Egyptian anti-government protesters on their way to Cairo’s Tahrir Square. Cairo, Feb 1, 2011
a succession of dictators in Egypt until, in 1979, Egypt made peace with Israel. Since then, despite a lack of true democracy and a poor human rights record, the United States supported Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and his successor, Hosni Mubarak. U.S. policymakers knew that real democracy in Egypt might lead to rule by the Muslim Brotherhood, so as the streets of Cairo filled with youthful pro-democracy protestors, U.S. officials were ambivalent. Many of the protestors looked to the United States for inspiration and political support and found U.S. inaction frustrating. That the tear gas canisters being fired at them by the police were sometimes literally marked “Made in the U.S.A.” did not help. Social media and other modern technologies fueled the revolt; the first protests had been organized in part on a Facebook page, “We Are All Khaled Said,” in honor of a young man who had recently been beaten to death by Egyptian police. If the Vietnam War was the first war televised live, then the Egyptian revolution was the first revolution streamed live. Norfolk Academy’s Spring 2011 International Relations course basically dropped its pre-planned agenda and focused for several weeks on following events in Cairo in virtually real time. With Norfolk six hours behind Cairo, class would often meet just as the day’s protests were winding down. When students asked if the protests would succeed or be crushed, my reply was that it depended on which side the Egyptian Army took. The next day’s class began with the playing of a YouTube video, only several hours old, which clearly showed the army intentionally positioning armored personnel carriers in order to shield protestors from police gunfire. As the protestors threw rocks at the police from behind the protection of the armored vehicles, class discussion turned to what sort of government might replace Mubarak if he eventually fled. The students were understandably optimistic, even giddy, as they watched democracy unfold before their eyes. In May 2012, however, the fears of many of U.S. policymakers were realized when the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Morsi, won election as the next president of Egypt. In neighboring Libya, however, most of its military proved willing to use force. The dictator of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, had made an enemy of the United States decades ago. When protests began in Libya in February 2011, the sympathies of the world were immediately with the protestors. Though in recent years
That the tear gas canisters being fired at them were sometimes literally marked ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ did not help.
Gaddafi had abandoned his weapons of mass destruction programs and rehabilitated his international image to some extent, the world still remembered Gaddafi’s history of sponsoring terrorist attacks against the West. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, led by Britain, France and the United States, provided air cover for the anti-Gaddafi guerrillas, and by September a transitional government had replaced Gaddafi. Few mourned Gaddafi’s death the following month. Libya is a nation of fewer than six million people, however. Its military was weak and Gaddafi had few powerful friends. Syria, on the other hand, has one of the most advanced air defense networks in the Middle East, and its ruler, Bashar Al-Assad, is supported by Russia (among others). Just as the Spring 2011 International Relations class came to be dominated by events in Egypt and Libya, the Spring 2012 class ended up focusing largely on the emerging civil war in Syria (as well as the continuing debt crisis in Europe). While the sympathies of the United States and Europe have never been in doubt in the case of Syria, few military options appear viable. Given Russian support for Syria, even diplomatic action has thus far been glacial. As of this writing, civil war continues unabated in Syria. The United Nations estimates that about 5,000 people were killed in August 2012 alone. Even if the AlAssad regime falls, however, it is unclear what sort of government might replace it. The Al-Assad family are members of the Alawite religious minority; many fear mass sectarian purges by the Sunni-majority guerrillas should the current government fall. Almost a year after Gaddafi’s death, Libya remains unstable as well, as demonstrated by the recent tragic deaths of four Americans in Benghazi. Even in Egypt, it remains unclear how much power the military will allow the newly-elected government to exercise. In short, the Arab world is relearning one of history’s oldest lessons: It is easier to destroy a government than it is to create one. ◆ Dr. David Rezelman, Upper School history and social sciences teacher.
Norfolk Academy magazine
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winter 2012
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