The Attaché 2011 (Volume 2)

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011) Editors-In-Chief Salahuddin Rafiquddin Salvator Cusimano Editors Daniel Adler Sima Atri Sarah Ellis Zack Garcia Tanzeel Hakak Samantha Lee Michael Scott Ioana Sendroiu Kerry Sun Joanne Szilagyi Steven Wang Adrian Zita-Bennett Staff Photographer and Critic Sam Khanlari Director of Advertising Ayşegül Karaküçük Layout Editor Jane Ye-Won Lee Web Master Salahuddin Rafiquddin Munk School of Global Affairs, 1 Devonshire Place, Room 004, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5S2K7 ISSN 1481-7756 www.theattache.ca theattache@gmail.com Cover: Stephen Birarda Table of Contents: Sam Khanlari

From the Editor’s Desk:

The quality and diversity of material contained in the two volumes we have published this year reflects our editorial team’s dedication and commitment. This year’s Attaché Team worked hard, on time, and enthusiastically. In realization of this dedication, we would like to extend a warm thank you to our team for a wonderful year. However, it shouldn’t be forgotten that the journal would not be here without the authors and photographers who submitted their work. Their achievements testify to the high level of intellectualism, creativity, and passion for learning that University of Toronto students possess and demonstrate each day.

In this volume, our authors discuss some of the most pressing issues that have arisen in our rapidly evolving world. We start with Tara Stankovic’s review of Jean Hatzfeld’s Machete Season, a moving account of the Rwandan genocide. Next, we move to Justine Johnston’s criticism of the convergence of UN Peacekeeping Missions and the burgeoning international human trafficking industry, in which she exposes the moral bankruptcy of some of the individuals called upon to protect the world’s most vulnerable. Christophe Shammas then offers an exploration of the classic agent-structure problem in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Fahim Quayyum, analyzes the international environmental NGO Greenpeace using social movement theory and concludes that it has responded effectively to the challenges of globalization and technological advancement. In the last contribution to this year’s Attaché, Khilola Zakhidova examines the legality of both Russian and Georgian conduct during hostilities over the breakaway region of South Ossetia in 2009.

Finally, we must thank Professor Robert Bothwell, Ms. Marilyn Laville, Mr. Geoffrey Seaborn, The Munk School of Global Affairs, and Trinity College for their support throughout this process. We could not have done it without them.

We hope you enjoy this year’s editions of the Attaché.

Salvator Cusimano and Salahuddin Rafiquddin Editors-in-Chief

AttachĂŠ Vol. 1 (2011) An International Affairs Jounrnal At Trinity College and the University of Toronto Vol. 2 (2011)

Review 2 Book Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak

By Tara Stankovic

9

When Peacekeepers Become the Perpetrators: Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Sierra Leone

By Justine Johnston

First Intifada: 19 The A Structure or Agent Driven Phenonmenon?

By Christophe Shammas

Social Movement 29 ATheory Approach: Greenpeace

By Fahim Quayyum

The 2008 South Ossetian Law

41 War under International

By Khilola Zakhidova

Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak

By: Tara Stankovic

“The reader is drawn in, in effect eavesdropping on a casual chat among killers.

The

murderers

discuss

everything from the first time they killed to how they joked about raping and murdering Tutsi women to how they enjoyed feasting on pillaged cattle and other food.” - Alison Des Forges, The Washington Post

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Book Review

Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak Machete Season is a chilling exploration of the dark side of human nature and the horrific crimes that the average human being will commit when pushed far enough by peer pressure. The main content is drawn from a series of interviews with a group of killers who participated in the Rwandan genocide, particularly in the dense papyrus swamps of the Nyamata region. Jean Hatzfeld draws us into the lives of the seemingly “normal” everyday farmers who willingly slaughtered their neighbors day after day without remorse.

The killers describe in detail of how they were willing and able to hunt down and kill their Tutsi and moderate Hutu neighbors with whom their lives were so intertwined. The direct account of these events from the point of view of the killers is an original and sobering illustration of “the other side” of the story that we rarely hear about, and brings to focus many disturbing but important aspects of the experiences of these men. Machete Season is an extremely interesting read and can teach everyone something about the psychology of the killers in a situation completely unimaginable to most of the world.

T

he author begins by explaining that Machete Season is a sequel to complement his previous book, Dans le Nu de La Vie, where Hatzfeld reveals the stories of a group of survivors who hid out in the papyrus marshes of the Nyamata region while they were hunted by their former Hutu neighbors and friends. This series of interviews exposes the suffering and trauma experienced by these survivors and illuminates the fear and intimidation that these people still feel in their daily lives after the genocide. Machete Season aims to reveal the motivation, rationale, and general psychological portraits of the killers who carried out these savage attacks. One of the questions this book asks is why did so many seemingly ordinary people take up machetes and participate in the slaughter of their fellow citizens?

Hatzfeld describes the difficulties in finding “normal” people to divulge their stories and go into depth about their experiences as killers because of the stigmatized nature of the genocide. He eventually

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manages to find a group of men who actually pursued many of the survivors that he had interviewed in his previous book. These killers were part of their own gang prior to the genocides and have been tried and imprisoned through the local gacaca courts set up in Rwanda to bring justice to the survivors of the genocide. Hatzfeld met with the group on a daily basis to interview them individually and as a group in the prison.

Through numerous dialogues, the author attempts to uncover the reasons for their involvement in the killings and to solve the moral problem of understanding how they could have committed these acts against humanity. He explains how finding the killers who were already tried, sentenced, and convicted was a key factor in his search because these individuals would feel safer from public betrayal, judgment, and shame behind the walls of a prison. Therefore, the importance of finding a group of men who could consult with one another and had all come to terms with their decision to be involved in the killings was crucial. The author recognizes that, “no matter what scheming and trickery he may be up to, the fact that the killer acknowledges his involvement in the genocide is in fact indispensable.”1 This prerequisite was a crucial factor in finding the Machete Season aims to right men to interview. However, these men were also quite reluctant to open up about their experiences and divulge their stories completely to reveal the motivation, Hatzfeld. rationale, and general

Although the author does convince this group of killers to engage in a dialogue with him about their actions, the prisoners seem so guarded psychological portraits of that it is uncertain how often we are actually getting their genuine insights about what happened. Obviously, these people do not want to risk damaging the killers who carried out their reputation and likelihood of communal forgiveness upon their return to the villages, and it is expected that they will be cautious to some extent these savage attacks. in the interviews. Hatzfeld describes how the men “cannot help using... the defense mechanism they created to protect themselves from the judicial system, their families, or their own consciences: mixing lies, spontaneous or tactical, into their accounts.”2 These drawbacks presumably confront any reporter discussing their experiences with former killers, especially in the case of Rwanda, where clemency is much more difficult because of the complete and total nature in genocide’s end goal. Hatzfeld does say that the interviews were conducted in a private room in the prison with a guard who did not speak French, so the possibility of their information leaving 3

Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak

Complete confidentiality and the promise that none of the information from

the

interviews

would be divulged to their families, community members, or to any relatives of victims also reassured the killers in the process.

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the room was slim and therefore not a large hindrance to the discussions.

He gave them the option of remaining silent or briefly explaining their refusal to respond if they wished to do so. Complete confidentiality and the promise that none of the information from the interviews would be divulged to their families, community members, or to any relatives of victims also reassured the killers in the process. Many potential issues or obstacles to the project were reduced by setting up as many safeguards and checks as possible in the conditions provided.

I believe that there are some constraints which the author could have resolved and some limitations that he could have overcome in the interview process. Perhaps not choosing a Tutsi survivor as his interpreter would have been a wiser choice in order to put the subjects further at ease in the interviews. This could have made the participants less uncomfortable and hesitant about describing their actions. In addition, this would ensure that the translator did not over exaggerate the truth when translating. The author also goes in to the interview process with a mindset that only the survivors are the ones telling the complete and honest truth about their experiences. He hardly questions the factual accuracy or inclusiveness of the survivors’ accounts, and states that their stories must be correct as a result of the nature of the relationships that he established with them and their honest attitudes in the interview process. But, approaching the killers and hearing their stories was undertaken in a completely different tone. The author had convinced himself that he would never get their full story because of the dynamic of distrust that would always exist between him and the prisoners. Because the killers feared possible future accusations brought forth by Hatzfeld, they would never be completely honest or establish a relationship where they could confide in him. He emphasized that “no relationship of trust can completely overcome the anxiety felt by the killers. The killer stays on guard because he feels the threat of punishment hanging over him.”3 Clearly, he has a point. This is an impediment that cannot be avoided in most circumstances when interviewing people who are so guarded. By contrasting his distrust for the genuineness of the killers’ narratives with his complete confidence in the undisputable authenticity of those of the survivors, the reader gets the sense that no matter where the conversations leads, both the reporter and the prisoners would always remain hesitant and restrained in their

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Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak

relationship. This was an impediment to the depth and intensity of the content in the interviews from the onset.

However, the interviews do provide great insight into the deceiving simplicity of how these atrocities were enacted, and how quickly entire communities of normal people allowed themselves to be swept up in this series of executions and horrific events. The killers describe in detail how they were willing and able to hunt down and kill their Tutsi and moderate Hutu neighbors with whom their lives were so intertwined.

They described the mob mentality of the genocide, and depict themselves as human machines that were just following orders and going with the rest of the crowd. I found it interesting that none of them tried to pay their way out of killing, which was a definite option for those who had the will and financial means to do so. Physical retribution for refusing to participate in the slaughtering was rarely (if ever) used by the Interahamwe leaders.

However, communal pressure and harassment were commonly exercised when individuals resisted partaking in the gruesome activities. There was an interesting story of a prosperous merchant who had paid numerous fines in order to avoid killing and looting, to the point of “ruining himself,” but all in the name of not spoiling his money with the blood of others.4 None of the prisoners interviewed in this book made efforts to downplay or deny their involvement in the killings. On the contrary, many of them preferred it to their ordinary lives and daily routines.

Not only was killing and looting profitable for the killers, but it also was relatively easier than farming and brought immediate satisfaction and rewards for those who showed initiative in the swamps. This also reveals a main theme in the book that was implicit throughout all of the interviews: farming. One of the killers describes how “killing was a more gratifying activity” than farming because it was less wearisome than working in the fields, the workday did not last as long, and at the end of the day the men returned home to a cooked meal and wives that were satisfied with all of the loot brought in.5 Taxes were no longer an issue, pillaging profited everyone equally, and life was restful for the women at home who did not need to worry about planting or going to the market. This “lucky season,” as one killer described it, meant fewer worries and more time to drink and relax when the day was done.6 Drunken reveling and private celebrations

They

described

the

mob mentality of the genocide, and depict themselves as human machines that were just following orders and going with the rest of the crowd.

5

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with good food, drinks, and music (all stolen) took up the rest of the time that these men were not killing or looting their fellow neighbors.

The prisoners often made the claim that they were just men following orders and cast themselves as innocent victims in the whole situation.

Another important theme in the book is that of the killers’ dissociation with their actions and their failure to take on or comprehend responsibility for what they had done. The prisoners often made the claim that they were just men following orders and cast themselves as innocent victims in the whole situation. The genocide is repeatedly depicted as something that happened rather than something that was done, and these atrocities are frequently understood as abnormal activities of perfectly normal people. This made it easy at times to view the killers as good people who were caught up in the middle of a horrible situation. Therefore, they can claim to have little responsibility or guilt in the aftermath of the events.

In this sense, numerous comparisons are drawn between the Holocaust and the post-war depictions of killers and bystanders as being innocent people gripped in a mass-level scheme that was out of their control. I agree with this portrayal of the killers to some extent, but I believe that some responsibility and individual blame are definitely a crucial element in postwar or post-genocidal reconciliation. One of the killers, Ignace, who has long felt resentful towards the Tutsis, does admit some uneasiness and remorse for his actions. He acknowledges that, “I had not foreseen that this memory would work at me so viciously.”7 Other killers, like Fulgence, admit to regretting the events and wrongdoings. Most of the men are tormented with frequent dreams in which they revisit bloody scenes of killing and hunting, and many speak of the evils that will haunt them in their memories for the remainder of their lives. But Élie, one of the killers, also states that “most of the killers are sorry they didn’t finish the job. They accuse themselves of negligence rather than wickedness.”8 In the end, Hatzfeld leaves it up to the reader to judge the killers and their representation of themselves as well as potential feelings of repentance, shame or guilt that they might feel today.

Although the book provides an intense examination of these killers’ mentalities and the simplistic manner in which they committed these acts, the reader is still left asking a lot of questions at the conclusion of the book. The problem of coming to a psychological understanding of why so many of these people partook in the atrocities and committed

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Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak

such terrible crimes is left somewhat unanswered. The author explores the mentalities of these killers to some extent, but a deeper moral comprehension of their genuine feelings and reasoning is hard to grasp.

This may have been because of the situational limitations that were out of Hatzfeld’s control, but he may have also attempted to establish a more meaningful relationship with at least some of the prisoners in order to get them to open up more. This was exemplified in his manner of approaching the killers as men who would be unreceptive and insincere in their responses, and his assumption that getting them to expose their true feelings completely would be almost impossible. Furthermore, without having previously studied the origins of the hostilities between Hutus and Tutsis, the reader does not get a very meaningful explanation of the real differences between the two groups. The author gives an explanation of the history of conflicts between the two factions and highlights some underlying economic and social inequalities, but I felt it was an overall shallow picture of the real reasons why there was so much hatred among the Hutus for the Tutsis. He never truly addressed why there was such widespread apathy about committing these horrible crimes day after day.

