation-‐public relationships (Jo and Kim, 2003); 2) event organising incorporated the community into the organisation’s decision making structure which Heath (2001) suggests is the ideal of relationship building. It is important to caution against following the Utopian line that the Internet ‘caused’ the Maidan social movement; which was simply not the case. The Maidan movement arose out of necessity of circumstance, in reaction a repressive force that affected many others. As such, rather than having to convert individuals to their ideology Maidan needed primarily to
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connect to, and build trust with, those individuals who were already ideologically sympathetic. In content alone the Maidan website would have appealed to this target public; as the organisation’s server was located aboard, the website was free from censorship, in stark contrast with the mainstream media, which had failed to provide dissatisfied citizens with a public voice. In order to reach isolated individuals it was logical to attempt to form a large weak-‐tie network, a function for which the Internet is widely appreciated (Wellman, 2001; Donath and Boyd, 2004; Boekkooi, 2009), in order to penetrate the closed clusters that made up Ukrainian society. With the target public identified and in contact, the objective switched to trust building, which was achieved by making participation opportunities available. The Digital Realist grievance of the Internet lowering the participation threshold for activism is in fact a benefit in this case, as it provided an initial low-‐cost commitment for participation with the community. Two crucially important functions were fulfilled by a core group of members with administrative access to the site: Firstly, they were online 24 hours a day maintaining constant interactivity with the community and providing positive feedback to the contributions of new members. Secondly, they acted as a filter for counter-‐ideological or counter-‐productive comments in the main channel, keeping the site focused and the core communication ideologically homogenous. The diagram below is provided in a tentative attempt to consolidate Maidan’s approach into a conceptual model representing the flow of individuals from unaware publics into the various organisational strata (Diagram created by author).
CONCLUSION This paper has attempted to develop a contribution to what is currently a lively debate over the role of online media in building civic protest movements. Rather than confirming either the Utopian or Realist extremes, this paper’s findings support the Utilitarian view that the Internet is a supplementary utility to traditional advocacy and resistance. Through the SN: 46978
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theoretical lens of social capital and network theory, the work infers that when implemented for the purpose of community building, the Internet is indeed effective; even when the contextual odds are stacked against it. It is important to recognise that the inferences of this paper are limited to aiding movements that arise organically in reaction to genuine oppressive forces and does not attempt to address the Utopian assumption of a causal link between media and uprising. What is asserted here, however, is that when used to amass a wide network and consolidate trust, in conjunction with online and offline participation, the Internet provides an opportune platform for building a community with the essential morally supportive strong-‐ ties that facilitate collective action. From this paper’s perspective, the relationship between online media and civil uprisings appears not so much causal as catalytic, in the words of Anatoly Bondarenko (2011), Maidan’s Relationship Officer: “The seeds sewn in 2000 had not so much blossomed as exploded. Our [online] discourse generated not only ideas and actions, but also a momentum in the belief that our goals could be achieved.” (Appendix A). Word Count: 3097 (including diagram annotations).
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APPENDIX: A ANATOLY BONDARENKO – COMMUNITY RELATIONS OFFICER, MAIDAN, 2011. INTERVIEWED BY XXXXXXXXX XXXX (Author) [ONE TO ONE, UNSTRUCTURED] KYIV, 14 t h JULY 2011. Transcript translated in part from Ukrainian language. QU: Lets Start by talking about how the organisation started, and why it was decided to use the Internet from the beginning. AB: We started our initial movement: ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ in 2000, following the death of Georghiy Gongadze. Georghiy had a number of activists, some affiliated some independent, in his close friendship circle -‐ and they wanted to start some action to protest after the kidnapping and beheading of their friend. At that time the Internet was the only means of access to the public – none of the members owned newspapers or television channels. There was tight censorship of the media throughout the Kuchma regime; the only way around it was to pay very large bribes to existing publications, or to fund the set-‐up of an independent publication, but without vast financial resources it would be impossible to sustain a consistent message with either option. Thus the Internet was an obvious choice for transmitting our message for two reasons: 1) to escape censorship; 2) lack of finance. QU: So you began to use the Internet to disseminate your message, when did you start to utilise it as a tool to collect and mobilise support? AB: Not immediately, it took some time for us to comprehend that this was not only a media but also a tool for organising people. It was around the same time that we held a large demonstration on Maidan Nesalezhnosti (the central square in Kyiv with which the organisation shares its name), which lasted from December 2000 till March 2001, when it was over we came upon the idea that the Internet could be used as a powerful tool to organise, to connect, to network. At first our website was just a one page petition with announcements, but after we replaced it with a forum structure we started understanding its potential. Activity on the forum varied depending events in the country: at the peak of the protest actions in 2001 we counted over 5000 users per day with hundreds of those contributing input to the forum itself. SN: 46978
