The Politic - Fall 2011

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International The al Qaeda Franchise Al Qaeda, which means “the Base,” formed as the Soviets were retreating from Afghanistan in 1989. Bin Laden and his group of mujahedeen, primarily from the Arabian Peninsula, received American and Saudi funding to participate in expelling Soviet invaders, who had been in Afghanistan since 1979. In 1990, bin Laden volunteered his organization to help defend Saudi Arabia from a possible Iraqi strike. The Saudis rejected his offer; instead, they permitted US forces to use the country as their base during the Gulf War. Angered, bin Laden publicly disparaged the Saudi monarchy and was forced into exile in Sudan. Al Qaeda relocated to Afghanistan after the Taliban, who shares bin Laden’s literalist Islamic theology, came to power in 1996. Al Qaeda’s deadliest attacks prior to September 11 were the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack on the USS Cole, which was docked in the Port of Aden off the

“Nodes are expected to conform to al Qaeda tactics and targets, [but] for the most part, are financially independent.” coast of Yemen, in 2000. Osama bin Laden sought to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Arab world by ridding the region of foreign influence and crafting a social order under an Islamic government akin to the Taliban. In his 2002 letter to the American people titled “Why We Are Fighting You,” he says, “you attacked us and continue to attack us,” and lists his grievances, particularly American support for Israel, Indian oppression

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in Kashmir, occupation of Muslim countries, and theft of oil. He targeted anyone he considered complicit in the advancement of the “Western agenda.” Before the Arab Spring, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak was an al Qaeda target because of his dependence on Western aid. In January, protests in Tahrir Square deposed Mubarak without al Qaeda’s assistance. Though established in Afghanistan, al Qaeda has spread throughout the Arab world, leading to the development of semi-autonomous “nodes” in Iraq, North Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. Since 2004, regional groups with similar Salafi Islamic ideologies have been negotiating mergers with senior al Qaeda leaders. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) formally merged with al Qaeda in 2004, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) formally merged with al Qaeda in 2006, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) formally merged with al Qaeda by combining the Saudi and Yemeni al Qaeda contingents in 2009. Al Qaeda has adopted a franchise model in which they cede some authority to regional nodes in order to expand its reach throughout the Muslim world. Dr. Geoff Porter, the founder and director of North African Risk Consulting, says that senior al Qaeda leaders seek out Islamist organizations whose views and tactics align with their own. Though regional nodes are expected to conform to al Qaeda tactics and targets, for the most part, they are financially independent. Al Zawahiri, who has succeeded bin Laden, seems unsure how to direct them. Today, terrorists are conducting attacks in pursuit of the Islamic caliphate envisioned by bin Laden without consulting al Zawahiri. Regional nodes are becoming increasingly independent. Al Zawahiri is ushering in an era of further decentralization between al Qaeda senior leaders and their operatives.

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Even under bin Laden, al Qaeda struggled to control the actions of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi, whose target set included Americans, Iraqi Shi’a, members of Sunni resistance groups, and Sunni tribal leaders that refused to coalesce when confronted with his demands. The increasingly violent al Zarqawi sent suicide bombers to attack hotels in Amman, Jordan in 2005. In doing so, al Zarqawi alienated potential sympathizers. Ultimately, bin Laden tamed al Zarqawi, but not before al Zarqawi damaged the jihad in Iraq. Though AQI has been declining since the United States killed al Zarqawi, the story of AQI speaks to al Zawahiri’s primary challenge: to prevent the regional nodes from straying from the tactics and targets that benefit al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has always had a tenuous relationship with al Qaeda senior leadership. They formally merged with al Qaeda on the fifth anniversary of September 11; since the merger, they have conducted attacks against national, regional, and Western targets. From 2008 to 2010, ties between senior leadership and AQIM worsened; they disagreed over the kinds of attacks that were being conducted in the Maghreb, and Algerian counter-terrorism efforts challenged AQIM. I interviewed Dr. Geoff Porter, the founder and director of North African Risk Consulting, who writes for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.


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