The killers described in detail how they killed children, pregnant women, babies, friends, and neighbors, but the conclusion as to why so many of them committed these crimes was left somewhat open-ended.

Machete Season accomplishes some of Hatzfeld’s goals in exposing the killers’ stories and their perceptions of the genocide, but a lot of his questions remain unsettled and limited in their responses. Perhaps including a longer time period of the study, or a more varied group of interviewees could have resulted in a more complete answer. Hatzfeld did, however, write a subsequent book that addressed many of the issues that I have highlighted as unsatisfactory and incomplete. The Antelope’s Strategy combines the two experiences of the survivors and the killers, and examines how re-encountering one another in their communities affects each group and the society as a whole. It would be interesting to read this third piece and see if a deeper understanding of the killers’ mentality and true feelings come out more once they are reintegrated (or not?) into their communities. Overall, Machete Season is an extremely interesting read and can teach everyone something about the psychology of the killers in a situation completely unimaginable to most of the world. The fact that

The problem of coming to

a

psychological

understanding of why so many of these people partook in the atrocities and

committed

such

terrible crimes is left somewhat unanswered.

7

Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak

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the author went and found these individuals, sat down and spoke with them on multiple occasions about very sensitive issues, and managed to get detailed accounts of their experiences is impressive and significant in itself.

Overall, Machete Season is an extremely interesting read

and

everyone

can

teach

something

about the psychology of the killers in a situation completely unimaginable to most of the world.

Thessaloniki 路 Greece 路 Photograph by Yisheng Loh

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When Peacekeeps Become the Perpetrators

When Peacekeepers Become the Perpetrators: Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Sierra Leone

When United Nations peacekeepers are deployed to conflict areas, they are trusted to behave beyond legal and moral reproach.

However, in practice, peacekeepers have been known to violate this trust and commit criminal acts, including sexual violence against the host country’s population. Drawing on research conducted by Smith and Smith , Human Rights Watch, and Save the Children, this paper seeks to demonstrate that in conflict areas where peacekeepers are deployed, there is generally an increase in human trafficking for the purposes of sexual slavery. In the case of Sierra Leone, where peacekeepers were deployed from 1998 to 2001, there was a concentrated increase of human trafficking to peacekeeping areas. In the past decade, significant attention has been paid to human trafficking and sexual exploitation and abuse in conflict settings, yet it continues unhindered. In this paper, I argue that the sexual exploitation and abuse inflicted on Sierra Leonean women and children by peacekeepers occurred unchecked because of peacekeepers’ hyper-masculine culture, peacekeepers’ noncombatant status, and their immunity from host countries’ laws.

W

hen United Nations peacekeepers are deployed to conflict areas, they are trusted to behave beyond legal and moral reproach.

However, in practice, peacekeepers have been known to violate this trust and commit criminal actions, including sexual violence against the host country’s population. During peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, the peacekeeping missions and other non-governmental organizations have documented increases in human trafficking into areas where peacekeeping forces are stationed. The women and children who are trafficked into peacekeeping areas are usually trafficked for the purposes of sexual slavery. In the past decade, significant attention has been paid to this sexual exploitation and abuse, yet it continues. To examine this phenomenon, I have selected the United Nations peacekeeping force stationed in Sierra Leone as a case study. The United Nations peacekeepers presence in Sierra Leone from

By Justine Johnston

The

United

Nations

peacekeepers presence in Sierra Leone from 1998 to 2001 led to increased levels of human trafficking for the purposes of sexual slavery.

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When Peacekeepers Become the Perpetrators

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1998 to 2001 led to increased levels of human trafficking for the purposes of sexual slavery. In this paper, I argue the sexual exploitation and abuse inflicted on Sierra Leonean women and children by peacekeepers occurred unchecked because of peacekeepers’ hyper-masculine culture, non-combatant status, immunity from host countries’ laws.

It is important to note that not all peacekeepers are involved in human trafficking and the sexual exploitation and abuse of

the

host

population.

country’s

Definitions Peacekeeping, according to Muna Ndulo, is defined as, “….an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.”2 In the past two decades, “… peacekeeping has come to involve a diverse array of activities including: confidence building measures, cease-fire monitoring, disarmament of combatants, election monitoring and humanitarian relief distribution.”3 For clarity, the term peacekeepers in this paper will encompass military personnel, civilian personnel, international support staff and local citizens who are employed by the United Nations mission. It is important to note that not all peacekeepers are involved in human trafficking and the sexual exploitation and abuse of the host country’s population. Estimates of the number of peacekeepers involved in such abuses vary because reliable empirical data is limited.i For the purposes of this paper, human trafficking is defined using Graycar’s4 (1999) work which distinguishes between human trafficking and smuggling. Graycar states that human trafficking is a, “complex set of processes involving labour exploitation in the destination country” and human smuggling is, “the method by which people are moved across borders.”5 Trafficked individuals are moved coercively— abducted, kidnapped, and confined by abductors— whereas smuggled individuals are undocumented migrants who are able to exercise agency. Thus, trafficking is associated with, “exploiting the labour of the victim in the destination country.”6 This paper will focus on human trafficking for the i There are methodological constraints on gathering empirical data about human trafficking in Sierra Leone.

Smith and Smith (2010) identify four problem areas including: inadequate government data collection and release to the public, victims of human trafficking are afraid or unable to report their experiences, public officials that do have knowledge of human trafficking are often complicit in the activity or bribed by traffickers, and finally, traditional social science methods are incapable of testing the causes of human trafficking.

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When Peacekeeps Become the Perpetrators

purposes of sexual slavery. The term sexual slavery is defined by the 1953 Protocol amending the 1926 Slavery convention and states, “[t]he status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, including sexual access through rape or other forms of sexual violence.”7 The phrase ‘sexual exploitation and abuse’ is defined according to the United Nations definition and means: any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another . . . [or the] actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.8 The term sexual exploitation and abuse also encompasses non-consensual sexual contact as well as qualified consensual sexual contact, for instance, where the woman or girl is engaged in sex work for survival. In recent years, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against peacekeepers have included: “sex with minors (under 18), employment for sex, sex with sex workers, sexual assault, rape, and other incidents that include sex in exchange for food or assistance in kind.”9 Lastly, the term sex work is used in this paper rather than prostitution because of the stigma associated with the term prostitution, as well as the reluctance of sex workers to identify themselves as prostitutes. Sex work is defined here as a broad range of sexual acts including: sex (penetrative, non-penetrative, oral etc.), sexual displays and dances, and creating pornography, which are performed in exchange for money, gifts, basic necessities (food and hygiene items), and other goods.

Background

Sierra Leone’s decade long civil war began in 1999 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), supported by Liberian President Charles Taylor, took up arms against the Sierra Leonean government.

Initially, the RUF was comprised of middle class students and unemployed youth seeking salvation, but the group quickly degenerated into a violent militia.10 The RUF employed Charles Taylor’s tactics and swept across

Lastly, the term sex work is used in this paper rather than prostitution because of the stigma associated with the term prostitution, as well as the reluctance of sex workers to identify themselves as prostitutes.

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When Peacekeepers Become the Perpetrators

Unfortunately, the increased military presence did not end the fighting between government and rebel forces.

Rebel groups continually failed to meet disarmament and demobilization targets and abduction of women into sexual slavery persisted.

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Sierra Leone executing village chiefs and elders, traders, and government officials. During the mid-1990s, the RUF took control of the country’s diamond and mineral mines and maintained a campaign of sexual exploitation and abuse against the civilian population.11 In the 1996 presidential election, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s party (SLPP) was elected president, but the following year a coup, led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, ousted President Kabbah. In late 1997, with the assistance of South African mercenaries, troops from Nigeria and Guinea unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow Koroma.12 The destabilized political situation in Sierra Leone contributed to the deteriorating security situation for the civilian population.

In mid-1998, 12,500 troops from the Economic Community of West African States Monitory Group (ECOMOG) were deployed to Sierra Leone and controlled over two-thirds of the country.13 In October 1999, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was created to help end the nearly decade long civil war. To maintain the agreed upon ceasefire between government and rebel forces, UNAMSIL was given a 6,000 troop mandate who were mainly deployed in Freetown. A United Nations Security Council Resolution increased the mandate to 11,100 troops in February 2000, and then again in May, to a total of 13,000 troops.14 Unfortunately, the increased military presence did not end the fighting between government and rebel forces. Rebel groups continually failed to meet disarmament and demobilization targets and abduction of women into sexual slavery persisted. In May 2000, the ceasefire suddenly ended when the RUF captured over 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers and military observers. As the security situation further deteriorated, the United Nations Security Council further increased the number of personnel in March 2001, when the mandate increased to 17,500 troops which included 260 military observers.15 The civil war officially ended in 2001, when the Sierra Leonean government and warring rebel factions agreed to a ceasefire. The post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and re-integration processes continue and Sierra Leone has begun to slowly recover from the civil war.

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When Peacekeeps Become the Perpetrators

Human Trafficking and Sierra Leone The literature shows that military personnel frequent sex workers at a much higher rate than members of other populations. Malone et. al.16 (1993) studied American military personnel around the world and found that American military members, “… frequently visit prostitutes, fail to use condoms, and generally engage in high risk-sexual activity.”17 Saundra Sturdevant and Brenda Stolzfus’s Let the Good Times Roll18 (1992) chronicles the American military personnel’s abuse of sex workers in the Philippines, Korea and Okinawa. In Let the Good Times Roll, Sturdevant and Stolzfus analyze the sexually promiscuous behaviour of American military personnel and the effect it has on the sex workers from their respective countries.19 As a logical extension of this data, it is possible that the higher the number of military personnel in an area, the higher the demand for sex workers. This means that as UNAMSIL troop numbers increased in Sierra Leone, the demand for sex workers also increased, a phenomenon that will be explained further below.

Human trafficking in Sierra Leone can be explained using an economic theory of human trafficking. This paper employs the ‘business approach’, the proportional relationship between supply and demand, to explain the emergence and expansion of human trafficking rings in Sierra Leone.ii The ‘business approach’ suggests that when demand for sexual services increases, traffickers supply women to meet the demand.20 This model suggests that the most compelling motivation for trafficking in persons is profit. While there are limitations to a purely economic approach to human trafficking, economic theory does explain the trend in Sierra Leone. Smith and Smith (2010) employ the ‘business approach’ and examine “… the ways in which the introduction of a global peacekeeping force may alter domestic demand and create sufficient conditions for the introduction and expansion of a market in the trading of humans.”21 In the case of Sierra Leone, Smith and Smith (2010) found that human ii For further reading on economic theories on human trafficking refer to Bales’ (2005) Understanding Global Slavery: A Reader, and Salt and Stein’s (1997) “Migration as a Business: The Case of Trafficking”. For further reading on other theories on human trafficking refer to: Aronowitz’s (2001) “Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: The Phenomenon, The Markets that Drive it and the Organizations that Promote it”, or Schloenhardt’s (1999) “Organized Crime and the Business of Migrant Trafficking: An Economic Analysis” or Caldwell et. al.’s (1999) “Capitalizing on Transition Economies: The Role of the Russian Mafia in Trafficking Women for Forced Prostitution”.

This paper employs the ‘business approach’, the proportional relationship between

supply

and

demand, to explain the emergence and expansion of human trafficking rings in Sierra Leone.

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trafficking increased to areas where large numbers of peacekeepers were deployed.iii

The increase in human trafficking

was

most

noticeable in the capital city

of

Freetown,

because the majority of international troops were deployed

there

from

January 1998 to March 2001.

The presence of a large peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone created a new demand for human trafficking. The increase in human trafficking was most noticeable in the capital city of Freetown, because the majority of international troops were deployed there from January 1998 to March 2001.22 Kate Grady argues that, “United Nations peacekeepers should expect to find trafficking and exploitation emerging in its areas of operations, even as the first personnel arrive. Senior managers of missions should assume that traffickers will target United Nations personnel for revenue” and actions should be taken to prevent peacekeepers from exacerbating this problem.23 Peacekeeping missions deployed after 2005 have been required to undergo additional training to prevent peacekeepers from committing further acts of sexual exploitation and abuse against host countries’ populations. During the three year period that UNAMSIL was stationed in Freetown, Amnesty International reports made a total of 18 references to abductions or slavery, and implicated the RUF, other rebel groups, and pro-government forces as perpetrators.24 Moreover, within a year of posting peacekeepers in Freetown, human rights organizations began to report the increase in sex workers as a direct result of the UNAMSIL personnel stationed there.25 A 2002 report by the British organization, Save the Children, found that “sexual exploitation in form of prostitution was rampant,” especially in Freetown, where nationals ‘spoke about the behaviour of the ‘boys in blue helmets’ with a feeling of helplessness and sadness’.”26 Save the Children also found that women were being trafficked from Liberia and Guinea to meet the demand for sex workers created by the UNAMSIL peacekeepers. In conclusion, human trafficking increased in Sierra Leone to meet the demand for sex workers because of the introduction of the UNAMSIL force into Freetown.

Analysis Throughout the history of peacekeeping missions, men have made up an overwhelming majority of personnel deployed to conflict iii My analysis of why human trafficking and sexual exploitation continued unchecked in Sierra Leone depends upon the validity of Smith and Smith’s (2010) research which concludes that in Sierra Leone, human trafficking emerged and expanded as the numbers of international peacekeepers increased.

