The Influence of Neoconservativism on the George W. Bush Administration’s Policies towards Iraq Caterina Perlini
Abstract Much has been written about the influence of neoconservatism on the George W. Bush administration in the aftermath of the 9/11 bombings. This paper examines the rise of neoconservatism, both before the events of 2001 and after, and assesses its impact on decision making in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In particular it examines other potential influences on policy making during this time period, suggesting that neoconservatism is not the dominant force it is often purported to be. Introduction As instability continues to prevail in Iraq and the entire Gulf region, academics, politicians and the informed public are seeking an explanation as to why George W. Bush’s administration decided to venture down the road of regime change in Baghdad. This has given rise to close scrutiny of the initial rationale for war, with increasing focus on the role and influence of neoconservatives, who have become a cause célèbre in American and international politics. There is a flood of literature illustrating how, after the attacks of 11 September 2001, neoconservatives manipulated the United States’ response to terrorism in order to push through their agenda for regime change in Iraq. However, this paper argues that the conservative nationalist character of the principle members of the Bush administration actually played a much greater role in decisions than these commentators on neoconservatism have presumed. Neoconservatism The complex character of neoconservatism has been suggested by Halper and Clarke who state that there is no absolute divide “between who is and who isn’t a
neoconservative” (Halper and Clarke, 2004 p. 10), and that the word ‘movement’, often used to describe it, may overstate its academic cohesion (ibid., p. 10-11). Analysis of the origins of neoconservativism have been the focus of many detailed studies (see Ehrman, 1995; Heilbrunn, 2008; Steinfels 1979), with continuing interest in its ideas and impacts (Fukuyama, 2006; Halper and Clarke, 2004; Kristol and Kagan, 2000). Fukuyama singles out three core principles that characterise neoconservatism’s approach to foreign policy. Firstly, neoconservatives advocate that a democratic regime founded on an idea of equality permeates the conduct and beliefs of its citizens, and that regimes that treat their own citizens unjustly are expected to act in a similar way towards foreigners. The second characteristic is the belief that “American power has been and could be used for moral purposes and that the US needs to remain engaged in international affairs”, and finally, a deep scepticism about “the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law and institutions to achieve either security or justice” (Fukuyama, 2006 p. 48-49). Neoconservatism developed within the context of the end of the Cold War, which left the United States seeking to define its role as the world’s preeminent power within a new international environment. The neoconservatives sought a solution by lobbying for a foreign policy agenda involving concepts like unipolarity, preemption, regime change, benevolent hegemony and American exceptionalism. For example, Pulitzer Prize-winning syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer urged the US to seize its position as the leader of the international order and embrace the virtues of preemptive military action (the elimination of a threat before it materialises, based on incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent), in order to impose its priorities on
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