the world. The argument for a muscular and interventionist foreign policy that would actively promote democracy abroad and deter rogue regimes from threatening American security is a continuous theme throughout neoconservative literature. The ousting of the Iraqi army from Kuwait during the 1990-1 Gulf War was generally considered a successful operation as it was short, with few casualties (Santella, 2004 p. 4-16). However, in line with its interventionist foreign policy, neoconservatives criticised the administration’s decision to allow Saddam Hussein to remain in power, instead of overthrowing his government in Baghdad, characterising it as “unfinished business” (Project for the New American Century, 1998a). As a consequence, in 1992 the then Under Secretary for Policy at the Pentagon, Paul Wolfowitz, outlined a grand strategy of US supremacy in a leaked five year draft Defence Planning Guidance paper. It outlined several scenarios for possible future foreign conflicts involving the US, presenting seven case studies including one set in Iraq (Tyler, 1992). However, under the Clinton administration, the neoconservative vision for a strong US military presence reshaping the world in the American image was quickly disappointed. In an effort to push through their agenda in Washington, the neoconservative think tank called the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) was founded in 1997 to rally support for a policy of “American international involvement” (Kristol, 1997). In January 1998 the PNAC sent an open letter to President Clinton advocating the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime from power, stating that this “now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy” (Project for the New American Century, 1998b). By this point, the PNAC was a key organisation in a growing neoconservative alliance that included intellectuals, Government officials, media figures and political advisers, all calling for increased military spending, unilateralism instead of multilateral institutions and agreements, and an era of American supremacy. This coalition regularly published articles in major newspapers, spoke at congressional hearings and was increasingly present in the media (Halper and Clarke, 2004 p. 48-49).
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Despite this, foreign policy was initially low in the George W. Bush administration’s priorities. However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks opened a window of opportunity for the neoconservatives who were finally able to push through their foreign policy agenda that had been articulated over the course of preceding decades. Only a few days after the attacks, the events were being treated not as a crime, but as an act of war (George W. Bush quoted in Frontline, 2003), perpetrated by states, not individuals. For the neoconservatives, the climate of fear in the White House following 9/11 presented an opportunity to push through their agenda, especially toward Iraq. The neoconservatives’ advantage was that in a time of chaos, they were ready with a detailed plan for the nation’s response that enabled them to propel the administration toward state-on-state conflict with Iraq. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address demonstrated a shift in policy as a result of this influence, stating that the first goal of the war on terror was to invade Afghanistan, and that the second was to “prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America… with weapons of mass destruction” (ibid.). This defined the situation as an unavoidable battle against specific states and advanced the neoconservative vision of a war against a morally degenerate enemy to maintain virtue at home. A large increase in defence spending was announced, corresponding to the PNAC’s September 2000 report Rebuilding America’s Defences, and the rhetoric of the speech indicated that the preemptive use of force was envisaged. The publication of the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) in September 2002 further laid the groundwork for preemption and an invasion of Iraq. The NSS used neoconservative language and reflected many of the views of the PNAC’s 1997 Statement of Principles. In particular, three of the core values of modern neoconservatism had entered the Bush administration’s policy agenda; preemption, unilateralism and regime change in Iraq. In the run up to the war, it became increasingly evident that the rationale behind the invasion coincided with the neoconservative idea of America’s responsibility to shape the global security environment. On March 19, 2003 Bush declared war against Iraq.