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areas. However, in recent years, a gender quota has been mandated to ensure that there are women deployed in each peacekeeping mission.

Nevertheless, in a peacekeeping mission of 17,500 troops, a gender quota of four female officers is unlikely to be enough to break the hypermasculine culture.27 Since the majority of peacekeepers are men, a hypermasculine culture has developed in peacekeeping missions. It seems that within this hyper-masculine culture, sexual exploitation and abuse of host country women and children is encouraged.28 Despite the United Nations having banned staff from having sex with sex workers or anyone under 18 and discouraging peacekeepers from having sexual relations with any ‘consenting’ adult member of the host population, sexual exploitation and abuse is still rampant.29 While peacekeepers may have relationships with ‘consenting’ adults, in the context of a civil war and the wealth and power discrepancy between peacekeepers and civilians, true consent cannot be obtained. Ndulo argues that in the context of peacekeeping, “…consent is immaterial where it is obtained under the circumstances of peacekeeping because the perpetrators are there to protect the victim.”30 While, superficially, this seems to deny women and children sexual agency in conflict situations, “the rationale for this approach is that in obtaining sex or sexual favours from vulnerable victims, the peacekeepers abuse their position of power.”31 The sexual exploitation and abuse of women and children by peacekeepers has been historically dismissed with a ‘boys will be boys’ attitude and the perception that peacekeepers were not responsible for their actions.32 In contrast to this patriarchal view of peacekeeping, today, there is a “growing consensus that what [was once] dismissed as boyish behaviour or the harmless satisfaction of natural desires has become an unacceptably close connection with forced prostitution, human slavery and organized crime.”33 While the sexual exploitation and abuse of host country populations is being increasingly viewed as problematic, peacekeepers have bonded together to stand united against accusations of misconduct, creating a ‘wall of silence’.34 Defeis states, “Instances of abuse and exploitation may go unreported not only to protect the reputation of the peacekeepers, but also because the so-called ‘whistle-blower’ would be stigmatized.”35 The whistleblower would be stigmatized because of the solidarity between peacekeepers and the expectation that the wall

Since

the

majority

of

peacekeepers are men, a hyper-masculine culture has developed in peacekeeping missions. It seems that within this hyper-masculine culture, sexual exploitation and abuse of host country women and children is encouraged

15

When Peacekeepers Become the Perpetrators

By withholding information from other organizations, and excluding outsiders from

peacekeeping

culture, the members of peacekeeping

missions

are able to operate unchecked

by

outside

institutions and actors.

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011)

of silence will be maintained. By withholding information from other organizations, and excluding outsiders from peacekeeping culture, the members of peacekeeping missions are able to operate unchecked by outside institutions and actors.

Peacekeepers, who engage in sexual exploitation and abuse of the host population when deployed, do so because they are not bound by international codes of behaviour, including the Geneva Conventions.

The Geneva Conventions are a set of rules which legally governs how combatants may act during conflict. Under the Geneva Conventions women and children are given special protection status, and there is a legal framework to redress abuses committed by combatants.36 Since peacekeepers are non-combatants, they are not required to abide by the Geneva Conventions.37 In fact, peacekeeping forces are only bound by the United Nations Security Council mandate that requires peacekeepers to avoid sexual relations with sex workers and minors.38 One of several negative consequences of not requiring peacekeepers to uphold the Geneva Conventions is that peacekeepers can behave with impunity.

In the absence of an international code or standard of behaviour, peacekeepers have been able to sexually exploit and abuse members of the host population without redress.

Another factor that enables peacekeepers to behave with impunity is their immunity from host countries’ laws. Troop contributing countries do not want their troops to be arrested or prosecuted in a foreign country, especially by a country experiencing conflict. Therefore, in order to deploy a peacekeeping force, the host country must sign a Status of Forces Agreement. Under this agreement, the host country agrees to waive jurisdiction over peacekeepers for violations of the host country’s laws.39 In doing so, peacekeepers can only be accused or charged with an offense under their home state’s laws. In fact, the only context where a peacekeeper can have her or his immunity revoked is through a waiver by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.40 Since it is extremely unlikely that the Secretary-General would waive any immunity, the only recourse the peacekeeping mission has against a peacekeeper is to dismiss he or she from the peacekeeping mission.41 Peacekeepers’ immunity from prosecution under host country laws only enhances their power over host

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When Peacekeeps Become the Perpetrators

country populations and increases the perception that peacekeepers are immune from prosecution.

When peacekeepers are accused of sexual exploitation and abuse, they can only be dismissed from the peacekeeping mission and returned to their home country. In the case of Sierra Leone, like most other peacekeeping missions, the majority of peacekeepers were from developing countries. When the allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse of Sierra Leonean women and girls caused embarrassment to troop contributing countries, they were reluctant to investigate the allegations and seemed likely to prefer to cover up the abuse.42 Moreover, some troop contributing countries do not have gender equality laws and may not recognize the behaviour of their troops as problematic. Instead, these countries, much like the United Nations, dismiss the allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse of women and children with a ‘boys will be boys’ attitude and with the belief that it is a natural consequence of deploying a large, predominantly male military force.43 In cases where home states would like to prosecute their peacekeepers for alleged sexual misconduct, it is unlikely the accused will stand trial.44 The criminal investigations that occur in the host nation do not usually produce the physical evidence, witness statements and other evidence that is required to take a case to trial in the home country. The inadequate legal constraints on peacekeepers make it unlikely that peacekeepers will behave morally and appropriately while stationed in the host nations. Finally, in the instances where peacekeepers do face punishment for their sexual exploitation and abuse of members of the host country’s population, the punishments are uneven. Under the military style hierarchy of peacekeeping missions, punishments that individual peacekeepers receive will vary upon rank, experience and other factors. This uneven and sporadic disciplinary system encourages further inappropriate behaviour and the peacekeeper’s feeling of immunity. The overall perception among peacekeepers that they are immune from host countries’ laws and the belief that they will not face prosecution at home has allowed them to behave with impunity.

The overall perception among

peacekeepers

that they are immune from host countries’ laws and the belief that they will not face prosecution at home has allowed them to behave with impunity.

Together, the following three factors: hyper-masculine peacekeeping culture, peacekeeper’s non-combatant status, and immunity from host nation’s laws allow peacekeepers to act with impunity. In Sierra 17

When Peacekeepers Become the Perpetrators

The

sexual

exploitation

and abuse of the host population by peacekeepers occurred

throughout

the

UNAMSIL mission because peacekeepers

were

not

held accountable to the international community and to Sierra Leone, the host country.

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Leone, the deterioration of civil society, breakdown of the rule of law, and economic and psychological hardships faced by Sierra Leoneans created a power imbalance between citizens and peacekeepers. The power and relative affluence that peacekeepers hold in comparison to the host country population created a situation where peacekeeper’s abuse of power was likely. The disregard for the peacekeeping mission’s rules forbidding peacekeepers from engaging in sexual relations with Sierra Leonean women and children led to an increase in demand by peacekeepers for sexual services. In Sierra Leone, the presence of peacekeepers in Freetown led to an increase in human trafficking to meet the increased demand for sex workers in the city. The hyper-masculine culture that developed within UNAMSIL, allowed for the rampant sexual exploitation and abuse of Sierra Leonean women and children without outsider interference.

The sexual exploitation and abuse of the host population by peacekeepers occurred throughout the UNAMSIL mission because peacekeepers were not held accountable to the international community and to Sierra Leone, the host country.

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011)

The First Intifada:

A Structure of Agent Driven Phenomenon?

By using the Palestinian Intifada as a case study, this paper attempts to analyse group behaviour from two perspectives: one that views it as a ‘structure-driven’ phenomenon and one that views it as ‘agentdriven’. This paper analyses the events leading up to the Intifada and discusses whether it was caused by the social structures that were in place at the time or by particular individuals. Looking from the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, one can see that the social factors that developed over time proved to be heavily influential.

There was a strong ethnocentric divide between the two neighbours and the recession of the early 1980s failed to bring an adequate standard of living to the Occupied Territories. In addition to this, the global climate did not favour the Palestinians and they had believed that most of the Arab world has deserted them in their greatest time of need. However, proponents of “agency” would argue that these factors are not enough – there had to have been some sort of catalyst.

In response to this claim, this essay found the widely accepted catalyst to be a relatively minor event: an Israeli tank-transport truck crashing into Arab cars in Gaza. The extent of the structural factors was so great that the catalyst for the outbreak did not need to be particularly great.

T

he First Intifada – a show of popular Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation – erupted in the Palestinian territories in late 1987. It was an ‘unarmed’ uprising that used both violent and non-violent tactics to pressure the Israeli government to end the occupation.1 The PalestinianIsraeli conflict dates back to the 1920s, when European Zionists began to immigrate in considerable numbers to Palestine. The conflict was deeply exacerbated by the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and the resulting collapse of much of Palestinian society. Then, as a result of regional war in 1967, the Palestinian territories and their 1.5 million inhabitants came under Israeli control. The occupation has been characterised by harassment, political control, and limited economic development. While individual Palestinians had occasionally used violence against Israeli targets, never before had the Palestinians as a group risen up to challenge

The First Intifada

By Christophe Shammas

The

intifada

was

a

reminder to Israelis of what their first Prime Minister

David

Ben

Gurion had said in 1938: “A people which fights against the usurpation of its land will not tire so easily.” - BBC News

19

The First Intifata

The

Intifada

“spontaneous

was

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011)

a

outburst

of anger” without any organisation from a higher command.

the Israeli occupation. The Intifada was a “spontaneous outburst of anger” without any organisation from a higher command.2 Because of this, one ought to look at the roots of the movement to see how such an uprising occurred. One of the major debates in the analysis of human behaviour is whether ‘structure’ or ‘agency’ plays a bigger role in human endeavour. It is unclear whether the individual or society has greater significance when we look at actions and the creation of institutions. Arguments for the ‘structure-driven’ view state that it is social relationships – independent of individuals – that shape the interactions of the actors.3 It is thus not the motives of the individual that are the main cause of his actions, but rather society’s influence on that individual. In reference to the Intifada, these theorists would argue that it was the ethnocentric views of the Palestinians towards the Israelis, the oppression they suffered at the hands of the Israeli counterinsurgency, and the standards of living in the refugee camps that sparked the Intifada. Proponents of ‘agency’ would argue that the individual is the main perpetrator of his actions and that he is free to change his mind if he wishes. Whatever happened in history would not have occurred had someone else been put in that individual’s place.4 In other words, social forces are actually a result of human interactions.5 This means that the structural factors described above actually came about through the motives of individuals. The aim of this essay is to show that the Intifada was sparked by social factors such as the antagonism between the Israelis and Palestinians, economic prosperity followed by degradation, and the unfulfilled expectations of the Palestinian people.

Although advocates of ‘agency’ would say that these social forces were caused by individual agents, one has to look at the motives of these agents in relation to the social structures that influenced them.

When one examines the social forces that affected the Intifada, one ought to consider the relationship between the two groups first.

Ethnocentrism is the view of one’s own group as the “center [sic] of everything” while viewing all other groups in relation to one’s in-group.6 People generally think positively of their own in-group while believing that members of out-groups are inferior.7 Sumner argues that every group must see the other as an enemy since they are bound to have a conflict of interests. Thus, different groups treat each other with “suspicion and distrust.” Towards other members of the in-group, however, people

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act more favourably since it is in their best interest to unite against the potential dangers of the out-group. Man is therefore in a state of conflict with the out-group while being in a state of peace with members of his own group.8

The first overt conflict between Jewish and Arab forces, which began in 1947, spanned almost two years and forced 300,000 Arabs to flee the region and become refugees in neighbouring states.9 Because of these circumstances, along with a similar language, ethnic background and quest for a homeland, the Palestinians naturally constituted an ‘ingroup’. This identity had been developing since the end of the First World War, with the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire, and the events of 19479 played a large role in securing it. The newly created Israeli state was the out-group since almost all Israelis followed the same religion and had common needs from their new nation. In addition, the creation of this Jewish state had led to the demise of Palestinian society. David Shipler reinforces Sumner’s suggestion that people naturally form suspicious and distrustful opinions of the out-group. He argues that the stereotypes that Arabs and Jews use for each other have a number of sources. First is the ‘relationship of power’. The Israelis were certainly the stronger of the two groups and so the Arabs became the subordinate group in the region. This led to disdain for the dominant group. Secondly, some Arabs, in light of the conflict with Zionism, adopted classical anti-Semitic prejudices from Christian Europe. Lastly, and most importantly, was the ‘legacy of war’. The longstanding conflict between the two groups led to Israelis and Arabs naturally categorising the other as “violent, cruel and bloodthirsty.”10 The ethnocentric divide between Israelis and Arabs led to the development of unhealthy stereotypes and antagonism between the two groups. However, Brown argues that ethnocentrism is not enough to bring about hostile activities between two groups.11 For example, Canadians and Americans have ethnocentric views about each other but there is no danger of these two groups fighting. Brown suggests that in addition to ethnocentrism, it is necessary that the groups are similar so that they can compare their situations and perceive the outcome as unjust or unfair. Unjust disadvantage is the “sovereign cause” of hostility.12 Conflict theorists, heavily influenced by Marxism, also propose that social inequality between two groups is one of the main causes of conflict. Power

The newly created Israeli state was the out-group since almost all Israelis followed the same religion and had common needs from their new nation.