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QU: In the end your efforts developed a very large and very loyal community, which demonstrates a lot of trust amongst the members. Why do you think that so many young, typically cynical, Ukrainians placed trust in each other and trusted Maidan as an organisation? AB: Addressing the second part of this question… Maidan was positioned from the beginning as non-‐partisan, of course we had a political agenda, but we were honestly non-‐partisan and many times stress-‐tested this fact, and our deeds provided proof that we were not being lead by some oppositional party. Secondly… In my opinion, trust within a community cannot be engineered; it can only exist where there are common ideological values and can be reinforced by common actions and deeds. I don’t know of any techniques to create trust – only organically within a community of action, not only online but also in real life. QU: Often, fear of repercussions from the authorities deters individuals from joining activist communities. Was this an issue for Maidan? What did you do about it? AB: In 2000 fear of secret services was widespread. However, our network architecture undermined this fear automatically. People got over their fear through incremental commitments of trust allowing progression within a three-‐tier structure: the outer circle contained people who were prepared to visit the site to receive information; the middle circle contains users who are willing to take part in some activities; the inner circle is made up of individuals who dedicated most of their personal time to the cause. As users follow the natural flow, from outer to inner, the size of the community increased, as did internal trust. Trust grows effectively when actions create positive real-‐world results. Over time the size of the community and the amount of activity fostered a powerful sense of solidarity that worked towards combating any abstract fears of repercussion. QU: What is your estimate of the conversion rate from users who were active online to users who joined actions on the streets? AB: Roughly I would say that around 10-‐20% of our audience was active in our online community, contributing to brainstorms and so on. In terms of those that joined in with offline actions, I would say probably 5% of the total community, just under half of those that were active online – mainly those who were located close enough to Kyiv to take part. QU: It has been observed that networks often experience problems resulting from conflict in the absence of leadership. How did Maidan handle internal conflict? SN: 46978
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AB: We resolved conflict with a mixture of technology and ideology. From the very beginning our goal ‘a democratic future for Ukraine’ defined our strategy and actions. With it in mind we formed a set of rules for communication on the forum that would result in constructive contributions and, importantly, the generation of real-‐world actions. So firstly, I would say that unity behind a common goal, with frequent real-‐world events to focus attention, minimized the formation of conflict. Secondly, we had technical methods for pulling apart conflict and redirecting opinions away from destructive friction. When conflict arose we simply formed new threads (sub-‐topics within the forum) to accommodate these opinions and relocated the comments to there. This provided users the opportunity to opt in to these topics without distracting from the constructive action focused work going on in the main channels. But, I’m afraid I don’t agree that there was an absence of leadership. There was a core unit of between 10-‐15 people who were online nearly all the time and acquired authority and respect within the community. These opinion leaders all held a deep commitment to the core goals and their reputations allowed them to moderate conflict effectively. QU: I understand that Maidan played a role in monitoring the 2004 Presidential elections. To what extent was Maidan involved? AB: A lot of our online discussions were centered on the creation of initiatives to help observe election procedures. Because of our large audience we received a lot of tip-‐ offs from various sources over the election period. Our first reactive tactic was the Night Watch. This consisted of mobile teams of 2-‐3 people were able to respond to tip offs of election fraud by arriving at the polling station and informing members of the commission that they had been identified and exposed. Of course, Night Watch relied on tip-‐offs from whistleblowers within the polling stations. In order to facilitate this we organized teams of people to manage the incoming messages; including two 24hr call centers. It is impossible to say how many thousands of citizens contacted us with information; other than that we received enough leaked information to post a new report of violations every minute throughout the election. In terms of direct participation with monitoring, we took part in a project called ‘Znau’ (I Know) which was organized by opposition politicians and international NGO’s. The Maidan site was used as a platform to source volunteers for monitoring positions. We received between 5,000 and 10,000 applications, which we passed on to ‘Znau’ for selection and training. We also performed our own targeted observation actions in known problem areas, such as the Mikolayvskij region in which we trained 200 people to act as observers. SN: 46978
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Also because of our international penetration, we were able to bring over 100 independent observers to Ukraine to monitor the third round of elections. QU: The second round of the 2004 Presidential elections is now infamous for its ballot fraud, which along with Ukrainians taking to the streets, ultimately led to its invalidation. What did Maidan do to campaign for better practice in the third round? AB: I’ve heard rumors that some of the information exposed by Maidan was used in the invalidation appeal to the Supreme Court, but I haven’t been able to validate that as fact. One of our actions that was publicly recognized however was a project in which we used all the cases of mal-‐practice we had exposed to identify commission members who had failed in their duties. We wrote to each of them warning them that their ‘mistakes’ had been recognized and that particular attention would be turned towards their management of the next round; we also reminded them of the legal implications of failure to perform their duties. At the very least this provoked a reaction, a member of government complained of ‘Ukrainian fascists scaring commission members’ in a speech to parliament. Other than the efforts mentioned already, I can only say that Maidan acted as a hub for those who wanted to contribute to a freer and more democratic Ukraine. At the time of the orange revolution nearly our entire network was activated. The seeds sewn in 2000 had not so much blossomed as exploded. Our discourse generated not only ideas and actions, but also a momentum in the belief that our goals could be achieved.
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