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met with successive failures. From federalist dreams to intergovernmentalist realism, the driving forces of European integration have so far been unable to provide a credible solution to
“Still we are foresaking our allies and giving our adversaries the false impression that the Old Continent is a spent force”
the lack of European external power. Henry Kissinger once emblematically asked, “Who do I call if I want to talk to Europe?”, and while the recent creation of the office of High Representative for Foreign Affairs may have answered this question, still Europe remains unable to speak with a single voice. Still we are forsaking our allies and giving our adversaries the false impression that the Old Continent is a spent force. To avoid another 2014 capitulation, or another 2022 shock, it is clear that there needs to be greater development of a truly European foreign policy. New ideas are desperately needed to vitalise an area historically seen as a secondary and even tertiary issue, or beyond the remit of the EU - we are playing catch-up for years of lost discussion. This is why we have founded the Oxford Charlemagne Institute, a student-run think tank dedicated to researching and discussing all aspects of European foreign policy. With the support and guidance of Lord Patten, our senior member, and his wealth of experience, we are researching areas as crucial but varied as the European defence industry, the management of evacuations from countries in crisis, and how the invasion of Ukraine has affected the position of the EU’s easternmost members. These represent the genesis of our exciting project, one that we seek to make as open and welcoming as possible. We have outlined the importance of EU foreign policy, its shortcomings, and the need for new ideas to continue its development. We want these to come from all, regardless of the colour of your passport. So, whether you agree or disagree with our firm belief that European Union foreign policy is crucial now more than ever, please reach out to us with your ideas and proposals.
Is Poland turning its back on populism? Etienne Baker
O
n Sunday 15th October, Poland’s ruling party, Law and Justice (PiS), lost its majority in parliament after eight years in power. Whilst winning the vote with 35.8%, the PiS lacks the seats to make up a majority. Poland’s electoral system is proportional and multi-party, meaning that if one party fails to make a majority, a coalition is formed. These
“this election was a long awaited tussle between national populism... and liberal centrism” results of the election signify that the oppositional parties led by Donald Tusk and the Civic Coalition that have fledged to form a coalition government have 248 seats; comfortably over the 231 needed to form a government. For many, this election was a long-awaited tussle between national populism that has been rampant in Europe and liberal centrism, fighting to re-emerge after a decade of disappearance. As a former president of the European Council, Tusk is unlikely to hold the same stance on the EU as the current president of Poland, Andrzej Duda. From this perspective, officials in Brussels are sure to be breathing a sigh of relief at the results. Furthermore, this polarisation fits with a wider divide on social issues, such as women’s reproductive rights and LGBTQ+ rights, which have been systematically chipped away at by the PiS over the last eight years. According to the latest ILGA Europe country ranking report, Poland is now considered the worst state in the European Union for LGBTQ+ rights. These contests were reflected in turnout from the election, which was up to 74.3%, break-
ing the record turnout in 1989 which triggered the collapse of the Soviet-backed communist system. Almost 69% of under30s turned out to vote, a marginally higher percentage than over 60s. This bucks many Western electoral trends, such as in the UK, and a 2023 European Parliament report which found a ‘shocking landscape of voter absenteeism…especially among the youngest cohorts of eligible voters.’ The hostility of the PiS on minority rights seems to have pushed greater youth turnout, and was a large contributor to boosting oppositional parties’ vote share. There are many complications, though, and despite hope among many left-wing and central supporters, the road away from ultra-conservative populism is long and complicated. For those familiar with the TV show Borgen, the post-election mayhem from an unexpected election result rings some bells, and it will likely still be some time until a new coalition is confirmed and approved to
“it will not resolve the ongoing tensions that rightwing populism provokes for the electorate”
govern. Although the rhetoric around the election results is one of a rebirth and radical change, this is more symbolic than realistic. Mistrust, resentment and conservatism are an ingrained part of the Polish, and European, political landscape now, and the PiS still won the largest vote share out of all the parties. Polish politicians and progovernment media have heavily used anti-German propaganda, which paints Tusk as bringing about ‘the end of Poland.’ This is
Friday 27 October 2023 | The Oxford Student
a presentation that is not immediately forgotten from popular discourse whether the leader of the governing party or not, and will no doubt be used to discredit his policy agendas. The Ukraine-Russia war remains in the laser-focus of Eastern European governments, and concern over Russian in-
“despite hope among many leftwing and central supporters, the road away from ultraconservative populism is long and complicated”
tentions to restore a Cold Waresque empire weighs heavy in an only relatively recently independent nation-state’s consciousness. Spending on defence specifically for arms supplies for Ukraine is unlikely to stop, and may draw a wedge between the promising EUPoland relations if the EU tries to retract support for Ukraine at all. This links to the wider anti-German and anti-French sentiment stirred by the PiS, some of which is focused on the lack of strategy for fighting against Russian expansionist ambitions. This is fuelled in many ways by the deep national trauma that is ever-present in Polish politics. The PiS’ ‘history policy’, which bases a version of history on the politics of memory, effectively erases anything that doesn’t protect a positive depiction of Poland. This is reflected by so-called ‘phantom’ or ‘ghost’ borders, through which electoral results geographically fall on previous geographical borders of Poland; something that has been linked to collective memory of WWII and its aftermath. A contested Poland is by no means over, instead working in a cycle of
Credit: Arno Mikkor
fighting with its own national trauma, manifested in some senses through national populism. On a more practical level, as a coalition there will inevitably be contested issues within the likely incoming governing parties. For example, parts of the coalition involving the New Left will be considerably more socially liberal, such as on abortion policy, which will likely grate against the Christian Democrat faction of the Third Way. Such a diverse coalition risks fracturing, against the opposition of a defined and populist conservative party. Its lasting impact on the constitution will be long and arduous to unpick, and the PiS will be ready to challenge and divide wherever they can. As well as this, the shift to the ultra-conservative right has a long-lasting impact on the ideological scope for all parties, and has a lasting resonance in popular consciousness. Even if ‘radical’ legislative policy does get introduced, it will not resolve the ongoing tensions that right-wing populism provokes for the electorate. In spite of the post-election talk of a new age of politics from the left and centre, by no means is populism gone from either parliament or the public. What the election does signal, though, is an uprising of political engagement from traditionally under engaged demographics, such as young people; a pattern
“A contested Poland is by no means over, instead working in a cycle of fighting with its own national trauma”
that would not be a surprise to see cascading through the rest of Europe.