21

The First Intifata

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011) is distributed among social structures and those with the power try to maintain it while those who are powerless attempt to rise up and seize it for themselves.13

By the time the First Intifada erupted, the Palestinians had been living under brutal military occupation for twenty years – facing daily

checkpoints

and

humiliation, stunted economic development, and lack of control over political and cultural institutions.

In the Israeli-Palestinian situation, there was clearly a huge disparity between the two groups, in terms of living and economic conditions. As Abdul Kalam Azad argues, the Intifada was caused by the “total discontent and exasperation of the masses towards the existing situation.”14 By the 1920s, both Zionists and Palestinian Arabs had national aspirations in Palestine. They had comparable levels of economic and military power, and so both had hoped to achieve statehood. This expectation was reenforced by a UN decision in 1947 to partition Palestine into two states – one Jewish and one Arab. While much of Palestinian society collapsed after the fighting of 1947-9, it continued to crumble after Israel began its occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967. By the time the First Intifada erupted, the Palestinians had been living under brutal military occupation for twenty years – facing daily checkpoints and humiliation, stunted economic development, and lack of control over political and cultural institutions. Given the unmet expectations of the Palestinian national movement and the substantial inequalities between Palestinian and Israeli societies, it is reasonable to expect active and widespread resistance to the occupation. There are, however, many groups around the world that are in extreme poverty and face grave oppression – but yet do not revolt against their oppressors. Evidently, then, while there is no doubt that the ethnocentric views of the Palestinians towards the Israelis and the social inequality between the two groups were necessary causes of the Intifada, they were not sufficient causes.

Davies argues that revolutions occur when “a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal.”15 People who are facing consistent oppression are not necessarily dissatisfied. They may feel that there is not enough incentive to strive for something different and so accept their conditions.

As their social situation improves, however, expectations for continued improvements also rise. Indeed, people begin to feel that they are owed more because society becomes more capable of offering them privileges they did not have before. When rates of development plateau, or even

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The First Intifada

deteriorate, expectations remain high – resulting in a divergence between reality and what is expected of society. People become used to their improved standard of livings and when this development is threatened, a deep sense of fear and anxiety about the future leads people to believe their hopes can only be achieved through revolutionary activity.16

As noted, after the 1967 War, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, among other territories. While many Palestinians were now under the control of Israel, their standard of living actually improved.

Arab employment in Israel increased, leading to a huge boom in the Palestinian territories during the 1970s. This alleviated the Palestinians of many of the costs of occupation. Wages were actually better under Israeli rule than before 1967 and their lifestyle was not threatened by the occupation.17 In 1977, however, the Likud – a right-wing Israeli party – came into power seeking a ‘greater Israel’.18 Prime Minister Menachem Begin argued that the occupied areas were “Israeli lands belonging to the Jewish people. Settlement is a right and a duty.”19 The number of Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories rose considerably under the Likud party. This constituted a major threat to Palestinian national aspirations, as a two-state solution envisioned the creation of a state in the Palestinian territories.. Many of the settlements were strategically placed near Palestinian villages and land was expropriated. This had the effect of making life more difficult for the Palestinians and of intimidating them into leaving their homes altogether.20 The advancement of Jewish settlements was accompanied by an ‘iron fist’ policy designed to crush Palestinian resistance. Demonstrations were met with beatings and arrests, which progressively worsened as the Intifada grew closer.21 While these grievances were originally offset by economic development in the Palestinian territories, the 1980s saw less promise for the Palestinians.

Recession and inflation in Israel led to a decline in most sectors and so the Palestinian economy, closely tied to the Israeli shekel, also greatly suffered.22 Declining circumstances, however, were not only social and economic. Indeed, the Palestinians also suffered politically. The 1973 War was a beacon of hope for the Palestinians as it was the first time that the Arab countries had dealt a serious blow to the Israelis. The expectations of the Palestinians, however, were to be disappointed by a series of diplomatic failures. Egyptian President Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem for the Camp David

While many Palestinians were now under the control of Israel, their standard of living actually improved.

Arab

employment

in

Israel increased, leading to a huge boom in the Palestinian

territories

during the 1970s.

23

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After the 1973 War, there seemed to be real promise in finding a solution to the Palestinian question. The Palestinians were hopeful that their Arab neighbours would be able to attend to their needs.

24

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011) Accords in 1978 was seen as a huge opportunity to expose the world to Palestinian suffering. When Sadat failed to make a linkage between the return of Sinai (which was Egyptian territory lost to Israel in 1967) and the Palestinian struggle, however, the West Bank and Gaza Strip receded into the background again.23 Later, in 1982, Ronald Reagan tried to put forward a peace initiative that was called the Reagan Plan. The aim was to transfer authority to the Palestinians and to freeze the settlement policy of the Israelis. By 1983, the negotiations died and the Palestinians began to realise that they would have to rely on themselves.24 The final sign that this was the case was the Arab Summit in November 1987. At this summit, the Palestinian issue was largely ignored because of the Iran-Iraq war. The Palestinians had once again taken a back seat as another issue became a priority.25 After the 1973 War, there seemed to be real promise in finding a solution to the Palestinian question. The Palestinians were hopeful that their Arab neighbours would be able to attend to their needs. Their hopes outpaced the reality of the situation, however, and as Davies’ theory predicts, unrest built up within the region.

These social structures provide a thorough explanation of how and why the Intifada occurred. In the 1980s, the Palestinians were suffering economically because of the state of the economy in Israel. Moreover, they were facing pressure because of the continued occupation by the Israeli government and the growing number of Jewish settlements in the territories. After having been relatively prosperous in the period before this, their new situation created unrest among the people. Other global developments, such as the Iran-Iraq war, diverted the attention of the rest of the world and so the Palestinians, who had been hopeful for outside intervention, felt inclined to address their problems themselves. Theorists who believe in the significance of ‘agency’, however, would argue that these structures do not actually explain the onset of the Intifada. While they did lay the foundations for the conflict, there must have been some sort of catalyst. Even though Davies certainly identifies a correlation between unfulfilled expectations and the likelihood of revolution, he admits that there still is not an objective way of measuring and predicting revolutions.

That is because they each require a unique and different catalyst to spark the onset. To understand this catalyst, one has to look at the interactions of individuals.

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The First Intifada

Great Man Theory argues that the best way to explain history is to look at the impact of ‘great men’ or heroes. Thomas Carlyle claims that “all things that we see standing accomplished in the world” are caused by the thoughts of great men. The actions of the masses are created and modelled by these leaders.26 One only has to look at other revolutions to see the influence of these heroes. The Islamic revolution would not have happened without Ayatollah Khomeini in the same way that the Cuban revolution could not have occurred without Fidel Castro. When one considers the Intifada, however, one fails to find a single heroic leader. As already mentioned, the Intifada was a spontaneous outburst of the people and it took the PLO – the exiled and de facto leadership of the Palestinian people – some time before they began to direct the masses.27 It is largely accepted that the spark for the Intifada was an Israeli tank-transport truck crashing into Arab cars in Gaza, killing four, on 8 December 1987.28 Compared to the extent of the Intifada, the gravity of this incident does not seem to be proportional. It demonstrates, however, how the sense of frustration caused by the occupation had risen to the point where a relatively small accident could cause a revolt that lasted nearly six years.

There was no need for a hero to lead the masses – the social structures had pushed the people to the tipping point.

Theorists who emphasize the importance of individual agency, however, would argue that these social structures were formed through the interactions of individuals. John Elster claims that “the elementary unit of social life is the individual human action.”29 This means that when we look at social forces, we have to look at them in the context of the actions of individuals. The social pressures that the Palestinians faced due to the increase of Jewish settlements and the implementation of an ‘iron fist’ policy were caused by the actions and motives of the Israeli government. One could argue that the largest contributor to the onset of the Intifada was the Likud party and its policies.30 Similarly, the sense of abandonment that the Palestinians felt towards the rest of the world was caused by the fact that the priorities of other countries did not include the Palestinian question.31 While these actions did have an effect on the Palestinians, however, they were also simply a result of other social pressures. The Likud party feared the increasing strength of Palestinian nationalist sentiment. They had to halt the rise of nationalist movements

There was no need for a hero to lead the masses – the social structures had pushed the people to the tipping point.

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The First Intifata

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011) in the Palestinian territories before they began to constitute a major threat. Thus, they responded to it with extreme measures that ended up backfiring and adding fuel to the “embers of rebellion” instead of resolving the issue.32 Additionally, the Iran-Iraq war had important implication for the world economy – particularly the Middle East – and forced leaders to pay attention to the conflict. For example, in 1983, OPEC experienced its first ever price cut in oil, showing the extent of the damage that the conflict was having on the Middle East.33 This conflict was simply of more importance and the Arab states had no choice but to focus their attention on a solution at the Arab Summit in 1987. Evdiently, individuals do indeed affect social structures. Yet by considering their motives, we can see that these individuals are also hugely affected by those same structures and so responsibility belongs to social forces rather than to the agent himself.

The period of relative prosperity, followed by oppression and pressure from Jewish settlements, led

to

a

divergence

between the expectations and the reality of the Palestinian people.

26

The Intifada was caused by a variety of social factors that led to frustration building up among the Palestinian people. The period of relative prosperity, followed by oppression and pressure from Jewish settlements, led to a divergence between the expectations and the reality of the Palestinian people. This created unrest and anxiety within the region. On top of this, the other Arab states did not live up to the hopes of the Palestinian people. Palestinian national aspirations were not a priority to these leaders because they faced pressure politically and economically from elsewhere. The extent of these structural factors was so great that the catalyst for the outbreak of the Intifada was only a minor incident.

There was no need for a leader or hero to rally the people against the oppressors. Instead, the people rose up spontaneously to spark change in the area and make their plight known to the international community.

While some argue that the motives of the Israeli government and other Middle Eastern states led to such a state of affairs, they fail to recognise that these motives were also caused by social forces and pressures. While it appears that the social structures that led to the Intifada were caused by the actions of other individuals, their actions cannot be understood outside the context of external structures.

The AttachĂŠ Vol. 2 (2011)

Get Involved

Get Involved at the University of Toronto and Explore YOUR Changing World

27

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011)

Český Krumlov · Czech Republic · Photograph by Jane Ye-Won Lee

Thessaloniki · Greece · Photograph by Yisheng Loh

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Greenpeace

A Social Movement Theory Approach: Greenpeace

Examining the role of Greenpeace in constructing a “Global Civil Society”

By Fahim Quayyum

The purpose of this essay is to analyse the manifestation of environmental movements. I will use Social Movement Theory (SMT) approach to analyse the way in which Greenpeace (as an environmental NGO) politicises environmental issues. First, I will examine what political opportunities and constraints propelled Greenpeace. Second, I will explain what resources the group has utilized to create a global network. Finally, I will show how the organisation has framed environmental issues at a global level. In doing so, I will demonstrate that Greenpeace has created the first steps in bringing about a global environmental consciousness, by creating a network of local environmentalist in various different countries.

I will use SMT to analyse Greenpeace activism because it will highlight both how and why NGOs are directly involved in social movements.

Having emerged in the 1970s, it was a direct response to the earlier socio-psychological conceptions of social movements which labelled movements as irrational, unorganized, and spontaneous. While the previous socio-psychological approaches assume that social movements occur cyclically (grievances that express itself through a radical collective outburst), SMT argues that social movements are constructed and organised from rationality; they are a sophisticated means of mobilizing members. In this way, SMT provides us with a conceptual framework with which we can acknowledge structural, political, economic and social preconditions. It does not reduce the entire social movement to being a one-dimensional grievance based product.

E

nvironmental issues have become prominent political questions; the recent climate change conference in Copenhagen only reinforces this notion. The environmental movement has played a significant role in raising ecological issues and changing conceptions

With offices in 40 countries and some three million supporters, Greenpeace is unquestionably one of the world’s most influential environmental groups. The New York Times

29

Greenpeace

The AttachĂŠ Vol. 2 (2011) of environmentalism. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Greenpeace may be credited for taking a leading role within the broader environmental movement.

Having emerged in the 1970s, SMT was a direct response to earlier sociopsychological conceptions of

social

movements,

which

had

such

movements

irrational,

claimed were

unorganized,

and spontaneous.

NGOs are agents for politicising various issues which emerge from civil society; these issues may be humanitarian, environmental or political in nature.2 In turn, civil societies are the “forum where the social and the environmental problems can be identified and solutions can be explored.�3 Furthermore, it is a forum that transpires external to the formal state apparatus. It is where participants can deliberate and through political activism, define, demand and/or seek to achieve their political objectives; thus, it is the sphere in which social movements are catalyzed. A global civil society may be thought of as an extension of the domestic civil society into the global level.i The purpose of this essay is to analyse the manifestation of environmental movements. I will use the Social Movement Theory (SMT) approach to analyse the way Greenpeace (as an environmental NGO) politicises environmental issues. First, I will examine what political opportunities and constraints propelled Greenpeace. Second, I will explain what resources the group has utilized to create a global network.

Finally, I will show how it has framed environmental issues at a global level. In doing so, I will demonstrate how Greenpeace created the first steps in bringing about a global environmental consciousness by creating a network of local environmentalists in different countries.

I will use SMT to analyse Greenpeace activism because it will highlight both how and why NGOs are directly involved in social movements. Having emerged in the 1970s, SMT was a direct response to earlier socio-psychological conceptions of social movements, which had claimed such movements were irrational, unorganized, and spontaneous.4 In particular, these previous socio-psychological approaches assume that social movements occur cyclically and express grievances through a radical collective outburst. In contrast, SMT argues that social movements i However, this conception is a homogenization of the diverse political and socio-economic conditions that exist at the global stage. The inequality in the global north and south acts a barrier for political mobilization in the global sphere. As such, it can arguably be said that the notion of a global civil society is an oversimplification of the dynamics of the international system.

