Nicolas Sarkozy The date of July 13, 2008 marked the beginning of a new era for relations between Europe and the Mediterranean region. The 27 member states of the European Union and 16 Mediterranean countries -- including Israel and its neighboring countries -met in Paris at Nicolas Sarkozy’s initiative to approve the launching of a new cooperation framework, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). While this Paris summit signaled both “the return of France to Europe” and the start of the French EU presidency, the extensive media coverage of the impressive gathering of European and Mediterranean government leaders cannot conceal the current tensions among the attending nations or the numerous uncertainties that continue to surround the implementation of the UfM. Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision to renew Euro-Mediterranean relations is supported by the acknowledgment of three factors. The first is the partial failure of the European policy towards Mediterranean countries. The aim of the “Barcelona Process,” also launched with great ceremony, in November 1995, was to develop and deepen political, economic, and cultural ties between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbors. Ultimately, this process was meant to “promote peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean Basin.” Twelve years later, the facts speak for themselves: The Barcelona Process has failed to resolve the various political crises that have assailed the
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et la vision By Frédéric Allemand
basin over the last decade.1 Little progress has been made in improving respect for human rights and political freedom.2 From an economic vantage point, despite the eight partnership agreements entered into force between the EU, its member states, and the Mediterranean countries, the strides made have fallen far short of the goals initially set: The average income gap between the South and North Mediterranean countries remains at 1:5 (US $6,200 per capita in the South vs. approximately US $30,000 in the EU). Only 1 percent of EU foreign direct investment is targeting Mediterranean countries. The second factor is that the Mediterranean region constitutes a traditional zone of influence for France, which is one of its primary investors (on an equal footing with Germany and the Netherlands). Some 170,000 French nationals -- or one-third of the French living abroad in non-OECD countries -- are located in the Mediter1. The Barcelona Process never managed to influence the course taken by the political crises that broke out in the Mediterranean region: the closing of the land border between Morocco and Algeria due to their conflict over the Western Sahara (August 1994), the Algerian Civil War and massacres (1996–1998), the U.S. intervention in Iraq (March 2003) and the Lebanese crisis (summer 2006). 2. European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: "Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners. Strategic guidelines," COM (2003) 294, final version, 21 May 2003.
ranean region. More than half of the 12,500 French overseas military forces are stationed in the Mediterranean Basin or its vicinity (Afghanistan). The UfM also provides France with an opportunity to challenge the growing political, military, and economic influence of the United States over this region. According to Tunisian journalist Wicem Souissi, the sudden introduction of the French UfM proposal in public debate, right in the middle of a presidential election year in the US, is not fortuitous, “Through its EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2008, France is taking advantage of the approaching end of George W. Bush’s term of office -- and thus, of the momentarily dimmed presence of the United States on the international stage -- to act as a superpower.”3 The third and final factor has to do with the fact that the French president is eager to prove that there is no such thing as political fatalism. In an environment in which political leaders are often criticized by the public for being negligent, Nicolas Sarkozy, in his own campaign, has been stressing his belief that nobody knows what the future holds. His view is that the role of the president of the French Republic should not be confined to describing and explaining events, and 3. “L’Union pour la Méditerranée, une Europe sans l’Autre?” Nouvel Observateur, 10 July 2008.