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Greenpeace

are constructed and organised rationally, and therefore are a sophisticated means of mobilizing members. In this way, SMT posits a conceptual framework which acknowledges structural, political, economic and social preconditions; moreover, it does not reduce the entire social movement to a one-dimensional grievance based product.

Political Opportunities and Constraints SMT argues that political opportunities and constraints are integral to social movements. In general, movements are shaped by political institutions and the regime types, which define their channels of access.

The nature of political institutions indicates how a social movement organization (SMO) will mobilise the masses for political action. As a determining factor, “not only are [political] institutions important in shaping how groups are politically active they are also significant in determining whether the group is successful.”5 Indeed, a SMO’s political opportunity will vary from state to state because the political structures of some states are more amenable than others to addressing environmental concerns. In the global context, movements must adapt their strategy according to the political channels offered by the particular state in interest. However, it is also important to account for the nature of suprastate institutions as well.

Supra-state institutions, such as the United Nations are representative of states, and accordingly prioritize global governance to act in the interest of the state. Presently, the dominant global shift toward neo-liberal practices has prioritised international trade issues in global politics. The consequential free trade practices endorse the most efficient means of conducting businesses, which often disrupt the natural ecology of surroundings.6 I will argue that the blissful ignorance towards deteriorating environmental conditions may primarily be attributed to neo-liberal global institutions, including the World Bank, IMF, World Trade Organization and various bi- and multi-lateral free trade agreements such as the NAFTA. It has become “clear that the establishment of these trade rules represents a significant step backwards for environmental protection and resource

In the global context, movements must adapt their strategy according to the political channels offered by the particular state in interest.

31

Greenpeace

Put

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another

Greenpeace

way, is

the

product of the political constraints

placed

environmentalism,

on which

were made at the state and supra-state level.

conservation.”7 Indeed, trade liberalization has weakened the welfare state and its ability to regulate social and environmental issues within its borders. In addition, neo-liberal and neo-conservative policies have cited the importance of economic growth over social and environmental issues in order to achieve a level of modernization.8 The “East Asian Tigers” are an apt example of these policies. Inevitably, governmentimplemented conservation regulations are labelled as domestic industrial protectionism.9 To avoid backlash from these global institutions, third world countries have tended not to address the concerns of domestic environmental regulation.

In essence, national governments have been either weakened or are unwilling to challenge the trade compliance mechanism. Apart from a few selective cases, such as the asbestos dispute between Canada and France in 1997, national governments have been unable to successfully challenge trade issues that threaten their environmental integrity.1011 At the same time, “the exclusion of environmental and other social movement organizations from the WTO constrains and restricts their ability to participate in the activities of the [institution].”12 As a result, trade issues have trumped international environmental concerns so that neither the state nor non-state actors have successfully addressed the issues of environmental regulation in the global neo-liberal regime.

Compliance with environmental norms has been voluntary, whereas commercial conventions were enforced by the WTO.13 In this way, meaningful environmental regulations remained unaddressed by these levels of governance.

I argue that the lack of ecological representation in state and suprastate spheres presented the political opportunity to (an increasingly interconnected/‘global’) civil society and provided the impetus for organizations such as Greenpeace to emerge. Put another way, Greenpeace is the product of the political constraints placed on environmentalism, which were made at the state and supra-state level. Unlike institutional approaches to conservation, SMOs such as Greenpeace aim for a more direct, issuespecific and mass-based approach to environmental regulation. It has done so by invoking “a supranational consciousness that is linking trade questions to environmental issues.”14 Although Greenpeace’s strategy

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Greenpeace

towards addressing issues has been controversial, its tactics do not lack rationality, as the socio-psychological approach would suggest.

Resource Mobilization SMT rejects the notion that collective actions are a disorganized irrational activity. Instead, SMT focuses on the ability of organized groups and their rational participants to acquire significant resources for their purposes – which range from material, labour, and capital resources.

Moreover, SMT stresses the importance of a skilled cadre of leaders who “can translate the amorphously held values of the group into political capital”; as well, as an institutional framework for the group’s leaders to draw resources to create new organizations.15 Through these internal networks, leaders can raise resources and recruit new members. In this way, the only barrier to the movement’s success is a lack of resources that the group’s leaders must mobilize to address the group’s concerns.16

Greenpeace has more than 2.5 million members and an annual budget of over $120 million. With a presence in more than forty countries, it is the world’s largest environmental NGO.17 It has a network of national and regional offices around the world with Greenpeace International (located in Amsterdam) as its headquarters. Representatives from boards governing various branch offices meet annually to determine organizational strategy and attend to administrative matters.18 These representatives also elect the board of Greenpeace International, who in turn appoint the executive director.

Due to the geographic spread and size, Greenpeace coordinates its activities with its regional and national office network through a hierarchical arrangement. As such, the head office ensures that its local offices work towards the organization’s broader strategies, serving as components in global campaigns. In doing so, it coordinates the different local offices, and avoids overlaps. Apart from this, the local offices are encouraged to pursue the organization’s global campaigns using methods that fit the community’s political culture and traditions.19 In other words, local offices must incorporate local civil society to work towards their objectives.

Although

Greenpeace’s

strategy towards addressing issues has been controversial, its tactics do not lack rationality, psychological

as the socioapproach

would suggest.

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The internet has provided Greenpeace with a new and

innovative

means

to reach the public and recruit

members.

organization

The

created

one of the first internet websites in 1994 and received hundreds and thousands of visits weekly by mid-2000.

An important component of Greenpeace International is its communication department. It is strategically based in London (UK), where many international brokers of television news footage are also based.

These corporate new agencies supply the G8 and third world broadcasters with international news. Using these media outlets, the communications departments can capture a global audience with a simple emailed press release followed by a phone call. In addition, Greenpeace garners media attention not only from their ability to create a spectacle, but also by filming of events; which they later supply to these media outlets.20 For example, when the French navy sank a Greenpeace’ ship (the Rainbow Warrior) - killing one of the activists during one of their protests in 1985 - Greenpeace filmmakers were quick to capture the moment and pass it to the media.21 Although this particular incident was unintended, it brought media attention and sympathizers to Greenpeace’ cause. With its global network, Greenpeace can gather environmental stories from its regional and national offices and “get its message out” by providing the media with sensational stories.22 In essence, the communications department frames events and environmental issues in such a way as to capture a global audience and sympathizers.

The internet has provided Greenpeace with a new and innovative means to reach the public and recruit members. The organization created one of the first internet websites in 1994 and received hundreds and thousands of visits weekly by mid-2000. The website offers extensive online resources for the general public and Greenpeace members, including electronic mailing lists, news, academic research, donation pages, etc. 23 In this way, the website is a medium through which the group recruits and mobilizes a network of international activists. As such, the organization not only uses its regional and national offices, but also the internet to incorporate sympathizers for its environmental causes.

So far, it is clear that Greenpeace operates as an organized and sophisticated multinational ENGO rather than as an “irrational and spontaneous” – as early socio-psychological approaches would have claimed. The organizational structure derives its capabilities from a skilled cadre of leaders, internal departments, and the regional and national

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Greenpeace

offices. Furthermore, Greenpeace has strategically used its network of local offices to capture environmental concerns, which is then published on their websites and the media. According to SMT, social movements use media to mobilize organizational resources to advance their political agenda; this is more effective and efficient than the organization of a purely individual capacity.24 Greenpeace’s global network allows it to mobilize the organizational resources from the local and community level to the global level. As a result, “Greenpeace is able to mobilize a transnational coalition of elites against particular domestic targets, ranging from the BC practice of clear cut logging”25 to anti whaling practices in Japan.

Framing Process The framing process is an important attempt to create consciousness from the audience. In doing so, movements must articulate issues and disseminate frameworks to potential participants and the broader public in order to bring forth a collective action.26 Frames provide interpretations of events, which allows for dissemination and the potential to mobilize the group’s participants. It is a process of ‘meaning construction’.

Therefore, an SMO must undertake three important tasks. First, the group identifies a problem or concern that causes grievance. The SMO then offers a solution to engage the particular problem, including strategies and tactics to approach the problem. The third task involves providing a rationale that will resonate among the masses, motivating support and collective action against the problem. In this way motivational frames are needed to transform a mere bystander into an active participant of the larger movement. Although a movement may share a common understanding of the problem, the strategies and tactics used are less cohesive amongst different SMOs .27 In doing so, the group begins to build support and credibility from the potential participants of the movement.

Greenpeace’s

global

network

it

allows

to

mobilize the organizational resources from the local and community level to the global level.

Paul Wapner notes that Greenpeace has identified the popular outlook of contemporary ecological issues as a fundamental problem: “People do not do not damage the ecosystem as a matter of course. Rather they operate in an ideational context that motivates them to do so.”28 Consequently, the public is unaware of the ecological externalities that are 35

Greenpeace

Greenpeace’

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011)

policy

of bearing witness to ecological

degradation

has brought attention to environmental

concerns

which may have otherwise gone unnoticed.

directly produced from their consumerism. In other words, the masses have been conditioned to think about the environment in an unbalanced manner. As such, Greenpeace has framed and identified the corporate sector, for disseminating ecological misinformation, which tends to favour corporatism and trade issues over environmental conservation.

Wapner argues that an important part of Greenpeace’ agenda has been to educate the masses about the ecological damages that are caused through corporatism.

In this way, Greenpeace has framed and linked environmental degradation with commercial practices. These actions are an attempt to concern the public about the environmental wellbeing of the planet. “By offering spectacular images to the media, Greenpeace invites the public to ‘bear witness’ to environmental damages. It enables people throughout the world to know about environmental dangers and tries to tap into their sense of outrage.”29 Paul Watson (one of Greenpeace’s founding members) notes that the main reason Greenpeace emerged from a grassroots organization to one of the world’s largest environmental groups is because of its understanding of the media and its effects on the masses.30 In effect, the media has been used as the framing mechanism to motivate and transform the public bystander into part of the movement.

In this respect, Greenpeace has utilized the framing process to activate the masses towards environmental conservation. Greenpeace’ policy of bearing witness to ecological degradation has brought attention to environmental concerns which may have otherwise gone unnoticed. By using the media and the internet, Greenpeace shows the environmental costs of industrial practices and trade norms. As such, this organization has diagnosed the problem of pollution as related to commercial practices, as well as to the ignorance concerning environmental issues. In this way, Greenpeace implicitly identifies neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism as the source of the problem.31 Essentially, it has brought the public to a state of environmental consciousness.

Following the second stage of the framing process, Greenpeace has funded projects and research towards environmentally-friendly means of conducting business. In essence, the organization posits solutions to

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Greenpeace

sources of environmental degradation. An example is Greenpeace’s funding research for “Green freeze” refrigerators – a CFC-free icebox that runs on energy from butane lighter fluid. The group decided to waive its rights on the patent so that manufactures could use it.32 Greenpeace also supports other initiatives, such as the use of hybrid vehicles and public transport, to show the bystander that environmentally friendlier alternatives are available. This funding and active support purposefully induces the bystander into an alternative solution to an anti-environmental lifestyle.

Greenpeace’s thirty years of existence gives it the status of a legitimate and credible environmental organization.

Indeed, Greenpeace’s credibility is integral to its environmental movement, giving the organization the clout to influence governmental and supra-national policies (the Kyoto accord is one such example).

Through its global network, Greenpeace has the ability to influence environmental practices at the community and domestic levels. As noted earlier, this is done by raising the level of environmental consciousness within the community. Raised levels of consciousness give Greenpeace the ability to influence and lobby governments, supra-national organizations, and corporations. For example, Coca Cola has begun to use CFC free refrigerators after its demonization by Greenpeace funded ad campaigns.33

However, at the global level, Greenpeace’ records suggest its insensitivity towards accommodating local cultures and practices within their branch offices. The organization has admitted that its methods are geared towards a western approach to environmental issues. This has often led to negative images of the organization. Since the 1990’s, Greenpeace has attempted to change its approach to accommodate to the local cultural and socio-economic surroundings.34 Moreover, significant regions such as the Middle East and the African continent are still left untouched by Greenpeace. Most Greenpeace offices are located in wealthier first world or burgeoning countries. This settlement indicates that the organization does not represent a truly ‘global network’, since many localities and communities are left unconnected to Greenpeace’ activities. It can be argued that Greenpeace only offers a partial global network at best. Nonetheless, Greenpeace’s presence in

This settlement indicates that

the

organization

does not represent a truly ‘global network’, since

many

localities

and

communities

are

left

unconnected

to

Greenpeace’ activities.

37

Greenpeace

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011) several other non-western regions and communities gives it the ability to mobilize its activists and raise environmental consciousness.

Since political opportunities vary from country to country, Greenpeace

therefore

incorporates local interests into

its

environmental

agenda and works within local

communities

to

forge an environmental consciousness.

As noted earlier, the term global civil society simplifies and homogenizes the social, cultural, political, and economic differences that exist in the global sphere. What is more, the contemporary international system favours the states over civil societies. The internet and the mass media may be identified as a forum; however, the growing disparities between the global rich and the global poor prevent equal access to these media outlets.35 As such, it can arguably be said that a truly global civil society is does not exist.

In its replacement, I have shown the current global arrangement as a network of elites operating in local communities and domestic levels.

Greenpeace has mobilized its resources to create a network of local branches that address particular environmental concerns. Since political opportunities vary from country to country, Greenpeace therefore incorporates local interests into its environmental agenda and works within local communities to forge an environmental consciousness.

Moreover, the group’s global reach gives it the unique ability to mobilize activists for the environmental movement. It links environmental elites in diverse communities together through its network, bringing about an increased level of global environmental consciousness.

Conclusion

Throughout this essay I have shown how Social Movement Theory (SMT) best describes Greenpeace’s contribution to the construction of a global network and global environmental consciousness. I have argued that Greenpeace is a rational and sophisticated organization operating at the global level. Political constraints at the state and supra-state levels have made Greenpeace resort to non-conventional means to raise support for the global environmental movement. In doing so, the group has constructed a global network, with branch offices that work at local levels, to mobilize the group’s sympathizers and activists. These global networks have given Greenpeace the ability to create an environmentally conscious global public.

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Lahore · Pakistan · Photograph by Salahuddin Rafiquddin

Gangneung · Republic of Korea · Photograph by Jane Ye-Won Lee

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The Attach茅 Vol. 2 (2011)

New York City 路 USA 路 Photograph by Sam Sarhang Khanlari

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The 2008 South Ossetian War

The 2008 South Ossetian War under International Law After 5 days of violent clashes, the battles of the 2008 South Ossetian war had ended, but the war of legal arguments between Russia and Georgia was still underway. Fought in the realm of international law, this “war’s” weapons were international treaties, customs and conventions. This paper reviews the body of law governing jus ad bellum and jus in bello, as well as other sources of international law which may be relevant to the conflict. In particular, it analyzes and applies the provisions of The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the UN Charter, the Geneva and the Hague Conventions and other applicable case law to the events of the war.

The paper argues that both parties acted in breach of international law. Not only was Russia in violation of the UN Charter when it allowed its UN-mandated peacekeeping force to support secessionist movements and use disproportionate measures in conflict, but Georgia, too, acted in breach of international law by refusing the South Ossetian secessionists the right to autonomy and/or selfdetermination, by employing disproportionate use of force in the conflict and by launching an unnecessary war

By Khilola Zakhidova

The armed conflict over South Ossetia lasted one week in August 2008 and will have consequences for lifetimes and beyond...

A significant casualty of the conflict was all sides’ respect for international

Introduction

humanitarian law. - Human

fter 5 days1 of violent clashes,i the battles of the 2008 South Ossetian war had ended, but the war of legal argumentsii between Russia and Georgia was already underway. Fought in the realm of international law, this “war’s” weapons were international treaties, customs and conventions. In this unequal battle, Georgia, in an act of public diplomacy,2 accused Russia of being in breach of international law.

Rights Watch

A

i That, according to various reports, resulted in numerous civilian deaths, injuries, displacement and the destruction of infrastructure and property. ii For an interesting argument on how legal arguments in politics tend to shape state practices and create norms and conventions, see Christopher J. Borgen, “The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia” in Chicago Journal of International Law 10, (2009): 1 – 33.

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But was Russia, in fact, in violation of international law during the South Ossetian war?

Fought in the realm of international

law,

this

“war’s” weapons were international

treaties,

customs and conventions.

With this question in mind, this paper will review the body of law governing jus ad bellum and jus in bello, as well as other pertinent sources of international law which may be relevant to the conflict.iii In particular, it will analyze and apply the provisions of The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,iv the UN Charter, the Geneva and the Hague Conventions and other applicable case law to the events.

This paper will argue that, as evidenced by independent factfinding missions, both parties were in breach of international law. Not only was Russia in violation of the UN Charter when it allowed its UNmandated peacekeeping force to support secessionist movements and use disproportionate measures in battle, but Georgia, too, acted in breach of international law by refusing the South Ossetian secessionists the right to autonomy and/or self-determination by employing disproportionate use of force in the conflict and by launching an unnecessary war.

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)

Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, Georgia made an application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming that Russia had “practiced, sponsored and supported racial discrimination through attacks against, and mass-expulsion of, ethnic Georgians,”3 thereby acting in breach of its obligations under CERD. Georgia also requested an “indication of provisional measures”4 against Russia, in order to stop Russia’s “unlawful attacks against civilians and civilian objects, murder, forced displacement, denial of humanitarian assistance, and extensive iii In examining each source, emphasis will be placed on the merit / grounding of the possible arguments that Georgia can advance against Russia. iv The convention is a human rights tool, which aims at ensuring that signatory states eliminate racial discrimination within their borders. See L.F. Zwaak, International human rights procedures: petitioning the ECHR, CCPR and CERD (Nijmegen :Ars Aequi Libri,1991) 87. The convention was ratified by Georgia on 06.06.1999, entering into force on 07.07.1999, while Russia ratified it in 04.02.1969 and it entered into force on 06.03.1969. For a full list of countries, see Netherlands Institute of Human Rights Database, Accessed November 30th, 2010 at http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/Library/RATIF.nsf/(CERD)?OpenView Also, for a list of “reservations” see United Nations Treaty Collection at : http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails. aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en.

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The 2008 South Ossetian War

pillage and destruction of towns and villages, in South Ossetia,”5 Georgia insisted that Russia was actively supporting the expansionist sentiments of the South Ossetian separatists.

Russia objected,6 claiming that Georgia had “failed to respect the peoples’ right of self-determination in the regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia.”7 Furthermore, it argued that since Russia does not have, nor seek to, obtain control over the region, and participated in the conflict for peacekeeping purposes only, the requested provisional measures are not grounded in fact.8 In addition, Russia argued that had the issue been about discrimination, then, according to CERD’s requirements, Georgia should have articulated its concerns earlier, through bilateral negotiations and other diplomatic means.v Shortly thereafter, the ICJ held that provisional measuresvi should be applied to both parties, not because it agreed with either Georgia’s or Russia’s claim, but because “the indication of provisional measures was required for the protection of CERD rights.”9 After numerous Georgian-Russian exchanges of legal arguments in the so-called “preliminary objections,” the ICJ concluded its public hearings on September 17th 2010, and is currently in “deliberation.”10

According to Borgen, Georgia used CERD against Russia for two reasons. First, Georgia needed legal grounds to bring Russia before the ICJ, and second, it wanted to influence global public opinion by using the popular rhetoric of racial discrimination to rally international support for its cause.11 This view is also supported by Dworkin,12 who claims that Georgia used “this obscure treaty as a basis for legal action,” made possible

by Russia’s 1969 ratification of the treaty. It remains to be seen whether the ICJ will conclude that Georgia’s accusations have merit.

Article 2 and 51 of the UN Charter

Georgia has the option of referring to Article 2 of the UN Chartervii and accusing Russia of interfering in the internal affairs of a v Russia’s final argument is based on the provisions of Art 22 CERD, which states that disputes between signatories may be referred to ICJ only if they are “not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention”. Buys, 296. vi According to Borgen, an “order of provisional measures”, in non legalese languages means practically, an order to cease fire. Borgen, 23. vii This is also known as the principle of non-intervention. As outlined in Article 2, Section 3 of the UN Charter, Russia and Georgia, as members of the UN, had to “refrain from the threat or use of force against

First, Georgia needed legal grounds to bring Russia before the ICJ, and second, it wanted to influence global public opinion by using the popular rhetoric of racial discrimination

to

rally

international support for its cause.

43

The 2008 South Ossetian War

Russia, in its defense, could refer to Article 51

of

the

Charter,

retorting that Georgian forces

had

Russian

attacked

peacekeepers

and residents of South Ossetia who had Russian citizenship.

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011)

sovereign state. Based on the ICJ’s reasoning in Nicaragua v. US,13 Georgia could argue that Russian peacekeeping and military forces had acted in violation of international law when they supported the South Ossetian secessionists’ activities against the Georgian government.viii Furthermore, following the court’s reasoning in Congo v. Uganda14, Georgia might demand that Russia pay reparations for the damages that resulted from the 2008 incident.

Russia, in its defense, could refer to Article 51 of the Charter,15 retorting that Georgian forces had attacked Russian peacekeepers and residents of South Ossetia who had Russian citizenship.16 Therefore, Russia’s involvement constituted an act of self-defense. Furthermore, since Russia’s constitution imposes a duty on its armed forces to defend Russian nationals abroad,17 Russia can argue that it had no other choice but to intervene.

Yet Georgia could reply that Russian peacekeepers had lost their legal status because they had engaged in active nation-building in South Ossetia—an activity beyond their peacekeeping mandate,18 and because Georgia withdrew its consent to the mandate in an Act of Parliament in October 2005.19 Furthermore, the Georgian position could be that residents of South Ossetia with Russian passports do not meet the criteria of “genuine citizens,” as outlined in the Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v.

Guatemala).20 This is due to the “absence of a bond of attachment between South Ossetian Russian Passport Holders and Russia”21 and the assertion that their “naturalization lacked a genuineness requisite.”22 Of course, Russia, then, could make the case that there exists a genuine and effective link, since these individuals collect Russian pension payments and engage in economic activities using Russian currency on a daily basis.23

Russia could also resort to customary international law and rely upon the precedent set by the Caroline Case.24 Under this ICJ precedent, Russia could claim that it had acted in preemptive self-defense as it was the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” and had a duty to resolve disputes by peaceful means. United Nations Charter, accessed November 30th 2001, at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ chapter1.shtml. viii Cutts’s article on the Russian involvement in the 1992 – 1993 Georgia- Abkhazia war provides good insight into Georgian accusations of Russian military and financial support to secessionists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For more, see Cutts, “Enemies Through the Gates,” 295.

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facing an imminent Georgian attack. However, it would be hard for Russia to provide sufficient evidence to support this claim as South Ossetia, although sharing a border with Russia, does not constitute an extension of Russian territory and Georgia was not launching an attack that would infiltrate the Russian border.

In theory, Georgia could also get a UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution against Russia or rally international (especially US) support, demanding that the SC impose sanctions on Russia. After all, the postCold War evolution of UN’s sanctions25 demonstrates that, particularly, interference in the domestic affairs of a state,ix serious humanitarian crises,x violation of a minority’s fundamental rights,xi breaches of peace,xii and other acts of aggression26 may serve as legal bases for imposing sanctions.

However, in practice, it would be both difficult and politically risky to rally support for collective military action or any form of sanctions against Russia, because of the following reasons: a) UNSC members would not risk a massive war over a relatively minor incident in Georgia; b) Russia, having a permanent seat on the UNSC, would veto any decision on South Ossetia; 27 c) In light of America’s entanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the White House would not want to alienate Russia, a dominant actor in the region.

In sum, Georgia’s chances of success in winning a case against ix For instance, in the cases of Bosnia and Herzogovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Security Council demanded that “all forms of interference from outside” be terminated; as there was no evidence of compliance SC’s demands, sanctions were imposed, on the basis of the provisions of Chapter VII. See Farrall, United Nations sanctions under the rule of law, 91. For the full text of Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression” see UN Charter, Accessed November 30th 2010, at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml x The SC imposed sanctions on Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda and Sudan after finding that the humanitarian crises in the latter countries constituted a “threat to peace and security of the region”. But, in the case of South Ossetia, it must be first established that the humanitarian situation in the region was as dramatic as in above mentioned countries. Farrall, United Nations sanctions under the rule of law, 100-101. xi The SC imposed sanctions on Kosovo when it established that “excessive force was used against civilian and peaceful” population. Farrall, United Nations sanctions under the rule of law, 101. xii The SC imposed sanctions on Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the legal arguments justifying the sanctions were “breach of peace” and “threat to peace”. Farrall, United Nations sanctions under the rule of law, 103.

In theory, Georgia could also get a UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution against Russia or rally international

(especially

US) support, demanding that

the

SC

impose

sanctions on Russia.

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Russia on the basis of the UN Charter are extremely low. At best, Georgia could accuse Russia of violating the non-binding “Friendly Relations Declaration”28—thereby attempting to paint a negative image of Russia’s involvement and garner the sympathy and generosity of aid donors.

To date, three independent reports

have

been

published, each aimed at providing an objective picture of the events of the war.

International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law According to Dworkin, both Georgia and Russia could accuse the other of acting in breach of international humanitarian lawxiii and committing war crimes during their military engagement in South Ossetia.29 At this point, it is important to distinguish between international humanitarian law, which applies in conflict only, and international human rights law, which applies at all times.30 The general principles of international humanitarian law are spelled out in the Geneva and Hague Conventions,xiv but their applicability to the 2008 war is subject to the following factors: a) which party was the first to attack, thereby addressing the issue of aggression vs. self-defense; b) the legal status of individuals involved in the conflict, (i.e. army, peacekeepers, militia, volunteers, secessionists) as each Convention provides different rights and protections to the above mentioned. 31 c) the legal status of South Ossetia itself.xv

To date, three independent reports have been published,

xiii Generally, refers to the laws governing Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello; specifically, to the Hague Conventions of 1907, Geneva Gonventions of 1907 as well as customary law and treaties. Marco Sassoli and Antoine A.Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1999), 105 – 112. xiv According to Sassolli and Bouvier, the general principles of International Humanitarian Law are humanity, necessity of war, proportionality of the use of force and war aims, distinction between combatants, the prohibition of causing unnecessary suffering and the strict distinction between ius in bello and ius ad bellum. See Ibid. For a good discussion of these principles, see Abi-Saab, R. “The General Principles of Humanitarian Law According to the International Court of Justice” in International Review of the Red Cross, 27 (1987): 367-375. xv As argued by M. Sterio , in situation where a struggling miniority groups seeks self-determination, it is possible for secession to occur if the following criteria are satisfied: oppression, relatively weak central government, existence of some sort of internal organization, presence of an international monitoring body, support of secessionist cause by Great Powers. If South Ossetia satisfies these criteria, then it may qualify for secession as remedy. If South Ossetia is granted the status of a de jure an dde facto state, then the legal and political arguments surrounding the 2008 war change dramatically. M. Sterio, “On the Right to External SelfDetermination: ‘Selfistans’, Secession and the Great Powers’ Rule” in Minnesota Journal of International Law , 19 (2010): 137 – 165.

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each aimed at providing an objective picture of the events of the war.

According to the European Union’s “Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia,”xvi both Russia and Georgia were in violation of the laws of war. Although the report did not “assign the overall responsibility for the conflict to one side alone,”32 it charged Georgia with provoking Russian intervention and criticized Russia for utilizing disproportionate force in its military engagement.33 The report also dismissed claims of South Ossetian genocide, accused Russia of wrongful recognition of the secessionist South Ossetian Republic, and denounced Russia’s “passportization policy” in South Ossetia.34

Similarly, Human Rights Watch has published two documents on the incident: a report on Russia’s use of cluster munitions35 and an overall assessment of the humanitarian law violations and civilian victims of the conflict.36 According to both reports, Russia’s use of cluster munitions, as well as other weapons, constitutes disproportionate measures in war.

Furthermore, Russia’s inability to establish peace and order in a region which was under its de facto37 control negates the presumption of the neutrality and impartiality of its peacekeeping force.xvii Furthermore, the latter report accuses Georgia of “deliberate and systematic destruction”38 of specific residential areas in South Ossetia. Amnesty International’s report, which focuses on the human rights violations during the war,has found evidence of violence against women,xviii violations of the freedom of assembly and expression,xix the existence of a deliberate policy of forced xvi The mission’s mandate stems from the decision of the Council of the European Union of Dec 8th 2008. For full text of the decision, See: European Council Decision Concerning an Independent Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia Accessed November 30th, 2010, at: http://eurlex.europa.eu/Notice.do?mode=dbl& lang=en&ihmlang=en&lng1=en,fr&lng2=bg,cs,da,de,el,en,es, et,fi,fr,hu,it,lt,lv,mt,nl,pl,pt,ro,sk,sl,sv,&val=48 4042:cs&page, For the fact finding mission’s report See “Report, volume 1”, accessed November 30th 2001, at http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html. xvii According to Gibbs, peacekeepers must remain neutral and impartial in their operations, and cannot exceed their mandate. If they do, their “special status” under international law becomes void. David. N. Gibbs, “The United Nations, international peacekeeping and the question of ‘impartiality’: revisiting the Congo operation of 1960” in The Journal of Modern African Studies 38, 3 (2000):359-382. xviii Women are protected, under International Law, by: UN’s “Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women” of Dec 20th 1993, accessed November 30, 2010 at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/ a48r104.htm, the 1979 UN “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” , accessed November 30, 2010 at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ cedaw/cedaw.htm and other human rights and regional bodies of law. xix Freedom of Expression constitutes a human right under Article 18, 19, 20 of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, (Accessed November 30, 2010 at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/ udhr/index.shtml as well as under the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed November 30, 2010 at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/

Similarly, Human Rights Watch has published two documents on the incident: a report on Russia’s use of cluster munitions and an

overall

assessment

of the humanitarian law violations

and

civilian

victims of the conflict.

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The 2008 South Ossetian War

Considering the findings of the aforementioned reports,

both

Russia

and Georgia could be held

liable

for

both

humanitarian

law

and

human rights violations.

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displacement of people,xx and disproportionate use of military force on the part of Georgia.39 Surprisingly, the report attributed the aforementioned violations to Georgian and South Ossetian forces only, leaving the readers to wonder whether Russia’s involvement has been scrutinized at all.

Considering the findings of the aforementioned reports, both Russia and Georgia could be held liable for both humanitarian law and human rights violations. In terms of international humanitarian law, the International Court of Justice, based on its jurisdiction over states’ actions,40 could launch an investigation of the following breaches, on part the of Russia and Georgia: a) failure to distinguish between civilian and military targets, as per the Geneva Convention, (which outlines the difference between combatants and non-combatants);xxi b) failure to distinguish between civilian and military targets, as per the Hague Conventions (which focuses on the rights and duties of the combatants);41 c) disproportionate military objectives.42 In particular, the ICJ could investigate whether Georgia’s armed campaign against secessionist South Ossetians was in excess of the actual threat they posed to the Georgian state. Similarly, it could examine whether Russia’s military involvement was proportionate to the threat that its “citizens” (South Ossetian residents with Russian Passports) were under. d) disproportionate use of force.43 In particular, whether the conflict necessitated the use of air and tank forces on the part of Russia? Whether Georgia’s air bombing of Tskhinvali can be justified, given the actual potential of South Ossetian secessionists to threaten the stability and integrity of the Georgian state, ccpr.htm. xx In fact, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees claims that the 2008 conflict uprooted over 127 000 people from their homes. The overall number of internally displaced persons is 352, 640, as of January 2010. UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, Global Needs Assessment: Georgia, accessed November 30, 2010 at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d2e6.html. xxi According to Article 4 of the Geneva Convention, Combatants are members of the armed forces and groups involved in the conflict. They must distinguish themselves from civilian population. Sassoli and Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War?, 122.

On the difference between the Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention, See Sassoli and Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War?, 159, Section: “The Distinction between the Law of the Hague and the Law of Geneva”. For a good summary of the Geneva Conventions, see Raymund T. Yingling and Robert W. Ginnane “Geneva Conventions of 1949” in The American Journal of International Law, 46, 3 (1952): 393-427.

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The 2008 South Ossetian War

As far as Human Rights Law is concerned, both Georgian and Russian citizens could file complaints to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) or the International Criminal Court, which are mandated to adjudicate on crimes committed by individuals during the war. 44 In fact, Georgia has already applied to the EHCR requesting the imposition of “interim measures” against Russia.45 However, as argued by the International Crisis Group,xxii both Russian and Georgian Governments, instead of continuing their focus on accusations and legal battles, should instead concentrate on negotiations and sign “non–resumption of hostilities agreements,”46 under the watchful eyes of the UN Security Council, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and NATO. Conclusion This paper has argued, based on an analysis of the relevant sources of International Law, and the reports of independent fact-finding missions, that both Russia and Georgia acted in breach of international law during the 2008 South Ossetian war. This conclusion is important because, in a region with the potential for over 200 inter-ethnic conflicts,47 international law can become the “bloodless theatre of war.” Yet, as each party launches a “legal attack” against its adversary, grounding its arguments on conflicting interpretations of facts and sources of international law, the potential stakeholdersxxiii of this legal battle may be confused into believing that international law is irrelevant, unenforceable and obfuscated by Realpolitik.48 As this study of the South Ossetian war has demonstrated, international law is indeed highly complex. But it is independent from politics, to the extent that its provisions do not let the claims of the powerful party (Russia) negate those of the underdog (Georgia),xxiv nor skew towards allowing the aggressor (Georgia) to escape responsibility

As far as Human Rights Law is concerned, both Georgian and Russian citizens

could

file

complaints to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) or the International Criminal Court, which are mandated to adjudicate on crimes committed by

xxii Which, in its report, also found that Russia was in gross violation of international law due to the use of disproportionate measures in its counter-offensive. International Crisis Group, “Russia vs. Georgia: the Fallout”, August 22 2008. Accessed November 30, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/ caucasus/georgia/195-russia-vs-georgia-the-fallout.aspx. xxiii Stakeholders of this legal war include, but are not limited to the citizens of Russia and Georgia, victims of the incident and the broader international community, scholars, the media, scholars etc. xxiv The exception is the stalemate that can be caused at the SC level by Russia’s veto right.

individuals during the war.

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on the basis of its relative political fragility.xxv Thus, notwithstanding the overall complexity of international law, such “bloodless” legal wars should be welcomed.xxvi After all, in the words of Winston Churchill: “To jaw-jaw is better than to war–war.”xxvii

Thus, notwithstanding the overall

complexity

international

law,

of such

“bloodless” legal wars should

be

welcomed.

After all, in the words of Winston Churchill: “To jawjaw is better than to war– war.”

Tehran · Iran · Photograph by Sam Sarhang Khanlari

xxv Georgia, in the past 10 years, has been through civil unrest, small scale wars and the (reportedly USsponsored) Rose Revolution. xxvi To prove this, it was important to lay bare the arguments, provisions and processes that regulate the “legal” war of South Ossetia. Perhaps thae only casualties in such wars would be the international lawyers, on both sides of the conflict. xxvii W. Churchill, as quoted in “Churchill Urges Patience in Coping with Red Dangers”, The New York Times, June 27, 1954.

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Endnotes

ENDNOTES Book Review Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak 1 Hatzfeld, J. (2005). Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak. Picador USA. p. 127.

2 Ibid., p. 138.

3 Ibid., p. 42.

4 Ibid., p. 117.

5 Ibid., p. 63.

6 Ibid., p. 64.

7 Ibid., p. 163.

8 Ibid., p. 163.

When Peacekeepers Become the Perpetrators: Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Sierra Leone 1 Charles Anthony Smith and Heather M. Smith. “Human Trafficking: The Unintended Effects of United Nations Intervention.”

University of California (2010): 1- 44. Web. 7 Dec 2010.

2 Muna Ndulo. “The United Nations Responses To The Sexual Abuse And Exploitation Of Women And Girls By Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions.”

Berkeley Journal of International Law 27.1 (2009): 127- 61. Web. 7 Dec 2010.

3 Ibid 4 Adam Graycar. “Trafficking in Human Beings.” Speech given to the Internationational Conference on Migration, Culture and Crime, Israel, 7 July 1999.

5 Ibid 6 Ibid 7 Human Rights Watch/Africa, “We’ll kill you if you cry: Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict,” January 2003, Vol. 15, No.1 (A) 8 Kate Grady “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers: A Threat to Impartiality.” International Peacekeeping 17.2 (2010): 215- 28. Web. 20 Nov 2010.

9 Ibid 10 Charles Anthony Smith and Heather M. Smith. “Human Trafficking: The Unintended Effects of United Nations Intervention.”

University of California (2010): 1- 44. Web. 7 Dec 2010.

11 Ibid 12 Ibid 13 Ibid 14 Ibid 15 Ibid 16 JD Malone, et. Al 1993. “Risk Factors for Sexually Transmitted Diseases Among Deployed Military Personnel,” 5 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (1993): 294-298.

17 Charles Anthony Smith and Heather M. Smith. “Human Trafficking: The Unintended Effects of United Nations Intervention.”

University of California (2010): 1- 44. Web. 7 Dec 2010.

18 Saundra Sturdevant and Brenda Stoltzfus.

Let The Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia. New Pr, 1992. Print 19 Ibid 20 Charles Anthony Smith and Heather M. Smith. “Human Trafficking: The Unintended Effects of United Nations Intervention.”

University of California (2010): 1- 44. Web. 7 Dec 2010.

21 Ibid 22 Ibid 23 Kate Grady. “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers: A Threat to Impartiality.” International Peacekeeping 17.2 (2010): 215- 28. Web. 20 Nov 2010.

24 Ibid 25 Charles Anthony Smith and Heather M. Smith. “Human Trafficking: The Unintended Effects of United Nations Intervention.”

University of California (2010): 1- 44. Web. 7 Dec 2010.

26 Ibid 27 Keith J. Allred. “Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It.” Armed Forces & Society 33.5 (2006): 5 - 23. Web. 20 Nov 2010.

28 Elizabeth Defeis, “U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity.”Washington University Global Stud.

Law Review (2008): 185-214. Web. 20 Nov 2010.<http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page ?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/ wasglo7&id=211>.

29 “Who will watch the watchmen?

Peacekeeping and sex abuse.” The Economist [US] 31 May 2008: 64US. CPI.Q (Canadian

Periodicals). Web. 27 Nov. 2010.

30 Muna Ndulo. “The United Nations Responses To The Sexual Abuse And Exploitation Of Women And Girls By Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions.” Berkeley Journal of International Law 27.1 (2009): 127- 61. Web. 7 Dec 2010.

31 Ibid 32 Ibid 33 Keith J. Allred. “Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It.” Armed Forces & Society 33.5 (2006): 5 - 23. Web. 20 Nov 2010.

34 Elizabeth Defeis, “U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity.”Washington University Global Stud. Law Review (2008): 185-214.

Web. 20 Nov 2010.<http://www.heinonline. org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handl e=hein.journals/wasglo7&id=211>.

35 Ibid 36 Muna Ndulo. “The United Nations Responses To The Sexual Abuse And Exploitation Of Women And Girls By Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions.” Berkeley Journal of International Law 27.1 (2009): 127- 61. Web. 7 Dec 2010.

37 Ibid 38 “Who will watch the watchmen?

Peacekeeping and sex abuse.” The Economist [US] 31 May 2008: 64US. CPI.Q (Canadian Periodicals). Web. 27 Nov. 2010.

39 Keith J. Allred. “Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It.” Armed Forces & Society 33.5 (2006): 5 - 23. Web. 20 Nov 2010.

40 Elizabeth Defeis, “U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity.”Washington University Global Stud. Law Review (2008): 185-214.

Web. 20 Nov 2010.<http://www.heinonline. org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handl e=hein.journals/wasglo7&id=211>.

41 Ibid 42 “Who will watch the watchmen?

Peacekeeping and sex abuse.” The Economist [US] 31 May 2008: 64US. CPI.Q (Canadian Periodicals). Web. 27 Nov. 2010.

43 Elizabeth Defeis, “U.N. Peacekeepers

51

Endnotes and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity.”Washington University Global Stud. Law Review (2008): 185-214. Web. 20 Nov 2010.<http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/ Page?collection=journals&handle=hein. journals/wasglo7&id=211>.

44 Keith J. Allred. “Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It.” Armed Forces & Society 33.5 (2006): 5 - 23. Web. 20 Nov 2010.

Was the first Intifada a structure or agent driven phenomenon?

1 Ruth Margolies Beitler, The Path to Mass Rebellion: An analysis of two intifadas (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2004), xiv.

2 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the ArabIsrael Conflict (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992), 296.

3 Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987) : 338.

4 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the theory of Structuration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 9.

5 John Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 13.

6 William Graham Sumner, Folkways: A study of the sociological importance of usages, manners, customs, mores and morals (New York: The New American Library, 1960), 12-13.

7 Roger William Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition (New York: Free Press, 1986), 534.

8 William Graham Sumner, War and Other Essays (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for LIbraries Press, 1970), 24.

9 Smith, 143.

10 David K. Shipler, Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land (New York: Times Books, 1986), 181-182.

11 Brown, 534.

12 Ibid.

13 Victor Ragunathan, “War is a Complex, Multi-system Disease,” Ilankai Tamil Sangam. April 7, 2006. http://sangam.org/

52

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011) taraki/articles/2006/04-07_War_is_the_ Disease.php?uid=1633.

14 Abul Kalam Azad, Intifada: The New Dimension to Palestinian Struggle (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies,1990), 52.

15 James C. Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review 27, no. 1 (1962) : 136.

16 Ibid, 137.

17 Smith, 292.

18 Beitler, 93.

19 Azad, 64.

20 Smith, 292.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid, 293.

23 Beitler, 90-91.

24 Ibid, 92.

25 Ibid.

26 Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes: Heroworship, and the Heroic in History (New York: F.A. Stokes, 1893), 7.

27 Smith, 296.

28 Ibid, 290 29 Elster, 13.

30 Beitler, 93.

31 Ibid.

32 Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, Intifada: Palestine at the crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990), 20.

33 Hosein Tahmasebbi, “The impact of the Iran-Iraq war on the world oil market,” Energy (Oxford, England) 11 (1986) : 409410.

A Social Movement Theory Approach: Greenpeace Examining the role of Greenpeace in constructing a “Global Civil Society” 1 Princen and Finger; found in Environmental NGOs in World Politics linking the local and the global; Routledge (1994); pg 49-53.

2 Richard Holloway; NGOs: Losing the Moral High Ground – Corruptions Misrepresentation.

3 Thomas Ward; Development, Social Justice, and Civil Society An Introduction to the Political Economy of NGOs; pg 6.

4 Princen and Finger; found in Environmental NGOs in World Politics linking the local and the global; Routledge

(1994); pg 49-53.

5 Fetzer and Soper; found in Muslims and the state in Britain, France, and Germany; Cambridge University Press (2005) pg 111.

6 Larry Herman; POL341H1 Lecture 7.

7 Shrybman; found in “The World Trade Organization: A Citizens Guide to the WTO”; Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (1999); pg 91.

8 Porter, Brown, and Chasek; Global Environmental Politics (third Ed); Westview Press (2000); pg 176-182.

9 Rugman; found in “Corporate Strategy and Environmental Regulations: BaptistBootlegger Coalitions”; Environmental Regulations and Corporate Strategy A NAFTA Perspective; pg 52-71.

10 Clarkson found in Uncle Sam and Us Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State; University of Toronto Press and Woodrow Wilson Press (2002); pg 352.

11 Shaw and Schwartz; found in “Trade and Environment in the WTO: State of Play”; Journal of World Trade (2002).

12 Williams; “The Environmental Social Movement and the World Trade Organization”; International Studies Association 1998.

13 Conca; “The WTO and the Undermining of Global Environmental Governance”; Review of International Political Economy no.

2, (2000).

14 Clarkson found in Uncle Sam and Us Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State; University of Toronto Press and Woodrow Wilson Press (2002); pg 351.

15 Fetzer and Soper; found in Muslims and the state in Britain, France, and Germany; Cambridge University Press (2005) pg 8.

16 Fetzer and Soper; found in Muslims and the state in Britain, France, and Germany; Cambridge University Press (2005) pg 8.

17 Wapner; found in Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics; Suny Press (1996) pg 47-50.

18 Warkentin; found in Reshaping World Politics NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society; Rowman &Littlefield Publishers (2001) pg 66.

19 Warkentin; found in Reshaping World Politics NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society; Rowman &Littlefield Publishers (2001) pg 75.

20 Dale; found in The Greenpeace message and the Media; Between the lines (2001) pg 109.

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011) 21 Bohlen; found in Making Waves The Origins and the Future of Greenpeace; Black Rose Books (2001); pg 112.

22 Dale; found in The Greenpeace message and the Media; Between the lines (2001) pg 9.

23 Warkentin; found in Reshaping World Politics NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society; Rowman &Littlefield Publishers (2001) pg 77.

24 Princen and Finger; Environmental NGOs in World Politics Linking the Local and the Global; Routledge (1994) pg 54.

25 Clarkson; Uncle Sam and Us Globalization Neo-conservatism, and the Canadian State; University of Toronto Press 2002; pg 350.

26 Wiktorowicz; Islamic Activism a Social Movement Theory Approach; Indiana University Press (2004); pg 15.

27 Wiktorowicz; Islamic Activism a Social Movement Theory Approach; Indiana University Press (2004); pg. 15- 19.

28 Wapner; found in Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics; Suny Press (1996) pg 50.

29 Wapner; found in Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics; Suny Press (1996) pg 51.

30 Dale; found in The Greenpeace message and the Media; Between the lines (2001) pg 115.

31 Janet Conway at POL341H1 Lecture 9; November 7, 2006.

32 Dale; found in The Greenpeace message and the Media; Between the lines (2001) pg 127.

33 Dale; found in “Mcluhan’s Children: The Greenpeace Message and the Media; Between the Line (1996) 34 found in Greenpeace 1996 Annual Report: Global Commitment 35 found in UNDP Human Development Report 2006

The 2008 South Ossetian War under International Law 1 Charles King, “The Five Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis. accessed November 30th 2010, at http:// www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/kingch/King_ Five_Day_War.pdf.

2 Borgen, Christopher, J. “The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia” in

Endnotes Chicago Journal of International Law 10, (2009): 16.

3 International Court of Justice, “Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), accessed November 30th 2010, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/140/14657.pdf.

4 C. G. Buys, “Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination” in The American Journal of International Law 103, 2 (2009): 295.

5 International Court of Justice,“ Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination” (Georgia v. Russian Federation), accessed November 30th 2001, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/140/14657.pdf 6 Buys, 296. Also, International Court of Justice, “Preliminary objections of the Russian Federation”, accessed November 30th 2010, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/140/16099.pdf.

7 Buys, 294.

8 Buys., 296.

9 Buys, op. cit., 297.

10 For a summary of the “legal battle” see the International Court of Justice, Press Releases Section. Accessed November 30th 2010, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1= 3&p2=1&k=4d&case=140&code=GR&p3=6.

11 Borgen, “The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics,” 20.

12 Anthony Dworkin is the Head of the Crimes of War Project and editor of the widely published book Crimes of War 2.0: What the Public Should Know, New York: W.W. Norton &Co , 2007. The statement appeared on the official website of the Crimes of War Project, accessed November 30th 2010, at: http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/ news-georgia.html.

13 N.M. Shanahan Cutts, “Enemies Through the Gates: Russian Violations of International Law in the Georgia/Ablhazia Conflict” in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 40 (2008) : 294. For a discussion of the precedent set by the Nicaragua case, see Abram Chayes, “The US, Nicaragua and the World Court” in Columbia Law Review 85, 7 (1985):1445-1482. Full text of the ICJ’s decision See Military and Paramilitary

Activities Nicaragua v. United States, 1968. I.C.J. 14, 108 (June 1986), accessed November 30th 2010, at http://www.icj-cij. org/docket/index.php?sum=367&code=nus &p1=3&p2=3&case=70&k=66&p3=5 14 Cutts, “Enemies Through the Gates,” 294. For the full text of the court’s decision, See : Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, 101, accessed November 30th 2010, at: http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php ?p1=3&p2 =3& code=co&case=116&k=51.

15 Borgen, “The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics,” 18. For the full text of Article 51 of the UN Charter See “Chapter VII: Action With Respect To Treats to toe Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression” , accessed November 30th 2010, at http://www.un.org/en/documents/ charter/chapter7.shtml.

16 Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, “Abkhazia on Three Wheels” in World Policy Institute, (2010): 77. Also, See Cutts, “Enemies Through the Gates”, 290-301, who mentions Russia’s policy of “passportization” during the 1992 – 1993 Georgia- Abkhazia war.

17 Cutts, “Enemies Through the Gates,” 301.

18 Terry McNeil, ”Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” in International Political Science Review 18, 1 “The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention” (1997): 112.

19 Cutts, “Enemies Through the Gates,” 303.

20 Currie, John, Craig Forcese and Valerie Oosterveldt, International Law: Doctrine, Practice and Theory. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007), 454-458.

21 Currie et al, 454-458.

22 Ibid., 454-458.

23 Cooley and Mitchell, “Abkhazia on Three Wheels,” 6.

24 Yale Law School, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, “The Caroline Case”. Accessed November 30th 2010, at http://avalon.law. yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp.

25 Jeremy Farrall, United Nations sanctions under the rule of law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 81.

26 Farral, United Nations sanctions under

53

Endnotes the rule of law, 103.

27 Cutts, “Enemies Through the Gates,” 308.

28 Robert Rosenstock, “The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey” in The American Journal of International Law 65, 5 (1971): 715.

29 Anthony Dworkin is the Head of the Crimes of War Project and editor of the widely published book Crimes of War 2.0: What the Public Should Know, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007. The statement appeared on the official website of the Crimes of War Project, Accessed November 30th 2010, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/ onnews/news-georgia.html 30 Sassoli, Marco and Antoine A.Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1999),, 264 – 265.

31 Sassolli and Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War?, 264 – 267.

32 Independent International Fact Finding Mission, on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, Volume 1, accessed November 30, 2010 at http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html.

33 Independent International Fact Finding Mission.

34 Ibid.

35 Human Rights Watch, “Dying Practice”: Report on the use of Cluster Munitions by

The Attaché Vol. 2 (2011) Russia and Georgia in August 2008, April 14 2009. Accessed November 30, 2010 at http:// www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/04/14/dyingpractice-0.

36 Human Rights Watch, “Up in Flames”: Report on Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia, January 23, 2009. Accessed November 30, 2010 at http://www.hrw.org/ en/reports/2009/01/22/flames-0.

37 Cooley and Mitchell, “Abkhazia on Three Wheels,” 8.

38 Human Rights Watch, “Up in Flames.”

39 Amnesty International, “Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Georgia-Russia Conflict” 2008. Accessed November 30, 2010 at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ EUR04/005/2008/en/d9908665-ab55-11dda4cd-bfa0fdea9647/eur040052008eng.pdf.

40 International Court of Justice, “Jurisdiction”, accessed November 30, 2010 at: http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/ index. php? p1=5.

41 Sassolli and Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War?, 159. For an extensive analysis of the Hague Conventions, See J.B. Scott, The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and 1907 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1909) 42 Bernard L Brown, “The Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian Law of Warfare: Recent Efforts at Codification” in Cornell International Law Journal. 10 (1979): 134-155.

43 Brown, 136.

44 As suggested in a Report by Amnesty International, “Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Georgia-Russia Conflict” 2008, accessed November 30, 2010 at: http://www.amnesty. org/en/library/asset/EUR04/005/2008/en/ d9908665-ab55-11dd-a4cd-bfa0fdea9647/ eur040052008eng.pdf.

45 Organization for European Security and Cooperation, “Information concerning the legal proceedings initiated by Georgia against Russia”, accessed November 30th 2010, at http://www.osce.org/documents/ odihr/2008/10/33948_en.pdf.

46 International Crisis Group, “Russia vs.

Georgia: the Fallout”, August 22, 2008.

Accessed November 30, 2010 at: http://www. crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/caucasus/ georgia/195-russia-vs-georgia-the-fallout. aspx 47 McNeil, Terry. “Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” in International Political Science Review 18, 1 “The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention” (1997): 111.

48 For a good discussion of the “validity” of International Law See: Harold Hongju Koh, “Is International Law Really State Law?” in Harvard Law Review 111, 7 (1998):1824-1861. On the expectations from International law and its perceived relevance, see John Bassett Moore, “Fifty Years of International Law” in Harvard Law Review 50, 3 (1937):395-448.

Hong Kong · Hong Kong · Photograph by Stephen Birarda

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Singapore City 路 Republic of Singapore 路 Photograph by Yisheng Loh

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Hlubok谩 nad Vltavou 路 Czech Republic 路 Photograph by Jane Ye-Won Lee

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stop

To submit an article, to get involved in producing the next issue, or to learn more about the journal, please email theattache@gmail.com or visit the journal’s website at www.theattache.ca.

New York City · Photograph by Sam Sarhang Khanlari